Introducing Madrasa Discourses to the Madrasa

Scholarly Community
A Madrasa Discourses Winter Intensive

Doha, Qatar | December 25-30, 2018

Over the past two years, our project to advance scientific and theological literacy
in Madrasa Discourses has been working with a select group of madrasa graduates
from India and Pakistan. Participants have studied the relationship between history and
epistemology, reconceptualized the Islamic scholarly tradition as a series of intellectual
contestations, and equipped themselves with intellectual tools to engage the cross-
section of science, history, and theology through the lens of "big history." Participants in
the third year of this program are presently engaged in research projects to analyze
moments or conversations in Islamic history with fresh conceptual tools, and to imagine
alternative narratives for the future of Muslim theology in a world characterized by
accelerating change.

This winter intensive will consist of presentations and discussions of research

papers generated through the past two years of the madrasa discourses program. In
addition to student papers, the lead faculty and project leader are also collaborating in a
research project. Each of the four faculty members are advising a group of three or four
students each. Each faculty member will have one day to present his research and the
research of the group in the mornings. The afternoons shall be devoted to small group
discussions on these papers. The purpose of the program is to receive critical feedback
and to sharpen the drafts for a public symposium in the summer and eventually for
publication. A fifth day of the winter intensive will be devoted to teaching and interaction
with students and faculty from the College of Islamic studies, and a sixth day shall be
devoted to field trips. A special presentation on the history and culture of Qatar along
with a conversation on regional politics will orient students prior to the field trip.

Students from the University of Notre Dame will accompany us to observe the
program and participate in dialogue. Their participation greatly enriches the nature of the
conversations and provides a valuable opportunity for cultural exchange. The program
welcomes the participation of the community of teachers and learners at the College of
Islamic Studies. This Reading Packet contains a tentative program schedule (subject to
revision onsite) and working drafts of research papers.
 Day 8:00am- 2:00-Maghrib Evening Readings
11:30pm & Prep
Mon, Dec 24 Arrivals

A.K. Nasir with

Hafiz Abdur Welcome Dinner
Research
Tues, Dec 25 Rehman, Zaid Discussion Emad Shahin; paper drafts
Hassan, and Ebrahim Moosa
Waqar Ahmed

Mahan Mirza
with Maryam Dinner; optional
Wed, Dec 26
Mudassar, M. small group
Research
Shahzad, Discussion meetings;
paper drafts
Waqas Khan, library time;
Tehami Bashar film

Waris Mazhari Dinner; optional

with M. Furqan, small group
Thrs, Dec 27 meetings; Readings
M. Ali, and Discussion library time; about Qatar
Ghulam Rasool
film
Friday prayer
Field Trip, Field Trip, Free time
and dinner Research
Fri, Dec 28 Bin Jelmood
Doha Institute in the city paper drafts
House

Ebrahim Dinner; optional

Moosa with small group
Sat, Dec 29 M. Bilal, Discussion meetings; TBD
Manzar Imam library time;
film

CIS Faculty; MD Faculty Informal dinner in

Sun, Dec 30 Formal Wrap up/ the city;
Conclusion Business Departures Begin
with CIS Mtng
Mon, Dec 31 Departures

-Tea/Coffee breaks at 9:30am and at suitable time in the afternoon.

-Lunch and Zuhr between 11:30 and 2:00pm.
-Asr at regularly scheduled time between
-Program concludes in evening with Maghrib
-Buses leave hotel in the morning at 7:30am and return in the afternoon at 4:30pm.
-Field trips to be arranged
 Table of Contents

Dec 25: Muhammad Ammar Khan Nasir Research Group

English Synopses of Urdu Papers … … … … … … … 3

Muhammad Ammar Khan Nasir: Non-Muslims under Muslim Rule: Theological
ontext of Dar ul Islam and Modern Nation State … … … … … … 9
Zaid Hassan: The Correlation between Divine Law and Evolving Human Societies … 18
Waqar Ahmad: The Universal and Contingent Aspects of Hudud Punishments … … 27
Hafiz Abdur Rahman: The Question of Literal/Metaphorical Interpretation … … 39

Dec 26: Mahan Hussain Mirza Research Group

Mahan Mirza: Egalitarian Turn as Copernican Revolution … … … … 56

English Synopses of Urdu Papers… … … … … … … … 83
Muhammad Shahzad: Deobani Scholars’ Reception of the Theory of Evolution … … 90
Waqas Ahmad: The Challenges to World Religions by Big History … … … 101
Muhammad Tihami Bashar: A Critical Appraisal of Theological Discourses in an Age of Science 113
Maryam Mudassar: Ambiguities in the Ethics of Intelligence Enhancement … … 135

Dec 27: Waris Mateen Mazhari Research Group

English Synopsis of Urdu Paper … … … … … … … … 154

Waris Mazhari: Qur’anic Hermeneutics: Is Reconciliation Possible between Tradition and Modern
Trends? … … … … … … … … … … … 156
Mohammad Ali: Debating Muhammad: Ahmad Raza Khan and the Idea of Devotional Islam 169
Mohammad Furqan: Human Dignity as the Foundation of Human Rights in Islam … 172
Ghulam Rasoon Dehlvi: Blasphemy and the Hanafi Jurisprudence … … … 181

Dec 28: Field Trips and Friday Prayers ... … … … … … 193

Dec 29: Ebrahim Moosa Research Group

Ebrahim Moosa: Being and Knowing in an Age of Contingency … … … … 215

English Synopsis of Urdu Paper … … … … … … … … 262
Muhammad Bilal: The Role of Historical Perspectives in Quranic Exegesis … … 263
Manzar Imam: The Genealogy of Freedom in Islam: Contemporary Challenges and Conflicts 272

Dec 30: College of Islamic Studies Panel and Program Conclusion

 The Correlation between Divine Law and Evolving Human Societies:
A Study of Shah Waliuallah’s Views
Zaid Hassan

This paper focuses on studying the views of the prominent 18th century scholar of India, Shah Wali Allah
regarding the correlation between the divinely revealed law and ever-evolving human societies. These view
are basically expounded in his seminal work on Islamic theology, Hujjatullah al-Balighah. The main
features of his socio-religious theory are as follows:
1. Shah Wali Allah identifies four stages for the development of a cultured society. He gives them the
name of irtifaqat. The first or primary level of social development (iritifq) is an essential
characteristic of small social groups like those of nomadic people and the dwellers of remote and
far-flung areas such as mountain peaks. These lands are geographically distant from the main
centers of civilization and culture. The second stage of social development (irtifaq) is attained by
the people who live in urban areas and civilized cities. The experience of their inhabitants is
diversified, and a large number of social practices are developed. In the course of time, these
practices become permanent social customs and form part of the collective social behavior of the
individuals. The achievement of the second stage of social development (irtifaq) to its point of
culmination leads as a natural consequence to the third stage, the stage in which a human society
needs the agency of government in order to resolve their disputes, administer their affairs on the
basis of equity and justice, and deter those who commit contravention of social rules and cultural
norms. Again, this third stage of social development (irtifaq) leads to yet another stage, the fourth
stage. This comes about when different rulers engage in mutual quarrel, even fighting. In this state
of affairs, people feel compelled to establish the office of a superior authority, khalifah who, by
uniting all the warring rulers under his authority, founds an empire..
2. Shah Waliullah explains prophecy and revelation of divine laws as a process of reform. According
to Shah Wali Allah, the Prophetic reform consists mainly in the revival of latent potentialities of
the members of the society. Various communities received different sets of Divine commandments
and injunctions as per the the conditions and circumstances in which they lived. The social, cultural
and psychological conditions of those societies provided the underlying considerations for these
injunctions. Each community was charged only with those obligations which already had a basis in
their consciousness as something worthwhile and valuable. No Prophetic dispensation introduces
any reform in a society which brings in its wake an idea or precept which is completely foreign to
that society or is totally inconsistent with its religious consciousness. On the contrary, the Divine
practice in reforming a society had been to appeal to the religious imagination of people with
reference to the ideas preserved in their collective genius. These ideas served as the common
premises for intellectual interaction between a Prophet and his community. The prophets examined
the laws in practice. They retained most of them and reformed only those that had lost their aspect
of human good due to changes in social practice.
3. Shah Waliullah is of the view that most of injunctions in the Sharia that Prophet Muhammad PBUH
taught in the seventh century Arabia were based on customs, conventions that were common
between Arabs and non-Arabs as well as between the rest of the inhabitants of the balanced areas.
He cites as example the habit of mourning over the dead, pride over one's lineage and prestige,
sleeping after lapse of one third or a quarter of the night and awakening at dawn, and similar other
 customs. These customs, according to him, were most worthy of being taken into consideration
while formulating the Sharia. After that, there were customs and beliefs that were confined to the
people to whom a Prophet was sent. These customs and beliefs were also taken into consideration
and form a part of the Sharia handed down to the coming generations of believers.
4. The aforementioned discussion raises an interesting question: how are we to understand the
universality of Sharia that originally catered to the specific tastes and cultural tendencies of the
Arabs in the context of ever-changing social realities? Should they be taken as a changeable
component of the divine law in the same way as different sets of divine injunctions brought by
different prophets at certain periods of human history were binding on those specific communities
only? If otherwise, then wouldn’t it be tantamount to fossilizing human experience in the norms
and conventions that are deeply embedded in the culture of seventh century Arabia? This paper
tries to unfold some of the complexities and theological challenges involved in this debate.
 The Universal and Contingent Aspects of Hudud Punishments:
Mawlana Ubaidullah Sindhi’s Views
Waqar Ahmad

Mawlana Ubaidullah Sindhi was a prominent modernist thinker of India in the early/mid 19th century.
Among the orthodox circles of religious thought, Sindhi is known, and criticized, for his radically
unorthodox view on a number of issues. This paper intends to weave together a comprehensive philosophy
regarding the nature of hudud punishments from from Sindhi’s writings.
The classical Islamic law divides the crimes in two categories: hadd and tazir. The punishments fixed in
the Quran and hadith for crimes are called hudud and considered to be against the rights of God. The six
crimes for which punishments are fixed are theft (amputation of the hand), illicit sexual relations (death by
stoning or one hundred lashes), making unproven accusations of illicit sex (eighty lashes), drinking
intoxicants (eighty lashes), apostasy (death or banishment), and highway robbery (death). Punishment for
all other crimes is left to the discretion of the court; these punishments are called tazir.
In this regard, Mawlana Sindhi’s views can be summarized in the following points:
1. Hudud punishments are applicable only to habitual offenders whose behavior defies all attempts of
reform. Hence, occasional offenders who show evidence of being capable of reform are not liable
to hudud punishments. In the same way, the culprit must be cognizant of the severity of the
punishment that his act would incur. If he were ignorant of it, then he will be exempted from hadd
punishment.
2. Hudud punishments are to be implemented in extreme cases of committing a crime where the court
sees that the severity of crime has crossed all limits and no mitigating factors are involved. In cases
of lesser degrees of crime, only lesser punishments will be justifiable.
3. The socio-economic conditions surrounding the crime as well as the personal situation of the culprit
will be taken into consideration while adjudicating the case. Thus, the nisab for the application of
the had of theft will be determined keeping in view the level of prosperity that a society enjoys at
that time and might vary from time to time and place to place.
4. Sindhi is of the view that although the hudud punishments were most appropriate to the historical
and social circumstances in which they were revealed, they were not supposed to be everlasting and
omnipresent in their relevance and application. Hence, changing social conditions would require
substituting these punishments with more appropriate penalties that could best achieve the
fundamental purposes of the law.
 The Question of Literal/Metaphorical Interpretation
of Scriptures in Islamic Theology
Hafiz Abdur Rahman

Questions related to the literal or metaphorical interpretation of a text are one of foci of hermeneutical
discussions. Muslim exegetes, jurists and theologian were all equally concerned with this question and tried
to formulate demarcating principles between the texts that lend themselves to metaphorical interpretation
and the ones that do not. The most profound implications of this debate, however, were manifested in Ilm
al Kalam where contending theological considerations gave birth to multiple approaches which gradually
became identified with particular kalami schools of thought. This paper focuses on describing the
viewpoints that represent different mainstream schools in Islamic theology such as muhaddithun,
Mu’tazalites, Ash’arites and Maturidis.
At the center of theological controversies among these schools was the phenomenon of attributing
anthropomorphic qualities and properties to the person of God in most of the verses and prophetic traditions.
Apparently, this contradicted some other verses that testify to the transcendent nature of God as well as the
commonsense view that corporeality or spatiotemporal qualities were incompatible with the concept of
Perfect Being and, therefore, ipso facto unattributable to God. The problem gave rise to the fundamental
question of how to resolve contradiction between reason and the revealed text. The theological response in
Islamic tradition came in the form of a number of approaches which are summarized below:
1. Muhaddisun insisted that the apparent meaning of a text must be abided by unless there were clear
indications within the text that the words were used figuratively. They argued that allowing the text
to be interpretted metaphorically because of some extra-textual considerations will erode the
authority of the text and make it open for all kinds of exoteric interpretations which were by no
means intended by the author.
2. Mutakallimun, notwithstanding myriad internal differences, accepted, rather recommended an
additional reason for abandoning the apparent of the text. They said that if there arose an
unresolvable contradiction between what come to know by using our reason and what is revealed
in a divine text, then it was obligatory to interpret the text non-literally. They argued that belief in
revelation was itself based on proofs furnished by reason; and falsifying any reason-based
knowledge will eliminate the very basis on which belief in the truth of revelation rest. Therefore,
the only logical possibility in such cases would be to leave the apparent meaning in favor of a non-
literal, figurative one.
3. Muslim philosophers like Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes held that Scriptures have two distinct
layers of textual meaning which they call the “outer” (ẓâhir) and the “inner” (bāṭin) senses. They
thought that the outer layer was meant for the ordinary folk while having access to the inner layer
was a prerogative of intellectually trained people, i.e philosophers. According to them, it was
important to keep philosophical interpretations (i.e. true insights alluded to by the text) away from
average people as it was their duty to have faith in the apparent [ẓāhir] sense. Thus, Averroes
criticizes allegorical interpretation as an allowable mode of scriptural interpretation for the average
person as it will lead them to confusion and possible apostasy.
 Non-Muslims under Muslim Rule:
Theological Debates in the context of
Dar ul Islam and Modern Nation State
Muhammad Ammar Khan Nasir

The issue of citizenship of non-Muslims residing in a Muslim country holds a special place in contemporary
debates on political theology.
Traditionally, Islamic law granted non-Muslims opting for a permanent residence in Islamic lands the
special status of dhimmis. The covenant of dhimma entailed paying a poll-tax called jizyah which signified
the dhimmis’ political allegiance to Islamic rule. The dhimma ensured the protection of their life, property,
and religion, etc. as well as exemption from military service. Volunteering for military service was
compensated with the calling off of jizyah. However, their civil rights fully protected, treating them as
unequal with Muslims in legal matters was the grundnorm of classical Islamic law. Hence, courts would
not entertain a non-Muslim’s testimony against a Muslim in a legal dispute; the law of qisas was not
applicable in case a Muslim murdered a non-Muslim according the majority opinion of Musim jurists
(Hanafis disagreed, though); and their holding a public office that involved exercising authority over
Muslim subjects was considered to be violating the principle of ‘‫( ’اﻻٕﺳﻼم ﯾﻌﻠﻮ وﻻ ﯾﻌﲆ‬Islam has to be dominant and
not to be dominated).
Historically, the conduct of Muslim polity regarding the status and rights of non-Muslims living under
Muslim rule has varied from a policy of moderate inclusion to that of outright exclusion. Up to the middle
of the nineteenth century, it had been fundamentally a question of political discretion and expediency, a
tolerant attitude governing the political conduct at times and a hostile one taking over at others. The
variations stemmed from the differences in historical and socio-political conditions that prevailed at a
certain time period.
The paper provides background information on the concept of dhimma in classical political thought and
reflects on critical questions such as: how we think of governance in the modern world, compared to
governance in the pre-modern world; what does governance mean in a country with a diversity of religions;
what can be the justification of laws in country with citizenship; what is the possible relationship of
citizenship to religion; and most importantly, the view of the 'other' (ghayr) as a person or human person
according to a contemporary Muslim theology. The ambiguities and confusions that are involved it this
debate have also been brought to the fore.
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 Egalitarian Turn as Copernican Revolution:
Theorizing Continuity and Change in Islamic Theology and Law

Research Paper for Madrasa Discourses

Mahan Mirza
University of Notre Dame

Dec 7, 2018

Tradition is dangerous to the intellect which does not know how to love it, for it
can weigh heavily on weak heads. To accept it is to borrow trouble, for it heaves
with controversies and unanswered questions. It has been said that to inherit the
tradition of democracy is like inheriting a lawsuit, and this goes for tradition in
general. But tradition is most dangerous, and most troublesome, when it is
forgotten. It gives strength as well as takes it. It brings life as well as threatens it.
It is life fighting to maintain itself in time. For there is the curious fact that
tradition is never so healthy as when it is being fought. We deny its authority,
but in doing so we use its clearest terms; and end, if we are original, in enriching
it so that it may have strength for future wars. It is orthodoxy at its best, thriving
on heresies which it digests into nobler problems. We return to tradition not for
answers, but for questions, and some of those we find capable, like live wires, of
shocking us into a condition of dizziness or extreme heat. It is dangerous, and it
is to be feared. But it fears us as well. The hope of education is to reconcile the
two strengths. 1

Observation is theory laden. While this is perhaps the most spiritual of maxims that
derives from the philosophy of science, it is also the most subversive. It tells us that while we
might consider our observations to be objective and even certain, they are actually conditioned
by our expectations. The history of science suggests that both the theories and methods of
science change over time. This means that not only does the way in which we describe and study
the world change, the line of demarcation between valid and invalid knowledge also shifts. The
line is drawn by a community of scholars, each of whom is authorized by knowledge produced
and transmitted in credible institutions of learning. The scholars are called “scientists” when it
comes to the tradition of modern science, and they are called ʿulamāʾ when it comes to the
interpretation of God’s words in Islam.
How does one find certainty in faith and in the religious systems that stem from human
acts of interpreting scripture when we know that all knowledge is liable to error? The variety of
contending religious convictions that history has produced only compounds the problem. No

1
Mark van Doren, Liberal Education, 119-120.

1
doubt, our very “knowing” of even this one thing—that all knowledge is liable to error—is an
apparent contradiction, one that Descartes and al-Ghazali did their best to resolve in their own
ways. 2 Both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of history have attempted to work
through questions of epistemology, and these disciplines, I argue, must find their place at the
foundation of Islamic theology today. Epistemological questions in history and science lie at the
heart of theology just as philosophy was the cornerstone of classical theology. Theology and
philosophy are thus destined to tango forever.
The claim that theology and philosophy are entangled rests on the following historical
observation: philosophy was at the heart of the tradition of dialectical or rational theology (ʿilm
al-kalām) in Islamic intellectual history. Those who challenged rational philosophy—whether
wholly in method as did Ibn Taymiyya, or partially in some of its conclusions as did al-
Ghazali—were condemned to do so only on its own terms. 3 Giants like al-Biruni or Mulla Sadra
may have certainly challenged conventional wisdom, but they developed alternative conceptions
of the natural order only through parallel modes of speculation anchored in the natural
philosophy and the exact sciences of their time, whose terms and modes of inquiry were set by
the ancient Greeks. 4 Others, like Ibn ʿArabi, may have succeeded in avoiding systematic
engagement with natural philosophy, but they too wound up employing patterns of thought and
reasoning from the very same intellectual milieu, however ingenious their respective creative
formulations. 5
What I am saying is that there were limits to the intellectual horizons of our forebears.
These intellectual limits were set by, quite literally, the cosmic horizon of the time. This paper
advances an argument in favor of the following proposition: the theology of a community must
shift with the cosmic horizons of its time if it is to remain a vibrant force that animates
faith and supports civilization. Three parts structure the argument: 1) Part I surveys apparently
intractable problems in Islamic thought that continue to plague contemporary scholars. This
section identifies a “crisis” in contemporary Muslim thought that has been ongoing since the

2
Mohammad Alwahaib, “A-Ghazali and Descartes from Doubt to Certainty.”
3
Abdurrahman Mihrig, “The Myth of Intellectual Decline.”
4
See, for example: Franz Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam; Dimitri Gutas: Greek Thought, Arab Culture;
Alessandro Bausani, “Anti-Aristotian Controversy between al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Sīnā”; Ibrahim Kalin, Mullā Sadrā.
5
Franz Roshental, “Ibn ʿArabī between ‘Philosophy’ and ‘Mysticism’.”

2
advent of modernity. The failure to clearly and systematically advance the conversation results
from an inability to recognize the theological roots of the crisis. 2) Part II explains what I mean
by the term “horizon,” which I often quality with words like “cosmic,” “cultural,” or
“intellectual.” This section draws on the history of science to identify a fundamental shift in our
intellectual horizon ushered in by modern science that has deep consequences for Islamic
religious thought across the board. New connections between history, science, and theology have
the potential of radically transforming the manner in which religious thought is constructed in
our age. 3) Part III draws on conceptual tools from the philosophy of science to theorize the
notion of continuity and change in tradition. I argue here that there is a way to authentically
imagine new formulations of religious thought as being in continuity with the past, even though
these new formulations appear to be very different from what has come before. 4) Part IV
concludes with some reflections on open theological questions to ponder for the future.
Throughout this essay, I will rely on concepts from the philosophy of science to help theorize
continuity and change in Islamic theology and law, two disciplines that I treat as coimbricated
through the term “theolegal.” 6

PART I: CRISIS IN THOUGHT

Arguably, by the middle of the twentieth century the Sharīʿa had been reduced
to a fragment of itself at best and, at worst, structurally speaking, a nonentity. 7

The sharia prescribes the public stoning of adulterers, cutting off the hands of theieves,
and the ownership of slaves. The sharia also permits a Muslim man to marry multiple women at
the same time, sexual relations with concubines in addition to one’s wives, and the physical
disciplining of wives if they are disobedient. Although many of these practices no longer exist,
some do, and all are theoretically still on the books. Since God and His messenger know best,
argue some believers, who are we to outlaw that which God has ordained? The Quran says: “And
it is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when God and His Messenger have decreed a
matter, to have a choice regarding the matter. Whosoever disobeys God and His Messenger has

6
The term “theolegal” has been used in the title of a book on political theology: Whose God Rules? Is the United
States a Secular Nation or a Theolegal Democracy. I discovered this after having independently thought of the term
in the process of writing this essay. My use of the term has not been influenced by that work, which I have not
consulted for this essay.
7
Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 500.

3
strayed into manifest error.” 8 The inability to consider aspects of the sharia deemed unsavory
today as being categorically obsolete, albeit practically defunct, has resulted in a crisis: how are
God’s teaching universal for all societies through history if they no longer seem right for us
today?
It is a travesty to reduce the sharia to a mere penal code, but it is helpful to begin here in
order to clarify the problem. Even the Swiss-born Muslim intellectual Tariq Ramadan was
unable to move the conversation forward: “The majority of the ulamâ’, historically and today,
are of the opinion that these penalties are on the whole Islamic but that the conditions under
which they should be implemented are nearly impossible to reestablish. These penalties,
therefore, are ‘almost never applicable’.” 9 He therefore calls for an international moratorium on
applying the sharia in its unsavory forms until we are able to find theoretical clarity. 10 The quest
for theoretical clarity to bring the sharia into harmony with contemporary sensibilities has been
the story of Muslim thought for over a century. Among the many to write the history of that story
is Wael Hallaq. The penultimate chapter of his encyclopedic Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice,
Transformations is titled “In search of a legal methodology.” 11 In this chapter Hallaq discusses
the reform efforts of no less than ten thinkers spanning the Muslim world and in diaspora from
east to west, placing them in sequence on an ideological spectrum, with the following
conclusion: “The differences as well as the intersecting similarities between and among all these
thinkers not only defy neat classification but at once also affirm their failure to provide
indigenous solutions to the epistemic havoc wrought by modernity.” 12
The idea of crisis in a knowledge tradition was theorized by the historian and philosopher
of science, Thomas Kuhn, in his now classic Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 13 Kuhn explains
that science operates in “normal” modes as a puzzle-solving activity in which observations are
made and experiments are designed within certain preconceived notions of how the universe
works. A new discovery or observation that fails to fit neatly into an existing theory is called an

8
Q. 33:36. All translations are from The Study Quran.
9
Tariq Ramadan, “An International call for Moratorium on corporal punishment.”
10
For a critical analysis of Tariq Ramadan’s position, see the relevant section in Abou El Fadl’s Reasoning with
God, 291ff.
11
Hallaq, Sharīʿa, Chapter 17, 500-542.
12
Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 542.
13
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

4
anomaly. Anomalies are treated like pieces of a puzzle; we know they are supposed to fit
somewhere in the picture that we are trying to complete, even though we don’t immediately
know where. The accumulation of anomalies to the point that scientists begin to suspect the
picture might be different from the one they imagined results in a crisis—and work begins
outside the “paradigm” of normal science, spawning all kinds of speculations and fresh
hypothesis on what the actual picture might be in which the anomalous pieces, along with all the
previously known pieces of the puzzle, would find their proper place. Eventually, a “paradigm
shift” occurs when the community of scientists agree on a new overall picture of reality, and the
process of normal science begins afresh. This scheme of normal science-anomalies-crisis-
paradigm shift helps us understand what may be happening in the Islamic intellectual tradition.
In times of crises, institutions have no choice but to continue to form new scholars using
the very same paradigm that is undergoing the crisis. Newton, for example, was trained in the
scholastic paradigms of ancient philosophy with its essentialist, axiomatic, teleological,
deductive mode of reasoning. 14 It is, thus, no surprise, that the madrasas in the Muslim world
continue to use traditional books while the discerning members of their ranks independently
experiment with new formulations of religious thought in their attempts to discover some kind of
resolution to the crisis posed by modern rationality.
Although Hallaq identifies the crisis in the legal tradition, he does not altogether miss the
theological underpinnings of the “epistemic havoc” that Muslim scholars have been attempting
to remedy. Legal hermeneutics (uṣūl al-fiqh) are predicated on the theological position that law
and doctrine are to be derived from a systematic reading of scriptural texts. Indications (dalālāt)
embedded within revelation, read through strict rules of grammar and rhetoric in historical
context, are the primary guide to divine will. Any speculation into how God truly intends we
ought to live derived without reference to revelation would be ultimately baseless. Behind this
theological position lies the philosophical supposition that human reason is incapable of arriving
at ethical or legal norms independent of revelation in matters on which the texts have explicitly
or implicitly spoken. 15 “At best, then,” summarizes Hallaq, “the human mind is a tool that

14
George Smith, “Isaac Newton.”
15
The philosophical school (falāsifa) and some theological schools like the Muʿtazila dissented from this position,
as did more esoteric movements in Islam such as the Ismailis. This paper focuses on the traditionalist schools of
Sunni law and theology. Although the critique presented in this paper may transfer in some instances to other
schools of thought, it would require a broader analysis than the one undertaken here.

5
deciphers textual meanings within social contexts, but does not independently produce meanings
of its own.” 16
The contemporary scholar of the Islamic legal tradition, Kecia Ali, also works her way
out from fiqh to theology. In analyzing competing approaches to reform in issues of marriage and
divorce laws, for example, she concludes that even feminists fall into the very same hermeneutic
trap that renders resolutions to the crisis impossible when they try to reinterpret scripture
piecemeal: therefore, she concludes, “a new jurisprudence is required.” 17 This is because
particular legal rulings are embedded in a complex web of assumptions on the nature of men and
women within an entire “system of spousal rights and obligations.” 18 In this system, the legal
definition of marriage essentially consists of the transference of rights over access to a woman’s
reproductive capacity in exchange for dowry. 19 For Ali, this structural foundation pervades all
aspects of the law—redefining dowry as “financial security” is not merely historically
inaccurate, it also perpetuates the structural disparity by presuming women to be economically
inferior or disadvantaged from the outset, thereby merely shifting the problem from one place to
another. “The early and classical Muslim jurists had a clear logical system underpinning their
conception of marriage and the interdependent rights of spouses within it…The system was
predicated, at a very basic logical level, on an analogy to slavery and other types of
ownership.” 20 Ali acknowledges that this description likely bears little or no resemblance to the
lived experiences of a majority of Muslim women today. Nonetheless, “it served as a basis for
the elaboration of many different rules that are unintelligible if removed from this framework”. 21
Like Hallaq, however, Ali’s critique of legal reform leads straight to theology. One
window into theology opens up through historicism: “The system is the result of an
interpretation, indeed of numerous acts of interpretation, by particular men living and thinking at
a specific time.” 22 And another window into theology opens up by acknowledging competing

16
Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 503.
17
Kecia Ali, “Progressive Muslims and Islamic Jurisprudence,” 166.
18
Ali, Progressive Muslims, 166.
19
Ali, Progressive Muslims, 177-8.
20
Ali, Progressive Muslims, 180.
21
Ali, Progressive Muslims, 180.
22
Ali, Progressive Muslims, 182.

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value commitments that exist prior to the act of interpretation: patriarchy. Whereas the classical
tradition developed in a world of patriarchy, it must now be refashioned in a world that aspires to
egalitarianism. Ali believes that a new jurisprudence governed by egalitarianism between the
genders is very much possible by new and fresh acts of interpretation that take the values of our
own time seriously: “Qualified Muslims must begin to shape new laws, beginning from new
assumptions”. 23 Most interestingly, instead of having these new assumptions parachuted down
from modernity, Ali finds them within the same corpus of scriptural texts. She concludes her
argument with the following suggestion:
A marriage law that foregrounds the mutual protectorship of men and women
(Q. 9:71) rather than male providership (Q. 4:34), or that focuses on the
cooperation and harmony of spouses inherent in the Qur’anic declaration that
spouses are garments for one another (Q. 2:187), can represent a starting point
for a new jurisprudence of marriage. The result will be a closer–but still only
human, and therefore fallible – approximation of divinely revealed Shari‘ah than
what currently exists. And God knows best. 24

There are many interesting points to note here. First, Ali seems to accept the notion of
“progress” in Islamic thought. Two, she ties herself to a fallibilist epistemology. And three, she
believes that the “new assumptions” that are to form the starting point for “new laws” are
themselves to be found in the same scriptural texts. One is compelled to ask: if the “particular
men, living in a specific time” came up with a version of the law that we do not consider a good
approximation of divine will today, what makes us expect that particular people living in our
particular moment of modernity can come up a better approximation of divine will? To ponder
these questions of fallibilism, progress, subjective values, and our relationship to tradition that
was founded on values that are apparently incommensurable with our own, we turn to the history
and philosophy of science.

PART II: SHIFTING HORIZONS

The main problem faced by Muslim scholars when balancing traditional
concerns with contemporary ones is the fundamentally incompatible nature of
patriarchal and egalitarian cosmologies. 25

23
Ali, Progressive Muslims, 182.
24
Ali, Progressive Muslims, 183.
25
Ayesha Chaudhry, Domestic Violence and the Islamic Tradition, 136.

7
 Is nature ordered or random? Is the order of the universe egalitarian or hierarchical? Does
God’s command align with an egalitarian or hierarchical world? Are women and men to be
treated socially equal? If our interpretation of scripture depends on our commitments prior to
scripture vis-à-vis these questions, then how are these commitments generated, and how are they
justified? The locus of the crisis in Islamic thought lies precisely here, which I will henceforth
characterize as the theolegal. In order to understand how we got here, we need to peer through
the two windows of historicism and egalitarianism opened up by Kecia Ali in the previous
section of this paper. The scientific gaze of historicism and the humanist value of egalitarianism
generate seismic shifts in the theolegal sphere. Classical doctrine narrates that the prophet
Muhammad was the last of God’s messengers to humanity. The norms of seventh century Arabia
have thus been universalized through the sharia as applicable for all time and place in future
human history until the end of time. A number of legal devices, juridical maxims, and higher
order objectives have allowed the scholarly tradition to make room for reasonable
accommodations wherever tensions arose between the teachings of the sharia and the lived
experiences of any society through the ages. Mohammad Fadel argues, for example, that an
overlapping consensus between traditional Islam and liberal citizenship is possible with
minimalist conceptions of each. 26
Ingenious methods may in fact enable us to develop an overlapping consensus, but
historicism argues that such scholarly gymnastics are unnecessary. The tradition of scholarly
interpretation that guards revelation is anchored in the sensibilities of Near Eastern culture. 27 In
fact, revelation itself speaks in words and concepts that would have been comprehensible to the
people of that time. Even if it were to be accepted that God knows everything, God must speak
using concepts and terms that His audience in history would readily understand. Revelation is
thus de facto constrained by history and culture. As recently as the late twentieth century, serious
scholars have continued to argue using both reason and revelation that the sun revolves around
the earth while the earth stands still.28 Although this statement remains true from the perspective
of human observation and experience, why would revelation seem to adopt this view if it does

26
Andrew March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship; Mohammad Fadel, “Is Historicism a Viable Strategy for Islamic
Law Reform?”
27
Hina Azam, Sexual Violation in Islamic Law.
28
Ibn Bāz, Al-Adilla al-naqliyya waʾl-ḥiṣṣiyya.

8
not represent objective reality that describes how things “really are”? If scripture speaks from
human perspective about the heavens, why should we assume that it speaks from an objective
perspective about social culture? This is a vexing question for the theolegal, and one that
traditional scholars have been unwilling to take seriously because of its potential to completely
unravel the traditionalist worldview.
Some historicist interpreters try to isolate scripture or revelation per se from the tradition
of scholarly interpretation that developed in history. The school of tafsīr ʿilmī that argues in
favor of scientific miracles in the Quran, for example, is part of this camp of interpreters. 29 This
school argues that it is only fallible humans who misunderstand scripture from time-to-time
because of the limits of their own intellectual “horizons.” The Quran, being God’s word, has no
such limits. Consequently, anything we discover to be true in modern science would have
already been known to God, allowing us to re-read scripture in light of our new knowledge. If
the scientific horizon of a culture was geocentric, that culture would interpret God’s word
according to the limits of their own horizon, not the limits of revelation. Similarly, if the cultural
horizon was patriarchal, the argument goes, we should re-read scripture through our own—and
pace Kecia Ali, truer—horizon of egalitarianism. In this sense, those who try to read
egalitarianism in the Quran are merely the epistemological analogues in the domain of culture to
the tafsīr ʿilmī school in the domain of science.
The Quran proclaims: “We will show them Our signs upon the horizons and within
themselves till becomes clear to them that it is the truth. Does it not suffice that thy Lord is
Witness over all things?”30 This is where the discussion above connects with the theologal. The
Quran invites us to look into nature in order to confirm its very truth. So what is nature telling
us? If we trust science, we learn that humans evolved from simpler forms of life, our atoms
fashioned in the crucible of giant exploding stars from the same bits of matter and energy that
makes up the rest of the universe. This new “creation myth” 31 decenters our story on planet earth
within the broader cosmic story of the universe. 32 While there are virtually infinite points of

29
Nidhal Guessoum discusses the tafsīr ʿilmī school of thought at length in Islam’s Quantum Question.
30
Q. 41:53.
31
David Christian in Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History.
32
One example of an effort to recenter humanity in light of our new scientific cosmology is Primack and Abrams,
The View from the Center of the Universe.

9
entry into this story for theology, there are two points worth highlighting in the context of our
present discussion: 1) we are new kids on the block: if the history of the universe could be
written in twenty-four hours, we arrived in the last few seconds; if it could be written in one year,
we arrived in the late afternoon of Dec 31; 33 if it could be written in a thirty volume
encyclopedia, each of roughly four hundred pages, our first mention occurs on the last page of
the last volume. 34 2) Islam is the last of the major world religions to appear in history, just after
what Carl Jaspers calls the Axial Age, a world whose daily and annual rhythms were propelled
by seasonal trade, nomads in search of pasture, and the cycles of agriculture. 35
The universe of that world was heterogeneous, divided into celestial and terrestrial
realms, each with its own elements and laws. The natural elements mapped onto the humors of
the body, the immaterial soul on earth was connected to the celestial realm in the heavens, the
stars influenced events on earth and fashioned temperaments, and substances existed as fixed
essences to which temporal, material, and spatial accidents attached. Virtue stemmed from
human effort to balance different faculties of the soul. Islamic thought borrowed heavily from
these views of the natural world, departing in some ways, adapting in others, to fashion the
classical scholarly tradition. Medicine, astronomy, physics, theology, epistemology, and
metaphysics formed a single coherent worldview: unraveling one strand threatened to unravel the
entire fabric. 36
That worldview formed the intellectual horizon of the classical tradition. It had cosmic
limits: at the edge of the universe resided the sphere of fixed stars, visible to the naked eye, the
origin of all motion that cascaded through the celestial spheres animating all existence on earth.
Take a minute to compare that universe to ours. In our universe today, there is no sphere of fixed
stars. The universe is homogeneous, infinite, expanding. The same laws and elements are found
in the heavens as on earth. Space and time, matter and energy, are merely different forms of one
other, all fluid or congealed states of the very same light—a particle-wave duality substance that

33
The 2014 TV documentary series Cosmos: A Spacetime Odyssey hosted by Neil deGrasse Tyson presents the
history of the cosmos mapped onto a twelve-month calendar year. Also see a representation of the geological
timescale of earth condensed to a twenty-four hour period at an educational site hosted by Northern Arizona
University, http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/lrm22/lessons/timeline/24_hours.html.
34
John Haught opens with this encyclopedia analogy in his Science and Faith.
35
Marshal Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. 1, 112-113.
36
An excellent introductory text on scientific worldviews and their transitions is by Richard DeWitt, Worldviews.

10
itself may be constituted of vibrating strings fluctuating in up to eleven dimensions—that is the
foundation of all being. Even “mind,” previously thought to be a separate and immaterial
substance, may be something that merely “emerges” from complex systems of interacting matter
and energy. 37 There are no essences, there is no discernable teleology, and there is neither a fixed
hierarchy nor egalitarianism. There is only evolution.
The historian and philosopher of science Richard DeWitt provides metaphors for
different cosmological worldviews in Western thought: the ancients viewed the world as a living
organism; in the period of Newton and Descartes, the universe is more like a machine. But what
about the contemporary period? “It is easy to understand the appeal and usefulness of such
metaphors, in that they provide a convenient and simple way of summarizing the overall view of
what the universe is like. But one intriguing feature of recent discoveries is this: the universe
they suggest is not like anything we have ever experienced…For the first time in (at least
recorded) history, we may be metaphorless.” 38 The historian R. G. Collingwood gives us a
similar periodization: “In the history of European thought, there have been three periods of
cosmological thinking.” 39 The Greek world of nature “is not only alive but intelligent; not only a
vast animal with a ‘soul’ or life of its own, but a rational animal with a ‘mind’ of its own.” 40 In
the second, which Collingwood calls the Renaissance view of nature, “Instead of being an
organism, the natural world is a machine…The Renaissance thinkers, like the Greeks, saw in the
orderliness of the natural world an expression of intelligence”. 41
Unlike DeWitt, however, Collingwood finds a workable analogy for our contemporary
period: “As Greek natural science was based on the analogy between the macrocosm nature and
the microcosm man…; as Renaissance natural science was based on the analogy between nature
as God’s handiwork and the machines that are the handiwork of man…; so the modern view of
nature…is based on the analogy between the processes of the natural world as studied by natural
scientists and the vicissitudes of human affairs as studied by historians.” 42 The shift is a

37
Philip Clayton, Mind & Emergence.
38
DeWitt, Worldviews, 347-348.
39
R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, 1.
40
Collingwood, Idea of Nature, 3.
41
Collingwood, Idea of Nature, 5.
42
Collingwood, Idea of Nature, 9.

11
qualitatively different one than anything that came before. The universe as organism; the
universe as machine; the universe as imagined by a historian.43
This shift in the view of nature in the contemporary period has generated new problems
for theology, two of which are worth highlighting here. The first is the problem of knowledge:
we can only know things provisionally, and never finally. Human conditions change; not only
does culture change, the very species evolves. We view the world one way today, another way
tomorrow. The classical tradition was framed in very different conditions when objective
knowledge, proceeding from the first principles of reason in harmony with the laws of thought as
conceived at the time, was considered possible. What foundations can be given to theology in a
state of perpetual epistemological contingency? The second problem is the problem of values: if
the Quran was read through the lens of patriarchy yesterday, and we demand it be read through
the lens of egalitarianism today, in what source to we ground this demand other than the
subjective spirit of our age? Attempts to derive egalitarianism begs the question: why do we see
it today while our predecessors missed it in the past? What will prevent future generations from
discarding the egalitarianism of today for the law of the jungle tomorrow? 44
The academic scholar Ayesha Hidayatullah courageously articulates this challenge: “that
feminist conceptions of justice and equality may not be fully reconcilable with the text of the
Qur’an takes us to the ‘edge’ of the Qur’an: we have reached and exceeded the limits of clear-cut
Qur’anic support for our ideals.” 45 What results is nothing short of “a radical uncertainty…about
the Qur’an’s possible incommensurability with our notions of equality and justice...a theological
wrestling that may be deeply unsettling and even terrifying.” 46

PART III: CONTINUITY & CHANGE

The task before the modern Muslim is, therefore, immense. He has to rethink the
whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past. 47

In his parallel work on The Idea of History, Collingwood identifies history as being uniquely selected by
43

modernity as the subject of special philosophical reflection.

44
Christian Smith argues in Atheist Overreach that it is impossible to derive any conception of universal human
rights from nature; this is, of course, simply a restatement of Hume’s law: you can’t get an “ought” from an “is.”
45
Aysha Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges of the Qur’an, 178.
46
Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges, 193.
47
Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, chapter on “The Human Ego.”

12
 The notion of change and our need to adapt to it are native to Muslim thought. Before the
age of the prophet Muhammad, change was managed directly by God through the sending of
prophets and messengers in succession through the ages. After the prophet Muhammad, change
is managed by scholars, some of whom are especially endowed as periodic “renewers” at the turn
of every century. 48 Modern conditions of life, however, have no historic parallel to what has
come before. Our ability to adapt to change has now been outstripped by the accelerating pace of
change itself. 49 What baffles agents of change presently is how to remain faithful to scripture and
tradition while at the same time feeling the need to radically depart from it. Martin Nguyen
argues that although the particulars of our present crisis may be unique, the state of being in
crisis is not: “The present moment has always presented itself as daunting, desolate, and bleak.
The rhythmic recurrence of messianic and apocalyptic expectations across centuries is but one
symptom of the human disposition toward crisis. The feeling of crisis pervades, if not defines,
human experience. It was felt by the first of us—Adam and Eve, who were brought low so long
ago. Indeed, what prophet from the past did not encounter and confront their share of crisis?” 50
Our condition is different from any past crisis in that modernity does not sit in
anticipation of apocalypse, it brings dreams of immortality with a bid for divinity. 51 We are
neither Adam & Eve, nor are we prophets. Prophecy has ended, but history marches on. So while
Ngyuen may be correct in his notion of perpetual crisis, ours is like none before, even though
every generation may feel that its own particular crisis is unique from all others. In what follows,
I propose one way to advance the conversation by relying on four laws that govern the process of
scientific change. In drawing from the history and philosophy of science, I recognize that science
as a knowledge tradition behaves in analogous ways to religious thought.
Recent scholarship in the history and philosophy of science has attempted to theorize the
mechanisms that govern scientific change over time. In what follows, the term “theories” in
relation to science will stand for “legal norm” (sharʿī ḥukm) or “theological doctrines” (ʿaqāʾid)
in relation to Islam, while the term “methods” in relation to science will stand for “hermeneutics”
or principles of interpretation (uṣūl) in relation to religious thought. The history of science tells

48
Ebrahim Moosa and Sherali Tareen, “Revival and Reform.”
49
Thomas Friedman, Thank You for Being Late.
50
Martin Nguyen, Modern Muslim Theology, 42.
51
Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow.

13
us that not only do theories change over time, the methods employed in theory assessment also
change. In other words, our very criteria for categorizing a theory as being validly scientific
shifts from one worldview to another. What is science today was nonscience yesterday; by
extension, what we consider science today may be considered nonscience tomorrow. According
to the laws of scientific change, the intellectual activity of Aristotle, Newton, and Einstein form
part of the same continuous knowledge tradition, even though their modes of reasoning and
theories of nature are incommensurable. They flow seamlessly one from another. Aristotle’s
theory of gravity relies on the essential natures of the elements. Newton sees dynamic forces of
attraction between massive objects across empty space. And Einsteen imagines a curved
continuum with time as a fourth dimension of space. If history allows us to witness these kinds
of shifts in the scientific tradition, why can we also not witness a shift from patriarchy to
egalitarianism in the theolegal tradition?
According to the historian and philosopher of science Hakob Barseghyan, a worldview is
defined by a “mosaic of accepted theories” about the world. 52 Each element of the mosaic
consists of a statement or set of statements that describe an object of its domain. There are four
laws that help us theorize changes to the mosaic.
1. “An element of the mosaic remains in the mosaic unless replaced by other
elements.” 53
2. “In order to become accepted into the mosaic, a theory is assessed by the method
actually employed at the time.” 54
3. “A method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed
methods and accepted theories at the time.” 55
4. “At any moment of time, the elements of the scientific are compatible with each
other.” 56
The first law presumes continuity unless there is a valid reason to change. The second
law gives us the driver of change: new theories can only replace old ones if they are better at
meeting the criteria of theory assessment employed by a community of scholars. The present
criteria for considering something as scientific are set by the contemporary scientific method that

52
This entire section draws from the open source textbook Introduction to History and the Philosophy of Science by
Barseghyan, Overgaard, and Rupik.
53
Hakob Barseghyan, Laws of Scientific Change, 123.
54
Hakob Barseghyan, Laws of Scientific Change, 128.
55
Hakob Barseghyan, Laws of Scientific Change, 132.
56
Hakob Barseghyan, Laws of Scientific Change, 153.

14
uses falsifiability as one of its cornerstone principles. 57 The second law also gives us the
principle of context-based theory assessment: we cannot use our contemporary method to assess
the validity of theories that have been articulated in a worldview with different methods. Take
the Galileo affair as an example. Galileo saw “with his own eyes” moons around Jupiter, the
phases of Venus, craters on the moon, and spots on the sun. On face value, this evidence is
sufficient to shatter ancient cosmology that maintained the heterogeneity of the superlunary and
sublunary realms in a geocentric universe. But that “face value” is derived from our present
worldview with its particular criteria for theory assessment (along with the many “facts” at our
disposal that render intuitive that which would be considered entirely non-intuitive in Galileo’s
time). In the framework of Aristotelian physics and Ptolemaic cosmology, accepting Galileo
would have raised more questions than it answered: If the earth is not at the center, what keeps it
moving? Why do we neither perceive its motion nor observe stellar parallax? Why are heavenly
motions circular but terrestrial motions linear? Why do we neither observe any changes in the
heavens nor receive any reports of changes from our ancestors? Why do the scriptures speak of a
stationary and fixed earth if it moves, and why do they speak of the sun as moving if it is
stationary? 58
Since it was well-known that our senses were liable to deception, moreover, Galileo’s
knowledge, from the perspective of an Aristotelian-Ptolemaic framework, rested on less reliable
foundations than deductions proceeding from premises that were accepted as true by definition.
It was quite reasonable for Galileo’s contemporaries to reject his claims at the time. Conversely,
it would be equally unreasonable, if not more so, to continue to reject his views today, which is
precisely what Imam al-Haramayn Shaykh Ibn Baaz does. In a treatise On the Motion of the Sun
and Stillness of the Earth, he argues using both scriptural sources and rational methods in favor
of Galileo’s opponents. 59 The arguments are very good; but they violate the second law of
scientific change: the methods he uses do not satisfy the expectations of our time because they do
not accord with our criteria for theory assessment.
The third law, called the law of “method employment,” explains how methods are
generated from existing theories: “A method becomes employed only when it is deducible from

57
Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations.
58
DeWitt, Worldviews, “A Summary of Problems Facing the Aristotelian Worldview,” 164-169.
59
Ibn Bāz, op. cit.

15
other employed methods and accepted theories at the time.” 60 Once Descartes and Newton had
introduced a mechanical view of the universe into the mosaic of accepted theories, new methods
evolved directly from these new theories. Reading the second and third laws together, we notice
that methods are both derived from theories and employed to assess whether theories are
acceptable. The apparent circularity seems irrational, but it is no different from what is known in
the humanities as a hermeneutical circle. 61 Knowledge is not possible without this kind of
circularity. It allows for the smooth functioning of what Kuhn calls “normal science” as well as
periodic episodes of “paradigm shifts.” The circularity enables a constant recalibration of
theories with methods, permitting periodic shifts in theories, methods, and, from time-to-time,
entire paradigms.
A look at the history of Islamic thought makes it clear that the circularity between the
second and third laws permitted a high range of flexibility. Rumee Ahmed has identified the
ability of Islamic legal norms to change with circumstances as “hacking”: “Muslims have been
hacking the laws for centuries using highly intricate and sophisticated methods.” 62 While on the
surface the term hacking may appear irreverent if not satirical, Ahmed suggests that hacking
demonstrates the highest form of devotion. “After all,” he asks, “if one did not care deeply about
working within the law, why bother hacking at all?”63 The problem that Ahmed identifies is the
very problem, which he calls paradox, this paper aims to address: “the law must be ancient and
contemporary at the same time. That is, the law has to be rooted in a historical past for it to have
authority, but it also has to be relevant to new times and circumstances. Muslim scholars
navigate this paradox when making legal claims about the sharia, and they have developed rather
sophisticated methods for doing so.” 64
Ahmed further clarifies that “Hacking is about working within a system, using its existing
tools to make it work better without bringing the whole thing down.” 65 He demonstrates with
copious examples how scholars have been involved in using the “system” of sharia to make

60
Barseghyan, Laws of Scientific Change, 132.
61
C. Mantzavinos, “Hermeneutics.”
62
Rumee Ahmed, Sharia Compliant, xiv.
63
Ahmed, Sharia Compliant, 186.
64
Ahmed, Sharia Compliant, 24.
65
Ahmed, Sharia Compliant, xiii.

16
changes to it when driven by political or economic power considerations in order to maintain
their own legitimacy as custodians of ancient teachings. In order words, scholars have devised
the ability to change rulings to meet contemporary needs while making it seem as if they are
saying nothing new at all. Whereas the examples that Ahmed cites are very compelling, and one
finds corroboration for his theories elsewhere, 66 his historical examples fall within the scope of
Kuhn’s “normal science,” not “paradigm shifts.”
Contrast the following two examples, one of slavery and one of gender. When the
Mamluks assumed power in thirteenth century Egypt, argues Ahmed, the Shafiʿis were forced to
legitimize Mamluk rule by amending their legal code to allow slaves to occupy government
posts. Lest the Shafiʿis lose ground to their rival Hanafis whose legal school permitted that which
the Shafiʿis forbade, the Shafiʿis, with a subtle sleight of hand, used subtle distinctions between
different kinds of slaves to accommodate their new political overlords. Confining the prohibition
to a certain category of “non-free” people (raqīq as opposed to other categories like khādim or
jāriya), the Shafiʿis were able to make room for the Mamluks as legitimate rulers while
technically maintaining legal precedent in their school of thought. 67
Fast-forward seven centuries to modern-day Egypt and Hosni Mubarak’s attempted
gender reforms, one of which was to allow women to serve in the judiciary. Instead of the more
sophisticated hack of the Mamluk era, contemporary scholars turned to the legal instrument of
necessity to permit women to participate in the judiciary. This, for Ahmed, was the bare
minimum that the scholars could do to accommodate the whims of the ruler: “Necessity is not a
very welcoming line of reasoning, which is why Shafiʿis in the Mamluk era did not use it.
Necessity in the modern Egyptian case basically says to women that they will be tolerated only
because of an executive order but that in an ideal world they would not be judges. It suggests that
the bench is an unnatural place for women and that Islamic law allows them to serve only as an
exception rather than as a rule.” 68
To strengthen his argument, Ahmed supplements the Egyptian example with a similar
one from Morocco. The reason these reforms have been weak is because, according to Ahmed,
they fail to overhaul of the notion of patriarchy (qiwāma). “Until laws are hacked to adequately

66
See my discussion of the Marrakesh Declaration as aspirational in “Scientific Literacy for Madrasa Graduates.”
67
Ahmed, Sharia Compliant, 162-168.
68
Ahmed, Sharia Compliant, 168.

17
reflect the complete abolition of qiwama in family law,” argues Ahmed, “qiwama will continue
to influence how Islamic law is applied in Morocco, inside and outside the courtroom.” 69 Why
does Ahmed require the complete overhaul of one concept to consider it a successful hack in one
case while accepting a mere subtle sleight of hand as a completely satisfactory hack in the other
case? The two cases are not in parity. One is normal science, the other is a paradigm shift. A fair
comparison would require the Mamluk hack to completely abolish slavery.
With respect to gender, Ahmed is looking not simply for new rulings that permit new
forms of practice. He wants wholesale structural reform. And in perceiving a systemic problem,
Ahmed seems to have intuited Barseghyan’s fourth law of scientific change, which Barseghyan
calls the zeroth law because of its static nature: the law of compatibility. Put simply, one cannot
tolerate erasing qiwama here but not there, excepting this kind of patriarchy but not that. The
criteria undergirding legal rulings must be consistent across the board, otherwise the worldview
will be fractured. In order to arrive at a position that does not fracture our worldview, we need to
move beyond hacks, however elegant and sophisticated.
Copernicus and Galileo offered new theories, but they were not accepted in their
lifetimes. What was needed was a systematic articulation of a new philosophy, a breakthrough in
method that could account for all the evidence, bridging the old world and the new. By law laws
of scientific change, the old method must open the door to the acceptance of new theories before
the new theories become the drivers of generating new methods. That need was fulfilled by
Descartes: he relied on an axiomatic deductive method using intuitions and first principles of
reasoning to articulate a new mechanistic view of nature. The experimental, inductive method of
science henceforth emerged from the new natural philosophy. The crisis in cosmology at the
time needed new physics to account for the accumulated anomalies: the phases of Venus; craters
on the moon; spots on the sun; moons revolving around Jupiter; and elliptical as opposed to
circular orbits of the heavenly bodies.
The anomalies in the Islamic tradition are also at crisis point: it does not seem right to us
today to allow men to physically discipline their wives, structure marriage contracts like business
transactions, permit men to have unilateral right to divorce, and so on; it does not seem right to
have laws in the books that permit slavery, even though the practice is virtually obsolete; Muslim

69
Ahmed, Sharia Compliant, 170.

18
and non-Muslim citizens should be treated equally in society and have the freedom to choose,
practice, and spread their faith; literally cutting off someone’s hand for theft or the public stoning
of adulterers are simply no longer harmonious with the spirit of our age. New ethics require new
uṣūl to justify a new theolegal domain. The egalitarian turn accented by feminist scholarship
requires a Copernican revolution in Islamic thought. 70 As in the case of the scientific revolution,
the new uṣūl in Islamic scholarship must derive from the first principles of reason native to the
Islamic tradition.
In order for any new theory in Islamic interpretation to account for the egalitarian turn,
the new theory must derive from the Quran and Sunna. There is no other way to satisfy the
expectations of the community of scholars. The uṣūl presently state that all doctrine and law
must be derived from revelation. Reason, independent of revelation, may occasionally
corroborate revelation, or be generative in matters that revelation is silent upon. But reason may
not generate doctrines or laws in matters on which revelation has explicitly or implicitly taken a
position. As Hallaq points out: “Central to any new theory there remains the centuries-old
question regarding the balance between reason and revelation”. 71 This is precisely why, in order
to tilt the balance back toward reason, many reformers turned their gaze toward the Muʿtazila for
inspiration. 72
The Mu’tazila are helpful in one sense: the prioritization of reason over revelation. But
the Muʿtazila are not helpful beyond that; appealing to Muʿtazili rationalism to resolve the
present epistemological crisis is the equivalent of expecting someone like Johannes de
Sacrobosco, an astronomer in Ptolematic tradition, to help us make sense of Copernicus, Galileo,
and Kepler. The egalitarian turn needs a Copernican revolution, not a Muʿtazili revival. The
prioritization of reason over revelation today means two things today: 1) taking our present mode
of scientific and historical reasoning seriously; and 2) taking contemporary ethical commitments,
when established as virtually universal cultural practices, as natural and authoritative. These
positions are significant departures from traditional Islam, but they can be shows to be
completely reasonable even from plain sense meanings of revelation as argued in tradition.

70
Among those who have compared the shifts needed in Islamic thought to a Copernican Revolution are
Muhammad Shahrur and Tariq Ramadan, as cited in Mohammad Hashas on “Abdolkarim Soroush,” Note 29, 155-
156.
71
Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 502.
72
Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 503. Also see Mohammed Hashas on “Abdolkarim Soroush.”

19
 Ibn Rushd said that the science of logic should be considered an obligation per
revelation. He argued that the Quran commands believers to reflect deeply on the world of
nature. The best way to study nature was through the use of systematic reasoning—logic. 73 Logic
has both formal and material domains, the latter opening a window into metaphysics and natural
science. Ibn Rushd’s adversary in philosophy, al-Ghazali, also sets the foundation of religious
thought in a study of the natural world. In his magnum on legal hermeneutics, he directs his gaze
to the external world of nature, 74 and in another work, he turns toward the inner universe of
human intuitions and mysticism. 75 In his theological treatise, Taftazani begins with assuming the
correspondence theory of knowledge that was in harmony with the philosophy of his age. 76 True
as it may be, we no longer consider it possible to philosophically justify that theory. 77 In our
contemporary era, the investigation of nature is guided by knowledge that has very different
foundations. 78 If Ibn Rushd’s argument still holds, our study of nature should be guided by the
best available method at our disposal today, which is natural science, bearing in mind the limits
of its domain because of methodological naturalism. The shift to natural science as a means to
witness God’s signs in nature—thus warranted by scripture and tradition—is also a shift from
certainty to probability in our knowledge of the natural world. This is how we get our
epistemological revolution, bridging past with present.
The old theolegal, entangled with the worldview of ancient philosophy, says that the
Quran and Sunna provide both general and specific guidance for all time; the community’s
consensus carries binding epistemic authority; nature and history bear witness as signs of God;
reason, when applied systematically, can yield certain knowledge. These uṣūl form the bedrock
of the classical tradition, and they stem from a conviction nature consists of fixed entities that are
knowable to the mind. “For the Greeks,” reminds Collingwood, “it had been an axiom that
nothing is knowable unless it is unchanging.” 79 In contrast, “the new cosmology entails a certain

73
Ibn Rushd, Kitāb Faṣl al-maqāl.
74
Al-Ghazali, Kitāb al-Mustaṣfā min al-uṣūl.
75
Al-Ghazali, Al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl.
76
Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-aqāʾid al-nasafiyya.
77
DeWitt, Worldviews, “Truth,” 17-31.
78
DeWitt, Worldviews, Part III: “Recent Developments in Science and Worldviews,” 205-348.
79
Collingwood, Idea of Nature, 11.

20
scepticism as to the validity of any argument which, starting from our own observations,
inductively reasons that what we have observed is a fair sample of nature in its entirety.” 80
Building on this kind of tentativeness, the new theolegal might say something like the
following: nature, history, and our own experiences necessarily condition our reading of
religious texts; reason yields knowledge that is fallible and subject to revision; the Quran and
Sunna provide a window into God’s will acting in a particular cultural context at a particular
moment in history; scholarly interpretation changes over time, and the community’s consensus is
a contingent social convention.

PART IV: OPEN QUESTIONS

Human groups are defined more by the changes they undergo than by any
continuity, but they nevertheless manage to create for themselves ancient
identities thanks to their storytelling skills. No matter what revolutions they
experience, they can usually weave old and new into a single yarn. 81

To share a culture, suggests Alasdair MacIntyre, “is to share schemata which are at one
and the same time constitutive of and normative for intelligible action by myself and are also
means for my interpretations of the actions of others.” 82 Crisis is what happens when one’s
schemata are put into question, and they always take place in the context of a community
because of the shared culture in which crises by definition come to transpire. “To be unable to
render oneself intelligible is to risk being taken to be mad, is, if carried far enough, to be mad.
And madness or death may always be the outcomes which prevent the resolution of an
epistemological crisis, for an epistemological crisis is always a crisis in human relationships.” 83
Those who follow the egalitarian turn risk being considered unintelligible—or “mad”—
by those who are either unable to see the anomalies or unwilling to take them seriously. Those
who are convinced that our faith needs new foundations need to accept that normal science will
not resolve the present crisis. This paper suggests what the contours of a paradigm shift might
look like, and the consequences are far reaching. Here are some questions to ponder for future
research for those who are intrigued by the line of thinking presented here. Why did prophecy

80
Collingwood, Idea of Nature, 24.
81
Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons, 96.
82
Alisdair MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crisis,” 453.
83
MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crisis,” 455.

21
end with a man who lived in seventh century Arabia? Can patriarchal and egalitarian Islam
coexist as part of the same broader community of Muslims? How far-reaching will changes to
our lived practices and rituals be in a fallibilist theolegal paradigm? Will the paradigm be able to
crystallize into a definable school of thought, garnering broad-based consensus with institutions
that carry norm-making authority? Most significantly, if an entire religious paradigm can
undergo an epistemological revolution of the kind we see propelled by the egalitarian turn—
analogous to a Copernican revolution in cosmology—what is the meaning of truth?
Scholars have attempted to pose and answer various forms of these questions from a
variety of different disciplines since Islam’s fateful encounter with modernity. Recently, the pace
seems to have picked up. The scientist Nidhal Guessoum, for example, invites us to think about
how developments in the natural sciences such as quantum mechanics and evolution are
challenging classical kalām cosmology. 84 The sociologist and philosopher of religion Basit
Koshul engages some of these challenges through semiotics and the pragmatism of Charles
Pierce. 85 Studies by each of these scholars are supported by institutions such as Kalam Research
& Media, an organization devoted to “the renewal of Islamic theology.” 86 The jurist-scholar
Khalid Abou El Fadl agrees that something has been lost that needs to be reclaimed. But that will
not happen by simplistic appeals to past tradition: “it is naïve and misleading to believe that it is
possible to avoid or to ignore the epistemological parameters allowed by each cultural
age…There is, of course, a serious problem with arguing that God intended to lock the
epistemology of the seventh century into the immutable text of the Qur’an and then intended to
hold Muslims hostage to this epistemological framework for all ages to come.” 87 The Harvard-
trained Muslim academic Martin Nguyen, cited earlier in this paper, has penned his conviction
that “theology today needs to be viewed in a new light.” 88 His work on Modern Muslim
Theology reflects on concepts like time, imagination, revelation, and language whose meanings
must be reconstituted in religious thought post-egalitarian turn, just like concepts like space,
gravity, and energy have found new meaning after the scientific revolution.

84
Nidhal Guessoum, Kalam’s Necessary Engagement with Modern Science.
85
Basit Koshul, Semiotics as a Resource for Theology.
86
Kalam Research & Media, https://www.kalamresearch.com/about-us.php
87
Abou El Fadl, Reasoning with God, 300.
88
Nguyen, Modern Muslim Theology, 6.

22
 The meaning of truth for us today may need to shift from an objective grasp of reality to
our best attempt at understanding given the limits of our respective cultural and cosmic horizons.
In that way, those who came before us were no more wrong than we are right. The second law of
scientific change tells us that theories are to be assessed by the methods of their time, not by the
methods of a different time. The Quran echoes this sentiment: “That is a community that has
passed away. Theirs is what they earned, and yours is what you earned, and you will not be
questioned about that which they used to do.” 89 The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze calls this
perspective “difference without negation.” 90 Truth, then, is not rationally demonstrable, although
the search for it may be aided by reason. The egalitarian turn may thus signify a shift from
ideology to pragmatism, just as it moves from scholasticism to empiricism. William James
captures the spirit of this movement from one world to another: “In the end it had come to our
empiricist criterion: By their fruits ye shall know them, not by their roots.” 91 This, as I
understand, is also the persuasive strategy of the Quran. As I have shown elsewhere, even the
prophet cannot ultimately rely on purely discursive arguments to convey the message with which
God has entrusted him. 92
Iqbal, of course, is one of the forefathers of the post-egalitarian school. He attempted to
lay new theoretical foundations for religious thought in the modern age. In his series of lectures
on The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, he sees in the empirical methods of
scientific inquiry an innate affinity with the spirit of the Quran. 93 Iqbal’s optimism in human
reason also offers one explanation for the end of prophecy, which we may let ourselves ponder in
conclusion: “the Prophet of Islam seems to stand between the ancient and the modern world. In
so far as the source of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the
spirit of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the modern world. In him life discovers other

89
Q. 2:141.
90
Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition. I am indebted to Ebrahim Moosa for much of what is accurate in this
essay, but this reference in particular.
91
Cited in Iqbal’s Reconstruction, chapter on “Knowledge and Religious Experience.” Also cited in William D.
Phelan Jr., “William James and Religious Experience.”
92
See my article “A Delegation of Christians from Najrān.”
93
Iqbal, Reconstruction, chapter on “Knowledge and Religious Experience.”

23
sources of knowledge suitable to its new direction. The birth of Islam…is the birth of inductive
intellect. In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition.” 94

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27
 The Relationship of Science and Religion
in Light of Deobandi Scholars’ Reception of the Theory of Evolution

Muhammad Shazhad
Pakistan

Science and religion have a complex relationship with each other. Some believe that science and
religion mutually support each other because they operate in different domains. That an
individual can at once be a productive scientist and a believer is evidence in support of this
claim. St Augustine is among the early Christian scholars who holds this position, arguing that
both science and nature are books authored by the same God, one a book of nature and the other
a book of scripture. Contradictions between the two are merely apparent; skilled interpreters are
capable of resolving them. The problem with Islam is, however, of a different kind, because the
Bible is seen to have been inspired by God, but the Quran is the very literal word of God.

Others like John William Draper have offered a “conflict” or “warfare” thesis on the relationship
between science and religion. Phenomena such as earthquakes, for example, were once thought
of as divine wrath, but can now be explained as the movement of tectonic plates. These and other
similar examples make it seem that the “conflict” thesis has merit. Religion does not deny the
importance of human experience and observations, but rather, invites us to pay attention to them
as signs of God. For this reason, recent Muslim scholars like Mawdudi and Kashmiri have
argued that scripture speaks according to the observations and experiences of its immediate
audience. South Asia has produced a variety of schools that have attempted to respond to
challenges to religious thought. Deobandis are one such important school.

Evolution is one scientific theory that has created havoc in the world. This is because it is not
merely an abstract theory like quantum mechanics or relativity. It affects us personally, speaking
to who we are as a species. Darwin did not just offer the idea of evolution but also its mechanism
of natural selection. The idea of evolution was already present in its nascent form in ancient
Greek philosophy, and also in Arabic philosophical literature. Darwin’s grandfather Erasmus
Darwin also believed in evolution. Charles Darwin is considered revolutionary because of the
naturalistic explanation that he gives to his theory.

There is no single book in Urdu or Arabic written by Deobandi scholars in response to the theory
of evolution. Mawlana Thanvi writes that the theory is absolutely wrong because it goes against
what is written explicitly in scripture. Writings on legal opinions in Urdu tend to deal in detail
about issues related to worship and family laws, but they rarely deal systematically or at length
with contemporary intellectual challenges. When Mawlana Abdul Haqq was asked about
Darwin, he said that it is categorically false to say that human beings are the offspring of apes.
Mawlana Yusuf Ludhianwi has a more detailed response in which he says that it is impossible
for us to make scientific determinations about the origin of human beings because we are unable
to go back into the past to directly witness those occurrences.

These and other thinkers summarily dismiss and condemn the theory of evolution as disbelief.
Their arguments criticize both the contradiction of the theory with scripture and also argue that it
is not based in sound reasoning. What is clear from reading their positions is that they have not
understood how science generates knowledge. They fail to distinguish between axiomatic-
deductive and empirical-inductive modes of reasoning and the different kinds of knowledge that
each of these methods is able to yield. They also do not understand the difference between a
mere “hypothesis” that is yet to be tested and a scientific “theory” that is well tested and the best
available—albeit fallible—description that we have at our disposal. Muslim scholars tend to say
that Islam is unique among religions when it comes to the relationship between science and
religion. However, this assessment seems to be based on a lack of proper understanding of
scientific methods.

There is a contrast between the reception of Darwin in South Asia and in the Arab World.
Scholars were reading Darwin’s theories in Arabic since the late nineteenth century in journal
articles, and The Origin of Species was translated into Arabic as early as 1928. In contrast, the
book has not been translated into Urdu even until today. It is clear that Deobandi scholars have
not taken science and the methods of investigating nature seriously. They are thus not able to
respond to contemporary challenges with credibility. This paper is not to blindly support
accepting Darwin’s theories wholesale. It is merely to point out that our present engagement with
the theory has so far been inadequate. It has been over a century-and-a-half since Darwin
published his work. The theory has since then received confirmation through new discoveries in
biology, and it is being widely applied in other fields. The entire universe is now being read in
evolutionary perspective, from the cosmos to society, and underneath the inquiries that are
guiding these perspectives is a materialist metaphysical foundation. If Islamic scholars expect to
remain relevant and to guide us into the future, a more serious engagement with contemporary
intellectual challenges posed by science will be required.
 New Challenges to World Religions by Big History

Waqas Ahmad
Pakistan

Human beings have been attempting to make sense of the cosmos since the beginning of time.
Our traditions provide us with one perspective of the past through sacred history. But science has
generated another version that we now call Big History. The traditional story speaks of a Creator
of the universe responsible for all acts of generation and corruption, who decrees all things,
forms human beings with the duty to worship Him. Humans are endowed with an innate nature
to know their purpose in life. Different religious traditions have different conceptions of the
Creator: some consider Him Transcendent, others Immanent, some are Monotheistic, yet others
Polytheistic. Despite these differences, all religions have some Creation story to make sense of
their place in the universe.

Science, unlike religion, relies on its method to investigate the natural world to learn of what has
come before us. Whereas religions turn to scripture and stories that have been passed down,
science uses the world of nature as its book of evidence. Big History tells us that evolution
resulted in a cognitive revolution where human beings developed the faculty of imagination,
which they used to develop stories of their origins. Although these stories appear fantastical to us
today, they were in harmony with the worldviews of our ancestors. Mythologies weren’t
imagined by any one group somewhere; it is a common feature of all known human cultures in
history: from South American Mayans to Australian Aboriginals to ancient Egyptians, Indian,
Chinese, Japanese, and Greek. Each believed and develop a certain story from its region that
captured the imaginations of a majority its peoples, providing them with explanatory power of
their observations and experiences for which no better explanation could be offered at the time.

The study of the natural world commenced its journey on a natural basis with Aristotle. The
rational study of nature has evolved into a naturalistic worldview today with the scientific
revolution, resulting in an evolutionary perspective of the universe in contrast to Aristotle’s
notion of things consisting of fixed essential natures since pre-eternity. The scholar David
Christian has thus put together a new creation myth for our time through a naturalistic study of
the universe that he calls Big History, which can be divided into eight parts: 1) The big bang; the
formation of stars; the creation of the elements; the formation of solar systems; the emergence of
life; the cognitive revolution of collective learning; organization of communities through
agriculture; and the modern age of a globally networked civilization.

There are several challenges that Big History poses for world religions and their sacred histories.
The biggest challenge is how to orient ourselves toward the natural world. Should it be primarily
though the stories we have received from our ancestors, or through an independent attitude of
discovery and curiosity? According to essentialist modes of reasoning, there is purpose in all
things. Meaning is derived through reading teleology in nature. Big History does not reveal any
such purpose in the universe. The Abrahamic monotheistic religions must reflect on new
perspectives of the human story and find ways to make sense of their sacred histories within its
context.
 A Critical Appraisal of Theological Discourses in an Age of Science

Muhammad Tihami Bashar

Science and theology are locked in an ongoing tussle. When thinking of theology, we need to
separate the actual scriptural texts from human interpretations. Whereas the texts are fixed and
infallible, human interpretations are contingent and fallible. However, even acts of interpretation
may be divided into two kinds. Interpretations that have the consensus of the community have
binding authority, whereas the opinions of individual scholars are subject to revision. Given that
the knowledge generated by science is by definition fallible, what can be said about the
relationship between science and theology? Are the discourses of science and theology mutually
exclusive, or do the two intersect?

We know that the domain of science is the natural world. What is the domain of scriptural texts?
Muslim intellectuals not only disagree in the various positions they adopt in response to this
question, they outright contradict each other. They are unable to restrict the main topic of
scriptural texts to any particular domain of human knowledge, which is why they include the
domain of science within the purview of theology. So we observe an apparent contradiction
between theology and much of what science is saying today. If revelation comes directly from
God, then whatever it says about the natural world must be true and accurate. If humans, though
their attempt to independently understand the world, arrive at a position that is different from
revelation, then that position must be erroneous. Scriptural texts must be taken as categorically
correct, even when describing the natural world.

Today, science seems to be generating knowledge that must be undeniably taken seriously. The
power of science today has compelled Muslim thinkers to engage it. In doing so, there are only
two competing strategies of reconciling the claims of science with theology that may be adopted.
The first is the abandonment of scriptural texts altogether. This approach simply discards
religious texts as being wrong. Obviously, it is impossible to remain a believer while at the same
time maintain that revelation from God contains factual errors. The second strategy is more
sophisticated and has to do with investigating the meanings of the scriptural texts. This approach
has five complex ways of dealing with meaning:

1. The texts can have multiple meanings at the same time: This approach argues from the
omniscience of God. Since God is all-knowing, He chose His words in such a way that
they could offer different meanings to human beings in different ages. There is no
possibility for a divine text to contain any errors, so the task of theologians is to merely
reinterpret scripture in light of the knowledge of their time. Since the Prophet lived and
spoke according to the knowledge of his time and historical conditions in which he lived,
Muslims should today only rely on the Quran for guidance while considering the
prophet’s life as restricted to his historical context. Example: Ghulam Ahmed Pervez.
This approach has a number of problems. It is entirely ahistorical; it allows for a variety
of language games that enable an infinite number of post-hoc explanations on the
meaning of scripture.
 2. The meaning of the text evolves: This approach argues that the text can have only one
meaning, but that true meanings in scientific areas become apparent as they are
discovered with the advance of science. The major problem with this approach is that it
considers past interpretations as incorrect and invalid, and leaves the possibility of our
own interpretations to be superseded by new knowledge in the future. By implication,
God would be leaving people in ages of less developed science with incorrect or
insufficient guidance.

3. Impossibility of contradictions: This approach begins with the theoretical statement that it
is categorically impossible for there to be any contradiction between true science and
correct theology. If a contradiction is perceived, it is only apparent and not real, resulting
from an error in human reasoning, either in science or in our attempt to understand God’s
words. The major problem with this approach is that it allows for an endless shift of
meanings with new knowledge.

4. Non-overlapping magisteria: 1 This approach argues that science and theology have two
entirely different domains. While science attempts to understand material reality,
theology is interested in the moral and ethical guidance of human beings. If scriptural
texts speak of the natural world according to the perspectives of its immediate audience,
it is inconsequential, because the true purpose of religion is not to provide scientific
knowledge in the first place. One significant problem with this approach is that it
fragments human knowledge and experience into different domains.

5. Theology as contingent discourse: According to this approach, the Quran is no longer

considered to be making statements that correspond literally to absolute and universal
truths. Rather, Quranic statements are tied to the historical context of their time. It is the
task of scholars and believers who come afterward to try to understand revelation within
its own context for guidance rather than projecting new meanings onto it from another
context.

This paper is incomplete. The next task is to develop the section on “theology as contingent
discourse” in more detail.

1
Translator’s Note: I’ve adopted the term of Stephen Gould to translate this concept from the Urdu.
 Ambiguities in the Ethics of Intelligence Enhancement

Maryam Mudassar
Pakistan

Science is moving from simply curing human diseases to enhancing their physical and cognitive
abilities. Humans are now pursuing their desires to upgrade themselves with gusto. But this
pursuit to better ourselves is nothing new; past attempts at optimizing human physiology have
included things like diet and exercise. Recent attempts, however, are taking things to a whole
new level, and these attempts have their skeptics because of the many ethical issues that they
introduce. Are there any limits to what we can do to our bodies?

This paper focuses on intelligence or cognitive enhancement. What is enhancement? What are
different ethical positions on enhancement? What is the difference between medical treatment
and enhancement? What different theological positions are there in relation to enhancement?
Will enhancement be good or bad for human beings collectively? What legal limits should be
considered with respect to enhancement?

Intelligence enhancement could be in memory, capacity to solve problems, reduction in required

sleep, enhanced focus, less mental fatigue, increased productivity, less anxiety, fewer mistakes,
and more efficient performance. One way to produce the desired effect is by genetically
enhancing the embryo immediately after conception. Mitochondrian Replacement in the cell has
the potential to protect from diseases that would be caused by the original mitochondria. Another
way to enhance human capacities is through drugs, medication, doping, and various kinds of
stimulants, as is often the case in athletics.

New developments in neuroscience and neurotechnology are now driving the enhancement of the
brain. Transcranial Magnetic or Direct Current Stimulation techniques are capable of not only
treating ailments but also enhancing capacities like memory, coordination, and calculation.
Neuromodulation stimulates metabolic, electrical, and physiological states to control and alter
the brain’s capacities, including the generation of new cells or improving the connections
between existing cells. 3D printing techniques can also be used in this field, generating
biomaterial that can eventually be transplanted into human bodies for the purpose of treatment or
enhancement.

All these developments are raising new ethical questions. What is considered “treatment” is
typically acceptable, but techniques categorized as “enhancement” tend to be viewed with
caution if not suspicion. Since the very label determines our attitude, it is essential to draw the
line between the two terms with care. Treatment means to return an organ or organism to its
original or natural state, whereas enhancement is to increase the capacity or ability beyond its
natural state. The obvious question that arises here is what is meant by the state of nature? How
is a natural state to be determined? Is the nature of a thing an objective state or is it merely
circumstantial and conventional?
When these questions are applied to intelligence, what can be considered someone’s natural state
of intelligence, improvement beyond which would be considered artificial enhancement? If a
child is born somehow “impaired,” will bringing that child to a more “normal” condition, as
determined in reference to the larger population, be considered treatment or enhancement? In
that case, is “normal” simply some kind of social or cultural average of a biological population?
Surely, in such cases, we would call our intervention treatment and not enhancement, even in the
case of physical capacities for those who are born “impaired.” If the standard is taken to be the
“well-being” of an individual, then we can see that there is no objective norm for nature that can
be pre-defined.

The ideal for health and well-being changes with time; in ancient societies, for example, it was
considered the “harmonious functioning of the organs.” For Darwin, an ideal organism was that
which was best suited for its environment so that its chances for survival were maximized. The
concept of well-being today goes beyond the individual to the holistic flourishing of an
individual, physically, spiritually, and socially. Health, disease, sickness, and well-being have
become fluid concepts in this kind of holistic perspective. Careful reading of history reveals that
definitions have always been somewhat fluid between treatment and enhancement, as in
palliative care, artificial life support, plastic surgery, and techniques to enhance fertility. Things
we considered enhancements before are in the category of treatment today. Similarly, it is
possible for that which we categorize as enhancement today may just be considered treatment
tomorrow.

For those who are concerned with setting norms, what will the standard be? If an exceptionally
gifted individual loses mental capacity with age, will that individual’s norm be her peak capacity
or the average intelligence of the general population of her community? Should the standard of
someone who is born impaired be pegged to the average population or to the smartest member of
that community? If the technology exists, then why stop there and not go even higher? Could the
same procedure could be considered treatment in the case of one individual and enhancement in
the case of another? Moreover, in some settings as in athletics or perhaps the workplace,
enhancement may be considered unfair or outright fraud. The concern of unfair advantage is real
in a society that rewards on the basis of merit. What kinds of problems could arise in society if
enhancement enables an individual or group of people gain permanent advantage over others?

Human beings are complex. There are many unknowns. One potential concern with enhancement
is that changing one capacity may cause unknown harm to other capacities that will only become
apparent in the future. But that concern is predicated on a certain notion of human nature that we
no longer hold on to. The contemporary evolutionary perspective has allowed us to view our
bodies as mutable and in a constant state of becoming, not fixed, so the only limits we give to
ourselves are culturally determined, not objective reality. This brief survey demonstrates that the
question of treatment vs. enhancement is far more intricate than originally meets the eye.
 ‫اﺳﻼم و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ‪ :‬ﻋﻠﻤﺎے دﯾﻮﺑﻨﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ‬

‫‪Muhammad Shahzad‬‬
‫‪Pakistan‬‬

‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ دوﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ اﮨﻤﯿﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﮑﻞ واﺿﺢ ﮨﮯ۔ )ﻋﻤﺮاﻧﯿﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻧﻘﻄۂ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺳﮯ( اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺑﺎﮨﻢ‬
‫اﮐﮣﮭﺎ رﮐﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اور )ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﻘﻄۂ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺳﮯ( اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺧﺪا ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮڑﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﮩﺎﯾﺖ اﮨﻢ ﮨﮯ۔ اور‬
‫دوﺳﺮی ﺟﺎﻧﺐ اﻧﺴﺎن اﭘﻨﯽ )‪ (cognitive‬ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ‪ ،‬ﮨﻤﯿﺸہ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻮم طﺒﯿﻌﯿہ ﯾﺎ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫اور ﺧﻮد ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﻮ ﭼﻼﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﺻﻮﻟﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺗﻼش ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺳﮯ‬
‫ﻧﺎم ﺳﮯ ﯾﺎد ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ان دوﻧﻮں ﮐﺎ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ رﺷﺘہ ﺑﮩﺖ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ اور ﭘﺮاﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﮔﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ اور اس ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ان دوﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞِ ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻮ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪه ﻧﻈﺮ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾہ ﺳﻮال اﭘﻨﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺳﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺿﺮور ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺶ آﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺗﺤﺪّی ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ دوﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ و ﺗﻌﻠّﻖ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﯿّﻦ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺑﮩﺖ اﮨﻢ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻋﺎم‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺐ ﮐہ‬‫ّ‬ ‫طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ دو طﺮح ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ؛ اﯾﮏ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮕﯽ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر۔‬
‫ّ‬ ‫دوﺳﺮا ﺗﻀﺎدّ و ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﺟﻮ ﻟﻮگ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮕﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬وه ﮐﮩﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ دوﻧﻮں ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﺗﮏ رﺳﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ‬
‫اﯾﮏ دوﺳﺮے ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﺎون ﮨﯿﮟ اور ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻗﺴﻢ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻀﺎدّ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺎت ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ‬
‫رﮐﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪاﺗﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮨﮯ۔ دوﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ )‪ (domain‬ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا ﺗﻀﺎدّ ﮐﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ‬
‫ﺳﻮال ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﯾہ ﮐہ ﻋﻤﻠﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺌﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ دان اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺳﮯ واﺑﺴﺘہ ﺣﻀﺮات اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﭘﻮری‬
‫ﺗﻮ ّﺟہ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﻨﺴﻠﮏ ره ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﺗﻀﺎدّ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔ اﺳﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ ﮐﺌﯽ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻧﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﻼﻣہ طﻨﻄﺎوی ﮐﯽ اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ ﰲ ﺗﻔﺴﲑ اﻟﻘﺮآن ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اس طﺮح ﮐﯽ ﮐﺎوﺷﻮں ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮ ﻧﺘﯿﺠہ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ وه ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ آﺋﮯ روز ﺑﺪﻟﺘﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺌﯽ‬
‫ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﺑﺎﻗﯽ رﮨﮯ ﮔﯽ۔ اس ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﺳﮯ ﻏﻮر ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺣﺎﻻت ﺑﺪﻟﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ‬
‫ﺑﺪﻟﺘﮯ رﮨﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺲ ﺣﺪ ﺗﮏ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ره ﺳﮑﮯ ﮔﺎ؟‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮓ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻣﺴﯿﺤﯽ ﭘﺎدری ﺳﯿﻨﭧ آﮔﺴﮣﯿﻦ ﻧﮯ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰدﯾﮏ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﺣﻖ ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﯽ دو ﮐﺘﺎﺑﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﮑﮭ دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﯾﮏ ﮐﺘﺎب‪ The Book of Scripture ،‬ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺐ ﮐہ دوﺳﺮی ﮐﺘﺎب‪The ،‬‬
‫‪ Book of Nature‬ﮨﮯ۔ دوﻧﻮں ﮐﺘﺎﺑﻮں ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﻟﮑﮭﺎری ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ‪ ،‬ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻀﺎدّ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ‪ ،‬اﻟﺒﺘہ ﺟﮩﺎں ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ اور درﺳﺖ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ و ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﯽ ﭘﻮری ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ظﺎﮨﺮی ﺗﻀﺎدّ ﮨﻮ ﺗﻮ اﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ۔ ﻋﯿﺴﺎﺋﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﯿﻨﭧ آﮔﺴﮣﯿﻦ ﮐﺎ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮده ﯾہ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده وﻗﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮩﺖ ﻣﻘﺒﻮل ﮨﮯ اور اس ﮐﺎ اﻧﺪازه اس‬
‫ﺑﺎت ﺳﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺤﺪّﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﯿﮟ وﯾﮣﯿﮑﻦ ﺳﮣﯽ ﮐﮯ ﭘﻮپ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﺳﮯ وﻗﺘﺎ ً ﻓﻮﻗﺘﺎ ً ﯾﮩﯽ‬
‫ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺐ اﺳﻼم ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ اس ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﻮ ﮨﻮ ﺑﮩﻮ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯽ ﺳﮯ ﺧﺎﻟﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ اﻧﺠﯿﻞ‬ ‫ﻣﺬﮨ ِ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻂ و درﺳﺖ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫)ﺑﺎﺋﺒﻞ( ﮐﻮ ﺧﺪا ﮐﮯ اﻟﻔﺎظ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎے اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ و ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ اﺣﺘﻤﺎل ﺑﺎﻗﯽ‬‫ّ‬ ‫وﺣﯽ اﻟﮩﯽ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﺎ ً آﺳﺎن ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن و ﺣﺪﯾﺚ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺘﺎ۔ ﻟﮩﺬا وﺣﯽ ﮐﻮ ﮨﺮ ﺣﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺎ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ اور اس ﮐﺎ اﻧﮑﺎر ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫دوﺳﺮی ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺣﻀﺮات ﮐﯽ راے ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺑﺎﮨﻢ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﮭﮍے ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اﺳﮯ ‪(conflict or‬‬
‫)‪ warfare thesis‬ﮐﮯ ﻧﺎم ﺳﮯ ﯾﺎد ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﻓﺮﺿﯿﮯ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻤﯿﺸہ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ‬
‫ﺑﺎﮨﻢ ﻣﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اس ﻓﺮﺿﯿﮯ ﮐﻮ اﻧﯿﺴﻮﯾﮟ ﺻﺪی ﻣﯿﮟ دو ﺣﻀﺮات؛ ﺟﺎن وﻟﯿﻢ ڈراﭘﺮ )م ‪ (1882‬اور اﯾﻨﮉرﯾﻮ ڈﮐﺴﻦ‬
‫واﺋﭧ )م ( ﻧﮯ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ۔ ان ﺑﺎﺗﻮں ﮐﻮ درﺳﺖ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﯾﺎ ان ﮐﺎ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑہ ﮨﺮ ﺣﺎل اس ﺑﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ طﺮح‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﺗﺮدّد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ آﺋﮯ روز ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت و اﻧﮑﺸﺎﻓﺎت ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻋﻘﺎﺋﺪ ﭘﺮ اﺛﺮ اﻧﺪاز ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﺟﺎ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﻮ ﺑﺎت‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻋﻘﯿﺪه ﺳﻤﺠﮭﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ‪ ،‬وه آج اﯾﮏ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ )‪ (natural phenomenon‬ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ زﻟﺰﻟﮯ ﮐﻮ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺧﺪا ﮐﮯ ﻗﮩﺮ و ﻏﻀﺐ ﮐﯽ ﻋﻼﻣﺖ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﯽ‬
‫روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ا‪TheWh‬ﯾﮏ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ )‪ (plate tectonics‬ﮐﺎ اﺛﺮ ﮨﮯ اور اس ﮐﺎ ﺧﺪا ﮐﮯ ﻗﮩﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺳﻮرج ﮔﺮﮨﻦ اور ﭼﺎﻧﺪ ﮔﺮﮨﻦ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺧﺪا ﺳﮯ رﺣﻢ و ﻣﻐﻔﺮت طﻠﺐ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺣﺎﻻں ﮐہ ﯾہ‬
‫ﻣﺤﺾ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺎ ﻧﺘﯿﺠہ ﮨﮯ۔ آدم و ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ ﺳﮯ ﻟﮯ ﮐﺮ ﻣﻮت ﮐﮯ وﻗﻮع ﺗﮏ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻤﺎم ﻋﻘﺎﺋﺪ و ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت‬
‫اﺳﯽ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﯽ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺌﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اس ﺿﻤﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺛﺒﻮت ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ آﺋﮯ دن اس ﮐﮯ ﺣﻖ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ دﻻﺋﻞ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻘﺮﯾﺒﺎ ً اس ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺗﻔﺎق ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﻟﮯ ﮐﺮ ﭼﺎرﻟﺰ ڈﮐﻨﺰ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﮐﺌﯽ ﺣﻀﺮات ﺧﺪا ﮐﮯ وﺟﻮد ﮐﺎ ﺳﺮے ﺳﮯ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﺮ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺳﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺑﻞ ﺑﻮﺗﮯ ﭘﺮ ﺟﺮﻣﻨﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﯽ ﺑﻮﺧﻨﮯ )‪ (Buchner‬اور ﻋﺮﺑﯽ ﻣﻔ ّﮑﺮ ﺷﺒﻠﯽ ﺷﻤﯿﻞ ﻧﮯ ﻣﺎ ﻓﻮق اﻟﻔﻄﺮت ﮨﺴﺘﯽ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ت ﺣﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﮐﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻋﻤﻼً زﯾﺎده درﺳﺖ ﻧﻈﺮ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬ ‫وﺟﻮد ﮐﺎ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ۔ اس ﺻﻮر ِ‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت و ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪات ﮐﻮ ﻟﻐﻮ ﻗﺮار ﻧﮩﯿﮟ دﯾﺎ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻗﺪرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻮر و ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮﻏﯿﺐ دی‬
‫ﺐ ﺛﻮاب ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ؛ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ ﯾہ ﺧﺪا ﮐﯽ ﻋﻈﻤﺖ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮﻧﮯ اور اﻧﮭﯿﮟ ﭘﮩﭽﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ ﺳﺒﺐ ﺑﻨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس‬ ‫ﮨﮯ اور اﺳﮯ ﻣﻮﺟ ِ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪه ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ؛ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮﻏﯿﺐ دی اور اﺳﮯ درﺳﺖ ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ‪،‬‬
‫ﺣﺎﻻں ﮐہ ﮨﻤﺎرا ﯾﮩﯽ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﮨﻤﯿﮟ اب ﺧﺪا ﺳﮯ دور ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ذرﯾﻌہ ﺑﻨﺘﺎ ﺟﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻣﻔ ّﮑﺮﯾﻦ )اﻧﻮر‬
‫ﺷﺎه ﮐﺎﺷﻤﯿﺮی‪ ،‬ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﻣﻮدودی وﻏﯿﺮه( ﻧﮯ اﺳﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐہ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ اﻋﻤﺎل ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮﺿﯿﺤﺎت‬
‫ﻣﺮوﺟہ آرا ﮐﺎ ﻟﺤﺎظ رﮐﮭﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ورﻧہ رﺳﻮل و ﭘﯿﻐﻤﺒﺮ ﮐﯽ‬‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﻖ اور ﺳﭻ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻠﺤﻮظ رﮐﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎے‪ ،‬اﭘﻨﮯ وﻗﺖ ﮐﯽ ّ‬
‫ﻗﻮم ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ’ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ‘ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ ﺑﮩﺖ ﻣﺸﮑﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ اور ﺷﺎﯾﺪ ﯾہ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺑﻦ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ۔ دوﺳﺮی وﺟہ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ‬
‫ت ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ‘ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ اﯾﮏ ﻏﯿﺮ‬ ‫ﮐہ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮﺿﯿﺢ و ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ ’ﻧﺠﺎ ِ‬
‫اﮨﻢ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اﺳﯽ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﮯ ان ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ زﯾﺎده ﺗﻮ ّﺟہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﺮﺗﯽ۔‬
‫اس ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﻮ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﺌﯽ ﺳﻮاﻻت ﮐﺎ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﮔﺮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻠﻢ‬
‫ﺷﺎﯾﺎن ﺷﺎن ﯾہ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺮض ﮐﯿﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮔﯿﺎ ﺗﻮ ﺧﺪا ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻌﺮض ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﯽ؟ اور اﮔﺮ ّ‬ ‫ﻏﯿﺮ اﮨﻢ ﺗﮭﺎ ﺗﻮ ﺧﺪا ﮐﻮ اس ﺳﮯ ّ‬
‫ﮐﯿﺴﮯ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮ ﺧﻼف ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﺎت ﮐﮩﮯ ۔‬
‫ﺑﺮ ﺻﻐﯿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺳﻼم ﺳﮯ واﺑﺴﺘہ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﮑﺎﺗﺐ ﻓﮑﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻨﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ وﻗﺘﺎ ً ﻓﻮﻗﺘﺎ ً ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﭘﯿﺶ آﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺗﺤﺪّﯾﺎت ﮐﺎ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ﺐ ﻓﮑﺮ‪ ،‬دار اﻟﻌﻠﻮم دﯾﻮﺑﻨﺪ ﺳﮯ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ‬ ‫ﺟﻢ ﮐﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠہ ﮐﯿﺎ اور اﭘﻨﯽ آرا ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﮟ۔ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ اﮨﻢ ﻣﮑﺘ ِ‬
‫ﺣﻀﺮات ﮐﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ دﯾﻮﺑﻨﺪی ﺣﻀﺮات ﮔﺎﮨﮯ ﺑﮕﺎﮨﮯ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎﺗﯽ و ﻓﮑﺮی‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﺎﺷﯽ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﯽ اور ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼت‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ اﺳﻼﻣﯽ ﻧﻘﻄۂ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﻮ واﺿﺢ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ اور ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ ﭘﯿﺶ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اور ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬
‫ﺗﺤﺪّﯾﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺗﻤﺎم آﻓﺎﻗﯽ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﺟﻦ ﺗﺤﺪّﯾﺎت ﻧﮯ ﻣﺸﮑﻼت ﮐﮭﮍی ﮐﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ‬
‫ﭼﺎرﻟﺰ ڈارون ﮐﺎ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮده ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫زﯾﺮ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﻟہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻢ دﯾﻮﺑﻨﺪی ﺣﻀﺮات ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﺳﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮده ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﻮ ان ﮐﮯ ﭘﯿﺶ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫ﮐﺮده دﻻﺋﻞ ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﺮﮐﮭﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ اور اس ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺳﻼم و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﻮ واﺿﺢ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ اس‬
‫ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﭘﺮ ﻟﮑﮭﻨﺎ اس ﻟﯿﮯ اﮨﻢ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و اﺳﻼم )ﻣﺬﮨﺐ( ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ اﺗﻨﺎ ﺳﺎده ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﮨﺎں ﯾﺎ ﻧہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮاب دے ﮐﺮ اﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺑﺮﺧﺎﺳﺖ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ ﮨﺮ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮩﺖ ﺳﯽ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯿﺎں ﮨﯿﮟ اور ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﻧﻤﺎﺋﻨﺪه ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﭼﻨﻨﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﻮ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ )اﺳﻼم( ﮐﮯ ﻣﻨﺎﻓﯽ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﮔﺮ اس ﺑہ ظﺎﮨﺮ‬
‫ﻣﺘﻀﺎدّ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﮔﺮ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ )‪ (insights‬ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و اﺳﻼم ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺑﺮ ﺻﻐﯿﺮ اور ﻋﺮب ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ‬ ‫ﺗﻮ دﯾﮕﺮ اﻣﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﻤﺎری ﯾہ ﮐﺎوش ﻣﻔﯿﺪ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔آﺧﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ّ‬
‫ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﮨﺎﺋﮯ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮازﻧہ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﮔﮯ۔‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ‪:‬‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت اﯾﺴﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻨﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻠﭽﻞ اور ﺗﮩﻠﮑہ ﻣﭽﺎﯾﺎ۔ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ‬
‫دو ﮔﺮوﮨﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮣﻨﮯ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺠﺒﻮر ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ؛ ﺣﺎﻣﯽ اور ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻒ۔ اﯾﺴﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ اﻧﯿﺴﻮﯾﮟ ﺻﺪی ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ‬
‫ﮐﺮده ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮐﯽ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﺖ اور اس ﮐﯽ ﺑﮩﺖ ﺟﻠﺪ ﻣﻘﺒﻮﻟﯿّﺖ ﮐﮯ دو ﺑﮍے اﺳﺒﺎب ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اﯾﮏ ﺑﺎت ﺗﻮ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﺑﮩﺖ زﯾﺎده ذاﺗﯽ )‪ (personal‬ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ‪،‬ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﯾہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ذاﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ اور ﯾہ ﮨﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ دوﺳﺮی ﺑﺎت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ڈارون ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ اس ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﻮ اﺗﻨﮯ ﺳﮩﻞ اور ﻋﺎم ﻓﮩﻢ اﻧﺪاز ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯﮐہ ﮨﺮ ﺷﺨﺺ اﺳﮯ ﺑﺎ آﺳﺎﻧﯽ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺣﺎﻻں ﮐہ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﯽ زﺑﺎن ﮐﺎﻓﯽ ﻣﺸﮑﻞ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ‬
‫ﻓﻦ‪ ،‬اﻧﮭﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ آﺳﺎﻧﯽ ﺳﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔ ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ آﺋﻨﺴﮣﺎﺋﻦ ﮐﯽ ‪(Theory of‬‬ ‫ﻣﺎﮨﺮﯾﻦ ّ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﮨﮯ اور ﺳﻮاے‬
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‫)‪ Relativity‬ﮐﻮ دﯾﮑﮭ ﻟﯿﺠﯿﮯ‪ ،‬ﯾﺎ اﺳﯽ طﺮح )‪ (Quantum Mechanics‬ﮐﻮ ﻟﮯ ﻟﯿﺠﯿﮯ۔‬
‫ﻔﺲ‬
‫ڈارون ﻧﮯ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی طﻮر ﭘﺮ دو ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﮯ؛ ارﺗﻘﺎ )‪ (evolution‬اور طﺒﻌﯽ اﻧﺘﺨﺎب )‪(natural selection‬۔ ﻧ ِ‬
‫ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻧﯿﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ؛ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ ان ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻟﻮگ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧہ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺷﮑﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺑﻌﺾ‬
‫اﺑﻦ ﻣﺴﮑﻮے اور اﺧﻮان اﻟﺼﻔﺎ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺣﻀﺮات ﻧﮯ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﮐﻮ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ ﯾﻮﻧﺎﻧﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﺗﮏ ﻟﮯ ﮐﺮ ﮔﺌﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﺎﺣﻆ‪ِ ،‬‬
‫ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﮩﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮐہ وه ﺑﮭﯽ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧہ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺷﮑﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺎﻧﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎن‪ ،‬ﺟﯿﺴﮯ اﺳﻤﺎﻋﯿﻞ ﻣﻈﮩﺮﮐﺎ‬
‫دﻋﻮی ﺗﻮ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ اﻧﮭﯽ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﻧﮯ اس ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﻮ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ۔ وه‪ (Origin of Species) ،‬ﮐﮯ ﻋﺮﺑﯽ‬
‫ﺗﺮﺟﻤہ ’أﺻﻞ اﻷﻧﻮاع‘ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺪّﻣہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬

‫’ﻣﺬﻫﺐ اﻟﻨﺸﻮء واﻻﺗﻘﺎء ﻗﺪﱘ ﻳﺮﺟﻊ ﺎﺗرﳜﻪ إﱄ آﻻف ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻨﲔ ‪ ...‬ﻛﺎﻧﻮا )اﻟﻌﺮب( أول ﻣﻦ اﺳﺘﺠﻤﻊ ﻛﺜﲑاً ﻣﻦ اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺎت ﰲ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ اﻟﻨﺸﻮء‪ ،‬وأول ﻣﻦ‬
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‫ﻗﺎﻟﻮا ﺄﺑن ﻋﺎﱂ اﳊﻴﻮان واﻟﻨﺒﺎت واﳉﻤﺎد واﺣﺪ ﻳﻔﺼﻞ ﺑﲔ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ و ﺑﻌﺾ ﺣﺪود اﻧﻘﻼﺑﻴﺔ دﻗﻴﻘﺔ‪‘.‬‬

‫ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ اﺑﻮ ﻋﻠﯽ اﺣﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺴﮑﻮﯾہ ﺧﺎزن )ﻣﺘﻮﻓّﯽ ‪421‬ھ( ﮐﺎ ﺗﺬﮐﺮه ﮐﯿﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﻨﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ دو‬
‫ﻖ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت و اﺑﺘﺪاے ﺣﯿﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐﭽﮭ ﻟﮑﮭﺎ ﮨﮯ‪،‬‬ ‫ﮐﺘﺎﺑﻮں‪’ ،‬اﻟﻔﻮز اﻷﺻﻐﺮ‘ اور ’ﺗﮭﺬﯾﺐ اﻷﺧﻼق‘ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺨﻠﯿ ِ‬
‫ان ﺳﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﯽ ﺟﮭﻠﮏ ﻧﻈﺮ آﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﺟﺎﺣﻆ ﮐﯽ’اﻟﺤﯿﻮان‘ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ اس ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ آرا ﻣﻠﺘﯽ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﺧﻮد ڈارون ﮐﮯ دادا‪ ،Erasmus Darwin ،‬ﺑﮭﯽ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ و ﺣﺎﻣﯽ ﺗﮭﮯ اور اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻧﺜﺮ و ﻧﻈﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ اس‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﺑﮭﺮﭘﻮر اظﮩﺎر ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﯿﺎ۔ اﻟﺒﺘہ ﺟﺲ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﻮ ڈارون ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ اور ﻧﮯ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ اور ﺟﺲ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﺎ ﭘﺮ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺣﻀﺮات ﻧﮯ ڈارون ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﮐﻮ اﻧﻘﻼﺑﯽ )‪ (revolutionary‬ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬وه ارﺗﻘﺎ ﺑہ ذرﯾﻌہ طﺒﻌﯽ‬
‫اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﮐﺘﺎﺑﻮں‪ The Descent of Man ،On the Origins of Species ،‬اور ‪The‬‬
‫‪ Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals‬ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﻮ اﯾﮏ ﺟﻤﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ اس طﺮح ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪Life on earth evolved gradually beginning with one primitive species - perhaps a self-‬‬
‫‪replicating molecule – that lived more than 3.5 billion years ago; it then branched out over‬‬
‫)‪time, throwing off many new and diverse species; and the mechanism for most (but not all‬‬
‫‪of evolutionary change is natural selection. 3‬‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﭘﭽﮭﻠﯽ ڈﯾﮍھ ﺻﺪی ﺳﮯ ﻋﺎم طﻮر ﭘﺮ دو وﺟﻮﮨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ ﺟﮭﮣﻼﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﯾﮏ وﺟہ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾہ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻧﺼﻮص )ﮐﻼم ﻣﻘﺪّس( ﮐﮯ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ )‪ (literal meaning‬ﮐﮯ ﺗﻀﺎدّ رﮐﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﯾﮏ اور ﺳﺒﺐ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾہ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ذﻣﮯ دارﯾﻮں )‪ ،(moral responsibilities‬ﻻﻓﺎﻧﯽ روح )‪ (immortal soul‬اور )‪ (free will‬ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮرات ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻏﯿﺮ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮓ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ّ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻋﻠﻤﺎے دﯾﻮﺑﻨﺪ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ‪:‬‬

‫‪1‬‬
‫‪Cynthia Mills, The Theory of Evolution, p. 2.‬‬
‫‪ 2‬إﺳﻣﺎﻋﯾل ﻣظﮭر‪ ،‬أﺻل اﻷﻧواع‪ ،‬ص ‪13‬۔‬
‫‪3‬‬
‫‪Jerry Coyne, Why Evolution is True, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 3.‬‬
‫ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ذﮐﺮ ﮨﮯ ﻋﻠﻤﺎے دﯾﻮﺑﻨﺪ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﺳﮯ اردو ﯾﺎ ﻋﺮﺑﯽ زﺑﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اب ﺗﮏ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ‬
‫ﻣﺴﺘﻘ ّﻞ ﮐﺘﺎب ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ۔ اﻟﺒﺘہ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺟﮕﮩﻮں ﭘﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻧﮯ ﺿﻤﻨﺎ ً اﭘﻨﺎ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ذﮐﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ‬
‫ﺗﮭﺎﻧﻮی ’اﻻﻧﺘﺒﻬﺎت اﳌﻔﻴﺪة‘ ﻣﯿﮟ رﻗﻢ طﺮاز ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬

‫اﻟﻨﺺ ﻗﺪ ورد ﲞﻼﻓﻪ‪ ،‬وﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﻨﺎك دﻟﻴﻞ‬

‫ﺗﺪرج ﺷﻴﺌﺎً ﻓﺸﻴﺌﺎً ﺣﱵ أﺻﺒﺢ إﻧﺴﺎ�ً – ﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻦ أوﻫﺎم داروﻳﻦ – ﺎﺑﻃﻞ ﻗﻄﻌﺎً‪ ،‬ﻷن ّ‬
‫’اﻟﻘﻮل ﺄﺑن اﳊﻴﻮان ﻗﺪ ّ‬
‫ﻋﻘﻠﻲ ﻳﻌﺎرﺿﻪ‪ ،‬ﻻ ﻋﻨﺪ داروﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮﻩ أﻧﻪ ﻗﺎل ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻇﻨّﺎً وﲣﻤﻴﻨﺎً‪ ،‬وﻻ ﻋﻨﺪ ﻣﺘّﺒﻌﻴﻪ‪ ،‬ﻛﻤﺎ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮﻫﻢ ﺄﺑ�ﻢ ﻗﺎﻟﻮا ﻬﺑﺬﻩ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪاً‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪4‬‬
‫ﺗﺒﲔ ﻟﻨﺎ أن ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪﻫﻢ ّإ�ﻩ �ﻗﺺ ﰲ اﻷﺻﻞ واﻟﻔﺮع‪‘...‬‬ ‫ﻟﻪ‪ .‬وإذا ﺗﺪﺑّﺮ� ﰲ أﻣﺮﻫﻢ ﺗﺪﺑﲑاً ﺻﺤﻴﺤﺎً ّ‬
‫ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﺎ دﯾﮕﺮ ﺣﯿﻮاﻧﻮں ﺳﮯ ﺑہ ﺗﺪرﯾﺞ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ و ﯾﻘﯿﻨﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺑﺎطﻞ اور ﻏﻠﻂ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﮐﻮﺋﯽ دﻟﯿ ِﻞ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﯾﺎ ﻧﻘﻠﯽ اس ﮐﯽ ﺣﻤﺎﯾﺖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺗﯽ اور ڈارون ﻧﮯ ﻣﺤﺾ اﻧﺪازوں اور اﮢﮑﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﯾہ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ۔‬
‫اردو ﻓﺘﺎوی ﺟﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﮩﺎں ﻋﺒﺎدات اور ﻋﺎﺋﻠﯽ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻘﺮﯾﺒﺎ ً ﮨﺮ طﺮح ﮐﮯ اﺳﺘﻔﺘﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪،‬‬
‫ﺼہ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ّ ،‬اﻻ ﻣﺎ ﺷﺎء ﷲ۔ ﭼﻮں ﮐہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ اﯾﮏ‬ ‫وﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ و ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮩﺖ ﻣﺤﺪود ﺣ ّ‬
‫اﻟﺤﻖ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧﮯ ’ڈﯾﺴﻨﭧ‬‫ّ‬ ‫ﻧﯿﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا ﺳﻮاے ﭼﻨﺪ ﻓﺘﺎوی ﺟﺎت ﮐﮯ اس ﮐﺎ ﺗﺬﮐﺮه ﮐﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﻠﺘﺎ۔ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﻋﺒﺪ‬
‫آف ﻣﯿﻦ‘ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﺳﺘﻔﺘﺎ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐہ اس ﮐﺘﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﺑﺘﺪا ًء دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻤﺎم ﻣﺨﻠﻮق اﺻﻞ‬
‫ﻓﻄﺮت ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﺗﮭﯽ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ ﺗﺮﻗّﯽ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ﯾہ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺋﯿﮟ اور اﻧﺴﺎن اس ﻓﻄﺮی رﻓﺘﺎر ﮐﺎ آﺧﺮی ﻣﺮﺣﻠہ‬
‫ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﯾﻌﻨﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن دﻓﻌﺘﺎ ً ﭘﯿﺪا ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮا۔ اس ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﺳﻼﻣﯽ ﻧﻘﻄۂ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ اس ﮐﮯ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻓﺘﻮی دﯾﺎ‪:‬‬
‫’ڈارون ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﻧﺒﺎﺗﺎت ﭘﮭﺮ ﺣﯿﻮان )ﺑﻨﺪر( ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬ﭘﮭﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﻨﺎ‪ ،‬ﺳﺮاﺳﺮ ﻏﻠﻂ اور ﻧﺼﻮص ﺷﺮﻋﯿّہ ﮐﮯ‬
‫‪5‬‬
‫ﺧﻼف ﮨﮯ۔‘‬
‫ﺖ آدم ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ آﯾﺎت اور اﺣﺎدﯾﺚ ذﮐﺮ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ﯾہ اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ‬
‫اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ﺧﻠﻘ ِ‬
‫ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﺗﺪرﯾﺞ ﮐﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ۔ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﯾﻮﺳﻒ ﻟﺪھﯿﺎﻧﻮی ﻧﮯ اس ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮍی ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻠﯽ ﻓﺘﻮی ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﺼہ درج ذﯾﻞ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬‫ﮐﭽﮭ ﺣ ّ‬
‫’ﯾہ ﺳﻮال ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ آﻓﺮﯾﻨﺶ ﮐﺎ آﻏﺎز ﮐﯿﺴﮯ ﮨﻮا؟ ظﺎﮨﺮ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾہ اﯾﮏ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ واﻗﻌہ ﮨﮯ اور ﮐﺴﯽ اﻧﺪازے اور ﺗﺨﻤﯿﻨﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﺎ ﭘﺮ اس ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ دو ﮢﻮک ﺑﺎت ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﮩﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ۔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده دور ﮐﺎ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧہ ﺗﻮ اﺑﺘﺪاے آﻓﺮﯾﻨﺶ ﮐﮯ وﻗﺖ‬
‫ﭼﺸﻢ دﯾﺪه ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﮐﮩﺘﺎ‪ ،‬ﻧہ ﯾہ اﯾﺴﯽ ﭼﯿﺰ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﮯ ﻧﮯ اس‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﺧﻮد ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ وه ﺟﻮ ﮐﭽﮭ ﮐﮩﺘﺎ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﮐﯽ ﮨﻮ‪ ،‬ورﻧہ ﮨﺰاروں ﺑﺮس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺑﻨﺪر ﮐﻮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﻨﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﺿﺮور دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ‪ ،‬ﯾﺎ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺑﻨﺪر‬
‫ﮐﻮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﻨﺎ دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ اس ﻧﮯ ﺗﺠﺮﺑہ ﺿﺮور ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ۔ ﭘﺲ ﺟﺐ ﯾہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه اور ﺗﺠﺮﺑہ دوﻧﻮں ﺳﮯ ﻣﺤﺮوم ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﻖ‬
‫اس ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ اﮢﮑﻞ ﭘﭽﻮ ﺗﺨﻤﯿﻨﻮں‪ ،‬اﻧﺪازوں اور وﮨﻢ ﮐﯽ ﮐﺮﺷﻤہ ﺳﺎزﯾﻮں ﭘﺮ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ۔ اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﻮد ﺧﺎﻟ ِ‬
‫ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﺎ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ‪ ،‬ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺒﮩﻢ اور دو ﮢﻮک ارﺷﺎد ﮨﮯ ﺟﺴﮯ آپ ﻧﮯ ﺳﻮال ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻘﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ۔۔۔ اﮔﺮ وﺣﺊ اﻟﮩﯽ ﻧﮯ اس ﻣﺴﺌﻠﮯ‬
‫ﮨﻤﺎری ﮐﻮﺋﯽ راه ﻧﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯽ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﺗﺐ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻋﻘﻞ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎ ﯾہ ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ ﮨﻢ ڈارون ﮐﮯ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪاﺗﯽ اور ﻏﯿﺮ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎﺗﯽ‬
‫ﺗﯿﺮ ﺗﮑﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻗﺒﻮل ﻧہ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ‪ ،‬ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻋﻘﻞ‪ ،‬ﻋﻘﻞ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻏﯿﺮ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﻗﯿﺎﺳﺎت اور ﺗﺨﻤﯿﻨﻮں ﭘﺮ اﻧﺪھﺎ دھﻨﺪ‬
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‫اﯾﻤﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻻﯾﺎ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ۔‘‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ اور ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺼﻮص آدم ﻋﻠﯿہ اﻟﺴﻼم ﮐﯽ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اس ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﺎ اطﻼق ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺘﻮی ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫ﻧﺼﻮص ﻗﻄﻌﯿّہ اور اﺟﻤﺎعِ ﺳﻠﻒ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻠﯽ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫’اس ﺷﺨﺺ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﺑﺪ ﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﺑﺪﻋﺖ ﮨﮯ ‪7‬۔۔۔ ﺣﻀﺮت آدم ﻋﻠﯿہ اﻟﺴﻼم ﮐﻮ‬
‫ت اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮﮨﯿﻦ ﮨﮯ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺣﯿﻮان آدم‘ ﮐﮩﻨﺎ اور ان ﮐﺎ ﺳﻠﺴﻠۂ ﻧﺴﺐ ﺑﻨﺪروں ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﻼﻧﺎ ’اﺷﺮف اﻟﻤﺨﻠﻮﻗﺎت‘ ﺣﻀﺮ ِ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ’‬
‫اور ﯾہ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف ﺣﻀﺮت آدم ﻋﻠﯿہ اﻟﺴﻼم ﮐﯽ ﺷﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﮔﺴﺘﺎﺧﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ ان ﮐﯽ ﻧﺴﻞ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺗﻤﺎم اﻧﺒﯿﺎء‬

‫‪ 4‬اﻟﺗﮭﺎﻧوي‪ ،‬أﺷرف ﻋﻠﻲ‪ ،‬اﻻﻧﺗﺑﮭﺎت اﻟﻣﻔﯾدة‪ ،‬ص ‪172-168‬۔‬

‫اﻟﺣﻖ‪ ،‬ﻓﺗﺎوی ﺣﻘّﺎﻧﯾّہ‪ ،‬طﺑﻊ‪ :‬ﺷﺷم‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺷر‪ :‬ﺟﺎﻣﻌہ دار اﻟﻌﻠوم ﺣﻘﺎﻧﯾہ اﮐوڑه ﺧﮢﮏ ﻧوﺷﮩره‪268/1 ،‬۔‬
‫ّ‬ ‫‪ 5‬ﻣوﻻﻧﺎ ﻋﺑد‬
‫‪ 6‬ﯾوﺳف ﻟدھﯾﺎﻧوی‪ ،‬ﻣوﻻﻧﺎ‪ ،‬آپ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺳﺎﺋل اور ان ﮐﺎ ﺣل‪ ،‬ﻣﮑﺗﺑہ ﻟدھﯾﺎﻧوی‪ ،‬ﮐراﭼﯽ‪37/9 ،‬‬
‫‪ 7‬اﯾﺿﺎ ً‪88/9 ،‬۔‬
‫ت ﻧﺒﻮﯾہ ﺳﮯ اﻧﺤﺮاف‪ ،‬اس‬
‫ﮐﺮام ﻋﻠﯿﮩﻢ اﻟﺴﻼم ﮐﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﻮﮨﯿﻦ و ﺗﻨﻘﯿﺺ ﮨﮯ۔ ‪ 8‬اس ﺷﺨﺺ ﮐﺎ ﻓﻼﺳﻔہ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻘﻠﯿﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ارﺷﺎدا ِ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﮐﺞ روی و ﮔﻤﺮاﮨﯽ ﮐﯽ دﻟﯿﻞ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اس ﻟﯿﮯ اس ﺷﺨﺺ ﮐﻮ ﻻزم ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻋﻘﺎﺋﺪ و ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﺳﮯ ﺗﻮﺑہ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ رﺟﻮع‬
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‫اﻟﯽ اﻟﺤﻖ ﮐﺮے اور ﻧﺪاﻣﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﺠﺪﯾ ِﺪ اﯾﻤﺎن ﮐﺮے۔‬
‫ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﺣﻤﯿﺪ ﷲ ﺟﺎن ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ اﯾﺴﮯ ﺷﺨﺺ ﮐﮯ ﺣﮑﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ اﺳﺘﻔﺘﺎ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﺒﺎرات ﮐﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﮨﮯ۔ ان‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻋﺒﺎرت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫’ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﮯ آﮨﺴﺘہ آﮨﺴﺘہ ﮨﻢ ﮨﯽ ﻟﻮگ ﻧﻮری ﻣﺨﻠﻮق‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﯾﺎ ﻓﺮﺷﺘہ ﺑﻦ ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ‪ ،‬آﺧﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده ﺷﮑﻞ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﺻﺪﯾﻮں ﮐﺎ ﻓﺎﺻﻠہ طﮯ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ﯾﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اﯾﺴﺎ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺣﯿﺎﺗﯿﺎﺗﯽ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ڈارون ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﺟﺎری و ﺳﺎری رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔۔۔‘ اس ﮐﮯ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ رﻗﻢ طﺮاز ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫’ان ﻋﺒﺎرات ﮐﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ اور ﺗﺒﻠﯿﻎ و ﺗﺮوﯾﺞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻻ ﺷﺨﺺ ﺿﺎ ّل و ﻣﻀ ّﻞ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﺧﻮد ﺑﮭﯽ ﮔﻤﺮاه ﮨﮯ اور دوﺳﺮوں ﮐﻮ‬
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‫ﺑﮭﯽ ﮔﻤﺮاه ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻻ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اور اﮔﺮ ان ﻋﺒﺎرات ﭘﺮ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﮐﮯ ﯾﻘﯿﻦ رﮐﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﻮ ﺗﻮ اﺳﻼم ﺳﮯ ﺧﺎرج ﮨﮯ۔‘‬
‫ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ زﮐﺮﯾﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻠﯿﻔہ اور ﺟﺎﻣﻌہ ﺣﺴﯿﻨﯿہ راﻧﺪﯾﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺻﺪر ﻣﻔﺘﯽ‪ ،‬ﻣﻔﺘﯽ اﺳﻤﺎﻋﯿﻞ ﮐﭽﮭﻮﻟﻮی ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﭘﻮﭼﮭﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮐہ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﺎ ﻗﺎﻋﺪه دﯾﻨﯽ ﻧﻘﻄۂ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺳﮯ ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﮨﮯ ﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ؟ ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﯿﮟ وه اﺧﺘﺼﺎر ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫’ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﭼﮭﻮﮢﮯ ﭼﮭﻮﮢﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﻮر ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺋﮯ‪ ،‬ﭘﮭﺮ طﺒﻘہ وار اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ۔ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﺑﺎت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﷲ ﻧﮯ ﺑﺬرﯾﻌہ وﺣﯽ ﺑﺘﺎﺋﻲ ﮨﮯ۔۔۔اﺳﮑﻮل ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮑﮭﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ڈارون ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺗﮭﯿﻮری ﮐﻮ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﮐﺮ اس ﮐﻮ ﺳﯿﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ اور ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮨﯽ ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﯿﺖ ﮐﺮے ﮐہ ﯾہ ﮔﻤﺮاه ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺗﮭﯿﻮری ﺳﯿﮑﮭ‬
‫ﮐﺮ ﮨﻢ اﺳﻼم ﮐﯽ ﺧﻮﺑﯽ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اور اﮔﺮ وه ﻟﻮگ ﮨﻢ ﭘﺮ ﺳﻮال ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﺗﻮ ﮨﻢ اس ﮐﺎ ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﺟﻮاب دے ﺳﮑﺘﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔۔۔اور ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮨﯽ اﺳﻼﻣﯽ ﻋﻘﯿﺪه ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﮏ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ آﻧﮯ دﯾﻨﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ۔‘ ‪ 11‬ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺣﺬﯾﻔہ‬
‫اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋۂ ﻣﺴﺎﺋ ِﻞ ﺟﺪﯾﺪه ﻣﯿﮟ رﻗﻢ طﺮاز ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫’اس )ڈارون( ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﻋﻘﯿﺪه ﻗﺮآن و ﺣﺪﯾﺚ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﻟﮑﻞ ﺧﻼف ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﯾہ ﺑﮯ ﺳﺮ و ﭘﺎ اور ﻣﻠﺤﺪاﻧہ ﻋﻘﯿﺪه ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اﺳﻼم ﺳﮯ اس ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﻌﻠّﻖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‪ ،‬اس ﻟﯿﮯ اﮔﺮ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺷﺨﺺ )ﻣﻌﺎذ ﷲ( اس ﻗﺴﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻘﯿﺪه رﮐﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﻮ ﺗﻮ اﺳﮯ ﻓﻮرا ً اﭘﻨﮯ اس ﻋﻘﯿﺪے ﺳﮯ‬
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‫ﺗﻮﺑہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯاور ﺗﺠﺪﯾ ِﺪ اﯾﻤﺎن و ﺗﺠﺪﯾ ِﺪ ﻧﮑﺎح ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ۔‘‬
‫ﻣﺬﮐﻮره ﺑﺎﻻ ﻓﺘﺎوی ﺟﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﺳﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﯾہ ﺗﺎﺛّﺮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾہ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل‬
‫اور دﻻﺋﻞ ﺳﮯ ﻋﺎری ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﮨﮯ اور ﺑﻌﺾ ﻓﺘﺎوی ﺟﺎت ﻧﮯ اﯾﺴﺎ ﻋﻘﯿﺪه رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺗﺠﺪﯾ ِﺪ اﯾﻤﺎن ﮐﻮ ﻻزﻣﯽ‬
‫ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﻨﺎﯾ ًۃ اﺳﮯ ﮐﻔﺮ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ذﯾﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻢ اس ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﺎ ﺗﺠﺰﯾہ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﯽ اﮢﮑﻞ اور ﺗﺨﻤﯿﻨﻮں ﭘﺮ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد‪:‬‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎﺑﺖ ﻋﻠﻤﺎے دﯾﻦ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ ﺗﺎﺛّﺮ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾہ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﻣﻀﺒﻮط ﻋﻠﻤﯽ دﻻﺋﻞ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ اور ﻧہ ﺷﻮاﮨﺪ‬
‫اس ﮐﯽ ﺣﻤﺎﯾﺖ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﺗﮭﺎﻧﻮی اور ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﻟﺪھﯿﺎﻧﻮی ﻧﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻘﺮﯾﺒﺎ ً اﻧﮭﯽ ﺗﺎﺛّﺮات ﮐﺎ‬
‫اظﮩﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ‪ 13‬ﺧﻮد ﭼﺎرﻟﺰ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ﺣﺎﻻں ﮐہ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺗﻨﮯ دﻻﺋﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ دان اﺳﮯ ﯾﻘﯿﻨﯽ‬
‫ڈارون ﻧﮯ ﻧﮩﺎﯾﺖ اﺣﺘﯿﺎط ﺳﮯ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه و ﺗﺘﺒّﻊ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﯾہ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ۔ ‪1831‬ء ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ اﯾﭻ اﯾﻢ اﯾﺲ ﺑﯿﮕﻞ‬
‫)‪ (HMS Beagle‬ﭘﺮ ﭘﺎﻧﭻ ﺳﺎﻟہ ﺳﻤﻨﺪری ﺳﻔﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ اور ﯾﮩﯽ ﺳﻔﺮ ان ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﮯ اﻓﮑﺎر ﮐﺎ ﭘﯿﺶ ﺧﯿﻤہ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮا۔ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ‬
‫اس ﺳﻔﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻓﺎﺳﻠﺰ )‪ ،(fossils‬ﭼﺮﻧﺪ و ﭘﺮﻧﺪ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﻧﻮاع)‪ (species‬اور ﺟﺰاﺋﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﮐﯿﺎ۔ اس ﺳﻔﺮ‬
‫ﺳﮯ واﭘﺴﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ وه اﭘﻨﮯ ﺗﺌﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت ﺟﺎری رﮐﮭﮯ۔‬

‫‪ 8‬اﯾﺿﺎ ً‪89/9 ،‬۔‬

‫‪ 9‬اﯾﺿﺎ ً‪90/9 ،‬۔‬
‫‪ 10‬ﺣﻣﯾد ﷲ ﺟﺎن‪ ،‬ﻣﻔﺗﯽ‪ ،‬ارﺷﺎد اﻟﻣﻔﺗﯾن‪ ،‬ﻣﮑﺗﺑۃ اﻟﺣﺳن‪ ،‬ﻻﮨور‪83/1 ،‬۔‬
‫‪ 11‬اﺳﻣﺎﻋﯾل ﮐﭼﮭوﻟوی‪ ،‬ﻣﻔﺗﯽ‪ ،‬ﻓﺗﺎوی دﯾﻧﯾہ‪ ،‬ﺟﺎﻣﻌہ ﺣﺳﯾﻧﯾہ راﻧدﯾر‪ ،‬ﺿﻠﻊ ﺳورت‪ ،‬ﮔﺟرات‪ ،‬اﻧڈﯾﺎ‪ ،‬طﺑﻊ اول‪ ،2013 :‬ص ‪183/1‬۔‬
‫‪ 12‬ﻣﺣﻣد ﺣذﯾﻔہ‪ ،‬ﻣوﻟوی‪ ،‬ﻣﺣﻘّﻖ و ّ‬
‫ﻣدﻟل ﺟدﯾد ﻣﺳﺎﺋل‪ ،‬ﺟﺎﻣﻌہ اﺳﻼﻣﯾہ اﺷﺎﻋت اﻟﻌﻠوم‪ ،‬اﮐل ﮐوا‪ ،‬ﺿﻠﻊ ﻧﻧدر ﺑﺎر ﻣﮩﺎراﺷﮢر‪ ،‬اﻧڈﯾﺎ‪ ،‬طﺑﻊ دوم‪ ،2014 :‬ص‪65‬۔‬
‫‪ 13‬ﻣﻼﺣظہ ﮨو‪ Jerry Coyne ،‬ﮐﯽ ‪Why Evolution is True‬۔‬
‫اس ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﮯ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ان ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪّ درﺟہ اﺣﺘﯿﺎط ﮐﺎ اس ﺑﺎت ﺳﮯ ﺑہ ﺧﻮﺑﯽ اﻧﺪازه ﻟﮕﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ان ﮐﯽ ﭘﮩﻠﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب )‪1859 (Origin of Species‬ء ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﺎﺋﻊ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ اور اس درﻣﯿﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﺮﺻﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ وه ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ‬
‫‪14‬‬
‫ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت و ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪات ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺼﺮوف رﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﮐﺎر‪:‬‬
‫ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﻟﺪھﯿﺎﻧﻮی ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﮐﮩﻨﺎ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ اﺑﺘﺪا ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ دو ﮢﻮک ﺑﺎت ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ‪ ،‬ﯾﻘﯿﻨﺎ ً درﺳﺖ ﮨﮯ‪،‬‬
‫ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ اﻋﺘﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﺴﯽ’دو ﮢﻮک ﺑﺎت‘ ﯾﺎ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ )‪ (absolute truth‬ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺣﺼﻮل ﮐﯽ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ان ﮐﯽ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن اﭘﻨﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ ﮐﺎ ﺧﻮد ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﮐﺎر ﭘﺮ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﻋﺘﺮاض ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻨﺘﺎ۔ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ اﻋﺘﺮاﺿﺎت ﮐﻮ دﯾﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﻟﮕﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬
‫طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﮐﺎر ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﮐﮯ ذﮨﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻏﻠﻂ ﻓﮩﻤﯿﺎں ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾﮩﺎں ﭘﺮ اﺧﺘﺼﺎر ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﮐﺎر ﮐﯽ وﺿﺎﺣﺖ ﮐﺮ دی ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔‬
‫ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺼﻮل ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﮐﺎر ﮐﻮ ﻋﺎم طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﭼﻨﺪ اﺟﺰا ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ؛ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﻮ اﮐﮣﮭﺎ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ‪ ،‬ان ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ‬
‫ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿہ )‪ (hypothesis‬ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ اور ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ اﯾﺴﮯ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺗﮏ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﻨﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﯾﺎ ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺎﯾﯿﺪ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮں ﯾﺎ ان ﮐﯽ ﺗﮑﺬﯾﺐ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮں۔ ﺑہ ظﺎﮨﺮ ﻣﺤﺾ ﯾﮩﯽ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﮐﺎر ﻟﮕﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪،‬‬
‫ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﭘﺮ اﯾﮏ ﻧﻈﺮ ڈاﻟﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺼﻮل ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﮐﺎر ﻣﺤﺾ‬
‫اﯾﮏ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺎ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﮐﮯ طﺮﯾﻘﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﯾﻮﻧﺎﻧﯽ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﺎم طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺟﻮ طﺮﯾﻘہ راﺋﺞ‬
‫ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬اﺳﮯ ارﺳﻄﻮ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﻣﻨﺴﻮب ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ اور وه ﺑﺪﯾﮩﯿّﺎت ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺗﮭﺎ )‪(axiomatic approach‬۔ ارﺳﻄﻮ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ‬
‫ﻣﻨﻄﻘﯽ طﺮﯾﻘہ اﺳﺘﺨﺮاج دﻻﺋﻞ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺗﮭﺎ اور وه ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ )‪ (absolute truth‬ﯾﺎ ﯾﻘﯿﻨﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺎ ﺿﺎﻣﻦ ﺗﮭﺎ۔‬
‫اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﻼﺳﻔہ اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ داﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ اﺣﺴﺎس ﮨﻮا ﮐہ ﮐﺌﯽ رﮐﺎوﮢﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ‪ ،‬ﮨﻢ ﯾﻘﯿﻨﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺼﻮل‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا ارﺳﻄﻮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﯽ طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎے )‪ (hypothetico-deductive method‬ﮐﻮ ﺷﮩﺮت‬
‫ﻣﻠﻨﮯ ﻟﮕﯽ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ اﺳﯽ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﮯ ﭘﺮ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮨﻢ ﺑﻌﺾ رﮐﺎوﮢﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ )‪ (absolute truth‬ﺗﮏ رﺳﺎﺋﯽ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ۔‬
‫‪Science is now generally viewed as producing theories that are probably correct, but we do‬‬
‫‪not expect science to guarantee that theories are correct (nor do we think that this is‬‬
‫‪possible). 15‬‬
‫)‪ (Hypothetico-deductive method‬ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﺎت )‪ (hypotheses‬ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اور ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﺎت ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻻزﻣﯽ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ )‪ (consequences‬ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺒﻂ ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﭘﮭﺮ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪے ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﺎ ﭘﺮ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮﺛﯿﻖ ﯾﺎ ﺗﻀﻌﯿﻒ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﯾﮩﯽ طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﻋﻠﻢ اب ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ زﯾﺎده ﻣﻘﺒﻮل ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ اﺑﺘﺪا ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ﺗﮭﯿﻮرﯾﺰ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫اﺳﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ دﯾﮑﮭﻨﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ اور ان ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮدﯾﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺤﺾ ﯾہ ﮐﮩہ دﯾﻨﺎ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﭼﻮں ﮐہ ﻓﻼں واﻗﻌہ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ‬
‫رﮨﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﺿﻌﯿﻒ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻤﯽ روﯾّہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ۔ ﮨﺎں‪ ،‬اﮔﺮ دﻻﺋﻞ و ﺷﻮاﮨﺪ اس ﺗﮭﯿﻮری ﮐﮯ ﺧﻼف ﻧﻈﺮ آ رﮨﮯ‬
‫ﻋﯿﻦ اﻧﺼﺎف اور ﻋﻠﻤﯽ دﯾﺎﻧﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﮨﻮں اور اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ اﺳﮯ ﺿﻌﯿﻒ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﺎ ِ‬
‫ﺗﮭﯿﻮری‪/‬ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ اور اﻧﺪازے )‪ (speculation‬ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق‪:‬‬
‫ﯾﮩﺎں ﭘﺮ اﯾﮏ اور ﻏﻠﻂ ﻓﮩﻤﯽ ﮐﻮ دور ﮐﺮ دﯾﻨﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﺑﻌﺾ اوﻗﺎت )اور ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺼﻮص ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻓﺘﺎوی ﺟﺎت‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮨﻮ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ( ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ اور اﻧﺪازے ﮐﻮ ﺧﻠﻂ ﻣﻠﻂ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ؛ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ دوﻧﻮں ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﮯ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ‬
‫ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ زﺑﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻈﺮے اور اﻧﺪازے ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮩﺖ ﺑﮍا ﻓﺮق ﮨﮯ۔ ﺗﮭﯿﻮری ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد دﻧﯿﺎ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﯾﺴﮯ‬

‫‪14‬‬
‫‪Cynthia Mills, The Theory of Evolution, John Willey & Sons, INC., p. 40.‬‬
‫‪15‬‬
‫‪DeWitt, Richard, Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science, Wiley, Kindle Edition, p. 53.‬‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﺎ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋہ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻨﮭﯿﮟ ﻏﻮر و ﻓﮑﺮ اور ﺗﺘﺒّﻊ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﻮ۔ ‪ 16‬اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﺗﮭﯿﻮری ﮐﯽ دوﺳﺮی‬
‫‪17‬‬
‫ﺧﺎﺻﯿّﺖ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﺳﮯ دﻻﺋﻞ و ﺷﻮاﮨﺪ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﭘﺮﮐﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮﺛﯿﻖ و ﺗﻀﻌﯿﻒ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﻮ۔‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺤﺾ اﻧﺪازه ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﺎ ﻏﻠﻂ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ؛ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ ﯾہ ﺳﻮﭼﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮨﮯ اور اس ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﺎت ﮐﻮ دﻻﺋﻞ ﭘﺮ ﭘﺮﮐﮭﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻧﻘﺾ اﯾﻤﺎن‪:‬‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﺳﮯ ِ‬
‫ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﻟﺪھﯿﺎﻧﻮی ﮐﮯ ﻓﺘﻮی ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﻏﻮر ﺑﺎت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﯾﮏ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ وه ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﮐﮩہ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اور اس ﮐﺎ ﻻزﻣﯽ ﻧﺘﯿﺠہ ﯾہ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ان ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ‬
‫و ﯾﻘﯿﻨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ اور اﻧﮭﯿﮟ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮔﻨﺠﺎﯾﺶ ﻧﮑﻞ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ‪ 18‬ﺟﺐ ﮐہ دوﺳﺮی ﺟﺎﻧﺐ وه ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﺑﺪﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﺑﺪﻋﺖ ﻗﺮار دے رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺑﻞ ﮐہ اس ﺳﮯ ﺗﻮﺑہ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ اور ﺗﺠﺪﯾ ِﺪ اﯾﻤﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺗﻠﻘﯿﻦ ﮐﺮ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﺗﺠﺪﯾ ِﺪ‬
‫ﺗﻮﮨﯿﻦ آدم ﮐﮯ اﻟﺘﺰام ﮐﯽ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﺗﻮﮨﯿﻦ اﻧﺒﯿﺎ اور ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺼﻮص‬‫ِ‬ ‫اﯾﻤﺎن ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ان ﺳﮯ ﮐﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻔﺘﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﺮ رﮨﮯ ﮨﻮں‪ ،‬ورﻧہ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﮭﯽ ﭘﻮﭼﮭﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ اور ﺷﺎﯾﺪ اﺳﯽ ﺗﻮﮨﯿﻦ ﮐﯽ ﺷﺒہ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ وه اﺳﮯ ﻧﺎﻗﺾ ﻟﻼﯾﻤﺎن‬
‫’اﯾﮏ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ واﻗﻌہ‘ ﮐﻮ ﮐﻔﺮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﻓﮩﻢ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﺑﺪﻋﺖ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺧﺎص وﺟہ‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ آﺗﯽ۔ ﺳﻮال ﯾہ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﺗﮑﻔﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ اﻗﺮار ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺷﮏ و ﺷﺒہ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ‬
‫ﮐﻔﺮ ﮨﻮ‪ ،‬ﺗﻮ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺑہ ﻗﻮل ’اﯾﮏ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ واﻗﻌہ‘ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻔﺮ اور ﺗﺠﺪﯾ ِﺪ اﯾﻤﺎن ﮐﺲ طﺮح ﻻزم آﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ؟‬
‫ﺗﻮﮨﯿﻦ اﻧﺒﯿﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺷﺒہ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ ﮨﻮ؛ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ اﻧﮭﻮں‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﺣﺬﯾﻔہ ﮐﺎ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻓﺘﻮی ﻣﯿﮟ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻠﺤﺪاﻧہ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﯾﺪ‬
‫‪19‬‬
‫ﻧﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﻟﺪھﯿﺎﻧﻮی ﮐﯽ ﻋﺒﺎرت ﻧﻘﻞ ﮐﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﺳﻼم اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ‪:‬‬
‫اﺳﻼم اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮩﺖ ﮐﻢ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻧﮯ واﺿﺢ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﺎ اظﮩﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﻟﺒﺘہ ﺟﻦ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻧﮯ اﺳﻼم و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﻠّﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﺎ اظﮩﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اس ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻣﯿﺪان ﮐﺎر اﻟﮓ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫دﯾﮕﺮ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮﺧﻼف‪ ،‬اﺳﻼم ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﮯ ﻋﯿﻦ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ اور ﻣﺆﯾّﺪ ﮨﮯ اور ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ ان دوﻧﻮں ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ‪) ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺑہ ﮨﺮ ﺻﻮرت دوﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻀﺎد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ(۔ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﺷﮩﺎب اﻟﺪﯾﻦ ﻧﺪوی ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫’ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﯾﺎ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﺴﻢ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﯾﺎ ﻣﻨﺎﻓﺎت ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ دوﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﮔﮩﺮا رﺑﻂ و ﺗﻌﺎون ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ۔ ﻧﯿﺰ‬
‫ان ﻣﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ واﺿﺢ ﮨﻮ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﭘﺮ ﺣﺎﮐﻢ ﯾﺎ ﻓﺮﻣﺎں روا ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ وه درﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﻣﻌﺎون‬
‫ﺐ اﺳﻼم ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ اس‬ ‫و ﻣﺪدﮔﺎر ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اور ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﮐﺴﯽ اور ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﭘﺮ ﺻﺎدق ﻧہ آﺗﯽ ﮨﻮ – ﻧہ آﺋﮯ – ﻣﮕﺮ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺘﺎ ً ﻣﺬﮨ ِ‬
‫‪20‬‬
‫ﮐﯽ اﺻﻞ ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ ﯾﮩﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‘‬
‫ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﺒﺎری ﻧﺪوی ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫’اﺻﻮﻻً ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ اور ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻮعِ ﺑﺤﺚ اور ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ و ﺣﺪود ﺑﺎﻟﮑﻞ ﺟﺪا ﺟﺪا ﮨﯿﮟ۔۔۔ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ اﺑﺘﺪا اور‬
‫ت ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﮐﺎ ﺟﻮ رخ ﺑﺮا ِه راﺳﺖ ﯾﺎ ﮨﻤﺎرے‬ ‫اﻧﺘﮩﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺳﻮاﻻت ﺳﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﻮ ﻧہ ﺳﺮوﮐﺎر ﻧہ اس ﮐﯽ رﺳﺎﺋﯽ‪ ،‬ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ِ‬
‫ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه و ﺗﺠﺮﺑہ ﻣﯿﮟ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﺎ ﮐﺎم ﺑﺲ اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ رواﺑﻂ و ﻋﻼﺋﻖ ﮐﮯ ﻗﻮاﻧﯿﻦ و ﻗﻮاﻋﺪ ﮐﺎ اﻧﻀﺒﺎط ﮨﮯ۔۔۔ ﺑﺎﻗﯽ‬
‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺷﮩﺎدت ﯾﺎ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﮐﮯ ﭘﺲ ﭘﺮده اس ﮐﮯ ﻏﯿﺐ اول و آﺧﺮ اور ﺑﺎطﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﭼﮭﭙﯽ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﮐﺎر ﻓﺮﻣﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﯾہ‬ ‫اس ِ‬
‫‪21‬‬ ‫ً‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺎت ﮐﺎ داﺋﺮۀ ﺑﺤﺚ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ زاﮨﺪ اﻟﺮاﺷﺪی اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﻟہ‪ ،‬ﺑہ ﻧﺎم اﺳﻼم اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬

‫‪16‬‬
‫‪Jerry Coyne, Why Evolution is True, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 15.‬‬
‫‪17‬‬
‫‪Ibid, p. 16.‬‬
‫‪ 18‬ان ﮐﮯ اﻟﻔﺎظ ﯾہ ﮨﯾں‪’ ،‬ظﺎﮨر ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾہ اﯾﮏ ﺗﺎرﯾﺧﯽ واﻗﻌہ ﮨﮯ اور ﮐﺳﯽ اﻧدازے اور ﺗﺧﻣﯾﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻧﺎ ﭘر اس ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯾں ﮐوﺋﯽ دو ﮢوک ﺑﺎت ﻧﮩﯾں ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺗﯽ۔‘‬
‫‪ 19‬ﺣذﯾﻔہ‪ ،‬ﻣﺳﺎﺋ ِل ﺟدﯾده‪ ،‬ص ‪68‬۔‬
‫ﺳن طﺑﺎﻋت‪ ،1993 :‬ص ‪91‬‬ ‫ﺗﻌﻣﯾر اﻧﺳﺎﻧﯾت‪ ،‬ﻻﮨور‪ِّ ،‬‬
‫ِ‬ ‫‪ 20‬ﺷﮩﺎب اﻟدﯾن ﻧدوی‪ ،‬ﻣوﻻﻧﺎ‪ ،‬اﺳﻼم اور ﺟدﯾد ﺳﺎﺋﻧس‪ ،‬ﻣﮑﺗﺑہ‬
‫‪ 21‬ﻋﺑد اﻟﺑﺎری ﻧدوی‪ ،‬ﻣذﮨب و ﺳﺎﺋﻧس‪ ،‬ﺳﮢﯽ ﺑﮏ ﭘواﺋﻧٹ‪ ،‬اردو ﺑﺎزار‪ ،‬ﮐراﭼﯽ‪ ،‬دوﺳری اﺷﺎﻋت‪2007 :‬ء‪ ،‬ص ‪187‬‬
‫’ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮨﻤﺎری ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻒ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ ﻣﻌﺎون اور ﻣﺆﯾﺪ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن و ﺣﺪﯾﺚ ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮده ﺑﮩﺖ ﺳﮯ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﻋﻤﻞ و ﺗﺠﺮﺑہ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ ﻗﺮآن و ﺣﺪﯾﺚ ﮐﯽ ﺻﺪاﻗﺖ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ واﺿﺢ ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺋﯽ ﮨﮯ۔۔۔۔ اﺳﻼم‬
‫اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﺼﺎدم ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ اﺳﻼم ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻘﺎت ﮐﯽ دﻋﻮت دﯾﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ اور اس ﮐﯽ ﺣﻮﺻﻠہ اﻓﺰاﺋﯽ‬
‫‪22‬‬
‫ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ وﺣﯽ اﻟﮩﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮده ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺎﺋﯿﺪ ﮐﺮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ اور ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ ﮐﺮﺗﯽ ﺟﺎ رﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‘‬
‫ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺣﯿﺮت ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺐ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺳﻮال ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪے ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ‪،‬‬
‫اﯾﮏ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺗﻮ ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ ﮨﻢ ﻧﮯ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ‪ ،‬اﺳﮯ ﺳﻨﺠﯿﺪه ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ اور ﻗﻠﻢ ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺟﻨﺒﺶ ﺳﮯ اﺳﮯ ’ﻏﯿﺮ‬
‫ﻣﻌﻘﻮل‘‪’ ،‬ﻣﻀﺤﮑہ ﺧﯿﺰ‘ اور ’ڈارون ﮐﺎ وﮨﻢ‘ ﮐﮩہ ﮐﺮ ردّ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﺳﻼم و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﻢ‬
‫ﻣﻮاﻓﻘﺖ ﮐﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ‪ ،‬ﺷﮩﺎب اﻟﺪﯾﻦ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﭘﺮ طﻨﺰ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫’اﻧﺴﺎن اس دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ آزاد و ﺑﮯ ﻣﮩﺎر ﮨﺴﺘﯽ ﯾﺎ ڈارون ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ’ﺑﮍھﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﻮر‘ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
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‫ﺟﻮ ﺟﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ آﺋﮯ ﮐﺮ ڈاﻟﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ اﯾﮏ ذﻣﮯ دار اور ﺟﻮاب ده ﮨﺴﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‘‬
‫اس ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﺎ ﮨﻢ ﻧﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻟﯿﺎ‪ ،‬اس ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﺗﺎﺛّﺮ ﻣﻠﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﺳﻼم و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺑﺎﮨﻢ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ اور‬
‫ﺧﻼف ﻋﻘﻞ‪ ،‬ﻣﻠﺤﺪاﻧہ اور ﻣﻀﺤﮑہ ﺧﯿﺰ ﮨﮯ ۔‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮓ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺑﻞ ﮐہ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺑﺮ ﺣﻖ و ﻋﻘﻞ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺐ ﮐہ دوﺳﺮا‬
‫دﯾﻮﺑﻨﺪی ﻋﻠﻤﺎ اور ﻋﺮب ﮐﮯ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﮐﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮازﻧہ‪:‬‬
‫ﭘﮩﻠﯽ ﺑﺎت ﺗﻮ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ‪1928‬ء ﻣﯿﮟ ڈارون ﮐﯽ ﻣﺬﮐﻮره ﺑﺎﻻ ﮐﺘﺎب ﮐﺎ ﭘﮩﻼ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﻋﺮﺑﯽ ﺗﺮﺟﻤہ اﺳﻤﺎﻋﯿﻞ ﻣﻈﮩﺮ‬
‫ﺗﻄﻮر ﺗﮏ ﻋﺮﺑﻮں ﮐﯽ رﺳﺎﺋﯽ ﺑﮩﺖ‬ ‫ﻧﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ‪ 24 ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﻋﺮﺑﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺟﺮاﺋﺪ و رﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺑہ دوﻟﺖ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﯾﺎ ّ‬
‫ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ ﭘﯿﺶ ﺑﯿﺮوت ﺳﮯ ﺷﺎﺋﻊ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻻ ﻋﺮﺑﯽ زﺑﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ اﻧﮑﺸﺎﻓﺎت و درﯾﺎﻓﺘﻮں ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺻﺮوف ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﯾہ دوﻧﻮں ﺣﻀﺮات‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﯽ ﺟﺮﯾﺪه ’ﻣﻘﺘﻄﻒ‘ ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯﻣﺪﯾﺮ ﻓﺎرس ﻧﻤﺮ اور ﯾﻌﻘﻮب‬
‫اﻣﺮﯾﮑﯽ ﭘﺮوﮢﺴﮣﻨﭧ ﮐﺎﻟﺞ ﮐﮯ ﻓﺎرغ اﻟﺘﺤﺼﯿﻞ طﻠﺒہ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﺑﯿﺮوت ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺸﻨﺮی ﻣﻘﺎﺻﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ اس‬
‫ﺟﺮﯾﺪے ﮐﺎ آﻏﺎز ﻣﺌﯽ ‪1876‬ء ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ اور اس ﮐﮯ ّاوﻟﯿﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﺻﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﺮب دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﻮ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ اﻧﮑﺸﺎﻓﺎت و‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﺎرف ﮐﺮواﻧﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ اس رﺳﺎﻟﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ اس وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ اﻋﻼ درﺟﮯ ﮐﮯ ﯾﻮرﭘﯽ و اﻣﺮﯾﮑﯽ ﻓﻼﺳﻔہ و داﻧﺶ وروں‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت و آرا ﺑﮭﯽ وﻗﺘﺎ ً ﻓﻮﻗﺘﺎ ً ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ڈارون‪ ،‬ﮨﮑﺰﻟﮯ )‪ ،(Huxley‬ﭘﺎﺳﮣﯿﺌﺮ )‪ ،(Pasteur‬ﮢﯿﻨﮉل‬
‫)‪ ،(Tyndall‬ﺑﺎﺳﮣﯿَﻦ )‪ ،(Bastian‬ﻟﺒّﻮک )‪ ،(Lubbock‬وﯾﻠﯿﺲ )‪ ،(Wallace‬ﺳﭙﯿﻨﺴﺮ )‪ ،(Spencer‬ﮨﯿﮑﻞ )‪،(Haeckel‬‬
‫ﮢﯿﻠﺮ )‪ ،(E. B. Tylor‬ﮨﻨﺮی ﺳﮉﮔﻮک )‪ ،(Henry Sidgwick‬اﮔﯿﺴﯿﺰ )‪ ،(Agassiz‬ﻓﯿﺮاڈے )‪ ،(Faraday‬ﻣﯿﮑﺲ ﻣﻮﻟﺮ‬
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‫)‪ ،(Max Muller‬ﮐﺮوﭘﮣﮑﻦ )‪ (Kropotkin‬وﻏﯿﺮه ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﺗﮭﮯ۔‬
‫اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻤﺎرے ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪّ ﺗﮏ ڈارون ﮐﯽ )‪ (Origin of Species‬ﮐﺎ ﻋﺎم ﻓﮩﻢ ﺗﺮﺟﻤہ اردو زﺑﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ اﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﺗﮏ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮا۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﮩﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اردو ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه رﺳﺎﻟﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ دﺳﺖ ﯾﺎب ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻧہ ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﺧﻮد اس ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﻣﺘﻮ ّﺟہ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ اور ﻧہ اﭘﻨﮯ طﻠﺒہ اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﺮﯾﺪوں اور واﻗﻒ ﮐﺎروں ﮐﻮ اس‬
‫ﮐﯽ اﮨﻤﯿﺖ ﺳﮯ روﺷﻨﺎس ﮐﺮواﯾﺎ۔ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ اس ﺳﮯ ﻣﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﺗﮭﺎﻧﻮی ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﻧﮯ ﺧﻮد ﺑﮭﯽ ﻋﺼﺮی ﻋﻠﻮم ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﻗﻠﻢ اﮢﮭﺎﯾﺎ اور دﯾﮕﺮ زﺑﺎﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد اﮨﻢ ﮐﺘﺎﺑﻮں ﮐﺎ ﺗﺮﺟﻤہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﺮواﯾﺎ۔ اس ﺳﮯ ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮍا ﻧﻘﺼﺎن ﯾہ ﮨﻮا ﮐہ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ اور ﭼﯿﻠﻨﺠﺰ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻤﺎ ﺣﻘہ واﻗﻒ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ اور اﮔﺮ ﺳﻄﺤﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﺴﺌﻠﮯ ﺳﮯ واﻗﻒ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ اس‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺣﻞ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑہ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺗﻌ ّﻤﻖ ﺳﮯ ﻋﺎری ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﻋﺮب و ﮨﻨﺪ ﮐﮯ اس روﯾّﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻻزﻣﯽ اﺛﺮ رﺟﺎ ِل ﮐﺎر ﮐﮯ وﺟﻮد ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ روﻧﻤﺎ ﮨﻮا۔ ﻋﺮب دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭼﻮں ﮐہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ‬
‫ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﻋﻮاﻣﯽ طﺒﻘﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﺳﻨﺠﯿﺪه ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﻧﮯ اﺳﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺸﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﮟ اور اس‬
‫ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﺎ اظﮩﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ۔ ان ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺎں ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﺟﻤﺎل اﻟﺪﯾﻦ اﻓﻐﺎﻧﯽ‪ ،‬ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﺟﺴﺮ اور‬
‫ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﻋﺒﺪه وﻏﯿﺮه ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ان ﺣﻀﺮات ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮨﺮ اﯾﮏ ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺗﺌﯿﮟ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ اور اس ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ دﯾﻨﯽ‬
‫ﻧﻘﻄۂ ﻧﻈﺮ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ۔ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺼﻮص ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﻋﺒﺪه ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺶ ﭘﯿﺶ رﮨﮯ اور ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم‬

‫‪ 22‬زاﮨد اﻟراﺷدی‪ ،‬ﻣوﻻﻧﺎ اﺑو ﻋﻣﺎر‪ ،‬اﺳﻼم اور ﺳﺎﺋﻧس ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﮨﻣﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ‪ ،‬وﯾب ﺳﺎﺋٹ ﮐﺎ ﭘﺗہ‪http://www.alsharia.org/mujalla/2016/jan/islam-aur- :‬‬
‫‪28-11-2018, 5:42 A.M. ،science-maulana-zahidurrashdi‬‬
‫‪ 23‬اﺳﻼم اور ﺟدﯾد ﺳﺎﺋﻧس‪ ،‬ص ‪50‬‬
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‫‪Marwa Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic, p. 262.‬‬
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‫‪Marwa Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic, p. 25-28‬‬
‫و ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ اور ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ان ﮐﯽ آرا ﺑﮩﺖ ﻗﯿﻤﺘﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﻋﻠﻤﺎے ﮨﻨﺪ )دﯾﻮﺑﻨﺪ( ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ آﯾﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﻧﮯ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه طﻮر ﭘﺮ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﯾﺎ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﭘﺮ ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺎں ﮐﺎم ﮐﯿﺎ ﯾﺎ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ اس ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﺗﺮﻏﯿﺐ دی‬
‫ﮨﻮ۔‬
‫ذﯾﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻢ ان ﺟﻼل اﻟﺪﯾﻦ اﻓﻐﺎﻧﯽ‪ ،‬ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﺟﺴﺮ اور ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﻋﺒﺪه ﮐﯽ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﺧﺘﺼﺎر ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ آرا ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮ‬
‫رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﺟﻼل اﻟﺪﯾﻦ اﻓﻐﺎﻧﯽ‪:‬‬
‫ﺟﻼل اﻟﺪﯾﻦ اﻓﻐﺎﻧﯽ اﯾﮏ رواﯾﺘﯽ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ اﺳﻼﻣﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﯽ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺖ ﭘﺮ ان ﮐﯽ ﮔﮩﺮی ﻧﻈﺮ ﺗﮭﯽ اور ان ﮐﮯ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ اﻓﮑﺎر‬
‫ﺑﺮ ﺻﻐﯿﺮ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ اﻓﻐﺎﻧﯽ ﻧﮯ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ﮐﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ اﻧﮭﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ و اﻧﻘﻼﺑﯽ رﮨﻨﻤﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ اﭘﻨﮯ اﻓﮑﺎر ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ڈارون ﮐﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ﺳﺮ ﺳﯿّﺪ‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎن ﺣﺎ ِل ﻧﯿﭽﺮﯾﺎن‘ ﻟﮑﮭﯽ‪ ،‬ﺟﺴﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ‬‫ﺐ ﻧﯿﭽﺮی و ِ‬ ‫ﺖ ﻣﺬﮨ ِ‬
‫اﺣﻤﺪ ﺧﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮدﯾﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺎرﺳﯽ زﺑﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ’ﺣﻘﯿﻘ ِ‬
‫ﻋﻨﻮان ’اﻟﺮدّ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺪھﺮﯾّﯿﻦ‘۔ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ اﻓﻐﺎﻧﯽ ﻧﮯ ﯾہ ﮐﺘﺎب‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﮐﮯ ﺷﺎﮔﺮد ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﻋﺒﺪه ﻧﮯ ﻋﺮﺑﯽ زﺑﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺮﺟﻤہ ﮐﯿﺎ‪ ،‬ﺑہ‬
‫ﺳﺮ ﺳﯿّﺪ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﯽ‪ ،‬ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﻋﺒﺪه ﻧﮯ اﺳﮯ ﺷﺒﻠﯽ ﺷﻤﯿﻞ ﮐﮯ اﻓﮑﺎر ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮدﯾﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺗﺮﺟﻤہ ﮐﯿﺎ۔ ﺷﺒﻠﯽ‬
‫ﺷﻤﯿﻞ ‪ Materialist‬ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻨﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﭘﺮ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد رﮐﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﺎدﯾّﺖ ﮐﻮ ﺗﻘﻮﯾّﺖ دی۔ ﯾﮩﺎں ﭘﺮ ﺷﻤﯿﻞ ﮐﮯ‬
‫اﻓﮑﺎر ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻞ ﻟﮑﮭﻨﺎ ﻣﻘﺼﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‪ ،‬اﻟﺒﺘہ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﺗﻮ ّﺟہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻓﻐﺎﻧﯽ ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ اس ﮐﺘﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ڈارون ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺳﺮﺳﺮی اﻧﺪاز ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺬﮐﺮه ﮐﯿﺎ اور ان ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎدﯾّﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ۔ ‪ 26‬اﻟﺒﺘہ ﺣﯿﺮت ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
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‫ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ڈارون ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﭽﮭ ﻧﺮﻣﯽ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮه ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ اﻧﮭﻮں ‪ theist‬ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ۔‬
‫ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﺟﺴﺮ‪:‬‬
‫ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﺟﺴﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ اﯾﮏ رواﯾﺘﯽ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺟﻮ ﭼﯿﺰ اﻧﮭﯿﮟ دﯾﮕﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻤﺘﺎز ﮐﺮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬وه ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﮐﯽ ﺳﻨﺠﯿﺪﮔﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻋﺮﺑﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ اس وﻗﺖ ﮐﺌﯽ اﺳﮑﻮل اﯾﺴﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﻣﺸﻨﺮی ﻣﻘﺎﺻﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ‬
‫ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻢ دے رﮨﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ اور ﺧﻮد ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ ان ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﻣﺘﻮ ّﺟہ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ﺳﺒﺐ اﻋﻼم ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﯽ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﺗﮭﺎ۔‬
‫ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﯽ ﻣﯿﺪان ﻣﯿﮟ وه ان ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻨﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻣﺸﻨﺮی ﺳﮑﻮﻟﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻨﺠﯿﺪه ﻟﯿﺎ اور اﯾﺴﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﯽ‬
‫اداروں ﮐﻮ ﻓﺮوغ دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺸﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ اﯾﺴﮯ اﺳﮑﻮﻟﻮں ﮐﺎ ﺑﺪل ﺑﻦ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ۔ ﻟﮩﺬا اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﺎ اداره ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺮوع ﮐﯿﺎ‪،‬‬
‫ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻮم ﺳﮑﮭﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺑﺪ ﻗﺴﻤﺘﯽ ﺳﮯ وه اﭘﻨﯽ اﺑﺘﺪا ﮐﮯ ﺗﯿﺴﺮے ﺳﺎل ﮨﯽ ﺑﻨﺪ ﮨﻮ‬
‫ﮔﯿﺎ۔‬
‫زﯾﺮ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﺳﮯ واﻗﻔﯿّﺖ دﻻﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﮐﺘﺐ اور رﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺼﻮص ’اﻟﻤﻘﺘﻄﻒ‘‪ ،‬ﯾﮩﯽ وﺟہ‬ ‫ﺟﺴﺮ ﮐﮯ ِ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎت اور اﺑﺤﺎث ﺳﮯ واﻗﻒ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ان ﮐﯽ ﺷﮩﺮت ﮐﺎ ﺳﺒﺐ ان ﮐﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ’اﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺤﻤﯿﺪﯾﺔ‘ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ‬
‫ﺖ ﻋﺜﻤﺎﻧﯿہ ﮐﯽ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ ﭘﺎﻟﯿﺴﯿﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ‪ ،‬اﻟﺒﺘہ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﮭﯽ‬ ‫اﺻﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ ﺳﻠﻄﻨ ِ‬
‫ﺑﮩﺖ ﺳﮯ اﻓﮑﺎر ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ۔ اس ﮐﺘﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺴﺮ ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﺑﮍا ﮨﺪف ﻣﺎدﯾّﺖ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ )‪ (materialism‬ﮐﯽ ﺳﺨﺖ ﺗﺮدﯾﺪ‬
‫ﺗﮭﯽ۔ اس ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻣﻨﺎظﺮاﻧہ اﺳﻠﻮب اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﯾہ ﺑﺘﺎﯾﺎ ﮐہ اﯾﮏ ﻋﺎم ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎن ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺑﮭﯽ اس ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺑﺎ آﺳﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺮدﯾﺪ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﯾہ ﮐہ ﻣﺎدﯾّﺖ ﮐﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ زﻣﺎﻧۂ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ ﺳﮯ ﭼﻼ آرﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ اﺳﻼف ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﺎدﯾّﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻼف دﻻﺋﻞ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺬﮐﺮه ﮐﯿﺎ۔‬
‫ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ان ﮐﯽ ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﺎﻓﯽ دل ﭼﺴﭗ ﮨﮯ۔ دﯾﮕﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﮐﯽ طﺮح وه ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺎدﯾّﺖ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ ﮐﻮ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﯽ‬
‫دَﯾﻦ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اور وه ﺑﻌﺾ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﮐﮯ اس ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن و ﺳﻨّﺖ ﮐﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﮯ ظﺎﮨﺮی‬
‫ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﮐﻮ ﭼﮭﻮڑ ﮐﺮ ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ وه اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ‬
‫ﺑﻌﺾ دﻻﺋﻞ اﯾﺴﮯ ﺿﺮور ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﺳﮯ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﺎ ﺛﺒﻮت ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﮯ۔ ‪ 28‬اﻟﺒﺘہ اﮨﻢ ﺑﺎت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ‬
‫ﻣﻔﺮ ﻧہ رﮨﺎ ﺗﻮ اﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺳﻨﺠﯿﺪه ﻟﯿﻨﺎ ﭘﮍے ﮔﺎ اور‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﮔﺮ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎﻓﯽ دﻻﺋﻞ اﮐﮣﮭﮯ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺌﮯ اور ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ّ‬

‫‪ 26‬ﺟﻣﺎل اﻟدﯾن اﻷﻓﻐﺎﻧﻲ‪ ،‬اﻟر ّد ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟدھرﯾّﯾن‪ ،‬ﻣﺗرﺟم‪ :‬ﻣﻔﺗﻲ ﻋﺑده و ﻋﺎرف اﻓﻧدي‪ ،‬ﻣطﺑﻌﺔ اﻟﻣوﺳوﻋﺎت‪ ،‬ﻣﺻر‪1902 :‬م‪ ،‬اﻟطﺑﻌﺔ اﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ‪ ،‬ص ‪9‬‬
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‫‪Marwa Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic, p. 125‬‬
‫‪ 28‬ﺣﺳﯾن اﻟﺟﺳر‪ ،‬اﻟرﺳﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺣﻣﯾدﯾّﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻘﯾﻘﺔ اﻟدﯾﺎﻧﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾّﺔ وﺣﻘﯾﮫ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ اﻟﻣﺣ ّﻣدﯾﺔ‪ ،‬ﻣﻛﺗﺑﺔ اﻹﺳﻛﻧدرﯾّﺔ‪2011 ،‬م‪ ،‬ص ‪291-290‬‬
‫ﻖ ﺧﻠﻖ ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ ذرﯾﻌہ ﮨﮯ ‪،29‬‬
‫ﺿﺮورت ﭘﮍﻧﮯ ﭘﺮ ﻧﺼﻮص ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ؛ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﺨﻠﯿ ِ‬
‫ﻖ ّاول ﷲ ﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﻟﺒﺘہ ﯾہ اﻋﺘﻘﺎد رﮐﮭﻨﺎ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺧﺎﻟ ِ‬

‫’ ّ‬
‫ﻓﻜﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻳﻦ اﻻﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻳﻦ أي اﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﳋﻠﻖ واﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﻟﻨﺸﻮء ﰲ إﳚﺎد اﻟﻌﻮاﱂ اﳌﺬﻛﻮرة ﻣﺎ دام ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺪاً إﱄ ﺧﻠﻖ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱄ وأﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﺴﻮاﻩ ﺄﺗﺛﲑ‬
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‫ﺗﺪل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻵﺎﺛر‪‘.‬‬
‫ﻛﺎن ﻣﻦ ﺣ ّﻘﻪ أن ﻳﻜﻔﻲ أﺗﺒﺎع ﳏﻤﺪ ﷺ ﻻﺳﺘﺪﻻﳍﻢ ﻋﻠﻲ وﺟﻮد ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱄ‪ ،‬واﺗﺼﺎﻓﻪ ﺎﺑﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﱵ ّ‬

‫ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﻋﺒﺪه‪:‬‬
‫ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﻋﺒﺪه ﻧﮯ ﻋﻘﻞ ﮐﯽ اﮨﻤﯿّﺖ ﭘﺮ زور دﯾﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮی رواﯾﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﻧﺌﮯ طﺮﯾﻘۂ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺘﻌﺎرف ﮐﺮواﯾﺎ۔ وه‬
‫ان ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﯽ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ‬
‫اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ اس ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد رﮐﮭﯽ ﮐہ ﻣﻌﺎﺻﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ اﺻﻮﻟﻮں اور درﯾﺎﻓﺘﻮں ﮐﮯ دﻻﺋﻞ )ﺑہ ﺷﻤﻮل ارﺗﻘﺎ( ﻗﺮآن ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺗﻼش ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ وه اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﺗﮭﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و اﺳﻼم‪ ،‬ﻣﺴﯿﺤﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮ ﺧﻼف‪ ،‬اﯾﮏ دوﺳﺮے ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ‬
‫آﮨﻨﮓ اور ﻣﻌﺎون ﮨﯿﮟ اور دوﻧﻮں ﻣﻞ ﮐﺮ ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺒﯽ ارﺗﻘﺎ و ﺗﺮﻗّﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﮔﺎﻣﺰن ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮﻗّﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ‬
‫ان دوﻧﻮں ﮐﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل و اﻧﮭﯿﮟ ﯾﮏ ﺟﺎ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ۔ اﺳﯽ ﻟﯿﮯ وه ﻋﻘﻠﯽ دﻻﺋﻞ اور ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺼﻮل ﮐﻮ ﺿﺮوری‬
‫ﻗﺮار دﯾﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ان ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰدﯾﮏ ﻣﻐﺮﺑﯽ ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺐ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﺮﻗّﯽ ﮐﮯ اﻋﻼ درﺟﮯ ﭘﺮ ﭘﮩﻨﭻ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ؛ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ روﺣﺎﻧﯿّﺖ ﺳﮯ وه‬
‫ﻋﺎری ﮨﯿﮟ اور اس ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﻧﮭﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ رﺟﻮع ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭘﮍے ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫ﻋﺒﺪه ﮐﮯ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﺗﻮ ّﺟہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻋﺒﺪه ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﻼم اور اس ﮐﯽ ﻧﺸﺎةِ ﺛﺎﻧﯿہ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﻋﻤﻠﯽ ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده ﺧﻄﯿﺒﺎﻧہ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ وه ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﺌﮯ ِ‬
‫زﯾﺎده ﻣﺘﻮ ّﺟہ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﻧہ ﮐہ ﻣﻌﺎﺻﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ۔ اﺳﯽ ﻟﯿﮯ اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت‪ ،‬ﻣﺜﻼً ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﮐﻮ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮﻏﯿﺐ دی ﮐہ وه اﺳﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺧﻮد ﮐﺒﮭﯽ اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻞ ﺑﯿﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯽ۔‬
‫ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣﻘﺎﻣﺎت اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ ﭘﺮ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺳﻮرۀ ﻧﺴﺎء ﮐﯽ ﭘﮩﻠﯽ آﯾﺖ‬
‫ﻧﻔﺲ و ٍ‬
‫اﺣﺪ‘ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ راے ﯾہ ﺗﮭﯽ‪:‬‬ ‫’اﻟﺬي ﺧﻠﻘﻜﻢ ﻣﻦ ٍ‬

‫أﺻﻮﱄ ﻗﺎﻃﻊ ﻋﻠﻲ أن ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﺒﺸﺮ ﻣﻦ ذرﻳّﺔ آدم‪ .‬واﳌﺮاد ﺎﺑﻟﺒﺸﺮ ﻫﻨﺎ ﻫﺬا اﳊﻴﻮان اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ اﻟﺒﺎدي اﻟﺒﺸﺮ اﳌﻨﺘﺼﺐ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻄﻠﻖ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫’ﻟﻴﺲ ﰲ اﻟﻘﺮآن ّ‬
‫ﻧﺺ‬
‫‪31‬‬
‫ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻟﻔﻆ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن‪‘.‬‬

‫ﻗﺮآن ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﺑﺎت ﭘﺮ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ دﻟﯿﻞ ﻣﺬﮐﻮر ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ آدم ﻋﻠﯿہ اﻟﺴﻼم ﺗﻤﺎم اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿّﺖ ﮐﮯ واﻟﺪ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﯾﮩﺎں ﭘﺮ ﺑﺸﺮ اور‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد اﯾﺴﺎ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻣﻨﺪ ﺣﯿﻮان ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ ﺟﻠﺪ ﻧﻈﺮ آﺗﯽ ﮨﻮ اور ﺟﻮ ﺳﯿﺪھﺎ ﮐﮭﮍا ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﻮ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح وه ﺳﻮرۀ‬
‫ب طﺒﻌﯽ ﻗﺮار دﯾﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﮯ‬‫ﺑﻘﺮه ﮐﯽ آﯾﺖ ﻧﻤﺒﺮ ‪’ :251‬وﻟﻮﻻ دﻓﻊ ﷲ اﻟﻨﺎس ﺑﻌﻀﮭﻢ ﺑﺒﻌﺾ‘‪ ،‬ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺳﮯ اﻧﺘﺨﺎ ِ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫‪32‬‬
‫ﻳﻌﱪ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻋﻠﻤﺎء اﳊﻜﻤﺔ ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﺼﺮ ﺑﺘﻨﺎزع اﻟﺒﻘﺎء‪‘.‬‬ ‫’دﻓﻊ ﷲ اﻟﻨﺎس ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ ﺑﺒﻌﺾ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻨﻦ ّ‬
‫اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ّ‬
‫ﷲ ﮐﺎ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺑﻌﺾ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ دﻓﻊ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ طﺮﯾﻘہ اور ﯾہ وﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺴﮯ آج ﮐﻞ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ دان طﺒﻌﯽ‬
‫اﻧﺘﺨﺎب )‪ (natural selection‬ﮐﮯ ﻧﺎم ﺳﮯ ﯾﺎد ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻏﺮض ﯾہ ﮐہ ﻣﻔﺘﯽ ﻋﺒﺪه ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮی ﻓﺮﻣﻮدات ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﮩﺎں‬
‫دﯾﮕﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﻮ ﻗﺮآن ﺳﮯ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ‪ ،‬وﮨﯿﮟ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮨﻢ‬
‫آﮨﻨﮓ ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ۔‬
‫ﺧﻼﺻۂ ﺑﺤﺚ‪:‬‬
‫ﻣﺬﮐﻮره ﺑﺎﻻ ﺑﺤﺚ ﺳﮯ ﺟﮩﺎں ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻤﺎے دﯾﻮﺑﻨﺪ ﮐﺎ اﺳﻼم و ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻮم طﺒﯿﻌہ ﮐﻮ ﺧﺎطﺮ ﺧﻮاه ﺳﻨﺠﯿﺪﮔﯽ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ آ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬وﮨﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﮭﻞ ﮐﺮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آ رﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻧﮯ‬

‫‪ 29‬أﯾﺿﺎً‪ ،‬ص ‪293-292‬‬

‫‪ 30‬أﯾﺿﺎً‪ ،‬ص ‪290‬‬
‫‪ 31‬ﻣﻔﺗﻲ ﻋﺑده‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺳﯾر اﻟﻣﻧﺎر‪ ،‬دار اﻟﻣﻧﺎر‪ ،‬ﻣﺻر‪ ،‬اﻟطﺑﻌﺔ اﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ‪1367 :‬ه‪ ،‬ص ‪.4/362‬‬
‫‪ 32‬أﯾﺿﺎً‪ ،‬ص ‪.2/496‬‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻟﯿﺎ اور ﻧہ ﮨﯽ ان ﻋﻠﻮم ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﭼﯿﻠﻨﭻ و ﻣﺴﺌﻠﮯ ﭘﺮ ﮐﻤﺎ ﺣﻘّہ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﮐﯽ۔ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﯾﺎد رﮨﮯ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻮم طﺒﯿﻌﯿہ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ اس ﻏﯿﺮ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ﮐہ اس ﻣﻘﺎﻟہ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﻗﺎرﺋﯿﻦ ﮐﻮ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﺑﻨﺎﻧﺎ ﮨﺮﮔﺰ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ‬
‫ﺳﻨﺠﯿﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﻣﺘﻮ ّﺟہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮨﻤﺎرے اﻧﺪر ﺻﺪﯾﻮں ﺳﮯ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ اور ﺟﺴﮯ دور ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ اﺷﺪّ ﺿﺮورت‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ ﮨﻢ ﻧﮯ ﺟﻦ ﻋﻠﻤﺎے ﻋﺮب ﮐﺎ ﺗﺬﮐﺮه ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ رﮐﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﮑﻞ واﺿﺢ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ اﮐﺜﺮ ﻧﮯ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﮨﻮ ﺑہ ﮨﻮ ﻗﺒﻮل ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ اور ﻧہ ﮨﯽ ﯾہ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اﯾﮏ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻓﻀﺎ ﮐﺎ ﭘﯿﺪا‬
‫ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﺑہ ﮨﺮ ﺣﺎل ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﮩﺎں ﺧﺎرج ﺳﮯ آﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﻮ ﮐﻤﺎ ﺣﻘّہ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ اور ﺗﻌ ّ‬
‫ﺼﺒﺎت و ﺗﻘﻠﯿ ِﺪ ﻣﺤﺾ‬
‫ﮐﻮ اﯾﮏ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮ دﻻﺋﻞ ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔‬
‫ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﺑﮭﯽ ذﮨﻦ ﻧﺸﯿﻦ رﮨﮯ ﮐہ اب ﻣﺤﺾ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ؛ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ ڈارون ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﻮ ﮐﻢ و‬
‫ﺑﯿﺶ ڈﯾﮍھ ﺻﺪی ﮔﺰر ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﮐہ اب ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ اس ﺳﮯ ﺑﮩﺖ آﮔﮯ ﺑﮍھ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺧﻮد ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻞ ﺑﻮﺗﮯ ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﻣﺮﮨﻮن ﻣﻨّﺖ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﮐﺌﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ اﻧﮑﺸﺎﻓﺎت ﮨﻮﭼﮑﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻣﺜﻼً ‪ DNA‬ﮐﺎ اﻧﮑﺸﺎف‪ ،‬ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﺎ ﮨﯽ‬
‫اﯾﺴﮯ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﻧﮯ ﺟﻨﻢ ﻟﮯ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺗﺤﺪّی ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺷﻤﯿﻞ اور ‪ Buchner‬ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﻣﺎدﯾّﺖ)‪ (materialism‬اور ‪ evolutionary socialism‬وﻏﯿﺮه۔ ﻟﮩﺬا اب ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ﺟﮩﺎں ﻧﻈﺮﯾۂ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ‬
‫ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬وﮨﯿﮟ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ دﯾﮕﺮ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺳﻨﺠﯿﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اﭘﻨﯽ آرا ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮﻧﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺗﺎ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﮐﻮ ا ّﻣﺖ ﮐﯽ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺟﻮ ذﻣﮯ داری دی ﮔﺌﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬وه ﺑہ ﺧﻮﺑﯽ اﻧﺠﺎم ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ۔‬
 ‫ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﮐﻮ درﭘﯿﺶ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺗﺤﺪﯾﺎت‬
‫)ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ(‬
‫وﻗﺎص اﺣﻤﺪ‪ ،‬ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎن‬
‫‪Waqas Ahmed, Pakistan‬‬

‫ﯾہ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﭘﮩﻠﯽ ﺑﺎر ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺟﺐ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ آﻏﺎز‪ ،‬ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ اور ﺧﻮد اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﺟﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﺮ رﮨﺎ ﮨﻮ۔ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ آﻧﮯ واﻻ ﮨﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫اﭘﻨﮯ آپ ﮐﻮ اور اﭘﻨﮯ ارد ﮔﺮد ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺳﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﺿﺮور ﮐﺮﺗﺎ‬
‫رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ﺑﻠﮑہ ﯾہ ﮐﮩﻨﺎ ﺑﮯ ﺟﺎ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺷﻌﻮری دور ﮐﺎ زﯾﺎده ﺗﺮ وﻗﺖ اﻧﮩﯽ اﺳﺮار‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﭘﺮده ﭼﺎک ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺻﺮف ﮨﻮاﮨﮯاور ﯾہ ﺳﻠﺴﻠہ ﺗﺐ ﺗﮏ ﭼﻠﺘﺎ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ ﺟﺐ ﺗﮏ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﺎﻗﯽ‬
‫رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ ﮨﻢ ﮐﻮن ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﮨﻢ ﮐﮩﺎں ﺳﮯ آﺋﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ اور ﮐﯿﺴﮯ ﺑﻨﯽ‪ ،‬ﯾہ وه ﺳﻮال ﮨﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺟﻦ ﮐﻮ دو طﺮح ﺳﮯ اﭘﺮوچ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬

‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬ ‫‪2‬۔‬ ‫ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ‬ ‫‪1‬۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ‬

‫ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ‬

‫ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ‬

‫ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ‪ ،‬ﺟﺴﮯ ﻣﻌﺮوف اﺻﻄﻼح ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ‪ Creation Story‬ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﻣﺎﺣﺼﻞ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺧﺎﻟﻖ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ازل ﺳﮯ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ ﮐﺌﯽ ﺻﻔﺎت‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ و ﺗﺨﺮﯾﺐ ﮐﮯ ﮨﺮ ﮨﺮ ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﮐﻮ ﺣﺎوی ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﻧﮯ ﺗﮑﻮﯾﻦ‬
‫و ﺗﻘﺪﯾﺮ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﯾہ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ اور اس ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ اﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻋﺒﺎدت ﮐﯽ‬
‫ذﻣہ داری ﺳﻮﻧﭙﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻓﺮاﺋﺾ ﻣﻨﺼﺒﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه اﭘﻨﮯ ﺧﺎﻟﻖ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﭘﮩﭽﺎﻧﮯ‪ ،‬اس ﮐﯽ ﻋﺒﺎدت ﮐﺮے‪ ،‬اس ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﮐﯽ ﻣﺮﺿﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ‬
‫ﮔﺰارے ﺗﺎﮐہ ﻣﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﯽ ﻻﻓﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺑﺪی ﮐﺎﻣﯿﺎﺑﯽ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﮯ۔ اﮨﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺧﺎﻟﻖ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﻧﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮨﯽ اﺳﮯ وﺣﯽ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ‬
‫ﺳﮯﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ اس ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﭽﮭ ﻋﻠﻮم و ﺧﺼﻮﺻﯿﺎت ‪ Built in‬رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮ اﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺧﺎﻟﻖ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﭘﮩﭽﺎن‪ ،‬اﭘﻨﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ اور اس ﻣﻌﻤﻮره ازل ﻣﯿﮟ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ )‪ (Position‬ﮐﺎ درک‬
‫ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ﺑﻨﺪوﺑﺴﺖ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ﯾﻮں ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ زاوﯾہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺳﮯ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺷﻌﻮر اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﮐﻮ درﭘﯿﺶ ان ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﺳﻮاﻟﻮں ﭘﺮ ﻏﻮر و ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻣﻘﺪس ﻓﺮﯾﻀﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ دﻟﭽﺴﭗ اﻣﺮ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﮔﺮﭼہ ﺧﺎﻟﻖ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮨﺮﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ‬
‫ﻣﺜﻼ ﮐﭽﮭ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﺎﻟﻖ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﺎوراﺋﯽ )‪ (Transcendent‬ﮨﮯ ﺟﺒﮑہ ﮐﭽﮭ دﯾﮕﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺳﺮﯾﺎﻧﯽ ﺧﺪا )‪( Immanent‬ﮐﺎ ﺗﺼﻮر ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح وﺣﺪت و ﮐﺜﺮت ﮐﮯ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﻮﺣﯿﺪی )‪ (Monotheistic‬اور ﺗﮑﺜﯿﺮی )‪ (Polytheistic‬ﺗﺼﻮر ﺧﺪا ﮐﯽ ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﯿﻦ ازم اس ﺑﺎﺑﺖ ﻗﺪرے ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ ﺟﯿﻦ ﻣﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﮯ‬
‫واﻟﻮں ﮐﺎ ﺧﯿﺎل ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐﭽﮭ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮨﻤﯿﺸہ ﺳﮯ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﺑﺘﺪا ﮨﮯ‬
‫اور ﻧہ ﮨﯽ اﻧﺘﮩﺎ۔ اﻟﺒﺘہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﺷﮑﻠﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ رﮨﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم اﺑﺘﺪاﺋﮯ‬
‫آﻓﺮﯾﻨﺶ‪ ،‬ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ اور اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻤﺎم ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﻣﻌﻤﻮﻟﯽ‬
‫رد و ﺑﺪل ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﻘﺮﯾﺒﺎ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ ﺟﯿﺴﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺧﺎص ﺑﺎت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﯽ دﻟﯿﻞ اور ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪے ﮐﯽ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ وﺣﯽ ﺧﺪاوﻧﺪی ﭘﺮ رﮐﮭﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬

‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ‬

‫اس ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﮐہ ﮨﻢ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻼت ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ‪ ،‬ﯾہ ﺑﺘﺎﻧﺎ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﮨﻮ‬
‫ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ طﺮز اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ) ‪Hypothetico Deductive‬‬
‫‪ (Method‬ﮐﺎ ﺳﮩﺎرا ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﮐہ وﺣﯽ ﺧﺪاوﻧﺪی ﺟﺴﮯ اﮨﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺘﻨﺎزع‬
‫اور ﻣﮑﻤﻞ ﺳﭻ )‪ (Ultimate Truth‬ﻣﺎﻧﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪ ،‬ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ طﺮز اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﭘﺮ ﺟﺎﻧﭽﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ اﺑﺘﺪاﺋﮯ آﻓﺮﯾﻨﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎﺑﺖ ﻣﺼﺪﻗہ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت دﺳﺘﯿﺎب‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ اﮨﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺟﺲ وﺣﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺘﻔﻘہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ وه ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬
‫ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑﻞ اﺳﺘﻨﺎد ﮨﮯ۔ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻘﯽ و ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪے‬
‫ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﺟﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺗﮏ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ رﺳﺎﺋﯽ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﮯ وه ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﻮ ﺟﻮں‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﺗﻮں ﺗﺴﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺟﺴﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ‬
‫)‪ (Big History‬ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ‪ ،‬ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ آﻏﺎز ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺐ ﺷﻌﻮر اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﻮ ﮔﺮد و ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ادراک ﮨﻮا ﺗﻮ اس ﮐﺎ درﺳﺖ ﻓﮩﻢ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻗﻮت ﻣﺘﺨﯿﻠہ‬
‫)‪(Imagination‬ﮐﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ‪ ،‬اﭘﻨﮯ ﺧﻮاﺑﻮں ﺳﮯ ﺳﯿﮑﮭﺎ اور ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت اور اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ‬
‫ﮐﻮ دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺷﺮوع ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ۔ ﯾہ دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ ﺟﺘﻨﯽ زﯾﺎده دﻟﭽﺴﭗ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﮨﻢ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط‬
‫اور ﺣﯿﺮان ﮐﻦ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ اﺗﻨﯽ ﮨﯽ ﺟﻠﺪی اور وﺳﯿﻊ ﺳﻄﺢ ﭘﺮ ﻗﺒﻮل ﮐﺮ ﻟﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اﯾﮏ‬
‫دﻟﭽﺴﭗ ﮐﮩﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺳﺮ ﺑﺴﺘہ رازوں ﮐﯽ اﺻﻞ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﮯ‬
‫طﻮر ﭘﺮ۔ اﮐﯿﺴﻮﯾﮟ ﺻﺪی ﮐﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ ﯾہ دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ ﺑﮭﻠﮯ ﻣﻀﺤﮑہ ﺧﯿﺰ ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮨﻮ ﻣﮕﺮ ﺳﭻ ﯾہ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮨﻤﺎرے آﺑﺎءؤ اﺟﺪاد ﮐﺎ طﺮز ﺣﯿﺎت‪ ،‬ان ﮐﮯ ﻋﻘﺎﺋﺪ و اﻓﮑﺎر اﺳﯽ دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ ﮐﮯ زﯾﺮ اﺛﺮ‬
‫ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﮐﮯ وه ﻟﻮگ ﺟﻮ اﻋﻠﯽ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﮐﯽ ذﮨﺎﻧﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﺗﮭﮯ اس دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف ﯾہ ﮐہ ﺳﭻ ﻣﺎﻧﺘﮯ ﭼﻠﮯ آﺋﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ اﺳﮯ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ واﺣﺪ اور درﺳﺖ ﺗﺮﯾﻦ‬
‫ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﮩﺘﮯ رﮨﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﯾﮩﺎں اس ﻧﮑﺘﮯ ﮐﺎ ذﮐﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ دﻟﭽﺴﭙﯽ ﺳﮯ ﺧﺎﻟﯽ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ دﯾﻮ‬
‫ﻣﺎﻻ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺧﻄﮯ ﯾﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده دور ﮐﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ و ﻣﻠﺖ ﮐﮯ ﭘﯿﺮوﮐﺎروں ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ‬
‫ﺧﺎص ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ اور ﻣﺎﻗﺒﻞ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﮐﯽ ﮨﺮ ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ دﯾﻮ ﻣﺎﻻ ﭘﻮری آب‬
‫و ﺗﺎب ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻣﺎﯾﺎ ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﻋﻘﯿﺪے ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺗﺴﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ‬
‫دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﻮ دو ﺧﺪاؤں ﻧﮯ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﯾﮏ ﮐﺎ ﻧﺎم ﮢﯿﭙﻮ) ‪ ( Tepeu‬اور دوﺳﺮے‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﻧﺎم ﮔﻮﮐﻮﻣﮣﺰ)‪ ( Gucumatz‬ﮨﮯ۔ ﮢﯿﭙﻮ ﮐﻮ ﺧﺎﻟﻖ ﯾﺎ ﺑﻨﺎﻧﮯ واﻻ )‪ ( The Maker‬ﺟﺒﮑہ‬
‫ﮔﻮﮐﻮﻣﮣﺰ ﮐﻮ ﭘﺮوں واﻟﯽ روح )‪ (The Feathered Spirit‬ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺎﯾﺎ ﻟﮣﺮﯾﭽﺮ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ان دوﻧﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻣﻞ ﮐﺮ دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺧﯿﺎل‪ ،‬ﺗﺼﻮر ﯾﺎ وﺟﺪان )‪ (Thoughts‬ﺳﮯ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ‬
‫ﺗﮭﺎ۔ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺟﺐ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﮐہ ان ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﯾہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت اﺗﻨﯽ ﺧﻮﺑﺼﻮرت ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﮐﯿﻮں ﻧہ اس ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻣﺨﻠﻮق ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﻨﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﻮ اس ﮐﯽ ﺧﻮﺑﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ دﯾﮑﮭ ﮐﺮ اس ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺧﺎﻟﻖ ﮐﯽ ﺣﻤﺪ و ﺛﻨﺎ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮے۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ اس ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﭘﮩﻞ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﺳﺎﻧﭗ‪ ،‬ﮨﺮن‬
‫اور دﯾﮕﺮ ﺟﺎﻧﻮر ﺑﻨﺎﺋﮯ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ان ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﭘﻮرا ﻧہ ﮨﻮ ا ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ ان ﺟﺎﻧﻮروں ﮐﯽ زﺑﺎن ﮢﯿﭙﻮ اور‬
‫ﮔﻮﮐﻮﻣﮣﺰ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻧہ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ اﮔﻠﮯ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ‬
‫ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اﻧﺴﺎن اﯾﮏ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‪ ،‬دو ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﺗﯿﻦ ﮐﻮﺷﺸﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺑﻨﺎ۔ ﭘﮩﻠﯽ ﺑﺎر اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﮐﯿﭽﮍ‬
‫ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺟﺐ اس ﻧﮯ ﺑﻮﻟﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮ ﮢﻮٹ ﮐﺮ ﺑﮑﮭﺮ ﮔﯿﺎ۔ ﭘﮭﺮ اﻧﮩﻮں‬
‫ﻧﮯ ﻟﮑﮍی ﺳﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اس ﮐﯽ آواز ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺬﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ آﻣﯿﺰش ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ آﺧﺮ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﻣﮑﺌﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺳﻔﯿﺪ اور زرد داﻧﻮں ﺳﮯ ﯾﮑﺒﺎرﮔﯽ ﭼﺎر اﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﻨﺎﺋﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﺑﻮل ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬ﺳﻮچ‬
‫ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ اور ﻣﺤﺒﺖ‪ ،‬اﺣﺘﺮام اور ﻋﻘﯿﺪت ﮐﮯ ﺟﺬﺑﺎت ﺳﮯ ﺳﺮﺷﺎر ﺗﮭﮯ۔ﻣﮑﺌﯽ ﮐﮯ داﻧﻮں‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ ﭘﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺟﺬﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺧﯿﺎل رﮐﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﮢﯿﭙﻮ ﻧﮯ ﻋﻮرت ﮐﻮ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﻮ‬
‫ان ﮐﯽ ﮨﻤﺪرد و ﻏﻤﮕﺴﺎر ﺗﮭﯽ۔ ﯾﻮں اس ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺳﻠﺴﻠہ ﭼﻞ ﻧﮑﻼ۔‬
‫اﺳﯽ طﺮح آﺳﮣﺮﯾﻠﯿﺎ ﮐﮯ دﯾﺴﯽ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪوں )‪ (Australian Aboriginals‬ﮐﺎ ﺧﯿﺎل ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ‬
‫زﻣﯿﻦ آﻏﺎز آﻓﺮﯾﻨﺶ ﮐﮯ وﻗﺖ ﻣﺴﻄﺢ اور ﮨﻤﻮار ﺗﮭﯽ۔ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﮩﺎڑ ‪ ،‬ﻧﺪﯾﺎں اور درﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﮭﮯ۔‬
‫ﭘﮭﺮ اﯾﮏ دن ﺟﻨﮕﻠﯽ ﭼﮭﭙﮑﻠﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺷﮑﻞ واﻟﮯ ﺧﺪا )‪ (Adnoartina‬اور ﮨﺎﺗﮭﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺴﺎﻣﺖ واﻟﮯ‬
‫ﺧﺪا )‪ (Willauk‬ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﺎت ﭘﺮ اس ﻗﺪر اﺧﺘﻼف ﮨﻮا ﮐہ دوﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺟﻨﮓ ﭼﮭﮍ ﮔﺌﯽ۔‬
‫دوﻧﻮں ﺧﺪاؤں ﮐﯽ ﻟﮍاﺋﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺐ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ اﯾﮏ دوﺳﺮے ﮐﻮ زﻣﯿﻦ ﭘﺮ ﭘﮣﺦ ﭘﮣﺦ ﮐﺮ ﻣﺎرا ﺗﻮ ان‬
‫ﮐﮯ وزن اور ﺟﺴﺎﻣﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺴﺎب ﺳﮯ زﻣﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮔﮍھﮯ ﭘﮍﺗﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ‪ ،‬ان ﮔﮍھﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻣﻠﺒﮯ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﺎڑ ﺑﻨﮯ ۔ ﮐﭽﮭ ﮔﮍھﮯ اﺗﻨﮯ ﮔﮩﺮے ﺗﮭﮯ ﮐہ ان ﮐﮯ اﻧﺪر ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎﻧﯽ ﻧﮑﻞ آﯾﺎ اور درﯾﺎؤں‬
‫اور ﻧﺪﯾﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﺑﮩﻨﮯ ﻟﮕﺎ۔ ﯾﻮں زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﯽ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده ﺷﮑﻞ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺋﯽ۔اﻧﮩﯽ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻠﺘﯽ‬
‫ﺟﻠﺘﯽ دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ ﯾﻌﻨﯽ اﺳﻄﻮرات )‪ (Creation Myths‬ﭼﯿﻨﯽ‪ ،‬ﮨﻨﺪی‪ ،‬ﻣﺼﺮی‪ ،‬ﺟﺎﭘﺎﻧﯽ اور ﯾﻮﻧﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫اﻟﻐﺮض ﺗﻤﺎم ﻗﺪﯾﻢ ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺒﯽ ادب ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻋﮩﺪ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﮐﺎ اﻧﺴﺎن اﮔﺮﭼہ دﯾﻮ ﻣﺎﻻ ﮐﻮ دل‬
‫ﺑﮩﻼﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ اﯾﮏ دﻟﭽﺴﭗ ﮐﮩﺎﻧﯽ ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده ﮐﭽﮭ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺘﺎ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻻﮐﮭﻮں اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫اﻧﮩﯽ ﮐﮩﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻣﻘﺪس ﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﮐﺮ ﺳﻨﺘﮯ‪ ،‬ﺳﯿﮑﮭﺘﮯ اور ان ﭘﺮ ﯾﻘﯿﻦ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﭼﻠﮯ آﺋﮯ‬
‫ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮯ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﮨﺮ اس ﺷﻌﺒﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻﺋﯽ‬
‫ﮐﮩﺎﻧﯿﺎں ﺑﻨﺎ ڈاﻟﯽ ﺗﮭﯿﮟ ﺟﺲ ﮐﺎ ﻓﮩﻢ و ادراک اس ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﺎﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﯾﻮں ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﻟﯿﻨﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻗﺪﯾﻢ دور ﮐﯽ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﺳﺎری ﮐﯽ ﺳﺎری ﻣﯿﺘﮭﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﮐﮯ زﯾﺮ اﺛﺮ ﮔﺰری ﺗﮭﯽ۔ﯾﮩﯽ وﺟہ ﮨﮯ‬
‫ﮐہ دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ اور اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺟﺒﻠﯽ ﻧﻔﺴﯿﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﮔﮩﺮا رﺷﺘہ اﺳﺘﻮار ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﺎﮨﮯ ۔ ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ‬
‫اﺛﺮات آج ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺟﯿﻨﺰ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﺧﻮف‪ ،‬ﺣﯿﺮت‪ ،‬ﺧﻮﺷﯽ‬
‫اور طﺎﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺟﺬﺑﺎت و اﺣﺴﺎﺳﺎت ﮐﺎ اﮔﺮ ﺗﺘﺒﻊ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ دور ﮐﮩﯿﮟ آج ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧہ ﮐﺴﯽ‬
‫دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ ﮐﺎ ﺳﺮاغ ﻣﻠﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ دﯾﻮ ﻣﺎﻻﺋﯽ داﺳﺘﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ اﺛﺮ ﭘﺬﯾﺮی ﮐﺎ اﻧﺪازه ﯾﻮں ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﺎﻗﺒﻞ‬
‫ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﺗﻮ ﺳﺎری ﮐﯽ ﺳﺎری ان ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻤﺎم ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ اور ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺒﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ان ﮐﮩﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﮯ اﺛﺮات ﺳﮯ ﻣﺤﻔﻮظ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ آج ﮐﮯ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﯾﺎﻓﺘہ اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﯾہ دﯾﻮﻣﺎﻻ ﻣﻀﺤﮑہ ﺧﯿﺰ ﮨﯿﮟ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اس ﮐﮯ آﺑﺎء و اﺟﺪاد ان ﮐﮩﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﭘﺮ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺘﺰﻟﺰل‬
‫اﯾﻤﺎن رﮐﮭﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ﯾﻮں اﮔﺮ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻋﺼﺮ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت اور اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی طﻮر ﭘﺮ دو ﻧﻘﻄہ ﮨﺎﺋﮯ ﻧﻈﺮ آﻣﻨﮯ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫‪ .1‬ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻟﺰوﻣﯿﺖ )‪ (Essentialism‬ﯾہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﮐہ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت دراﺻﻞ ﭼﻨﺪ رواﯾﺘﯽ‬
‫اور ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻣﻌﯿﺎرات‪ ،‬ﺗﺼﻮرات اور طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮨﺎﺋﮯ ﮐﺎر ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻐﯿﺮ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ ۔ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻟﺰوﻣﯿﺖ ارﺳﻄﺎطﺎﻟﯿﺴﯽ ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﯿﺎﻧہ ﻧﺎم ﮨﮯ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ‪Aristotelian‬‬
‫‪ Approach‬اور ‪ Essentialism‬ﮐﻮ ﺑﺎﮨﻢ دﯾﮕﺮ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾﺎد رﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻟﺰوﻣﯿﺖ ﮨﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﯿﺮ و ﺷﺮ‪ ،‬ﺧﺎﻟﻖ و ﻣﺨﻠﻮق‪ ،‬اﺑﺘﺪاء و اﻧﺘﮩﺎء اور ﮔﻨﺎه و ﺛﻮاب ﮐﮯ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ‬
‫ﻣﻌﯿﺎرات طﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫‪ .2‬ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ طﺒﯿﻌﯿﺖ‪ /‬اﻟﻤﺬھﺐ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯽ )‪ (Naturalism‬ﯾہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﮐہ اﺷﯿﺎء ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﻗﺎﺑﻞ‬
‫ﺗﻐﯿﺮ ﮨﮯ اس ﻟﯿﮯ ان ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﭘﺴﻨﺪی و واﻗﻌﯿﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ روا‬
‫رﮐﮭﻨﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ۔ ﻧﯿﭽﺮل ازم دراﺻﻞ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ارﺗﻘﺎء )‪ (Evolution theory‬ﮐﺎ ﺗﻮﺳﯿﻌﯽ‬
‫اﻧﯿﺴﻮﯾﮟ ﺻﺪی ﮐﮯ آﻏﺎز ﻣﯿﮟ ﻻﻣﺎرک )‪ ( Lamarck‬ﻧﮯ‬ ‫ورژن ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫‪Transmutation of species‬ﮐﯽ ﺗﮭﯿﻮری ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ‪ ،‬ﺟﺴﮯ ﭘﮩﻼ ﻣﮑﻤﻞ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ‬
‫ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻟﮓ ﺑﮭﮓ ﭘﭽﺎس ﺳﺎل ﺑﻌﺪ ڈارون )‪ (Charles Darwin‬اور اﻟﻔﺮﯾﮉ‬
‫رﺳﻞ )‪ (Alfred Russel‬ﻧﮯ ‪ On the origin of species‬ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﻧﯿﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ارﺗﻘﺎء‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﺟﺴﮯ ﺑﯿﺴﻮﯾﮟ ﺻﺪی ﮐﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮯ ﻣﻌﻤﻮﻟﯽ رد و ﺑﺪل ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﮑﻤﻞ‬
‫طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺗﺴﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺳﯽ ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮍے ﮐﯿﻨﻮس ﻣﯿﮟ ‪ Naturalism‬ﯾﺎ‪Anti-‬‬
‫‪Aristotelian approach‬ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔‬

‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻧﯿﭽﺮل ازم دﺳﺘﯿﺎب ﺷﻮاﮨﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ درﺳﺖ ﺗﺮﯾﻦ‬
‫ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮨﮯ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ درﺳﮕﺎﮨﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ و ﺗﺪوﯾﻦ اﺳﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﻌﺮوف اﻣﺮﯾﮑﯽ ﺳﮑﺎﻟﺮ ڈﯾﻮڈ ﮐﺮﺳﭽﯿﻦ )‪ (David Christian‬ﻧﮯ اس ﻧﻘﻄہ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﻮ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ )‪ (The Big History‬ﮐﮯ ﻧﺎم ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮﺗﺐ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ان ﮐﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ‪Maps‬‬
‫‪ of Time‬ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻣﺬﮐﻮره ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻼت درج ﮐﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ذﯾﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ‪،‬‬
‫ﺟﻐﺮاﻓﯿﺎﺋﯽ‪ ،‬ﺑﺸﺮﯾﺎﺗﯽ‪ ،‬ﮐﻮﻧﯿﺎﺗﯽ ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﮑﯿﺎﺗﯽ اور ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﻮ ﻣﺤﯿﻂ اﺳﯽ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﺎ اﺑﺘﺪاﺋﯽ‬
‫ﺗﻌﺎرﻓﯽ ﺧﺎﮐہ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ‪ ،‬اﯾﮏ ﺗﻌﺎرف‬
‫ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ڈﯾﻮڈ ﮐﺮﺳﭽﯿﻦ ﻧﮯ ‪ Maps of Time‬ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ وﻟﯿﻢ اﯾﭻ اس‬
‫ﮐﺘﺎب ﮐﮯ دﯾﺒﺎﭼہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺨﺘﺼﺮ ﻣﮕﺮ ﺟﺎﻣﻊ ﺗﻌﺎرف ﮐﺮاﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬

‫‪Maps of Time unites natural history and human history in a single, grand,‬‬
‫‪and intelligible narrative. This is a great achievement, analogous to the‬‬
‫‪way in which Isaac Newton in the seventeenth century united the heavens‬‬
‫‪and the earth under uniform laws of motion; it is even more closely‬‬
‫‪comparable to Darwin's nineteenth-century achievement of uniting the‬‬
‫‪human species and other forms of life within a single evolutionary‬‬
‫‪process.1‬‬

‫"زﯾﺮ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﺘﺎب ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ اور اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﮐﻮ ﮐﭽﮭ اس طﺮح ﯾﮑﺠﺎ ﮐﺮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﺑﮍا‬
‫ﻣﮕﺮ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻓﮩﻢ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾہ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﮐﺎ ﮐﺎم ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺳﺮ آﺋﺰک ﻧﯿﻮﮢﻦ ﻧﮯ آﺳﻤﺎن و‬
‫زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﻮ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ طﺮح ﮐﮯ ﻓﻄﺮی ﻗﻮاﻧﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ ﻻ ﮐﺮ ﺳﺮ اﻧﺠﺎم دﯾﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﯾہ ﮐﺎم‬
‫ڈارون ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ ﺗﺮ ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ ڈارون ﻧﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﻮع‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ اور دﯾﮕﺮ اﻧﻮاع ﺣﯿﻮاﻧﯽ ﮐﻮ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ ﺳﻠﺴﻠہ ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ارﺗﻘﺎﺋﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﺎﮨﻢ ﺟﻮڑ دﯾﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ''۔‬
‫ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ اﮨﻢ ﮐﺮدار ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯽ )‪ (Complexity‬ﮐﺎ‬
‫ادراک ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﺑﮭﯽ ‪Increasing Complexity‬ﮐﮯ اﺻﻮل ﭘﺮ‬
‫آﮔﮯ ﺑﮍھﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﻋﺪم ﺳﮯ وﺟﻮد ﺗﮏ‪ ،‬ﯾﮏ ﻧﻘﻄہ ارﺗﮑﺎز ﺳﮯ ﮐﺜﯿﺮ ﺟﮩﺘﯽ ﮔﮩﺮاﺋﯽ و‬
‫ﮔﯿﺮاﺋﯽ ﺗﮏ اور ﺻﻔﺮ ﺳﮯ ﻻ ﻣﺤﺪود ﻋﺪد ﺗﮏ ﮐﮯ ﻣﮑﻤﻞ ﺳﻔﺮ ﮐﯽ داﺳﺘﺎن ﮐﺎ ﻋﻨﻮان ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ‬
‫ﻋﻈﯿﻢ )‪ (The Big History‬ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺲ ﮐﺎ زﯾﺮ ﻋﻨﻮان ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﺮﺗﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬
‫دﯾﻮ ﻣﺎﻻ ﮨﮯ۔‬

‫اس دﯾﻮ ﻣﺎﻻ ﮐﻮ آﮢﮭ ﺣﺼﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻞ ﮐﭽﮭ ﯾﻮں ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬

‫‪ .1‬اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ) ‪(The big bang‬‬

‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻘﺎت ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎﺗﯽ و ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪاﺗﯽ دﻻﺋﻞ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ اس ﻟﯿﮯ اﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﮏ‬
‫ﯾہ ﺗﻮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺎ ﮐہ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﭽﮭ ﺗﮭﺎ ﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‪ ،‬اﮔﺮ ﺗﮭﺎ ﺗﻮ ﮐﯿﺎ اور‬
‫ﮐﮩﺎں ﺗﮭﺎ ﻣﮕﺮ ﯾہ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﺎ ﻧﻘﻄہ آﻏﺎز اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ‬
‫ﮨﯽ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮨﯽ زﻣﺎن و ﻣﮑﺎن ﮐﯽ اﺑﺘﺪا ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ ﺟﺲ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺨﻤﯿﻨہ ﺗﯿﺮه‬

‫‪1‬‬
‫‪Christian, David Maps of Time,‬‬
‫اﻋﺸﺎرﯾہ ﺳﺎت ﺑﻠﯿﻦ ﺳﺎل ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﮐﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﻋﻤﺮ ﺗﯿﺮه اﻋﺸﺎرﯾہ ﺳﺎت ﺑﻠﯿﻦ ﺳﺎل ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮨﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﻻﻧﻮاع ﮔﯿﺴﯿﮟ ﭘﮭﯿﻠﻨﮯ ﻟﮕﯽ ﺗﮭﯿﮟ ﺟﻨﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ آﮔﮯ ﭼﻞ‬
‫ﮐﺮ ﮨﻤﺎری ﻣﻮﺟﻮده ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺳﺘﺎرے‪ ،‬ﺳﯿﺎرے‪ ،‬ﭼﺎﻧﺪ اور دﯾﮕﺮ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ طﺒﯿﻌﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺷﮑﻞ‬
‫اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯽ۔‬

‫‪ .2‬ﺳﺘﺎروں ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ )‪( The formation of stars‬‬

‫اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت وﺟﻮد ﻣﯿﮟ آﺋﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ وه ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻗﺴﻢ ﮐﯽ ﮔﯿﺴﻮں‬
‫ﭘﺮ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ اﻧﮩﯽ ﮔﯿﺴﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﻢ ﻣﻼپ اور ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺗﻮاﻧﺎﺋﯽ ﻧﮯ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪه اﺷﯿﺎء‬
‫‪Complex Objects‬ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ ﮐﯽ۔ ﯾہ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪه اﺷﯿﺎء ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺘﺎروں ﮐﮯ ﻧﺎم ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﭽﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﮔﺌﯿﮟ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﺳﺘﺎرے ﺟﻮ ﮐہ آج ﺳﮯ ﺗﻘﺮﯾﺒﺎ ً ﺑﺎره ﺑﻠﯿﻦ ﺳﺎل ﭘﮩﻠﮯ وﺟﻮد ﻣﯿﮟ آﺋﮯ ‪،‬دراﺻﻞ‬
‫ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯽ ‪ ،‬ﮔﮩﺮاﺋﯽ اور ﮔﯿﺮاﺋﯽ ﮐﯽ طﺮف ﭘﮩﻼ ﻗﺪم ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺳﺘﺎرے اﭘﻨﮯ آپ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﻣﮑﻤﻞ‬
‫وﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﮭﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﺗﻮاﻧﺎﺋﯽ اور ﮔﯿﺴﺰ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﻢ ﻣﻼپ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﯾﮏ ﮔﺮم ﺑﮭﮣﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت‬
‫ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻔﺠﯿﺮ‪ ،‬ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ اور ﺗﺮﻣﯿﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ ﺟﺎری رﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﺎ آﻧﮑہ ﻧﺌﯽ ﮨﯿﺌﺎت‬
‫و اﺷﮑﺎل ﮐﯽ اﺷﯿﺎ وﺟﻮد ﻣﯿﮟ آﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﺘﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬

‫‪ .3‬ﮐﯿﻤﯿﺎﺋﯽ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ ) ‪The making of Chemical‬‬

‫‪(Elements‬‬
‫ﺳﺘﺎرے ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﺗﻔﺠﯿﺮ و ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻤﻞ ﺳﮯ ﮔﺰرﺗﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮐﭽﮭ اﯾﺴﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﺗﮭﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺗﻮاﻧﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﮯ اﺧﺮاج ﮐﮯ ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ اﺧﺮاج ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﺎ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺮﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ‪ ،‬اﯾﺴﮯ ﺗﻤﺎم‬
‫ﺳﺘﺎرے دم آﺧﺮﯾﮟ ﮐﯿﻤﯿﺎﺋﯽ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺷﮑﻞ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﯾﮩﯽ وه ﮐﯿﻤﯿﺎﺋﯽ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ‬
‫ﺗﮭﮯ ﺟﻦ ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺷﮑﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده ﺣﯿﻮاﻧﺎت ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اﻟﺠﺪول اﻟﺪوری ‪ Periodic Table‬اﻧﮩﯽ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﻣﻞ ﮐﺮ ﺗﯿﺎر ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﺎ ﯾہ دور ارﺑﻮں ﺳﺎل ﭘﺮ ﻣﺤﯿﻂ ﮨﮯ۔‬

‫‪ .4‬ﻧﻈﺎم ﺷﻤﺴﯽ اور زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ ) ‪The creation of Solar‬‬

‫‪(System‬‬
‫اﮔﻼ ﻣﺮﺣﻠہ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺷﻤﺴﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ ﮐﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ زﻣﯿﻦ ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺷﻤﺴﯽ ﮐﯽ دﯾﻦ ﮨﮯ اس‬
‫ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺷﻤﺴﯽ ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ ﮐﮩﻼﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ وﮔﺮﻧہ اس وﻗﺖ ﺟﻮ ﺷﮯ آج ﮐﯽ‬
‫زﻣﯿﻦ ﺑﻨﯽ ﮨﮯ وه آگ ﮐﮯ اﯾﮏ ﮔﻮﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺳﻮا ﮐﭽﮭ ﻧہ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺷﻤﺴﯽ ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ ﭼﺎر‬
‫اﻋﺸﺎرﯾہ ﺳﺎت ﺑﻠﯿﻦ ﺳﺎل ﻗﺒﻞ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ۔ زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﺎ درﺟہ ﺣﺮارت‪ ،‬ﺳﻮرج ﮐﮯ ﮔﺮد اس ﮐﯽ داﺋﺮوی‬
‫ﺣﺮﮐﺖ اور زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﯽ ﻓﻀﺎ ﮐﻮ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﻨﻨﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﻻﮐﮭﻮں ﺳﺎل ﻟﮕﮯ۔‬

‫‪ .5‬زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ )‪(Life‬‬

‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﺤﻘﻘﯿﻦ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ زﻣﯿﻦ ﭘﺮ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﻮ وﺟﻮد ﭘﺬﯾﺮ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ اور ﺣﺼﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد رﮨﯽ ﮨﻮ۔ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وﮨﺎں آج ﺑﮭﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﻮ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺷﻮاﮨﺪ اﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﮏ ﺻﺮف زﻣﯿﻦ ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﮨﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﻮ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اور زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﺎ ﭘﮩﻼ ﻧﻤﻮ ﺗﯿﻦ اﻋﺸﺎرﯾہ آﮢﮭ ﺑﻠﯿﻦ ﺳﺎل ﻗﺒﻞ ﮨﻮا۔‬
‫ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ اس ﺣﺼﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪه ﺣﯿﺎت ﮐﯽ اﺑﺘﺪا ﺳﮯ ﻟﮯ ﮐﺮ اس ﮐﮯ ارﺗﻘﺎﺋﯽ‬
‫ﻣﺮاﺣﻞ اور ﭘﮭﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ آﺑﺎؤ اﺟﺪاد ﮐﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻼت ﮐﺎ ذﮐﺮ ﻣﻠﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬

‫‪ .6‬اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ اﻧﻔﺮادﯾﺖ )‪(What makes humans different‬‬

‫ﺣﯿﺎت اﭘﻨﯽ اﺻﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ اﯾﮏ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﭼﺮﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﭘﺮﻧﺪ‪ ،‬اﻧﺴﺎن اور ﺣﯿﻮان ﮐﯽ ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﮭﯽ‪ ،‬ﭘﮭﺮ اﯾﺴﺎ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن اﭘﻨﮯ ﮨﯽ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ دﯾﮕﺮ ﺟﺎﻧﺪاروں ﺳﮯ اﻟﮓ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻣﺤﻘﻘﯿﻦ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﯽ وﺟہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ اﻧﺪر ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ وه ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ وه ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻧﺎ ﺻﺮف ﯾہ ﮐہ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺖ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﯽ‬
‫ﺿﺮورﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ڈھﺎل ﺑﮭﯽ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ اور ﺣﺎل ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺳﯿﮑﮭﻨﺎ ‪Collective Learning‬ﮐﮯ آﻏﺎز ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﺳﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ‪ ،‬اﭘﻨﮯ‬
‫آپ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ڈھﺎﻟﻨﺎ اور ﻧﮩﺎﯾﺖ آﮨﺴﺘﮕﯽ ﻣﮕﺮ ﮐﻢ رﻓﺘﺎری ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ‬
‫ﺣﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ دور ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاوار ﮨﮯ۔ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﺣﺼہ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ‬
‫ﺣﺠﺮی دور ‪ Paleolithic Era‬ﮐﺎ اﺣﺎطہ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ ﺣﺠﺮی دور ڈھﺎﺋﯽ ﻻﮐﮭ ﺳﺎل ﻗﺒﻞ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺷﺮوع ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ دس ﮨﺰار ﺳﺎل ﺗﮏ ﺟﺎری رﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾہ دور اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﮐﺎ ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ ﻟﻤﺒﺎ اور‬
‫ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ دور ﮨﮯ ﻣﮕﺮ ﺑﺪﻗﺴﻤﺘﯽ ﺳﮯ اس دور ﮐﯽ ﮐﭽﮭ زﯾﺎده ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻼت ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫اس دور ﮐﯽ زﯾﺎده ﺗﺮ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻼت ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺣﺠﺮی دور ‪Neolithic Era‬ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬

‫‪ .7‬زرﻋﯽ دور )‪(Agriculture Era‬‬

‫زرﻋﯽ دور ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﮐﯽ رﻓﺘﺎر ﺗﯿﺰ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ۔ اﻧﻔﺮادی ﯾﺎ ﮔﺮوﮨﯽ و وﺣﺸﯿﺎﻧہ دور‬
‫زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺧﺎﺗﻤہ ﮨﻮا۔ اﺳﯽ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﮯ اور ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ رواج ﭘﺬﯾﺮ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮯ ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺒﯽ‬
‫زﻧﺪﮔﯽ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯽ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﯾﮩﯽ وه دور ﺗﮭﺎ ﺟﺲ ﻧﮯ ﺧﻮد اﻧﺴﺎن اور ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯿﻮں ﮐﯽ رﻓﺘﺎر‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﮍھﺎ دﯾﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده دور ﮐﮯ ﺑﮍے ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ‪ ،‬ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺑﮍی ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺒﯿﮟ اور ﻧﺎﻣﻮر‬
‫ﻓﻠﺴﻔﮯ زرﻋﯽ دور ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاوار ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اﺳﯽ دور ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ آﺑﺎدی ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮨﻮا اور ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﻣﻞ ﺟﻞ ﮐﺮ رﮨﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ طﺮﯾﻘﮯ درﯾﺎﻓﺖ ﮐﯿﮯ۔ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮ و ﮐﺘﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﮭﯽ زرﻋﯽ دور ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاوار ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺑﮍھﺘﯽ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ آﺑﺎدی ﻧﮯ ﻧﺌﯽ زﻣﯿﻨﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺗﻼش ﮐﻮ ﻣﮩﻤﯿﺰ دی اور ﯾﻮں ﻧﺴﻠﯽ و ﻗﻮﻣﯽ ﺗﻨﻮع ﮐﮯ‬
‫اﻣﮑﺎﻧﺎت ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺋﮯ۔ زرﻋﯽ دور ﮔﯿﺎره ﮨﺰار ﺳﺎل ﻗﺒﻞ ﺷﺮوع ﮨﻮا اور اس ﮐﺎ اﺧﺘﺘﺎم ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﮐﮯ‬
‫آﻏﺎز ﭘﺮ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬

‫‪ .8‬ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور)‪(Modern Age‬‬

‫ﺗﯿﻦ ﺳﮯ ﭼﺎر ﺻﺪﯾﺎں ﻗﺒﻞ ﺳﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور ﮐﺎ آﻏﺎز ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور ﮐﻮ ﺻﻨﻌﺘﯽ ﯾﺎ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﮢﯿﮑﻨﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﮐﺎ دور ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮯ اس دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﯿﺰ ﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯿﻮں ﮐﺎ‬
‫وﺗﯿﺮه اﭘﻨﺎﯾﺎ۔ وه ﺗﻤﺎم ﮐﺎم ﺟﻮ اس ﺳﮯ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻧﺴﺎن اﭘﻨﮯ ﮨﺎﺗﮭﻮں ﺳﮯ ﺳﺮ اﻧﺠﺎم دﯾﺘﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ اب ﻣﺸﯿﻨﻮں‬
‫ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﺤﻨﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺟﮕہ اس ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﻗﻮت ﻧﮯ ﻟﮯ ﻟﯽ۔ زور ﺑﺎزو ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺟﮕہ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﮐﺎ ﻟﻮﮨﺎ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﺎ۔ ﯾﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮯ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﮐﺎم ﮐﯽ زﺣﻤﺖ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ﺧﻮد ﮐﻮ ﺑﭽﺎ ﻧﮯ واﺳﻄﮯ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻣﺸﯿﻨﯿﮟ اﯾﺠﺎد ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ اس ﮐﮯ اﺷﺎره اﺑﺮو ﭘﺮ اس ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﻣﺮﺿﯽ ﭘﻮری ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﮯ۔ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ اﺳﯽ دور ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاوار ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﮐﺒﮭﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﯾﻮں وﺳﯿﻊ ﺗﺮ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌہ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ ﻋﻨﻮان ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔‬

‫ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ اﮨﻢ ﻧﮑﺎت ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ وه درج ذﯾﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬

‫ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﺎ ﻧﻘﻄہ آﻏﺎز اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﺗﮭﺎ۔‬ ‫•‬

‫اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻤﺎرے ﭘﺎس ﮐﭽﮭ زﯾﺎده ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻼت ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬ ‫•‬
‫ﭼﺎﻧﺪ‪ ،‬ﺳﺘﺎرے‪ ،‬ﺧﻼ‪ ،‬وﻗﺖ‪ ،‬زﻧﺪﮔﯽ اور ﺗﻤﺎم ﺗﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدات دراﺻﻞ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮨﯽ ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاوار ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ زﻣﯿﻦ اور آﺳﻤﺎن ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻻ ﺗﻌﺪاد ﺳﺘﺎرے اور ﮐﮩﮑﺸﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﯽ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﺗﯿﺮه ﺑﻠﯿﻦ ﺳﺎل ﯾﻌﻨﯽ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﺳﮯ ﻟﮯ ﮐﺮ آج ﺗﮏ ﺟﺘﻨﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ ڈﯾﮣﺎ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻘﯽ‬ ‫•‬
‫اﺻﻮﻟﻮں ﺳﮯ ﮔﺰر ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺳﺎرا ﻓﻄﺮی ﻗﻮاﻧﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﻠﺐ‬
‫ﯾہ ﮨﻮا ﮐہ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺳﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺧﺎرﺟﯽ ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﻣﺪاﺧﻠﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺷﻮاﮨﺪ‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ۔‬
‫وﺟﻮد ﺧﺪا اور ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﻣﺪاﺧﻠﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﮑﻞ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿہ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ طﺮح اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﺎ وﻗﻮﻋہ۔ ﮨﻢ اس ﺑﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺣﺘﻤﯽ راﺋﮯ ﺗﮏ‬
‫ﭘﮩﻨﭽﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ڈارون ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﺳﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﺪار اﺷﯿﺎ ء ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﺳﻠﺴﻠہ ﺣﯿﺎت ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﻣﮕﺮ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﻧﮯ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻧﺎ ﺻﺮف ﯾہ ﮐہ ﺟﺎﻧﺪار اﺷﯿﺎ ء اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ‬
‫ﺳﻠﺴﻠﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﮍﯾﺎں ﮨﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﺳﺘﺎرے اور ﮐﮩﮑﺸﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ وﺟﻮد ﮐﺎ اﺗﻨﺎ ﮨﯽ‬
‫ﺣﺼہ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﺘﻨﺎ ﮐہ دﯾﮕﺮ ﺟﺎﻧﺪار اﺷﯿﺎء۔‬
‫ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﻧﻈﺎم ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ اﺑﺘﺪا اور اﻧﺘﮩﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ زﻣﯿﻦ اور اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ وﺟﻮد و ﻋﺪم ﭘﺮ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮯ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﮐﯽ ﻣﻨﺎزل ﺷﻌﻮر اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﯽ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ طﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ اس‬ ‫•‬
‫ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﺴﻔﯿﺎﻧہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت اور ﻧﻈﻢ ﮨﺎﺋﮯ اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺘﻨﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺻﻮرﺗﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻣﺎﺿﯽ و ﺣﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺳﺐ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮨﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﭘﺲ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮا ﮐہ وﺣﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﻌﻮر اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮨﯽ ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﺣﺼہ ﮨﮯ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺣﺘﻤﯽ اور آﺧﺮی ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ۔‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺑﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﻘﻂ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻼش ﮐﻮ ﺟﺎری رﮐﮭﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اس ﻟﯿﮯ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺟﺘﻨﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮات ﺧﻮاه وه ﺳﯿﮑﻮﻟﺮ ﮨﻮں‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﮨﻮں ﯾﺎ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ‪ ،‬ان‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺣﺘﻤﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ اﻟﺒﺘہ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه و ﺗﺠﺮﺑﮯ ﮐﮯ اﺻﻮﻟﻮں‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻣﺪ ﻧﻈﺮ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻋﮩﺪ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺑﮩﺘﺮﯾﻦ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ "ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ‬
‫ﻋﻈﯿﻢ" ﮨﮯ۔‬

‫ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺗﺤﺪﯾﺎت‬

‫ﻣﺬﮐﻮره ﺑﺎﻻ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻼت ﺳﮯ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﮩﺪ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﮐﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯدو‬

‫ﻣﺘﻀﺎد ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮﯾﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اﯾﮏ وه ﺟﻮ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻋﻘﯿﺪے اور اﯾﻤﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺒﮑہ‬
‫دوﺳﺮی وه ﺟﺲ ﮐﻮ ﺳﮩﺎرا دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﮯ و ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﮐﺎ ﺑﮭﺮﭘﻮر ﺳﺎﻣﺎن ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ اﯾﮏ اﯾﺴﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت )‪ (Worldview‬ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ واﺑﺴﺘہ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدﯾﮟ‬
‫ﺗﻌﻘﻞ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ اور ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎﺗﯽ و ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪاﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﭘﺮ رﮐﮭﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﭘﯿﺶ‬
‫ﮐﺮده ﺗﺤﺪﯾﺎت ﮐﻮ ﻋﻘﯿﺪت ﮐﯽ ﮐﮭﻮﻧﮣﯽ ﺳﮯ ﺑﺎﻧﺪھﻨﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺎ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ اﮨﻢ ﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﺳﻮال ﺟﻮ‬
‫ﮨﻤﺎرے ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﮨﮯ وه ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﮨﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ و ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﺳﺮﮔﺮﻣﯿﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺳﻤﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮﻧﯽ‬
‫ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ۔ ﻗﺒﻞ ازﯾﮟ ﮐہ ﮨﻢ اس ﺳﻮال ﮐﮯ ﺟﻮاب ﭘﺮ ﻏﻮر و ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ اﯾﮏ رواﯾﺘﯽ ﻣﺆﻗﻒ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺬﮐﺮه‬
‫ﺿﺮوری ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ اور ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻟﺰوﻣﯿﺖ )‪ (Essentialism‬ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺧﺎص ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺳﯽ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﮯ ارد ﮔﺮد ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﺣﯿﺎت ﮔﮭﻮم رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾﻌﻨﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻠﻨﺎ‪ ،‬اس ﮐﺎ ﮔﺰارﻧﺎ اور ﺧﺘﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﺮﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﯽ اﺑﺪی زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎﻣﯿﺎﺑﯽ ﯾﺎ ﻧﺎﮐﺎﻣﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮨﮯ۔۔ اﺳﯽ ﮐﻮ اﮨﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ‪Meanings‬‬
‫‪of life‬ﻣﺎﻧﺘﮯ ﭼﻠﮯ آﺋﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﮐﺮوڑوں اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﻧﮯ اﺳﯽ ﺗﺼﻮرﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺗﮓ و ﺗﺎز‬
‫ﺣﯿﺎت ﮐﻮ ﻣﮩﻤﯿﺰ دی ﮨﮯ ۔ﺟﺒﮑہ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ اور ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ طﺒﯿﻌﯿﺖ )‪ (Naturalism‬ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ‬
‫اﯾﺴﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻠﮑہ ﺟﻮﮨﺮ ﺣﯿﺎت اﯾﮏ اﯾﺴﺎ ﺳﺮ ﭼﺸﻤہ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن و ﺣﯿﻮاﻧﺎت ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻧﺒﺎﺗﺎت‪ ،‬ﺟﻤﺎدات اور اﺟﺮام ﻓﻠﮑﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﯾﮑﺴﺎں ﻣﺴﺘﻔﯿﺾ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺑﺴﺖ‬
‫و ﮐﺸﺎد ﻓﻘﻂ اﻧﺴﺎن اور اس ﮐﮯ اﻋﻤﺎل و ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﭘﺮ ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ۔ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ‬
‫ﻟﺰوﻣﯿﺖ ﺗﺐ ﺗﮏ ﺗﻮ ﺷﺎﯾﺪ ﮐﺎرﮔﺮ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﺟﺐ ﺗﮏ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ اﯾﮏ اﻧﺘﮩﺎﺋﯽ ﻣﺤﺪود‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺟﯿﻮن ﺑﺴﺮ ﮐﺮ رﮨﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ آج ﺟﺐ ﻻ ﻣﺤﺪود ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت اور ﺑﮯ ﺷﻤﺎر ﮐﮩﮑﺸﺎؤں‬
‫ﮐﺎ وﺟﻮد اﯾﮏ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﺑﻦ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ اس ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺟﯿﻨﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫رﮨﺎ۔‬
‫ﯾﻮال ﻧﻮح ﮨﺮاری )‪(Yuval Noah Harari‬اﭘﻨﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ‪ Sapiens‬ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫‪"So, our medieval ancestors were happy because they found meaning to‬‬
‫‪life in collective delusions about the afterlife? Yes. As long as nobody‬‬
‫‪punctured their fantasies, why shouldn’t they? As far as we can tell, from‬‬
‫‪a purely scientific viewpoint, human life has absolutely no meaning.‬‬
‫‪Humans are the outcome of blind evolutionary processes that operate‬‬
‫‪without goal or purpose. Our actions are not part of some divine cosmic‬‬
‫‪plan, and if planet Earth were to blow up tomorrow morning, the universe‬‬
‫‪would probably keep going about its business as usual".2‬‬

‫'' اﮔﺮ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﮐﮩﮯ ﮐہ ﻗﺮون وﺳﻄﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮگ ﻣﻄﻤﺌﻦ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﮔﺰار رﮨﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ‬
‫ﮐہ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻣﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﻮ ﮨﯽ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﺣﯿﺎت ﺳﻤﺠﮭ رﮐﮭﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬ﺗﻮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﮩﻮں ﮔﺎ‬
‫ﺟﯽ ﮨﺎں‪ ،‬ان ﮐﮯ اطﻤﯿﻨﺎن ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﯾﮩﯽ ﺳﺮاب ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﺟﺐ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ان ﮐﮯ ﺧﯿﺎﻟﯽ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﻮں ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﺟﮭﮣﻼﻧﮯ واﻻ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﯽ ﻧہ ﺗﮭﺎ ﺗﻮ وه ﮐﯿﻮں ﻧہ اطﻤﯿﻨﺎن ﺑﮭﺮی زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮔﺰارﺗﮯ۔۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ آج ﮨﻢ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﮐﮩﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮨﮯ اور ﻧہ ﮨﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﻘﺪس ﻧﻈﺎم ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ ﯾﺎ ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﺣﮑﻢ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﺘﯿﺠہ ﮨﮯ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻏﯿﺮ ﺷﻌﻮری ﻧﻈﺎم ﮐﺎ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﮐﻞ ﮐﻮ اﮔﺮ زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮍی ﺗﺒﺎﮨﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﺘﻢ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﻮ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺑﺎﻗﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت آﮔﮯ ﺑﮍھﺘﯽ رﮨﮯ ﮔﯽ‪ ،‬ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ وه ﺻﺪﯾﻮں ﺳﮯ ﮐﺮﺗﯽ آ رﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ''۔‬
‫ﻣﺬﮐﻮره ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻞ ﺳﮯ واﺿﺢ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﮩﺪ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﮐﯽ ﻧﺌﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ دﯾﻮ ﻣﺎﻻ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ‬
‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﯾﮏ ﺑﮍے اور اﮨﻢ ﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﭼﯿﻠﻨﺞ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ اﮨﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻟﯿﮯ داﺧﻠﯽ اﺧﺘﻼﻓﺎت ﺳﮯ ﮐﮩﯿﮟ زﯾﺎده اﮨﻢ اﻣﺮ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺑﮭﺮﻧﮯ‬
‫واﻟﮯ ﺳﻮاﻻت ﮐﻮ زﯾﺮ ﻏﻮر ﻻﺋﯿﮟ اور ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﭘﺮ از ﺳﺮ ﻧﻮ ﻏﻮر ﮐﺮﯾﮟ۔ ﻣﺜﻼً ﺗﻮﺣﯿﺪی‬
‫ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﺧﺎص طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﺑﺮاﮨﯿﻤﯽ ﺷﺮﯾﻌﺘﻮں ﮐﺎ اس ﺑﺎﺑﺖ اﺗﻔﺎق ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت اﯾﮏ ﺧﺪا ﮐﯽ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ زﻣﯿﻦ ﭘﺮﺑﮭﯿﺠﺎ۔ ان ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺐ وﺣﺪاﻧﯿﺖ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ آﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن اﭘﻨﮯ اس ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﻋﻘﯿﺪے رو‬
‫ﮔﺮداﻧﯽ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده ﺧﺪاؤں ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﻟﮕﮯ۔ اﺳﯽ ﺑﻨﺎ ﭘﺮ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ ﻧﺒﻮت‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﺳﻠﺴﻠہ ﺷﺮوع ﮐﯿﺎ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﺟﺐ ﺟﺐ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ وﺣﺪاﻧﯿﺖ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ ﮐﮯراﺳﺘﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮨﭧ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﺐ‬

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‫‪Harari, Yuval Noah Sapiens, P 391‬‬
‫ﺗﺐ ﺧﺪا ﻧﺒﯽ ﺑﮭﯿﺠﺘﺎ ﺟﻮ اﻧﮩﯿﮟ ان ﮐﮯ اﺻﻠﯽ ﻋﻘﯿﺪے ﮐﯽ طﺮف ﺑﻼﺗﺎ۔ ﯾہ ﺳﻠﺴﻠہ ﭼﻠﺘﺎ رﮨﺎ ﺗﺎ آﻧﮑہ‬
‫آﺧﺮی ﻧﺒﯽ آﺋﮯ اور اﭘﻨﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺧﺪا ﮐﺎآﺧﺮی ﭘﯿﻐﺎم ﻻﺋﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ رﮨﺘﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﺗﮏ ﺗﻤﺎم اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ۔ ﺟﻮ اس ﭘﯿﻐﺎم ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ اﭘﻨﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮔﺰارے ﮔﺎ‪ ،‬ﮐﺎﻣﯿﺎب ﮢﮭﮩﺮے ﮔﺎ اور ﺟﻮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮔﺰارے ﮔﺎ وه روز ﻣﺤﺸﺮ ﺧﺪاﮐﯽ ﻧﺎراﺿﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺷﮑﺎر ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ ﻣﺬﮐﻮره ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﺗﯿﻨﻮں اﺑﺮاﮨﯿﻤﯽ‬
‫ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﯾﮩﻮدﯾﺖ‪ ،‬ﻣﺴﯿﺤﯿﺖ اور اﺳﻼم ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻌﻤﻮﻟﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾﻮں ﮐﮩﻨﺎ‬
‫ﺑﮯ ﺟﺎ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﺗﯿﻨﻮں ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ڈھﺎﻧﭽہ اﺳﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﻋﻘﯿﺪے ﭘﺮ ﮐﮭﮍا ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﺒﮑہ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ اس ﺳﮯ ﯾﮑﺴﺮ اﻟﭧ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ اﮨﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﻓﺮض اوﻟﯿﻦ ﯾہ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ وه ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺎری ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ‬
‫ذﮨﻦ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻠﺠﺎن ﮐﻮ اﮨﻤﯿﺖ دﯾﮟ۔ آج ﺑﯿﺴﯿﻮں ﺻﺪی ﮐﯽ طﺮح ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮐﺎ اﻧﮑﺎر ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫رﮨﺎ ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮐﻮ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺗﺴﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اب ﺟﺐ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻒ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮯ ﺷﻤﺎر ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪاﺗﯽ دﻻﺋﻞ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ذﮨﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺌﯽ اﮨﻢ ﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﺳﻮاﻟﻮں ﮐﺎ ﺟﻨﻢ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﻧﺎﮔﺰﯾﺮ اﻣﺮ ﮨﮯ۔ ذﯾﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﮯ ﮨﯽ ﭼﻨﺪ ﺳﻮال‬
‫ﺑﻄﻮر ﻣﺜﺎل ﻟﮑﮭﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﺎﮐہ ان ﭘﺮ ﻏﻮر و ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ﺷﺮوع ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﮯ۔‬

‫• اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺎ ﮐﺮﺷﻤہ ﮨﮯ ﯾﺎ ارﺗﻘﺎﺋﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺎ ﺷﺎﺧﺴﺎﻧہ۔ دوﻧﻮں ﺻﻮرﺗﻮں‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ و ﺛﻤﺮات ﯾﮑﺴﺮ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻒ و ﻣﺘﻀﺎد ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اول اﻟﺬﮐﺮ دﻋﻮی ﮐﮯ ﺣﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﻮاﺋﮯ‬
‫وﺣﯽ ﮐﮯ اور ﮐﻮﺋﯽ دﻟﯿﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔وﺣﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻼوه دﯾﮕﺮ دﻻﺋﻞ ﮐﺎ ﯾﮩﺎں اﺳﺘﺮداد‬
‫ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻧﺴﺎن اﮔﺮﭼہ اﯾﮏ ﻟﻤﺒﯽ ﻣﺪت ﺗﮏ اﺳﯽ ﺑﺎت ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﺗﺴﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﻣﮕﺮ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﻮ ﻋﺮش اور ﻓﺮش ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت دﯾﮑﮭﺘﺎ‬
‫ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬اس دور ﮐﮯ ﺗﻘﺮﯾﺒﺎ ً ﺳﺒﮭﯽ ﺗﺼﻮرات اﭘﻨﯽ اﻓﺎدﯾﺖ ﮐﮭﻮ ﭼﮑﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ‬
‫ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﺑﮭﯽ ﭘﺎﯾہ ﺗﮑﻤﯿﻞ ﮐﻮ ﭘﮩﻨﭻ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺷﻌﻮر اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﯽ وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ‬
‫ﮐﺮ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮرات ﮐﻮ دﻟﯿﻞ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔‬
‫ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﻏﻮر و ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺪار اس ﻧﮑﺘﮯ ﭘﺮ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ارﺗﻘﺎء اور ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ‬
‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﺷﺎﻧہ ﺑﺸﺎﻧہ ﭼﻞ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬
‫• ﺗﻮﺣﯿﺪی ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ دﻋﻮی ﮨﮯ ﮐہ زﻣﯿﻦ ﭘﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ آﺑﺎدﮐﺎری وﺣﺪاﻧﯿﺖ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ‬
‫)‪ (Monotheism‬ﺳﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﮯ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ اﭘﻨﯽ اﺻﻞ ﺳﮯ ﮨﭧ ﮐﺮ‬
‫ﺑﮯ راه روی ﮐﺎ ﺷﮑﺎر ﮨﻮﺋﯽ اور ﻣﺸﺮﮐﺎﻧہ ﻋﻘﺎﺋﺪ )‪ (Polytheism‬ﮐﺎ وﺟﻮد ﮨﻮا۔ ﺟﺒﮑہ‬
‫ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﻧﮯ دﻻﺋﻞ و ﺷﻮاﮨﺪ ﺳﮯ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ اﺑﺘﺪا ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺸﺮﮐﺎﻧہ ﻋﻘﺎﺋﺪ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ وﺣﺪاﻧﯿﺖ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﮯ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ اس وﻗﺖ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺋﯽ ﺟﺐ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﺑﮍی ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺒﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺷﮑﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﯿﻨﺎ ﺳﯿﮑﮭﺎ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﻧﻘﻄﮯ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺮﮐﻮز‬
‫رﮐﮭﻨﮯ اور ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﻧﻈﺎم ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺟﯿﻨﮯ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺠﺒﻮر رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﺳﻄﮯ وﺣﺪاﻧﯿﺖ‬
‫ﭘﺮﺳﺖ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﺷﯿﻮع ﮨﻮا ﺗﺎﮐہ اﯾﮏ ﺧﺪا‪ ،‬اﯾﮏ ﺑﺎدﺷﺎه اور اﯾﮏ ﻧﻈﺎم ﮐﺎ دور دوره ﮨﻮ‬
‫ﺳﮑﮯ۔ اس ﭘﺲ ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ اﮨﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﮨﻢ ﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﺳﻮال ﯾہ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﮐﯿﺎ اس ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﻮﺣﯿﺪی ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ دﻋﺎوی اﭘﻨﺎ وﺟﻮد ﺑﺮﻗﺮار رﮐﮭ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﯾﺎ اﻧﮩﯿﮟ اﭘﻨﮯ‬
‫دﻋﺎوی ﭘﺮ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫• اﺳﯽ ﺿﻤﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺒﻮت اور ﺧﺘﻢ ﻧﺒﻮت ﮐﺎ ﻣﺴﺌﻠہ ﺑﮭﯽ زﯾﺮ ﺑﺤﺚ آﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﮐﺎ‬
‫اﺻﻮﻟﯽ ﻣﺆﻗﻒ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻧﺒﯽ ﮐﯽ آﻣﺪ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ درﺳﺖ راه ﮐﯽ ﮨﺪاﯾﺖ ﻓﺮاﮨﻢ‬
‫ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﺟﺐ ﺟﺐ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ ﻏﻠﻂ اور ﮔﻤﺮاه ﮐﻦ ﺧﯿﺎﻻت ﮐﮯ زﯾﺮ اﺛﺮ درﺳﺖ راه ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺑﮭﮣﮑﺘﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ اﻧﺒﯿﺎء ﮐﯽ ﺑﻌﺜﺖ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ۔ آج ﺟﺐ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ اﯾﮏ ﺑﮩﺖ ﺑﮍے ﻋﻠﻤﯽ و ﻓﮑﺮی‬
‫اﻧﻘﻼب ﺳﮯ ﮔﺰر رﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻧﺒﯽ ﮐﯽ آﻣﺪ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﮩﯿﮟ زﯾﺎده ﮨﮯ۔ ﭘﮭﺮ‬
‫اﯾﺴﺎ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻧﺒﻮت ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎب ﺑﻨﺪ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ اور ﺻﺪﯾﻮں ﻗﺒﻞ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ‬
‫وﺣﯽ ﮐﻮ ﮨﯽ رﮨﺘﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﮑﻤﻞ ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯽ )‪(Ultimate Truth‬ﺗﺴﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﭘﺮ‬
‫اﺻﺮار ﺟﺎری ﮨﮯ ۔ ﯾﮩﺎں ﺳﻮال ﮐﺎ ﻣﺪار اس ﻧﮑﺘﮯ ﭘﺮ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﻧﺒﻮت اور وﺣﯽ واﻗﻌﯽ‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ ﺧﺎرﺟﯽ ذرﯾﻌہ ﮐﯽ دﯾﻦ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮐﯿﺎ ﻧﺒﻮت اور وﺣﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت واﻗﻌﯽ ﺧﺘﻢ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ اﮔﺮ اﯾﺴﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﮐﯿﺎ اس ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﭘﺬﯾﺮ ﺷﻌﻮر اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮨﮯ ﯾﺎ ﮐﭽﮭ اور۔ اﮔﺮ‬
‫ﺷﻌﻮر اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﯽ رو اﻓﺰوں ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﮨﯽ ﺧﺘﻢ ﻧﺒﻮت ﮐﺎ ﺳﺒﺐ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ اﮨﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ‬
‫ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮐﻮ ﯾﮩﺎں ﺗﺴﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﺒﮑہ ﺣﯿﺎﺗﯿﺎﺗﯽ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾﮩﯽ ﻟﻮگ اس‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺨﺖ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻒ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫• ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ اﯾﮏ )‪(Meta Narrative‬ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮨﺴﺖ و ﺑﻮد ﮐﯽ ﮨﺮ ﺷﮯ ﭘﺮ ﺑﺎ‬
‫ﺿﺎﺑﻄہ راﺋﮯ رﮐﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮐﯿﺎ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺑﮭﯽ اﯾﺴﺎ ﮨﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﺤﯿﻂ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ اﭘﻨﮯ اﻧﺪر‬
‫رﮐﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ اﮔﺮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮐﮭﺘﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ و ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﺧﻂ ﺗﻔﺮﯾﻖ ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ وه ﮐﻮن ﮐﻮﻧﺴﮯ ﻣﯿﺎدﯾﻦ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻦ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪود ﻣﺬﮨﺐ و ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﻣﺸﺘﺮک‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ اور ﮐﮩﺎں ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﻣﻐﺎﯾﺮت ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﺑﺮآں ﯾہ ﮐہ اﮔﺮ ﮐﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺧﺎص ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠﮯ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ان دوﻧﻮں ﮐﺎ اﺧﺘﻼف راﺋﮯ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺗﺮﺟﯿﺢ ﮐﺎ ﭘﯿﻤﺎﻧہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح اﮔﺮ‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺑﮭﯽ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺤﯿﻂ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ اور ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﭼﻠﻨﺎ ﮐﺲ‬
‫ﺣﺪ ﺗﮏ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫• ﻣﻘﺪس ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ و ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﮯ اﺻﻮل و ﺿﻮاﺑﻂ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮں ﮔﮯ۔ ﮐﯿﺎ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﯽ ﮔﻨﺠﺎﺋﺶ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻈﯿﻢ ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮده ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل اور ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺴﯽ‬
‫اﯾﮏ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺘﻔﻖ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ اور آﺋﻨﺪه دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﺘﻔﻘہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر‬
‫ﻟﯿﮟ۔‬
 ‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ دور اورﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ؛ ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻞ و ﺗﺠﺰﯾہ‬
‫‪Muhammad Tihami Bashar‬‬
‫‪Pakistan‬‬
‫ﺑﺸﺮﻋﻠﻮی )‪(basharalawi47@gmail.com‬‬ ‫ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮ ‪ :‬ﻣﺤﻤﺪﺗﮩﺎﻣﯽ‬
‫‪ ‬ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ‪W:‬‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ اور اس ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﯽ ﻓﮑﺮی ﺗﮓ و ﺗﺎز ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ﯾہ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﭘﻨﯽ اﮨﻤﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ‪ ،‬ﻋﮩ ِﺪ ﺣﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﯽ طﺮف ﻣﺘﻮﺟہ ﮐﺮ رﮨﺎﮨﮯ۔ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬
‫زﯾﺮ اﺛﺮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺳﻮﭼﻮں ﮐﺎ رخ ﺟﻦ ﻧﺌﯽ راﮨﻮں ﺳﮯ آﺷﻨﺎ ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ اس ﮐﺎ اﺛﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﭘﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﭘﮍا‬
‫اﻧﮑﺸﺎﻓﺎت ﮐﮯ ِ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻣﺠﺒﻮر ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﯾﺴﺎ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ دے ﺳﮑﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ اﻧﺪر ﻋﻠﻤﯽ وزن رﮐﮭﺘﺎ‬
‫ﮨﻮ۔ﮨﻢ ﯾﮩﺎں ﭼﻨﺪ اﮨﻢ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻞ و ﺗﺠﺰﯾہ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺣﺎﺻﻼت ﻓﮑﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﻟہ ﮐﯽ ﺷﮑﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ رﮐﮭﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺳﻌﯽ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ ﺑﺤﺚ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﮐﯽ ﻟﺌﮯ اﮨﻢ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﭼﻨﺪ ﺗﻌﺎرﻓﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ اﻣﻮر ِ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﺟﺐ ﮨﻢ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﻟﻔﻆ ﺑﻮﻟﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ ﯾہ ذﮨﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ رﮨﻨﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮨﻤﺎرے ﭘﺎس دو ﺻﻮرﺗﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫‪ (1‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن‬
‫‪ (2‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮات‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ ﺧﯿﺎل ﯾﮩﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ان ﮐﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﺗﺮک ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔ وه ﺑﮩﺮﺣﺎل ﺣﺘﻤﯽ اور ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ ﮨﯽ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﮯ ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ ﺧﺪا ﺳﮯ ﮨﯽ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﮨﮯ‬
‫اور اب ان ﮐﻮ ﺻﺮف ﺧﺪا ﮨﯽ ﻣﻨﺴﻮخ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻨﺴﻮﺧﯽ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﯽ‬
‫درﺳﺘﮕﯽ ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ۔ ﯾﻌﻨﯽ اﯾﺴﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮐہ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧﻘﻄ ِہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﻮ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﭘﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ ادراک و اﺣﺴﺎس ﮨﻮا اور اس ﻧﮯ وه ﻏﻠﻄﯽ درﺳﺖ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾﮩﺎں ﻣﻨﺴﻮخ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ طﺮح "اﻟﺤﻖ " ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ طﺮح ﮐہ ﻧﺎﺳﺦ "اﻟﺤﻖ" ﮨﻮﺗﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔اس ﺳﮯ ﻗﻄﻊ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ درﺳﺖ ﮨﮯ ﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ وه ﺑﮩﺮﺣﺎل ﯾﮩﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﭘﺮ اﮨﻢ‬
‫ﺳﻮال ﯾہ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺐ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ اﻣﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺴﺦ ﮐﮯ اﺳﺒﺎب ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮ‬
‫زﯾﺮ ﺑﺤﺚ ﻻﺋﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ‪ ،‬ﺳﺮدﺳﺖ اس ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﺮض ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ‬ ‫ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ؟ اس ﺳﻮال ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﭘﺮ ﮨﻢ ﭘﮭﺮ ِ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮات ﮐﺎ ﮐﺎم اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﺎم ﮨﮯ۔ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن و وﺟﻮد ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﻮ ﺗﺴﻠﯿﻢ‬
‫اﻣﮑﺎن ﺧﻄﺎ ﺳﮯ ﺧﺎﻟﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﯾہ اﻣﮑﺎن ﺧﻮد ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﯽ طﺮح‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔ ﮐﺐ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﻮ ﺑﺪﻻ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻏﻠﻂ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﮐﻦ وﺟﻮه ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ؟ ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ داﺧﻠﯽ ﻧﻈﻢ ِاﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ ﮨﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﭽﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ ﯾﺎ ﮐﺴﯽ‬
‫دوﺳﺮی ﺟﮩﺖ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﻮ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻠﯽ ﺑﺤﺚ ﺳﮯ ﻗﻄﻊ ﻧﻈﺮ‪ ،‬ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮات ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻓﮑﺮ دوﺑﮍے رﺟﺤﺎﻧﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
 ‫‪ (1‬اﺟﻤﺎﻋﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮات ﮐﻮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﺪﻻ ﺟﺎﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔‬
‫‪ (2‬اﺟﺘﮩﺎدی آراء ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺳﺮدﺳﺖ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ان ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ و ﺳﻘﻢ ﭘﺮ ﮐﻼم ﺳﮯ ﻗﻄﻊ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ دوﺳﺮے ﭘﮩﻠﻮؤں ﮐﯽ طﺮف‬
‫ﺑﮍھﻨﺎ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ذﮨﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ رﮨﻨﯽ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎﺗﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ ﮔﺰر رﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬
‫طﻮر ﭘﺮ اس ﮐﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ وه اﺳﮯ ﺗﺮک ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﺴﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﮐﻮ ﻗﺒﻮل ﮐﺮ ﻟﮯ‬
‫ﮔﯽ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ درﺳﺖ ﮨﻮ۔ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺘﻮں ﮐﻮ اس طﺮح ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ اور ﺣﺘﻤﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﺎﻧﺘﯽ ﮐہ‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﭘﺮ اﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدوں ﭘﺮ ﺗﺮک ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ۔ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اس ﻟﯿﮯ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن اور وﺟﻮد ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ طﺮح ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮐہ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ وﺟﻮد ﻧہ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ۔‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺳﮯ ﺟﮍے ان ﻟﻮازﻣﺎت ﮐﻮ ذﮨﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮ"ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ" ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﭘﺮ ﻏﻮر‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ان دو ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﭘﺮﻏﻮر ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ان ﭘﮩﻠﻮؤں ﺳﮯ ﺳﻮﭼﻨﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪ (1‬ﮐﯿﺎ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ دو اﻟﮓ اﻟﮓ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ؟‬
‫زﯾﺮﺑﺤﺚ اﻣﻮر اﻟﮓ اﻟﮓ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ؟‬‫‪ (2‬ﮐﯿﺎ ان دوﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ِ‬
‫ﮨﻢ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺎﻧﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ وه ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻋﻼﻗہ رﮐﮭﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ وه ﻣﺨﺼﻮص‬
‫طﺮﯾﻘﻮں ﺳﮯ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﮐﺮﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻧﻘﻄ ِہ ﻧﻈﺮ اﭘﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ طﺮﯾﻘﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ ﺧﺎص‬
‫اﮨﻤﯿﺖ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﮯ ﮐﮭﻮج ﻣﯿﮟ وه ﺗﺠﺮﺑﮯ ﮐﮯ درﺟہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺎ ﮐﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﺎ ادراک‬
‫ﮐﺮﺗﯽ اور ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﺎ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ اس ﮐﺎ ﺟﻮاب ﮨﻢ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺷﺎﯾﺪ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﺘﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ۔ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻓﮑﺮ اس‬
‫ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻧﺎ ﺻﺮف ﯾہ ﮐہ ﻓﮑﺮی اﺧﺘﻼف ﮐﺎ ﺷﮑﺎر ﮨﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻓﮑﺮی ﺗﻀﺎدات ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾﮩﺎں ﯾہ اﺷﺎره‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ اﮨﻢ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻣﺰاﺟﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻘﺪس آﻣﯿﺰ ﻏﻠﻮ ﮐﯽ ﺑﮭﺮﻣﺎر ﻧﮯ‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺧﺎص ﻣﻮﺿﻮع‬
‫ﺳﮯ واﺑﺴﺘہ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﺎﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﺑﻨﺎ دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ان ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻮ آﻣﯿﺰ ﻋﻘﯿﺪت اﻧﮩﯿﮟ اﮐﺴﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﻗﺮآن‬
‫ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﮐﻮ ﮨﺮﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺎ ﺧﺰاﻧہ اور ﭘﯿﻐﻤﺒﺮﷺ ﮐﻮ ﮨﺮ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﺑﺎور ﮐﺮﯾﮟ۔‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ ﺟﻮاب ﻧہ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد ﮨﻢ ﯾہ ﯾﻘﯿﻨﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﮐﮩہ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ان ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﮯ اﻣﻮر ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺬﮐﻮر ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ رﮐﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﯾہ‬
‫داﺋﺮه ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ و ﺟﺴﺘﺠﻮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮔﻮﯾﺎ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ دوﻧﻮں‬
‫اﯾﮏ اﯾﮏ ﻧﻘﻄ ِہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اب ﯾﮩﺎں ﺳﻮال ﯾہ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫• ﮐﯿﺎ اﯾﺴﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ دوﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﺧﺘﻼف ﮨﻮ؟‬
‫ﮨﻢ دﯾﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﺘﻌﺪد اﻣﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ دوﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ اﯾﮏ دوﺳﺮے ﺳﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﻠﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اس اﺧﺘﻼف‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺲ ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ درﺳﺖ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ اور ﮐﺲ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﻮ ﻏﻠﻂ ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ؟‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮ ﺳﻮﭼﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻧﺘﯿﺠہ ﯾﮩﯽ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮﮐﯽ اﺑﺘﺪاﺋﯽ ﺳﻄﺮﯾﮟ ِ‬
‫ﻧﮑﻠﻨﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫"ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‪ ،‬ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬وه اﮔﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﻮ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ اﺳﮯ ﮨﯽ درﺳﺖ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ۔‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺟﮕہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺑﺮﻋﮑﺲ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﭘﺮ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ اﺳﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ"۔‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﺳﮯ ﺟﮍے ﯾہ ﺑﺪﯾﮩﯽ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻓﮑﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﻮری طﺮح ﻋﯿﺎں دﯾﮑﮭﮯ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮات ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﮯ ان ﺣﺼﻮں ﮐﺎ ﻣﺪﻋﺎ اس ﺟﺰم و ﯾﻘﯿﻦ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮔﻮﯾﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮﻋﮑﺲ ﮨﻮ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ۔ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ اﻣﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﻮ ِل ﻓﯿﺼﻞ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺘﻮوں ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺟﻠﻮه ﮔﺮدﮐﮭﺎﺋﯽ‬
‫دﯾﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ اس ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﭘﺮ ذﮨﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﯿﺦ ﺑﻦ ﺑﺎز اور ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ اﺣﻤﺪ رﺿﺎﺧﺎن ﮐﮯ وه ﻓﺘﻮے ﺗﺎزه ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﻨﮯ‬
‫ﭼﺎﮨﯿﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮨﭧ ﮐﺮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﭘﺮ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ اﭘﻨﺎﻟﯿﻨﮯ ﮐﻮ ﮐﻔﺮ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﯾہ ﮔﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ "زﻣﯿﻦ و آﺳﻤﺎن ﺳﺎﮐﻦ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﯾہ ﺳﻮرج ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﮔﺮد‬
‫ﭼﮑﺮ ﻟﮕﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ"۔ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺳﺮآﻏﺎز ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺐ اس ﻣﺘﻨﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﺳﮯ اﻟﮓ ﺗﮭﺎ ﺗﻮ ﺗﺐ اس ﮐﮯ ﭘﺎس‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﮩﻨﮯ ﮐﻮ ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﺗﺮدﯾﺪ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﮯ ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻧہ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﻣﺘﻨﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﺪاﻗﺖ ﭘﺮاﯾﻘﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ‬
‫ﺳﮑﻮن‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ت ﻓﺮﻗﺎن ﺑہ‬ ‫ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ وه اس ﻋﻨﻮان ﺳﮯ ﮐﺘﺎب ﺑﮭﯽ ﻟﮑﮭ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ‪" :‬ﻧﺰول آﯾﺎ ِ‬
‫زﻣﯿﻦ و آﺳﻤﺎن؛ از ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ اﺣﻤﺪ رﺿﺎ ﺑﺮﯾﻠﻮی"۔‬
‫اب ﺟﺒﮑہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﺗﺮدﯾﺪ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﻻﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﮯ۔اب‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻣﺤﺾ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﮯ اﻣﮑﺎن ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ رد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔اس ﻋﮩﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ اﯾﻘﺎن ﮐﮯ اﺳﯽ ﻣﻘﺎم ﭘﺮ ﻓﺎﺋﺰ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ره ﺳﮑﺘﮯ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ ﮨﻢ دﯾﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻓﮑﺮ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ اﮨﻤﯿﺖ دﯾﻨﮯ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺠﺒﻮر ﮨﮯ۔ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ اﮨﻤﯿﺖ دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻧﺎﮔﺰﯾﺮ ﺗﻘﺎﺿہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ درج ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ اﭘﻨﺎ ﻧﻘﻄ ِہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺑﺪﻻ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔اب ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ درج‬
‫ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ اﻣﻮر ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻼ اﻣﮑﺎن ﯾﮩﯽ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬

‫ﺗﺮک ﻣﺘﻮن‪:‬‬
‫ِ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﯾہ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ درج ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻧﮯ واﺿﺢ ﮐﺮ دی ﮨﮯ ﻟﮩﺬا ان ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﺗﺮک ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ ﮐﻢ از ﮐﻢ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻣﻔﮑﺮی و اﮨ ِﻞ ﻋﻠﻢ ن ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﮐﯽ ﮔﻨﺠﺎﺋﺶ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫دﯾﮑﮭﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ۔‬
‫اس اﻣﮑﺎن ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﺎﻧﺎ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎﻧﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺘﺎ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن اﺑﺘﺪاﺋﯿﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮔﺰر ﭼﮑﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﺎﻧﺎﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬
‫اب اﯾﺴﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺳﺆال ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫• ﮐﯿﺎ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﮯ وﮨﯽ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﺑﻨﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ ﯾﺎ ﯾہ ﮐہ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺌﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﮯ‬
‫ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ؟‬
‫ﭼﻨﺎں ﭼہ ﮨﻢ دﯾﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ اس ﺳﺆال ﺳﮯ ﻧﺒﺮد آزﻣﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ رﺟﺤﺎﻧﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺎں رﺟﺤﺎﻧﺎت ﮐﻮ ﯾﻮں ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬

‫‪ .1‬ﮐﺜﯿﺮاﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ‪:‬‬
‫ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﮐﻼم ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺑہ ﯾﮏ وﻗﺖ‬
‫ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﻟﮩﺬا ﯾہ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ﯾہ ﻣﺆﻗﻒ اﭘﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮐہ ﮨﺮزﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮگ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ‬
‫ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ اﭘﻨﮯ زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺸﯿﺪ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﯾﮩﺎں ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﯽ طﺮف ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ‬
‫اﻣﮑﺎن اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮐہ آپ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﯽ طﺮف ﭘﮭﯿﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔اﯾﺴﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﮔﻮﯾﺎ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﻏﻠﻂ ﮐﮩﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮓ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت‬
‫ﻧﮑﻞ آﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﺎ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ اﯾﮏ اﻋﺠﺎز ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﺻﻔﺖ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺚ‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﭘﺮ ﻣﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﺣﺪﯾ ِ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ۔ﯾہ اﺻﻮل ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﺻﺮف‬
‫دﻋﻮی ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮐہ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ اﻟﻐﯿﺐ واﻟﺸﮩﺎدة ﻣﺘﮑﻠﻢ ﻓﺮض‬
‫ٰ‬ ‫رﺳﻮل ﷺ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ۔ ﭼﻨﺎں ﭼہ اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻠﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻢ ﻏﻼم اﺣﻤﺪ ﭘﺮوﯾﺰ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﮐﻮدﯾﮑﮭ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻣﺘﻦ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﻐﻮی اﺷﺘﻘﺎﻗﺎت ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻋﮩﺪ ﮐﮯ‬ ‫وه ﮐﺲ طﺮح ﺣﺪﯾﺚ ﺳﮯ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ِ‬
‫ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ "ﻣﻔﮩﻮم اﻟﻘﺮآن" ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﻻﺋﮯ ۔اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻣﻀﻤﺮات و‬
‫ﻟﻮازﻣﺎت ﭘﺮ ﮐﻼم اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺟﺎﺋﺰے ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬

‫‪ .2‬ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ارﺗﻘﺎ‪:‬‬

‫ﻣﺘﻦ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﮐﻮ‬
‫اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ اﺻﻮﻟﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﮯ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ِ‬
‫ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﯾہ رﺟﺤﺎن‬
‫اﭘﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ درﺳﺖ ﻧہ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﮨﻢ اﯾﺴﮯ اﻣﻮر‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﺳﮯ اﭼﮭﯽ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا اب ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻧﺺ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‬
‫درﺳﺖ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﮕﺮ ظﺎﮨﺮ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻧﺺ ﮐﺎ آج ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻻ‬
‫ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‪ ،‬ﮐﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﺑﺪﻟﻨﮯﺳﮯ ﺑﺪل ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ اس ﻟﯿﮯﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ زﻣﺎﻧہ ﮔﺰرﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻧﺺ ﮐﮯ واﺣﺪ درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﺗﮏ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﯾﮩﺎں ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﻣﺤﻔﻮظ ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﺗﮏ رﺳﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﮨﻢ ﮐﮩہ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﯾہ رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﺎﺣﺎﻣﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ﮐﺴﯽ ﻟﻔﻆ ﺳﮯ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‬
‫آج ارﺗﻘﺎﺋﯽ ﺳﻔﺮ طﮯ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ درﺳﺖ ﺗﺮ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ ﺗﺮ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﯾہ رﺟﺤﺎن ﺳﺮﺳﯿﺪ اﺣﻤﺪ‬
‫زﯾﺮ ﺑﺤﺚ ﻻﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺧﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﻣﺆﻗﻒ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻀﻤﺮات ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ِ‬
‫ﮔﮯ۔‬

‫ﻋﺪم ﺗﻌﺎرض‪:‬‬
‫‪ِ .3‬‬
‫اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ اور ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ اﺧﺘﻼف ﮐﮯاﻣﮑﺎن ﮐﯽ ﮨﯽ‬
‫ﻧﻔﯽ ﮐﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﮩﺎں اﺧﺘﻼف ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮨﻮ وﮨﺎں‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ درﺳﺖ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﭘﺮ ﭘﮩﻨﭻ ﮐﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮨﻢ‬
‫آﮨﻨﮕﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﺗﮭﺎﻧﻮی وﻏﯿﺮه اﮨ ِﻞ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں ﯾہ رﺟﺤﺎن دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬

‫‪ .4‬ﻣﻘﺼﺪﯾﺖ و ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق‪:‬‬

‫ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎن ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ان‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺳﮯ اﻟﮓ ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﺐ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮاﯾﺴﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎن ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ ﮨﯽ ﻏﻠﻂ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ اﻣﻮر اس وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﯽ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪاﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ‬
‫ﮐﺎﺷﻤﯿﺮی ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﮐﮯ آﺛﺎر دﯾﮑﮭﮯ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬‫ؒ‬ ‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎاﻧﻮرﺷﺎه‬

‫‪ .5‬ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‪ ،‬ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ‪:‬‬

‫اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ اﺑﺪﯾﺖ و ﺣﺘﻤﯿﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﺘﻦ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ﻋﮩﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ‬ ‫ﻋﮩﺪ و ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﯾﮩﺎں ﭘﻮرے ِ‬
‫و ﻋﻤﻠﯽ اﻣﮑﺎﻧﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ اﺑﺪ ﺗﮏ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﺑﺪی ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻧﺌﮯ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﺎ ﻣﻨﺼﺐ وﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﻦ‬
‫ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮩﺘﺮﯾﻦ ﻧﻈﯿﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻨﺼﺐ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻧﻤﺎﺋﻨﺪﮔﯽ ڈاﮐﮣﺮ ﻓﻀﻞ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں دﯾﮑﮭﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﯾہ ﻣﺒﯿﻨہ ﻓﮑﺮی رﺟﺤﺎﻧﺎت ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣﻮﻗﻌﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﭘﻨﯽ اﺑﺘﺪاﺋﯽ اور ﺧﺎم ﺷﮑﻠﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اور ﮐﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮐﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﺤﺾ اﺷﺎرے ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ان رﺟﺤﺎﻧﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻣﻀﻤﺮات و ﻟﻮازﻣﺎت ﮐﯽ ﻧﺸﺎﻧﺪﮨﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ‬
‫واﺿﺢ ﻧﻘﻄ ِہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺗﮏ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﻨﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ اﺳﺘﻨﺎد ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺮﺣﻠہ ‪ ،‬ان ﻣﻮﺟﻮد رﺟﺤﺎﻧﺎت اور ان ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮازﻣﺎت ﮐﻮ ﻧﻈﺮ اﻧﺪاز ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ‪،‬طﮯ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﻟہ ﻣﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ان ﻣﺒﯿﻨہ رﺟﺤﺎﻧﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻣﻀﻤﺮات و ﻟﻮازﻣﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺗﺠﺰﯾہ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ‪ ،‬ﻏﻮر طﻠﺐ اﻣﻮر‬
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‫ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﻻﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻄﻮط واﺿﺢ‬
‫ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ اﻣﮑﺎﻧﺎت ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ ۔‬
‫ت ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ آپ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ‬
‫آﺋﻨﺪه ﺳﻄﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﺎ ﻣﺮﺣﻠہ وار ﺗﺠﺰﯾہ ‪ ،‬ﺣﺎﺻﻼ ِ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ‬

‫‪ ‬ﮐﺜﯿﺮاﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ‪:‬‬
‫ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﮐﻼم ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺑہ ﯾﮏ وﻗﺖ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﻟﮩﺬا ﯾہ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ﯾہ ﻣﺆﻗﻒ اﭘﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮐہ ﮨﺮزﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮگ ‪ ،‬ﻟﻐﻮی اﺷﺘﻘﺎﻗﺎت ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد‬
‫ﺳﮯ‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ اﭘﻨﮯ زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺸﯿﺪ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﯾﮩﺎں ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﯽ طﺮف ﻏﻠﻄﯽ‬
‫ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮐہ آپ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ‪ ،‬ﻟﻐﻮی اﺷﺘﻘﺎق ﮐﯽ راه ﺳﮯ‪ ،‬ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﯽ‬
‫طﺮف ﭘﮭﯿﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔اﯾﺴﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﮔﻮﯾﺎ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﻏﻠﻂ ﮐﮩﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮓ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻧﮑﻞ آﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﺎ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ اﯾﮏ اﻋﺠﺎز ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﺻﻔﺖ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺚ رﺳﻮل‬ ‫ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﭘﺮ ﻣﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﺣﺪﯾ ِ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ۔ﯾہ اﺻﻮل ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﺻﺮف‬
‫دﻋﻮی ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮐہ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ اﻟﻐﯿﺐ واﻟﺸﮩﺎدة ﻣﺘﮑﻠﻢ ﻓﺮض ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ۔‬
‫ٰ‬ ‫ﷺ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ‬
‫ﭼﻨﺎں ﭼہ اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻠﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻢ ﻏﻼم اﺣﻤﺪ ﭘﺮوﯾﺰ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﮐﻮدﯾﮑﮭ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮐہ وه ﮐﺲ طﺮح ﺣﺪﯾﺚ‬
‫ﻣﺘﻦ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﻐﻮی اﺷﺘﻘﺎﻗﺎت ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻋﮩﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ "ﻣﻔﮩﻮم‬‫ﺳﮯ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ِ‬
‫اﻟﻘﺮآن" ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﻻﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔اﻧﮭﻮں ﻧﮯ "ﻟﻐﺎت اﻟﻘﺮآن" ﮐﯽ‬
‫اﻟﻔﺎظ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻐﻮی اﺷﺘﻘﺎﻗﺎت ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﻻﺋﮯ اور " ﻣﻔﮩﻮم اﻟﻘﺮآن" ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﮐﯽ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫اﺷﺘﻘﺎﻗﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻣﻔﺎﮨﯿﻢ طﮯ ﮐﺌﮯ۔ ﭘﺮوﯾﺰ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﮐﮯ ﭼﻨﺪ اﻗﺘﺒﺎﺳﺎت ﯾﮩﺎں ﻧﻘﻞ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﻨﺎ‪،‬‬
‫اور اس ﮐﯽ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞِ ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ ﻣﻔﯿﺪ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ‪:‬‬
‫"ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐﭽﮭ ‪۱۹۳۸‬ء ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ‪۱۹۸۰ ،‬ء ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ وﮨﯽ ﮐﭽﮭ ﮐﮩﺘﺎ ﮨﻮں ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ ﯾہ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮨﮯ اور ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ اﺑﺪی اور ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺘﺒﺪل ﮨﯿﮟ… ﻗﺮآن ﮐﻮ ﺣﺠﺖ اور ﺳﻨﺪ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ ﯾہ‬
‫ﻧﺎﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه آج ﮐﭽﮭ ﮐﮩہ دے اور ﮐﻞ ﮐﭽﮭ اور ۔ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺎ ﻣﺘﺒﻊ‪ ،‬ﻧہ ﻣﺪاﮨﻨﺖ ﮐﺮﺳﮑﺘﺎﮨﮯ‪ ،‬اور ﻧہ ﮐﺴﯽ‬
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‫ﺳﮯ ﻣﻔﺎﮨﻤﺖ"۔‬
‫"طﻠﻮعِ اﺳﻼم ‪۱۹۳۸‬ء ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺎری ﮨﻮا‪ ،‬اور ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ ﮨﻨﺪ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ‪۱۹۴۸‬ء ﺳﮯ اب ﺗﮏ ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ اور ﻣﺘﻮاﺗﺮ‬
‫ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪی ٴوﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺟﺎری رﮨﺎ۔ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ اور ﻋﻠﻢ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﻮں اور‬
‫ت ﺣﺎﺿﺮه ﮐﺎﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻟﯿﻨﺎ اس ﮐﺎ ﻣﺸﻦ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﮐﯽ اﺷﺎﻋﺘﻮں ﮐﮯ اﻧﺒﺎر ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ آپ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺳﮯ دو ﭘﺮﭼﮯ‬ ‫ﺣﺎﻻ ِ‬
‫اُﮢﮭﺎ ﻟﯿﺠﺌﮯ؛ ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬آپ ﮐﻮ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﻀﺎد‪ ،‬ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﺨﺎﻟﻒ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﻠﮯ ﮔﺎ ﯾہ‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﷲ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ دﻟﯿﻞ ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫اس ﻟﺌﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﺗﻀﺎد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﺧﺘﻼف ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ اس ﻟﺌﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐﭽﮭ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ‪ ،‬اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﻀﺎد‬
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‫و ﺗﺨﺎﻟﻒ ﻧہ ﮨﻮﮔﺎ"۔‬
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‫ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻧہ ﮐہ ﮐﺴﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﯾﺎ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ"۔‬
‫ِ‬ ‫”دﯾﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﺠﺖ‪،‬‬
‫"آﺳﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ﮐﯽ ﮐﯿﻔﯿﺖ اس ﺳﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔وه ﻓﻀﺎ اور ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﮐﮯ اﺛﺮات ﺑﻠﻨﺪاور زﻣﺎن و ﻣﮑﺎن‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪود ﺳﮯ ﻣﺎوراء ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯﻧہ اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﺒﮭﯽ ﭘﺮاﻧﯽ اور ﻓﺮﺳﻮده ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯاور ﻧہ ﮨﯽ وه ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﻘﺎم‬
‫ﭘﺮاﻧﺴﺎن ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﮐﮩﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﺳﮯ آﮔﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ۔وه ﮨﻤﯿﺸہ زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ اﻣﺎﻣﺖ ﮐﺮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ‬
‫اوراﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﮨﺮ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﮯ ﮐﺎ اطﻤﯿﻨﺎن ﺑﺨﺶ ﺣﻞ ﺑﺘﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔۔۔۔۔۔۔ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ان ﺗﻤﺎم ﺧﺼﻮﺻﯿﺎت ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺣﺎﻣﻞ آﺳﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ﮨﮯ۔اور ﻧﻮعِ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ آﺧﺮی ﺿﺎﺑﻄ ِہ ﺣﯿﺎت ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ‪ ،‬ﮨﺮ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﻣﮑﻤﻞ اور ﮨﻤہ ﮔﯿﺮ ﮨﮯ"۔‬

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‫ﻣﺎﮨﻧﺎﻣہ طﻠوعِ اﺳﻼم‪ :‬دﺳﻣﺑر‪۸۰‬ء ص ‪۶۰‬‬

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‫طﻠوعِ اﺳﻼم‪ ،‬ﺟوﻻﺋﯽ‪۸۴‬ء‪ :‬ص ‪۳۳‬‬
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‫اﯾﺿﺎً‪ ،‬ص ‪30‬‬
‫"ﯾہ ﮐﺘﺎب زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ ﻋﻤﻠﯽ اﺻﻮل دﯾﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔اورﯾہ ظﺎﮨﺮ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﻤﻠﯽ اﺻﻮل اﺳﯽ وﻗﺖ‬
‫ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﻧﺘﯿﺠہ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺐ اس ﮐﮯ ﮨﺮ ﺟﺰو‪ ،‬ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﺟﺰاء ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮﺗﯿﺐ اور اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﯽ‬
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‫ﻖ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺎ ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮨﻮ"۔‬
‫طﺮﯾ ِ‬
‫"ﯾہ ﻣﺮوﺟہ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﺳﮯ اﺧﺘﻼف ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻣﺮوﺟہ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﮐﯽ ﻣﺤﺪودﯾﺖ ﮐﻮ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﯽ وﺳﻌﺖ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ ﮐﻨﺎرﮐﺮ‬
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‫دﯾﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ " ۔‬
‫"دﯾﮑﮭﻨﺎ ﯾہ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ﮐہ ) ﻣﻔﮩﻮم اﻟﻘﺮآن ﻣﯿﮟ( ﺟﻮ ﮐﭽﮭ ﮐﮩﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ وه ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت اورﻋﺮﺑﯽ ﻟﻐﺎت‬
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‫ﮐﮯ ﺧﻼف ﺗﻮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ" ۔‬
‫اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻀﻤﺮات ﭘﺮ ﮨﻢ ﻧﮑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﺤﺚ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﮔﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪ .1‬ﻏﻮر ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﻮں ﭘﺮ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫• ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﺧﺪا ﮐﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ﮨﮯ‬
‫• ﺧﺪاﮨﺮ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﮨﮯ‬
‫• ﺧﺪاﯾﻮں ﮐﻼم ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﺎ ﮐﻼم ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮ‬
‫ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿہ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮨﮯوه اﯾﮏ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺴﻠﻤہ ﮨﮯ ﻧہ ﮐہ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﻣﺴﻠﻤہ۔ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﮐﻼم ﺧﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﺎﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﺳﮯ ﮨﮣﺎ ﮐﺮ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔اﮨﻢ ﺑﺎت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﻼم ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه و‬
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‫ﺗﺠﺮﺑہ ﺳﮯ ﻋﻼﻗہ رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﻣﻠﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﺳﮯ اس ﮐﻼم ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﭼﯿﺰﯾﮟ ﺑہ ﺗﺪرﯾﺞ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮔﺌﯿﮟ۔اﯾﺴﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ دو ﻣﺴﺎوی ﻋﻘﻠﯽ اﻣﮑﺎﻧﺎت ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ‬
‫آﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫ﻖ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬
‫• ﯾہ ﮐﻼم ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﺑﯿﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ رﮨﺎ‪ ،‬اس ﻟﯿﮯ اب ﻻﺋ ِ‬
‫• اس ﮐﻼم ﮐﺎ اﯾﺴﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﺼﺎدم ﻧہ ﮨﻮ۔‬
‫اب ﺳﺆال ﯾہ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮨﻢ ان دو اﻣﮑﺎﻧﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ اﻣﮑﺎن ﮐﻮ ﮐﺲ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ رد ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ؟ دوﺳﺮا اﻣﮑﺎن ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﺷﺪه ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﭘﻨﺎ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ اﺳﯽ ﭘﺮ اﺳﺘﻮار ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ دوﺳﺮی ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ‬
‫ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ اس ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﮐﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺛﺒﻮت ﻓﺮاﮨﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻧﺎﮔﺰﯾﺮ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺧﻼ ﮐﻮ ﭘﻮرا ﮐﯿﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﯾہ‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔‬
‫‪ .2‬اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ﮐہ " ﺧﺪا ﯾﻮں ﮐﻼم ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﮨﻮں" ﺑﺤﺚ طﻠﺐ‬
‫ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫• ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ واﺿﺢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮐہ ﯾہ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ﺟﺲ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮨﮯ اﺑﮭﯽ اس ﮐﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺛﺒﻮت ﺗﺸﻨہ دﻟﯿﻞ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ ﺗﺎﮨﻢ ﻣﺤﺾ اس ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ﭘﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻏﻮر ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﯾہ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ ﻧﺎ ﮔﺰﯾﺮ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ‪:‬‬
‫• ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ "ﮐﺜﯿﺮاﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﯽ" ﻣﺘﻦ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ اﺣﺘﻤﺎل ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﯾہ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮐہ اﯾﺴﺎ‬
‫ﻓﯽ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﮨﻮا ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺤﺾ ﮐﺴﯽ اﻣﺮ ﮐﮯ اﻣﮑﺎن ﺳﮯ اس ﮐﮯ وﻗﻮع ﭘﺮ اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ‬
‫اﻻ ﯾہ ﮐہ وﻗﻮع ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﺎﮔﺰﯾﺮ دﻻﺋﻞ ﻣﯿﺴﺮ آﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ۔‬

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‫ﻣﻔﮩوم اﻟﻘرآن‪ ،‬ﻏﻼم اﺣﻣد ﭘروﯾز‪ ،‬ص ‪6‬‬
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‫اﯾﺿﺂً‪ ،‬ص ‪24‬‬
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‫اﯾﺿﺂ ً ‪ ،‬ص ‪28‬‬
 ‫ﯾﮩﺎں "ﮐﺜﯿﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﯽ" ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ وﻗﻮع ﭘﺮ ﺧﻮد اس ﮐﻼم ﯾﺎ ﭘﯿﻐﻤﺒﺮﷺ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﺎت ﻣﻨﻘﻮل ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬ ‫•‬
‫ﭼﻨﺎں ﭼہ "ﮐﺜﯿﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﯽ "ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ﺛﺒﻮت ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدوں ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮨﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﻟﯿﮯ اس ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ اﯾﺴﮯ ﻣﻨﻔﺮد ﺧﺼﺎﺋﺺ ﺑﺘﺎﻧﺎ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ﺟﻦ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﺟﺎﻧﭽﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐﻮﺋﯽ دوﺳﺮا ﮐﻼم "ﮐﺜﯿﺮاﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﯽ" ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔ﻣﺤﺾ ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ ﮐﻼم ﮐﯽ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺳﮯ اس ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻗﺒﻮل ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬
‫زﯾﺮ اﺛﺮ ﻏﻼم اﺣﻤﺪ ﭘﺮوﯾﺰ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﻧﮯ ﻟﻐﻮی اﺷﺘﻘﺎﻗﺎت ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ ﺟﺲ طﺮح اس‬ ‫اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﮯ ِ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺳﻌﯽ ﮐﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮢﮭﯿﮏ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﻼم ﭘﺮ ﯾہ طﺮﯾﻘہ اﭘﻼﺋﯽ‬
‫ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ وه ﻓﻀﯿﻠﺖ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺴﮯ وه ﺗﻨﮩﺎ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﺘﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔ان ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ "ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ" ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ‬
‫اس ﻧﻮع ﮐﺎ اﻣﺘﯿﺎز ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ۔‬
‫ﮐﻼم ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﯿﺖ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺻﻒ ﺑﮭﯽ ﯾہ ﺳﻮال ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ‪:‬‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ دور ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﮏ رﺳﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﯿﺴﮯ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ ؟‬ ‫•‬
‫ﻧﯿﺎ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ ﻧﺌﮯ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻨﮑﺸﻒ ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ ﯾﺎ اس ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ؟‬ ‫•‬
‫اﮔﺮ ﺗﻮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧﺌﮯ اﻧﮑﺸﺎف ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﮨﺪاﯾﺖ ﭘﺎ ﺳﮑﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن رﮐﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﺑﻼﺷﺒہ ﯾہ اﯾﮏ اﻣﺘﯿﺎزی اور ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﺗﻮﺟہ ﺑﺎت ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اﮔﺮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﮯ اﻧﮑﺸﺎﻓﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ‬
‫اس ﮐﻼم ﺳﮯ ﺗﺎﺋﯿﺪ ﮐﺎ ﺗﮑﻠﻒ ﮐﺮواﻧﺎ ﮨﯽ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮢﮭﯿﺮے ﺗﻮ اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ‬
‫ﺳﮑﺘﯽ۔ ﯾہ ﻣﺤﺾ اس ﻋﻘﯿﺪه ﮐﺎ دﻓﺎع ﻗﺮار ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ " ﻗﺮآن " ﮐﻮ ﻏﻠﻂ ﮐﮩﻨﺎ ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻟﮩﺬا اس ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﻨﻔﺮد ﺻﻔﺖ ﻓﺮض ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺎوﯾﻼت ک راﺳﺘہ اﭘﻨﺎ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ اﯾﺴﯽ‬
‫ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﮐﻼم ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺗﺎﺋﯿﺪ ﮐﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ ره ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ۔‬
‫ﮐﻼم اﻟﮩﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺗﺎﺋﯿﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ‬ ‫ﭘﮭﺮ ﯾہ ﺳﻮال ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ِ‬ ‫•‬
‫؟اس ﮐﮯ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﯾہ ﻗﺒﻞ از وﻗﺖ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﺮ‬
‫ﺳﮑﮯ ﻧہ ﯾہ ﮐہ ﺑﻌﺪ ازوﻗﺖ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺗﺎﺋﯿﺪ ﮨﯽ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﮯ۔‬
‫اﻣﻮر اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺤﯿﻂ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﺎ داﺋﺮه ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﻤﺎم‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮐﺎر ﺗﮑﻠﻒ دراز ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ اس ﺳﺮﮔﺮﻣﯽ ﮐﻮ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﻨﮯ دﯾﺘﺎ۔‬ ‫ﯾہ ﺗﺎوﯾﻼت ﮐﺎ ِ‬
‫ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﯾﮩﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ "ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ" ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ "ﮐﺜﯿﺮاﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﯽ " ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ اﻣﺘﯿﺎزی وﺻﻒ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻟﺤﺎظ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﮯ ﭘﻮرے ﮐﺮﻧﺎﺑﺎﻗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻠﯿﻦ ﻧﮯ‬
‫اﭘﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﮐﺎم ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﺎﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ ‪ ،‬اس ﺳﮯ اِس ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ دوﺳﺮے ﮐﻼم ﺳﮯ "ﮐﺜﯿﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫" ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺟﮩﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدﯾﮟ ﻣﯿﺴﺮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ۔‬
‫ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ‬

‫‪ ‬ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ارﺗﻘﺎء‪:‬‬

‫ﻣﺘﻦ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﮐﻮ‬

‫اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ اﺻﻮﻟﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﮯ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ِ‬
‫ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻘﺴﯿﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﯾہ رﺟﺤﺎن‬
‫اﭘﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ درﺳﺖ ﻧہ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﮨﻢ اﯾﺴﮯ اﻣﻮر‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﺳﮯ اﭼﮭﯽ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا اب ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻧﺺ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‬
‫درﺳﺖ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﮕﺮ ظﺎﮨﺮ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻧﺺ ﮐﺎ آج ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻻ‬
‫ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‪ ،‬ﮐﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﺑﺪﻟﻨﮯﺳﮯ ﺑﺪل ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ اس ﻟﯿﮯﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ زﻣﺎﻧہ ﮔﺰرﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻧﺺ ﮐﮯ واﺣﺪ درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﺗﮏ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﯾﮩﺎں ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﻣﺤﻔﻮظ ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﺗﮏ رﺳﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﮨﻢ ﮐﮩہ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﯾہ رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﺎﺣﺎﻣﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ﮐﺴﯽ ﻟﻔﻆ ﺳﮯ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‬
‫آج ارﺗﻘﺎﺋﯽ ﺳﻔﺮ طﮯ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ درﺳﺖ ﺗﺮ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ ﺗﺮ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻧﻤﺎﺋﻨﺪﮔﯽ‬
‫ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ﺳﺮﺳﯿﺪ اﺣﻤﺪ ﺧﺎن ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں ﻧﻈﺮ آﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪:‬‬
‫" ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮯ ﺑﻘﺪر اﭘﻨﯽ طﺎﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻮد ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﭘﺮ ﻏﻮر ﮐﯽ اور ﭼﺎﮨﺎ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن ﮨﯽ ﺳﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ‬
‫ﭼﺎﮨﺌﮯ ‪ ،‬ﮐہ اس ﮐﺎ ﻧﻈﻢ ﮐﻦ اﺻﻮﻟﻮں ﭘﺮ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ اور ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﻣﯿﺮی طﺎﻗﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﮭﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ اور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮯ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﮐہ ﺟﻮ اﺻﻮل ﺧﻮد ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪﺳﮯ ﻧﮑﻠﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﺖ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻮم ﺟﺪﯾﺪه ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧہ اﺳﻼم ﺳﮯ ﮨﮯ اور ﻧہ ﻗﺮآن ﺳﮯ"۔‬
‫"اس ﮐﮯ اﻟﻔﺎظ اﯾﺴﮯ اﻋﺠﺎز ﺳﮯ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﮨﻤﺎرے ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﻮ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﺟﺎوﯾﮕﯽ‬
‫اور اس ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﯾﺎﻓﺘہ ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﮯ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ اس ﭘﺮ ﻏﻮر ﮐﺮﯾﻨﮕﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮﮔﺎ ﮐہ اس ﮐﮯ اﻟﻔﺎظ‬
‫اس ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮨﯿﮟ اور ﮨﻢ ﮐﻮ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎوﯾﮕﺎ ﮐہ ﺟﻮ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮨﻢ ﻧﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﻗﺮار‬
‫دﯾﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ اور اب ﻏﻠﻂ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ وه ﮨﻤﺎرے ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻗﺼﻮر ﺗﮭﺎ ﻧہ اﻟﻔﺎظ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺎ۔ ﭘﺲ اﮔﺮ ﮨﻤﺎرے‬
‫اﻣﻮر ﻣﺤﻘﻘہ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮﺗﻮ ﮨﻢ‬‫ِ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻮم ﮐﻮ آﯾﻨﺪه زﻣﺎﻧہ ﻣﻨﻂ اﯾﯽ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎوے ﮐہ اِس وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﭘﮭﺮ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﭘﺮ رﺟﻮع ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﮔﮯ اور اس ﮐﻮ ﺿﺮور ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﭘﺎوﯾﻨﮕﮯ اور ﮨﻢ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم‬
‫ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﺟﻮ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮨﻢ ﻧﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﻗﺮار دﯾﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ‪،‬وه ﮨﻤﺎرے ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻧﻘﺼﺎن ﮨﮯ۔ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﮨﺮ اﯾﮏ‬
‫ﻧﻘﺼﺎن ﺳﮯ ﺑﺮی ﺗﮭﺎ"‬
‫ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﻗﺪرت اﯾﮏ ﻋﻤﻠﯽ ﻋﮩﺪ ﺧﺪا ﮐﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اور وﻋﺪه اور وﻋﯿﺪ ﯾہ ﻗﻮﻟﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﮨﺪه‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫"ورک آف ﮔﺎڈ‪ ،‬ﯾﻌﻨﯽ‬
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‫ﮨﮯ۔اور ان دوﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺧﻼف ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ"۔‬
‫اس ﻧﻘﻄ ِہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺠﺰﯾہ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﺟﻮ ﻧﮑﺎت ﮨﻤﺎرے ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ‪:‬‬
‫• ﯾہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﯾﮩﺎں اﺳﺘﻮار ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ "ﻣﺘﻦ" ﺧﻄﺎ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎک ﮨﮯ ‪،‬اس ﻟﺌﮯ اﺳﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ‬
‫اﯾﺴﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺤﻤﻮل ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﺟﻮ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﻮ۔‬
‫• ﻟﮩﺬا اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ﮐہ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﯿﺎ‬
‫درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ اﭘﻨﺎ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﺎوﻗﺘﯿﮑہ وه ﺑﮭﯽ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔‬
‫• ﻏﻮر ﺳﮯ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﺧﻄﺎ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎک ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ اﺳﺘﻮار ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ ﺳﺮﺳﯿﺪ اﺣﻤﺪ ﺧﺎن ﺟﺐ ﯾہ ﮐﮩﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ‪ :‬ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت "ورک‬
‫آف ﮔﺎڈ" ﮨﮯ اور ﻗﺮآن " ورڈ آف ﮔﺎڈ"‪ ،‬ﻟﮩﺬا ان دوﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻀﺎد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ‪ ،‬اﮔﺮ ﺗﻀﺎد‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﮐﻼم ﺳﮯ وه ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﺮاد ﻟﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﺗﻀﺎد ﭘﯿﺪا ﻧہ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ۔اس ﭘﺮ ﯾہ‬
‫ﺳﺆال ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾﮩﯽ اﺻﻮل اس ﺳﮯ ﺑﺎﻟﮑﻞ ﺑﺮﻋﮑﺲ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ‬
‫دﻋﻮی ﮨﯽ‬
‫ٰ‬ ‫ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺜﻼ "ورڈ آف ﮔﺎڈ" ﭼﻮں ﮐہ "ورڈ آف ﮔﺎڈ" ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ اس ﻟﺌﮯ ﯾہ‬
‫درﺳﺖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن ﻓﯽ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ "ورڈ آف ﮔﺎرڈ" ﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫• "ورک آف ﮔﺎڈ" اور "ورڈ آف ﮔﺎڈ" ﮐﯽ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﮭﯿﻮری ﮐﺎ ﺧﺎﻟﺺ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ اﻧﻄﺒﺎق ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﭘﺮ ﻣﻨﺘﺞ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﻮی ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﮐﯽ راه اﭘﻨﺎ ﮐﺮ ﺑﭽﻨﮯ‬
‫ﮐﻼم ٰاﻟﮩﯽ" ﮨﮯ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﮐﯽ ﺷﻌﻮری ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ۔ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ اﮔﺮ ﯾہ اﯾﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ﮐہ " ﻗﺮآن‬
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‫اﻟﺗﺣرﯾرﻓﯽ اﺻول اﻟﺗﻔﺳﯾر‪ ،‬ﺳرﺳﯾد اﺣﻣد ﺧﺎن‬
‫ﺗﻐﻠﯿﻂ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﯽ ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ اﺧﺘﯿﺎرﮐﺮﻧﮯﻣﯿﮟ‬‫ِ‬ ‫درﻣﯿﺎن ﺳﮯ ﻧﮑﻞ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺗﺎوﯾ ِﻞ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﺎﻗﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ره ﭘﺎﺗﺎ۔‬
‫ب ٰاﻟﮩﯽ ﮨﮯ " ﮐﮯ اﯾﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ﭘﺮ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ‬ ‫اس ﺗﻨﻘﯿﺢ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎت ﻧﺎﮔﺰﯾﺮ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ "ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺘﺎ ِ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﺑﻨﯿﺎد رﮐﮭﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ اس اﯾﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﮯ ﮐﻮ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ﮐﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﭘﺮ ڈھﺎﻻ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ ورﻧہ‬
‫"ﮐﻼم ٰاﻟﮩﯽ" ﮐﯽ ﻓﯽ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده اﭘﻨﮯ اﯾﻤﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﻔﻆ‬‫ِ‬ ‫ﺗﺎوﯾ ِﻞ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﯽ ﯾہ ﮐﺎوش‬
‫ﮐﺎ "ﺣﯿﻠہ" ﮨﯽ ﻗﺮار ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ۔‬
‫ﮐﻼم اﻟﮩﯽ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ اﯾﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻼوه ﮐﺴﯽ اور ﮐﺘﺎب ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻓﺮض ﮐﺮ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮐﺎر ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﺑﺂﺳﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﻮﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﺎوﯾ ِﻞ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‬ ‫ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﯾہ ِ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﯾہ اﺻﻮل ﻣﺤﺾ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﺗﮏ ﻣﺤﺪود رﮐﮭﻨﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﺖ ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﻏﯿﺮﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﯽ طﺮف ﺑﮭﯽ ﭘﮭﯿﺮی ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ ﺗﻮ ﮨﺮ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﺧﻄﺎ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎک‬ ‫زﺣﻤ ِ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﺑﺎور ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻧﺎﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺘﺎ۔‬
‫ﺳﺮﺳﯿﺪ ﺟﺲ اﺳﻠﻮب ﺳﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﻮ ﺧﻄﺎ اور ﻗﺮآن ﮐﻮ ﺧﻄﺎ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎک ﺑﺎور ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪،‬‬ ‫•‬
‫اس اﺳﻠﻮب ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮﺳﯿﻊ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﻮ ﺧﻄﺎ ﮐﮩﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺮدد ﺑﮭﯽ ﺧﺘﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻗﺮآن‬
‫ﮐﯽ طﺮح ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺤﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺘﺒﺎدر ﻣﻔﺎﮨﯿﻢ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮭﯿﺮﻧﺎ‪ ،‬اﻧﮭﯽ ﻟﻐﻮی وﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺳﮯ‪،‬‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ طﺮح ﻧﺎﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬
‫اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻨﺎزع ﺗﻮ ﺧﺘﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ‪ ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﻣﺤﺾ‬ ‫•‬
‫اس وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻗﺮار ﻧﮩﯿﮟ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﺗﺎ وﻗﺘﯿﮑہ وه اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺎت‬
‫ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻣﻨﮩﺞ ﭘﺮ اﺳﺘﻮار ﻧہ ﮐﺮ ﻟﮯ۔‬
‫ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ‬

‫ﻋﺪم ﺗﻌﺎرض‪:‬‬
‫‪ِ ‬‬
‫اس رﺟﺤﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ اور ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ اﺧﺘﻼف ﮐﮯاﻣﮑﺎن ﮐﯽ ﮨﯽ‬
‫ﻧﻔﯽ ﮐﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﮩﺎں اﺧﺘﻼف ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮨﻮ وﮨﺎں ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫درﺳﺖ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﭘﺮ ﭘﮩﻨﭻ ﮐﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮕﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ اﺷﺮف ﻋﻠﯽ‬
‫ﺗﮭﺎﻧﻮی اس ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﯾﻮں ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪:‬‬ ‫ؒ‬
‫اﻟﻨﻘﻠﻲ – ﻓﻬﻨﺎك أرﺑﻌﺔ اﺣﺘﻤﺎﻻت ﻋﻘﻼً‪ (1) :‬أن ﻳﻜﻮ� ﻗﻄﻌﻴّﲔ‪ :‬وﻫﺬا ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﻮاﻗﻊ‪ ،‬إذ اﻟﺘﻌﺎرض ﺑﲔ‬ ‫اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ و ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫"إذا ﺗﻌﺎرض اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻼن –‬
‫ﻧﺮﺟﺢ اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ اﻟﻨﻘﻠﻲ ﻋﻠﻲ‬
‫ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ‪ ،‬إﻻ أ� ّ‬
‫اﻟﺼﺎدﻗﲔ ﳏﺎل‪ (2) .‬أن ﻳﻜﻮ� ﻇﻨّـﻴّﲔ‪ :‬وﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ وإن ﻛﺎن ﻫﻨﺎك ﳎﺎل اﳌﺼﺮف ﻋﻦ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ ﰲ ّ‬
‫ﺣﺠﺔ‬
‫اﻟﻘﻄﻌﻲ ‪ ،‬إذ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺎﻋﺪة اﻟﻠﻐﻮﻳّﺔ أن اﻷﺻﻞ ﰲ اﻷﻟﻔﺎظ اﳊﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ‪ ،‬ﻓﻴﺤﻤﻞ اﻟﻨﻘﻞ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ وﻻ ﳒﻌﻞ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ‬
‫اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ‬ ‫اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ ﻇﻨّـﻴّﺎً‪ :‬ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻘﻞ ﻣﻘ ّﺪم ﻗﻄﻌﺎً ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻮرة‪ (4) .‬أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ﻋﻨﺪﺋﺬ‪ (3) .‬أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ ّ‬
‫اﻟﻨﻘﻠﻲ ﻗﻄﻌﻴّﺎً و ّ‬
‫‪8‬‬
‫اﻟﻨﻘﻠﻲ‪".‬‬
‫اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ وﳚﺐ اﻟﺘﺄوﻳﻞ ﰲ ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻘﻠﻲ ﻇﻨّـﻴّﺎ – ﺳﻮاء ﻛﺎن ﰲ اﻟﺜﺒﻮت أو ﰲ اﻟﺪﻻﻟﺔ – ﻓﻴﻘ ّﺪم ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ‬
‫ﻗﻄﻌﻴّﺎ و ّ‬
‫ﺐ ذﯾﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺠﺰﯾہ ﺳﮯ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﻣﻮر ﺣﺴ ِ‬
‫• اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ اﺳﺎﺳﺎت ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ اﯾﻤﺎن ﭘﺮ اﺳﺘﻮار ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔ﺟﺒﮑہ دو اﻣﻮر ﮐﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻟﮯ ﮐﺮ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ و درﺳﺘﮕﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺣﮑﻢ ﻟﮕﺎﻧﺎﺳﺮاﺳﺮ اﯾﮏ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ‬

‫‪ 8‬اﻟﺗﮭﺎﻧوي‪ ،‬أﺷرف ﻋﻠﻲ‪ ،‬اﻻﻧﺗﺑﺎھﺎت اﻟﻣﻔﯾدة ﻓﻲ ﺣ ّل اﻻﺷﺗﺑﺎھﺎت اﻟﺟدﯾدة‪ ،‬ص ‪74-73‬‬

‫وظﯿﻔہ ﮨﮯ۔ﻧﺎﮔﺰﯾﺮ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ اﻣﻮر ﮐﮯ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺎوراء ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﺷﻮاﮨﺪ ﺑﮩﻢ‬
‫ﭘﮩﻨﭽﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﺟﻦ ﮐﻮ ﺑﺮوﺋﮯ ﮐﺎر ﻻ ﮐﺮ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ ﮐہ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﺲ طﺮح ﺑﮯ ﻋﯿﺐ‬
‫ت ﺣﺎل ﮐﺴﯽ‬ ‫ﮨﮯ؟اس ﮐﺎ ﺑﮯ ﻋﯿﺐ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺎوراء ﻣﺎن ﻟﯿﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺻﻮر ِ‬
‫ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﺰے ﮐﯽ ﻣﺘﺤﻤﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ۔‬
‫ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ دﺳﺘﯿﺎب ﻋﻘﻠﯽ و ﻋﻠﻤﯽ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺑﺮوﺋﮯ ﮐﺎر ﻻﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﻣﻌﺮض ﺑﺤﺚ ﺳﮯ ﮨﯽ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫درﺳﺖ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮ رﮨﺎ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺒﮑہ اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﺴﺎوی ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ‬
‫ﻣﺎوراء ﮨﻮ ﺗﻮ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮯ ﻋﯿﺐ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ اﯾﻤﺎن ﮐﺎ ﻣﺴﺌﻠہ ﮨﯽ ﻗﺮار ﭘﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ اﺻﻮﻟﯽ طﻮر اﭘﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﻋﻤﻠﯽ طﻮر اس ﮐﮯ اطﻼق ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﺎ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮐﺴﯽ ﭼﯿﺰ ﮐﯽ ﻗﻄﻌﯿﺖ و ظﻨﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ اﺛﺒﺎت ﮐﮯ ذراﺋﻊ ﺑﮩﺮﺣﺎل ظﻨﯽ‬
‫ﮨﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ ﯾہ اﻣﮑﺎن راه ﭘﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺲ ﭼﯿﺰ ﮐﻮ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺤﻘﻖ ﻋﯿﻦ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ‬
‫رﮨﺎ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺒﮑہ دوﺳﺮا اﺳﮯ ظﻨﯽ ﺑﺎور ﮐﺮ رﮨﺎ ﮨﻮ۔‬
‫ﺷﯿﺦ ﺑﻦ ﺑﺎز اور ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ اﺣﻤﺪ رﺿﺎ ﺧﺎن ﻧﮯ زﻣﯿﻦ و آﺳﻤﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﮐﻦ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ اور ﺳﻮرج ﮐﮯ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮔﺮد ﻧہ ﮔﮭﻮﻣﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺧﯿﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص ﭘﺮ اﺳﺘﻮار ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ‬
‫ﺖ زﻣﯿﻦ‬ ‫ﮐﮯ اﻧﮑﺎر ﭘﺮ اﻧﮭﯿﮟ درﭘﮯ ﺗﮑﻔﯿﺮ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﭘﮍا ‪9‬۔ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اب ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﮐﯽ اﮐﺜﺮﯾﺖ ﺧﻮد ﺣﺮﮐ ِ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺟﺐ ﻗﻄﯿﻌﺖ ﮐﺎ اطﻼق ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ وﮨﯽ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ روش در آﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﮭﻼ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﮩﺎں ﺟﻮ آﯾﺖ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﺳﮯ ﮢﮑﺮاﺋﮯ اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﺼﺪاق ﮐﯽ ﻗﻄﻌﯿﺖ ﮐﺎ اﻧﮑﺎر‬
‫ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﺮاد ﻟﮯ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔‬
‫اطﻼﻗﯽ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ دﯾﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻦ ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﻮ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﮐﺎ درﺟہ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﺗﮭﺎ اب ظﻨﯽ ﺑﺎور ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﯿﮟ‪ ،‬اور اس ﮐﯽ وﺟﻮﮨﺎت ﺑﮭﯽ داﺧﻠﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﭘﺮ ﺗﺪﺑﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ‬
‫ﻏﯿﺮﻣﺘﻨﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺳﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻮﺗﺎ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ زﯾﺎده ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﮨﻢ زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺮﮐﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺴﺌﻠہ ﮐﻮ دﯾﮑﮭ‬
‫ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﭘﺎﻧﭻ ﻣﻐﯿﺒﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﺎ ﺧﺪا ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺧﺎص ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﺑﺎور ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ‬
‫ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬ان ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﺑﺎت ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ ﮐہ ﻣﺎں ﮐﮯ رﺣﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺧﺪا ﮐﮯ ﺳﻮا ﮐﺴﯽ‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ اﻟﮣﺮاﺳﺎؤﻧﮉ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن وا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ اس ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﮐﯽ‬
‫راه اﭘﻨﺎﻧﯽ ﭘﮍی۔‬
‫ﻗﻄﻌﯿﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ﮐﺴﯽ رﯾﺎﺿﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﻓﺎرﻣﻮﻟﮯ ﮐﯽ طﺮح ﺗﻮﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‪ ،‬اب ﯾﮩﯽ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮐہ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻗﺮار دی ﮔﺌﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﺒﺎدر ﻣﻔﺎﮨﯿﻢ ﭘﺮ اﻋﺘﻘﺎد رﮐﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﯾﺎ ان ﮐﯽ ﻗﻄﻌﯿﺖ‬
‫ﮐﺎ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺳﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻮﺗﺎ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ ﭘﮩﻠﯽ ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ ﭘﺮ اﺻﺮار اس وﻗﺖ‬
‫ﺗﮏ ﮨﯽ ﮐﺎرآﻣﺪ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺐ ﺗﮏ ﮐہ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ۔ ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ‬
‫زﻣﯿﻦ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺮﮐﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﮐﯽ ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﺟﺐ ﺗﮏ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﻋﻠﻢ و ﻋﻘﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﭘﺮ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮨﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ و ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺠﺒﻮر ﮐﺮﺗﺎ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﮯ اﺣﺘﻤﺎل ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎت درﺳﺖ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮨﯽ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ واﺿﺢ ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺟﺐ ﺗﮏ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﮐﮭﮍا ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ واﺿﺢ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺘﺎ ﺗﺐ ﺗﮏ‬

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‫اﻟﻔوز اﻟﻣﺑﯾن ‪ ،‬ﻣوﻻﻧﺎ اﺣﻣد رﺿﺎ ﺧﺎن‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﻄﺎ ﮐﮯ اﻣﮑﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺪﻣہ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﺷﺪه ﻗﺮار ﻧﮩﯿﮟ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎ‬
‫اﻣﮑﺎن ﺧﻄﺎ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯽ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ۔‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺟﻦ ﻣﻌﯿﺎرات ﭘﺮ ﺧﻮد ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﺎ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﻧﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ ان ﻣﻌﯿﺎرات ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ ﺗﻮ‬ ‫•‬
‫اﺳﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺎ ﮨﯽ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔اس ﻟﺌﮯ اس ﺑﺤﺚ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ اور ظﻨﯽ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﺳﮯ اﻟﮓ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ اﺻﻄﻼح ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﺑﺎور ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﭘﺮ ﻣﺘﮭ ﮐﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﮐﯽ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ اور‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺧﻮد ﮐﻮ ظﻨﯽ ﮐﮩہ ﮐﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ اﻋﺘﻤﺎد ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﮐﯽ ﻗﻄﻌﯿﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻓﺎﺋﻖ‬
‫ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اس ﺗﻨﻘﯿﺢ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ و ظﻨﯽ ﮐﺎﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ و ظﻨﯽ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺘﺎ۔ دوﻧﻮں داﺋﺮوں ﻣﯿﮟ ان اﻟﻔﺎظ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم و ﻣﺼﺪاق اﯾﮏ دوﺳﺮے ﺳﮯ ﺧﺎﺻہ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ رﮨﻨﺎ اﮨﻢ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﯾﺴﺎ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺗﺼﻮر ﺟﻮ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت ﺳﮯ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻧہ‬ ‫ﯾہ ﻧﮑﺘہ ﺑﮭﯽ ِ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮨﻮﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﮨﻮ ‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ذﮨﻦ اﺳﮯ ظﻨﯽ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﮐﺮ ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺒﮑہ وه ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدوں‬
‫ﭘﺮﺟﻦ ﻗﻄﻌﯿﺎت ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎن رﮨﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ان ﮐﺎ داﺋﺮه ﺑﮭﯽ ﺳﺮاﺳﺮ ﻣﺎوراﺋﮯ ادراک ﮨﯽ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اﮔﺮ‬
‫ﻣﺤﺾ ﻏﯿﺮﺗﺠﺮﺑﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﮐﺴﯽ اﻣﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ ﮐﺎﻓﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺧﻮد ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‬
‫اﭘﻨﯽ ﻧﻔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﯾہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ اﭘﻨﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔‬
‫ﻖ اﻋﺘﻨﺎء‬‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ رﮨﻨﺎ اﮨﻢ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ وﮨﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻻﺋ ِ‬ ‫ﯾہ اﻣﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ ِ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﯿﺎﺗﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ زﯾﺎده درﺳﺖ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻓﺮاﮨﻢ ﮐﺮ رﮨﺎ ﮨﻮ۔‬
‫ت ﺣﺎل ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﺗﻮﺟہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﯿﺎﺗﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻏﻠﻂ ﻧﮑﻞ آﻧﮯ واﻻ‬ ‫ﯾہ ﺻﻮر ِ‬ ‫•‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ‪ ،‬ﻏﯿﺮ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺲ طﺮح درﺳﺖ ﯾﻘﯿﻦ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ؟‬
‫ﮨﻤﺎرے ﻧﻘﻄ ِہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺳﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ اﻣﻮر ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺴﺎوی ذرﯾﻌہ ﻗﺮار‬ ‫•‬
‫ت ﺣﺎل‬ ‫زﯾﺮ ﺑﺤﺚ ﺻﻮر ِ‬ ‫دے ﮐﺮ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﻄﻌﯿﺖ اور ظﻨﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ‪ِ ،‬‬
‫ت ﺣﺎل ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ‬ ‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻔﯿﺪ ﻣﻄﻠﺐ طﺮزﻋﻤﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻨﻘﯿﺢ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﯾہ ﺻﻮر ِ‬
‫آﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮯ ﮐﺎ اﺻﻞ ﻣﺤﺮک‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ‬
‫ﮐﺎ درﺳﺖ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﺮﻧﺎﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻢ ازﮐﻢ دﺳﺘﺒﺮدار ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ‬
‫راه ﺗﻼﺷﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﯾﻮں ﺗﻼﺷﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ راه ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﺑﮭﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ داﺋﺮے‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ اور ظﻨﯽ دﻻﺋﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎرآﻣﺪ ﮨﻮﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‬
‫ﻣﻌﯿﺎر اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق ﮐﮯ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ اور ظﻨﯽ ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﭘﯿﻤﺎﻧہ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ﮐﮯ داﺋﺮوں اور‬
‫ﻣﻘﺮر ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ‬
‫‪ ‬ﻣﻘﺼﺪﯾﺖ و ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق‪:‬‬
‫ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎن ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ان‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺳﮯ اﻟﮓ ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﺐ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮاﯾﺴﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎن ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ ﮨﯽ ﻏﻠﻂ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ اﻣﻮر اس وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﯽ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪاﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔اس‬
‫ﺐ ذﯾﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪:‬‬‫ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺠﺰﯾﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺣﺎﺻﻼت ﺣﺴ ِ‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺘﻮازی ذرﯾﻌہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﺗﻮ ﯾہ طﮯ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ‬
‫دﯾﺘﺎ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ اس ﮐﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔‬
‫ﺧﻂ اﻣﺘﯿﺎز‬
‫• ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اب ﺳﺆال ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ داﺋﺮے ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ِ‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ اور ﮐﺲ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ۔‬
‫• ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﺎ داﺋﺮه ﮐﺎر واﺿﺢ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮﺟﯿہ و ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﺳﮯ ﻋﺒﺎرت‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ داﺋﺮه ﮐﺎر ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﮐﯽ آراء ﺑﺎﮨﻢ دﮔﺮ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫• ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ داﺋﺮ ِه ﮐﺎر ﮐﮯﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اس ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ‪:‬‬
‫‪ ‬ﻣﺬﮨﺐ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﮨﺮﺷﻌﺒﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﻓﺮاﮨﻢ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫• اب اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ واﺿﺢ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﮐﺲ داﺋﺮے ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ‬
‫رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﻓﺮاﮨﻢ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ؟‬
‫• زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ اس ﻣﺨﺼﻮص داﺋﺮے ﮐﺎ دﯾﮕﺮ داﺋﺮوں ﺳﮯ اﻣﺘﯿﺎز ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ؟‬
‫• زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﻣﺨﺼﻮص داﺋﺮه ‪ ،‬زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ دﯾﮕﺮ داﺋﺮوں ﺳﮯ اﮨﻢ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮨﮯ ؟‬
‫• ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ راه ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮ ﭼﻨﺪ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺑﺘﺎﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﮯ ان ﮐﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ اﮨﻤﯿﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺑﺎﻗﯽ ﮐﺌﯽ‬
‫ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺑﺎرے ﺳﮑﻮت ﮐﯽ روش اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ؟‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ داﺋﺮه ﮐﺎر ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد ﮨﻢ اس اﻣﺮ ﮐﺎ اﻧﮑﺎر ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﺟﺎ ﺑﺠﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ اﻣﻮر ﮐﺎ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﻣﺤﻤﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ اور ﮐﺲ‬
‫ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﮨﮯ ؟‬
‫• اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺗﺠﺴﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ اس ﻧﻮع ﮐﮯ ﺳﺆاﻻت ﮐﻮ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺑﻨﺎ ﮐﺮ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ‬
‫ﻧﻘﻄ ِہ ﻧﻈﺮ اﭘﻨﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮨﮯ۔ﻋﻼﻣہ اﻧﻮر ﺷﺎه ﮐﺎﺷﻤﯿﺮی اور ﺑﻌﺾ دﯾﮕﺮ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻧﮯ ﯾہ‬
‫ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﭘﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ آﺳﮑﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ اﺳﺎﻟﯿﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺗﺎﮨﻢ اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻤﺎم ﻋﻠﻤﯽ اﻗﺘﻀﺎءٰ ت ﮐﻮ ﻧﺒﮭﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ۔ اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﻓﮑﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ڈھﺎﻟﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ ان رﺟﺤﺎﻧﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻻزﻣﯽ اﻗﺘﻀﺎءٰ ت ﮐﻮ ﮐﮭﻮل ﮐﺮ ﺑﯿﺎن‬
‫ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت اﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﺎﻗﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺬﮐﻮره ﺑﺎﻻ ﺳﺆاﻻت ﮐﮯ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ‬
‫ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺷﺎه ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﮐﺎ اﻗﺒﺎﺳﺎت ﯾﮩﺎں ﻧﻘﻞ ﮐﺮدﯾﻨﺎ اﮨﻢ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ‪:‬‬
‫اﳊﺲ أﻳﻀﺎً‪ ،‬ﻛﻤﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻳﻌﺘﱪ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﲝﺴﺐ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮ‪ ،‬ﻓﻴﺪﻳﺮ اﻷﺣﻜﺎم ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺸﻬﻮد‪ .‬وﻣﻦ‬
‫اﻟﻘﺮآن ﻗﺪ ﻳﻌﺘﱪ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﲝﺴﺐ ّ‬
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‫ﳌﺴﺘﻘﺮ ﳍﺎ﴾ ﻓﺈن ﺟﺮ��ﺎ ﻣﺸﺎﻫﺪ‪ ،‬ﺳﻮاء ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺟﺎرﻳﺔً ﰲ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﲝﺴﺐ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮ‪ ،‬أو ﻻ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻫﺬا اﻟﺒﺎب ﻗﻮﻟﻪ‪﴿ :‬واﻟﺸﻤﺲ ﲡﺮي‬
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‫ﻛﻞ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ‪ ،‬ﳌﺎ آﻣﻦ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺸﺮ‪،‬‬
‫اﻗﻌﻲ ﰲ ّ‬
‫وﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﺷﺄن اﻟﻘﺮآن‪ .‬ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ ﻛﺎن ﺑﲏ ﻛﻼﻣﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﻮ ّ‬
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‫ﻓﺈن ﻣﻦ ﻓﻄﺮﺗﻪ اﳉﻤﻮد ﻋﻠﻲ ﲢﻘﻴﻘﻪ‪.‬‬

‫• اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﭘﮩﻠﻮ اﮨﻢ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﯿﺪان ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎرﮔﺮ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ‪،‬‬
‫ﻏﯿﺮﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻣﻌﻨﻮی ﺗﺎوﯾﻼت ﮐﺎ ﺳﮩﺎرا ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ۔ﯾﮩﺎں ﮐﻼم ٰاﻟﮩﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ اﺳﻠﻮب‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﮐﻼم ٰاﻟﮩﯽ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﭘﺮ طﮯ ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﮐﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ اور ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎﺳﮑﺘﮯ‬
‫ﻟﺌﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﻼم ﻓﮩﻤﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﺎرف اﺳﺎﻟﯿﺐ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺎم ﻟﯿﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺳﻌﯽ اﭘﻨﮯ اﻧﺪر ﯾہ وزن رﮐﮭﺘﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾﮩﺎں ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﺒﺎدر ﻣﻔﺎﮨﯿﻢ ﺳﮯ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ ان ﮐﺎ درﺳﺖ ﻣﺤﻤﻞ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ راه اﭘﻨﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﮭﺮ ﺻﻮرت ﺣﺎل ﯾہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺘﯽ ﮐہ ﮐﻼم ﮐﺎ وه ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﺎرف اﺳﻠﻮب ﺳﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺑﻠﮑہ اس ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻓﻼں‬
‫ﻓﻼں ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺘﻌﺎرف اﺳﺎﻟﯿﺐ ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﯾہ ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ اب ﮔﻮﯾﺎﻋﯿﻦ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ‬
‫ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮ ﮔﯿﺎ۔اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ذﻣہ داری ﻗﺒﻮل ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﻼم ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﺗﻮ وﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ‬
‫ﮐﻼم ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﺎرف اﺳﺎﻟﯿﺐ ﺳﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﺎﮨﻢ اس ﮐﺎ ﻣﺤﻤﻞ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ اﻧﮑﺸﺎف ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اور ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫زﯾﺮ ﻏﻮر ﻻﯾﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬ ‫• اس ﻧﮑﺘہ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اس ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﻮ ِ‬
‫اﻧﮑﺸﺎف ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ادب ﮐﺎ داﺋﺮه ﮐﺎر طﮯ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾہ ﺟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺎﺗﯽ ذوق ﮐﺎ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮی اظﮩﺎرﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﻧہ ﮐہ‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮ ﺷﻌﺮاﭘﻨﯽ ﻣﻌﻨﻮﯾﺖ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار رﮐﮭ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﺳﮯ ﻧﮕﺎه ﮨﮣﺘﮯ‬ ‫ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ۔ ﺳﻮ اس ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﻮ ِ‬
‫ﮨﯽ ﯾﮩﯽ ادﺑﯽ ﺳﺮﮔﺮﻣﯽ ﺑﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ ره ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻏﺎﻟﺐ ﮐﺎ ﺷﻌﺮ ﮨﮯ ‪:‬‬
‫ﺧﺎک ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺻﻮرﺗﯿﮟ ﮨﻮں ﮔﯽ ﮐہ ﭘﻨﮩﺎں ﮨﻮ ﮔﺌﯿﮟ‬ ‫ﺳﺐ ﮐﮩﺎں ﮐﭽﮭ ﻻﻟہ و ﮔﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺎں ﮨﻮ ﮔﺌﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻖ اﻟﺘﻔﺎت ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺘﺎ۔ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ‬ ‫اﮔﺮ ﯾﮩﯽ ﮐﻼم ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻣﺎن ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺷﻌﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ درﺟہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻻﺋ ِ‬
‫دﻋﻮی ﻟﻐﻮ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﮔﻞ و ﻻﻟہ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺴﻦ آراﺋﯿﺎں ‪ ،‬ﭘﺮی ﭘﯿﮑﺮ ﺣﺴﯿﻨﻮں ﮐﮯ ظﮩﻮر ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﮨﮯ۔‬ ‫ﯾہ ٰ‬
‫دﻓﺘﺮ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮢﮭﯿﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﮯ ﻟﻐﻮ ﮐﮩﻨﮯ‬ ‫ﺟﮩﺎن ِ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﯾﮩﯽ ﮐﻼم ادﺑﯽ ﺳﺮزﻣﯿﻦ ﭘﺮ ﻗﺪم رﮐﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯽ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﻟﻐﻮﯾﺖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔‬
‫• ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﻣﺴﺌﻠہ ﺣﻞ طﻠﺐ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ اس ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ؟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﺧﻮد ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮے ﮔﺎ ﯾﺎ اﺟﺘﮩﺎدی ﻋﻤﻞ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﯾہ‬
‫ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ طﮯ ﮐﺮے ﮔﺎ ؟ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺗﺼﺮﯾﺢ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺗﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮐہ وه ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ ﯾﺎ ﻣﺤﺾ اوﻟﯿﻦ ﻣﺨﺎطﺒﯿﻦ ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻤﯽ و ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻤﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎت ﮨﮯ؟‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﺎ داﺋﺮه و ﻣﺤﻤﻞ طﮯ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮاﺑﺪﯾﺪ ﭘﺮ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﯾہ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﻣﺤﺾ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺘﺎ‪ ،‬اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮﺳﯿﻊ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮده‬
‫ﻏﯿﺒﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻨﺖ اور ﺟﮩﻨﻢ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﮏ ﺟﺎ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﺑﺂﺳﺎﻧﯽ ﯾہ ﮐﮩہ‬
‫ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﯾﺴﯽ ڈراؤﻧﯽ ﺳﺰاﺋﯿﮟ اس زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮓ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﺑﺘﻼﺋﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪،‬ﺟﮩﻨﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺳﺰا ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ﮨﻢ ﺟﺎﻧﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﮩﻨﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺳﺰا ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺗﺎوﯾﻼت ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں ﻣﻞ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺜﺎل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﮨﻢ ﯾﮩﺎں ﻋﻼﻣہ اﻗﺒﺎل اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮده‬
‫ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﮐﻮ دﯾﮑﮭ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪:‬‬

‫‪ 10‬أﻧور ﺷﺎه ﻛﺎﺷﻣﯾري‪ ،‬ﻓﯾض اﻟﺑﺎري ﻋﻠﻲ ﺻﺣﯾﺢ اﻟﺑﺧﺎري‪ ،‬دار اﻟﻛﺗب اﻟﻌرﺑﯾّﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﯾروت‪ ،‬ص ‪306/4‬‬
‫"ﺟﻨﺖ اور دوزخ ﺣﺎﻟﺘﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺑﺴ���ﺘﯿﺎں ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸ���ﺮﯾﺢ اﻧﺪروﻧﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺼ���ﺮی ﭘﯿﺶ‬
‫ﮐﺶ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﺮدار۔ دوزخ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﮯ اﻟﻔﺎظ ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ "ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ آگ ﺟﻼﺋﯽ ﺟﻮ دﻟﻮں ﺳ�����ﮯ اوﭘﺮ ﭼﻠﯽ‬
‫ﮔﺌﯽ۔ ﯾہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﮐﺮب ﻧﺎک ﺑﺼﯿﺮت ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺑﻄﻮر اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﺎﮐﺎم رﮨﺎ۔ ﺟﻨﺖ وه ﺧﻮﺷﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ اس اﺣﺴﺎس‬
‫ﺳ��ﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻓﻨﺎ ﮐﺮ دﯾﻨﮯ واﻟﯽ ﻗﻮﺗﻮں ﭘﺮ ﻏﻠﺒہ ﺣﺎﺻ��ﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ۔ اﺳ��ﻼم ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﯾﺴ��ﯽ ﺷ��ﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺟ���������������ﺎﺋ���������������ﮯ۔‬ ‫ﮐ���������������ﮩ���������������ﺎ‬ ‫ﻟ���������������ﻌ���������������ﻨ���������������ﺖ‬ ‫اﺑ���������������ﺪی‬ ‫ﺟﺴ���������������������ﮯ‬
‫دوزخ ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ اﺑﺪی اذﯾﺖ دﯾﻨﮯ واﻻ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﮔﮍھﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺴﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ اﻧﺘﻘﺎم ﭘﺴﻨﺪ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮨﻮ‪ ،‬ﯾہ اﯾﮏ اﺻ��ﻼح ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻻ ﺗﺠﺮﺑہ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐﺴ��ﯽ ﺳ��ﺨﺖ ﮐﻮش ﺧﻮدی ﮐﻮ دوﺑﺎره اﺗﻨﺎ ﺣﺴ��ﺎس ﺑﻨﺎ دے‬
‫ﮐہ وه ﺧﺪا ﮐﯽ ﻋﻈﻤﺖ ﮐﯽ ﮨﻮا ﮐﻮ ﻣﺤﺴ���ﻮس ﮐﺮ ﺳ���ﮑﮯ۔ ﺟﻨﺖ ﮐﺴ���ﯽ ﺗﻌﻄﯿﻞ ﮐﺎ ﻧﺎم ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ اﯾﮏ ﮨﮯ‬
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‫اور ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ ﮨﮯ۔"‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ داﺋﺮه ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮاﺑﺪﯾﺪ ﭘﺮ طﮯ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﯿﺪان ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﮐﯽ ﮨﺰﯾﻤﺖ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﻣﺴﺌﻠہ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﺣﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اس داﺋﺮے ﮐﯽ ﻣﻐﯿﺒﺎت ﺗﮏ ﺗﻮﺳﯿﻊ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ‬
‫ﻧہ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ‪،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﻔﺎﮨﯿﻢ ﮐﯽ ﻗﻄﻌﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﻨﮯ واﻟﯽ زک ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﺷﺪت اﺧﺘﯿﺎر‬
‫ﮐﺮﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺷﮩﻮد و ﻏﯿﺐ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻗﻄﻌﯽ ﻣﻔﺎﮨﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﻣﻘﺎم ﮐﮭﻮ ﮐﺮ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﻣﻔﺎﮨﯿﻢ ﺳﮯ ﻋﺎری ﻣﺤﺾ ﺗﻤﺜﯿﻠﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﭘﺮ آﻧﺎ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ‬
‫‪ ‬ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اﯾﮏ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ‬
‫ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﮔﺮﮨﻢ اﺳﻼم ﭘﺮ ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ اس ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ و ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ طﮯ‬
‫ﮐﺮ ﻧﺎ ﻧﺎﮔﺰﯾﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﺑﻦ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده ﻧﻘﻄہ ﮨﺎﺋﮯ ﻧﻈﺮ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﯿﮟ ‪،‬ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﯾﮩﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺴﮯ ﺳﺮﻋﻨﻮان ﻣﯿﮟ "ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ" ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ۔‬
‫اس ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮﮐﺎ ﻣﺨﺘﺼﺮ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‪ ،‬ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﯾﺎ ﺗﻤﺪن ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐﭽﮭ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﮩﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ وه دراﺻﻞ‬
‫اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺨﺎطﺒﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻋﮩﺪ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔وه اﭘﻨﮯ زﻣﺎﻧہ ﻧﺰول ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ‪،‬ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ‬ ‫ﺗﺒﮭﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت و ﺗﻤﺪن ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﻓﮩﻢ ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ ان ﻣﺤﺪود ﺗﻨﺎظﺮات ﮐﮯ ﭘ ِ‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮده ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ‪،‬ان ﺗﻨﺎظﺮات ﮐﻮ ﻻﻣﺤﺪود ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ؛ ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﮨﻢ ﯾہ‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺎن رﮨﮯ ﮨﻮں ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ اﺻﻞ وظﯿﻔہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ اﻣﻮر ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ و ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اس ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﮯ اﮨﻢ ﻣﻔﮑﺮ ڈاﮐﮣﺮﻓﻀﻞ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪:‬‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺂﺧﺬ‬
‫"ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺎ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی وﻟﻮﻟہ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﮩﺎں ﺳﮯ ﭼﻞ ﮐﺮ ﯾہ ﺗﻮﺣﯿﺪ اورﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ اﻧﺼﺎف ﭘﺮ زور دﯾﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اﺧﻼﻗﯽ‬
‫ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﺗﻐﯿﺮ ﮨﮯ۔ﯾہ ﺧﺪا ﮐﺎ ﺣﮑﻢ ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎن اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﮐﻮ ﻧہ ﺑﻨﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﻧہ ڈھﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﻻزم ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه اﭘﻨﮯ آپ ﮐﻮ اس ﮐﮯ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﮐﺮ دے۔اس ﮐﺎ اس طﺮح ﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ آپ ﮐﻮ اس ﮐﮯ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ اﺳﻼم‬
‫ﮐﮩﻼﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اور زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﮐﻮ ﻧﺎﻓﺬ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻋﺒﺎدت ﮐﮩﻼﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ"۔ ص ‪47‬‬
‫"ﻗﺮآن ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی طﻮر ﭘﺮﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ اور اﺧﻼﻗﯽ اﺻﻮﻟﻮں اور ﻧﺼﯿﺤﺘﻮں ﮐﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ﮨﮯ اور ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﯽ دﺳﺘﺎوﯾﺰ‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اس ﮐﮯ اﻧﺪر ﮐﭽﮭ اﮨﻢ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﯽ اﺣﮑﺎﻣﺎت ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﻣﺪﯾﻨہ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ رﯾﺎﺳﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻤﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ دوران‬
‫دﯾﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ "۔ص ‪55‬‬

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‫ﻓﮑر اﺳﻼﻣﯽ ﮐﯽ ﻧﺋﯽ ﺗﺷﮑﯾل‪ ،‬ﭼوﺗﮭﺎ ﻟﯾﮑﭼر‪ ،‬ﺻﻔﺣہ ﻧﻣﺑر‪152 ،‬۔‬
‫ِ‬
‫ت ﺣﺎل ﮐﻮ ﻧﻈﺮ اﻧﺪاز ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯاﯾﮏ ﺧﯿﺎﻟﯽ اور‬
‫"ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺼﻠﺢ ﺟﻮ ﺑﺎاﺛﺮﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬واﻗﻌﯽ ﺻﻮر ِ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮراﺗﯽ ﺑﯿﺎن ﺻﺎدر ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ"۔‬
‫"ﻓﻮری ﺣﻞ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻗﺮآن ﻧﮯ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﭘﺮ ﻏﻼﻣﯽ ﮐﮯ ادارے ﮐﻮ ﻗﺒﻮل ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ"‬
‫"ﻗﺮآن ﮐﯽ واﻗﻌﯽ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﺳﺎزی ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﻠﺐ ‪ ،‬ﺧﻮد ﻗﺮآن ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰدﯾﮏ ﺑﮭﯽ ﯾہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ وه ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﻣﻌﻨﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ‬
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‫اﺑﺪی ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ"۔‬
‫ذﯾﻠﯽ ﺳﻄﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻢ اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻣﻀﻤﺮات ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻧﮑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﮯ دﯾﺘﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ ‪:‬‬
‫‪ .1‬ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻧﮯ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﻮ ﺟﺲ طﺮح ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ ‪،‬وه ﺑﮩﺮﺣﺎل اس طﺮح ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﺳﮯ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اس ﻋﮩﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﺟﺲ ﻣﺴﺌﻠہ ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه راﺋﮯ ﮨﻮ‪ ،‬ﯾہ اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﺘﻮازی ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺘﻌﺎرف‬
‫ﮐﺮوا ﺳﮑﮯ۔ ﮐﻢ از ﮐﻢ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ اﻣﻮر ﮐﯽ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺟﮕہ ﺑﺎﻗﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ‪،‬‬
‫اﻻ ﯾہ ﮐہ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﺴﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ اﺳﺘﻨﺎد ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﮯ۔ اﯾﺴﺎ ﮨﻮﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺂل ﮐﺎر وه ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ داﺋﺮے ﺳﮯ ﻧﮑﻞ ﮐﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ داﺋﺮے ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ‬
‫ﮐﺎ اﺳﺘﻨﺎد ﻣﺤﺾ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﺑﻠﮑہ اب ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﮨﯽ ﮨﻮ‬
‫ﮔﺎ۔ زﯾﺎده واﺿﺢ ﺑﺎت ﯾﮩﯽ ﮐﮩﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﮯاﺛﺒﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ‬
‫ت ﺣﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ‬ ‫ﻣﺤﺾ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ذرﯾﻌہ ﮨﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ اس ﺻﻮر ِ‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﺘﺒﺎدل ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻦ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺻﺪاﻗﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺎﺛﺮ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار رﮐﮭﻨﮯ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮده ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻀﺎد ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﻧہ ﮐﺮے۔‬
‫ﻣﺜﻼً اﮔﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﻓﮩﻢ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮا ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ ﺳﻮرج ﮔﮭﻮﻣﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ اور زﻣﯿﻦ ﺳﺎﮐﻦ ﮨﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻮ اﯾﮏ وﻗﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﮐﮯ اس ﺧﯿﺎل ﭘﺮ ﺳﭻ ﮐﺎ ﮔﻤﺎن ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﻣﮕﺮ اس ﻋﮩﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﮨﺮﮔﺰ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﻮﺟہ ﮐﮯ ﻻﺋﻖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﻮ آج ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﯾہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﺼﻮر ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮے‬
‫ﮔﺎ ‪ ،‬وه ﺧﻮد اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮﮨﯽ ﺑﮯ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ آج ﮐﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﮐﺮے ﮔﺎ‪ ،‬ﭼہ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‬
‫ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﺒﺎدل ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اس ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﺗﻮﺟہ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ و ﺗﻀﺎد ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ‪ ،‬ﮐﺌﯽ‬
‫اور ﺳﻮاﻻت ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﭘﺮ اﮔﻠﮯ ﻧﮑﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﺤﺚ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ‪ ،‬ﺗﺎﮨﻢ ﺧﺎص اس ﭘﮩﻠﻮ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺳﮯ ﺑﺮﺳﺮﭘﯿﮑﺎر ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺤﻔﻮظ ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺟﺐ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻣﺤﺪود ﺗﻨﺎظﺮات ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﻗﺮار دے دے ﮔﺎ ﺗﻮ اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧﺌﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺳﮯ اﺳﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﺧﺘﻼف ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫‪ .2‬ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﻧہ دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺤﺚ اس ﺳﻮال ﺳﮯ ﻧﺒﺮد آزﻣﺎ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ آﮔﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺑﮍھ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮐہ ﻓﯽ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اور اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ‬
‫ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ؟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﻣﻌﯿﻦ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮨﯽ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﺳﮯ اس ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ راه ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﮑﻞ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺟﻮ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ‬
‫ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ اس ﮐﮯ ﻻزﻣﯽ ﺧﺼﺎﺋﺺ ﯾہ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪:‬‬

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‫ڈاﮐﮢر ﻓﺿل اﻟرﺣﻣﺎن ‪ ،‬اﺳﻼم‪ :‬ﺗرﺟﻣہ ﻣﺣﻣد ﮐﺎظم‪ ،‬ص ‪ 47‬ﺗﺎ ‪55‬‬
 ‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺨﺼﻮص دور ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺗﮭﮯ۔‬ ‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ِ‬
‫• اُس دور ﮐﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘہ ﺗﻤﺎم ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺣﻞ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ِ‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮ ﺗﮭﺎ۔‬
‫طﻮر ﻧﻤﻮﻧہ ﮨﺪاﯾﺎت ﺟﺎری ﮐﯿﮟ ﺗﺎﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ‬‫ِ‬ ‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑہ‬
‫اﻣﻮر زﻧﺪﮔﯽ طﮯ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﮯ۔‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ﻋﻘﻞ ان ﭼﻨﺪ ﻧﻈﺎﺋﺮ ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﺎﻗﯽ‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﮨﺪف ﯾہ ﻗﺮار ﭘﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ دراﺻﻞ اس ﮐﺎ اﺻﻞ وظﯿﻔہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺣﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮزوں طﺮﯾﻘہ ﺳﺠﮭﺎﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺖ واﻗﻌﯿہ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ‬ ‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﺎ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺣﻘﯿﻘ ِ‬
‫ﻣﺴﻠّﻤہ ﮐﻮ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﺑﻨﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺘﺒﺎدر ﻣﻔﺎﮨﯿﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﻗﺒﻮل ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ‬ ‫• ﺟﺐ ِ‬
‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻏﯿﺐ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﭘﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﭘﮍﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬ ‫ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺘﺎ ﺗﻮ اس ﮐﯽ زد ِ‬
‫ﺖ واﻗﻌﯿہ ﮐﻮ ﻧﻈﺮ اﻧﺪاز ﮐﺮﮐﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﻘﯿﻘ ِ‬
‫ﺟﺐ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﮯ ِ‬
‫اﮨﺪاف ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﮐﯿﺴﮯ ﯾﻘﯿﻨﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻏﯿﺒﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎن‬
‫ﺖ واﻗﻌﯿہ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻠﺤﻮظ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮﮨﯽ ﮐﻼم ﮐﺮ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ؟‬ ‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺣﻘﯿﻘ ِ‬
‫ﺳﻮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺑﮭﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اس ﮐﯽ ﻓﯽ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﮐﺴﯽ‬
‫طﻮر ﻧﻈﯿﺮ ﺟﻮ ﺧﺪﻣﺖ ﺑﺠﺎ ﻻﻧﺎ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫اﻓﺎدﯾﺖ ﭘﺮ ﺳﻮال ﻗﺎﺋﻢ رﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺑہ‬
‫ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻧﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺳﮯ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﮨﯽ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺷﻌﻮر و ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت ﺳﮯ وه‬
‫راﮨﯿﮟ ﺑہ ﺧﻮﺑﯽ ﺳﺮ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﮟ۔‬
‫دوﺳﺮا ﯾہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر اطﺎﻋﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮉﺟﺴﭧ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺗﺎ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﺎ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻤﺰور ﮨﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﺟﻮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻤﺎم ﺗﺼﻮرات ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﻧہ ﮨﻮ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‬
‫اﭘﻨﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﻣﺤﺾ ﻧﻤﻮﻧﮯ و ﻧﻈﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ واﺟﺐ اﻻطﺎﻋﺖ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﺲ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﮯ اﺣﮑﻼم ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎﻧﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص‬
‫طﺮز ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﺳﺎزی ﺳﮯ ﺳﺒﻖ ﭘﺎ ﮐﺮ ﺧﻮد‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ﯾہ ﮨﺪف ﺑﯿﺎن ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺗﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ‬
‫ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﺳﺎزی ﮐﺮﻧﯽ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮﻋﮑﺲ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﯾہ ﮐﮩﺘﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﺧﺪا ﯾﮩﯽ‬
‫ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﭘﺮ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﭘﺮ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﯽ ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪی‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ دور ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺎطﺒﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺗﮭﯽ‪ ،‬ﭘﮭﺮ ﯾہ ﺳﻮال ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ زﻣﺎﻧ ِہ ﻧﺰو ِل ﻗﺮآن ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮگ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ؟ اﻧﮭﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ﯾہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ‬
‫ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن اﭘﻨﮯ دور ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺎطﺒﯿﻦ ﺳﮯ " ﻧﺬﯾﺮ" ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻮ اطﺎﻋﺖ ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﻣﮕﺮ ﺑﻌﺪ‬
‫طﺮز ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﺳﺎزی ﭘﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن‬‫ِ‬ ‫ﮐﮯ ادوار ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺎطﺒﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ "ﻧﻈﯿﺮ" ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﺳﮯ ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ‬
‫ﺳﺎزی ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص اس ﻗﺴﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻓﺮق ﮐﻮ ﺑﯿﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺗﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ‬
‫ﻣﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ زﯾﺎده ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﮐﯽ ﻣﻔﯿﺪ ﮐﺘﺐ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻦ ﺳﮯ دﯾﮕﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺗﺮاث ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻓﺎﺋﺪه اﮢﮭﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﭘﮩﻠﻮ‬
‫ﺐ ﺿﺮورت‬ ‫ﺳﮯ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﻔﮑﺮ ﮐﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻔﮑﺮﯾﻦ ﺣﺴ ِ‬
‫رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﭘﺎ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ اس ﭘﺮ اﯾﻤﺎن ﻻﻧﺎ اور اس ﮐﮯ اﺣﮑﺎﻣﺎت ﭘﺮ ﻣﻦ و ﻋﻦ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺎﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ‬
‫اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧہ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫‪ .3‬ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﻧہ دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺤﺚ اس ﺳﻮال ﺳﮯ ﻧﺒﺮد آزﻣﺎ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ آﮔﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺑﮍھ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮐہ ﻓﯽ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اور اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ‬
‫ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ؟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﻣﻌﯿﻦ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮨﯽ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﺳﮯ اس ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ راه ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﮑﻞ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺟﻮ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ‬
‫ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ اس ﮐﮯ ﻻزﻣﯽ ﺧﺼﺎﺋﺺ ﯾہ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪:‬‬
‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ اور دﯾﮕﺮ ﺗﻤﺪﻧﯽ اﺣﮑﺎﻣﺎت ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ اﯾﮏ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﺨﺼﻮص دور ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺗﮭﮯ۔‬
‫• اُس دور ﮐﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘہ ﺗﻤﺎم ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺣﻞ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ِ‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮ ﺗﮭﺎ۔‬
‫طﻮر ﻧﻤﻮﻧہ ﮨﺪاﯾﺎت ﺟﺎری ﮐﯿﮟ ﺗﺎﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑہ‬
‫اﻣﻮر زﻧﺪﮔﯽ طﮯ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﮯ۔‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ﻋﻘﻞ ان ﭼﻨﺪ ﻧﻈﺎﺋﺮ ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﺎﻗﯽ‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﮨﺪف ﯾہ ﻗﺮار ﭘﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ دراﺻﻞ اس ﮐﺎ اﺻﻞ وظﯿﻔہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺣﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮزوں طﺮﯾﻘہ ﺳﺠﮭﺎﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺖ واﻗﻌﯿہ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﺎ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺣﻘﯿﻘ ِ‬
‫ﻣﺴﻠّﻤہ ﮐﻮ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﺑﻨﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺘﺒﺎدر ﻣﻔﺎﮨﯿﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﻗﺒﻮل ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ‬
‫• ﺟﺐ ِ‬
‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻏﯿﺐ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﭘﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﭘﮍﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬ ‫ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﺘﺎ ﺗﻮ اس ﮐﯽ زد ِ‬
‫ﺖ واﻗﻌﯿہ ﮐﻮ ﻧﻈﺮ اﻧﺪاز ﮐﺮﮐﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﻘﯿﻘ ِ‬
‫ﺟﺐ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﮯ ِ‬
‫اﮨﺪاف ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﮐﯿﺴﮯ ﯾﻘﯿﻨﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻏﯿﺒﯽ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎن‬
‫ﺖ واﻗﻌﯿہ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻠﺤﻮظ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮﮨﯽ ﮐﻼم ﮐﺮ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ؟‬ ‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺣﻘﯿﻘ ِ‬
‫ﺳﻮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺑﮭﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اس ﮐﯽ ﻓﯽ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﮐﺴﯽ‬
‫طﻮر ﻧﻈﯿﺮ ﺟﻮ ﺧﺪﻣﺖ ﺑﺠﺎ ﻻﻧﺎ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫اﻓﺎدﯾﺖ ﭘﺮ ﺳﻮال ﻗﺎﺋﻢ رﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺑہ‬
‫ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻧﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺳﮯ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﮨﯽ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺷﻌﻮر و ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت ﺳﮯ وه‬
‫راﮨﯿﮟ ﺑہ ﺧﻮﺑﯽ ﺳﺮ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﮟ۔‬
‫دوﺳﺮا ﯾہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر اطﺎﻋﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮉﺟﺴﭧ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺗﺎ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﺎ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻤﺰور ﮨﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﺟﻮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻤﺎم ﺗﺼﻮرات ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﻧہ ﮨﻮ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‬
‫اﭘﻨﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﻣﺤﺾ ﻧﻤﻮﻧﮯ و ﻧﻈﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ واﺟﺐ اﻻطﺎﻋﺖ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﺲ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﮯ اﺣﮑﻼم ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎﻧﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص‬
‫طﺮز ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﺳﺎزی ﺳﮯ ﺳﺒﻖ ﭘﺎ ﮐﺮ ﺧﻮد‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ﯾہ ﮨﺪف ﺑﯿﺎن ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺗﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ‬
‫ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﺳﺎزی ﮐﺮﻧﯽ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮﻋﮑﺲ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﯾہ ﮐﮩﺘﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﺧﺪا ﯾﮩﯽ‬
‫ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﭘﺮ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﭘﺮ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﯽ ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪی‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ دور ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺎطﺒﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺗﮭﯽ‪ ،‬ﭘﮭﺮ ﯾہ ﺳﻮال ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ زﻣﺎﻧ ِہ ﻧﺰو ِل ﻗﺮآن ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮگ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ؟ اﻧﮭﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﻣﺎن ﮐﺮ ﯾہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ‬
‫ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن اﭘﻨﮯ دور ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺎطﺒﯿﻦ ﺳﮯ " ﻧﺬﯾﺮ" ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻮ اطﺎﻋﺖ ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﻣﮕﺮ ﺑﻌﺪ‬
‫طﺮز ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﺳﺎزی ﭘﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﮐﮯ ادوار ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺎطﺒﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ "ﻧﻈﯿﺮ" ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﺳﮯ ﺧﺪاﺋﯽ‬
‫ﺳﺎزی ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص اس ﻗﺴﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻓﺮق ﮐﻮ ﺑﯿﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺗﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ‬
‫ﻣﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻣﺘﻮن ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ زﯾﺎده ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﮐﯽ ﻣﻔﯿﺪ ﮐﺘﺐ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﺳﮯ دﯾﮕﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺗﺮاث ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﺪ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻘﻞ ﻓﺎﺋﺪه اﮢﮭﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﭘﮩﻠﻮ‬
‫ﺐ ﺿﺮورت‬ ‫ﺳﮯ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﻔﮑﺮ ﮐﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻔﮑﺮﯾﻦ ﺣﺴ ِ‬
‫رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﭘﺎ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ اس ﭘﺮ اﯾﻤﺎن ﻻﻧﺎ اور اس ﮐﮯ اﺣﮑﺎﻣﺎت ﭘﺮ ﻣﻦ و ﻋﻦ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺎﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ‬
‫اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧہ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫‪ .4‬ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﭘﻮزﯾﺸﻦ ﭘﺮ ﯾہ ﺳﺆال ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻋﺒﺎدات ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻻوﻗﺎت‬
‫اور ڈھﺎﻧﭽﻮں ﮐﻮ "ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺑﺮ ﺗﻤﺪن" ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﯾﺎ "ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺑﺮ ﺷﺮع" ؟ ﮐﯿﻮں ﮐہ ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﮨﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﮨﺪاﯾﺖ ﮐﯽ طﺮح‪ ،‬ﻋﺒﺎدات ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻻوﻗﺎت اور ڈھﺎﻧﭽﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ " ﻣﺒﻨﯽ‬
‫ﺑﺮ ﺗﻤﺪن" ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ اﺳﺎﺳﺎت ﭘﻮری طﺮح ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻋﺒﺎدات ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ "ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺑﺮ ﺗﻤﺪن"‬
‫ﻗﺮار دے دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ دﻧﯿﻮی زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﺣﮑﺎﻣﺎت آج ﮐﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻗﺮار ﭘﺎﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ اس ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻔﮑﺮﯾﻦ ‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﻋﺒﺎدات ﮐﯽ ﺳﺎﺧﺖ و ﻧﻈﺎم اﻻوﻗﺎت‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻋﺒﺎدات ﺳﮯ اﻟﮓ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﯾﮟ واﺿﺢ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ ﻋﺒﺎدات ﮐﮯ داﺋﺮے‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﺗﻤﺪن ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧہ دﯾﮑﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺟﻮاز ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫‪ .5‬اس ﻧﮑﺘﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﺌﮯ اس ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﺳﮯ ﻏﻮر ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺑﺮﺻﻐﯿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺳﻼم ﮐﯽ آﻣﺪ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﻨﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ طﺮﯾﻘﮯ راﺋﺞ ﺗﮭﮯ اور اب ﺗﮏ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﮐﺲ دﻟﯿﻞ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﭘﻮﺟﺎ ﭘﺎٹ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ان راﺋﺞ طﺮﯾﻘﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻏﻠﻂ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ اور ﮐﺲ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ان ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﺳﮯ ﻧﻤﺎز ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻋﺮﺑﯽ طﺮﯾﻘﮯ اﭘﻨﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪی ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ ﻋﺒﺎدت ﮐﮯ اﯾﮏ دوﺳﺮے ﺑﮍے ﻣﻈﮩﺮ‬
‫ﺣﺞ ﮐﻮ ﻟﮯ ﻟﯽ ﺟﺌﮯ‪ ،‬ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ وﺟہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ وﻗﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ وﮨﺎں ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‪ ،‬ﻋﻘﻞ اس ﺗﺠﻮﯾﺰ ﮐﻮ ﮢﮭﮑﺮا ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮐہ اس زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﺞ ﭘﺮ اﺗﻨﺎ ﺑﮍا اﺟﺘﻤﺎع‬
‫ﺟﻤﻊ ﮨﻮﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻣﺸﮑﻼت ﭘﯿﺶ آ رﮨﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺳﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ اﯾﮏ ﺳﮯ‬
‫زﯾﺎده ﺑﺎر ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﺎﮐہ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺣﺞ ﻣﯿﮟ زﯾﺎده ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺳﮩﻮﻟﺖ ﻣﯿﺴﺮ آﺳﮑﮯ۔‬
‫‪ .6‬ﯾہ ﻧﮑﺘہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻏﻮر طﻠﺐ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ اﺣﮑﺎم ﮐﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺧﺎص ڈھﺎﻧﭽﮯ ﮐﻮ ﺑﺪﻟﻨﮯ ﻧہ ﺑﺪﻟﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﺳﺆال ﻣﺤﺾ ﻣﺠﺒﻮری اور ﺿﺮورت ﺳﮯ ﺟﮍا ﮨﻮا ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ اﺻﻞ ﺳﺆال ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﺣﮑﺎم ﮐﮯﮐﺴﯽ‬
‫ﺧﺎص ڈھﺎﻧﭽﮯ ﮐﯽ ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪی ﮐﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ و ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ؟ ﺟﺐ وه وﺣﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻣﺤﺾ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ‬
‫ﺑﻨﯿﺎدوں ﭘﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ ڈھﺎﻧﭽﮯ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺣﺘﻤﯽ ﻗﺮار دﯾﻨﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮐﮭﺘﺎ۔ ﻋﺒﺎدات ﮐﯽ روح‬
‫و ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﺗﻮ ﯾﮩﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺧﺪا ﮐﻮ ﯾﺎد ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﺑﻨﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﺎ اظﮩﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ اب ﯾہ اظﮩﺎر‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺨﺼﻮص ﺷﮑﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﯽ ﮨﻮ ﯾﺎ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﮑﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ ﻣﺨﺼﻮص ﺷﮑﻞ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪی ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒہ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ‪ ،‬ﭼﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻋﺒﺎدات ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ڈھﺎﻧﭽہ اﭘﻨﯽ‬
‫وﺿﻊ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ اﻣﺘﯿﺎز ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺑﺮ وﺣﯽ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ اﻣﺘﯿﺎز ﮐﻮ ﺧﺘﻢ ﮐﺮﻟﯿﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ‬
‫ﯾہ ﻣﺨﺼﻮص طﺮﯾﻘہ ﻣﺤﺾ اﯾﮏ "اﻣﮑﺎﻧﯽ"ﻋﻘﻠﯽ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﻗﺮار ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﻧہ ﮐہ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ "واﺣﺪ ﺣﺘﻤﯽ"‬
‫طﺮﯾﻘہ۔‬
‫‪ .7‬ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﺟﻦ اﺳﺎﺳﺎت ﭘﺮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺟﮕہ ﯾﮩﯽ ﺑﭻ ﭘﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺧﯿﺮ و ﺷﺮ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ ﺧﯿﺮ‬
‫وﺷﺮ ﮐﮯ اﺧﺮوی ﺻﻠﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎرآﻣﺪ ﻣﺎﻧﺎﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔اور ﻋﺒﺎدات ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ اس اﺧﻼﻗﯽ‬
‫ﺷﻌﻮر ﮐﻮ ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ دﯾﻨﮯ ﺗﮏ ﻣﺤﺪود رﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺟﺲ ﺧﺪا ﻧﮯ ﺗﺨﻠﯿﻖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ان ﮐﺎ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ‬
‫ﻓﺮض ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ اظﮩﺎر ﺑﻨﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ رﮨﺎ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ۔اس ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ اﺻﻞ‬
‫ت ﻋﺮف ﮐﻮ ﻗﺒﻮل ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﯾہ ﯾﻘﯿﻦ دﻻﺋﮯ ﮐہ‬ ‫وظﯿﻔہ ﯾہ ﮨﻮﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﺧﯿﺮ و ﺷﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻌﺮوﻓﺎ ِ‬
‫اﻧﻌﺎم ﻋﻈﯿﻢ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ان ﻣﻌﺮوﻓﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺑﺠﺎ آوری ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻻ "رﺟ ِﻞ ﺻﺎﻟﺢ" ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮐﻞ ﺧﺪا ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ت ﻋﺮف ﺑﺠﺎ ﻻﻧﮯ واﻻ"ﻓﺎﺳﻖ و ﻓﺎﺟﺮ" ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮐﻞ‬ ‫ﮐﺎ ﻣﺴﺘﺤﻖ ﮢﮭﯿﺮے ﮔﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﺒﮑہ ﻣﻨﮑﺮا ِ‬
‫ﻋﺬاب اﻟﯿﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺴﺘﺤﻖ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ۔ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺷﮏ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ دﯾﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ اﺳﺎﺳﯽ ﺗﺼﻮرات ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫"آﺧﺮت" ﻧﮩﺎﯾﺖ اﮨﻢ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮨﮯ۔ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻌﻤﻮﻟﯽ ﺗﻤﺪﻧﯽ ارﺗﻘﺎ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد آﺧﺮت ﮐﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧہ ﺧﺘﻢ‬
‫ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺟﮩﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮐﺎ اﺣﺴﺎس ‪ ،‬اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺗﻤﻨﺎؤ ں ﺳﮯ ﺗﺎ ﺣﺎل ﮐﮭﺮﭼﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺟﺎ‬
‫ﺳﮑﺎ۔اس ﭘﻮرے ﭘﺲ ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﮨﻢ ﯾﻮں ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ ﮐﺎم اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ‬
‫اﺣﮑﺎم دﯾﻨﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ اﯾﮏ ذﮨﻦ دﯾﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ ‪،‬ﺟﻮ ﺑﮭﻼﺋﯽ اور ﺑﺮاﺋﯽ ﮐﮯ اﺧﺮوی ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ‬
‫رﮐﮭ ﺳﮑﮯ۔ "آﺧﺮت" ﮐﯽ ﺳﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ اَن ﻣﭧ ﺗﻤﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﯾہ اﮔﺮ ﺧﺪا ﻧہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﻨﺎ ﮐﺮ‬
‫دے‪ ،‬اﺳﮯ ﺧﻮد ﺑﻨﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮨﺮﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﺳﻌﯽ ﮐﺮﻧﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ۔ ﮨﻤﺎرے ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ اب ﺗﮏ ﮐﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬
‫زﯾﺮ اﺛﺮ ﻧہ ﻣﺎن ﺳﮑﯿﮟ۔ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺟﺐ ﺗﮏ ﮐہ ﮢﮭﯿﮏ وﯾﺴﯽ ﮨﯽ‬ ‫ﺗﺮﻗﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ اﺳﯽ ﺟﺒﻠﺖ ﮐﯽ ِ‬
‫زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﯾﮩﺎں ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺎﮐﺎم رﮨﮯ ﮔﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮐﺎ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧہ‬
‫رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔اﮔﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﺮض وه اﺧﺮوی ﺟﮩﺎن‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﮯ ﺧﺒﺮ دی ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﺳﭻ ﻣﭻ ﮨﮯ ﮨﯽ ﺗﻮ اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اس ﺳﮯ ﺑﮍی ﺧﻮش ﺧﺒﺮی ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اور ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ۔‬
‫‪ .8‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﻣﺤﺾ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺧﺒﺮ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ذﮨﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﺳﮯ ﯾﻘﯿﻦ ﮐﯽ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺳﮯ‬
‫دﯾﮑﮭ ﺳﮑﮯ۔اس ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯿﻮں ﭘﺮ ﯾﻘﯿﻦ رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﻔﮑﺮﯾﻦ ﮐﮯ ذﻣﮯ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺟﺪﯾﺪ‬
‫ذﮨﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﮐﺎ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ۔اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺷﺒہ ﮐﯽ ﮔﻨﺠﺎﺋﺶ‬
‫ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﺛﺒﻮت ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ اﺛﺒﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎرآﻣﺪ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔اور ﻧہ ﮨﯽ ﯾہ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬
‫ﮐہ ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر اﺛﺒﺎت ﭘﺮ ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ ره ﮔﺌﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﻏﯿﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﺟﮭﻮﮢﺎ ﻧہ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدوں ﭘﺮ‪ ،‬ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﭘﺮ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺑﺤﺎل ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺿﺮوری‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر آﺧﺮت ﻣﯿﮟ "ﺟﮩﻨﻢ"‬
‫ِ‬ ‫‪ .9‬اس ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﭘﺮ اس ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﮐﯽ طﺮف اﺷﺎره ﮐﺮ دﯾﻨﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ اﮨﻢ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﮐﻠﯿﺪی ﺗﺼﻮر‪ ،‬ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ذﮨﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﮨﻀﻢ ﮨﯽ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻧﮯ ﺳﺰا ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺨﺘﯽ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﻧﺮﻣﯽ ﮐﯽ طﺮف ﺳﻔﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﮩﻨﻢ ﺟﯿﺴﯽ ﺳﻨﮕﯿﻦ ﺳﺰا ﮐﻮ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﺟﻮاز دے ﺳﮑﻨﺎ ﺑﮩﺮﺣﺎل اﯾﮏ‬
‫ب آﺧﺮت"‬‫ﻣﺸﮑﻞ ﺿﺮور ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ۔ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ ﮐﮯ اﮨ ِﻞ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻧﮯ اس ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﺗﺎوﯾﻼت ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ"ﻋﺬا ِ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺨﻔﯿﻔﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرﺗﯿﮟ ﺑﺘﺎﺋﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎت ﺷﺎﯾﺪ اس ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﻦ ﺳﮑﻨﮯ واﻟﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻟﮕﺘﯽ۔ "ﺟﮩﻨﻢ"‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺳﺰا ﮐﺎ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﺟﻮاز ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ اﮔﺮ اﭘﻨﮯ اﺧﺮوی ﺗﺼﻮرات‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﻗﺒﻮل ﮢﮭﯿﺮے ﮔﺎ ﺗﻮ ﻓﯽ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ اس ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮨﯽ ﺑﺎﻗﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ اﺧﺮوی‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮرات ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ "ﺟﮩﻨﻢ" ﮐﮯ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﺟﻮاز ﭘﺮ ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ ﮨﮯ۔ﻣﮕﺮ اس ﺑﺎب ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﮯ‬
‫اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﺗﺼﻮرات ﺳﮯ ﮐﺎم ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮐﻢ از ﮐﻢ ﻧﻈﺮ آﺗﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت و ﺣﯿﺎت ﮐﯽ آﻻم ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﭘُﺮﺳﻨﮕﯿﻨﯿﻮں ﮐﺎ ﺟﻮاز ﻓﺮاﮨﻢ ﻧہ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ۔‬
‫• ﺧﻼﺻہ ِ ﺑﺤﺚ ﯾہ ﮨﻮا ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﻣﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮں ﮔﮯ وه ﯾہ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮ ﺗﺸﮑﯿﻞ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔اﻧﮭﯿﮟ‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻋﮩﺪ ﮐﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻋﻠﻢ ﮐﻮ ِ‬
‫اﺑﺪی ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻗﺮار دے ﮐﺮ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺳﮯ ﺗﺼﺎدم ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮﻧﺎ درﺳﺖ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ روﯾہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت اﭘﻨﮯ ﻋﮩﺪ ﮐﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺗﻮ واﺟﺐ اﻻطﺎﻋﺖ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﺒﮑہ دوﺳﺮے‬
‫ﺗﻤﺪن ﺳﮯ واﺑﺴﺘہ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﯾہ اﯾﺴﮯ ﻧﻈﺎﺋﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ رﮐﮭﺘﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﮐﯽ روﺷﻨﯽ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﺳﺎزی ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫• ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﻘ ِﻞ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﺎرآﻣﺪ ﮨﻮﺳﮑﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ‬
‫ﮨﺪاﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺗﮑﻠﻒ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻮﺟﯿہ ‪ ،‬اس ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ‪ ،‬ﺑﮩﺮﺣﺎل ﺛﺒﻮت طﻠﺐ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ داﺋﺮے ﺳﮯ "ﻋﺒﺎدات" ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ اﺳﺎس ﭘﺮ ﺧﺎرج ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ‪،‬‬
‫ﺟﺲ ﭘﺮ ﮐہ ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯽ ﮨﺪاﯾﺎت ﺧﺎرج ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ت‬
‫• اس ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ اﺻﻞ وظﯿﻔہ ﺧﯿﺮ و ﺷﺮ ﯾﺎ ﻋﺒﺎدات ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺠﺎﺋﮯ ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﺮوﻓﺎ ِ‬
‫ﻧﻔﺲ ﻋﺒﺎدات ﺑﺠﺎ ﻻﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ اﺧﺮوی اﻧﻌﺎم ﮐﯽ ﯾﻘﯿﻦ دھﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﺮواﻧﺎ اور‬ ‫ﻋﺮف و ِ‬
‫اﻋﺮاض ﻋﺒﺎدت ﮐﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ اﺧﺮوی ﺳﺰا ﺳﮯ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ت ﻋﺮف ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺒﺘﻼ ﮨﻮﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﯾﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﮑﺮا ِ‬
‫ﺧﺒﺮدار ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺑﻨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫• آﺧﺮت ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮐﯽ ﺗﮑﻤﯿﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺿﻤﺎﻧﺖ دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ آﺋﯿﻨﺪه ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﺎﮔﺰﯾﺮ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ ‪ ،‬اﻻ ﯾہ ﮐہ "آﺧﺮت" ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺿﺮورت ﮐﯽ ﺗﮑﻤﯿﻞ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎﺗﮭﻮں ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔‬
‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ اﺛﺒﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ اﺻﻞ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﻣﺸﮑﻞ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد ﻣﺬﮨﺐ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﮐﯽ ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﺲ طﺮح ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ اطﻤﯿﻨﺎن ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ؟ ﺟﻦ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﻣﻌﯿﺎرات‬
‫ﭘﺮ اس ﮐﯽ ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﭽﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﮯ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﺧﻮد ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت و‬
‫ﻣﻌﺮض ﺳﻮال ﻣﯿﮟ آﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ِ‬ ‫اﻓﺎدﯾﺖ ﮨﯽ‬
‫‪"،‬ﺗﺼﻮر ﺟﮩﻨﻢ" ﮐﮯ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﺟﻮاز ﮐﺎ ﻣﺴﺌﻠہ‪،‬‬
‫ِ‬ ‫• ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﻏﻮر اﺧﺮوی ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ذﮨﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺧﺎﺻﯽ ﺳﻨﮕﯿﻨﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ اس ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﺎ‬
‫اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﺟﻮاز ﻓﺮاﮨﻢ ﮐﯿﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ اطﻤﯿﻨﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ۔‬
‫• ﺟﮩﻨﻢ ﮐﯽ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدﯾﮟ واﺿﺢ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ وﻗﺖ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدوں ﺳﮯ ﮐﺎم ﻟﯿﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ﺧﻠﻞ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ‬
‫ﻖ ﺣﯿﺎت و ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت" ﮐﮯ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﺗﺼﻮر ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﺼﺎدم ﮨﻮں۔ ﮐﯿﻮں‬ ‫ﺑﻦ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ "ﺗﺨﻠﯿ ِ‬
‫ت اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ و ﺣﯿﻮاﻧﯽ ﮐﻮ ﻻﺣﻖ ﺳﻨﮕﯿﻦ آﻻم و ﻣﺼﺎﺋﺐ ﮐﯽ‬ ‫ﮐہ ﻧﻈﺮ آﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﯿﺎ ِ‬
‫اﺧﻼﻗﯽ ﺗﻮﺟﯿہ ﮨﯽ ﮐﭽﮭ ﮐﻢ ﻣﺸﮑﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻧہ آﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺟﮩﻨﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ آﻣﯿﺰ ﺗﻮﺟﯿﮩﺎت‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﮐﺎم ﭼﻼﯾﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ۔‬
‫ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ‬
 ‫‪ ‬ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺧﻄﻮط‬
‫اس ﺑﺤﺚ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮨﻢ آﺋﻨﺪه ﺳﻄﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺑﯿﺎﻧﯿہ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺑ ِﻞ ﻏﻮر ﺧﻄﻮط ﮐﯽ ﻧﺸﺎﻧﺪﮨﯽ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﮔﮯ۔‬
‫)زﯾﺮﻏﻮر و ﺗﺸﻨ ِہ ﺗﮑﻤﯿﻞ(‬
‫ِ‬
 ‫ا ﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ‪ :‬اﺷﮑﺎﻻت و ﺧﺪﺷﺎت‬

‫‪Maryam Mudassar‬‬
‫‪Pakistan‬‬

‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ ﻣﯿﺪان ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺣﯿﺮت اﻧﮕﯿﺰ اور ﻧﺎﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﯾﻘﯿﻦ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ اور اﯾﺠﺎدات ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﺟﮩﺎں اور ﮐﺌﯽ ﺣﻮاﻟﻮں ﺳﮯاﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ ﻣﺴﺘﻔﯿﺪ ﮐﯿﺎﮨﮯ وﮨﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ‬
‫اور ﺑﮩﺘﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺸﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺧﺎﺻہ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ‬
‫ذﮨﻨﯽ اور ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮩﺘﺮی اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﯽ ﺟﺪوﺟﮩﺪ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ رﮨﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ اور ﮢﯿﮑﻨﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ اﯾﺴﮯ دور ﻣﯿﮟ داﺧﻞ ﮐﺮ‬
‫دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﮩﺎں ﻋﻠﻢ طﺐ اور ﺣﯿﺎﺗﯿﺎت ﮐﻮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺧﻮاﮨﺸﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﮑﻤﯿﻞ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﺎ ﮨﮯ ﻧہ ﮐہ ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻋﻼج ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ۔ ﺟﮩﺎں اﻧﺴﺎن اﭘﻨﮯ آپ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺑﮩﺘﺮﯾﻦ ﺑﻨﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺴﺘﺠﻮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺼﺮوف ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ و ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ‪ ،‬ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ‪ ،‬ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﺳﺎﺧﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ‪ ،‬ﻧﺌﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں اور‬
‫ﺧﺼﻮﺻﯿﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﻤﻊ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮢﮭﮩﺮ ﭼﮑﺎﮨﮯ۔ اس ﺑﮩﺘﺮی اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﭘﯿﭽﮭﮯ اﮔﺮﭼہ ﻧﯿﮏ ﺧﻮاﮨﺸﺎت اور اﭼﮭﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺻﺪ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ اﺑﺘﺪاء ﮨﯽ ﺳﮯ ﯾہ‬
‫ﻣﯿﺪان اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ دﻟﭽﺴﭙﯽ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺮﮐﺰ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎن ورزش ‪ ،‬ﺧﻮراک اور ادوﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ‬
‫ﺧﻮد ﮐﻮ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺑﻨﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺸﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻤﯿﺸہ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺼﺮوف رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ذﮨﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺸﯿﮟ ﺟﮩﺎں اﭘﻨﮯ اﻧﺪر ﮐﺸﺶ اور اﺷﺘﯿﺎق ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﺟﮩﺎں‬
‫ﺳﻤﻮﺋﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اور دﻧﯿﺎ ﺑﮭﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﻌﺒہ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ طﺒﻘﺎت اس‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺣﺼﻮل ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺳﺮﮐﺮداں ﮨﯿﮟ وﮨﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﺖ ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ طﻮﻓﺎن ﺑﮭﯽ ان ﮐﻮﺷﺸﻮں ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﻧﺒﺮد آزﻣﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ و ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺟﻮ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر‬
‫اﺧﺘﯿﺎ ر ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎرﮨﮯ ان ﭘﺮ ﻧﻘﺪ اﮨﻞ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﺎﺻﺎ ﻣﻘﺒﻮل رﮨﺎﮨﮯ۔ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف اس ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺧﺎطﺮ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ذراﺋﻊ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺑﺤﺚ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ‬
‫اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اس ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪود ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ طﮯ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎرﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ان ﮐﮯ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر اور ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻊ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻧﻔﻊ و ﻧﻘﺼﺎن ﺳﮯ ﻗﻄﻊ ﻧﻈﺮ‬
‫‪ ،‬اس اﻣﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺌﯽ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯿﺎں ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﺰ ﮨﮯ ﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ؟ ﮐﻦ ﺣﻮاﻟﻮں ﺳﮯ اس ﮐﯽ ﮔﻨﺠﺎﺋﺶ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ؟ اور ﯾہ ﮐہ اس ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪود‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮﻧﯽ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﯿﮟ ؟‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ‬
‫واﻟﯽ ان ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯿﻮں ﮐﺎﺟﺐ ﺟﺎﺋﺰ ه ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ اس ﮐﮯ ﭘﺲ ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ‬
‫ﮐﺎرﻓﺮﻣﺎ ﻧﻈﺮ آﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ و ﻣﻔﮩﻮم‪ ،‬اس‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪود ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻨﻮع ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ‪ ،‬اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ‪ ،‬ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪ ﻓﺎﺻﻞ وﻏﯿﺮه ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫آﯾﺎ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺛﻤﺮات ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺑﻨﮯ ﮔﺎ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ ﻧﻘﺼﺎن ﮐﺎ ؟ اس ﮐﯽ‬
‫اﺟﺎزت ﮨﻮﻧﯽ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ﯾﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ؟ ان ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﺳﻮاﻻت ﮐﮯ ﺟﻮ ا ب ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻨﺪرﺟہ ﺑﺎﻻ‬
‫ﭘﮩﻠﻮؤں ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮده ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﻠﯿﺪی ﮐﺮدار ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺗﺎﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ و ﻧﻘﺼﺎﻧﺎت ﺳﮯ ﻗﻄﻊ ﻧﻈﺮ‬
‫اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﮩہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ان ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﺧﺘﻼﻓﺎت اور‬
‫اﺷﮑﺎﻻت ﺑﺬات ﺧﻮد ﺑﮩﺖ زﯾﺎده اﮨﻤﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﯾہ ﮐﮩﻨﺎ ﺑﮯ ﺟﺎ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎﺑﺖ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺑﯿﺸﺘﺮ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ اﻧﮩﯽ اﻣﻮر ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﺧﺘﻼﻓﺎت اور اﺷﮑﺎﻻت ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫اﮔﺮ ان اﺧﺘﻼﻓﺎت اور اﺷﮑﺎﻻت ﮐﻮ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺑﺤﺚ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ اوران ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا‬
‫ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﻮ اﺟﺎﮔﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ دﻋﻮت ﻓﮑﺮ دی ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ‪،‬ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺋﯽ وﺟہ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻞ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﭘﯿﺶ ﻗﺪﻣﯽ ﻧہ ﮨﻮﭘﺎﺋﮯ۔ زﯾﺮ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌہ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﻣﻘﺎﻟہ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﭘﯿﺶ‬
‫ﻗﺪﻣﯽ ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ ﮐﮍی ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ‬
‫ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ و اﺷﮑﺎﻻت ﮐﮯ ﭘﺲ ﭘﺮده ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺑﺤﺚ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎﮨﮯ۔‬
‫‪(Human Intelligence‬‬ ‫اﮔﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی‬
‫)‪Enhancement‬ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ وﻣﻔﮩﻮم اور اس ﮐﮯ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر اور اﮨﺪاف ﮐﻮ زﯾﺮ ﺑﺤﺚ‬
‫ﻻﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﺎﻧﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪Intelligence means the ability to learn or understand or to‬‬
‫‪deal with new or trying situations. Or An agency engaged‬‬
‫‪in obtaining such information.1‬‬
‫ﺟﺒﮑہ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی )‪ (Enhancement‬ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪Any activity by which we improve our bodies, minds or‬‬
‫‪abilities.2‬‬
‫ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﻮ ﯾﻮں ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪Boosting our capabilities beyond the species-typical level‬‬
‫‪or statistically normal range of functions for an individual.3‬‬
‫اس ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ظﺎﮨﺮ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺟﺴﻢ ‪ ،‬ذﮨﻦ ﯾﺎ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﮐﮯ‬
‫اﻧﺪر اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ان ﮐﻮ اوﺳﻂ ﺳﻄﺢ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮍھﺎ دﯾﻨﺎ ۔‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﻮ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﯾﺎ ﺟﻦ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺸﯿﮟ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎرﮨﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﯾﺎداﺷﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ‪ ،‬ﺳﻮﭼﻨﮯ‬

‫‪1‬‬
‫‪: Merriam Webster’ s definition of Intelligence.‬‬
‫‪www.merriamwebster.com/html/intelligence.retreived at 04/12/18‬‬
‫‪2‬‬
‫‪: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/enhancement‬‬
‫‪3‬‬
‫‪:https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enhancement‬‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ اور ﺣﺴﺎﺑﯽ ﺳﻮاﻻت ﺣﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ‪ ،‬ﻧﯿﻨﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻤﯽ‪ ،‬دﻣﺎﻏﯽ‬
‫ﺗﮭﮑﺎوٹ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻤﯽ‪ ،‬ذﮨﻨﯽ ارﺗﮑﺎز ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ‪ ،‬اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﮐﺎم ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ‬
‫‪ ،‬ﺑﮯﭼﯿﻨﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺧﺎﺗﻤہ‪ ،‬اﻏﻼط ﮐﯽ ﺷﺮح ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻤﯽ‪،‬ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ذﺧﯿﺮه ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﺿﺎﻓہ ‪ ،‬اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺗﺼﻮراﺗﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ اور ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺣﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ رﻓﺘﺎر اور ﺣﺪ‬
‫‪4‬‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﺟﺒﮑہ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﺟﻦ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ اﯾﻤﺒﺮﯾﻮ ﮐﯽ ﺟﯿﻨﯿﺎﺗﯽ‬
‫ﺗﺸﺨﯿﺺ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺴﮯ ‪ Preimplantation genetic diagnosis‬ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس طﺮﯾﻘہ‬
‫ﮐﺎر ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﻤﺒﺮﯾﻮ ﮐﯽ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺶ ﮐﮯ ﻓﻮرا ﺑﻌﺪ ‪،‬اس ﺳﮯ ﻗﺒﻞ ﮐہ وه رﺣﻢ ﻣﺎده ﺳﮯ ﺟﮍے اس‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻧﮑﺎل ﮐﺮ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑہ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯿﺎں ﮐﺮ ﻟﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اس طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﮐﻮ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف ﺟﯿﻨﯿﺎﺗﯽ‬
‫ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌہ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻧﻘﺎﺋﺺ اور ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻊ ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں ﮐﻮ دور ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ اس ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ اﯾﻤﺒﺮﯾﻮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑہ ﺧﺼﺎﺋﺺ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﭘﯿﺪا‬
‫‪5‬‬
‫ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ذراﺋﻊ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺎﺋﯿﮣﻮﮐﺎﻧﮉﯾﺎ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﯾﺎ اﯾﻢ آر ڈی‬
‫‪ Donation) (Mitochondrial Replacement or Mitochondrial‬ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ اﯾﻤﺒﺮﯾﻮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺋﯿﮣﻮﮐﺎﻧﮉرﯾﺎ ﮐﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ دوﺳﺮے ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺋﯿﮣﻮﮐﺎﻧﮉرﯾﺎ ﺳﮯ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ۔ﺗﺎﮐہ ان ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں ﺳﮯ ﺑﭽﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﻣﺎﺋﯿﮣﻮ ﮐﺎﻧﮉرﯾﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﺮاﺑﯽ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اس طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺎﺋﯿﮣﻮ ﮐﺎﻧﮉرﯾﺎ ﮐﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ دوﺳﺮے اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺋﯿﮣﻮﮐﺎﻧﮉرﯾﺎ ﺳﮯ ﺑﺪل ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اورﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﺳﮯ اس ﮐﯽ ﻓﺮﮢﯿﻼﺋﺰﯾﺸﻦ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺗﺎﮐہ اﯾﺴﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺪار ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﮯ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں ﮐﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ‬
‫‪6‬‬
‫ﺧﺪﺷﺎت ﻧہ ﮨﻮں۔‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺻﻮرت ادوﯾﺎت ﮐﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮨﮯ۔ ادوﯾﺎت ﮐﻮ ﺻﺮف‬
‫ﺑﯿﻤﺎری اور ﺗﮑﺎﻟﯿﻒ ﮐﮯ ﺧﺎﺗﻤہ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮨﯽ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﺑﻠﮑہ ان ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌہ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ اﻋﻀﺎء ﮐﯽ ﮐﺎرﮐﺮدﮔﯽ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ان ادوﯾﺎت ﮐﻮ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف ﮐﮭﻼڑی اور اﯾﺘﮭﻠﯿﭧ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ وﯾﭧ ﻟﻔﮣﻨﮓ‬
‫‪4‬‬
‫‪:https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2017/05/12/creating-superwoman-man-benefits-‬‬
‫‪human-enhancement/‬‬
‫‪5‬‬
‫‪:Coutelle C, Williams C, Handyside A, Hardy K, Winston R, Williamson R (July‬‬
‫‪1989). "Genetic analysis of DNA from single human oocytes: a model for‬‬
‫–‪preimplantation diagnosis of cystic fibrosis". BMJ. 299 (6690): 22‬‬
‫‪4. doi:10.1136/bmj.299.6690.22. PMC 1837017. PMID 2503195.‬‬
‫‪6‬‬
‫‪:Greenfield, Andy, ed. (June 2014). Third scientific review of the safety and efficacy of‬‬
‫‪methods to avoid mitochondrial disease through assisted conception: 2014‬‬
‫‪update (PDF). UK: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Retrieved 2‬‬
‫‪March 2016.‬‬
‫ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اور ﺑﺎڈی ﺑﻠﮉﻧﮓ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺣﻀﺮات ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ان ﮐﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل‬
‫ﻓﻮج ﮐﮯ اﮨﻠﮑﺎر ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻋﺎم ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اﻓﺮاد اﭘﻨﯽ ﭘﯿﺸہ وراﻧہ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻟﯿﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ان ﮐﻮ اﺳﺘﻤﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ان ادوﯾﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﻨﺎﺑﻮﻟﮏ ادوﯾﺎت ‪(Anabolic‬‬
‫)‪ ،Drugs‬ﺗﺤﺮک ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ادوﯾﺎت )‪ ،(Stimulants‬ﮐﮭﻼڑﯾﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ادوﯾﺎت‪(Ergogenic aids or Athletic Performance-‬‬
‫)‪ ، enhancing Drugs‬اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺣﯿﺎﺗﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﮑﯿﻮﻟﺰ)‪،(Human Biomolecules‬‬
‫‪(Gene‬‬ ‫ﻧﺎرﮢﺮوﭘﮑﺲ)‪ ،(Nootropics‬ﺳﯿﮉﯾﮣﻮز )‪(Sedatives‬اور ﺟﯿﻦ ڈوﭘﻨﮓ‬
‫‪7‬‬
‫)‪Doping‬ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﻧﯿﻮروﮢﯿﮑﻨﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ دﻣﺎغ اور اس ﮐﮯ اﻓﻌﺎل ﮐﻮ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﮢﯿﮑﻨﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ دﻣﺎﻏﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﮔﺮﭼہ‬
‫اس ﻣﯿﺪان ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎم ﮔﺰﺷﺘہ ﭘﭽﺎس ﺳﺎﻟﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اس ﮐﯽ رﻓﺘﺎر ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﺎطﺮ‬
‫ﺧﻮاه اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮔﺰﺷﺘہ ﺑﯿﺲ ﺳﺎﻟﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺮﮨﻮن ﻣﻨﺖ ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ دﻣﺎغ او‬
‫ر اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﻓﻌﺎل ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮاه راﺳﺖ ﻣﺸﺎﮨﺪه ﻧﮯ اس ﻣﯿﺪان ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﻘﻼب ﺑﺮﭘﺎ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮢﯿﮑﻨﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﺪان اس ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ وه دﻣﺎغ ﮐﮯ اﻓﻌﺎل ﮐﻮ‬
‫اﭘﻨﮯ ﮐﻨﮣﺮول ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﮯ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ اور ان ﻣﯿﮟ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻣﺮﺿﯽ ﺳﮯ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ و اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ۔ اس‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ ڈﭘﺮﯾﺸﻦ ‪ ،‬ﻧﯿﻨﺪ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻤﯽ ‪ ،‬ﮐﺎم ﮐﯽ زﯾﺎدﺗﯽ ﮐﮯ اﺛﺮات ﮐﻮ ﻧﺎرﻣﻞ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻻﯾﺎ‬
‫‪8‬‬
‫ﺟﺎﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾہ دﻣﺎﻏﯽ اﻣﺮاض ﮐﮯ ﻋﻼج ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺘﮩﺎﺋﯽ ﻣﻤﺪوﻣﻌﺎون ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﮢﯽ اﯾﻢ اﯾﺲ )‪ (Tanscranial Magnetic Stimulation‬ﮢﯿﮑﻨﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ دﻣﺎغ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ ﻣﯿﮕﻨﯿﮣﮏ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﮏ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ دﻣﺎﻏﯽ اﻣﺮاض‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﻋﻼج ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ذﮨﻨﯽ اﻓﻌﺎل اور اس ﮐﯽ ﮐﺎرﮐﺮدﮔﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ ﻣﯿﮕﻨﯿﮣﮏ ﻓﯿﻠﮉ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ دﻣﺎغ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﺗﺤﺮﯾﮏ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾہ ﺗﺤﺮ ﯾﮏ ﻣﺘﺎﺛﺮ دﻣﺎﻏﯽ ﺧﻠﯿہ ﺟﺎت اور ﻣﻨﺘﺨﺐ ﺧﻠﯿہ ﺟﺎت ﭘﺮ‬
‫‪9‬‬
‫اﺛﺮ اﻧﺪاز ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ ان ﮐﯽ ﮐﺎرﮐﺮدﮔﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺑﻨﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ی ڈی ﺳﯽ اﯾﺲ )‪ (Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation‬ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﺗﮑﻨﯿﮏ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ زﺑﺎن ‪ ،‬ﯾﺎداﺷﺖ ‪،‬‬
‫ﮐﻮآرڈی ﻧﯿﺸﻦ اور ﺣﺴﺎﺑﯽ ﺳﺮﮔﺮﻣﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﺗﮑﻨﯿﮏ ﮐﻮ ﺑﺮوﺋﮯ ﮐﺎر‬
‫ﻻﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﻟﯿﮑﮣﺮوڈز ﮐﻮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﮭﻮﭘﮍی ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﻨﺴﻠﮏ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﻦ ﮐﮯ‬

‫‪7‬‬
‫‪Frati P, Kyriakou C, Del Rio A, Marinelli E, Vergallo GM, Zaami S, Busardò FP‬‬
‫‪(January 2015). "Smart drugs and synthetic androgens for cognitive and physical‬‬
‫–‪enhancement: revolving doors of cosmetic neurology". CurrNeuropharmacol. 13 (1): 5‬‬
‫‪11. doi:10.2174/1570159X13666141210221750. PMC 4462043. PMID 26074739‬‬
‫‪8‬‬
‫‪Purves, Dale (2007). Neuroscience, Fourth Edition. Sinauer Associates, Inc.‬‬
‫‪p. 20. ISBN 978-0-87893-697-7‬‬
‫‪9‬‬
‫‪:Illes, J; Gallo, M; Kirschen, MP (2006). "An ethics perspective on transcranial‬‬
‫‪magnetic stimulation (TMS) and human neuromodulation". Behavioural‬‬
‫‪neurology. 17 (3–4): 149–57. doi:10.1155/2006/791072. PMID 17148834.‬‬
‫ذرﯾﻌﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ دﻣﺎغ ﮐﻮ ﮐﻢ ﻣﻘﺪار ﻣﯿﮟ اﻟﯿﮑﮣﺮ ک ﮐﺮﻧﭧ ﻣﮩﯿﺎ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ دﻣﺎغ‬
‫‪10‬‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑہ ﺣﺼﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺳﺮﮔﺮﻣﯿﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﺴﺐ ﺧﻮاﮨﺶ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﻻﺋﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﻧﯿﻮروڈﯾﻮاﺋﺴﺰ ﮐﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ﻧﯿﻮرو ڈﯾﻮاﺋﺴﺰ وه آﻻت ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻦ ﮐﻮ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺳﺮﮔﺮﻣﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻣﺎﻧﯿﮣﺮ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ ان ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﮐﻨﮣﺮول ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾہ دﻣﺎغ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺘﺤﺮک ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ آﻻت ﮨﻮﺗﮯ‬
‫‪11‬‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ان ﺣﺼﻮں ﮐﻮ اﻟﯿﮑﮣﺮﯾﮑﻞ ﺗﺤﺮک دﯾﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺘﺤﺮک ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﻧﯿﻮرو ﻣﺎڈﯾﻮﻟﯿﺸﻦ )‪(Neuromodulataion‬ﺑﮭﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮨﻮﺗﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ﯾہ اﯾﮏ ﻧﺌﯽ ﻓﯿﻠﮉ ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﯿﻮروڈﯾﻮاﺋﺴﺰ اور ﻧﯿﻮروﮐﯿﻤﺴﮣﺮی ﮐﻮ ﻣﻼ ﮐﺮ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮢﮑﻨﯿﮏ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﯾہ اﺻﻮل ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﻮ ﮐﺌﯽ‬
‫طﺮﯾﻘﻮں‪ ،‬ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﯿﮣﺎﺑﻮﻟﮏ ‪ ،‬اﻟﯿﮑﮣﺮﯾﮑﻞ اور ﻓﺰﯾﺎﻟﻮﺟﯿﮑﻞ طﺮﯾﻘﮯ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﮐﻨﮣﺮول ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ان ﺗﻤﺎم ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﮐﻮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ دﻣﺎغ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺼﺐ آﻻت ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺑﺮوﺋﮯ ﮐﺎر ﻻ ﮐﺮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ذﮨﻦ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﺴﺐ ﺧﻮاﮨﺶ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﻻﺋﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫‪12‬‬

‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺳﮯاﯾﮏ ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ دﻣﺎغ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺧﻠﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﯾﺎ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺌﮯ‬
‫ﺧﻠﯿﮯ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺌﮯ ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﺟﻦ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑہ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﮐﻮ ﺣﺼﻮل ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﮯ۔ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎت‬
‫ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﮐﺎﻣﯿﺎﺑﯽ ﺳﮯ ﺣﺎدﺛﺎت ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﺎﺛﺮ ﺑﭽﻮں اور ﺑﮍھﺎﭘﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﺎﺛﺮ ﺷﺪه اﻓﺮاد‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ اس طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﻧﺌﮯ ﺧﻠﯿﺎت ﮐﻮ دﻣﺎغ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺼہ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ‬
‫‪13‬‬
‫ﻧﯿﻮراﻧﺰ)دﻣﺎﻏﯽ ﺧﻠﯿﻮں ( ﮐﮯ درﻣﯿﺎن رواﺑﻂ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬

‫‪10‬‬
‫;‪Ramaswamy, B; Kulkarni, SD; Villar, PS; Smith, RS; Eberly, C; Araneda, RC‬‬
‫‪Depireux, DA; Shapiro, B (October 2015). "Movement of magnetic nanoparticles in‬‬
‫‪brain tissue: mechanisms and impact on normal neuronal function". Nanomedicine:‬‬
‫–‪Nanotechnology, Biology and Medicine. 11 (7): 1821‬‬
‫‪11‬‬
‫‪Gross, R. (2008). "What Happened to PosteroventralPallidotomy for Parkinson's‬‬
‫–‪Disease and Dystonia?". Neurotherapeutics. 5 (2): 281‬‬
‫‪293. doi:10.1016/j.nurt.2008.02.001. PMC 5084170. PMID 18394570.‬‬
‫‪12‬‬
‫;‪Ramaswamy, B; Kulkarni, SD; Villar, PS; Smith, RS; Eberly, C; Araneda, RC‬‬
‫‪Depireux, DA; Shapiro, B (October 2015). "Movement of magnetic nanoparticles in‬‬
‫‪brain tissue: mechanisms and impact on normal neuronal function". Nanomedicine:‬‬
‫–‪Nanotechnology, Biology and Medicine. 11 (7): 1821‬‬
‫‪13‬‬
‫;‪Sacchetti, P.; Sousa, K. M.; Hall, A. C.; Liste, I.; Steffensen, K. R.; Theofilopoulos, S.‬‬
‫‪Parish, C. L.; Hazenberg, C.; Richter, L. Ä. .; Hovatta, O.; Gustafsson, J. Å.; Arenas, E.‬‬
‫‪(2009). "Liver X Receptors and Oxysterols Promote Ventral Midbrain Neurogenesis in‬‬
‫–‪Vivo and in Human Embryonic Stem Cells". Cell Stem Cell. 5 (4): 409‬‬
‫‪419. doi:10.1016/j.stem.2009.08.019. PMID 19796621.‬‬
‫اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﺗﮭﺮی ڈی ﺑﺎﺋﯿﻮ ﭘﺮﻧﮣﻨﮓ ﺑﮭﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ‬
‫اﯾﺴﺎ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﻠﯿﻮں اور ﺣﯿﺎﺗﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﺎدوں ﮐﮯ اﺷﺘﺮاک ﺳﮯ ﺑﺎﺋﯿﻮﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻞ‬
‫اﺟﺰاء ﺗﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ﺗﺸﻮز ﮐﯽ ﺳﯽ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﯿﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫اس ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ ﺑﺎﻓﺘﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﯿﺎت رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ ﻣﺎدوں ﮐﻮ ﺗﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺗﺎﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﻦ ﮐﻮ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ طﺐ اور ﮢﺸﻮ اﻧﺠﯿﻨﺌﺮﻧﮓ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾہ ﻋﺎم طﻮر‬
‫ﭘﺮ ﺗﯿﻦ ﻣﺮاﺣﻞ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺎڈل ﺗﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‬
‫اور اس ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﮣﯿﺮﯾﻞ ﮐﺎ اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺟﺲ ﺷﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺎڈل‬
‫ﺗﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ اﯾﻢ آر آﺋﯽ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ اس ﮐﺎ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻠﯽ اﻣﯿﺞ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ‪14‬اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ‬
‫ﻣﺨﺼﻮص ﺧﻠﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ اﻟﮓ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ان ﮐﯽ ﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﻓﺰاﺋﺶ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ۔ دوﺳﺮے ﻣﺮﺣﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﺧﻠﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ‪ ،‬دﯾﮕﺮ ﺿﺮوری ﻣﺎدوں ﮐﻮ اور ﻏﺬاﺋﯽ‬
‫اﺟﺰاء ﺟﻦ ﮐﻮ ﺑﺎﺋﯿﻮﻟﻨﮑﺲ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﻣﯿﮟ رﮐﮭ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﮩﺎں وه‬
‫ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻞ اور ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﮢﺸﻮز ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔اس ﻣﺮﺣﻠﮯ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑہ ﻣﺎڈل ﺳﮯ رﮨﻨﻤﺎﺋﯽ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺒﮑہ ﺗﯿﺴﺮے ﻣﺮﺣﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ان‬
‫ﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ ﮢﺸﻮز ﮐﻮ اس ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯﮐہ وه ﮢﺮاﻧﺴﭙﻼﻧﭧ ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ اور ﮢﺮاﻧﺴﭙﻼﻧﭧ‬
‫ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف اﭘﻨﯽ ﻧﺸﻮوﻧﻤﺎ ﺟﺎری رﮐﮭ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑہ اﻓﻌﺎل ﺑﮭﯽ ﺳﺮ اﻧﺠﺎم‬
‫‪15‬‬
‫دے ﺳﮑﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده دور ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﯽ ﺧﺎطﺮ‬
‫ﮐﺌﯽ طﺮح ﮐﮯ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﮐﻮ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ رﮨﺎﮨﮯ ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ان ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﮐﻮ ﻟﮯ ﮐﺮ ﮐﺌﯽ‬
‫ﺳﻮاﻻت اور ﺧﺪﺷﺎت ﺑﮭﯽ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ذﮨﻦ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺼہ ﺑﻦ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ان ﺧﺪﺷﺎت اور ﺳﻮاﻻت ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﭘﺲ ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﻟﮩﺬا وه ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺟﻮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﺷﺪه ﻓﻠﺴﻔﯿﺎﻧہ ﺳﻮاﻻت اور اﺷﮑﺎﻻت ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺑﻨﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ‬
‫ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی اور ﻋﻼج ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ و ﻣﻔﮩﻮ م اور ان ﮐﮯ درﻣﯿﺎن ﺣﺪ ﻓﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﮨﮯ۔ ان‬
‫ﺳﻮاﻻت اور اﺷﮑﺎﻻت ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﭘﺮ ﺑﺤﺚ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺟﺲ ﭼﯿﺰﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻋﻼج ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‬
‫اس ﮐﻮ ﮨﺮ ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺐ اور ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ درﺳﺖ اور ﺟﺎﺋﺰ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔اس ﮐﯽ ﺣﻮﺻﻠہ‬
‫اﻓﺰاﺋﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺒﮑہ وﮨﯽ ﺗﮩﺬﯾﺒﯿﮟ اور ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺗﺤﻔﻈﺎت‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﺷﮑﺎر ﮨﯿﮟ۔اس ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﭘﺘہ ﭼﻠﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺤﺾ ﻋﻨﻮان ﮨﯽ ﮐﺴﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺟﺎﺋﺰ اور ﻧﺎﺟﺎﺋﺰ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ دﻟﯿﻞ ﺑﻦ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اس ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺳﻮال ﺑﮩﺖ زﯾﺎده اﮨﻤﯿﺖ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻋﻼج ﺳﮯ آﺧﺮ ﻣﺮاد ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ ﺟﺐ ﺗﮏ ﯾہ طﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮐہ ﻋﻼج ﮨﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ اس وﻗﺖ‬

‫‪14‬‬
‫‪:Murphy, Sean; Atala, Anthony (August 5, 2014). "3D bioprinting of tissues and‬‬
‫‪organs". Nature Biotechnology. 32: 773–85. doi:10.1038/nbt.2958. PMID 25093879.‬‬
‫‪15‬‬
‫‪Hinton TJ, Jallerat Q, Palchesko RN, Park JH, Grodzicki MS, Shue HJ, Ramadan MH,‬‬
‫‪Hudson AR, Feinberg AW (23 October 2015). "Three-dimensional printing of complex‬‬
‫‪biological structures by freeform reversible embedding of suspended hydrogels". Science‬‬
‫‪Advances. 1 (9): e1500758. doi:10.1126/sciadv.1500758. PMID 26601312.‬‬
‫ﺗﮏ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﻓﺮق ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺳﮑﺘﺎ ۔ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﯽ ﻣﻘﺒﻮل ﻋﺎم ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻔﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ اور ﻋﻼج ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺣﺎدﺛﮯ ﯾﺎ‬
‫ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺒﺘﻼ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ واﭘﺲ اس ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﭘﺮ ﻟﮯ ﮐﺮ آﻧﺎﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻋﻼج)‪ (Treatment‬ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻞ ڈﮐﺸﻨﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ‪:‬‬
‫‪The application of medicines, surgery, psychotherapy, etc, to‬‬
‫‪a patient or to a disease or symptom16‬‬
‫ﺗﮭﺮاﭘﯽ ﺟﺲ ﮐﻮ ﻋﻼج )‪ (Treatment‬ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﺮادف ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔اس‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﮐﭽﮭ ﯾﻮں ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪The treatment of mental or psychological disorders by‬‬
‫‪psychological means. 17‬‬
‫ﻣﻨﺪرﺟہ ﺑﺎﻻ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻔﺎت ﺳﮯ ﯾہ واﺿﺢ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﻼج ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﻤﺎر ﻓﺮد ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﻮ دور ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺐ ﮨﻢ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﺎ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﻟﻐﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ دﯾﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ اس ﺳﮯ ﭘﺘہ‬
‫ﭼﻠﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﺎ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﺳﮯ ﮨﭧ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﻌﺮوف اﻧﮕﺮﯾﺰی‬
‫ڈﮐﺸﻨﺮی ﻣﯿﺮﯾﻢ وﯾﺒﺴﮣﺮ )‪ (Merriam Webster‬ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﯾﻮں ﺑﯿﺎن ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪A condition of the living animal or plant body or of one‬‬
‫‪of its parts that impairs normal functioning and is‬‬
‫‪typically manifested by distinguishing signs and‬‬
‫‪symptoms. 18‬‬
‫ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ڈﮐﺸﻨﺮی آف ﺑﯿﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪An abnormal condition of an organism which interrupts the‬‬
‫‪normal bodily functions that often leads to feeling‬‬
‫‪of pain and‬‬ ‫‪weakness,‬‬ ‫‪and‬‬ ‫‪usually‬‬ ‫‪associated‬‬
‫‪with symptoms and signs.‬‬ ‫‪19‬‬

‫ان ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻔﺎت ﺳﮯ واﺿﺢ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﻼج ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد اس ﻓﻄﺮی ﯾﺎ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﻮ واﭘﺲ‬
‫ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯﻣﻨﻔﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ روﻧﻤﺎ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ اﮔﺮ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﻮ ﺗﺴﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق ﮨﯽ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻋﻼج ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﺳﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ اس ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﺟﺲ ﮐﻮ وه ﮐﮭﻮ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﮯ دوﺑﺎره واﭘﺲ‬
‫ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﺎظ دﯾﮕﺮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻤﯽ واﻗﻊ‬

‫‪16‬‬
‫‪https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/treatment‬‬
‫‪17‬‬
‫‪https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/therapy‬‬
‫‪18‬‬
‫‪https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disease‬‬
‫‪19‬‬
‫‪https://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Disease‬‬
‫ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ اس ﮐﻮ واﭘﺲ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺒﮑہ اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮﻋﮑﺲ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد‬
‫اس ﻧﺎرﻣﻞ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﯾﺎ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﺑﮩﺘﺮی ﻻﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﯽ ان ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻔﺎت ﮐﻮ ﻣﺪﻧﻈﺮ رﮐﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﯾﮩﺎں ﺳﻮال ﯾہ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺗﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ﺟﻮ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ درﻣﯿﺎن ﻓﺮق‬
‫ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﮐﺎ ﮐﺎم دﯾﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮐﯿﺎ اس ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﺘﻔﻘﺎﻧہ راﺋﮯ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ ؟ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ اس ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ؟ اس ﻓﻄﺮی ﯾﺎ‬
‫ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی اﮨﻤﯿﺖ ﮐﻦ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮐﻮ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﮯ؟اس ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ؟‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ اس ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﻋﺎﻟﻤﯽ اور آﻓﺎﻗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ ﺣﺎﻻت و اﺣﻮال ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﮨﻮﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ا‬
‫س ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ روﻧﻤﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ اﮔﺮ ﺑﺎت ذﮨﻨﯽ اور ﻧﻔﺴﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں ﮐﯽ ﮨﻮ ﺗﻮ اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻣﺪﻧﻈﺮ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮاس ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﮔﺮ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﯽ ﯾﺎ آﻓﺎﻗﯽ ﭘﯿﻤﺎﻧہ ﯾﺎ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ وه ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ؟ ذﮨﺎﻧﺖ ﮐﯽ ﮐﺲ ﺳﻄﺢ‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ؟ اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮﻋﮑﺲ اﮔﺮ اﻧﻔﺮادی ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﯾﺎ ﭘﯿﻤﺎﻧہ طﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‬
‫اور اس ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ﯾﺎ ﺧﺪاداد ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‬
‫ﺟﻮ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺸﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اس ﮐﻮ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ اور ﯾہ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮐہ اﯾﮏ اﻧﺴﺎن ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺸﯽ‬
‫طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺟﻦ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﺎ ﻣﺎﻟﮏ ﺗﮭﺎ اﮔﺮ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﯾﺎ ﺣﺎدﺛﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ‬
‫ﮐﻤﯽ آﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ اس ﮐﻮ دوﺑﺎره ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻋﻼج ﮐﮩﻼﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ان ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﺎ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﻮ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺸﯽ طﻮرﭘﺮ ﮐﻢ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﻟﮏ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ؟‬
‫اﮔﺮ ﮨﻢ ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﯾﮏ آﻓﺎﻗﯽ ﭘﯿﻤﺎﻧہ طﮯ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ اس‬
‫ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ ﮨﺮ وه ﺷﺨﺺ ﺟﻮ اس ﺳﻄﺢ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻢ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر رﮐﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺐ وه‬
‫اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮩﺘﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ طﺮﯾﻘہ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﺮے ﮔﺎ وه اس ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف ﺟﺎﺋﺰ‬
‫ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻋﻼج ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ اس ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺸﯽ ﻣﻌﺬور اور اﭘﺎﮨﺞ اﻓﺮاد ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮩﺘﺮی ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻋﻼج ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ۔ﺻﺮف ﯾﮩﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﮨﺮ‬
‫ﺷﺨﺺ ﭼﺎﮨﮯ وه ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﯾﺎ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺸﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اس ﻣﻌﯿﺎری ﺳﻄﺢ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﮐﻢ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﻋﻼج ﮐﺎ ﺣﻘﺪار ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ اﺳﯽ طﺮح اﮔﺮ‬
‫ﻓﻄﺮی ﯾﺎ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر اﻧﻔﺮادی ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ‬
‫ﮨﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺟﻦ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﻮ ﻟﮯ ﮐﺮ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﺴﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺑﮩﺘﺮی ﯾﺎ‬
‫اﺿﺎﻓہ ﻋﻼج ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮩﻼﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺪاﺋﺸﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ذﮨﻨﯽ‬
‫ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻌﺬور اﻓﺮاد ﮐﮯ ﻋﻼج ﮐﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮔﻨﺠﺎﺋﺶ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻧﮑﻠﺘﯽ ۔‬
‫ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ اس ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ‪،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﻮ ﮨﻢ ﻋﻠﻢ طﺐ ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ ﺻﺤﺖ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﺮار دے ﺳﮑﺘﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ ‪ ،‬ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎت ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ورﻟﮉ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻞ ﮨﯿﻠﺘﮭ آرﮔﻨﺎﺋﺰﯾﺸﻦ ﻧﮯ اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﮐﭽﮭ ﯾﻮں ﮐﯽ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪A state of complete physical, mental and social well-being‬‬
‫‪20‬۔‪and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity‬‬

‫‪20‬‬
‫‪World Health Organization.Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted‬‬
‫‪by the International Health Conference, New York, 19–22 June 1946; signed on 22 July‬‬
‫‪1946 by the representatives of 61 States‬‬
‫ﺟﺐ ﮨﻢ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮوں ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ اس ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﯾﺎ ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﻮ‬
‫دﯾﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﺲ ﮐﻮ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﺑﻨﺎ ﮐﺮ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ﭘﺘہ‬
‫ﭼﻠﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﯾﮑﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ اور ﻧہ ﮨﯽ ﯾہ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﯾﻮﻧﯿﻮرﺳﻞ‬
‫ﻓﺎرﻣﻮﻻ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ طﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ درﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﯾہ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ اطﻮار اور رﺳﻮم ورواج‬
‫ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ اس ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﺎ ﺳﺒﺐ ﺑﻨﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﻋﺎدات و اطﻮار ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ آﺗﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ وﯾﺴﮯ ﮨﯽ ان ﮐﯽ وﺿﻊ ﻗﻄﻊ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ رﮨﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻋﻼج ﮐﮯ‬
‫طﻮر طﺮﯾﻘﻮں ﮐﻮ ﮨﯽ دﯾﮑﮭ ﻟﯿﺎﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔اﻓﺮاد ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮه اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺤﺎﻟﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻋﻼج‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺟﻦ طﺮﯾﻘﻮں ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﺎﺋﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اﮔﺮ ان ﺳﮯ ﮨﭧ ﮐﺮ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻧﯿﺎ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ‬
‫آﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ اﺳﮯ اس طﺮح ﺷﺮف ﻗﺒﻮﻟﯿﺖ ﺑﺨﺸﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﺟﺲ طﺮح ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد‬
‫طﺮﯾﻘﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺑﺨﺸﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﺑﺴﺎ اوﻗﺎت ﺗﻮ اﺳﮯ ﻋﻼج ﻣﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮨﯽ اﻧﮑﺎر ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ اﮔﺮ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ و ﺗﻨﺪرﺳﺘﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ اس ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﻋﻼج‬
‫ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ اﻟﯿﮑﮣﺮ ک ﺷﺎک ﮐﻮ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯاﭘﻨﮯ آﻏﺎز ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮐﺌﯽ ﺳﺎﻟﻮں ﺗﮏ‬
‫ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺗﻨﻘﯿﺪ ﮐﺎ ﻧﺸﺎﻧہ ﺑﻨﺘﺎ رﮨﺎ ۔‬
‫اس اﻣﺮ ﮐﯽ وﺿﺎﺣﺖ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻟﯿﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺼﻮر ﺟﻮ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮوں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ اس ﻣﯿﮟ وﻗﺖ ﮔﺰرﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ آﺗﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ ﭘﺎﻧﭽﻮﯾﮟ ﺻﺪی ﻗﺒﻞ ﻣﺴﯿﺢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺻﺤﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ اﻋﻀﺎ ﮐﯽ ﮐﺎرﮐﺮدﮔﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻢ‬
‫آﮨﻨﮕﯽ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ﻗﺪﯾﻢ ﯾﻮﻧﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻔﮑﺮ ﭘﻨﺪار )‪ (Pindar 522-443BC‬اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﮐﻮ ﯾﻮں ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪:‬‬
‫‪Harmonious functioning of the organs.21‬‬
‫ﻟﮩﺬا ان ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰدﯾﮏ ﺻﺤﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ اﻋﻀﺎ ء ﮐﺎ درﺳﺖ ﮐﺎم ﮐﺮﻧﺎ اور ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ اور‬
‫ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﯽ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﮔﯽ ﺗﮭﺎ ۔ﺟﺒﮑہ ﻣﺎﯾہ ﻧﺎز ﯾﻮﻧﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻔﮑﺮ اﻓﻼطﻮن ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺟﻮ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ اور ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ و ﺗﻨﺪرﺳﺘﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﮨﻢ‬
‫آﮨﻨﮕﯽ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ رﮨﺎ۔ اﻓﻼطﻮن)‪ (Plato 428-347BC‬اﭘﻨﯽ ﮐﺘﺎب ﻣﮑﺎﻟﻤﮯ‬
‫)‪ (Dialogues‬ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ اﻋﺘﺮاف ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﯾﮏ ﺻﺤﺖ ﻣﻨﺪ ﺟﺴﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد‬
‫ﺻﺤﺖ ﻣﻨﺪ دﻣﺎغ ﺻﺮف اﺳﯽ وﻗﺖ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺐ اﻓﺮاد ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮه ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﻧہ‬
‫ﺻﺮف آﭘﺴﯽ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮕﯽ ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ اﻗﺪار اور طﺒﻌﯽ‬
‫ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﺑﮭﯽ ان ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ آﮨﻨﮓ ﮨﻮ۔ ارﺳﻄﻮ )‪(Aristotle 384-322BC‬ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ اﻧﺴﺎن ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ اﯾﮏ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﺣﯿﻮان ﮨﮯ ﻟﮩﺬا وه اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮوں ﻣﯿﮟ اس طﺮح‬
‫ﺳﮯ رﮨﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﺧﻼﻗﯽ اور ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﺿﻮاﺑﻂ ﮐﯽ ﭘﺎﺑﻨﺪی ﮐﺮ‬
‫ﺳﮑﮯ۔ارﺳﻄﻮ اس ﺑﺎت ﭘﺮ زور دﯾﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﻮ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار رﮐﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ‬
‫ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮوں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻈﻢ و ﺿﺒﻂ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ۔ﻣﺸﮩﻮر زﻣﺎﻧہ ﯾﻮﻧﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫طﺒﯿﺐ ﺑﻘﺮاط )‪ (Hippocrates 460-370BC‬ﺟﺐ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﯽ وﺿﺎﺣﺖ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‬

‫‪21‬‬
‫‪Grmek MD, Budak A. Introduction to medicine [In Croatian]. Zagreb: Nakladnizavod‬‬
‫‪“Globus”; 1996. p. 247.‬‬
‫ﺗﻮ وه اس ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﺻﺮف اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺟﺴﻢ ﮐﻮ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻨﺎﺗﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ اﻧﺴﺎن اور اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺣﻮل‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﻤﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ وﺿﺎﺣﺖ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ‪ 22‬اس ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﭘﺘہ ﭼﻠﺘﺎ ﮐہ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ ﯾﻮﻧﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﻣﻔﮑﺮﯾﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰدﯾﮏ ﺻﺤﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد ﺳﮯ ﺻﺮف اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺟﺴﻢ ﮐﮯ اﻋﻀﺎو اﻓﻌﺎل ﮐﯽ‬
‫درﺳﺘﯽ اور ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ اور ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﯽ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﮔﯽ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻣﺎﺣﻮﻟﯿﺎﺗﯽ اور ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ‬
‫ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺑﮭﯽ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری اور ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ ﮐﺎ ﻧﺎ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﯾﺎ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ اﻓﻌﺎل‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺑﻼ رﮐﺎوٹ اﻧﺠﺎم دﮨﯽ ﮨﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﻣﻨﺪی ﮐﮯ ﺿﺎﻣﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮه اور ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﮐﺎ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدوں ﭘﺮ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﻣﻨﺪ ﮐﮩﻼﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻻزم و‬
‫ﻣﻠﺰوم ﮨﮯ۔ ﭼﻨﺎﻧﭽہ دور ﻗﺪﯾﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﺤﺾ ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﯾﺎ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ‬
‫ﮐﯽ درﺳﺘﯽ ﺗﮏ ﮨﯽ ﻣﺤﺪود ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﮭﺎ ﺑﻠﮑہ وه ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ اور ﻣﺎﺣﻮﻟﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ اور ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ اﭘﻨﮯ اﻧﺪر ﺳﻤﻮﺋﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﺗﮭﺎ۔‬
‫وﺳﻄﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻐﺮب ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﭘﺮ‬ ‫ٰ‬ ‫ﻗﺮون‬
‫ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﮐﮯاﺛﺮات ﻏﺎﻟﺐ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﻧﺸﺎة ﺛﺎﻧﯿہ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﯽ اور ﺻﻨﻌﺘﯽ ﻋﻨﺼﺮ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ۔اس دور ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ‬
‫ﻣﻨﺪی ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں اور ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ ﮐﯽ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ اور ذﮨﻨﯽ‬
‫ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﮐﺎ درﺳﺖ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﺑﮭﯽ طﮯ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ۔ ڈارون ﮐﮯ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ‪(Natural‬‬
‫)‪ Selection‬اور ﺑﮩﺘﺮﯾﻦ ﮐﺎ ﺑﭽﺎؤ )‪ ( Survival of the fittest‬ﻧﮯ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﺧﺎطﺮ ﺧﻮاه اﺛﺮات ﻣﺮﺗﺐ ﮐﯿﮯ اور ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ داﺋﺮه ﮐﺎر ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺖ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮﻧﮯ اور ﻣﺎﺣﻮﻟﯿﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯿﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺧﻮد ﮐﻮ ڈھﺎﻟﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ۔ ‪ 23‬ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﺑﺮاں دور ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ‬
‫ارﺗﻘﺎء روﻧﻤﺎ ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ اس ﮐﻮ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری اور ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ دﯾﮑﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ رﮨﺎ ﺑﻠﮑہ ذاﺗﯽ ﺗﺴﮑﯿﻦ اور ﺗﮑﻤﯿﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺪﻧﻈﺮ رﮐﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ‬
‫رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اﻧﻔﺮادی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﺣﺎﻻت ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﺤﺚ ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺗﺼﻮر ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺻﺤﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد اﯾﮏ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎ ن ﺟﺲ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮے ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﺳﯽ ﮨﻮ اس ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف ذﮨﻨﯽ اور ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﺑﻠﮑہ‬
‫ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯽ اور روﺣﺎﻧﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺗﻤﺎم ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺑﮭﺮﭘﻮر اظﮩﺎر ﮐﯽ ﻗﺪرت رﮐﮭﺘﺎ‬
‫ﮨﻮ ۔اس ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ اور ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﻣﺪ ﺷﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ان ﮐﮯ‬
‫درﻣﯿﺎن واﺿﺢ اور ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ ﺣﺪ ﻓﺎﺻﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ ان دوﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ اﯾﮏ ﻋﻤﻞ‬
‫ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ اور ﻣﺘﺤﺮک ﮐﯽ ﺳﯽ ﮨﮯ ۔ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ زﻧﺪﮔﯽ د و اﻧﺘﮩﺎؤں ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری اور ﮐﺎﻣﻠﯿﺖ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﮐﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ اﯾﮏ طﺮف ﮨﺮ ﻋﯿﺐ اور ﺧﺎﻣﯽ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﺎ وه ﺑﻠﻨﺪ ﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ اس ﮐﻮ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ اور دوﺳﺮی ﺟﺎﻧﺐ‬

‫‪22‬‬
‫‪Nikodijevic B, editor. Contemporary diagnostics and therapy in medicine. Skopje:‬‬
‫‪Faculty of Medicine; 2000. p. 5-19‬‬
‫‪23‬‬
‫‪Donev D. Human health – definition, concept and content.in Grmek MD, Budak A.‬‬
‫‪Introduction to medicine [In Croatian]. Zagreb: Nakladnizavod “Globus”; 1996. p. 247.‬‬
‫اس ﮐﺎ آﺧﺮی ﻣﻘﺎم ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﻮت ۔ ‪24‬اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ اس ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﺮ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﺷﮑﻞ اس‬
‫‪(World Health‬‬ ‫وﻗﺖ ﻣﻠﯽ ﺟﺐ ‪1948‬ء ﻣﯿﮟ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﯽ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﯽ ﺗﻨﻈﯿﻢ‬
‫)‪Organization‬ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻣﻨﺸﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﮐﻮ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ۔ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ رو‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﺻﺤﺖ ﻣﻨﺪی ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد اﯾﮏ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺻﺮف ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﯾﺎ ﺗﮑﺎﻟﯿﻒ ﮐﯽ ﻋﺪم‬
‫ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﮔﯽ ﺳﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻋﺒﺎرت ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﺑﻠﮑہ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ‪ ،‬ذﮨﻨﯽ اور‬
‫ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﺧﯿﺮو ﻋﺎﻓﯿﺖ ﺑﮭﯽ اس ﮐﺎ ﻻزﻣﯽ ﺟﺰو ﮨﮯ۔ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﯽ ﺗﻨﻈﯿﻢ ﺻﺤﺖ ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﯾﺎ ﺻﺤﺖ ﻣﻨﺪی ﮐﻮ ﺟﺲ طﺮح ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﺎ اس ﺳﮯ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ دور ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺎں ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ‪،‬ﺟﺪت اور وﺳﻌﺖ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ۔ ﮔﺰﺷﺘہ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻋﺸﺮوں‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ذﮨﻨﯽ‪ ،‬ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ اور ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯽ ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ روﺣﺎﻧﯽ ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ‬
‫ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ۔ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﯽ اس ﻧﺌﯽ ﺟﮩﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻧﻘﻄہ ﻧﻈﺮ ﮐﺎ اظﮩﺎر طﺒﯽ ﻣﺎﮨﺮ‬
‫ڈوﻧﻮ )‪ (Donev‬ﯾﻮں ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫‪Generally speaking, spiritual health involves a sense of‬‬
‫‪fulfillment and satisfaction with our own lives, system of‬‬
‫‪values, self-confidence and self-esteem, self-awareness and‬‬
‫‪presence, peacefulness and tranquility with dynamic‬‬
‫‪emotional balance, both internal and toward the‬‬
‫‪environment, morality and truthfulness, selflessness,‬‬
‫‪positive emotions, compassion and willingness to help and‬‬
‫‪support others, responsibility and contribution to the‬‬
‫‪common good, and successful management of everyday life‬‬
‫‪problems and demands as well as social stress. 25‬‬
‫ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﯾﺎ ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ‪ ،‬ﺟﺲ ﮐﻮ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار رﮐﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯﻟﯿﮯ ﻋﻼج ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﺳﮩﺎرا ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ‪،‬ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ روﻧﻤﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ رﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﻋﻤﻞ ﯾہ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ‬
‫ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﭘﺮ‬
‫اﺗﻔﺎق راﺋﮯ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﻮ۔ ﻋﻼج ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ اﮔﺮ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری اور ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺤﺎﻟﯽ‬
‫ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم اور ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ وﯾﺴﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻋﻼج ﮐﺎ ﺗﺼﻮر ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﭼﻼﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﺟﺲ ﮐﻮ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار رﮐﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﻏﺮض ﺳﮯ ﻋﻼج ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺴﮯ دوﺳﺮے ﻟﻔﻈﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺻﺤﺖ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺮاد ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ اس‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮن ﺳﮯ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﮐﺎرﻓﺮﻣﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ؟ ﺗﻮ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻟﯿﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﻋﻨﺼﺮ ﮐﻮ اس ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ‬

‫‪24‬‬
‫‪Antonovsky A. The salutogenic model as a theory to guide health promotion. Health‬‬
‫‪Promot Int. 1996;11:11–8. doi: 10.1093/heapro/11.1.11.‬‬
‫‪25‬‬
‫‪Donev D. Toward the fourth dimension of health – the spiritual health. Vox‬‬
‫]‪Medici. 2014;23:318–21. [in Macedonian‬‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی اﮨﻤﯿﺖ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﯽ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮐﺎرﻓﺮﻣﺎ‬
‫رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﻦ ﮐﮯ ﮐﺮدار ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﺎﻻت اور ﺿﺮورﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ آﺗﯽ رﮨﯽ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾﻮﻧﺎﻧﯽ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ اس ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ اﮨﻢ ﮐﺮدار ﮐﯿﺎ ۔ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﻗﺮون‬
‫وﺳﻄﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻏﺎﻟﺐ ﻋﻨﺼﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ رﮨﯽ۔ ﻧﺸﺎة ﺛﺎﻧﯿہ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر‬ ‫ٰ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ آﺋﯽ اس ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺲ ﻋﻨﺼﺮ ﻧﮯ ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ اﮨﻢ ﮐﺮدار ادا ﮐﯿﺎ وه‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ اور ﺻﻨﻌﺘﯽ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﻓﮑﺎر وﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﺗﮭﮯ۔ ﺟﺒﮑہ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺟﻮده دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ اﻓﺎدﯾﺖ اور ﻣﺎدﯾﺖ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ ﻧﮯ اس ﮐﮯ ﺧﺪوﺧﺎل اﺳﺘﻮار ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﮨﻢ ﮐﺮدار ادا ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺧﺪﺷﺎت ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﮐﮯ ﭘﺲ‬
‫ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ درﻣﯿﺎن ﺣﺪ ﻓﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﻣﺸﮑﻮک اور ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی اور ﻋﻼج ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻓﺮق ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ واﺿﺢ ﺣﺪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺌﯽ طﺮح ﮐﮯ اﺷﮑﺎﻻت‬
‫ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﺗﻮ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﻼج ﮐﺎ ﺗﺼﻮر اور طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﻋﻼج ﻣﻮﺟﻮد رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ﻋﻼج‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﮐﺌﯽ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر اﯾﺴﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻦ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں ﯾﺎ ﻧﻘﺼﺎﻧﺎت ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﻣﺪاوا ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ان ﮐﻮ ﻋﻼج ﮨﯽ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺪاﻓﻌﺎﺗﯽ ادوﯾﺎت‪،‬‬
‫ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں ﺳﮯ ﺗﺤﻔﻆ ﮐﯽ ﺧﺎطﺮ ﻟﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ادوﯾﺎت ‪ ،‬زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ طﻮر‬
‫ﭘﺮ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار رﮐﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﯽ ادوﯾﺎت‪ ،‬ﺗﺴﮑﯿﻦ ﺑﺨﺶ ادوﯾﺎت )‪،(Palliative care‬ﭘﻼﺳﮣﮏ‬
‫ﺳﺮﺟﺮی اور اوﻻد ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر وﻏﯿﺮه ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫اس اﺷﮑﺎل ﮐﻮ ﯾﻮں ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ‪:‬‬
‫‪First, we may note that the therapy-enhancement dichotomy‬‬
‫‪does not map onto any corresponding dichotomy between‬‬
‫‪standard-contemporary-medicine and medicine as-it-could-‬‬
‫‪be-practised-in-the-future. 26‬‬
‫ﻟﮩﺬا اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ ﻗﻮی اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺐ ﻋﻼج ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ‬
‫آﺋﯽ ﺗﻮ ان طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﮐﻮ ﺟﻦ ﮐﻮ آج ﮨﻢ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﺮ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﺴﻦ ﯾﺎ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻞ ﭘﺮاﺳﺲ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺼہ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﯿﮟ ﻟﮕﯿﮟ۔‬
‫اس طﺮح ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﮯ وه طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻞ ﮐﮯ داﺋﺮه ﮐﺎر‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﺮ ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺧﺪﺷﺎت ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ ﭼﺎﺋﮯ ﯾﺎ ﮐﺎﻓﯽ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﮐﺎم ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮍھﺎﻧﺎ‪ ،‬ارﺗﮑﺎز ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﯾﺎ ﻧﯿﻨﺪ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﮕﺎﻧﺎ ‪،‬‬
‫ورزش اور ﻣﺸﻖ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ارﺗﮑﺎز اور ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ وﻏﯿﺮه۔‬

‫‪26‬‬
‫‪Nick Bostrom Rebecca Roache, Ethical Issues in Human Enhancement,Published in‬‬
‫‪New Waves in Applied Ethics, eds. JesperRyberg, Thomas Petersen & Clark Wolf‬‬
‫‪(Pelgrave Macmillan, 2008): pp. 120‬‬
‫اﺳﯽ طﺮح وه ادوﯾﺎت ﯾﺎ دﯾﮕﺮ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﺟﻦ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری اورﻣﻮت ﮐﮯ اﻣﮑﺎﻧﺎت‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﮐﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯﻣﺜﻼ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں ﮐﯽ وﯾﮑﺴﯿﻦ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﻮ ﮐﺲ‬
‫ﮐﯿﮣﯿﮕﺮی ﻣﯿﮟ رﮐﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ؟ ﮐﯿﺎ ان ﮐﻮ ﺑﯿﻤﺎرﯾﻮں ﺳﮯ ﺑﭽﺎؤ ﮐﺎ ﻋﻼج ﺗﺼﻮرﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ‬
‫ان ﮐﻮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ؟ اﺳﯽ طﺮح وه طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﯾﺎ دﺳﺖ‬
‫اﻧﺪازی ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﺑﮍھﺎﭘﮯ ﯾﺎ اﯾﺠﻨﮓ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﻮ ﺳﺴﺖ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﯾﺎ روﮐﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ‪ ،‬اس ﮐﻮ دوران ﺣﯿﺎت ﮐﻮ طﻮل دﯾﻨﮯ واﻻ ‪،‬اس ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻻ‬
‫ﻋﻤﻞ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﯾﺎﭘﮭﺮ ﯾہ ﯾہ وه طﺒﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻗﺮار ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﯾﺎ‬
‫ﻣﻌﺬوری ﮐﮯ اﻣﮑﺎﻧﺎت ﮐﻮ ﮐﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫‪There is the question of how to define a normal healthy state.‬‬
‫)‪Many human attributes have a normal (bell curve‬‬
‫‪distribution. Take cognitive capacity. To define abnormality‬‬
‫‪as falling (say) two standard deviations below the population‬‬
‫‪average is to introduce an arbitrary point that seems to lack‬‬
‫‪any fundamental medical or normative significance. 27‬‬
‫اس ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻻ ﺗﯿﺴﺮا اﺷﮑﺎل ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ اوﺳﻂ ﺻﺤﺖ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ‬
‫ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﺎ ﭘﯿﻤﺎﻧہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ؟ ﮐﯿﺎ اس ﭘﯿﻤﺎﻧہ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ ﮨﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﺿﺎﻓﮯ اور ﻋﻼج ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ اﻧﻔﺮاد ی ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﻣﺪﻧﻈﺮرﮐﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ؟ اﯾﮏ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ‬
‫ﻋﻤﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮐﻤﯽ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ اور اس ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﯾﻮﻧﭧ )‪(1σ‬‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﮐﻤﯽ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﮕﺮ اس ﮐﻤﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد اﮔﺮ وه اوﺳﻂ ذﮨﺎﻧﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ ﺳﮯ‬
‫زﯾﺎده ذﮨﺎﻧﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ ادوﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ اﮔﺮ اس ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﺗﻮ وه اوﺳﻂ ذﮨﺎﻧﺖ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﯾﺎ دو درﺟﺎت اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺑﻨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫ﺟﺒﮑہ دوﺳﺮی طﺮف اﮔﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻧﺎرﻣﻞ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ اوﺳﻂ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺳﻄﺢ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﺳﮯ ﮐﻢ ﮨﻮ اور وه ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺒﺘﻼ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ ﺗﻮ ﺟﺐ وه ﮐﺴﯽ طﺮﯾﻘﮯ‬
‫ﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻧﺎرﻣﻞ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎوﺟﻮد ﺑﮭﯽ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ اوﺳﻄﺎ ذﮨﺎﻧﺖ ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﻢ رﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﯾہ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﭘﮭﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮩﻼﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ؟ ﺟﺒﮑہ ﭘﮩﻠﯽ ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻻ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﻋﻼج ﮨﯽ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﺟﺒﮑہ وه اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﯽ اوﺳﻂ ذﮨﺎﻧﺖ ﺳﮯ‬
‫‪28‬‬
‫زﯾﺎده ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﯾﮏ ﮨﯽ ﻓﻌﻞ اﯾﮏ ﺷﺨﺺ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻋﻼج اور دوﺳﺮے ﮐﮯ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر زﻧﺪﮔﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﺮاﺣﻞ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ‬
‫ﺟﯿﺴﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻋﻤﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎﮨﮯ وﯾﺴﮯ وﯾﺴﮯ اس ﮐﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﮔﺮﺗﺎ‬
‫ﭼﻼ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ؟ ﻟﮩﺬا اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﺎ وه ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﺑﯿﺲ ﺳﺎل ﮐﯽ ﻋﻤﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺎرﻣﻞ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐﯿﺎ وه ‪ 80‬ﺳﺎل ﮐﯽ ﻋﻤﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ؟ ‪ 80‬ﺳﺎل ﮐﯽ ﻋﻤﺮ‬
‫‪27‬‬
‫‪Nick Bostrom Rebecca Roache, Ethical Issues in Human Enhancement, p. 124‬‬
‫‪28‬‬
‫‪: Nick Bostrom Rebecca Roache, Ethical Issues in Human Enhancement,p. 132‬‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻤﯽ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ اس‬
‫ﺑﯿﺲ ﺳﺎل واﻟﮯ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﮐﻮ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺷﺸﻮں ﮐﺎ ﺷﻤﺎر ﮐﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ؟ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ ﻋﻼج ﺟﻮ ﮐہ اس‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﻧﺎرﻣﻞ ﺳﻄﺢ ﭘﺮ ﻻﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ؟‬
‫ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺗﺤﻔﻈﺎت ﺟﮍے ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﺗﻮ ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺑﻌﺾ‬
‫اوﻗﺎت اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ دھﻮﮐہ اور ﺑﮯ اﯾﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﯿﺴﺎﮐہ‬
‫ﮐﮭﯿﻞ ﮐﮯ دوران ادوﯾﺎت ﮐﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ‪ ،‬ﯾﺎ دﻓﺎﺗﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎم ﮐﮯ دوران اور اﻣﺘﺤﺎﻧﺎت ﮐﮯ‬
‫دوران ارﺗﮑﺎز اور ﯾﺎداﺷﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ادوﯾﺎت ﮐﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ۔‬
‫ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﯾﮩﺎں ﺑﮭﯽ ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل ﯾﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺑﺪﻟﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ آﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺜﻼ‬
‫اﻋﻠﯽ ﻧﻤﺒﺮوں ﮐﺎ ﺣﺼﻮل ﮨﻮﺗﻮ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل‬‫ٰ‬ ‫اﮔﺮ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ اﭼﮭﮯ ﮔﺮﯾﮉ ز ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ادوﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﯽ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﯿﺖ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اﮔﺮ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﺷﻌﻮر اور آﮔﮩﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﺿﺎﻓہ اور اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ان ادوﯾﺎت ﮐﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﻏﻠﻂ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﮯ ﺣﺼﻮل ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ذرﯾﻌہ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺗﮑﻨﯿﮏ اﮔﺮ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮩﺖ زﯾﺎده اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺑﻨﻨﮯ ﻟﮕﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ ﭘﮭﺮ اس ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ اﺑﮭﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺳﺮ ﻓﮩﺮﺳﺖ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اﯾﮏ ﺷﺨﺺ ﺟﺲ ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫دوﺳﺮوں ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﺎطﺮ ﺧﻮاه اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ وه ﻧہ ﺻﺮف ﻣﻌﺎﺷﯽ ﺑﻠﮑہ‬
‫ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ دوﺳﺮوں ﺳﮯ ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺮ ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮ ﻟﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ اس ﮐﯽ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺷﺪه‬
‫ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﯿﮟ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف اس ﮐﻮ دوﺳﺮوں ﭘﺮ ﺣﺎوی ﮨﻮﻧﮯ اوراﺛﺮ و رﺳﻮخ ﻣﺮﺗﺐ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﻋﻄﺎ ﮐﺮ دﯾﮟ ﮔﯽ ﺑﻠﮑہ اس ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﻟﯽ ﺧﻮﺷﺤﺎﻟﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اس‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﮐﺎرﮐﺮﮔﯽ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻌﻤﻮﻟﯽ ﺑﻨﺎ دﯾﮟ ﮔﯽ۔ ﻣﺎﮨﺮ ﺟﯿﻨﯿﮣﮑﺲ )‪ (Lee Silver‬اس ﮐﻮ ﯾﻮں‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫‪This raises the worry, that the enhanced, having gained‬‬
‫‪cognitive abilities that far outstrip those of the unenhanced,‬‬
‫‪could band together and use their superior skills to dominate‬‬
‫‪and exploit the unenhanced.29‬‬
‫ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه‬
‫ﻟﻮگ ﺟﻮ ان ﺗﮑﻨﯿﮏ ﮐﻮ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮ ﻟﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ‬
‫ان ﻣﯿﮟ اوردوﺳﺮے ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ‪ ،‬ﺟﻮ ﮐہ اﯾﺴﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﮨﻮں ﮔﮯ ‪ ،‬ﺑﮩﺖ زﯾﺎده ﻓﺮق ﭘﯿﺪا‬
‫ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ ﯾﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﮐہ اس ﭘﯿﺪ ا ﺷﺪ ه ﻓﺮق ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠہ ﻣﯿﮟ وه ﻟﻮگ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﭘﯿﭽﮭﮯ ره‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮے ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺣﻘﺎرت ﻗﺮار ﭘﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮه دو ﺣﺼﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﭧ‬

‫‪29‬‬
‫‪Lee Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World (New York:‬‬
‫‪Avon, 1998).‬‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺟﺐ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﮯ اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ﮐﯽ اﮨﻠﯿﺖ‬
‫ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ ﺗﻮ اس ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﺗﻔﺮﯾﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ۔‪ 30‬اﻣﺮﯾﮑﯽ‬
‫ﻣﺎﮨﺮ ﺳﻤﺎﺟﯿﺎت ﻟﻨﮉا ﺳﻮﺳﯿﻦ ﮔﻮﮢﻔﺮﯾﮉﺳﻦ )‪(Linda Susanne Gottfredson‬ﻟﮑﮭﺘﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫‪If the cognitive enhancements in question were brought‬‬
‫‪about through germline genetic intervention, the resulting‬‬
‫‪improvements could be inherited by the children of the‬‬
‫‪enhanced, with successive improvements eventually‬‬
‫‪resulting in the enhanced forming a new species which may‬‬
‫‪prove a threat to unenhanced humans. 31‬‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﺳﮯ ﺟﺐ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮے ﮐﮯ اﻧﺪر اس طﺮح ﮐﺎ ﺗﻔﺎوت‬
‫ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎﺗﻮ اس ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠہ ﻣﯿﮟ وه ﻟﻮگ ﺟﻦ ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﯿﮟ ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ‬
‫اوﺳﻂ درﺟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻢ ﮨﻮں ﮔﯽ ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﺎطﺮﺧﻮاه‬
‫اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮ ﭼﮑﮯ ﮨﻮں ﮔﮯ‪ ،‬اﻧﺘﮩﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﻢ ﮨﻮں ﮔﮯ۔ ﺷﺎﯾﺪ اس وﻗﺖ ﯾہ ﻓﺮق اﺗﻨﺎ ﺑﮍھ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫اﯾﺴﺎ طﺒﻘہ ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻠﯽ ﺑﯿﻤﺎر ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﮯ۔ اس وﻗﺖ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ان ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﮯ اﻧﺘﮩﺎﺋﯽ ﻧﺎﮔﺰﯾﺮ ﺿﺮورت ﺑﻦ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ وه اس‬
‫ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮے ﮐﮯ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﭘﻮرا ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ۔‬

‫ﻋﻼج ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ وﺟہ ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮨﺮ وه ﺷﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻓﺮد ﮐﮯ ﺣﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻔﯿﺪ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮ‬
‫وه اس ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺟﺎﺋﺰ ﻗﺮار دے دی ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻣﺜﻼ اﮔﺮ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺷﺨﺺ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺼﻨﻮﻋﯽ آﻻت‬
‫ﻟﮕﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ اس ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس طﺮح ﮐﯽ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی اس ﮐﮯ ﺣﻖ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻔﯿﺪ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ ۔ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اﻓﺎدﯾﺖ ﮐﺎ ﯾہ ﺗﺼﻮر ﺑﮭﯽ ﺑﺪﻟﺘﺎ رﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورﯾﺎت اور ﻟﻮازﻣﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ آﺗﯽ رﮨﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ درﻣﯿﺎن ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﺮق ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ اﺷﮑﺎل ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻧہ ﺻﺮف ﺑﺬات ﺧﻮد ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻓﮩﻢ و ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق آرﮨﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ ان دوﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﻓﺮق ﺑﮭﯽ اب ﺑﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﺟﺎ رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﺻﺮف وﮨﯽ‬
‫ﭼﯿﺰ ﺟﺎﺋﺰ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ ﺟﻮ ﻋﻼج ﮨﻮ اور ﯾہ ﮐہ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ ﯾﺎ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﻮ دور ﮐﺮ‬
‫ﺳﮑﮯ۔ﻟﮩﺬا ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق روا رﮐﮭﻨﺎ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮے ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﯿﺖ‬
‫ﺗﮭﯽ۔ ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ اور ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﺎ ﺧﺎﺗﻤہ ﮨﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﺎ ﻣﺪﻋﺎ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اب ﮨﺮ وه‬
‫ﺷﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻗﺒﻮل ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ اس ﮐﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮ دے۔ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ روﯾﮯ‬
‫ﮐﯽ اس ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﻧﮯ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ درﻣﯿﺎن ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮے ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﻣﺘﯿﺎز‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﺧﺘﻢ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺷﺮوع ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ان ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰدﯾﮏ ﻋﻼج اب ﻣﺤﺾ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﯾﺎ ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ ﮐﺎ ﺧﺎﺗﻤہ‬

‫‪30‬‬
‫‪Ethics, Regulatory Challenges”, Science and Engineering Ethics (forthcoming, 2007).‬‬
‫‪31‬‬
‫‪L. S. Gottfredson, “Why G Matters: The Complexity of Everyday Life”, Intelligence,‬‬
‫‪24/1 (1997): 79- 132; and “Life, Death, and Intelligence”, Journal of Cognitive Education‬‬
‫‪and Psychology, 4/1 (2004): 23- 46.‬‬
‫ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﮨﺮ وه ﺷﮯ ﻋﻼج ﮐﯽ طﺮح ان ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ ان ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﻓﻼح و ﺑﮩﺒﻮد ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ۔آﺳﮣﺮﯾﻠﯿﻦ ﻓﻼﺳﻔﺮ ﺟﻮﻟﯿﻦ اس ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﻮ ﯾﻮں ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﺗﮯ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫—‪Decisions about what would make people’s lives go best‬‬
‫‪and also, therefore, what is in their best interests—should‬‬
‫‪be guided not by whether a treatment will cure a disease or‬‬
‫‪heal an injury, but by whether it will increase well-being.32‬‬
‫وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﮐﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں اور ﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻞ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﮐﮯ روﯾہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻓﺮق ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺗﺎ رﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اﺑﺘﺪاء ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺑﯿﻤﺎری ﯾﺎ ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ ﮐﻮ‬
‫دور ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﮨﯽ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻞ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺪﻋﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﻣﮕﺮ اب اﻓﺎدﯾﺖ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ اور ﻓﻼح و ﺑﮩﺒﻮد ﮐﺎ ﺣﺼﻮل ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺻﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧہ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺣﺪ ﺗﮏ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اﯾﮏ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﺻﺮف اﺳﯽ وﻗﺖ‬
‫ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻋﻼج ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ ﺟﺐ وه اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺗﮑﻠﯿﻒ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺑﻨﺘﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ ﻣﮕﺮ اب‬
‫اﯾﺴﺎ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔اب ﮨﺮ وه ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻋﻼج ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ اﻣﻮر ﮐﯽ اﻧﺠﺎم دﮨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ رﮐﺎوٹ ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﻮ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﮐﺎرﮐﺮدﮔﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﺮق آﺗﺎ ﮨﻮ۔‬
‫ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺧﺪﺷﺎت ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﺟﻦ ﺧﺪﺷﺎت ﮐﺎﺗﻌﻠﻖ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻧﯿﭽﺮ ﺳﮯ ﮨﮯ ‪ ،‬ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻓﻄﺮﺗﺎ اﯾﮏ ﻧﮩﺎﯾﺖ‬
‫ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪه ﻣﺨﻠﻮق ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮐﯽ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ اس ﮐﯽ ﮐﺴﯽ دوﺳﺮی‬
‫ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ ﻧﻘﺼﺎن ﭘﮩﻨﭽﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت )‪ (Nature‬ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ آﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ اور اس ﮐﯽ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻻ ﺗﻮازن‬
‫ﺧﺮاب ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﯾہ ﺧﺪﺷہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی‬
‫اس ﮐﯽ ﻧﯿﭽﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﮐﺮﮐﮯ اس ﮐﻮ ﮐﺴﯽ اور ﻣﺨﻠﻮق ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮐﺮ دے ﮔﯽ۔ وه اﻧﺴﺎن‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ اس ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﺑﺪل ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ۔‬
‫ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐہ وه اﯾﮏ ﺟﺎﻣﺪ ﭼﯿﺰ ﮨﮯ اور ﻣﻘﺮر ﺷﺪه ﮨﮯ‬
‫۔ﯾﻮﻧﺎﻧﯽ دور ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ رﮐﮭﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔اس دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ اس ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﮨﺮ ﺷﮯ‬
‫ﭼﺎ ر ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺮﮐﺐ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮا‪ ،‬ﭘﺎﻧﯽ ‪ ،‬آگ اور ﻣﮣﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ان ﭼﺎروں ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ‬
‫ﮐﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺧﻮاص اور ﻓﻄﺮت ﮨﮯ۔ ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﮨﺮ ﺷﮯ اﻧﮩﯽ ﭼﺎر ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺮﮐﺐ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﻟﮩﺬا ﮨﺮ ﺷﮯ ﮐﯽ اﭘﻨﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ان ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋہ ﺗﺮﺗﯿﺐ ﭘﺮ ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ‬
‫ﮨﮯ۔ ان ﭼﺎروں ﮐﯽ ﻣﻘﺪار ﯾﺎ ﺗﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻤﯽ ﺑﯿﺸﯽ ﯾﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﮔﯽ اور ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﮔﯽ ﮨﯽ ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﺷﯿﺎء ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮐﺎ داروﻣﺪار ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﮭﯽ ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ اﺳﯽ ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺣﺼہ ﮨﮯ ﻟﮩﺬا‬
‫وه ﺑﮭﯽ ان ﭼﺎروں اﺷﯿﺎء ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﻢ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋہ ﮐﺎ ﻧﺎم ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﻘﺮر اور‬
‫ﻣﺨﺼﻮص ﮨﮯ اور اس ﮐﺎ داروﻣﺪار ﺑﮭﯽ اس ﮐﮯ وﺟﻮد ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﺑﻨﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی‬
‫ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﭘﺮ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ۔ اﮔﺮ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮐﻮ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ‬

‫‪32‬‬
‫‪Julian Savulescu, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children”,‬‬
‫‪Bioethics 15/5/6 (2001): 413-426, p. 419.‬‬
‫ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ اﺷﯿﺎء ﮐﯽ ﻣﺎﮨﯿﺖ اور ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ۔ ﻟﮩﺬا ﻓﻄﺮت‬
‫‪33‬‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﮨﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اور ﻣﺨﻠﻮق ﺑﻦ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔‬
‫ﻟﯿﮑﻦ وﻗﺖ ﮔﺰرﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮐﮯ اس ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻻ ﯾہ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ ﺗﺼﻮر ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﺎﮨﮯ۔ اب‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮐﻮ ﺟﺎﻣﺪ ﯾﺎ ﻣﺨﺼﻮص ﺗﺼﻮر ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ۔ ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن اور اس ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﺗﻤﺎم ﺟﺎﻧﺪار اﭘﻨﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺼﻮص ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ اور ارﺗﻘﺎء اس ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﮨﺮ ﺟﺰو ﮐﺎ ﻻزﻣﯽ ﺣﺼہ ﮨﮯ۔ ﯾہ ﻋﻤﻞ اﺑﺪ ﺳﮯ ﺟﺎری ﮨﮯ‬
‫اور ازل ﺗﮏ ﺟﺎری رﮨﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ اس دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ارﺑﻮں اﻗﺴﺎم ﮐﯽ ﺣﯿﺎت دراﺻﻞ‬
‫اﺳﯽ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮐﺎ ﻧﺘﯿﺠہ ﮨﮯ۔ ‪ 34‬اس ﮐﺎﺋﻨﺎت ﮐﯽ ﮨﺮ ﺷﮯ ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ ارﺗﻘﺎء اور ﺑﮩﺘﺮی ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ‬
‫رواں دواں ﮨﮯ۔ ﺣﺎﻻت اور ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺧﻮد ﮐﻮ ڈھﺎل ﻟﯿﻨﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﯽ ﺑﻘﺎ ﻣﻀﻤﺮ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻗﺪرﺗﯽ اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ) ‪ (Natural Selection‬ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ارﺗﻘﺎء اور ﻧﺸﻮوﻧﻤﺎ ﮐﻮ ﺗﺤﻔﻆ ﻓﺮاﮨﻢ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ‬
‫رﮨﮯ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻟﮩﺬا اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﻘﺮر اور ﺟﺎﻣﺪ ﺷﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺎوراء ﮨﻮ۔‬
‫ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻧﻈﺮﯾہ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮐﯽ رو ﺳﮯاﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮ اور‬
‫اﭘﻨﮯ آپ ﮐﻮ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺑﻨﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺼﺮوف رﮨﮯ۔ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺷﻮاﮨﺪات اور‬
‫ﻧﺸﺎﻧﺎت ﻧﮯ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ ﺳﮯ زﯾﺎده ﻧﺴﻠﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺗﮭﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ‬
‫اﯾﮏ دوﺳﺮے ﺳﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺗﮭﯿﮟ۔ وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻐﯿﺮ و ﺗﺒﺪل ﮨﻮا۔اﻧﺴﺎﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺟﺴﺎﻣﺖ اور ﺧﺪوﺧﺎل ﮐﮯ ﻟﺤﺎظ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻻ اﺧﺘﻼف اور ﺗﻨﻮع اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﻋﻼﻣﺖ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن اﯾﮏ ﺟﺎﻣﺪ ﻓﻄﺮت ﻧﮩﯿﮟ رﮐﮭﺘﺎ ۔ ﻟﮩﺬا ﯾہ ﮐﮩﻨﺎ درﺳﺖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﻓﻄﺮت ﻣﺨﺼﻮص ﮨﮯ اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ اس ﻓﻄﺮت ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮐﺮ دے ﮔﺎ اور‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﭘﮭﺮ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﭽﮭ اور ﺑﻦ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ ﺑﮩﺘﺮی ‪ ،‬ﻧﺸﻮوﻧﻤﺎ اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮨﯽ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﻓﻄﺮت ﮨﮯ۔ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮐﯽ اس ﺧﺎﺻﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ ﺟﺮﻣﻦ ﻓﻼﺳﻔﺮ ﺑﭽﺎﻧﻦ )‪ (Buchanan‬ﯾﻮں‬
‫ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬
‫‪To enhance ourselves is not eugenic but expresses our‬‬
‫‪fundamental human nature: to make rational decisions and‬‬
‫‪to try to improve ourselves. To be human is to strive to be‬‬
‫‪better. 35‬‬
‫ﺟﺒﮑہ طﺒﯽ اﺧﻼﻗﯿﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﮨﺮ ﺗﮭﺎﻣﺲ اﯾﭻ ﻣﺮے )‪ (Thomas H Murray‬اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت‬
‫ﮐﮯ اس ﭘﮩﻠﻮ ﮐﻮ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪:‬‬

‫‪33‬‬
‫‪: http://akobsandbox.openetext.utoronto.ca/part/chapter-7/accessed at 29October,18‬‬
‫‪34‬‬
‫‪: Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, (London: Harvil Sacker, 2011), p3-4‬‬
‫‪35‬‬
‫‪: Buchanan A. Human Nature and enhancement. Bioethics.2009; 23(3): 141 doi:‬‬
‫]‪10.1111/j.1467-5819.2008.00633.x.[PubMed] [Cross Ref‬‬
 ‫‪It is our human nature to enhance ourselves and to use‬‬
‫‪anthropotechnology to alter and ameliorate ourselves. 36‬‬
‫اﻟﻐﺮض اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ اﺷﮑﺎﻻت‪،‬‬
‫ﺧﺪﺷﺎت اور ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺠﺰﯾہ ﺳﮯ ﯾہ ﺑﺎت ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺑﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻓﮩﻢ اور ﺳﮩﻞ‬
‫دﮐﮭﺎﺋﯽ دﯾﻨﮯ واﻟﯽ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﺟﯿﺴﯽ اﺻﻄﻼﺣﺎت اﭘﻨﮯ اﻧﺪر ﮐﺌﯽ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﺳﻤﻮﺋﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ان ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯿﻮں ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺑﻨﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﻼج اور‬
‫ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﻨﯽ و ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﮐﺎ ﻣﺒﮩﻢ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ زﻣﺎﻧﻮی ﻋﻠﻮم و ﺗﺼﻮرات ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﮐﺮدا ر ادا ﮐﺮﻧﺎ‪ ،‬ان ﻣﯿﮟ واﺿﺢ ﺣﺪ ﻓﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺎ طﮯ ﻧہ ﮨﻮ ﭘﺎﻧﺎ‪ ،‬ﻋﻼج اور ﺻﺤﺖ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺗﺼﻮرات ﮐﺎ وﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ‪،‬اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت‬
‫و ﺗﺼﻮرات ﮐﺎ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺎ ‪ ،‬ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﻮ ﭘﺮﮐﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﻌﯿﺎری ﺳﻄﺢ ﭘﺮ‬
‫اﺗﻔﺎق ﮐﯽ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﮔﯽ ‪،‬ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ طﺮﯾﻘہ ﮐﺎر ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ اس ﮐﮯ درﺳﺖ اور ﻏﻠﻂ‬
‫ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﭘﮩﭽﺎن ﮐﺮﻧﺎ وﻏﯿﺮه ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫اس وﻗﺖ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ اور ﮢﯿﮑﻨﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﮐﯽ رﻓﺘﺎر ﮔﺰﺷﺘہ ادوار ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﮯ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮩﺖ ﺑﮍھ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ اس وﻗﺖ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی اور اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﺌﯽ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ذراﺋﻊ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﮯ ﺟﺎرﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﻦ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ‬
‫ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯽ ﻻﺋﯽ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﮐﺎ ﮐﭽﮭ ﻋﺮﺻہ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﺗﺼﻮر ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﺟﮩﺎں ﺧﺪﺷﺎت اور ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ ﺑﻦ‬
‫ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ وﮨﯿﮟ ﭘﺮ اس ﮐﮯ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ اﺛﺮات ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ اﻧﮑﺎرﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺧﻮد ﮐﻮ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺑﻨﺎﻧﺎ‬
‫اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ﻓﻄﺮی ﺧﻮاﮨﺶ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ اﻧﮑﺎر ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﮯ۔ﮨﺮ دور ﻣﯿﮟ اﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﮯ دﺳﺘﯿﺎب‬
‫وﺳﺎﺋﻞ اور ذراﺋﻊ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﺳﮯ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ اور ذﮨﻨﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﺟﺎری رﮐﮭﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻟﮩﺬا دور ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﺳﮯ ﺑﮯ ﻧﯿﺎز ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ‬
‫اس وﻗﺖ ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻞ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻧﺎﻣﻤﮑﻨﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺣﺼﻮل ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺎﻣﯿﺎب ﮨﻮ رﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﮔﺮﭼہ ﻋﻼج اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ راﺋﮯ ﯾﮩﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ‬
‫ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﻣﮕﺮ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﻧﮯ اس ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺖ ﮐﻮ ﻋﯿﺎں ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻋﻼج اور‬
‫ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺗﺼﻮرات ﻧہ ﺗﻮ ﺟﺎﻣﺪ ﮨﯿﮟ اور ﻧہ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﯽ ۔ان ﻣﯿﮟ وﻗﺖ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ آﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺷﻌﻮر ﻧﮯ ﻗﺒﻮل ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ان ﺗﺼﻮرات ﮐﮯ ﭘﺲ‬
‫ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪﮔﯿﻮں ﻧﮯ ﮐﺌﯽ اﮨﻢ ﺳﻮاﻻت ﮐﻮ ﺟﻨﻢ دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﻦ ﭘﺮ ﻏﻮر ﮐﺮﻧﺎ اﮨﻞ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻢ ﺣﻀﺮات ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﻧﺘﮩﺎﺋﯽ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ۔ ان ﻣﯿﮟ ﭼﻨﺪ اﮨﻢ ﺳﻮاﻻت ﯾہ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ :‬اﮔﺮ ﻋﻼج‪،‬‬
‫ﺻﺤﺖ اور اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻓﻄﺮت ﯾﺎ ﻓﻄﺮی ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ واﻟﮯ ﺗﺼﻮرات‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ زﻣﺎں و ﻣﮑﺎں ﮐﺎ ﮐﺮدار رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯﺗﻮﭘﮭﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮده دور ﻣﯿﮟ آﻧﮯ واﻟﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ‬
‫اور ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯿﻮں ﮐﻮ ﮐﺲ ﺣﺪ ﺗﮏ اﭘﻨﺎﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮔﻨﺠﺎﺋﺶ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﮯ؟ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯽ اور‬
‫ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ اور ﺑﮍھﻮﺗﺮی ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺸﯿﮟ ﮨﺮ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺎری رﮨﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‬
‫اور ﮐﺴﯽ ﻧہ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺣﺪ ﺗﮏ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻗﺒﻮل ﺑﮭﯽ۔ان ﮐﯽ ﻗﺒﻮﻟﯿﺖ اور اس ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ‬
‫واﻟﯽ ﺟﺪوﺟﮩﺪ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ رﮨﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﮐﺒﮭﯽ ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ ﻧﮯ اس ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی‬

‫‪36‬‬
‫‪: Murray T. Enhancement,(Oxford: Oxford University Press,2009), p: 109‬‬
‫ﮐﺮدار ادا ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﮐﺒﮭﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﻧﮯ‪ ،‬ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﻋﺼﺮ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺐ ﮐہ ان دوﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ‬
‫ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﯿﮉﯾﮑﻞ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﺑﮭﯽ اﯾﮏ اﮨﻢ ﻋﻨﺼﺮ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯآ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ اس ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﺗﯿﻨﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺲ ﮐﻮ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ اور اﮔﺮ ان ﺗﯿﻨﻮں ﮐﻮ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﺗﻮ‬
‫ﭘﮭﺮ ﮐﺲ ﮐﻮ ﮐﺲ ﺣﺪ ﺗﮏ دوﺳﺮے ﭘﺮ ﺗﺮﺟﯿﺢ دﯾﻨﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ؟‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ اﺿﺎﻓہ ﮐﯽ ﯾہ ﺟﺪوﺟﮩﺪ اور ﮐﻮﺷﺸﯿﮟ ﻻﻣﺤﺪود وﺳﻌﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﻣﻞ‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ ﯾﺎ ﭘﮭﺮ ان ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪود و ﻗﯿﻮد ﮐﺎ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﮨﻮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ؟اﮔﺮ ﮨﺎں ﺗﻮ ان ﺣﺪود و ﻗﯿﻮد ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی اﺻﻮل ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﻮں ﮔﮯ؟ ان ﺳﻮاﻻت اور ان ﺟﯿﺴﮯ دﯾﮕﺮ ﺳﻮاﻻت ﮐﮯ ﺟﻮاﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺟﺴﺘﺠﻮ ﻋﺼﺮ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﮐﯽ اﮨﻢ ﺿﺮورت ﮨﮯ ﺗﺎﮐہ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ اور ﮢﯿﮑﻨﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﮐﮯ اس ﺗﻨﺪوﺗﯿﺰ‬
‫ﺳﯿﻼب ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﻮد ﮐﻮ ﻣﺤﻔﻮظ رﮐﮭﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ اور اﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺖ ﮐﻮ ان ﺗﻤﺎم ﺧﻄﺮات اور ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ‬
‫ﺳﮯ دوﭼﺎر ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺑﭽﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺳﮑﮯ ﺟﻮ اس ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻊ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
Qur’anic Hermeneutics:

Is Reconciliation Possible between Traditional and Modern Hermeneutical

Trends?

Waris Mazhari

The issue of Qur’anic hermeneutics assumes great significance. The question of how
a religious scripture should be studied and interpreted has constantly been debated
among the scholars. What rational and reasonable principles one can apply to
understand the scriptures correctly, and through which human thoughts and actions
can seek the right direction? At present, its importance has grown manifold. The facts
that have surfaced apropos of the nature and the universe, owing to the development
in the realms of humanities and modern science, have given new dimensions to
Qur’anic hermeneutics. The subject is regarded as the essential preface of the Islamic
modernism and enlightenment.

At present, there are two kinds of trends which prevail in the academic spheres in
respect of the Qur’anic hermeneutics:

Traditionalist approach is that the structure, cause and the context of the verses of
the Qur’an should be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the Qur’anic text;
and that benefiting from the scientific facts, classical principles and views should not
be rejected.

The modernist approach, on the contrary, is that Qur’an should be studied as a

general scripture, regardless of classical principles and views, linguistic contexts and
cause of the revelation.

Here the questions arise as to how could the question marks that the modern science
has put on the pre-modern Qur’anic study be viewed? What should be our academic
approach concerning them, and what are or could be their legal bases? Is it possible
to devise such an objective scientific method that could act as an arbiter between
these two trends, so that we can avoid going to the extremes that both academic
spheres complain about each other? How can this interpretive concern help us pave
the path for the new theology? What would be its structure or outline in the perspective
of Qur’anic hermeneutics?

There have been several reasons for the stagnation in the perspective on the
interpretation of the scripture. The first reason is the presumption that the finality of the
Qur’an implies that there are ‘clear verses’ (muhkamat) in it, which cannot be taken at
face value and the ‘unclear verses’ which could be interpreted, are merely an
exception. The second reason is the establishment of the notion that the actual
criterion for understanding the Qur’an are the highly guided early generations and their
understanding. Likewise, instead of understanding the Qur’an in accordance with the
circumstances, efforts were exerted to mould the circumstances according to the
Qur’an and thus it was made to be understood and interpreted. As a result, the sphere
of understanding the Qur’an grew narrower.
There is an air of dilemma regarding the interpretation between both the modernists
and traditionalists. As a result, on the one hand the stagnation has narrowed our
understanding of the scriptures which is now incapable of answering the questions
being raised on them. On the other hand, amongst the modernist Islamic scholars,
apparently, there is an air of dilemma with regard to the understanding and the
interpretation of the Qur’anic scripture/ hermeneutics..

The method of the modernist interpretation is willing to erect its structure, overlooking
or dismissing the classical principles altogether, on a very new foundation. Here, these
questions arise: to what extent is this attitude acceptable? To what extent could it help
us understand the scriptures? What could be the middle way of reconciliation between
these two trends of Qur’anic hermeneutics? How could we aspire for a middle path
between the both?

I assume that the interpretive concept/ approach of Averroes could serve as the basis
in this regard. There's no denying that many aspects of Averroes’ thought need review
and revision, but we come across such tools in his approach that are more relevant
today than all the other trends. Averroes has discussed it in detail in his book “Al-Kashf
an Manahij Al-Adillah Fi Aqa Id Al-Millah”. He also cast light on it in “Fasl al-Maqal fi
ma bayn al-Hikma wa al-Shariah min Ittisal”.

The characteristic of Averroes’ interpretive approach is that, on the one hand, he takes
philosophy into consideration in a way that leaves no room for the contradiction
between reason and revelation. On the other hand, he is mindful of the traditional
significance of the scripture. Thus, he conditions the interpretation with “Arabic legal
ruling of interpretation” thus suggesting Arabic language and its idioms are more
important to him for interpreting the Qur’anic scriptures.

Likewise, to him, interpretation of the verses which form the basis for religious
principles is akin to infidelity. In the same way, he doesn’t permit to whimsically
interpret the scripture which is not easily understandable.

Now, several crucial questions are being raised with reference to the Qur’anic
hermeneutics such as the question whether the revelation is transcendental or
immanent? And what is meant by the sanctity of the text? Does it mean that scriptures
based on the revelation could not be interpreted through the principles of the ordinary
scriptures? Does any such attempt nullify its sanctity and transcendentalism? What is
the position of the revelation itself? Whether it is something gained from outside, or
the outer expression of humans’ internal feelings and existence?

In the thesis, efforts are made to examine the functions of interpretation; to explore
how a new theology could be evolved on the basis of Qur’anic hermeneutics, which
could answer the various questions being posed by the modern science and
philosophy to the Islamic religious thought?
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13
 Debating Muhammad: Ahmad Raza Khan and the Idea of Devotional Islam

Mohammad Ali
Research fellow, Department of Islamic Studies
Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India

(Note: The article is in process. I am working on it within the given format.

It will be completed before the Qatar intensive.)

Modern scholarship has paid much attention to the inherited diversity in the dogmatic
discourses on Islam. Once understood as a monolithic doctrinal edifice, Islam is now seen as
much diverse as peoples and cultures are. In this context, studies on South Asian Islam are
increasingly abound in numbers. Recently, scholars have conducted rigorous studies on the
religious movements in South Asia, such as Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-i Hadith, etc., brought
about by the colonial and modern encounters, their interactions with each other on various
levels, and their relationship with culture and tradition 1; they are groundbreaking and
formative in some respect. However, the importance of the doctrines supported by the
Barelvis is overlooked in these studies. The Barelvi sect emerged out of opposition to the
Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadith ulama, as is observed by Metcalf.2 It is generally understood that
the Barelvi ulama defended “devotional” Islam laden with the medieval Sufi traditions against
their reformist and puritanical rivals; and so is true. What I seem interesting here is to ask
that how, in the face of the fierce counter arguments claiming to be more authentic on the
grounds of textual support from their rivals, did the Barelvi ulama succeed in substantiating
the authenticity of their so-called less orthodox devotion-based beliefs and practices?
Another intriguing question that one should ask is: how the Barelvi ulama, being the
benefactors and patrons of a vast religiously illiterate rural community, educated their
followers of a specific dogmatic theology?

To address these questions, it is necessary to understand the theological framework

developed by the most prominent and authoritative figure among the Barelvi ulama, Ahmad
Raza Khan of Bareilly, after whose hometown the movement is named as Barelvi; he is also
believed as the founder of the movement. The theology propounded by him revolves
exclusively around the unique nature of the person and the prophethood of Muhammad. The
image of the prophet he delineates in his fatwas, polemical tracts, and books is remarkably
embedded in the medieval Sufi imagination and justified by his juristic vigor, whose devotion
and reverence in its totality, he argued, is the foremost fundamental for the faith. This article
will discuss Ahmad Raza’s theological expositions about the prophet Muhammad and

1
There are extensive scholarly studies on the modern religious Muslim movements in South Asia. See, among
others, Barbara Metcalf (1982), Usha Sanyal (1996), Francis Robinson (2001), Qasim Zaman (2002), Ali Usman
Qasmi (2001) Harlan O Pearson (2008).
2
Barbara D Metcalf. 1982, Islamic Revival in British India Deoband, 1960-1900. Princeton University Press, NJ.
P. 265.
highlight the genealogy of his thoughts. Moreover, Ahmad Raza’s ideas along with his
personality came to possess the central authority in the movement; they together tied the
movement into an organizational community and played an important role in its flourishment
for more than a century. Even though the Barelvi movement did not have the benefit of
having a prestigious educational institution in its early history, like their Deobandi rivals had,
they were not without a clear, authoritative ideology 3. However, not after a very long time,
educational institutions, i.e. madrasas, established by the Barelvi ulama, sprouted throughout
the subcontinent. The Barelvi ulama, before and after establishing these institutions,
propagated the ideology, and in doing so, they benefitted from the occasional and seasonal
religious gatherings, and ‘urs ceremonies. This aspect of the movement will also be discussed
here. At the end of the article, I will provide a case study of the ‘urs of Bareilly, conducted for
commemorating the death anniversary of Ahmad Raza Khan, emphasizing that the
ceremonies of this kind are very crucial and dynamic in the spread of the Barelvi movement.

Ahmad Raza Khan: Life Sketch

Ahmad Raza 4 descends from a line of Baraich Pathan, which migrated from Qandhar to India
in the seventeenth century. In India, his ancestors served for a long time in the imperial army
of Mughal and then Nawab of Awadh as soldiers and soldier-administrators. In exchange of
their services, they had received a huge grant of land and, thus, enjoyed the status of local
notable. His grandfather, Raza Ali Khan (1809-65/66) was the first person who broke with the
family tradition. He studied Dars-i Nizamī at Tonk, then the only Muslim state in Rajputana,
and became famous for his juristic expertise and Sufi piety. His son Naqi Ali Khan (1831-80)
carried further the inherited tradition in his family. He was instructed by his father in religious
education and initiated in the Barkātī Sufi order by Shah Al-i Rasool. In spite of the fact that
Naqi Ali was tutored at home, even long before his birth, many influential families of ulama
had established educational networks in many important cities of India. They were famous
for their particular interest in the field of Islamic learning; for example, the family of the ulama
of Delhi had association with the great theologian Shah Waliullah and emphasized on hadith

3
Drawing on the studies of Metcalf (1982) and Gaborieau (1986), Eickleman and Piscatori have suggested that
“Although its (Barelvi) ideas have spread from the Indian sub-continent, they have done so without the benefit
of a clear, authoritative ideological center.” See Dale F Eickleman and James Piscatori 1990. ‘Social Theory in
the study of Muslim societies’ in Muslim Travelers, University of California Press, LA. P.13.
4
For the life sketch of Ahmad Raza, I have relied on Usha Sanyal’s work ‘Devotional Islam and Politics in British
India’, 1996. Yoda Press, New Delhi. Ahmad Raza has been one of the most widely discussed figure in the last
century among his followers and people with Sufi orientation. A considerable work in Urdu has been dedicated
to his life and work in both India and Pakistan. One of my fellow students in madrasa in Bareilly where I was a
student once, claimed more than once emphasizing the popularity and recognition of Ahmad Raza, that the
number of books written about A‘lā Hazrat is far larger than that written about anyone else, be it ālim or Sufi,
even Moīn ud-Dīn Chishti for that matter. His first biography, Hayat-i A‘lā Hazrat, vols 3 (1938), was written in
Urdu by his disciple, Zafar ud-Dīn Bihārī.
learning. These networks had an important role to play. When the controversy on the issue
concerning the possibility of a peer of Muhammad broke out after the publication of
Taqwiyat-ul Imān by Shah Ismail, the grandson of Shah Waliullah and disciple of Syed Ahmed
of Rai Bareilly,

Mapping the Genealogy of His Thoughts

Barelvi Symbolism and Formation of Authority

The Urs of Bareilly: A Case Study

Conclusion
 Human Dignity as the Foundation of Human Rights in Islam
Mohammad Furqan
Introduction
What do we think when we think of us as a human being? Our excellence, superiority or
dignity? What is our essence? Do we have the dignity, if yes so what kind of dignity is it? Is it
inherent or adventitious? Who has the dignity? Every human being or only Muslims? Both
pious or sinner or only devoted Muslim? These are the basic questions which appeared on my
mind when I started thinking about the human dignity. As a research student, I started my
inquiry with the help of history. I also looked into other religious interpretation of human
dignity, that how the idea of human dignity developed through out the history and through
religious traditions.
Dignity is directly related to the human beings and human beings are the creation of God. That's
why every religion somehow addresses the concept of human dignity in its on way but the most
explicit affirmation of human dignity (karamah) is found only in the Quran, in a general and
unqualified declaration: “We have honoured (all) the children of Adam with innate dignity and
conferred upon them special favours above the greater part of Our creation and favoured them
far above most of those We have created” (Q. 17:70). Despite the fact that human dignity is a
new concept (because it emerged as a new concept after UDHR, 1948) which was unknown in
antiquity and the early middle ages when Islam arose in the middle East. Let's have a look at
its meaning, concept and history.
Meaning and Concept of Human Dignity
The English expression ‘human dignity’ consists of the predicate ‘human’ and the noun
‘dignity’. The adjective has a similar function in the expression ‘human being’: Here it qualifies
the noun ‘being’, to determine the kind of being in question as a being of the human kind.
‘Human’ is etymologically related to the Latin for earth, humus, so that ‘human’ means what
is ‘earthly’ (as an adjective), or an ‘earthling’ (as a substantive). Generally speaking it means
what is proper to the kind that ‘we’ are, or to the species of rational animals, referring in
particular to their kindness (humanity) and their fallibility (‘all too human’). 1
‘Dignity’ comes from the Latin noun decus, meaning ornament, distinction, honour, glory.
Decet is the verbal form (which is impersonal), and is related to the Greek δοκειν − to seem or
to show. The Latin participle form decens, -tis, has survived in the English language in the
adjective ‘decent’. But dignity means, generally speaking, the standing of one entitled to
respect, i.e. his or her status, and it refers to that which in a being (in particular a personal
being) induces or ought to induce such respect: its excellence or incomparability of value.
When ‘human’ and ‘dignity’ are used in conjunction they form the expression ‘human dignity’,
which means the status of human beings entitling them to respect, a status which is first and
not to be taken for granted. It refers to their highest value, which affect us at the deepest possible
level. As I recognise the other, his value is experienced as equivalent to mine. Love, kinship
and friendship are the human relationships in which I am enabled to explore these depths, and
to realise that this highest value is constitutive of personal identity, simultaneously in myself

1
What is Human Dignity?, An article by Mette Lebech, faculty of philosophy, university of Ireland.
and in the other. The idea of human dignity conceptualises or embraces this experience of
recognition, and the principle of human dignity is the affirmation that the experience is possible
in relation to all human beings. When formulated, the principle affirms the fundamental value
of every human being, or of human beings as such. It enjoys general acceptance all round the
globe as a basic ethical and legal principle because it draws upon the universal experience of
the dynamics of recognition. It clearly is in everyone’s interest to be respected as having human
dignity, i.e. as having the highest value due to an inalienable humanity. 2
Historical Overview
The principle of human dignity, as the foundation of human rights and a universal affirmation
that human beings have the highest value, does not itself have a history, because a universal
statement is meant to have limits neither in space nor in time. But the idea of human dignity
does have a history. Because it keeps changing due to patterns of social organisation change.
A new understanding of social status ends up changing the way things are accounted for, and
hence these changes can be defined as world-views. The 1948 Declaration of Human Rights
testifies to the currency of both terms, then the term of ‘human dignity’ is constantly used to
express the basic intuition from which human rights proceed. It is meant as the basic principle
upon which human rights are understood to rest. It is said to be inherent in each and every
person, and also to be inalienable.
The idea of human dignity evolved and further developed in all different periods of history, i.e.
ancient, medieval, and modern history. Each depends on a time-typical world-view. Marcus
Cicero may represent the Cosmo-centric world-view of Antiquity, which explains human
dignity on the basis of nature. Thomas Aquinas represents the Middle Ages’ Christo-centric
world-view, which explains human dignity in relation to Jesus Christ. Immanuel Kant can
represent the logo-centric world-view of Modernity, explaining human dignity as a tribute to
reason. Each of these ways of accounting for human dignity can be understood as a source of
the idea as it appears in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 3
Human dignity in ancient history
Human dignity in ancient history was based on Cosmo-centric world-view. And there were
meritocratic and civic dignity in Greco-Roman antiquity. Human dignity was seen as a concept
of universal nobility. The universal status of a human, rational being was seen as a reason to
behave in accordance with this status. Specific roles are connected to specific duties: similarly
to the duties a person has in his quality of father or judge, a human being has duties that are
implications of his status as a human being –a being endowed with rational capacities. The
content of these obligations is simply to exercise one’s rational capacities: a being with dignity
should behave in a way that is appropriate to her rational capacities, it should exercise rational
control in action, it should master the emotions, it has to stay sober in order to stay in control
of himself, in short, it has to behave like a rational being should behave. 4
In that sense, human dignity formulates duties to ourselves, but it is not concerned with the
protection of the dignity of the other. There are some obligations towards other human beings
involved, but the core of this concept are the duties of the agent to behave according to his

2
ibid
3
ibid
4
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity, Cambridge university press 2014, p 53-56.
status –not the respect for the dignity of the other. So a human being can lose his or her dignity
by not living according to his or her duties and it can hardly be reconstructed as the foundation
of rights. However, whereas humans are in some way equal, namely in relation to the brutes
and to the gods, they are not equal in all respects. There exist inequalities in nature that makes
some more deserving than others. Thus dignity should be obtained and respected by justice.
Natural law, right reason or the law respected by gods and humans alike, would admit of this
form of aristocracy, which Cicero considers natural. Plainly, the Universe of the Ancients was
hierarchically ordered.
Human dignity in medieval history
The medieval period of history was influenced by Christo-centric world-view. The medieval
efforts to interpret the human being occur in dialogue with two kinds of sources: on the one
hand with biblical statements regarding the human being, and on the other hand with works
from antiquity along with the Arabic and Jewish texts that discuss these works. Of interest in
the first tradition is primarily the interpretation of the human being as the image of God,
expressed most notably in Genesis 1:26 and Wisdom 2:23. At the core of the influence of
ancient philosophy, in contrast, is the interpretation of the human being as rational, social and
political animal. The biblical doctrine of human beings as the image (imago) and likeness
(similitudo) of God was interpreted and developed in a number of very distinct ways in the
Middle Ages.
This understanding of personal dignity, or the understanding that the person is a dignity, is
related to the use of the term dignitas in medieval history. Thomas Aquinas, like other
Scholastics before and after him, used dignitas. Thomas argues that if dignity were to be
abstracted from the hypostasis then the person would be abstracted with it. Dignity, thus, like
personhood, defines the subject in its individuality. Dignity, in other words, is essential to the
existence of the individual person: it is what the person is before anything else, it is what
identifies it. 5
Like Cicero, Thomas Aquinas uses the phrase dignitas humana very rarely; in the Summa
Theologiae only once. He argues there that human beings can lose their human dignity if they
deviate from the rational order by sinning, and that it is not necessarily bad to kill such sinners,
despite the fact that to kill an innocent person in possession of natural dignity is evil. The
possession of human dignity must therefore to some extent depend on remaining free and
rational, or ‘existing for oneself’. Thomas argued ‘If therefore a man, on account of a
transgression, becomes a danger and corruptive influence to society, it is rational and beneficial
to kill him in order to save the common good’ (Summa theologiae II-II, q. 64,Art.2). Someone
who sins, the Dominicans moreover believe, falls from human dignity (Summa theologiae II-
II, q. 64,Art.2 ad 3). It means that this person does not act in accordance with the dignity of his
nature. 6
The rise of Islam and its impact on human dignity
The medieval era is also known for the rise of Islam in Arabia, which later spared over the
large part of the world. Along with the other challenges, one of the biggest challenge for Islam

5
What is human dignity?, by Mette Lebech, p 4.
6
Ibid, p 5.
was to establish a peaceful and just society by ensuring basic human rights for everyone.
Because there were many evil social practice including killing of girls and slavery.
It was also impossible to change everything all of the sudden. So Islam continued the pre
existing norms because of the conditions of that time. But when once the Islam established, it
started changing the evil practice and developed a well organised form of governance, mainly
focusing on justice. And slowly Islam became a revolution which also effected Christo-centric
world-view.
Human dignity in modern history
The most important aspect of modern history is its logo-centric world-view, where everything
is explained on the basis of reason. It was also the first time when human dignity appeared as
a philosophical agenda in history. The experience of the Reformation and the religious wars
following it made a lasting impact on all modern thinkers. They could afford to take very few
things indeed for granted, as tradition and authority were widely questioned, and it was
discovered that even the new institutions (such as the nation-state), put in the place of the old,
had also to withstand the wind of criticism. The new world-view – the Enlightenment –
attempted to explain anything and everything relation to Reason. Sometimes the logo-centric
framework is called ‘anthropocentric’. This designation is fitting because of the association of
modernity and anthropocentrism, and also because Kant regards humanity itself as a dignity.
It is also, however, misplaced, because Kant explains the importance of Man in relation to
Reason, exemplifying hereby the rationalism of the Enlightenment.
In the logo-centric world-view human beings have dignity because of Reason, or, in the
Kantian expression, because they are capable of understanding the implications of their
actions. Reason, also, is enough to certify status, account for law and found society. No
guarantee apart from reason is needed for human dignity in this life. If reason fails, however,
it is uncertain what happens to human dignity. Reason is a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for the possession of human dignity. The possessor must also be human, belonging
to the human kind. But then again: Humanity itself is considered a dignity because of its
rationality, and this is the reason why rationality can be considered a criterion for human
dignity. 7

Human Dignity in other Religions

Hinduism
Human dignity in the Indian tradition is an immense topic. We can choose three main sources
for our inquiry into human dignity in the Hindu tradition: the Upanisads, the Laws of Manu
and the Bhagavadgita. Though human dignity in Hinduism is an ambiguous and perhaps even
paradoxical concept: on the one hand, all living beings (not solely human beings) are thought
to possess inherent dignity, but on the other hand we find that in the social realm dignity appears
in degrees.
The Upanisads are dialogues in Sanskrit which were handed down orally as part of the Veda,
articulating the essentials of Vedic wisdom. These dialogues, stemming from approximately

7
Ibid, p 9.
the sixth century BC, contain two central doctrines: the teachings of atman and brahman –
explaining the identity of Self and Universal Whole –and the doctrine of reincarnation or
metempsychosis. The Upanisads express a world view which is centred on the individual, but
with the corollary that the self, atman, is everywhere: it is really one with all things, the Whole,
and as such one with brahman –the life power which suffuses the universe and is the ground
of all material things. Material objects, phenomena, are really the projection of human
experience. 8
The Manavadharmasastra or Manusmrti, which probably stems from a later period – is a story
wherein the more or less mythical figure of Manu, the wise law-giver, teaches the universal
laws to his pupils. These laws articulate an account of dignity which entwines the concept with
social status: dignity is dependent on social class. Manu received the universal laws from the
creator of the world, the ‘Self Existent Lord’ (svayambhur bhagavan), who created four distinct
social classes together with the world; For the growth of these worlds, moreover, he produced
from his mouth, arms, thighs, and feet, the Brahmin, the Ksatriya, the Vaisya, and the Sudra.
The Bhagavadita or ‘Song of the Lord’ –which is often called simply ‘Gita’, or ‘The Song’ –
appeared quite late in the last millennium BC and, although it was a relatively small book,
could be said to form the basis for later Indian religious thought. In the text, the notion of
dharma, duty or law, is combined with the idea of liberation: the highest ideal articulated in the
Gita is doing one’s duty for the sake of God, as a sacrifice to God. If one’s actions are motivated
only by devotion to God, one will become one with the divine essence of God and be liberated
from the round of rebirth.
Summing up, we can say that, in the Hindu tradition, dignity appears as an ambiguous and even
paradoxical concept; sometimes it appears as an inherent attribute of the individual, sometimes
it is dependent on social class, and sometimes a concept related to moral action but is in that
quality strongly religious. Taking these traditions together, we see that a type of accentuated
individualism coexists with a social system which is programmatically unequal, showing us
that a particular anthropology, which ascribes dignity to humans and animals alike, does not
necessarily create social conventions that promote the principle of inherent and equal dignity
for all human beings. 9
Buddhism
In Buddhism, as in the Hindu tradition, the concept of dignity appears in different and
paradoxical qualities. As in Hinduism, in Buddhism there exists a tension between dignity
which is inherent to all living beings and socially embedded dignity which appears in different
gradations. Since beginning-less time’ man is imprisoned in the round of rebirth, and whether
he is born as an animal, spirit, human in a high or low class, in hell or even as a divine being,
is entirely dependent on karma: action understood as a cause which explains a being’s (way of)
existence. This is reflected in the idea that the individual is completely responsible for his own
existence: what one is depends wholly on one’s previous actions –in this life and the ones
preceding it. 10

8
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity, Cambridge university press 2014, p 163-64.
9
Ibid, p 165-68.
10
Ibid, p 170-71.
The concept of dignity appears in various forms in the Buddhist tradition. In classical
Buddhism, dignity is a strongly individualistic notion and ascribed only to the arhat; 11 only he
will reach nirvana –the absence of disquietude after death. If we take a closer look at the term
‘arhat’ –the Buddhist counterpart of ‘dignified’ which the word directly denotes –we notice
that it could not be applied to everybody: the status of ‘arahts’ was reserved to persons who
practiced Buddha’s teachings on insight and meditation, to those who would reach nirvāna
upon death. Indeed, the word is perhaps best translated as ‘Saint’; the arhats were usually
depicted in Buddhist iconography as Buddha’s five hundred closest disciples. Thus, dignity as
arhat was applicable only to monks and formed an unattainable ideal for laymen.
The religious ideal of classical Buddhism did not remain without opposition: the so-called
‘Mahayana Buddhism’ paved the way for a more egalitarian conception of dignity. In parts of
Mahayana Buddhism, we find a view that attributes dignity to all living things equally: not
only human beings, but also gods, animals, spirits and the inhabitants of Hell participate in the
‘Buddha-nature’ or the ‘nature of the Awakened’. In Mahayana Buddhism, precisely this
individualism and elitism is criticized: the ideal is no longer the arhat but the bodhisattva, he
(or she) who manifests radical altruism in the quality of attempting to liberate the suffering of
all others before thinking about oneself. In this form of Buddhism, dignity becomes an
egalitarian moral notion: it is ascribed to all humans (although obviously not only to humans)
and leads to a duty in others. That these are not merely philosophical concepts is shown by the
example of emperor Asoka, who tried to effectuate an egalitarian notion of dignity through
political precepts of which freedom of religion is perhaps the most prominent. But that social
conditions do not necessarily reflect philosophical and religious ideas, is shown by the
Arthasastra: the collective; the stability of the state became central and the individual was not
in a moral sense relevant – let alone inherently dignified. So all in all we can say that dignity
appears in the Buddhist tradition in many interesting but fundamentally different ways. 12

Human dignity in Islam

In the Islamic ethics, human beings are given a very special status and the core of that status is
dignity. Because dignity isn't something which is earned but it is innate. There are many verses
in the Quran which clearly explain the status of human beings, their superiority and capabilities,
and narrate the whole story of Adam's creation as Allah's best creation. Allah says “I created
(Adam) with My own Hand”, “And I breathed into him (Adam) of My Own spirit” (Q, 38:72),
“Indeed, We created humankind in the best of forms;” (Q.95:12), and “ We fashioned you in
the best of images….” (Q.64:3). And when Allah commanded the angels to prostrate to Adam,
which they did. The only one who protested was Iblis (Satan), then Allah asked him “what
prevents thee from prostrating thyself to one whom I created with My Own Hand?” (Q, 38:75-
76). We need to see the beauty of these verses which clearly show the high level of intimacy
and closeness of Allah with Adam and thus with the children of Adam.
The Quran extends an open and unqualified recognition of dignity to all human beings
regardless of colour and creed. And gives them the highest value in the universe. Here is the

11
A Buddhist who has reached the stage of enlightenment.
12
Ibid, p 172-76
verse which explains human dignity in an open and unqualified way, it is also the core verse
of the subject.
“We have honoured (all) the children of Adam with innate dignity (karam); and
provided them with transportation on both land and sea; and given them sustenance
from the good and pure things in life; and favoured them far above most of those We
have created.” (Q.17:70)
The Arabic expression for ‘human dignity’ is karamat al-insan, the root word is karam.
According to the Quranic dictionary, the basic meaning of the root is ‘to bestow honour upon’
or ‘to venerate’ or ‘to treat with deference’. Another key word in this verse is faddalna its root
word is fadl meaning ‘to like better’ or ‘to give preference to’ (Mujam alfaz al-Quran). There
are two notable points in this verse. One is that this verse begins with karam and ends with
fadal. Another and most important is the word ‘children of Adam'. Quran could have used any
other specific word for this message but it didn't. Because the word children of Adam includes
every single human on earth.
Many commentators of Quran interpreted this verse in a general way, but one of the greatest
commentators of Quran, Mahmood Al-Alusi Al-Baghdadi went deeper and interpreted this
verse in a very unique and interesting way. He said that “everyone and all members of the
human race, including the pious and the sinner, are endowed with dignity….”. 13 I think this is
the beauty of this verse which Al-Alusi observed. Usually people don’t consider sinners as
dignified because they have committed a sin. This was also a general perception in other
previous religions and traditions. But the correct notion is that which Al-Alusi observed,
because human beings have been honoured with innate dignity not for being a pious or a sinner
but just being one of the children of Adam. Here is a beautiful Hadith from Prophet‘s‫ ﷺ‬period,
which shows that how sinners were treated in His time.
Narrated 'Imran bin Husain: A woman from Juhainah confessed before the Prophet ‫ﷺ‬
that she had committed adultery, and she said: 'I am pregnant.' So the Prophet ‫ ﷺ‬called
for her guardian and said: 'Be good to her and if she gives birth to her child then tell
me.' So he did so, and then h ‫ ﷺ‬gave the order that her clothes be bound tightly around
her. Then he ordered her to be stoned and she was stoned. Then he performed (funeral)
Salat for her. So 'Umar bin Al-Khattab said to him: 'O Messenger of Allah! You stoned
her then you prayed for her?!' He said: 'She has repented a repentance that, if distributed
among seventy of the people of Al-Madinah, it would have sufficed them. Have you
ever seen something more virtuous than her sacrificing herself for the sake of Allah?'14 13F

This Hadith clearly tell us that the woman confessed her sin and she wasn't ill-treated or
humiliated, rather she was awarded punishment with dignity and even allowed to give birth her
child. And when Hazrat Umar wanted to say something about that woman, Prophet stopped
him and praise her repentance. So punishments in Islam isn't for humiliation but for the
betterment of society and lesson for other to not indulge in any kind of violations.
It is also reported that once the funeral of a Jew brought to the Prophet and He stood up for the
funeral. One of His companion said “O messenger of Allah! It is a funeral of a Jew. Why did
you stand up?” the Prophet replied “is he not a human being?”. And He further asked them to

13
Tsfseer Ruhul Ma'ani, Shihabuddin Al-Alusi, Rar-al-turath, Beirut, vol 16, p117-18
14
Tirmidi, vol-2, Hadith no: 1435
behave in a good manner with the person having treaty with the Muslims. Then He said
“Narrated `Abdullah bin `Amr: The Prophet said, Whoever killed a person having a treaty with
the Muslims, shall not smell the smell of Paradise though its smell is perceived from a distance
of forty years.” 15
Human dignity as the foundation of human rights
It is debatable in contemporary discourse, with much more complicated philosophical roots,
that whether human dignity should be foundation or not for human rights. But from Islamic
point of view it is very much clear that human dignity plays foundational role in formation of
human rights. The dignity which Islam gives human beings is inherent and inseparable even
after death, because it is God-given. Hence, human dignity is inseparable from a human being
whether a male or female, irrespective of colour, time, place, social position, prestige among
people, age, even if still a foetus, or dead lying in his grave. And this inherent dignity provides
every human his or her basic rights like freedom, equality, and justice etc. So if someone isn't
being given his basic rights it means he isn't being dignified either. Because dignity itself a
basic right which is foundation for other human rights.
Human Dignity in Islamic jurisprudence
The scholastic Jurisprudence has always been a integral part of Islamic tradition in the form of
different school of thoughts. Ismah (inviolability), and Adamiyyah (humanity and personhood)
are the words which is used in Islamic legal tradition rather human dignity. The jurists also talk
about maqasid (purpose) of sharia which are life, intellect, religion, family, property, and
honour. These are the basic things for human kind and thus they must be protected as the matter
of priority. 16
The leading schools of Islamic jurisprudence interpret ismah differently. The universalist
position is taken by the Hanafi school (the most following school of jurisprudence among the
Muslims). The Universalists recognise ismah for all humans regardless of religion, gender, race
and the like. Thus everyone's dignity, life, property, and other rights are inviolable without any
discrimination. Therefore all will be given full and equal protection. The another position is
taken by other schools namely the Shafi, Maliki, Hanbali and the Shi’ah. They may be labelled
as communalist. According to them, ismah is established not by the fact of one’s being a
human, but by being a believer in Islam. Non-Muslims are consequently not qualified for ismah
unless they make a treaty with the Muslim state and secure their protection by virtue of a
commitment (dhimmah). 17
The key between both approach is that Imam Abu Hanifah, the leading advocate of the
universalist position, takes the Qur’anic verse as it is in an unqualified way. His position is
summarized in the phrase, al-ismah bil-adamiyyah- inviolability inheres in being human. But
Imam Shafai and others giving their first priority to human's faith not ismah, hence he is
interpreting the general verse in a particular way and making its meaning more specific. But
there isn't any convincing reason for doing so. Here are some critics on communalist position
holders.

15
Sahih al-Bukhari, Hadith no: 3166
16
Human dignity in Islam, article by Dr. Hashim Kamali, p 8.
17
Ibid, p 9.
A very famous and leading figure in Hanafi school of thought Al-Sarakhsi wrote in his book
“A human's religious choice must also be honoured, “even if it is contrary to the Islamic
teaching.” Sarakhsi further observed that everyone's life must be protected because only a
living person can respond to the Divine call of religion, and so must be his faculty of reason,
as this too is the only way through which he can understand and determine values. Everyone's
mind must be honoured and protected “even if they oppose the way we think.” 18 Al-Sarakhsi
went on to add that freedom and the right to own property are endowed in humans as of the
moment of birth. The insane child and the sane adult stand on the same footing concerning
these rights. This is how personhood is established in a human being to create in him the
capacity to bear rights and obligations.
Another prominent Hanafi jurist, al-Marghinani, criticized the communalist view and wrote
that the argument of al-Shafi to take the religion as the criterion of ismah is unacceptable. This
is because “protection is attached, not to Islam, but to the person,”. 19 Ibn-Abidin, another
leading voice in the Hanafi school, confirmed the universalist position of the school of his
following and wrote that “a human being is honoured, even if he is a non-Muslim, “al-adami
mukarrum wa law kafirun”. We are required to protect the sanctity of all humanity. Muslims
must therefore defend the ismah and human rights of non-Muslims. Each individual,
community and state bears the responsibility to protect the ismah of all human beings. 20

Conclusion
These were some interesting aspect of human dignity related debates which explains it more
clearly. Although the main source of today's conception of human dignity and rights is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, but human dignity in its different forms has
always been on the table of discussion. One thing we should also keep in mind that human
dignity is indeed a inherent quality of the human beings but it appears in the form of degree. It
means that some people are more dignified and some or less according to one's deed. But basic
human dignity is always possessed by every human in all circumstances, even after death.
That's why no one can't humiliate other's dead body and can’t sell organs. It has been clear now
that dignity is a natural and absolute right which inheres in every human person as of the
moment of birth. It is God-given and natural; hence no individual nor State may take it away
from anyone. But there are still many challenges for this notion in the field of bioethics and
human enchantment as modern science and technology are changing everything so fast. At the
same time, today we are living with all kinds of people, including pious and sinner, believers
and non-believers, people who are accused of blasphemy and LGBT community. So dealing
with all these challenges are really difficult in a manner where everyone is given equal dignity
and rights just on the basis of human being.

18
Abi Bakr Muammad b. Ahmad al-Sarakhsi, Usul-al-Sarakhasi,
19
Abu al-Hassan Buhan al-Din al-Marghinani, The Hedaya or Guide: Karachi: Darul-Ishaat, 1989, II, p 221.
20
Human dignity in Islam, article by Dr. Hashim Kamali, p 9.
Blasphemy and the Hanafi jurisprudence

A critical appraisal of the Asia Bibi verdict in the light of Hanafi

jurisprudence

By Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi

Most ulema in Pakistan and even in India extend the applicability of

blasphemy laws to non-Muslims living in Muslim countries. Not to speak
of the self-avowed clerics like the recently arrested Maulvi Khadim Razvi
of the ‘Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan’ (TLP) or the recently killed Maulvi
Samiul Haque of 'Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan' (TTP), even many well-
established Barelvi and Deobandi theologians, Muftis (Islamic jurists)
and the so-called Sufi-Sunni clerics seem to be unanimously agreed upon
this. They aver that it is incumbent upon the Islamic government to
execute all blasphemers, be they Muslim or non-Muslim. This actually
emanates from their reference to this Hadith report as recorded in Sahih
al-Bukhari: "Slay whoever has desecrated the Prophet (pbuh)".1
In Pakistan, one can be charged under the Blasphemy Law and shall be
punished with death or imprisonment for life, if he/she ‘defiles the
sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad by words, either spoken or
written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or
insinuation, directly or indirectly’ According to the clause 295-C of
Pakistan Penal Code, there is a fixed death penalty for a blasphemer. 2
Blasphemy in the Hanafi literature
But the vast literature of the Hanafi Islamic jurisprudence does not
mention blasphemy as consistent part of the Islamic penal code. A look
at the authoritative rulings and decrees (fatawā) or the jurisprudential
opinions (fiqhi a’ara) of the earliest Hanafi jurists (fuqahā) makes it
patently clear.
Imam Abū Ḥanīfa, the eponymous founder of the Hanafi school of
jurisprudence, is reported to have stated:

1
‫( ﻓﺎﻗﺗﻠوه ﻧﺑﯾﺎ ﺳب ﻣن‬Al-Bukhari. 1997, vol. 9, 46)
2
Clause 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code
 “‫”أﻋظم اﻟﺷرك ﻣن ﻋﻠﯾﮫ ھم ﻣﺎ وﺳﻠم ﻋﻠﯾﮫ ﷲ ﺻﻠﻰ اﻟﻧﺑﻲ ﺑﺷﺗم اﻟذﻣﻲ ﯾﻘﺗل ﻻ‬
(A non-Muslim will not be killed on the account of blasphemy against the
Prophet (Shatam-e-Rasool), as the shirk (idolatry or polytheism) which
he/she already professes, is far more grave sin than blasphemy). 3
Allama Qadhi Ayadh writes in his book “al-Shifa bi Ta’areef Huquq al-
Mustafa”:
‫ﻓﺄﻣﺎ اﻟذﻣﻲ إذا ﺻرح ﺑﺳﺑﮫ أو ﻋرض أو اﺳﺗﺧف ﺑﻘدره أو وﺻﻔﮫ ﺑﻐﯾر اﻟوﺟﮫ اﻟذى ﻛﻔر ﺑﮫ ﻓﻼ ﺧﻼف ﻋﻧدﻧﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺗﻠﮫ إن ﻟم‬
‫ وھو ﻗول ﻋﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻣﺎء إﻻ أﺑﺎ ﺣﻧﯾﻔﺔ واﻟﺛوري وأﺗﺑﺎﻋﮭﻣﺎ ﻣن أھل اﻟﻛوﻓﺔ ﻓﺈﻧﮭم‬،‫ ﻷﻧﺎ ﻟم ﻧﻌطﮫ اﻟذﻣﺔ أو اﻟﻌﮭد ﻋﻠﻰ ھذا‬،‫ﯾﺳﻠم‬
‫ﻗﺎﻟوا‬: ‫ ﻷن ﻣﺎ ھو ﻋﻠﯾﮫ ﻣن اﻟﺷرك أﻋظم وﻟﻛن ﯾؤدب وﯾﻌزر‬،‫ ﻻ ﯾﻘﺗل‬4‫۔‬

(There is consensus in the Maliki school of law on the punishment for

blasphemers, but Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Thauri and many of his
students from Kufa hold the opinion that such a Dhimmi (non-Muslim
blasphemer) will not be punished with death, because the shirk
professed by him, is far greater sin than blasphemy).
Imam Qurtabi has also noted the same jurisprudential stance of the
Hanafi school on blasphemy in his exegesis of the Qur’an “al-Jaam’e li
Ahkaam al-Qur’an” in an interpretation of the verse 8 of Surah al-Tauba.
He writes:
‫ﻋرض أو اﺳﺗﺧف ﺑﻘدره أو وﺻﻔﮫ ﺑﻐﯾر اﻟوﺟﮫ‬ ّ ‫أﻛﺛر اﻟﻌﻠﻣﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻣن ﺳب اﻟﻧﺑﻲ ﺻﻠﻰ ﷲ ﻋﻠﯾﮫ وﺳﻠم ﻣن أھل اﻟذﻣﺔ أو‬
‫اﻟذي ﻛﻔر ﺑﮫ ﻓﺈﻧﮫ ﯾﻘﺗل؛ ﻓﺈﻧّﺎ ﻟم ﻧﻌطﮫ اﻟذﻣﺔ أو اﻟﻌﮭد ﻋﻠﻰ ھذا۔ إﻻ أﺑﺎ ﺣﻧﯾﻔﺔ واﻟﺛوري وأﺗﺑﺎﻋﮭﻣﺎ ﻣن أھل اﻟﻛوﻓﺔ ﻓﺈﻧﮭم ﻗﺎﻟوا‬:
‫ وﻟﻛن ﯾؤدب وﯾﻌزر‬، ‫ ﻣﺎ ھو ﻋﻠﯾﮫ ﻣن اﻟﺷرك أﻋظم‬، ‫ ﻻ ﯾﻘﺗل‬5‫۔‬

Imam Nawawi, noted scholar of Hadith and Islamic jurisprudence

quotes the eminent Hanafi Imam al-Tahawi’s argument for the
blasphemy as an offence which does not require capital punishment.
He writes in his book “al-Majm’u Shrh al-Muhadhdhb”:

3 ٰ ُ ‫ﺳورﯾﺎ طﺑﻌﮫ ا‬1351‫ھ۔‬

1 ،‫وﻟﯽ۔ طﺑﻌﺔ وﺗﺻﺣﯾﺢ اﻟﺷﯾﺦ ﻣﺣﻣد راﻏب اﻟطﺑﺎخ ﻓﯽ ﻣطﺑﻌﺗﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻣﯾﺔ ﺣﻠب‬

4 ٰ
(2) 031،1030/2‫ ﺣﻘوق اﻟﺷﻔﺎ ﺑﺗﻌرﯾف‬،‫اﻟﻣﺻطﻔﯽ ﺑﺗﺣﻘﯾﻖ اﻟﺷﯾﺦ ﻋﻠﯽ ﻣﺣﻣد اﻟﺑﺟﺎوی‬ ،‫اﻟﻘﺎﺿﯽ ﻋﯾﺎض‬1024/2 ‫۔ دار‬
‫ﺑﯾروت۔‬،‫اﻟﮑﺗﺎب اﻟﻌرﺑﯽ‬1404‫ھ۔‬

5
83/8‫ﺛﺎﻧ�ﻪ ﻃبﻌﻪ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة۔ اﻟﻤ��ﺔ۔ اﻟ�ﺘﺐ دار‬:1384‫ھ۔‬
 ‫واﺣﺗﺞ اﻟطﺣﺎوي ﻷﺻﺣﺎﺑﮫ ﺑﺣدﯾث أﻧس اﻟذى ﻓﯾﮫ أن رﺳول ﷲ ﺻﻠﻰ ﷲ ﻋﻠﯾﮫ وﺳﻠم ﻟم ﯾﻘﺗل ﻣن ﻛﺎﻧوا ﯾﻘوﻟون ﻟﮫ اﻟﺳﱠﺎم‬
، ‫ وأﻣﺎ ﺻدوره ﻣن اﻟﯾﮭودي ﻓﺎﻟذي ھم ﻋﻠﯾﮫ ﻣن اﻟﻛﻔر أﺷد‬، ‫ وأﯾده ﺑﺄن ھذا اﻟﻛﻼم ﻟو ﺻدر ﻣن ﻣﺳﻠم ﻟﻛﺎﻧت ردة‬، ‫ﻋﻠﯾك‬
‫ ﻓﻠذﻟك ﻟم ﯾﻘﺗﻠﮭم اﻟﻧﺑﻲ ﺻﻠﻰ ﷲ ﻋﻠﯾﮫ وﺳﻠم‬6

Imam Ibn e Abidin, the most quoted Hanafi jurist on this subject
whose fatwas are part of the curriculum in India and Pakistan’s
mainstream Sunni madrasas, has rebutted the opinion that that
blasphemy is unpardonable. This opinion is held by al-Bazzazzi, the
only Hanafi jurist who has a differing view on this. But according to Ibn
e Abidin, this view is a ‘misreading’ of Ibn Taymiyyah’s “Al Sarim-ul-
Maslool a’laa Shatim-ir-Rasool”.

6
427/19‫ دار‬،‫ﻣﺼﺪر يﺑ�وت۔ اﻟﻔﮑﺮ‬: ‫ �ﻌﺴﻮب۔ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ‬296/3
Thus, blasphemy is a pardonable offense in the Hanafi school of law, if
the perpetrator happens to be a non-Muslim. This position has been
corroborated by the majority (jumhur) of the Ahnaaf jurists, mainly
disciples of Imam Abu Hanifa, such Qazi Abu Yusuf (Kitab al-Kharaj),
Taqī al-Dīn al-Subki (al-Sayf al-maslūl ‘alā man sabba al-Rasūl), Imam
Tahawi (Mukhtasar al-Tahawi), Abu Bakar Ala-ud-Din Kasani (Bada'i al-
Sanai’e) and many other Ahnaaf.

Asia Bibi’s exoneration

In its landmark verdict, the Pakistani Supreme Court has exonerated Asia
Bibi—the Christian woman who spent 8 years on death row under
Pakistan's blasphemy law. Thus, for the first time, Pakistan's apex court
has tried to challenge the gross misuse of the blasphemy law in the
country. It has categorically stated that “Blasphemy is a serious offence
but the insult of the appellant's (Asia Bibi) religion and religious
sensibilities by the complainant party and then mixing truth with
falsehood in the name of the Prophet Mohammad was also not short of
being blasphemous” 7.
Thus, the apex court has lambasted the complainants who had insulted
Asia's religious sentiments, which the court said was no less than
blasphemy as Prophet Jesus (pbuh) is also a prophet in Islam. It sets an
example of how to overturn the attempts by the extremists who use the
blasphemy law as a tool to pursue their personal agendas, while claiming
to protect the honour of Prophet Mohammad (pbuh) and at the same
time, slurring other prophets of Islam.
Widespread misuse of anti-blasphemy laws
In Pakistan, the anti-blasphemy laws were introduced in British colonial
times to avoid religious clashes. But in reality, they have been brazenly
misused by both individuals and extremist groups with serious
repercussions. They turned more violent in the 1980s when the dictator
Zia-ul-Haq introduced several reforms which led to the abuse of the law.
Since then, over 1,000 people have been accused of blasphemy in
Pakistan.
According to an Al-Arabiya report, in the last 28 years as many as 62
people have been murdered in Pakistan on blasphemy allegations, even

7
before their trial could be conducted in accordance with the law. A
report recently launched by the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom states, as many as 40 people are on
death row or serving a life sentence in Pakistan for blasphemy8.
More deplorably, the blasphemy laws have often been used to get
revenge after personal disputes, and in most such cases, convictions do
not stand to scrutiny. In fact, the public support for religious extremists
in the country who enjoy complete impunity is deeply rooted. The killing
of Salman Taseer was not an isolated incident in Pakistan. A former
judge, Arif Iqbal Bhatti was also brutally assassinated because he did not
sentence the accused to death in a fake case of blasphemy. Similarly,
some radical Islamists in Pakistan, a few years ago, burned alive a
mentally disabled man on the accusation of blasphemy. This insane
cruelty was perpetrated despite the fact that even the Islamic Sharia
does not implement the blasphemy law on anyone who lost his senses.
Not long ago, a Pashtun Muslim student Mashal Khan was mercilessly
lynched in the premises of his university in Pakistan’s Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa over fake allegations of posting blasphemous content
online. Scandalously, the 22 perpetrators of this lynching who were
arrested by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police included six employees of
the university.
Since 1990, at least 65 people have reportedly been killed in Pakistan
over the blasphemy allegations. Earlier, most of the accused were
Muslims or the Ahmadis also known as Qadiyanis. But since the 1990s,
the minority Christians, who make up just 1.6% of the population, have
been systematically targeted by numerous attacks, as a BBC report tells
us 9.
For any Muslim-majority country to be civilised and fair to the religious
minorities, one of the measures to be taken is to declare the blasphemy
laws outlawed and abrogated. One of the essential social and political
changes that must occur in Pakistan to usher in democracy is to oust the
medieval Islamic blasphemy laws. It should learn from Ireland which,
until recently, was deeply conservative, dominated by the Catholic
Church, but the country has recently celebrated the end of a “medieval”
blasphemy law.

8
9
bbc.com/news/world-asia-46080067
The abrogation or reformation of the anti-blasphemy laws will be widely
applauded by the progressive Muslims across the world who hail PM
Imran Khan’s stance against the extremist elements disrupting law and
order. Nevertheless, until the new government moves towards the
procedural reforms, the grave threats of potential exploitation of
blasphemy laws will loom large.
But ironically, the holy Prophet, whose sanctity the extremists claim to
defend never sentenced to death the Meccan pagans, who cursed,
ridiculed and plotted to kill him. Even when the pagans desecrated the
Prophet’s sanctity accusing him of ‘forging’ the Qur’an, he acted upon
the divine instruction indicating that only Allah can decide the
punishment for even as grievous sin as ‘fabricating’ and ‘concocting’ the
Qur’an. Allah says:

“Do they say, 'he has fabricated it'? Say you, 'if I have
fabricated it, you have no power for me against Allah.
He knows best the (words) you utter about this (Qur’an)
as mockery. And He is Sufficient as witness between me
and you. And He is Forgiving, Merciful”. (Translation by
Imam Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi)

The Asia Bibi verdict

It is important is to read the Pakistani Supreme Court’s judgment. Most
supporters of blasphemy laws challenging the verdict seem to have
wholly or conveniently ignored the apex court's verdict which starts with
a declaration of faith, and involves the first 14 paragraphs clarifying that
the Court, and its judges, hold the holy Prophet in the highest
veneration. It actually starts with a couplet of Allama Iqbal from his
famous “Jawaab-e-Shikwa” considering him the ‘Spiritual Father of
Pakistan’, in which the veneration and adulation of Holy Prophet is
reckoned as the foundational principle of Islam:
Ki Mohammed S.A.W. Se Wafa Tune, To Hum Tere Hain,
Yeh Jahan Kya Cheez Hai Loh-O-Qalam Tere Hain

(We are yours only with your loyalty towards Prophet Muhammad
PBUH. Let alone this universe, even the Tablet and The Pen are
yours.)
Thus, the judgment holds the Prophet’s prestige and dignity in the
highest esteem compared to all creatures of by Allah and clearly
demonstrates his lofty moral values as the highest exemplary role model
bearing an overwhelming effect on the course of history. “His teachings
have undoubtedly brought about the greatest effect in changing the
minds, deeds and conducts of individuals and nations. His exceptional
achievements have surpassed all predecessors in all respects”, it reads.
Thus, the court’s judgment authored by the Chief justice substantiates
the point that the “unlimited and unparalleled love” with Allah’s
Messenger is an integral part of a Muslim’s faith. In this connection, the
judgment quotes following verses along with a few Hadith narrations:
“Say, [O Muhammad], “If your fathers, your sons, your
brothers, your wives, your relatives, wealth which you
have obtained, commerce wherein you fear decline, and
dwellings with which you are pleased are more beloved
to you than Allah and His Messenger and jihad in His
cause, then wait until Allah executes His command. And
Allah does not guide the defiantly disobedient people”.
(Qur’an 9:24)

“By the star when it descends, Your companion

[Muhammad] has not strayed, nor has he erred, Nor does
he speak from [his own] inclination. It is not but a
revelation revealed”. (Qur’an 53:1-4).

“Say, [O Muhammad], “If you should love Allah, then

follow me, [so] Allah will love you and forgive you your
sins. And Allah is Forgiving and Merciful”. (Qur’an 3:31)

“But no, by your Lord, they will not [truly] believe until
they make you, [O Muhammad], judge concerning that
over which they dispute among themselves and then find
within themselves no discomfort from what you have
judged and submit in [full, willing] submission. (Qur’an
4:65)”.

It is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when

Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, that
they should [thereafter] have any choice about their
affair. And whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger
has certainly strayed into clear error. (Qur’an 33:36)

“Certainly, you have in Allah’s Messenger an excellent

example (role-model) to follow, for whoever looks
 forward to Allah and the last day and remembers Allah
abundantly.” (Qur’an 33:21)

And when you, [O Muhammad], do not bring them a sign, they say,
"Why have you not contrived it?" Say, "I only follow what is revealed
to me from my Lord. This [Qur'an] is enlightenment from your Lord
and guidance and mercy for a people who believe." (Qur’an 7:203).
And indeed, for you is a reward uninterrupted. And
indeed, you are of a great moral character. (Qur’an 68:3-
4)

And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a

mercy to the worlds. (Qur’an 21:107)]

Among the Jews are those who distort words from their [proper] usages
and say, "We hear and disobey" and "Hear but be not heard" and "Ra'ina"
(‫ )راﻋﻧﺎ‬twisting their tongues and defaming the religion. And if they had
said [instead], "We hear and obey" and "Wait for us [to understand]," it
would have been better for them and more suitable. But Allah has cursed
them for their disbelief, so they believe not, except for a few. (Qur’an
4:46)
By quoting these verses from Qur’an, the Supreme Court’s verdict has
unequivocally described the glorification and exaltation of Holy Prophet
and has ordered Muslims to strictly observe maximum respect and be
extremely careful in this regard, to the extent of using most appropriate
words and even lowering their voices, as mentioned in the following
verse from Surah Al-Hujurat:
“O ye who believe! raise not your voices above the voice
of the Prophet nor shout when speaking to him as you
shout one to another, lest your deeds be rendered vain
while you perceive not.” (Qur’an 4:46)]

As for the punishment for blasphemy against Prophet Muhammad (pbuh),

it has been endorsed in the judgement which quotes the following verse
from Surah Al-Ahzab in its premise:
“Lo! Those who malign Allah and his Messenger, Allah
hath cursed them in the world and the Hereafter, and
hath prepared for them the doom of the disdained”.
(Qur’an 33:57)
The judgment also puts forward an explanation of this verse by Imam
Qurtubi, the famous Mufassir (Qur’an exegete) from Cordoba of Maliki
origin, who writes in his commentary of the Qur’an:

“Everything which becomes a means of malignity (Aza’a) of the Holy

Prophet (pbuh) whether by quoting words bearing different meanings or
similar actions comes under his malignity?” 10
The judgement also brings, along with other commentaries, exegesis of
the same verse by Imam Ismail Haqqi, the 17th-century Turkish Sufi
scholar and interpreter of the Qur’an. He writes in Rūḥ al-Bayān (the
Spirit of Elucidation), an esoteric interpretation of the Qur’an:

“…..the malignity of Allah and his Prophet (pbuh) meant only the
malignity of the Prophet in fact, and mention of Allah (SWT) is only
for glorification and exaltation to disclose that the malignity of the
Prophet (pbuh) (is indeed the malignity of Allah (SWT).” (6)
But what surprised me is the fact that the apex court’s verdict did not
make mention of Imam Abu Hanifa, Sufyan Thawri, Imam Tahawi and
many other eminent Hanafi jurists who rejected the enactment of
blasphemy laws on the Ahl Zimmah (non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic
countries), as clearly evidenced above.

Significantly, the vast literature of Islamic jurisprudence does not

mention blasphemy as consistent part of the Islamic penal code. But the
Pakistani Supreme Court’s 57-page verdict offers several references to
the Qur’anic verses and Hadith traditions in support of punishing the
blasphemers. But at the same time, it gives crucial key observations,
such as these:
 "Islam may tolerate anything but it teaches zero tolerance for
injustice, oppression, and violation of the rights of other human
beings the Qur’an speaks about, from the very beginning”.
 "If our religion of Islam comes down heavily upon the commission
of blasphemy, then Islam is also very tough against those who level
false allegations of a crime".
 "It is a well-settled principle of Islamic law that one who makes an
assertion has to prove it. Thus, the onus rests on the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt

10
Al Jaam’e li Ahkaam al-Qur’an, Vol. XIV, page 238
 throughout the trial. "Thus, the bench noted that the prosecution
was unable to successfully prove its case.
Notably, the apex court’s verdict has strongly rejected the lower court’s
judgment in this case and rather critiqued it for failing to “give a fair
judgment in the light of clear Qur’anic injunctions”. The verdict quotes
Surah Al-Maida’s verse that requires believers to "persistently stand
firm for Allah, witnesses in justice, and do not let the hatred of a
people prevent you from being just. Be just, that is nearer to
righteousness. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is acquainted with what
you do”.

Similarly, this verdict makes another notable reference to the Qur’an:

"So follow not [personal] inclination, lest you not be
just. And if you distort [your testimony] or refuse [to
give it], then indeed Allah is ever, with what you do,
acquainted" (Surah Al Nisa: verse 135).

Thus, the verdict argues that the personal vendettas should not be used
to accuse anyone of blasphemy. In addition to citing the Qur’an, Justice
Khosa’s judgment also referenced Shakespeare's King Lear, saying Asia
was "more sinned against than sinning."
It has also quoted the ‘Covenant’ which was entered into between the
Prophet (pbuh) and a delegation from St. Catherine’s Monastery which
came to the Prophet (pbuh) requesting his protection. He granted them
a charter of rights, which went down in the Islamic history as a glorious
example of protection of human rights and respect for religious
minorities in 628 A.D. It is referred to as “The Promise to St. Catherine”.
Here’s the thrust of this covenant:
"This is a message from Muhammad ibn Abdullah, as a covenant to those
who adopt Christianity, near and far, we are with them. Verily I, the
servants, the helpers, and my followers defend them, because Christians
are my citizens; and by Allah! I hold out against anything that displeases
them. No compulsion is to be on them. Neither are their judges to be
removed from their jobs nor their monks from their monasteries. No one
is to destroy a house of their religion, to damage it, or to carry anything
from it to the Muslims' houses. Should anyone take any of these, he
would spoil God's covenant and disobey His Prophet. Verily, they are my
allies and have my secure charter against all that they hate. No one is
to force them to travel or to oblige them to fight. The Muslims are to
fight for them. If a female Christian is married to a Muslim, it is not to
take place without her approval. She is not to be prevented from visiting
her church to pray. Their churches are to be respected. They are neither
to be prevented from repairing them nor the sacredness of their
covenants. No one of Muslims is to disobey the covenant till the Last
Day."11

To sum up, the Pakistani Supreme Court’s verdict on the Christian lady
accused of blasphemy Asia Bibi, does consider the blasphemy as
punishable and its law as immutable. However, it stipulates its stance
with this statement: “unless proven guilty, through a fair trial, as
provided for in the Constitution and the law, every person is considered
innocent, irrespective of their creed, caste and colour”, citing this verse
from Surah Al-Ma’aidah:
“….. he who slays a soul unless it be (in punishment) for
murder or for spreading mischief on earth shall be as if
he had slain all mankind; and he who saves a life shall
be as if he had given life to all mankind. ……”. (Qur’an
5:32)

11
www.islamic-study.org/saint_catherine_monastery.htm
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Qatar
Qatar, independent
emirate on the west coast TABLE OF CONTENTS
of the Persian Gulf.
Introduction

Occupying a small desert Land

peninsula that extends People
Doha Bay and the skyline of Doha, Qatar,
northward from the
showing a high-rise district (left) and the Economy
Museum of Islamic Art (right).
larger Arabian Peninsula,
it has been continuously Government and society
© Paul Cowan/Shutterstock.com
but sparsely inhabited Cultural life
since prehistoric times. History
Following the rise of
Islam, the region became
subject to the Islamic caliphate; it later was ruled by a
number of local and foreign dynasties before falling
under the control of the Āl Thānī (Thānī dynasty) in the
19th century. The Āl Thānī sought British patronage
against competing tribal groups and against the
Ottoman Empire—which occupied the country in the
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
late 19th and early 20th centuries—and in exchange the
United Kingdom controlled Qatar’s foreign policy until
the latter’s independence in 1971. Thereafter, the monarchy continued to nurture close ties
with Western powers as a central pillar of its national security. Qatar has one of the world’s
largest reserves of petroleum and natural gas and employs large numbers of foreign workers
in its production process. Because of its oil wealth, the country’s residents enjoy a high
standard of living and a well-established system of social services.

The capital is the eastern coastal city of Doha (Al-

Dawḥah), which was once a centre for pearling and is
home to most of the country’s inhabitants. Radiating
inland from its handsome Corniche, or seaside
boulevard, Doha blends premodern architecture with
new of ce buildings, shopping malls, and apartment
complexes. Qatar’s traditions draw on a nomadic past
and practices that are centuries old, from hand-woven
products to falconry. However, the country’s population
is urban and coastal, its daily life is thoroughly modern,
Qatar and its rulers have sought to enhance civil liberties. The
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Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. press is among the freest in the region, and though they
are religious and traditional, Qataris pride themselves on
their tolerance for the cultures and beliefs of others. On the status of the country’s large
expatriate community, the ruling emir has noted that “in Qatar, they nd security and a
digni ed livelihood.”

Land

Slightly smaller in area than the U.S. state of Connecticut,

the Qatar peninsula is about 100 miles (160 km) from
north to south, 50 miles (80 km) from east to west, and is
generally rectangular in shape. It shares a border with
Doha, Qatar
eastern Saudi Arabia where the peninsula connects to
Nighttime skyline of Doha, Qatar. the mainland and is north and west of the United Arab
Jimmy Baikovicius (CC-BY-2.0) Emirates. The island country of Bahrain lies some 25
miles (40 km) northwest of Qatar. A territorial dispute
with Bahrain was resolved in 2001, when the International Court of Justice awarded the
Ḥawār Islands (just off the coast of Qatar) to Bahrain and gave Qatar sovereignty over Janān
Island and the ruined fortress-town of Al-Zubārah (on the Qatari mainland). That year Qatar
also signed a nal border demarcation agreement with Saudi Arabia.

Relief and drainage

Most of Qatar’s area is at, low-lying desert, which rises from the east to a central limestone
plateau. Hills rise to about 130 feet (40 metres) along the western and northern coasts, and
Abū al-Bawl Hill (335 feet [103 metres]) is the country’s highest point. Sand dunes and salt
ats, or sabkhahs, are the chief topographical features of the southern and southeastern
sectors. Qatar has more than 350 miles (560 km) of coastline; its border with Saudi Arabia is
some 37 miles (60 km) long. There are no permanent bodies of fresh water.

Soils

Soils in Qatar are marked by a small degree of organic material and are generally calcareous
and agriculturally unproductive. Windblown sand dunes are common, and soil distribution
over bedrock is light and uneven. Soil salinity is high in coastal regions and in agricultural

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regions where poor regulation of irrigation has led to

increased salinity.

Climate

The climate is hot and humid from June to September,

with daytime temperatures as high as 122 °F (50 °C). The
Dhows sailing off Doha, Qatar. spring and fall months—April, May, October, and
© Lingbeek/iStock.com
November—are temperate, averaging about 63 °F (17 °C),
and the winters are slightly cooler. Precipitation is scarce,
with less than 3 inches (75 mm) falling annually (generally in winter).

Plant and animal life

Vegetation is found only in the north, where the country’s irrigated farming areas are located
and where desert plants blossom brie y during the spring rains. Fauna is limited, and the
government has implemented a program to protect the Arabian oryx, Qatar’s national
animal.

People

Ethnic groups and languages

Qatar was originally settled by Bedouin nomads from the central part of the Arabian
Peninsula. Qatari citizens, however, constitute only a small portion—roughly one-ninth—of
the total population today. Economic growth beginning in the 1970s created an economy
dependent on foreign workers—mostly from Pakistan, India, and Iran—who now far
outnumber nationals. Few Qataris retain a nomadic lifestyle.

Arabic is the of cial language, and most Qataris speak a dialect of Gulf Arabic similar to that
spoken in surrounding states. Modern Standard Arabic is taught in schools, and English is
commonly used. Among the large expatriate population, Persian and Urdu are often spoken.

Religion
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Qatar: Ethnic composition
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
Qatar: Religious affiliation
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
Doha, Qatar: Fanar, Qatar Islamic
Cultural Center
Fanar, Qatar Islamic Cultural Center, Doha,
Qatar.
Nmnogueira (CC-BY-4.0)
A minaret and houses in the capital city of
Doha, Qatar.
© Peter Vine
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Qatar -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia
Islam is the of cial religion, and Qataris are largely Sunni
Muslims. There is a small Shīʿite minority. The ruling Āl
Thānī (Thānī family) adheres to the same Wahhābī
interpretation of Islam as the rulers of Saudi Arabia,
though not as strictly. Women, for example, have greater
freedom in Qatar than in Saudi Arabia.
Settlement patterns
Qataris are largely urban dwellers; less than 1 percent of
the population lives in rural areas. Doha, on the east
coast, is Qatar’s largest city and commercial centre and
contains about half of the emirate’s population. It has a
deepwater port and an international airport. The main oil
port and industrial centre is Umm Saʿīd, to the south of
Doha on the eastern coast. Al-Rayyān, just northwest of
Doha, is the country’s second major urban area. These
three cities and many smaller settlements are linked by
roads. Of the many islands and coral reefs belonging to
Qatar, Ḥālūl, in the Persian Gulf 60 miles (97 km) east of
Doha, serves as a collecting and storage point for the
country’s three offshore oil elds.
Demographic trends
The population of Qatar has been steadily growing;
despite a markedly low death rate, however, the
country’s relatively low birth rate has led to a rate of
natural increase that is slightly lower than the world
average. Its net migration rate is the highest of any
country in the Persian Gulf region and the third highest
in the world. Males outnumber females more than three
to one—in large part because of the disproportionate
number of expatriate males. Likewise due to the high
migration rate, the population is largely of working age,
with more than 70 percent of the population
concentrated in the 15–29 and 30–44 age ranges. The
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average life expectancy is about 77 years for males and 81

for females.

Economy
Qatar: Urban-rural
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Qatar’s economic prosperity is derived from the
extraction and export of petroleum—discovered in 1939
and rst produced in 1949—and natural gas. Before
World War II, Qatar’s population engaged in pearling,
shing, and some trade (with little exception the only
occupations available) and was one of the poorest in the
world. By the 1970s, however, native Qataris enjoyed one
of the highest per capita incomes in the world, despite
Qatar: Age breakdown subsequent declines in income due to uctuations in
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. world oil prices. Qatar’s original oil concession was
granted to the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), a
consortium of European and American rms. This and later concessions were nationalized in
the 1970s. While state-owned Qatar Petroleum (formerly Qatar General Petroleum
Corporation) oversees oil and gas operations, private corporations continue to play an
important role as service companies.

Agriculture and shing

The government has attempted to modernize the shing and agriculture sectors by offering
interest-free loans; yet food production continues to generate only a tiny fraction of gross
domestic product (GDP). The scarcity of fertile land and water imposes severe limitations on
agriculture, and a large proportion of the country’s food must be imported. Use of treated
sewage ef uent and desalinated water for irrigation, however, has helped to expand the
production of fruits such as dates and melons and vegetables such as tomatoes, squash, and
eggplant, which Qatar now exports to other Persian Gulf countries. Production of meat,
cereal-grains, and milk also began to increase by the end of the 20th century.

Once the mainstays of Qatar’s economy, shing and pearling have greatly declined in
importance. Pearling is almost non-existent, in large part because of Japan’s dominant
cultured-pearl industry. The government maintains a shing eet and since the late 1990s
has placed greater emphasis on commercial shing and shrimp harvesting.

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Resources and power

Qatar possesses enormous deposits of natural gas, and

its offshore North Field is one of the largest gas elds in
the world. The country’s petroleum reserves, found both
onshore along the western coast at Dukhān and offshore
from the eastern coast, are modest by regional
standards.

In an attempt to reduce its dependency on oil, Qatar

Oil refinery on the island of Hālūl in the
began to develop its natural gas resources in the mid-
Persian Gulf, Qatar.
© Peter Sanders 1990s. To develop its gas elds, Qatar had to borrow
heavily, but high oil prices in the early 21st century put
the country on more rm nancial footing. Qatar’s strategy has been to develop its natural
gas reserves aggressively through joint projects with major international oil and gas
companies, focusing on the North Field. Natural gas surpassed oil as the largest share of the
government’s revenues and the country’s GDP in the rst decade of the 21st century.

Manufacturing

Qatar has sought to diversify its economy through industrialization. Most of the
manufacturing sector comprises large rms of mixed state and foreign private ownership.
For example, the Qatar Petrochemical Company is largely owned by a government holding
company, and a French rm has a minor stake. Flour milling and cement production have
also been undertaken. Diversi cation by expanding manufacturing depends on an
abundance of cheap energy for running plants, however, and is thus tied to Qatar’s
hydrocarbon resources. Its natural gas reserves have been used to develop a strong lique ed
natural gas (LNG) industry.

Finance

The Qatar Central Bank (Maṣraf Qaṭar al-Markazī), founded in 1993, provides banking
functions for the state and issues the Qatari rial, the national currency. In addition to
domestic banks, including commercial, development, and Islamic banks (institutions bound
by strict religious rules governing transactions), licensed foreign banks are also authorized to
operate. Qatar has been generous in its foreign aid disbursements, particularly to other Arab
and Islamic countries. The Doha Stock Exchange began operations in 1997.

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Trade

Machinery and transport equipment, manufactured

Qatar: Major import sources
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
goods, and food and live animals are Qatar’s major
imports. LNG, crude petroleum, and re ned petroleum
account for the bulk of the value of exports. Top import
sources for Qatar include the United States, China,
Germany, and Japan. Japan, South Korea, and India are
among Qatar’s most important export destinations.
Japan alone receives by far the largest proportion of
Qatar’s exports, largely in the form of petroleum and
petroleum products.

Services

The service sector, including public administration and

Qatar: Major export destinations defense, accounts for roughly half of GDP and employs
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
more than half of the workforce. The country’s military
expenditure as percentage of gross national product is
high, at nearly four times the world average. In an attempt to further diversify Qatar’s
economy, the government has sought to develop tourism, in particular by promoting the
country as a site for international conferences; however, tourism remains a relatively small
component of the economy.

Labour and taxation

Foreigners account for the great bulk of Qatar’s workforce, a matter of continuing concern
for Qatari of cials. Qatar has banned the employment of Egyptians since 1996, when the
government claimed that Egypt was involved in an unsuccessful coup. The government has
actively pursued programs to encourage employing and promoting Qatari nationals in the
workforce. However, a ve-year plan introduced in 2000 to boost signi cantly the number of
Qataris in the labour force fell far short of its goals. Labour unions and associations are
forbidden. As in most countries of the region, the standard workweek is Saturday through
Wednesday.

Qatar does not levy taxes on personal income, nor does it have a sales tax. In coordination
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Qatar was set to implement a value-added tax of 5

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percent by 2020. Foreign corporations (excluding those owned by GCC members) are taxed,
but the amount accounts for less than one-tenth of the government’s revenue. The bulk of
its revenue comes from the sale of petroleum and natural gas.

Transportation and telecommunications

Qatar has more than 760 miles (1,230 km) of road, nearly all of which are paved. There are no
railroads. The country has several important ports, including those at Doha and Umm Saʿīd.
An international airport is located at Doha, and Qatar Airways is the country’s national carrier.

Qatar Public Telecommunications Corporation is the sole provider of telecommunication

services in the country. It also sets policies and makes administrative decisions for the sector.
In 1996 the Internet was made available to the public, with Qatar Public Telecommunications
Corporation as the sole service provider. Internet use is highest among Qatari nationals. A
submarine bre-optic cable system completed in the late 1990s links Qatar with Bahrain,
Oman, and Kuwait.

Government And Society

Constitutional framework

A constitutional emirate with one advisory body, Qatar is ruled by a hereditary emir from the
Āl Thānī. Members of the ruling family hold almost all the major ministerial posts, which are
appointed by the emir. The family, however, is large and fragmented. As oil revenues rose
after World War II, contention within the ruling family grew, and there have been several
bloodless palace coups.

The emir’s power is constrained by the need to maintain the support of important family
members, many of whom occupy high governmental posts. The homogeneity of the ruling
family and the country’s wealth contribute to Qatar’s political stability. The emir has also
cautiously expanded political participation, allowing the rst municipal elections to take
place in 1999, with an electorate that included both female and male Qataris. Under a
provisional constitution enacted in 1972, the emir ruled in consultation with a Council of
Ministers (Majlis al-Wuzarāʾ) and an appointed Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shūrā). However, a
new constitution was approved by referendum in 2003 and enacted in 2005; among its

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provisions was a new National Assembly, two-thirds of whose members would be popularly
elected and one-third appointed.

Justice

Qatar’s legal system has several sources: the Sharīʿah (Islamic law), Ottoman law, and
European civil and (to a lesser extent) common law. The latter was introduced through the
borrowing of codes of other European-in uenced Arab states. Personal status law is
governed largely by the Sharīʿah, while criminal law is in uenced but not governed by it. In
addition to a Higher Judicial Council, there are also several lower courts and a system of
appeals courts. The emir sometimes acts as the nal court of appeal. Formal civil and
criminal codes were introduced in the 1970s.

Political process

There are no political parties in Qatar. Since 1999, Qataris have been allowed to vote in
municipal elections. Voting is open to all citizens aged 18 years and older, except for
members of the police and armed forces, and women are allowed to stand for public of ce.

Security

Military service is voluntary for males aged 18 years and older. Qatar has a small defense force
—of some 12,000 troops, most of whom serve in the army—and the country depends on the
protection of its neighbours and allies to deter possible external threats. The country’s
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, however, is high: ve times the world average,
more than almost any other country’s.

Health and welfare

Health care and medical services are provided free to all residents through government
programs. The government also funds recreational and cultural clubs and facilities for young
people as part of its extensive “youth welfare” campaign.

Education
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Education is free but not compulsory for all citizens between the ages of 6 and 16. Classes are
segregated by sex. Qatar spends generously on education, having one of the highest per-
pupil expenditures in the world. Its system has expanded rapidly. Two teacher-training
faculties, one for men and one for women, were established in 1973, and together they were
given university status, as the University of Qatar, in 1977. The university has continued to
expand, and a new campus was completed in Doha in 1985. Interest in establishing Qatar as
a major regional research hub led to the foundation of Education City, a multi-university
facility located on the outskirts of Doha. By the early 21st century several American
institutions had branches in Education City, including Virginia Commonwealth University,
Weill Cornell Medical College (part of Cornell University), Carnegie Mellon University, Texas
A&M University, Northwestern University, and Georgetown University. The universities offered
programs such as premedical and medical studies, business administration, chemical,
electrical, and mechanical engineering, journalism, and ne arts.

The government also provides adult education classes in

schools and centres throughout the country, with an
emphasis on increasing adult literacy. About four- fths
of the country’s population is literate, with roughly equal
proportions of males and females.

Doha, Qatar: Education City

Facilities of Texas A&M University at

Education City, a complex in Doha, Qatar,
that housed branch campuses for six
Cultural Life
American universities.
Carlos Cazalis/Corbis
Daily life and social customs

The Qatari people are descendants of Bedouin and have

Doha, Qatar: Education City
International students at Texas A&M
University's campus at Education City in
Doha, Qatar, 2011.
Osama Faisal/AP
Many women still wear the full length black cloak (ʿabāyah), generally over Western clothing,
maintained a tradition of generous hospitality. Qatari
society, however, tends to be conservative in most
respects and is heavily in uenced by Islamic customs.
The consumption of alcohol, for example, is frowned
upon, although alcohol may be served in a limited
number of hotels catering mainly to foreigners. Likewise,
dress is generally traditional and conservative. Qatari
Arab men usually dress in a owing white shirt (thawb)
and a head scarf (kaf yeh) held in place by a cord (ʿiqāl).
Dress for Qatari women, although still conservative, is
much less formal than in neighbouring Saudi Arabia.

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but others simply wear the veil (ḥijāb). Their traditional dress is often decorated with gold or
silver embroidery. In public the sexes are customarily separated.

Qatari cuisine features fresh sh and rice cooked with

Indian spices. A typical meal might include broiled sh
served on a bed of spiced rice with curry and potatoes.
Coffee is the beverage of choice and is usually served
strong, boiling hot, and without sugar. The capital of
Doha also abounds in restaurants offering cuisines from
throughout the world.

Qatari men in traditional dress at a hawk

Qataris celebrate the standard Islamic holidays, including
market.
Ramadan and the two ʿīds, ʿĪd al-Fiṭr and ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā.
SuperStock
They also celebrate several secular holidays, such as
Independence Day and the anniversary of the emir’s ascension to power.

The arts

The Qatari Fine Arts Society promotes and exhibits work by local painters, as do the handful
of galleries to be found in Doha. The National Council for Culture, Arts, and Heritage and
several other agencies and departments oversee literary, artistic, and cultural activities as
well as recreation and tourism. The traditional Bedouin arts of weaving (mostly rugs and
pillows), poetry, and singing are still practiced. A genre of music known as nahmah, once
popular among pearl divers in Qatar and the broader Persian Gulf region, virtually
disappeared with the decline of the pearling industry, although the Qatari government has
made great efforts to preserve it. Arab, Pakistani, Indian, and other expatriate workers have
brought their musical styles to the country, but Qatari youth listen more to Western and Arab
popular music than to Bedouin or other traditional forms.

Cultural institutions

Located in a former palace, the Qatar National Museum

(founded 1975), in Doha, includes displays on the
country’s history and archaeology as well as a model
lagoon in which Qatari sailing and pearling vessels are
featured; the museum’s large aquarium is a popular
Doha, Qatar: Museum of Islamic Art
attraction. A fort at Doha has been converted into a

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The Museum of Islamic Art in Doha, Qatar, museum for traditional crafts. Qatar’s National Theatre
designed by I.M. Pei.
performs programs in the capital.
Larry Johnson (CC-BY-2.0)

Sports and recreation

Qatar’s sports culture blends the traditional sports of Arabia’s desert society with
contemporary sports of Western origin. Popular traditional sports include Arabian horse
racing, camel racing, and falconry, all rooted in the country’s nomadic past. Western sports
such as basketball, golf, handball, football (soccer), swimming, table tennis, track, and
volleyball are practiced widely, but primarily by the expatriate population; football is
overwhelmingly the most popular of these. In 2010 it was announced that Qatar would be
the site of the nals of the World Cup football competition in 2022, making it the rst Middle
Eastern country scheduled to host the event. The country also hosts several annual sporting
events, of which tennis, golf, and automobile racing are the most notable. The Qatar National
Sport Federation, founded in 1961, serves as an organizing body for sports education. Qatar
made its Olympic debut at the 1984 Summer Games; the country has never participated in
the Winter Games.

Media and publishing

Government-owned radio and television stations

broadcast in Arabic, English, French, and Urdu. Satellite
television transmissions from outside the country are
easily accessible through local providers, and Qatar
receives radio broadcasts from the neighbouring gulf
states and from such international broadcasters as the
BBC World Service. In 1996 media restrictions in Qatar
were relaxed—the country’s press is among the freest in
the region—and that year Al Jazeera, a satellite television
network, was founded by a member of the ruling family.
The outspoken news channel is received throughout
much of the Muslim world and has become one of the
most popular stations in the Middle East, as well as one
Doha, Qatar: 2006 Asian Games
of the most important sources of news in a region where
Torch of the 2006 Asian Games in Doha,
there is little toleration for a free press. It became
Qatar.
internationally known in 2001 after broadcasting several
Jimmy Baikovicius (CC-BY-2.0)
speeches and interviews of the militant Islamist Osama
bin Laden. Several local daily newspapers and weekly publications are also available in Qatar.
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History

Little is known of Qatar’s history before the 18th century, when the region’s population
consisted largely of Bedouin nomads and there were only a few small shing villages. Qatar’s
modern history begins conventionally in 1766 with the migration to the peninsula of families
from Kuwait, notably the Āl Khalīfah. Their settlement at the new town of Al-Zubārah grew
into a small pearl-diving and trade centre. In 1783 the Āl Khalīfah led the conquest of nearby
Bahrain, where they remained the ruling family throughout the 20th century. Following the
departure of the Āl Khalīfah from Qatar, the country was ruled by a series of transitory
sheikhs, the most famous of whom was Raḥmah ibn Jābir al-Jalāhimah, who was regarded
by the British as a leading pirate of the so-called Pirate Coast.

Qatar came to the attention of the British in 1867 when a dispute between the Bahraini Āl
Khalīfah, who continued to hold some claim to Al-Zubārah, and the Qatari residents
escalated into a major confrontation, in the course of which Doha was virtually destroyed.
Until the attack, Britain had viewed Qatar as a Bahraini dependency. It then signed a
separate treaty with Muḥammad ibn Thānī in 1868, setting the course both for Qatar’s future
independence and for the rule of the Āl Thānī, who until the treaty were only one among
several important families on the peninsula.

Ottoman forces, which had conquered the nearby Al-Ḥasā province of Saudi Arabia, occupied
Qatar in 1871 at the invitation of the ruler’s son, then left following the Saudi reconquest of Al-
Ḥasā in 1913. In 1916 Britain signed a treaty with Qatar’s leader that resembled earlier
agreements with other gulf states, giving Britain control over foreign policy in return for
British protection.

In 1935 Qatar signed a concession agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company; four years
later oil was discovered. Oil was not recovered on a commercial scale, however, until 1949. The
revenues from the oil company, later named Petroleum Development (Qatar) Limited and
then the Qatar Petroleum Company, rose dramatically. The distribution of these revenues
stirred serious in ghting in the Āl Thānī, prompting the British to intervene in the succession
of 1949 and eventually precipitating a palace coup in 1972 that brought Sheikh Khalīfah ibn
Ḥamad Āl Thānī to power. In 1968 Britain announced plans to withdraw from the gulf. After
negotiations with neighbouring sheikhdoms—those comprising the present United Arab
Emirates and Bahrain—Qatar declared independence on September 1, 1971. The earlier
agreements with Britain were replaced with a treaty of friendship. That same month Qatar
became a member of the Arab League and of the United Nations. In 1981 the emirate joined
its ve Arab gulf neighbours in establishing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an alliance
formed to promote economic cooperation and enhance both internal security and external
defense against the threats generated by the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq War.

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Qatari troops participated in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91, notably in the battle for control
of the Saudi border town of Raʿs al-Khafjī on January 30–31. Doha, which served as a base for
offensive strikes by French, Canadian, and U.S. aircraft against Iraq and the Iraqi forces
occupying Kuwait, remained minimally affected by the con ict.

Renewed arguments over the distribution of oil revenues also caused the 1995 palace coup
that brought Sheikh Khalīfah’s son, Sheikh Ḥamad, to power. Although his father had
permitted Ḥamad to take over day-to-day governing some years before, Khalīfah contested
the coup. Before Ḥamad fully consolidated his power, he had to weather an attempted
countercoup in 1996 and a protracted lawsuit with his father over the rightful ownership of
billions of dollars of invested oil revenues, which was nally settled out of court.

During the 1990s Qatar agreed to permit U.S. military forces to place equipment in several
sites throughout the country and granted them use of Qatari airstrips during U.S. operations
in Afghanistan in 2001. These agreements were formalized in late 2002, and Qatar became
the headquarters for American and allied military operations in Iraq the following year.

John Duke Anthony

Jill Ann Crystal

Rising demand for natural gas propelled the economy to new heights in the rst decade of
the 21st century and provided funds for Qatar’s efforts to lift itself from relative obscurity to a
position of greater prominence in the Middle East. The Qatari government invested heavily in
development with a special focus on prestigious cultural projects, including museums and
extension campuses for foreign universities. Qatar also sought to cultivate a reputation for
openness and political independence; this effort was perhaps exempli ed by Qatar’s
sponsorship of Al Jazeera, a popular satellite television network known for its largely
independent news coverage, which often included criticism of authoritarian Arab
governments and U.S. Middle East policy. Notably absent from the network’s broadcasts was
any criticism of Qatar, although the country remained an absolute monarchy and continued
to host a large U.S. military base.

One hallmark of Qatar’s foreign policy was its cordial ties with a wide range of Middle Eastern
countries and groups, which in some cases required balancing between regional rivals such
as Iran and Saudi Arabia or between secular governments and Islamist opposition groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood. With a reputation for impartiality, Qatar sought out
opportunities to bolster its international standing by serving as a mediator in Middle East
disputes. These efforts met with mixed success: a 2007 accord brokered by Qatar between
the Yemeni government and Ḥūthī rebels fell apart within months, but in 2008 Qatar proved
instrumental in resolving a factional standoff in Lebanon that had threatened to develop into
armed con ict.

https://www.britannica.com/print/article/485603 14/16
12/10/2018 Qatar -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia

The outbreak of popular uprisings against many of the entrenched regimes of the Middle
East in 2011 (see Arab Spring) provided new opportunities for Qatar to shape events in the
region. In Libya Qatar took an active role in supporting the rebellion against the regime of
Muammar al-Qadda , providing weapons and funds to the rebels and contributing military
assets to the NATO-led mission to enforce a no- y zone. In Syria Qatar played an important
part in the Arab League’s attempts to broker a peace agreement between the regime of
Bashar al-Assad and the opposition. When the agreement failed in 2012, Qatar took the side
against Assad, sending weapons and nancial aid to the rebels. In Egypt, Qatar continued its
long-standing support of the Muslim Brotherhood, providing billions of dollars to the Muslim
Brotherhood-led government of Mohammed Morsi, elected in 2012.

In June 2013 the 61-year-old Ḥamad announced his

abdication in favour of his 33-year-old son, Sheikh
Tamim, the crown prince, citing the need to make way
for a new generation of Qatari leaders. The transfer of
power was seen as unusual for the Gulf Arab region,
where rulers typically occupied their positions for life.

Tamim’s leadership was tested early in his reign by a

Haniyeh, Ismail; Sheikh Ḥamad bin series of setbacks to Qatar’s activist foreign policy. In
Khalīfa Āl Thānī Egypt, Morsi was ousted by a coup in July 2013, and the
Ḥamās Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (left) Muslim Brotherhood was driven underground by a harsh
and the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Ḥamad bin crackdown, while Libya and Syria—two countries where
Khalīfa Āl Thānī, arriving at a cornerstone-
Qatar sponsored armed groups—sank into chaos. In
laying ceremony for a new residential
March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab
neighbourhood in Khan Younis, southern
Gaza Strip, 2012. Emirates (UAE)—Qatar’s neighbors and fellow members
Mohammed Salem—EPA/Alamy of the Gulf Cooperation Council—registered their
irritation with Qatar’s independent foreign policy and its
support of the Muslim Brotherhood by withdrawing their ambassadors from Doha. The
ambassadors were reinstated in November after Qatar showed a willingness to distance itself
slightly from the Muslim Brotherhood and reconcile with the new government of Egypt led
by Pres. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Qatar’s rising international pro le, propelled higher when it was awarded the 2022 World
Cup for football (soccer) in December 2010, brought new scrutiny to Qatar’s domestic affairs,
particularly its reliance on low-paid foreign workers. The so-called kafalah labour system,
which barred the estimated 1.5 million foreign workers in Qatar from leaving the country or
changing jobs without the permission of their employers, attracted particular criticism from
labour and human rights groups. In late 2017, Qatari of cials announced plans to reform the
system and allow international monitoring of labour conditions.

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Tensions between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours reached a new level in June 2017 when a
coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain cut
diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed an economic blockade. Saudi and U.A.E. of cials
justi ed the blockade as a necessary measure to counter Qatar’s alleged support for militant
Islamist groups and its friendly relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s primary regional rival.

Qatar remained de ant, though, refusing to comply with a list of demands that it dismissed
as placing unacceptable restrictions on Qatari sovereignty. Despite an initial shock to the
country’s economy, Qatar’s wealth and business-friendly environment enabled it to absorb
early losses and reorient its economy. Qatar shifted its trade away from its neighbours and
increased trade with Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, and Oman as well as with countries in Southeast
Asia. It also adjusted its economy domestically. While dairy products disappeared from
shelves at the onset of the blockade, for example, Qatar used its wealth to y thousands of
cows into the country and became self-suf cient in dairy. In 2018 the International Monetary
Fund reported that the impact of the blockade on Qatar’s economy was “manageable”
because of measures undertaken by the government to mitigate its effects.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica

CITATION INFORMATION
ARTICLE TITLE: Qatar
WEBSITE NAME: Encyclopaedia Britannica
PUBLISHER: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
DATE PUBLISHED: 08 December 2018
URL: https://www.britannica.com/place/Qatar
ACCESS DATE: December 10, 2018

https://www.britannica.com/print/article/485603 16/16
12/10/2018 Doha slavery museum confronts past to help Qataris shape future - The National

Doha slavery museum confronts past to help Qataris

shape future
A remarkable new museum in Doha shines a rare light on the Indian Ocean slave trade a century ago, and is
helping Qataris to shape their future by examining issues of race and identity in the Arabian Gulf.
Taimur Khan
May 23, 2016

Updated: May 23, 2016 04:00 AM

The Bin Jelmood House museum explores the history of a trade rarely addressed in official narratives. Photos Courtesy Bin
Jelmood House

DOHA // Newly planted trees stand solemnly over the whitewashed courtyard of a traditional mansion in old Doha
that less than a hundred years ago was often filled with shackled men, women and children from east Africa — the
main commodities in a booming Gulf slave trade.

The large home once belonged to Doha’s most prominent slave trader, a man his neighbours called “jelmood”, or
“rock” — an allusion to his hard heart. Today, in the old house, this story and the larger history of slavery in the
Indian Ocean world that brought, by some estimates, hundreds of thousands of enslaved people to the Arabian
Gulf is being explored for the first time in a museum confronting the past and, its curators hope, helping Qataris
shape their future.

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“These settings reveal the circumstances of the enslaved people whose lives form part of the story of this country,”
reads one of the museum’s displays — a history that has largely been forgotten and avoided in both official
narratives and the public conscience, even by the descendants of slaves now integrated into Gulf societies.

The first exhibit in the museum features an ancient slave sales contract inscribed in Aramaic on a clay tablet,
Greek paintings of slaves working an olive plantation and other examples of slavery throughout history. The
artefacts are intended to create historical context and describe the various forms of slavery, stretching from ancient
Mesopotamia to serfdom in Middle Ages Europe and the most brutal form of human bondage, the trans-Atlantic
slave trade.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Read: How 800,000 African slaves ended up in the Gulf

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The historical frame then shifts to the system of which the Gulf was a part, the Indian Ocean slave trade. Short
video lectures by scholars and archival photographs describe the “maritime silk road” that connected the islands of
South-east Asia, the Indian subcontinent, Persia, the Arab Gulf and east Africa as a distinct region. One of the
threads linking these far-flung cultures and empires was slavery, though it was of a less oppressive form than in
the Americas. In the Indian Ocean world, race was not defined primarily by skin colour, but through paternal
descent.

While many slaves brought to the Gulf were from impoverished Balochistan, and some Gulf Arabs were enslaved
through war or sold themselves into slavery because of extreme poverty, during the trade’s peak most were from
east Africa.

The museum tells their stories through testimony given by freed slaves in manumission documents from the British
political agent in Manama — the colonial administrator for the Trucial States — from the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, when the trade was at its height. Stories of individual enslaved Africans are told in first person in
animated and live action films that trace their paths from east Africa to the Gulf, and the harsh circumstances of
their lives as they dived for pearls, worked date plantations and served in households.

The museum curators, who worked with western historians on the plan for the museum, collected oral histories
from a handful of Qatari families and archival material that details the roles of Qataris in the trade. But they have
not presented all of the material publicly, and took care to obscure identities in the exhibits.

Some Qataris, both descendants of slaves and of slave-owners, did have concerns about the museum, and many
refused requests for oral histories, said a consultant who worked on the museum. As a result, Bin Jelmood House
does not explore in much detail how contemporary Qatari society has been influenced by people whose ancestors
were brought, not so long ago, from Africa.

Conceptions of race and identity in the Gulf and a desire by many citizens to leave their history untold forced the
museum’s western consultants to rethink how they would present the story of slavery. Distinct black identity and
multiculturalism were not available frames for the project. “If they’re a Qatari national and they have been for a
long time and they happen to be black, they’re not ‘Black,’” the consultant said.

Bin Jelmood House is one of three new museums in the Msheireb heritage quarter, all located in a cluster of old
homes around which the district is being developed as a bridge between historical Doha and the towers and malls
of West Bay and Katara. Each of the museums focuses on an aspect of Qatar’s history, particularly since the
discovery of oil in the 1939.

But Bin Jelmood House stands out by confronting a painful and unpopular aspect of that history. “Since this house
was owned by a slave trader we thought it would be interesting for us to talk about human exploitation, and this is
part of the history that we cannot deny — we cannot doctor it to tell the story of something else,” said Hafiz Ali Ali,
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the director of the Msheireb museums. “The significance is that each house transformed Qatar in some way, [and]
the key message we wanted to communicate was to create this awareness for Qatari people to know about the
past and also look at the future — what will be the future? How we can shape our society?”

The last portion of the museum ties slavery in the past to modern forms of human exploitation, from sex trafficking
to workers in Bangladesh’s garment factories and those who make our mobile phones and computers, to the
conditions for labourers in the Gulf.

Although Mr Ali said the museum was not intended as a reaction to criticism of Qatar over the treatment of mostly
South Asian workers building the football World Cup 2022 infrastructure, broadening the conversation about
exploitation is a savvy tactic, observers say.

“It’s probably largely communicating to a global audience … and trying to show they are both open to dealing with
some of these challenges, but also showing that this isn’t a fault that’s just with Qatar, that there are global
connections, which I think is a pretty sophisticated way of tackling that problem,” said Kristin Smith Diwan, senior
resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.

Bin Jelmood House has also opened at a time when Gulf governments are working to create and reinforce notions
of national belonging and identity as imperative economic reforms, privatisation and diversification threaten to
weaken the traditional social contract between ruler and citizen that has been underwritten by vast — and now
unsustainable — state largesse.

Over the past decade, Gulf countries have sought to do this, in part, through “novel forms of nation-building and
inculcation of patriotism”, Ms Diwan wrote recently.

These initiatives are accelerating, Ms Diwan said. “How do you strengthen the national identity of your citizens at
the same time that you’re opening up your country” economically, she said. The Bin Jelmood museum is, partially,
an attempt to “educate citizens towards greater pluralism and tolerance”.

Qatar was the first Gulf country to give citizenship to the descendants of slaves, and its museum, which brings this
history into conversations about national identity, is also ahead of the curve. The United States still does not have
a national slavery museum, although a museum of African American history and culture is to open in Washington
later this year.

“The new museum in Doha, by highlighting the peak pearling period, when great wealth was created on the backs
of enslaved and exploited divers, bravely challenges widely held notions of Gulf history, and this differs significantly
from other museums I have seen in the Gulf,” said Matthew Hopper, a historian at Cambridge university. “Among
the Gulf states, Qatar pioneered the broad inclusion of diverse members of its population into its citizenry early in
its history.”

The museum’s stark presentation of the recent past and its inclusion of this history in a national narrative is an
important step forward, said one Gulf commentator.

“The Bin Jelmood House museum is a turning point for the Gulf states that are finally starting to confront a dark
era in their past. Slavery was only outlawed in the Gulf in the 1960s and many of our parents and grandparents
witnessed it first-hand,” said Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi, an Emirati cultural commentator and founder of the Barjeel
Art Foundation. “There are also parallels that can be drawn between the mistreatment of individuals in the recent
past and the continuing challenges with regards to labour practices in the Gulf. Education is the best guarantee
that in the future no individual’s personal rights will be violated, and such museums are a cornerstone in this
educational process.”

Reem, a 20-year-old Qatari communications student at Northwestern University in Doha, was visiting the museum
as part of her literature class’s reading of The Moor’s Account, a recent novel about a Moorish slave in the New
World.

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“I grew up in Doha and had no idea this was a slave market,” she said. “We’ve always known or had this general
sense of how they are a part of our family and how they’ve been integrated into our community, but there is this
whole part we didn’t know about until you go through all the rooms and you see the historical background, the
changes, and it’s a different perspective, it’s a different narrative than what we’re used to.”

tkhan@thenational.ae

* This article has been updated to reflect the correct designation of Hafiz Ali Ali.

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Being and Knowing in an Age of Contingency

By Ebrahim Moosa

A philosopher whose brother recently died, was asked: “What ailment caused your brother to die?” He replied:
“His being in the world (kaynūnatuhu fī ʾl-dunyā).” Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī1

‫ ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎﻧت ﻋﻠّﺗﮫ؟ ﻗﺎل ﻛﯾﻧوﻧﺗﮫ ﻓﻲ اﻟدﻧﯾﺎ‬:‫ﻗﯾل ﻟﻔﯾﻠﺳوف و ﻗد ﻣﺎت أﺧوه‬

Kafka writes that people cannot make promises for “impossible contingencies.” “But if one achieves the
impossible, the promises appear later retrospectively precisely where one had looked in vain for them before.”2

Introduction

A brain-dead patient is no longer alive in the eyes of the mainstream medical
profession. Yet the moral and theological status of a person on a respirator remains
contested in multiple religious traditions. This also holds true for some tendencies
in Islamic juristic-theology. Some Muslim jurists and ethical councils around the
world declare brain-dead persons to be “dead” in terms of Muslim ethics while other
perspectives contest their claims. The drama plays out at hospitals and emergency
rooms when especially Muslim families, struggle to make crucial decisions about
organ-donation or ending life-support.

Why does this happen? The juridical and ethical reasoning does not supply a
convincing juro-ethical literacy to make clear the difference between what is a
normal human being and what is the status of a body with an irreversibly damaged
brain. The juro-ethical teachings that simply yield a simple “yes” or, a “no,”
permissible or impermissible are insufficient.

Can one draw on a more sophisticated and complex Islamic literacy, one that
informs both laypersons and experts on conceptions of personhood, values, beauty
and the good life. To engage that complex literacy involves revisiting arguments of

1 ʻAlī ibn Muḥammad Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, al-Baṣāʾir wa-al-dhakhāʾir, ed. Wadād

Qāḍī (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1988). 1:137.

2 Franz Kafka, "A Report to An Academy," in Franz Kafka: The Complete Stories, ed.

Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1983 (1946)), 255.

1
ontology, epistemology and theology in both the archives of Muslim thought and
contemporary debates about all these topics.

Ontology, Epistemology and Theology

Early Muslim philosophers and philosophically-minded theologians in the medieval
world took metaphysics seriously. In other words, it is a question of the truth or a
search for the truth. Metaphysics is essentially a story or an attempt to provide a
comprehensive as possible account of what happens beyond what we see. So, we see
a chair, a house, atoms and we try to configure how each of these relate to each
other. We try to decipher the common denominator between all things. We call that
common and basic ground of all things, existence or being. How we talk about
existence is the domain of metaphysics and ontology. So, the question arises what is
the difference between metaphysics and ontology. The quick answer is that there is
hardly a significant difference. The more formal distinction is that metaphysics is
the more general conversation about how the world is, whereas ontology is the
subfield that explains what specific things exist in the world. So, for instance, the
conclusion that matter is regulated by a physical law. Ontology will describe the way
a specific reality is, namely the law of gravity.13

Metaphysics forms the foundation of philosophical thinking and gives us a sense of
what the world truly is in terms of the best cognitive and scientific tools at our
disposal. The prominent political philosopher, Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950-1), the
metaphysician par excellence, Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037) and the jurist-theologian
and polymath, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) valued metaphysics as integral to
their thinking about matters of science, faith, morals and values.4 The absence of
metaphysical thinking or, rather the paucity of complex modes of philosophical and

3 John Dupré, "The metaphysics of evolution," Interface focus 7, no. 5 (2017).
4 See Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman, Classical Arabic philosophy: an anthology of

sources (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Company, 2007).

2
moral thinking, has resulted in the impoverishment of contemporary Muslim
thought.

Medieval Muslim thinkers who were friendly toward philosophy engaged with the
Greek legacy, especially Aristotle and Plato, whose insights shaped large areas of
Muslim religious thought from theology, mysticism and law to ethics. Ghazālī for
instance, repeats the claim made by Aristotle to explain that each theoretical science
(al-ʿilm al-naẓarī) such as physics, mathematics and metaphysics are ways of
understanding being or what exists.5 As a theologian Ghazālī gives priority to
metaphysics, which Muslims thinkers translated as “divine knowledge” (al-ʿilm al-
ilāhī) and which he describes as “first philosophy” (al-falsfa-t al-ūlā), repeating how
Aristotle described metaphysics.6 For Aristotle first philosophy means “all causes
must be eternal ... that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us,” a
proposition Ghazālī would heartily endorse.7

The reason why metaphysics enjoys priority over physics and mathematics in
Aristotle’s scheme is because the science of “an immovable substance,” as Aristotle
puts it, must be prior, which then performs as first philosophy. (italics mine) In
other words, metaphysics in this scheme becomes universal, namely a way of
reasoning about the divine, theology, in a bid to comprehend the immovable Creator
and an estimation of how divine being acts in the world. Apart from Muslim
philosophers, clearly many Muslim metaphysicians, and most theologians, will not
describe the “immovable” as a “substance,” since as Ghazālī would remind us, “God
the Sublime is neither a substance (jawhar) nor an accident (ʿaraḍ).” 8 So any

5 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī and Aḥmad Farīd Mazīdī,

Maqāṣid al-falāsifa wa yalīhi Iljām al-ʿawām min ʿilm al-kalām wa al-Fuṣūl fī al-asʾila
wa ajwibatihā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 2003). 64-67.
6 Aristotle, "Metaphysica (Metaphysics)," in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard

Mc Keon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), 1026a 24&31; al-Ghazālī and
Mazīdī, Maqāṣid. 64.
7 Aristotle, "Metaphysica (Metaphysics)," 1026a 16-18.
8 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, 5 vols. (Beirut:

Dār al-Kutub al- ͑Ilmīya, 1421/2001). "Kitāb sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb," 3:16; For

3
discussion about God will be at the beginning of a metaphysical conversation to
consider being qua being as initiated by God. This also requires that we know how
and what the world is to the best of our available knowledge at a particular time.

A Muslim metaphysical conversation raises the following question: who is that
formative being who makes all other being possible? Yes, Muslim theology will
engage in a conversation related to the attributes belonging to the Divine Being.9 But
it would also be wise to remember that we use metaphysical language for the
purpose of our own coherence and understanding of the Divine Being. Muslim
thinkers disagreed whether we have an absolute understanding that God is identical
to our descriptions of the Divine, and according to the Muʿtazilī school our
descriptions were “mere words.”10 And according to the proto-Sunnī school and
later Ashʿarīs, the divine attributes mentioned in scripture “signify real, existing and
pre-eternal attributes of God.. .”11 Despite doctrinal disagreement, often Muslim
thinkers will say, God is beyond our best knowledge of the Divine, although
revelation through divinely dispatched prophets provide us with a minimum
understanding of the character of God. While such teachings provide us with a sense
of the Divine, we always-already admit, the Divine is beyond our imagination at
another level.

Ontology, the total view of what exists or the study of what there is, lies at the center
of metaphysics.12 Yet, a recognition of human finitude and a surprising post-modern

philosophers designating God a substance (jawhar) see Abū al-Baqāʾ Ayyūb b. Mūsā
al-Ḥusaynī al-Kafawī, edited and annoted by ʿAdnān Darwīsh, and Muḥammad al-
Maṣrī, al-Kulliyāt: Muʿjam fī al-Muṣṭalaḥāt wa al-Furūq al-Lughawīya, 2nd ed.
(Beirut: Muʾassasa al-Risāla, 1419/1998). 345.
9 Aristotle, "Metaphysica (Metaphysics)," 1026a 19&29-33.
10 See Hussein Ali Abdulsater, Shiʿi doctrine, Muʿtazili theology: al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā

and Imami discourse (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017). 70.

11 Ibid.
12 Thomas Hofweber, "Logic and Ontology," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University,

2017), 9/30.

4
modesty has cast doubt on whether it is even feasible to aspire to attain a coherent
understanding of all that exists. Hostility to metaphysics by positivism in the early
twentieth century has been replaced by a new turn in favor of metaphysics but with
a difference. Now there is there is a more “pluralistic” and “exuberant, metaphysics
of the explorers of possible worlds,” writes the philosopher Anthony Kenny.13
Divergences and disagreements between philosophers, metaphysicians and
theologians bear testimony to the “complexity of the epistemological configuration”
with which we view the universe and how we perceive it.14 At an earlier time
someone like Ghazālī provided the answer: existence/being (wujūd) at its most
elementary level consists of two categories, a substance (jawhar) and an accident
(ʿaraḍ).15 Atoms are substances, but redness in apples is an example of an accident.

In metaphysics, writes Ghazālī, one expends “thinking in the causes of being in its
totality.”16 A simple reason animates thinking and reflection: in order to configure
the grounds of what exists, namely, “a cause and its effect” and the discursive search
for the “singular cause, the necessary existent (wājib al-wujūd),” God.17 More
pertinent is the need to decipher the attributes of the divine as well as the
“connection of all existing things with the Divine and the mode of how things stem
from God.”18

To configure the nature of the divine requires a comprehensive framework of
knowledge. Of the three interrelated fields of learning—physics, mathematics and
metaphysics—says Ghazālī, mathematics is the least confusing given its precision,
while in his view physics is the most confounding. Why is physics, in Ghazālī’s view,

13 Anthony Kenny, Philosophy in the modern world, 4 vols., vol. 4, A new history of

Western philosophy (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press,
2007). 191.
14 Michel Foucault, The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences (New

York: Vintage Books, 1973). 348.

15 al-Ghazālī and Mazīdī, Maqāṣid. 67.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.

5
unstable as a field of knowledge? The phenomena of physics, he explains, is subject
to change and alteration, as opposed to say mathematics.19 Nevertheless, Ghazālī
takes seriously the relationship between metaphysics and the physical world we
inhabit. Despite the challenges in his time of apprehending the best form and shape
of the physical world, compared to our abilities today to view the physical world, the
connection between the world and metaphysics was indispensable to him and
places him in a unique category of jurist-theologians who genuinely valued aspects
of philosophy. In many ways Ghazālī’s ideas would in some aspects resemble that of
modern idealists, but not entirely.

Theology
Ghazālī made it a requirement for serious theologians to examine “the most general
of things, namely, reality or existence (mawjūd).”20 While Ghazali was thinking of
mental categories, he would not be closed to considering empirical categories of
what exists. He classified all existing things as they were determined in Aristotelian
philosophy as eternal or, temporal (contingent, ḥādith). All things temporal, are
either designated as a substance (jawhar) or, an accident (ʿaraḍ). “A necessary being
is intelligible in itself, without reference to any external thing,” explains Lenn
Goodman with accuracy. “A contingent being’s existence,” he explains, “is not
intelligible in itself.”21

Mediaeval metaphysics is very different from the language of modern metaphysics.
Metaphysicians like Ibn Sīnā and philosophically-minded theologians like Ghazālī
shared a common language of metaphysics despite their philosophical differences.
They were both partly conversing and disagreeing with each other about the mental

19 Ibid.
20 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl, ed.

Muḥammad Sulaymān al-Ashqar (ed), 2 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasa al-Risāla,

1417/1997). 1:37; Muḥammad b. ʻAbd al-Karīm Shahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa al-
niḥal, ed. Muḥammad Sayyid Kīlānī, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1402/1982).
2:173.
21 Lenn E. Goodman, Avicenna (London & New York: Routledge, 1992). 66.

6
or spiritual realms of ontology. Each made differing claims about the material
realm.22 Ibn Sīnā thought the world emanated from a divine being, while Ghazālī
held a view that the world was instantiated by a process of creation to mention just
one difference between them. This fundamental difference also framed how each
conceptualized the divine, framed the meaning and end of revelation and viewed the
role of humans in the world. The philosopher in Ibn Sīnā gave sophisticated and
educated humans a fairly autonomous role in understanding and managing the
world, whereas Ghazālī tethered human autonomy to divine ominiscience.

The task of a theologian, wrote Ghazali, was to convince audiences with arguments
how a necessary eternal being could originate all action and how the world is the
voluntary creation of such an eternal Being. A world voluntarily created, therefore,
requires a Creator (muḥdith) whose voluntary actions include the power to dispatch
prophets to the world. Ontology, the study of being, for Ghazālī is directed at the
idea of God, the Creator. It is this Creator who vouches and affirms the credentials
and truthfulness of delegated prophets. The credentials of God’s emissaries are
shored up by way of divinely-authorized miracles they perform. At this point the
work of the theologian ends, explains Ghazali in accordance with his Ashʿarite
reasoning, for the task of persuasion by means of reason ends here, namely to find
rational grounds for the acceptance of prophecy. The ontological question is put like
this in Ghazālī’s words. “If you grasp this,” he writes referring to the ontological
issues, “then know a theologian begins to think about the most general of things,
namely, that which exists. The theologian then gradually arrives (descends) to those
aforementioned details. And, as a consequence establishes the foundations of
knowledge of good conduct (religion) (al-ʿulūm al-dīnīya) derived from the
[revealed] Book, the Sunna and the truthfulness of the messenger.”23

22 For the various topics on Muslim metaphysics see Shahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal.

2:173-201.
23 al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl. 1:37.

7
Ghazālī required theologians to only grasp and understand the fundamentals of
metaphysics. All they needed to know was that eternal existents or those things we
deem to be eternal do not multiply, nor do they divide in the manner that contingent
things do. Eternal things are unique, and as a consequence they are different. Why
are they different? Because they are endowed with certain unique attributes. These
attributes make it possible and impossible for some existing things to take on
certain forms or to appear in stipulated conditions. Certain precepts (aḥkām)
become plausible, yet it is neither obligatory nor impossible for an eternally existing
thing to adopt that precept. God’s attributes for example include omniscience and
omnipotence, but they do not have modes, meaning they do not appear in concrete
appearances in the way trees do become manifest to us.24 Of course, one can infer
God’s power and knowledge, but one will still be unable to make it visible.

There are echoes of Aristotle in Ghazālī’s emphasis on the need for theology to
establish the idea of a necessary eternal being. Aristotle grappled with theoretical
philosophy and listed the prime candidates to be mathematics, physics and
theology.25 Aristotle thought that if the divine was present anywhere “it is present in
things of this sort,” namely, in the perfection of mathematics, in the awe-inspiring
experience of nature and finally, in theology, which in Martin Heidegger’s words
serves as the “primal ground of all beings.”26 But Aristotle is in search of a science
“other than those which are formed by nature...must be prior and must be first
philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first.”27 What qualifies as first
philosophy is theologia, meaning the science of being, “being qua being—both what
it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being,” in Aristotle’s view.28 The most

24 Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2005). 33.

25 Aristotle, "Metaphysica (Metaphysics)," s 1026a, ln 20, 779.
26 Ibid; Martin Heidegger, The basic problems of phenomenology, trans. Albert

Hofstadter, revised ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). 29.

27 Aristotle, "Metaphysica (Metaphysics)," 1026a, ln. 30-31, 779.
28 Ibid., 1026a, ln. 32-33, 779.

8
important task a theologian hopes to accomplish is an ontological one, to admit of
God as the ground of being qua being.

Establishing the necessity of prophecy with the authority of reason, Ghazali reminds
himself, follows from the ontological question of God as first philosophy. Once the
authority of God is ontologically supported, from that point onwards all the
dependent teachings follow. These include among others, how to establish the
credentials of the divinely sent emissaries. How to secure the relationship of trust
between prophets and the communities to which they were sent and the details of
how to make the world a place where the moral good can flourish. The authority of
reason, Ghazālī as an Ashʿarī theologian concedes, might not be able to validate all
the teachings the prophets received from God. Reason can neither conceive of such
matters, nor provide a compelling argument in support since the authority for such
matters comes from an authority outside of the autonomous self. Philosophers call
this heteronomy: action that is required by a force outside the individual. Reason,
for example, says Ghazali, cannot confirm or justify why obedience to God will be
the cause of happiness in the hereafter, or why disobedience will be the cause of
suffering in the hereafter.29 And reason is also unable to declare why it is impossible
to enjoy happiness or suffering in the hereafter.30 What reason can do is to provide
for plausibility structures and explanations as to how obedience and disobedience,
compliance and non-compliance to ethical imperatives can result in happiness or
suffering in the material world.

Epistemology

Ghazālī clearly identifies the Muslim knowledge framework to be a force-field that
combines intellect/reason and revealed teachings. In a well-known discussion
Ghazālī describes obedience to God as consisting of the duality of knowledge (ʿilm)

29 al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl. 1:37.
30 Ibid.

9
and practice (ʿamal).31 Knowledge is not separated from a practice, he explains.
Indeed, the very act of knowing involves a certain kind of work which takes place in
the heart. In short, to know and to possess knowledge is always-already a practice,
in his view. The heart, literally and figuratively, enjoys a preeminence among all
human organs, as the most crucial physical organ as well as the most revered and
relevant spiritual organ, Ghazālī explains.32 As the locus of the soul and the spirit,
the heart plays an intimate role in human subjectivity, identity and the complex
ways we understand the world, ourselves and others. Understanding is made by the
intellect which Ghazālī describes as the “vehicle for commitment to the salvation
practices-markab al-diyāna” and as the “carrier of the covenant of responsibility-
ḥāmil al-amānā.”33

Knowledge is derived from two sources, intellect/reason and revelation, explains
Ghazālī.34 Some forms of rational knowledge are innate to us and others are
acquired. Revealed knowledge reaches us via the mediation of the prophets,
especially the scriptures they received and the exemplary lives they led. People
acquire revealed knowledge by way of authoritative teaching (taqlīd), but these
teachings cannot be fully understood and appreciated without the help of the
intellect. Revelation primarily serves as a remedy and a healing for the condition of
the heart and soul by relying on reason. As Ghazālī explicitly writes: “The
intellect/reason cannot entirely dispense with revealed authority (simāʿ), nor can
revealed authority dispense with reason. The proponent who relies exclusively on
authoritative teaching and entirely dismisses the intellect/reason is an ignoramus.
The one who is solely content with intellect/reason by neglecting the illumination
provided by the Qurʾān and the Sunna is an arrogant person. So, beware that you do
not fall into one of these two camps, but rather combine both sources instead. For
the intellectual/rational sciences are like nutrition and revealed knowledge is like

31 Ibid., 1:32.
32 ———, Iḥyāʾ. "Kitāb sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb," 3:12.
33 ———, al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl. 1:32.
34 ———, Iḥyāʾ. "Kitāb sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb," 3:16-17.

10
medication...”35 We need a multiplicity of resources, Ghazālī says, in order to know
ourselves and the world we live in.

A later pre-eminent and representative theologian of the Sunnī-Ashʿarī school Saʿd
al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), for example, was by all accounts a realist. He
represents a Sunnī-Ashʿarī cum-Māturīdī theological perspective based on the
correspondence theory of truth. The truth, he claims, simply means: “the judgment
or determination of that which corresponds to reality.”36 Any empirical assessment
of reality or what exists, is informed by and corresponds to, what we know. And the
aspect of truth is informed by our judgment of things, which in turn is influenced by
how we assess reality. And thus, a definition of a thing is its truth; for a definition
surely means “to connect a sense with a word.”37 Taftāzānī explains that the “true
reality or the truth of things are constant/permanent.”38

Philosophers and theologians, Taftāzāni adds, use many synonyms to talk about a
thing or things as they exist: they call it ‘being’ (mawjūd/wujūd), a ‘cosmos’ (kawn)
and a ‘constant’ (thubūt), among other similar meaning terms.39 We use different
names to describe the truth or the true reality of things reports Taftāzānī. Using
nouns in order to designate a human being, a horse or to identify entities such as
earth and sky, are all terms we use to name things as existents in themselves.40 But
we also need to be attentive says Taftāzānī to the fact that we often speak of a thing
or an entity from a certain viewpoint or perspective. Metaphysicians and

35 Ibid., "Kitāb sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb," 3:17.
36 Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd b. ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafīya: fī uṣūl al-dīn

wa ʿilm al-kalām, ed. Claude Salāma (Damascus: Wazāra liʾl-Thaqāfa wa ʾl-Irshād al-
Qawmī, 1973). 9. (huwa al-ḥukm al-muṭābiq liʾl wāqiʿ)
37 Kenny, Philosophy in the modern world. 178.
38 al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafīya: fī uṣūl al-dīn wa ʿilm al-kalām.
39 Muḥammad ʿAlī (Aʿlā) al-Tahānawī and (ed) Rafīq al-ʿAjam, Mawsūʿa kashshāf

iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn wa al-ʿulūm, 2 vols. (Beirut: Maktaba Lubnan, 1996). 1:536. The
Ashʿarīs deem thubūt to be synonymous to the words wujūd and kawn, whereas the
Muʿtazila have a more inclusive use, reports Tahānawī.
40 al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafīya: fī uṣūl al-dīn wa ʿilm al-kalām. 10.

11
philosophers address these viewpoints in ordinary language. On reflection what we
call viewpoints requires some background activity. Viewpoints are actually
prompted and framed by conceptual considerations or mental concepts called
iʿtibārāt, an admission that is vital to any inquiry.41 Sometimes the conceptual
consideration is either beneficial or redundant, but they do nevertheless frame our
ontological and epistemological landscape.

Figures like Ghazālī and Taftāzānī tell us there is a relationship between concepts
with which we think and what we perceive to be reality or being. The different
philosophical methods might complicate these relationships with subtle and major
differences. The question can be put like this today: is the way we think identical to
the way existence is, or is there a gap or an unbridgeable gap between thinking and
being? I am inclined to the view that thinking is intimately related to existence or
being as we know it.

Medieval theologians like Ghazālī or early modern scholars like Ibn Khaldūn were
sanguine about grasping reality. It may well be that they were constrained by their
Ashʿarī theological lenses and dispositions to engage in more robust descriptions of
what existed. Despite urging us to know reality, Ghazālī issues a damper on any
optimistic effort to grasp reality. To define reality is an extremely complex matter,
he warns. “Most sensory perceptible things (al-mudrakāt al-ḥissīya) are challenging
to define,” he writes. “For instance,” he continues, “if we were required to define the
smell of musk or the taste of honey, we will be hard pressed to do so. So, if we are
challenged to define sensory perceptible things, then it will be even more impossible
to define perceptions (idrākāt).”42 These are examples where the reality of the smell
of musk or the taste of honey are fairly subjective. Reality is very much the picture
on the inside of our minds for a soft idealist like Ghazālī. And if there is inner
uncertainty then, of course, it will impact the view of external reality. His attitude

41 Ibid.
42 al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl. 1:67.

12
was not an isolated incident in Muslim thought and was characteristic of ideas
espoused by Ashʿarī theologians. Many Muslim theologians therefore took the
position that theologically mental existence was impossible whereas Muslim
philosophers accepted such a concept as real.

Further Debates

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406/732-808) is better known for his work on
history. But he was well-versed in theology. And was equally well-informed about
philosophy even though he had reservations about its efficacy in matters of faith. He
provides another instant of how Muslims grasped an aspect of ontology. He shares it
with his readers as an “insightful subtlety” (laṭīfa) drawn from his rational discourse
on the nature of divine oneness (tawḥīd).43

All temporal events in the ontological sphere (ʿālam al-kāʾināt literally, universe of
existence), writes Ibn Khaldūn, irrespective as to whether they are essences, and
actions of humans or animals, are required to have causes that precede them.44
Causes (asbāb) make actions and essences viable and hence things come into
existence. All these causes are in themselves temporal. Each cause progressively,
and in growing complexity, intersects with another cause until they lead to the
Cause of causes, the inventor and creator of causes, namely God. As these
dimensions of complexity grow, he explains, the mind on its own is incapable of
grasping and calculating the web of complex causes. Only “a comprehensive
knowledge can grasp these causes,” says Ibn Khaldun, “especially when these
[causes are related to] the actions of humans and animals.”45 Yet, Ibn Khaldūn
provides no hint as to how one acquires that comprehensive knowledge to explain
causes. Rather, he continues, to undermine the acquisition of such knowledge. In

43 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldūn, ed. Darwīsh al-Juwaydī

(Ṣayda/Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣrīya, 1460/2000). 429.

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 429.

13
other words, when it comes to complex empirical realities especially of an
ontological order or things related to cosmology, Ibn Khaldūn becomes pessimistic
and thinks humans do not have the conceptual tools to grasp all this complexity.

Empirically observed causes (fī al-shāhid) in human and animal actions, he explains,
stem from human intentions and volitions (al-quṣūd wa-ʾl irādāt).46 Intentions and
volitions, in his view, are mental states (umūr nafsānīya), produced by preceding
perceptions (taṣawurrāt), which occur consecutively. Perceptions constitute the
causes (asbāb) for the volition or intention of an act. It is plausible, in Ibn Khaldun’s
view, for the causes of identifiable perceptions to become the grounds for new
perceptions.47 How perceptions occur to the human soul (nafs), meaning how a
perception reaches the psyche was a mystery to Ibn Khaldūn. In his time, he
concedes, no one can grasp the “bases of the conditions of the soul/personhood.”48
Nor do humans understand the order (tartīb) of these thoughts since these are ideas
that god cast in our mind (fikr), one thought succeeding the other, while humans
were unable to grasp the origins (mabādiʾ) of these thoughts and their purposes.49

Ibn Khaldūn had a limited phenomenology of how causes operate. Let’s explain
what we mean by phenomenology. “Phenomenology is the study of structures of
consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central
structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something,
as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an
object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together
with appropriate enabling conditions.”50 So when any one of us or Ibn Khaldūn for

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 429-30.
48 Ibid., 430.
49 Ibid.
50 David Woodruff Smith, "Phenomenology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/phenomenology/>.

14
instance thinks about his experiences and explains it in relation to things, ideas and
objects then we are engaged in a phenomenology.

Ibn Khaldūn writes: “Human beings most often grasp knowledge by way of causes,
which is in effect a potentiality that is realized (ṭabīʿa ẓāhira) and which reaches the
mental faculties (madārik) in an orderly and systematic manner. This is because
potentiality (ṭabīʿa) is confined to a body (nafs) and thus subject to its limit.”51

As an empirical realist, Ibn Khaldūn placed great trust in the role the intellect and
the role reason played in human endeavors. He downplays an explanation that
perceptions originate in the soul or psyche as someone like Ghazālī would surely
admit. Proper perceptions in his view are generated by the intellect. “Perceptions
(taṣawwurāt) in turn have a larger scope than the soul/person,” he writes, “because
they belong to the intellect that is above the limits of the soul. Hence, the soul can
hardly perceive much of the perceptions, leave alone grasp them. So, ponder the
wisdom of the Lawgiver (al-shāriʿ) to forbid inquiries or speculation in causes and
the need to investigate them. For [pursuing the causes] is indeed a valley in which
the mind wanders aimlessly, not devoid of futility and is unsuccessful in finding the
truth (ḥaqīqa).”52

Ibn Khaldūn hardly provides a shred of evidence to explain his claim that inquiry
into causes is forbidden. One reading of his passage mentioned above would be to
say that Ibn Khaldūn is attempting to exclude proofs for the existence of the
universe/cosmos (kāʾināt) from the domain of ontology, metaphysics or rational
discourse. The human mind, in his view, cannot grasp such an enormous reality. It is
like trying to weigh a mountain using a goldsmith’s scale, he says employing a
metaphor with cunning irony.

51 Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah.
52 Ibid., 430.

15
Ibn Khaldūn frequently states how causes are linked to intentions and volitions of
the mind, which in turn are connected to perceptions. He repeatedly says it is not
sufficient to point to observable causes and facts. Rather, in order to produce real
knowledge or what we would call scientific knowledge, requires knowledge of their
real causes, which he calls their origins or principles (mabādīʾ).

Perhaps Ibn Khaldūn is adopting a form of explanatory empiricism which “denies
the validity of inferences from observable phenomena to causes that cannot
themselves be observed.”53 What Ibn Khaldūn describes as observable causes
(asbāb) might be his way of describing observable phenomena and inferences that
become so increasingly complex that they defy explanation. In such a case one can
only make sense if one ends the continuous regression and assert that there is some
Causer of all observable causes. He repeatedly argues that one does not have access
to an explanation of how exactly causes work in the world and in doing so he
recycles elements of Ghazālī’s argument. One should accept as a starting point in
matters of ontology the singularity of God as matter of faith or on the grounds of
fideism, in Ibn Khaldūn’s view.

It is clear that Ibn Khaldūn had less confidence in how one explains the totality of
existence. “Don’t trust your mind’s claim,” he writes, “that you are able to
comprehend the entire universe and its causes. And, that you can investigate the
details of all being in its totality. Dismiss such a claim as the stupidity of the mind.”54
Then he delivers his most potent judgement against idealistic thinking, saying:
“Know that every perceiver unhesitatingly thinks that being/existence (wujūd) is
contained in his/[her] mental faculties and does not exceed these faculties. The fact
is contrary to this claim. And the truth lies beyond it.”55

53 Gregory W. Dawes, "Ancient and Medieval Empiricism," in The Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2017).

54 Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah. 430.
55 Ibid.

16
Ibn Sīnā as a metaphysician of a different stripe when compared to Ibn Khaldūn’s
theological nominalism, does view the universe to consist of a chain of causes. These
included celestial beings, which are contingent and not necessary, because they are
not gods, explains Goodman.56 As a reply to Ibn Khaldūn’s objections a Goodman has
a clear idea and suffices here. “There is no self-contradiction in denying the
existence of the entire world,” Goodman writes, “affirming that it need not exist,
even though it always has existed. Thus, its existence is dependent on God. The
truest cause is not the merely transient efficient cause that officiates at the origin of
a thing but the enduring cause that sustains and perpetuates the existence of its
effect giving it a reality of its own, as God sustains and perpetuates the world.”57 In
short, Ibn Khaldūn might have focused too much on origins and principles of being
but paid little attention to theorizing in a theological manner the perpetuation of
being.

Modern Being and Knowing

Since Ghazālī and Taftāzānī’s time nature itself has been revolutionized by
technology and we can apprehend matter and the cosmos in ways that were
previously impossible. “Mathematics, ontology, and metaphysics,” writes Marilynne
Robinson, “have become one thing,” given the breakthrough discoveries of modern
science.58 How the physical world operates and functions is now to a great extent
empirically verifiable. And, in the view of many materialists “metaphysics is
philosophy masquerading as natural science.”59 Materialists have pursued a
reductionist line of inquiry that has alarmed many. Robinson has identified
neuroscience as one field in which mental function can be explained as casually as a
game of billiards.60 Philosopher Anthony Kenny also cautions saying: “It is a

56 Goodman, Avicenna. 66.
57 Ibid.
58 Marilynne Robinson, The givenness of things: essays (New York: Farrar, Straus and

Giroux, 2015). 5.Kindle edition

59 Kenny, Philosophy in the modern world. 188.
60 Robinson, The givenness of things. 5-6.

17
metaphysical error to think, for instance, that exploration of the brain will help us to
understand what is going on in our minds when we think and understand.”61 There
is no need to be overly confident about the resources of science and hence humility
is useful. Yuval Noah Harari, the noted historian and philosopher writes: “After
centuries of extensive scientific research, biologists admit that they still don’t have
any good explanation for how brains produce consciousness.”62

Both Robinson and Kenny draw our attention to the sciences that are “entangled” to
ontology, the question of being. Quantum entanglement raises questions about time
and space and ultimately about causality. Particles that are “entangled” no matter
how distant from each other undergo the same changes simultaneously.63 So, lets
assume that the basic question ontology asks, is: what exists? Following that claim,
the question that metaontology asks is: are there objective answers to the basic
question of ontology? Put differently, can we clearly and coherently spell out what
exists? This was also Ibn Khaldūn’s worry and hence he was unsatisfied with
ontological explanations. Yet, the question remain about whether we can answer the
questions of ontology in objective ways. Ontological realists reply, yes, and anti-
realists more cautiously say, no.64 But if you are an advocate of the theory that there
is not only a universe but rather a multiverse, then the question will be met with
another question: which world are you talking about? Robinson writes with clarity:
“However pervasive and robust entanglement is or is not, it implies a cosmos that
unfolds or emerges on principles that bear scant analogy to the universe of common
sense. It is abetted in this by string theory, which adds seven unexpressed
dimensions to our familiar four. And, of course, those four seem suddenly tenuous

61 Kenny, Philosophy in the modern world.
62 Yuval Noah. Harari, Sapiens: a brief history of humankind, (New York, NY:

HarperCollins, 2015). Kindle Locations 4022-23.

63 Robinson, The givenness of things. 5.
64 David Chalmers, "Ontological Anti-Realism," in Metametaphysics:New Essays on

the Foundations of Ontology, ed. David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan
Wasserman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), 77.

18
when the fundamental character of time and space is being called into question.”65
Albert Einstein had to admit one fine day that in addition to three dimensions—
length, width and depth—of all objects in the universe, there was also a fourth
dimension called spacetime. String theory in physics adds six more dimensions that
make us relate to possible worlds.

Yes, indeed the meaning of the constantly expanding cosmos in human
consciousness and the story of the cosmos itself is a constantly shifting one. This
brings about a huge variance with our inherited tradition-based knowledge of the
self in relation to the world as it is. Is there ‘something’ beyond the physical
universe that gives us meaning? The more formal language of ontology used by
philosophers of the ‘something’ is to describe it as: ‘what is there?’ or ‘what exists?’
Questions along these lines inquire about being, and is called ontology. How
metaphysics relates to other branches of philosophy might require us to agree with
Wittgenstein that philosophy was not a house, nor a tree, but a web.66 And a web
intersects to create a certain oneness with difference.

In order to know certain things one must follow a procedure determined by a
method, and an organized way (theory) of thinking and reflection. The technical
term for such tested and agreed ways of knowing is called epistemology, a theory or
an organized way of knowing.

Knowledge itself or the theory of knowledge (epistemology) for non-nominalist
interpreters of Islam always has some form of metaphysical backing. Let’s think of
metaphysics as the hidden backstory against which our assumptions about the
world and our identities or selves are measured. In short, metaphysics is the meta-
theory of meaning-making which also shapes our knowledge frameworks. Knowing
and the quest to know makes us ask: how do we know that there is ‘something’ in

65 Robinson, The givenness of things. 5.
66 Kenny, Philosophy in the modern world. 188.

19
the world in which we live? Perhaps, that question is a rhetorical one, since one can
reply saying: we feel and experience the world, we feel joy and sadness, live and die.
The question of the ‘something’ is the feeling or experience we have of the world
and we realize that its immense surround is not empty: we experience there is not a
‘nothing.’ Another way to put this is to say that existence and being is not meaning-
less.

Meaning in the broadest sense, is the question that metaphysicians try to address.
Philosophers give that ‘something’ a name, ‘being’, or ‘be-ing’, to-be in the world or
how to exist in the world. Except that being-in-the-world or existence per se is not
separate from us, rather, we already-are, we exist and are already embedded in the
world. In short, we make sense to ourselves or we make meaning of our lives in
relation to others and in relation to sacred and secular orders. But the Austrian-
born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein promptly disturbs our comfort zone and has
a way to make us question our assumptions. “Where in the world is a metaphysical
subject to be found?,” he asks. Then he adds, “You will say that this is exactly like the
case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in
the visual field allows to you to infer that it is seen by the eye.”67 So even if we do not
see certain aspects of being, in same way that we do not see our own eye when we
look, experientially we do indeed concede to saying things exists, even if we do not
see the instrument with which we are seeing. If we accept the claims metaphysics
makes, then the very fact that we exist, also means we accept that there is
‘something,’ even if we do not always have an adequate language to express and
explain that ‘something.’ More often, humans disagree both about the description of
that ‘something’ and its meaning. One reason why metaphysics is important, is that
depending on how we configure that ‘something’, it’s result will significantly shape
and impact what we know, how we know things and it will shape our experiences in
the world, how we conceive of the world and how we understand ourselves.

67 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F.

McGuinness (New York & London: Routledge, 2001). 69, S 5.633.

20

Metaphysicians, philosophers and theologians have for centuries puzzled over what
exists and what is known. Why? For the simple reason that humans devised and
discovered a multitude of ways of knowing as to what exists, and also multiple ways
of giving meaning to these known realities. In other words, human experiences
culminated in some ways of knowing and made other modes of knowing ambiguous
over time. Cultural and civilizational power also has a role in making some way of
being and knowing visible and makes other modes of knowing invisible. Philosopher
Owen Flanagan possibly describes this realization best when he writes:
“All actual differences across cultures and across individuals make a difference and
not just for the descriptive side of ethics. Goods—moral, aesthetic, epistemic—are
often internal to practices and tradition and possibly intermixed in unfamiliar
ways…. [A]lmost everyone will think that some practices are good, bad, right, or
wrong depending on how they are situated in a complex normative web that is
partly up to the people who live inside or abide the normative web in question.”68

So we have to agree that there are multiple narratives to explain being or ontology
as well as a multitude of languages of knowing, what we would call epistemological
languages. The differences are located at the theoretical level where presumptions,
understandings and feelings about being and knowing are made but in practice they
are the way Flanagan describes them to be.

Ethical and moral answers are determined by the perspective of reality adopted by
individuals, communities or experts in terms of scholars or views held by a
discursive community. For a time, the term ‘worldview’ made sense, meaning “a
system of beliefs that are interconnected in something like the way the pieces of a

68 Owen J. Flanagan, The geography of morals : varieties of moral possibility (New

York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2016). 7.

21
jigsaw puzzle are interconnected.”69(emphasis mine) In its simple form a worldview
approach involves how to abbreviate a complex set of views in a reductive form
without isolating the relationship between being-in-the world and knowledge and
knowing. There are instances when a more complex understanding of a worldview
can also reveal how being-in-the world and knowledge are separated and operate
on different planes. So, one might still adhere to practices prescribed by tradition
and teachings of faith which operate in a specified ontological zone and a reality of
being. Whether that faith-based ontology can be realigned with a science-based
ontology and whether these make sense is the challenge. Such a task requires both
an historical account, an experiential account followed by a normative ontological
account based on metaphysics. For some that metaphysics was grounded in the
Divine.

The preceding conceptions of the relationship between metaphysics and theology
are clearly inadequate. Thinking about God in relationship to an ever-expanding
cosmos today intimately ties our theological conceptions to the precepts of
metaphysics based on science. These relationships become more complex and
interdependent than previously thought. If ontology intersects with theology then
clearly the shape of being will also have implications for knowing the self and the
world.

Modern Muslim Metaphysics

Modern Muslim metaphysics is a hybrid of premodern constructions of ontology
and epistemology that grapples with modern technology. Contemporary Muslim
jurist-theologians in particular, together with Muslim bioethicists and ethicists in
general, hardly attempt to outline their ontological commitments and premises in a
systematic manner. Instead their focus is elsewhere. They emphasize mostly

69 Richard DeWitt, Worldviews:an introduction to the history and philosophy of

science, 2nd ed.. ed., World views (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K. ; Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010). 7.

22
juridical methods, to find answers derived from pre-existing rules that were made
over the centuries in order to settle contemporary ethical questions and dilemmas.
That is the language that enjoys legitimacy and authority. But clearly the language of
Islamic jurisprudence no longer resonate to a living, dynamic and vibrant
experiential ontological and epistemological realm. Our experiences in both
jurisprudence and theology is tied to a conception of being that is different from
what contemporary understandings of the world of science and living teaches us.
Muslim theologians have invited us to think about these questions from Shaykh
Muḥammad Abduh to Allama Shibli Nuʿmānī but we have made little progress in
that direction.

Often the rhetoric used by the jurists is the application of aphoristic rules and
certain dicta that either approve or disapprove of practices by saying permissible
(mubāḥ/jāʾiz) or prohibited (maḥdhūr/ḥarām). Often the judgment of permissible
or prohibited for an action or the use of a substance or the utterance of a thought is
arrived at on the basis of whether the new question resembles an earlier one or
whether it meets a standard of public interest. While the latter is an improvement it
remains randomly utilitarian without a complex assessment process of how the
public interest (maṣlaḥa) is assessed and what personal, social and public harms it’s
use might inflict.

Of the methods used to fill the requirements for ethical and moral deliberation two
are prevalent today: a scriptural approach and a canonical discursive approach.
Often a scriptural approach is deployed in broad brushstrokes. The scriptural
approach reaches for selective teachings from the Qurʾān and the prophetic
tradition (sunna) as the ultimate fonts of moral and ethical norms. This approach
often relies on the hermeneutical harvest of the past by making some adjustments in
order to apply them to issues in the present. But it is best characterized as an
approach where interpreters assert what revelation promises and pledges, and then
this is followed by pronouncements as to what revelation authorizes and commands
by way of norms.

23

Another way of putting it is to assert “the Qurʾān says,” (Quranolotry), or the “Sunna
says.” A. Kevin Reinhart dubbed the predilection of scholars and authorities to
invoke the claim that “Islam requires” and “Islam says,” as a form of Islamolotry.70
There is an assumed expectation that the Qurʾān and Sunna contain stipulated
truths in such perfect symmetry to match the “world-to-word” need of the
interpreter only to assert the “word-to-world” solution by invoking scriptural
sources.71 All the virtues are assumed to be self-evident and defined in the truth
structures of the two forms of revelation, the scripture of God and the normative
authority of the Prophet Muḥammad.

On the other hand, is the complex discursive approach in historical Muslim
hermeneutics, composed of a canon of writings and dizzyingly complex
hermeneutical frameworks which defy easy summation. This method is wedded to a
strong sensibility of tradition—broadly conceived—with its primacy on
understanding the world with the help of a variety of knowledge practices ranging
from the ontological and epistemological concerns embedded in theology,
philosophy and moral judgement and a reading of the history of the formative
society of revelation and the place of prophecy. Historically, the various Muslim law
schools, Sunni and Shīʿa, adopted versions of this approach, and they do exist in
some shape and form today when elements of these hermeneutical traditions
(madhhab pl. madhāhib) are invoked. These schools consist of a hermeneutic that
functions “simultaneously as a constructive interpretive method and as a
justification of preconceived views.”72 The canonical law schools do acknowledge a

70 A. Kevin Reinhart, "Afterword: The Past in the Future of Islamic Ethics," in Islamic

ethics of life: abortion, war and euthanasia, ed. Jonathan E. Brockopp (Columbia, SC:
University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 214.
71 Anthony C. Thiselton, New horizons in hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, Mich.:

Zondervan Pub. House, 1992). 298.

72 David Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal

Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law, ed. Stephanie Jamison, Peri Bearman, and Gary
M. Beckman, vol. 93, American Oriental Series (Ann Arbor: American Oriental
Society, 2010). 264.

24
certain historical sensibility of context and interpretation with the application of
some meticulous hermeneutics. While they do treat the authority of the text with
due reverence for its authority, it is the authority and practices of the hermeneutical
traditions in their multiplicity that carry the day in this schema, not so much the
authority of sacralized laws.73 The canonical approaches draw on a long tradition of
interpretation that had been authorized over the centuries. Thus, tradition has
evolved up to some point and is still invoked by practitioners in the present who
recognize such authority.

Practitioners in the present who use both the scripturalist and canonical
approaches, or hybrids thereof, tacitly acknowledge the prevalence of a modern
scientific cosmology and ontology. Yet, they hardly account for the realist
ontological premises of modern science and how this engages the ontologies of
tradition to foment new religious norms in the present. The absence of a systematic
account of ontology often leads to incoherence, paradox, contradiction and
anachronism in moral and theological claims. Even an account of an historical
interpretive tradition based on Muslim adaptations of Aristotelian cosmology
remains absent in most contemporary applications of juro-moral norms. Yet, a
limited version of an Aristotelian tradition might prove to be helpful in order to
critically engage a thriving world in the wake of a post-Newtonian cosmological
order. However, an account of how this post-Newtonian cosmology sits with the
inherited Muslim knowledge traditions remains inarticulate. At best one can say

73 Ibid. I respectfully disagree with Vishanoff who in my view makes too strong a

case for the sacralized nature of Islamic law viewing it as analogous to Goodrich’s
claim about religious law in the Christian tradition where the law is closely hewed
to the sacred, Peter Goodrich, "Law, Religion, and Critical Theory," in Encyclopedia of
Religion, ed. Lindsay Jones (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 5359. It might
well be that many modern Muslim authors sacralize the law, perhaps more
fervently, than say premodern interpreters. There is no denial that law is related to
revealed texts, but whether the interpretation of these texts turn into sacred icons of
the divine might be a stretch. There is a difference between a reverential approach
compared to a sacred approach.

25
that in the absence of a more systematic modern Muslim ontological schema, the
premodern and modern cosmologies in practice sit uncomfortably together.

It would be fair to say that the hermeneutical traditions used by contemporary
Muslims and their experts do carry imprints of both of their historical ontologies
and their concomitant moral and ethical epistemologies. Hence, when jurists and
ethicists apply their craft to contemporary practices, one can only surmise that they
are making certain unspoken assumptions about their lived ontologies. How exactly
a contemporary Muslim metaphysics addresses the human condition by way of
ethical endorsement or opposition to say the vast role technology plays in modern
therapies and the growth of molecular medicine still awaits further study. From the
approvals and disapprovals in the realm of Muslim bioethical rulings, it becomes
clear that a certain pragmatic and practical approach prevails.

A contemporary Muslim ethicist has to grapple with a fairly large set of questions
posed by modern ontologies that in themselves are hardly settled. Modern
metaphysicians in the simplest presentation are divided into idealists and realists.
Idealists believe that the material world does not exist independently of our
perceptions of it and that we do not have direct perceptual knowledge of the world.
Realists say just the opposite. In their view a real world exists “that is totally
independent of human beings and what they [humans] think and say about it,” and
they claim things are true or false to the extent that things are the way we say or
describe them to be so.74 It is not that the world has become unintelligible in “some
exciting and apocalyptic way,” says the philosopher John R. Searle, but that the
world “is a lot harder to understand for the rather boring and unexciting reason that
you have to be smarter and you have to know a lot more.”75

74 John R. Searle, Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (New

York: Basic Books, 1998). 13.

75 Ibid., 4.

26
Even if Searle is not an ardent defender of an idealist metaphysics, he does show
some understanding of the metaphysical dilemma religious people face in an age of
science. In an age of Newtonian mechanics and Darwin’s theory of evolution to the
claim that the universe had an intelligibility makes sense to some educated and
religious people. There are at least two metaphysical spheres: a spiritual and mental
metaphysical sphere versus a material metaphysical sphere. The spiritual and
mental sphere, Searle explains, is owned by religion. The material metaphysical
realm he argues is owned by science.76 Searle separates these metaphysical realms
heuristically since religious people live in both the spiritual and material
metaphysical spheres. These two spheres cannot be incomprehensible to each
other. And that is the challenge, how to at least make minimal sense to each other,
not necessarily ensure a marriage.

If contemporary Muslim moral theorists or jurist-theologians perhaps made known
the specific ontological realm they are adjudicating then it will indeed make a
valuable contribution to the conversation in Muslim philosophy and ethics. Often
they follow a realist perspective of science and try to combine it with a scripturalist
understanding of religion. Without the adoption of a sophisticated metaphysics and
hence epistemology and as a consequence an intelligible theology, the moral
discursivity of Muslim ethics will remain thin. Many dimensions of ontology are
becoming more accessible through the steady increase in the growth of knowledge
and understanding of science in conversation with philosophy.77

But would a scientific naturalist metaphysics both be determinative or even
sufficient within the Islamic tradition? Scientific naturalism implies that only natural
laws and forces operate in the world and constitute our metaphysics. In my view, it
remains insufficient. Why? The question of consciousness as a first-person ontology
will certainly rear its head and contradict scientific naturalism. The more dominant

76 Ibid., 1-2.
77 Ibid., 1.

27
forms of naturalism would not always square with a belief in God, since there is a
possibility of reducing nature to materialism. Let me turn to how one might frame
the question of ontology in contemporary Muslim moral philosophy starting with
the ancients.

Today, the situation becomes more challenging since in addition to the mental or
spiritual realms owned by religion what is dominant is the material and physical
realms owned by science: the latter dominates and determines the ontological
game.78 One should admit that the history of metaphysics in the Islamic tradition is
replete with complexity, providing us with ample discourses about the material,
physical, mental, imaginal and spiritual dimensions of the world. Yet, in the past the
material and spiritual realms of metaphysics had reasonable coherence. In modern
times a new coherence between the spiritual and the scientific poses to be a
Herculian task.

The realism versus idealism division is an unending debate in contemporary
metaphysics with little resolution. These positions provide us with helpful heuristic
perspectives. “Realism is most compelling,” says Thomas Nagel, “when we are
forced to recognize the existence of something which we can describe or know fully,
because it lies beyond the reach of language, proof, evidence, or empirical
understanding. Something must be true with respect to the 7s in the expansion of π,
even if we can’t establish it; there must be something it is like to be a bat, even if we
can never conceive it adequately. But once it is accepted in these cases, realism
becomes a possible position with regard to what we can understand as well.”79
Nagel contends that: “Idealism—the view that what exists in the widest sense must
be identified with what is thinkable by us in the widest sense—is an attempt to cut

78 ———, Mind, Language and Society:Philosophy in the Real World (New York:

Basic Books, 1998). 1-2.

79 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York & Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1986). 108.

28
the universe down to size.”80 Modern empiricism has made a huge impact on the
way we conceptualize our physical world. But empiricism ought not to be
tyrannical in its application. As Gregory W. Dawes writes: “Empiricism need not be a
global doctrine: a thinker may be an empiricist in one domain but not in another. It
is possible, for instance, to be an empiricist about knowledge of the natural world,
but a rationalist with regard to a particular area of mathematics.”81

When we speak of the truth of a thing we are actually talking about the identifiable
essence of a thing: truth and essence are identical.82 In short, the truth of a thing is
the essence of that thing. So, a human being is a rational animal. That is the truth of a
human being and is also the essence of being a human. But the existence of a thing is
separate from the essence of a thing, says Ibn Sīnā.83 On the other hand, Aristotle
said the being or existence of a thing makes it essence. How does one square these
positions? Ibn Sīnā possibly thinks about a unified concept of being with multiple
manifestations of being in terms of concrete essences. If so, then his position would
not be antithetical to Aristotle’s position.

When we use the expression ‘a human being,’ then we are making certain claims
about truth and about the essence of the person. Substances are either animal,
vegetable or mineral, Ghazali explained. Substances can occur in different forms and
according to species and contingency. Laughter or the capacity to write are not
truth-features or the essence of a human being, rather they are accidental properties
of a human being. Substances are natural things and exist in their own right, like
humans, trees and rocks. Aristotle, writes Lenn Goodman, deems “whatever holds
together and functions in a unified, coherent pattern—has the definiteness expected
of a substance.”84

80 Ibid., 109.
81 Dawes, "Ancient and Medieval Empiricism."
82 al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafīya: fī uṣūl al-dīn wa ʿilm al-kalām.
83 Goodman, Avicenna. 67.
84 Ibid., 54.

29

The concrete appearances of, say trees, are called ‘modes’ or ‘accidents’ such as the
colors of trees, the specific passions of humans or the quantity or size, of say, cats.
Some accidents occur in living organisms. These organisms will have attributes such
as knowledge, will, power, speech, hearing and sight. Accidents that occur in non-
living form, in turn, will have color, smell and, taste.

A way forward

Philosophical concepts have a “becoming”—a constant transmutation—in
relationship to concepts and ideas in the same order and plane.85 Since
contemporary Muslim ontology is in search of new concepts we will do well to heed
the words of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari when they say: “... new concepts must
relate to our problems, to our history, and, above all, to our becomings.”86 Mullā
Ṣadrā’s refreshing ideas open new conceptual categories. Recall that one sense of
being a Platonist, an Aristotelian, an Avicennian, a Ghazālian, a Ṣadrian or a Kantian
is that one finds oneself justified “in thinking their concepts can be reactivated in
our problems,”87 but more so that it might not be as easy a task to accomplish. What
is crucial is that by engaging the ideas of past thinkers they will in turn “inspire
those concepts that need to be created.”88 We repeat certain things they said to
show a sense of continuity with our present or we identify an age-old problem, but
the task remains “to do what they did” and create concepts for problems and
challenges that necessarily change.89

Philosophical concepts roam and drift in what is called a “plane of immanence.”90

85 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is philosophy? (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1994). 18.

86 Ibid., 27.
87 Ibid., 28.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 35 & 40.

30
Concepts, Deleuze and Gauttari argue, are “absolute surfaces” but the plane of
immanence is what they call the “horizon of events” that occurs in a field of
movement.91 Plane of immanence is not a concept, but rather the “image of
thought.”92 Thought demands movement that can be carried to infinity, infinite
movement, or the movement of the infinite, which constitutes the image of
thought.93

Deleuze and Gauttari explain: “It is the horizon itself that is in movement…but on
the plane of immanence we are always already on the absolute horizon. Infinite
movement is defined by a coming and going, because it does not advance toward a
destination without already turning back on itself…Infinite movement is double, and
there is only a fold from one to the other. It is in this sense that thinking and being
are said to be one and the same. Or rather, movement is not the image of thought
without being also the substance of being.”94

Brought back into our philosophical thinking by figures like Martin Heidegger, the
idea of “becoming” is not unfamiliar to the history of Muslim philosophy albeit in a
different key. Critical philosophers like Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191),
and especially Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 1050/1640),95 better known as Mulla Ṣadrā,
whose perceptive ideas were revived by Mulla Hādī Sabzawārī (d.1295 or
1298/1878 or 1881), among others eagerly engaged with notions of dynamism and
becoming.

Ṣadrā, identifies a genre of metaphysical knowledge linked to the constitution and
generative qualities of persons, which he describes as the “learning of human beings

91 Ibid., 36.
92 Ibid., 37.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 38. Jambet is aware of Deleuze’s notion of intensity see 446 note 66.
95 Ṣadrā’s death date is also said to be around 1045/1635-36.

31
(ʿilm al-insān) and their cognitive and practical powers.”96 Philosophy, in Sadra’s
view, has two parts to it. One is to understand (maʿrifa) and thereby acquire
knowledge of things as they truly exist by reaching a decision (ḥukm) with the use of
demonstrative evidence (barāhīn) and by shunning conjecture (ẓann) and
arguments from authority (taqlīd) in one’s methodology. 97 The other aspect of
philosophy is to put such knowledge in the service of the “perfection of the human
soul (istikmāl al-nafs al-insānīya),” by which he means the body and mind or
psyche.98 Nevertheless, theologians, moral philosophers and ethicists do work
within a framework of what exists, namely they have an ontological framework.
Early Muslim philosophers and theologians often staked out their positions with
regard to the topic of “existence” (wujūd).

Ṣadrā writes that knowledge and intellection (taʿaqqul) is a form of existence. And
existence is united to its essence (māhīya), similarly knowing is united to the
known. Some ‘really existing things’ (wujūdāt) are inferior and others are
superior.99 Really existing things transcend matter through intensification in
existence.100 In my view Ṣadrā deserves a great deal of attention since he might be
the best ally among past Muslim philosophers whose ideas avail contemporary
Islamic thought best in order to navigate the waters of philosophy in the twenty first
century. Ṣadrā took the position that existence (wujūd) is the foundation of all
philosophical principles.101 For Ṣadrā all of existence “is in truth a single substance

96 Muḥ ammad b. Ibrā hı̄m Ṣ adr al-Dı̄n al-Shı̄rā zı̄ and Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar, al-

Ḥikma al-mutaʻāliya fī al-asfār al-ʿaqlīya al-arbaʿa 1st ed., 9 vols. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā al-
Turāth al-ʿArabī, c.1387/1967). 1:47.
97 See full translation Sajjad H. Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā and metaphysics modulation of

being (London; New York: Routledge, 2009). 21.

98 Ṣ adr al-Dı̄n al-Shı̄rā zı̄ and al-Muẓaffar, Asfār. 1:47.
99 Ibid., 3:297.
100 I‡ brahim Kalın, Mullā Sadrā (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2014). 84.
101 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, The book of metaphysical

penetrations: a parallel English-Arabic text, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and İbrahim
Kalın, 1 ed. (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 2014). 3.

32
having a single identity, while possessing multiple stations as well as degrees, high
and low.”102

His ontology allows him to say that “bodies and potentialities (ṭabāʾiʿ) are always
subject to fluidity (sayalān), to change (tabaddul) and to perish (inqiḍāʾ), hence they
cannot enjoy permanence (baqāʾ) in two separate moments. For [bodies and
potentialities] resemble movement, which has a graduated existence (tadrījīya-t al-
wujūd). All those substances (jawāhir) when they change in their essence (ipseity),
demonstrate a type of movement. Not in the sense that this movement affects
substances as accidents, when substances are viewed as passive (sākina).
Substances are identical to all movements occurring in other contingent categories.
Following this line of reasoning, these [bodies and potentialities] are not permanent,
just as no single thing consisting of multiple movements is permanent... .”103

Elaborating Ṣadrā’s ideas and dwelling on the theme of the above citation, Christian
Jambet writes: “The act of being is animated by a movement that robs it of all
permanence in each of the ranks or degrees of existence that it traverses or
instantiates. It thus places in doubt the reality of these provisional stations to which
its impetus has carried it…..This skepticism of being places into doubt the truth in
and for itself, the separate, fixed, and definitive reality of each degree of its
expression…”.104 Each expressed degree of reality, Jambet explains Ṣadrā’s position,
then becomes “consolidated in a reality distinct from the unique act of being that
has its source and truth in God alone.”105 It was Henri Corbin who described the
movement of being as the “restlessness” of being and which manifests “the very

102 Ibid., 4 with stylistic amendments to translation.
103 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, Majmūʻat rasāʼil falsafīya, 1 ed.

(Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth al-ʻArabī, 2001). 178.

104 Christian Jambet, The act of being:the philosophy of revelation in Mullā Sadrā

(New York; Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books Distributed by the MIT Press, 2006). 174.
105 Ibid.

33
freedom of being, always producing, beyond any one of its expressions, a more
intense expression, ceaselessly surpassing the finite in its infinite perseverance.”106

In Ṣadrā human understanding is linked to the divine source of all things: being as
truth. Revelation enunciates God to the world. God is the subject of the enunciation
but is also the subject of the statements of revelation along with humans. The
subject of revelation is both God and human. Therefore, prophecy becomes possible
in the human form. And because the proto-human in the form of the prophet is
always in need of revelation and speech from the divine speaker, revelation is the
truth of being. In this sense writes Jambet, “Islam is the bearer of an immanent
ontology.”107 For Ṣadrā the age-old duel between transcendence or distance (tanzīh)
from God and presence to God, immanence or closeness (tashbīh) is resolved by
saying we see God through both our eyes of transcendence and immanence with a
singular vision, not a dual one.108 Nature is constantly invested with dynamism
according to this model. It may well be possible to also bring human experience and
culture with nature to a more meaningful fruition. Corbin describes a whole of
range of personal acts such as diverse forms of expression from garden art,
calligraphy, painting to mystical intuition as a “philosophical founding.”109 One
witnesses the significance in action of a motif with the possibility of leading the past
back into the present. “It is essentially a hermeneutic—by understanding it, the
interpreter implicitly takes on responsibility for what he understands.”110


106 Ibid. Ṣadrā offers a tantalizing idea of how to think of being. First, he introduces

us to idea of the skepticism and gradation (tashkīk) of being. What Ṣadrā implied is
that our relation to being involves both skepticism or a suspension of belief on the
one hand and the gradation and a susceptibility of being to the possibilities of
modulation. See Jambet 174
107 ———, The act of being: the philosophy of revelation in Mullā Sadrā, trans. Jeff

Fort (New York; Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books Distributed by the MIT Press, 2006).
21.
108 Kalın, Mullā Sadrā. 78.
109 Henry Corbin, The voyage and the messenger: Iran and philosophy, trans. Joseph

Rowe (Berkeley, Calif.: North Atlantic Books, 1998). 58.

110 Ibid.

34
Metaphysics of Death

The metaphysical perspective has often been absent from modern Muslim
discourses of death, since the jurist-theologians do not sufficiently elaborate but, of
course, assume it. Talk of death is often focused on the idea of the heart, especially
the physical heart as well as the figurative heart, as the seat of identity, personhood
and the reference point for the spirit (rūḥ) and the soul (nafs). It is perhaps better to
talk about the spirit-soul-heart complex since they are each distinct but are also
integrated in their functioning.

A description of death by an eighteenth century Indian Muslim thinker, sage and
mystic, Shāh Walīyullāh (d.1762) is perhaps a good place to begin. Death in
Walīyullāh’s perspective is when the spirit parts from the body. And how do we
know the spirit has parted? When the body ceases to spontaneously generate
(tawlīd) itself.111 The explanation will follow later, let’s first deal with some of the
issues Walīyullāh himself begins. First, he responds to a nominal reading of a
passage of the Qurʾān that at first blush appears as if Muslims are prevented from
making inquiries about the spirit. Verse 17: 85 reads: “They ask you [Muḥammad]
about the spirit, rūḥ. Say! the spirit, rūḥ, comes from the order of my Lord and you
have been given very little knowledge of it.” Walīyullāh explains that this Qurʾānic
reply was in response to what appeared to be a vexatious question posed to the
Prophet Muḥammad. So it was a kind of response to silence the questioners but it
does not mean one cannot speak intelligently about the spirit. His reply deserves
quotation in full since it is also a model lesson in the hermeneutics of a complex
learned and canonical tradition of Islam, not a nominalist scripturalist one.
Walīyullāh writes:

111 Aḥmad bin ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī and ed. al-Bālanbūrī
(Pālanpūrī), Saʿīd Aḥmad bin Yūsuf, Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha, 2 vols. (Deoband:
Maktaba Ḥijāz, 1426AH/2005). 1:76; See Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī, The Conclusive
Argument of God: Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi's Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha, trans. Marcia K.
Hermansen (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 2003). 53-59.

35

“The verse is not a univocal or an explicit text (naṣṣ) stating that no one from the
community, on whom is God’s mercy, will have knowledge pertaining to the reality
of the spirit as it is assumed. For it does not mean that everything on which the
revelation (sharʿ) is silent, therefore it is absolutely impossible to have knowledge of
such a matter. Rather, many of the things about which the revelation is silent
actually requires sophisticated knowledge. And it is not appropriate to share this
knowledge with the entire multitude, while it is possible to share it with some of
them.”112

Then Walīyullāh explains that the spirit is the source of life which becomes evident
in a living creature (ḥayawān). He has a two-step process to explain the spirit. First,
according to the science in Waliyullah’s time, the quintessence as well as the
combination of the four humors—black bile, yellow bile, blood and phlegm—
generate a subtle vapor in the heart. This vapor also carries the faculties of
perception, movement, and the distribution of nutrition in the body, based on the
principles of medicine.113 Altering states of the vapor, in terms of its density, light,
purity or opaqueness—have a commensurate effect on the various faculties and
their functions. The existence of this vapor signifies life and its dissolution indicates
death. Hence, the vapor is often superficially identified and equated with the spirit,
rūḥ. On closer inspection it becomes clear that this vapor is the lowest rung of the
spirit, call it an elementary spirit. It provides the matter for the heavenly spirit to be
attached to the body. Another way to think of the spirit and the body, is like the
aromatic oil in the petals of the rose or the potential of coal to combust.

Second, is the animation of a living creature by the in-breathing of the spirit into the
body. The characteristics of the carrier of the spirit can be a young person or an old
person, a learned one or ignorant one, but the person remains the same. If we

112 al-Dihlawī and al-Bālanbūrī (Pālanpūrī), Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha. 1:74.
113 Ibid.

36
assume these changing attributes for argument’s sake, Walīyullāh says, the adult
person is the very infant of decades ago. And, of course, we cannot be certain that
the characteristics of the person permanently remain in the same condition, but we
can be certain, he says, that the person is the same. We might have to concede, says,
that the person is something different from all these changing attributes. Here
Walīyullāh is possibly invoking Ibn Sīnā’s position to say that the soul is closely
identified with our bodies. “The thing by which a person becomes what one is
(haecceity--huwa bihi huwa) is not the spirit, nor the body or the individuation that
is seen at the first instance. The spirit in all truth is a unique individuating essence
(ḥaqīqa fardānīya) and a luminous point. The condition of the spirit (luminous light)
is elevated from the other altering and contrasting conditions of [the body]: some of
these conditions are made up of substances and some others of accidents. The spirit
with the young is exactly like it is with old, with a black person as it is with a white
person, as it is with similar opposites. And this luminous spirit has a special relation
with the pneumatic spirit (lit. airy spirit) firstly, and the body secondly, in so far as
the body is the substrate (lit. mount) for the pneuma (nasama-spirit). The luminous
spirit is an aperture [of light] from the Sanctified World (ʿālam al-quds). From [that
sanctified world] descends everything which equips the pneuma. As to the changing
conditions to the [embodied] spirit, its changes stem from the earthly dispositions.
It is similar to the different effects of the heat of the sun: it bleaches [colored]
garment, but darkens (or tans) the person doing the bleaching [assuming the work
is done in the open].”114

Walīyullāh spends some time to explain how an infant’s attributes might change as
he or she becomes an adult but they remain the same person. Of course, the child’s
embodied spirit undergoes numerous changes, but identity is attached to
separate/individuating essence (ḥaqīqa fardānīya) which we call the spirit. But
recall the pneuma (nasama) also plays an important role in his schema and plays a
significant role in the death. The nasama plays an important intermediary role

114 Ibid., 1:75-76; al-Dihlawī, The Conclusive Argument of God. 54.

37
between the divine soul and the earthly body. Hence it plays a critical role in the
transition of the body to the afterlife at the point of death.

So what is death? His metaphysical and mystical intuitions, Walīyullah explains, lead
him to understand that death is the separation of the life-giving breath (nasama)
from the body. How do we know this separation had taken place? He gives an
interesting answer: when the body loses the ability to be generative and
spontaneously generate itself. Importantly, he says, death is not the separation of
the sanctified spirit (al-rūḥ al-qudsī) from the life-giving breath (pneuma/nasama).
What happens is that the the life-giving breath (nasama) deteriorates as a result of
serious and life-threating illness to the body. As part of God’s wisdom most of the
nasama leaves the body, but a residual component of the life-giving breath remains
in the body.115 This residual nasama makes it possible for the divine spirit (al-rūḥ
al-ilāhī) to connect to the body of the deceased person, as part of the transition to
the afterlife. That residual life-giving breath now generates a sensus communis
within the person in the afterlife. What is the sensus communis? It is that plane
between the tangible world and the intangible world. In this shared world we
acquire a faculty to hear, see and speak, with the help from the world of images,
ʿālam al-mithāl. Obviously, the means of communication would be different from the
way we experienced it in the world but this allows for an approximation.

He further explains that at the time of death the life-giving breath, nasama, might be
wrapped up in a garment of light or of darkness thanks to the effects of the world of
images. Then the person begins to experience either the wonders or the horrors of

115 Walīyullah gives an interesting explanation why the body does not collapse
with the extraction of the nasama. It is like sucking out all of the air from a bottle
and creating a perfect vacuum. But the pressure inside the bottle decreases more
than the exterior pressure, then it could crack. What prevents a normal body from
collapsing is the residual nasama, in his view.

38
the intermediary world, barzakh, depending on one’s salvific status based on one’s
moral performance in this world.

The pneuma, in turn, has two aspects: it is the screen between the divine spirit and
the earthly body. One side is holy or sacred, and the other side is animalistic. Now on
resurrection day the holy side of this screen is activated and the emanation of the
divine spirit enables the life-giving breath, nasama, pneuma to take on a bodily form
on judgment day.

Conclusion: Alteration in Knowing and Being-How to Talk About Death in Age
of Techno-Science

A vexed question in Muslim bioethics is how to determine the status of a
person who is declared to be brain-dead based on a medical determination of
irreversible brain stem damage. Muslim theologians have applied a variety of
criteria based on historical Islamic legal and ethical strictures to determine if a
person in such a condition can for all intents and purposes be declared to be
dead.116 Several Muslim jurisdictions accept the idea of brain death but their
decisions are insufficiently grounded in both the metaphysical and the scientific
literature with the result that some view their conclusions to uncritically veer to
the medical status quo. Some clinicians too have raised doubts claiming that
criteria for brain-death determinations differ around the world.117 One should
at least point out that clinical criteria for any judgment is as variable as are
ethical criteria in judgment, and therefore variation and a plurality of responses

116 See my Ebrahim Moosa, "Languages of Change in Islamic Law: Redefining Death
in Modernity," Islamic Studies 38, no. 3 (1999).
117 Aasim I. Padela, Ahsan Arozullah, and Ebrahim Moosa, "Brain Death in Islamic
Ethico-Legal Deliberation: Challenges for Applied Islamic Bioethics," Bioethics
(2011); Aasim I. Padela and Taha A. Basser, "Brain Death: The Challenges of
Translating Medical Science into Islamic Bioethical Discourse Islamic Law," Medicine
and Law 31(2012).

39
 are to be expected. A good number of Muslim ethicists have accepted the idea of
brain death following the expertise of medical experts, but their judgments have
not satisfied everyone. However, few have addressed this question on the basis of
metaphysics and hence personhood.
From an Islamic perspective of personhood, I view a patient diagnosed as
cerebrally dead, what is called brain-dead by any of the three international clinical
criteria, as an individual who is an embodied biological organism. The individual
and embodied organism once had personhood, but the irreversible nature of
damage to the vital body has erased consciousness, the key criterion of personhood.
One could make an argument for residual personhood of the biological organism
drawing on Walīyullāh’s idea of the remnant nasama, pneuma in the body of the
deceased or organism that can no longer spontaneously regenerate. It is precisely
because the organism once was a locus of personhood that we continue to sustain
the dignity of the corpse or organism just as we honor the memories of the dead as
persons. We provide the dead with proper burial rights and take care in the
dignified handling the corpse. Plus, we also refer to persons long dead as “persons”
who existed, acknowledging their vital being as persons and their personhood.
However, when medical certainty predicts the patient cannot recover
consciousness then in my view, personhood is extinguished. Ghazālī explained the
beginning of life as the spirit-soul entering the body, as being analogous to the
lighting a wick. As Ghazālī, Walīyullāh and other Muslim theologians will concur,
consciousness is diminished with the exit of the spirit-soul.
Jeff Mc Mahan has argued that the cessation of cerebral function and
consciousness, means that being human being, is to be a mind. Once one can
determine that the mind is absent, then there is no longer an embodied mind, only
an organism called the body.118 In this case, with the help of techno-science it is
possible for the biological organism to show signs of breathing and therefore
resemble cardio-pulmonary life. Other forms of vegetative life even continue in a

118 Jeff McMahan, "An Alternative to Brain Death," The Journal of Law, Medicine &
Ethics 34, no. 1 (2006).

40
corpse when hair and nails might grow. In an irreversibly damaged brain-stem there
could be other forms of minimal expression of life or even residual brain function,
but we can say with a high degree of certainty that consciousness for viable human
existence is irreversibly diminished.
The quandary is the dominance of the cardio-pulmonary definition of death
as a standard measure of the end of life and an index for the exit of the soul. For this
reason, it is extremely difficult for laypersons and families to conclude that cerebral
death had occurred when the body still simulates life with externally assisted
breathing techniques. But if families and relatives realize that an organism is now
merely a vessel for oxygenation for a limited time, it could help them to process
what they see to have a different meaning. If we correct our vocabulary and identify
the person as an individual and a human organism supported by techno-science, it is
a step in the right direction.
In my view the spirit-soul complex serves a body or physical organism
that has full integrity. When the body is irreversibly damaged with growing
unfavorable conditions for its physical organism, then it is no longer tenable to
conclude that the soul subsists and can still perform its functions in the body. We
have to switch to the mind-dependency field as our guide. In other words, death
is not with the onset of the end of normal breathing but by indicators of the brain
function. A brain-dead organism is in essence identical to a corpse, except that
techno-science allows us to simulate life in the organism.
To begin with, a severely damaged organism has no intentional states, nor
does it have a capacity for first-person perspective. For these complex indications
of brain-death, techno-science’s intervention requires us to revisit our
conceptions of mind-body dualism. We now have to admit that the brain and the
mind play significant roles as indicators of the presence of the soul. Furthermore,
we have to admit that the mind is far more dependent on the brain than
previously acknowledged by pre-modern traditionalists.
Recall that personhood is highly dependent on the spirit-soul-heart-mind
complex in pre-modern Islamic accounts. But we can glean something from the
insights of Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī who wrote: “…The human soul is endowed with a

41
 special property, the cognitive property to perceive the reality of things as they
are. Cognition is the property or vessel through which the light of divine
knowledge becomes manifest and in it radiates the light of His majesty, and it is
cognition that is privy to the secrets of the material and non-material world
…”.119 Rāzī opened the door for us to think about the connection between the
soul and our cognitive abilities and the significance of these abilities for
personhood.120
The current state of science makes us even more aware of the neuronal
dimension of our bodily constitution. The philosopher, Catherine Malabou
helpfully writes: “The current state of research and observation allows cognitive
scientists to conclude that thought, knowledge, desires, and affects all proceed on
a neuronal, that is to say, biological, basis, and that the mental images
constituting the life of the mind are indeed formed in the brain. This chief
affirmation, which is the basis for all ‘‘reductions’’ (in other words, the basis for

119 Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, 16 vols. (Beirut: Dār
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1425/2004). ?:11 The terms and translations are: composite
substance is jawhar murakkab; vital spirit is nafs, body is badan; fundamental
properties or drives are quwāhā al-aṣlīya thalāth; animal spirit is al-nafs al-
ḥaywānīya; sentience is ḥassāsa; non-material world is ʿālam al-khalq wa al-amr.
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?idfrom=3429&idto=343
0&bk_no=132&ID=1461
120 Ibid. Rāzī’s observation would be helpful to ponder. “Know that the human
being is a composite substance consisting of the vital soul and body,” he writes. “The
human soul is the most noble of existing souls in the lower world. The human body
is among the most noble of bodies in the lower world. The reason for assigning this
excellence to the human soul is due to the fact that the human soul consists of three
fundamental properties or drives, namely nutrition, growth and reproduction.
Whereas the animal soul consists of two properties or drives: sentience, irrespective
whether it is internal or external perception and, voluntary movement … Then the
human soul is endowed with a special property, the cognitive property to perceive
the reality of things as they are. Cognition is the property or vessel through which
the light of divine knowledge becomes manifest and in it radiates the light of His
majesty, and it is cognition that is privy to the secrets of the material and non-
material world …”.
http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?idfrom=3429&idto=343
0&bk_no=132&ID=1461

42
 assimilating the mind to a natural datum), is at once the strongest and the
weakest point of neuroscientific discourse in general.”121 It is at its “strongest,”
explains Malabou, when the neuroscientific discourse is an advance in so far as
these inquiries have allowed us to understand memory, learning, psychic and
behavioral problems more precisely and objectively. It is at its “weakest” because
the “certainty of continuity” between the neuronal and the mental can never
strictly be a scientific postulate.122 It is precisely here, in this gap of certainty or
space of uncertainty—pointed out by Kenney, Robinson and Malabou—between
the neuronal and the mental that theological and philosophical accounts, in short
metaphysics can play a role. Collaboration between neuroscientists, philosophers
and ethicists is reaching a point where there is a recognition of the indispensable
“proto-self” consisting of the “state of the internal milieu, viscera, vestibular
system, and musculoskeletal frame’’ to which we attribute the notion of
consciousness.123 Neurobiologists treat the brain as the mysterious link
between what we call our personality and the nervous system or what is also
called the synaptic self. Muslim bioethics cannot ignore the undeniable results of
neuroscience. Body-soul dualism or substance dualism in Islam, and possibly
other traditions, is subject to revision.
I would align myself with “soft dualism” where there is no abyssal
separation between body-mind (soul) since our bodies are part of our integral
personhood.124 Yet, strict dualism “can’t connect the soul to its neural
template,” as a recent study, noted.125 Unfortunately, the distorted reception of
Cartesian dualism has created the wrong impression, as if the brain is not part of

121 Catherine Malabou, What should we do with our brain? , 1st ed.. ed. (New York:
New York : Fordham University Press, 2008). 55-56.
122 Ibid., 56.
123 Ibid., 59.
124 Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, Rev. ed. ed. (Oxford: Oxford:
Clarendon, 1997). 11.
125 Lenn E. Goodman and D. Gregory Caramenico, Coming to mind:the soul and its
body (Chicago; London:: The University of Chicago Press, 2013). 17.

43
 the body, when in fact it is integral to the body and as a result gives rise to
something called the mind, a faculty vital to personhood. Soft dualism should be
coupled with emergence, the notion that a human being is always-already formed

in relation to both material and immaterial conditions.126 William Hasker

explains emergent dualism as a view that states the “mind (or soul) is an
individual that is generated by the functioning of the biological body, specifically
the brain and nervous system, and yet is distinct from the physical body.”127 In
other words, the mental emerges from the physical: “consciousness and mental
properties appear when body and brain have evolved to the appropriate level of
complexity.”128
Haque has argued for Muslims to adopt the corporeal monist position of
the human person.129 Corporeal monism holds that there is one ontologically
distinct substance, the material body. Haque is agnostic whether the soul is
material or immaterial. If the former, then it squares with his preference for
corporeal monism, which he believes is compatible with modern intellectual life.
But his proposal is inattentive to the refinements and sophistication to the body-
mind dualist position and a range of traditional views demonstrating a much
more complex relationship between the body and incorporeal aspects of the self,
such as the spirit, soul and the heart in Muslim metaphysics. Despite a robust
advocacy Haque’s position takes us away from the conceptual understanding of
the body-soul or person-mind relationship in the tradition and there is no good
reason why a complex position should be abandoned in favor of a reductionist

126 Christian Smith, What is a person?:rethinking humanity, social life, and the moral
good from the person up (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 25-42.
127 William Hasker, "The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique," International
Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2004): 34.
128 Kelly James Clark, Religion and the sciences of origins:historical and
contemporary discussions, First edition.. ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014). 176.
129 Haque Omar Sultan, "Brain Death and its Entanglements: A Redefinition of
Personhood for Islamic Ethics," Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 1 (2008): 23.

44
 view. One of the salient advantages of the body soul-dualism is precisely the
advantage that it serves as a shield against reductionist understandings of
personhood.
A plethora of premodern Muslim insights on metaphysics couple being
and knowing in sophisticated discourses. Attention to that complex Islamic
metaphysical literacy and contemporary philosophy opens the door to
understanding the human being as “unique individuating essence” (ḥaqīqa
fardānīya) of the relationship between the spirit-soul complex and the mind as
being at the center of human personhood and the question of being in a modern
Muslim metaphysics. I am fully aware that the debate is an on-going one with
ample room for refinement and development.




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Smith, David Woodruff, "Phenomenology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/phenomenology/>.
Ṣ adr al-Dı̄n al-Shı̄rā zı̄, Muḥ ammad b. Ibrā hı̄m, and Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar. Al-
ḤIkma Al-MutaʻāLiya Fī Al-Asfār Al-ʿaqlīya Al-Arbaʿa 1st ed. 9 vols Beirut: Dār
Iḥyā al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, c.1387/1967.
Thiselton, Anthony C. New Horizons in Hermeneutics. Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Zondervan Pub. House, 1992.
Vishanoff, David. The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists
Imagined a Revealed Law. American Oriental Series. edited by Stephanie
Jamison, Peri Bearman and Gary M. Beckman. Vol. 93, Ann Arbor: American
Oriental Society, 2010.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D.F. Pears and
B.F. McGuinness. New York & London: Routledge, 2001.
Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. The Book of Metaphysical Penetrations:
A Parallel English-Arabic Text. edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr and İbrahim
Kalın. 1 ed. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 2014.

47
 The Role of Historical Perspectives in Quranic Exegesis

Muhammad Bilal
Pakistan

Religion rests on the claims of revelation that is transcendent. Nonetheless, every religion appears at some
moment in history. It is the duty of scholars to interpret revelation in different cultural contexts.
According to Qari Muhammad Tayyab, the sensibilities of a people changes entirely every century.
Mindsets transform from war to peace. This is why the Islamic tradition informs us that God sends
someone to renew religious teachings every century. Renewers speak to the spirit of the age, whether
rational or spiritual. The Quran is able to speak in many forms to meet the needs of people everywhere
and for all time.

In the formative centuries of Islamic thought, two schools of thought developed in Quran interpretation.
Traditional exegesis (tafsir biʾl-maʾthur) turns to explanations of the Quran that come to us on the
authority of the Prophet or his Companions. The second school of rational interpretation (tafsir biʾl-raʾy)
turns to external sources such as philosophy. Scholars like Ibn Rushd say that the sharia must be
interpreted according to truths that can be known to us through reason because it is impossible for the two
to be in contradiction. Others like Imam Razi, Allama Alusi, and more concur with Ibn Rushd.

Syed Ahmad Khan revived the latter kind of rational interpretation in the modern era with his attempt to
reconcile the findings of modern science with the Quran. Advances in the natural and social sciences have
changed our worldview entirely, opening up new approaches to the study of the Quran. Among the new
perspectives that are applied to Quranic interpretation today is the historical perspective, which requires
that the verses be read in their proper historical context. The Quran was revealed over a period of two
decades. Its commandments must be read according to the context in which they were revealed and then
interpreted anew for today.

The “occasions of revelation” form an important part of traditional exegetical material that is useful for
historical interpretation. The codification of the “Science of Occasions” was driven by three factors:
cultural, scholarly, and ideological. Scholarship is in need of occasions of revelation in order to give some
context to verses that were revealed in response to specific circumstances. And when different schools of
thought began develop disagreements on the meanings of different verses, the need for anchoring these
meanings in their proper contexts was felt even more. The process of codification took place in three
stages.

The first stage consists of the first Islamic century with the Companions of the Prophet and the generation
that came after them. This stage produced anecdotal reports that were transmitted and recorded in books
of Hadith. The second state is from the second century to the fourth in which the occasions of revelation
found their place within the exegetical tradition proper. The third stage commences with the fifth century
when entire separate works began to appear on the occasions of revelation, as in the work of Imam
Wahidi. The definition of “occasions of revelation” also evolved through these various stages.

Occasions of revelation help to fix meanings of words, elaborate the meanings of a verse, and remove
ambiguity. Jurists rely on occasions of revelation in order to derive rulings and to determine whether they
apply only in specific cases or are more universally applicable. Occasions of revelation also help scholars
determine whether a ruling in one verse has been abrogated by a ruling in another. And occasions of
revelation may also be used to determine which particular reading of a verse is correct in case multiple
readings of that particular verse have been reported through different transmitters.
 ‫ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﮐﺎ ﮐﺮدار‬
‫ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺑﻼل‬
‫‪Muhammad Bilal, Pakistan‬‬
‫ﮨﻢ ﺳﺐ ﺟﺎﻧﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد اﻟﮩﺎﻣﯽ دﻋﻮے ﭘﺮ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﮐﺎ زﻣﺎن و ﻣﮑﺎں ﺳﮯ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ۔ﻟﯿﮑﻦ‬
‫ﺑﮩﺮﺣﺎل ﮨﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺴﯽ اﯾﮏ زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ وﺟﻮد ﻣﯿﮟ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ اور اﯾﮏ ﻧﺒﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﻨﺴﻮب ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻮ اﯾﮏ‬
‫ﺧﺎص زﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ زﻧﺪه رﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ ﮨﺮ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﮐﺎ دﻋﻮی ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت اﺑﺪی ﮨﯿﮟ ۔ﻟﮩﺬا ﺟﺐ‬
‫ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺬﮨﺐ ﺧﺎص ﺟﻐﺮاﻓﯽ ﺣﺪود اور ﻋﮩﺪ ﻧﺒﻮی ﺳﮯ ﻧﮑﻠﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ اﺳﮯ دوﺳﺮی ﺟﻐﺮاﻓﯿﺎﺋﯽ ﺣﺪود اور‬
‫زﻣﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺗﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﭘﯿﺶ آﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ۔ ورﻟﮉ وﯾﻮ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ آج‬
‫ﮐﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ اس دﻧﯿﺎ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮩﺖ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮا ﺗﮭﺎ ۔ ﻟﮩﺬا ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫آج ﮐﮯ دور ﮐﮯ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ دﯾﻨﺎ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎن ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﮐﯽ ذﻣہ داری ﮨﮯ ۔ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎن ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﮨﺮ دور‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ذﻣہ داری ادا ﮐﺮﺗﮯ آﺋﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔‬
‫ﻗﺎری ﻣﺤﻤﺪ طﯿﺐ ؒ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ " ﮨﺮ ﻗﺮن ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﺮ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ذﮨﻨﯿﺘﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺋﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺑﻠﮑہ ﮨﺮ ﺳﻮ ﺑﺮس ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺑﻌﺪ ﻗﻮم ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯿﺖ ﺑﺪل ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺐ اﯾﮏ ﻧﺴﻞ ﺧﺘﻢ ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬دوﺳﺮی ﻧﺴﻞ آﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻠﯿﺎں‬
‫ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﺑﺪﻟﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ﺟﺐ اﯾﮏ ﺟﻨﮓ ﮨﻮ ﮐﺮ ﺻﻠﺢ ﮐﺎ وﻗﺖ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎت ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‪،‬‬
‫ﺗﻤﺪن ﺑﺪﻟﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﻼم ﻧﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ ﯾہ ﺧﺒﺮ دی ﮐہ ﮨﺮ ﺳﻮ ﺑﺮس ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮨﻢ ﻣﺠﺪد ﺑﮭﯿﺠﯿﮟ ﮔﮯ ﺟﻮ دﯾﻦ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﻧﮑﮭﺎرﯾﮟ ﮔﮯ اور اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﺠﺪﯾﺪ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﮔﮯ۔ ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ ﺳﻮ ﮨﯽ ﺑﺮس ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ان ﺿﺮورﺗﻮں ﮐﺎ اﻧﺘﻈﺎم ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪،‬‬
‫اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﯿﮟ آﻧﮯ واﻟﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﻞ دﯾﻦ ﮐﯽ ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﺣﺎل‪ ،‬اﻧﮭﯽ ﮐﮯ رﻧﮓ ﻣﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ان ﮐﯽ زﺑﺎن‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ ﺗﺎﮐہ وه دﯾﻦ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ۔اﮔﺮ ﻗﻮم ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺼﻮف ﮐﺎ ﻏﻠﺒہ ﮨﻮا ﺗﻮ اﺳﻼم ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ‬
‫ﮐﻮ ﺻﻮﻓﯿﺎﻧہ رﻧﮓ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﺎﮐہ ﺻﻮﻓﯽ ﻣﺸﻦ ﻟﻮگ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﺳﮑﯿﮟ۔ ﺻﻮﻓﯿﺎﻧہ اﻧﺪاز ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮﯾﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﻏﺰاﻟﯽ ان ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﻧﮯ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮﯾﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﯿﮟ۔ اﯾﮏ زﻣﺎﻧہ ﻋﻘﻞ ﭘﺮﺳﺘﯽ‬
‫ؒ‬ ‫ﻋﺮﺑﯽ اور اﻣﺎم‬
‫ؒ‬ ‫ﮔﺌﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﻣﺤﯽ اﻟﺪﯾﻦ اﺑﻦ‬
‫ﮐﺎ آﯾﺎ ﮐہ ﻟﻮگ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﻋﻘﻞ ﮐﯽ ﻣﺪد ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼت ﮐﻮ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ۔ اﯾﺴﮯ ﻣﺠﺪد ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﺟﻨﮭﻮں‬
‫ﻧﮯ ﻗﺮآن وﺣﺪﯾﺚ ﮐﻮ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ رﻧﮓ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ۔ اﻣﺎم رازی‪ ،‬ﺷﺎه وﻟﯽ ﷲ‪ ،‬اﻣﺎم ﻏﺰاﻟﯽ رﺣﻤۃ ﷲ ﻋﻠﯿﮩﻢ ﻧﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﯾہ ﮐﺎم ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐہ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ اﺻﻮل ﭘﺮ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮﯾﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﯿﮟ۔ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﻮ ﺧﺎﻟﺺ ﻋﻘﻞ ﮐﮯ ﺟﺎﻣﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎﯾﺎ۔ اﯾﮏ‬
‫زﻣﺎﻧہ آﯾﺎ‪ ،‬اس ﻣﯿﮟ طﺒﻌﯿﺎت ﮐﺎ ﻏﻠﺒہ ﺗﮭﺎ ﺗﻮ طﺒﻌﯽ رﻧﮓ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآن وﺣﺪﯾﺚ ﮐﻮ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ۔ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﯽ ﯾہ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﯿﺖ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه اﯾﺴﺎ ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﭼﮩﺮه ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﻟﺒﺎس ﭘﮩﻨﺎ دو‪ ،‬اﺗﻨﺎ ﮨﯽ ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﺲ رﻧﮓ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ‬
‫ﻗﻮم ﯾﺎ طﺒﻘہ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬وه اﺳﯽ رﻧﮓ ﻣﯿﮟ اﭘﻨﮯ ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ اﺳﻼم ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﯿﺖ ﮨﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻮ ﯾہ ﮐﯿﺴﮯ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﮯ طﺒﻘﺎت اور دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﯽ ﻗﻮﻣﻮں ﮐﯽ ذﮨﻨﯿﺖ اﻟﮓ اﻟﮓ ﮨﻮ‪ ،‬وه ﺳﺐ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ‬
‫ﭘﯿﻐﺎم ﺑﻨﮯ اور ﺳﺐ ﮐﯽ ﻧﻔﺴﯿﺎت ﮐﯽ رﻋﺎﯾﺖ ﻧہ ﮐﺮے؟ اس ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﮯ ﺟﺎﻣﻊ اﺻﻮل ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﮨﯿﮟ‪ ،‬وه ﺿﺮور‬
‫رﻋﺎﯾﺖ ﮐﺮے ﮔﺎ ‪1‬۔‬

‫‪1‬ﺧﻄﺒﺎت ﺣﮑﯿﻢ اﻻﺳﻼم‪ ،‬ج ‪ ،۴‬ص ‪ ۳۲۰‬ﺗﺎ ‪ ،۳۲۴‬طﺒﻊ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺷﺮ ﺑﯿﺖ اﻟﺴﻼم ﮐﺮاﭼﯽ‪ ،‬اﮐﺘﻮﺑﺮ ‪۲۰۱۱‬ء‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ و ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﺎ آﻏﺎز ﻧﺒﯽ اﮐﺮم ﷺ ﮐﮯ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮔﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ۔ﻧﺒﯽ اﮐﺮ مﷺ ﮐﮯ وﺻﺎل ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺑﻌﺪ ﯾہ ذﻣہ داری ﺻﺤﺎﺑہ ﮐﺮام ؒ ﮐﮯ ﮐﻨﺪھﻮں ﭘﺮ آ ﭘﮍی ۔ ﭼﻮﻧﮑہ ﺻﺤﺎﺑہ ﻋﺮﺑﯽ زﺑﺎن ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻋﺮب‬
‫ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﻣﺎﺣﻮل ‪ ،‬رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﮐﮯ اﻧﺪاز اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ﻟﮩﺬااس دورﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﮐﭽﮭ‬
‫ﺧﺎص ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪه ﻧہ رﮨﺎ ۔اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺟﺐ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ دور آﯾﺎ ‪ ،‬اﺳﻼم ﻋﺮب ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﮨﺮ دوﺳﺮی اﻗﻮام ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﮭﯿﻠﻨﮯ‬
‫ﻟﮕﺎ اور اﺳﻼم ﮐﺎ دوﺳﺮے ﻣﺬاﮨﺐ اور دوﺳﺮے ﻋﻼﻗﻮں ﮐﮯ رﺳﻢ و رواج ﺳﮯ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼت ﺑﮍھﻨﮯ ﻟﮕﮯ اور‬
‫ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ ان ﮐﺎ دور رﺳﻮل ﷲﷺ ﮐﮯ دود ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﺗﻮ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠہ ﭘﯿﭽﯿﺪه ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﺎ ۔ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﻼﻗﻮں‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺜﻼ ﻣﮑہ ‪ ،‬ﻣﺪﯾﻨہ ‪ ،‬ﮐﻮﻓہ ‪ ،‬ﻋﺮاق وﻏﯿﺮه ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﮑﺎﺗﺐ ﻓﮑﺮ وﺟﻮد ﻣﯿﮟ آﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﮯ ۔ﺗﯿﺴﺮی‬
‫ﺻﺪی ﮨﺠﺮی ﻣﯿﮟ آ ﮐﺮ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﻣﮑﻤﻞ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻟﮑﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ رواج ﭘﮍا ورﻧہ اس ﺳﮯ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺻﺮف ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ان اﻟﻔﺎظ ‪ ،‬ﻣﺤﺎورات ﯾﺎ ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻼﻗﺎت ﮐﯽ وﺿﺎﺣﺖ ﮐﺮ دی ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ ۔ ﺟﺐ ﮨﻢ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮی ادب ﮐﯽ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ‬
‫ﭘﺮ ﻧﮕﺎه ڈاﻟﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی طﻮر ﭘﺮ دو ﺑﮍے ﺳﮑﻮل آف ﺗﮭﺎٹ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺋﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔اﯾﮏ ﺟﻦ‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺎﺳﯿﺮ ﮐﻮ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮﺑﺎﻟﻤﺎﺛﻮر ﮐﺎ ﻧﺎم دﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ اور دوﺳﺮی وه ﺟﻮ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﺑﺎاﻟﺮاﺋﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻮﺳﻮم ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ۔‬
‫ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺎﺛﻮر ‪:‬‬
‫ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺎﺛﻮر ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﻠﺐ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ ان ذراﺋﻊ ﮐﻮ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺟﻮ ﺧﻮد ﻗﺮآن ‪،‬‬
‫رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﯾﺎ ﺻﺤﺎﺑہ ﮐﺮام ؒ ﮐﮯ واﺳﻄﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻢ ﺗﮏ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﺧﻮد ﻗﺮآن‬
‫ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﺳﮯ ‪ ،‬ﻗﺮآن ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ اﺣﺎدﯾﺚ ﻧﺒﻮﯾہ و ﺳﻨﺖ ﻣﺘﻮاﺗﺮه ﺳﮯ ‪ ،‬اور ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺗﺮﺑﯿﺖ ﯾﺎﻓﺘہ ﺻﺤﺎﺑہ ﮐﺮام ؒ ﺳﮯ ﻣﻨﻘﻮل آﺛﺎر ﺳﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ ۔اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﮯ‬
‫ﻟﺴﺎﻧﯽ ﻗﻮاﻋﺪ ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﯽ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ۔اس ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺧﺎرﺟﯽ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﺳﮯ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ۔ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ زﺑﺎن ‪ ،‬ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﮯ اﺳﺎﻟﯿﺐ ﺳﮯ آﮔﺎﮨﯽ ﮐہ ﮐﺲ ﻣﻘﺎم ﭘﺮ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺎ ﻣﺨﺎطﺐ ﮐﻮن‬
‫ﮨﮯ‪ ،‬ﻧﻈﻢ ﮐﻼم اور ﺳﻨﺖ ﻣﺘﻮاﺗﺮه وه ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﮢﻮﻟﺰ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻦ ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ وﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ‬
‫۔ﺟﻨﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ اﻟﻘﺮآن ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺮآن ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ اﻟﻘﺮآن ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺪﯾﺚ اور ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ اﻟﻘﺮآن ﺑﺎاﻗﻮال اﻟﺼﺤﺎﺑہ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔‬
‫ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﺮاﺋﮯ ۔‬
‫دوﺳﺮے ﻣﮑﺘﺐ ﻓﮑﺮ ﮐﺎ ﺧﯿﺎل ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن و ﺣﺪﯾﺚ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻼوه ﻋﻠﻮم ﻣﺜﻼ ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ وﻏﯿﺮه ﮐﻮ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ و ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ۔اس ﻟﯿﮯ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ ﺳﯿﮑﮭﺎ اور ﭘﮭﺮ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ و‬
‫ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اس ﺳﮯ ﻣﺪد ﺑﮭﯽ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﯽ ۔ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ ﮐﻮ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﮯاﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ‬
‫ان ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں دو طﺮﯾﻘﮯ اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ ۔ اﯾﮏ ﯾہ ﮐہ ﻗﺮان ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﻧﺼﻮص ﮐﯽ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﮐﯽ‬
‫ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺲ ﺳﮯ ﻗﺮآن و ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺗﻌﺎرض ﮐﻮ رﻓﻊ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﮯ ۔ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﻌﺮوف ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﯽ‬
‫اﺑﻦ رﺷﺪ ﮐﮩﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ‬
‫اﺑﻦ رﺷﺪ ﮐﺎ ﮐﮩﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺐ ﮨﻢ ﻋﻘﻞ ﮐﮯ درﺳﺖ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﺳﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯽ ﺗﮏ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﻮﺷﺮﯾﻌﺖ اس‬
‫ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﯾﺎ ﺗﻮ ﺧﺎﻣﻮش ﮨﻮﮔﯽ اور ﯾﺎ وه ﺳﭽﺎﺋﯽ ﺑﻌﯿﻨہ ﺷﺮﯾﻌﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺬﮐﻮر ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ ۔اﯾﺴﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻋﻘﻞ ﺟﺲ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﭘﺮ ﭘﮩﻨﭽﮯ وه اور ﺷﺮﯾﻌﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺘﺎﺋﯽ ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻼت ﺑﺎﮨﻢ ﻣﺘﻌﺎرض ﮨﻮں۔ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اﮔﺮ ﻗﺮآن‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﺎت ﺑﻈﺎﮨﺮ ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻼف ﻣﺤﺴﻮس ﮨﻮ ﺗﻮ ﯾﻘﯿﻨﺎ ً اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﮩہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ اور ﻣﻌﻨﯽ و ﻣﻄﻠﺐ ﺿﺮور‬
‫ﮨﻮں ﮔﮯ ﺟﻮ ﮐہ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﻓﻠﺴﻔہ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﮨﻮں ۔ ﻟﮩﺬا اس ظﺎﮨﺮی ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ ‪2‬۔‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ آﯾﺖ " اﻓﻤﻦ ﮐﺎن ﻋﻠﯽ ﺑﯿﻨہ ﻣﻦ رﺑہ وﯾﺘﻠﻮه ﺷﺎﮨﺪ ﻣﻨہ "' ﺳﮯ اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﻋﻼﻣہ آﻟﻮﺳﯽ‬
‫ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ اس آﯾﺖ ﺳﮯ ظﺎﮨﺮ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ دﻟﯿﻞ ﺷﺮﻋﯽ ‪ ،‬دﻟﯿﻞ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﮨﮯ ۔ اور ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﮐﺒﮭﯽ اﺻﻞ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺧﻼف ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ۔ ﻟﮩﺬا ﺟﮩﺎں ﮐﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ اﯾﺴﺎ ﻧﻈﺮ آﺋﮯ ﮐہ دﻟﯿﻞ ﺳﻤﻌﯽ اور دﻟﯿﻞ ﻋﻘﻠﯽ آﭘﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺘﻌﺎرض‬
‫ﮨﯿﮟ وﮨﺎں دﻟﯿﻞ ﺳﻤﻌﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺗﺎوﯾﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﯽ ۔ ‪ 3‬اﺳﯽ ﻣﻨﮩﺞ ﭘﺮ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎن ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﻧﮯ ﺗﻔﺎﺳﯿﺮ ﻟﮑﮭﯿﮟ ۔ﻣﺜﻼ ۔‬
‫ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﺒﯿﺮ اﻣﺎم رازی ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻧﯿﺴﺎﭘﻮری ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﺷﯿﺮازی ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ آﻟﻮﺳﯽ ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ طﺒﺎطﺒﺎﺋﯽ وﻏﯿﺮه ۔‬
‫ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺮ ﺳﯿﺪ اﺣﻤﺪ ﺧﺎن وه ﭘﮩﻠﮯ آدﻣﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺟﻨﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻘﻠﯿﺪ روش ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﭼﮭﻮڑ ﮐﺮ اﺟﺘﮩﺎدی روش اﭘﻨﺎﺋﯽ ﮨﮯ ۔ﺳﺮ ﺳﯿﺪ اﺣﻤﺪ ﺧﺎن ﮐﺎ ﺧﯿﺎل ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﻮ اﭘﻨﯽ رواﯾﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺑﺪﻟﺘﯽ‬
‫دﻧﯿﺎ ﻧﺌﮯ ﻋﻠﻮم اور ﺑﺪﻟﺘﯽ ﺿﺮورﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺠﺰﯾہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﺌﮯ۔ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﯾہ اﺻﻮل ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐہ‬
‫ﻋﻘﻞ اور ﻧﻘﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﻔﺎوت ﻧﮩﯿﮟ۔ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮ ﻓﯽ اﺻﻮل اﻟﺘﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ‪ ” :‬ﭘﮭﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮯ ﺑﻘﺪر اﭘﻨﯽ‬
‫طﺎﻗﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻮد ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﭘﺮ ﻏﻮر ﮐﯽ اور ﭼﺎﮨﺎ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن ﮨﯽ ﺳﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﺌﮯ ‪ ،‬ﮐہ اس ﮐﺎ ﻧﻈﻢ ﮐﻦ‬
‫اﺻﻮﻟﻮں ﭘﺮ واﻗﻊ ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ اور ﺟﮩﺎں ﺗﮏ ﻣﯿﺮی طﺎﻗﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﮭﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ اور ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮯ ﭘﺎﯾﺎ ﮐہ ﺟﻮ اﺻﻮل‬
‫ﺧﻮد ﻗﺮآن ﻣﺠﯿﺪﺳﮯ ﻧﮑﻠﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ان ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﺖ ﻋﻠﻮم ﺟﺪﯾﺪه ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧہ اﺳﻼم ﺳﮯ ﮨﮯ اور ﻧہ ﻗﺮآن‬
‫ﺳﮯ‪ ،‬۔” اس اﺻﻮل ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﯽ آﯾﺎت ﮐﻮ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺎﺗﯽ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ‬
‫ﮐﯽ۔‬
‫ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﯽ وﺳﻮﺷﻞ ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺴﺰ ﮐﮯ ﻋﻠﻮم ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎﻋﺚ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﺎ دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﻮ دﯾﮑﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ زاوﯾہ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﺎﻟﮑﻞ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮ ﭼﮑﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ﺳﺎﺋﻨﺲ و ﮢﯿﮑﻨﺎﻟﻮﺟﯽ ﮐﮯ اﻧﻘﻼب ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻢ آﺛﺎرﯾﺎت ‪ ،‬ﺑﺸﺮﯾﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ‬
‫ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ‪ ،‬ﻗﻮﻣﯽ رﯾﺎﺳﺘﯿﮟ ‪،‬اور ﺟﻨﺴﯽ ﻣﺴﺎوات وﻏﯿﺮه ﺟﯿﺴﮯ اﻧﻘﻼﺑﺎت ﻧﮯ اﻧﺴﺎن ﮐﯽ دﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﻮ دﯾﮑﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ‬
‫زاوﯾہ ﮐﻮ ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮍا اﮨﻢ ﮐﺮدار ادا ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور ﮐﯽ اس ﺗﺮﻗﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎن‬
‫ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﻧﮯ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور ﮐﮯ ﭼﯿﻠﻨﺠﺰ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠہ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ۔اور اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ طﺮﯾﻘﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻗﺮآن‬
‫ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﻮ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور ﮐﮯ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ دﯾﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺘﯿﺠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآن‬
‫ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﻨﺎﮨﺞ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ آﺋﮯ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ ﻣﻨﮩﺞ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﻮ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔اس ﻣﻨﮩﺞ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اس ﮐﮯ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ‬
‫ﺳﯿﺎق ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌہ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺿﺮوری ﮨﮯ ۔اﮔﺮ اس ﮐﻮ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ اﮨﻤﯿﺖ ﻧہ دی ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﮐﺲ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﮑﻤﻞ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﺎ ﻣﺸﮑﻞ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺳﯿﺎق ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﻠﺐ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺲ وﻗﺖ اور زﻣﺎﻧہ ﻣﯿﮟ وه ﻣﺘﻦ‬
‫ﻟﮑﮭﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ اس ﮐﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮﺗﯽ ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﺎﺷﯽ ‪ ،‬ﻣﺬﮨﺒﯽ اور ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ رﮐﮭ ﮐﺮ اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ‬
‫ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ۔اﯾﺴﮯ ﮨﯽ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﺎ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮا اس ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﮐﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻓﮩﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ی ﺣﯿﺜﯿﺖ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮨﮯ۔ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰول ﮐﺎ دور دو ﻋﺸﺮوں ﭘﺮ‬
‫ﻣﺤﯿﻂ ﮨﮯ ۔ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اوﻗﺎت ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺿﺮورﺗﻮں ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد ﭘﺮ اﺣﮑﺎم ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺗﮯ رﮨﮯ ۔ اس ﻟﯿﮯ‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﮐﮯ اس ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﮐﻮ اﺣﮑﺎم ﮐﮯ ﺗﻌﯿﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻈﺮاﻧﺪاز ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ۔ ﻟﮩﺬا ﺟﺐ ان اﺣﮑﺎم ﮐﺎ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ‬

‫‪ 2‬ﻓﺻل اﻟﻣﻘﺎل ‪ ،‬ص ‪2‬‬

‫‪ 3‬روح اﻟﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ ‪228/6‬‬
‫ﺗﺒﺪﯾﻞ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﺗﻮ ﻣﺘﻦ ﮐﯽ ﻧﺌﮯ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ دوﺑﺎره ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮوت ﮨﻮ ﮔﯽ۔ اس ﺗﺼﻮر ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ ﻗﺮآن‬
‫ﻣﺠﯿﺪ ﻧﮯ زﻣﺎﻧۂ ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ رﮐﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ اﺣﮑﺎﻣﺎت دﯾﮯ۔ آج ﮐﮯ دور ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﺳﮯ واﺑﺴﺘﮕﯽ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﻠﺐ ﯾہ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ اس ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﺧﯿﺎل ﮐﻮ ﺳﺎﻣﻨﮯ رﮐﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ان ﻣﺨﺼﻮص اﺣﮑﺎم‬
‫ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﻧﻮ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﯿﺎن ﮐﯿﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ اﺣﮑﺎم ﮐﯽ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺖ دو طﺮح ﮐﯽ ﮨﮯ اﯾﮏ وه اﺣﮑﺎم‬
‫ﺟﻮ ﻣﻄﻠﻮب ﮨﯿﮟ۔ اور دوﺳﺮے وه ﺟﻮ ﻋﮩﺪ ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ﺣﺎﻻت ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ دﯾﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ ۔اﺣﮑﺎم ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻋﮩﺪ‬
‫ﻧﺰول ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺮاد ﯾہ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺧﺎص ﺣﺎﻻت ﻣﯿﮟ درﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﺴﺌﻠﮯ ﮐﺎﮐﯿﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺣﻞ ﺗﺠﻮﯾﺰ‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔ اس ﮐﺎ ﻣﻄﻠﺐ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻣﺜﺎﻟﯽ ﺣﻞ ﮐﺎ ﺑﯿﺎن ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‪ ،‬ﺑﻠﮑہ اﯾﮏ ﻣﻤﮑﻨہ ﺣﻞ ﺗﺠﻮﯾﺰ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اس‬
‫ﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﺮﻏﯿﺐ دﯾﻨﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮩﺮﺣﺎل ﻣﺜﺎﻟﯽ ﺣﻞ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻼش اور طﻠﺐ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد رﮨﻨﯽ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ۔اس‬
‫ﺿﻤﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ وه ﺗﻌﺪدازواج ﮐﯽ ﻣﺜﺎل ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔ ان ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺒﯿﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻗﺮآﻧﯽ ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰدﯾﮏ ﺑﮩﺘﺮ ﺑﺎت‬
‫ﯾﮩﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﯾﮏ ﺑﯿﻮی اور ﺧﺎوﻧﺪ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮت ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﯿﺎد رﮐﮭﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔ ﺗﺎ ﮨﻢ ﻗﺮآن ﺟﺲ ﻣﻌﺎﺷﺮے ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮ رﮨﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬اس ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ رواﯾﺖ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺗﮭﯽ۔ اس ﺳﮯ ﺣﺎﻻت ﭘﺮ ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ ﺣﻞ ﯾہ ﺗﺠﻮﯾﺰ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎﮐہ ﭼﺎر‬
‫ﺑﯿﻮﯾﻮں ﮐﯽ اﺟﺎزت ﮨﮯ۔ ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﮐﻮ ﻗﺮآن‬
‫ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﯾﮏ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی اﺻﻮل ﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺟﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ؟ اس ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‬
‫ﮔﺎ ﮐہ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﮐﺎ ﻣﻨﮩﺞ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﮐﻮ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ دور ﮐﮯ ﺗﻘﺎﺿﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮐﺲ ﻗﺪر ﻣﻌﺎون ﮨﮯ ۔؟‬
‫اس ﺳﻠﺴﻠﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﺐ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﺰه ﻟﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮐہ ﮨﻤﺎرے ﻗﺪﯾﻢ ﻣﻔﺴﺮﯾﻦ ﮐﮯ ﮨﺎں ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﻓﮩﻢ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐﺮدار رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ رواﯾﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﮐﻮ ﮐﺲ ﻗﺪر اﮨﻤﯿﺖ دی‬
‫ﮔﺌﯽ ﮨﮯ ۔ اور دوﺳﺮے ﺣﺼہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ﮐﮯ ﺗﺎﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﮐﮯ اﺻﻮل ﮐﺎ ﻗﺪﯾﻢ رواﯾﺘﯽ ﺗﺼﻮر‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ اور ﺗﯿﺴﺮے اور آﺧﺮی ﺣﺼہ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ آﯾﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺗﺎرﯾﺨﯽ ﺗﻨﺎظﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮی‬
‫ﻣﻮازﻧہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ ۔‬

‫اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﺎ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺮدار‬

 ‫ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻋﻠﻢ اﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﻨﺰول ‪:‬‬
‫دور رﺳﺎﻟﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ اور ﺻﺤﺎﺑہ ﮐﺮام اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﻮ ﺑﮍی اﮨﻤﯿﺖ دﯾﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ۔ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ آﯾﺖ اﮔﺮ‬
‫ﮐﺴﯽ ﺻﺤﺎﺑﯽ ﯾﺎ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﮐﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﻋﻤﻞ ﯾﺎ ﺳﻮال ﮐﮯ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﯿﮟ اﺗﺮی ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ وه اس ﮐﺎ اظﮩﺎر ﺿﺮور‬
‫ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ۔ ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ ﺧﻮد رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﺟﺐ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺑﻦ ﻣﮑﺘﻮم ؒ ﮐﻮ دﯾﮑﮭﺘﮯ ﺗﻮ ان ﮐﻮ ﺧﻮش آﻣﺪﯾﺪ ﮐﮩﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ‬
‫ﯾہ ارﺷﺎد ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﮯ ﮐہ ﺧﻮش آﻣﺪﯾﺪ ﺧﻮش آﻣﺪﯾﺪ اس ﺷﺨﺺ ﮐﻮ ﺟﺲ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺠﮭﮯ ﻣﺘﻨﺒہ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ۔ ﯾﻌﻨﯽ‬
‫ﺳﻮره ﻋﺒﺲ ﮐﯽ اﺑﺘﺪاﺋﯽ آﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ اﺷﺎره ﻓﺮﻣﺎﯾﺎ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ۔ اﯾﺴﮯ ﮨﯽ ﺻﺤﺎﺑہ ﺑﮭﯽ اﮐﺜﺮ ﻣﻮاﻗﻊ ﭘﺮ‬
‫اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ اظﮩﺎر ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ﮐہ ﻓﻼں آﯾﺎت ﮐﺲ وﻗﺖ اور ﮐﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ‬
‫اﯾﮏ ﯾﮩﻮدی ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ ؒ ﮐﯽ ﺧﺪﻣﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﮨﻮا ﺗﻮ ﮐﮩﺎ ﮐہ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﮏ اﯾﺴﯽ آﯾﺎت ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﮔﺮ‬
‫ﮨﻢ ﭘﺮ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﺗﻮ ﮨﻢ اس دن ﮐﻮ ﻋﯿﺪ ﻣﻨﺎﺗﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ ﻧﮯ ﺟﻮاﺑﺎ ارﺷﺎد ﻓﺮﻣﺎﯾﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﺠﮭﮯ ﻧہ ﺻﺮف‬
‫وه دن ﺑﻠﮑہ ﻣﺠﮭﮯ وه ﻣﻘﺎم ﺑﮭﯽ ﯾﺎد ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺲ دن ﯾہ آﯾہ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ۔ﯾہ آﯾﺎت ﺟﻤﻌہ ﮐﮯ روز ﻋﺮﻓﺎت ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﻣﯿﺪان ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ ۔ ‪4‬ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻠﯽ ؒ ﮐﺎ ﻗﻮل ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﻣﺠﮭﮯ ﮨﺮ آﯾﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه‬
‫ﮐﺐ اور ﮐﺲ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ۔ ‪5‬ﺣﻀﺮت اﺑﻦ ﻣﺴﻌﻮد ؒ ﺳﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﯽ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﮐﯽ رواﯾﺖ ﻣﻨﻘﻮل ﮨﮯ ۔ ‪ 6‬دور‬
‫ﺻﺤﺎﺑہ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﯿﻦ ﻧﮯ ﺑﮭﯽ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﻮ ﺟﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺑﮭﺮﭘﻮر ﺗﻮﺟہ رﮐﮭﯽ۔ ﺣﺴﻦ ﺑﺼﺮی ؒ ﮐﺎ ﻗﻮل ﮨﮯ‬
‫ﮐہ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ آﯾﺖ اﯾﺴﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﯾہ ﺟﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺶ ﻧہ ﮐﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮐہ وه ﮐﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﮐﺲ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﮨﮯ۔ ‪ 7‬اور ﻋﮑﺮﻣہ ؒ ﮐﺎ ﻗﻮل ﮨﮯ ﮐہ وه ﭼﻮده ﺳﺎل اس آﯾہ " وﻣﻦ ﯾﺨﺮج ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﺑﯿﺘہ ﻣﮭﺎﺟﺮا اﻟﯽ ﷲ ورﺳﻮﻟہ " ﮐﯽ ﺗﻼش ﻣﯿﮟ رﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﮐﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫ﻋﻠﻢ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ ﺗﺪوﯾﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﯿﻦ طﺮح ﮐﮯ اﻣﻮر ﮐﺎ ﮐﺮدار رﮨﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ ﺛﻘﺎﻓﺘﯽ ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻤﯽ اور ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎﺗﯽ ۔‬
‫ﺟﺐ اﺳﻼم ﮐﯽ دﻋﻮت ﻋﺮب ﺳﮯ ﻧﮑﻞ ﮐﺮ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﻤﺎﻟﮏ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﮭﯿﻠﻨﮯ ﻟﮕﯽ اور ﮨﺮ رﻧﮓ و ﻧﺴﻞ ﮐﮯ ﻟﻮگ‬
‫اﺳﻠﻤﺎ ﻗﺒﻮل ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺟﮩﺎں اﺳﻼم ﮐﯽ دﻋﻮت ﺑﮍھ رﮨﯽ ﺗﮭﯽ وﮨﯿﮟ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اور ﻣﻦ ﮔﮭﮍت رواﯾﺎت ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﻓﺘﻨہ ﺑﮭﯽ زور ﭘﮑﮍ رﮨﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ۔ ﺟﮩﺎں دوﺳﺮے ﺷﻌﺒہ ﺟﺎت اس زد ﻣﯿﮟ آﺋﮯ وﮨﯿﮟ ﻋﻠﻢ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﺑﮭﯽ اس ﮐﺎ‬
‫ﺷﮑﺎر ﺑﻨﺎ ۔ اور اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﮭﯽ روﯾﺎت ﮔﮭﮍی ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﯿﮟ ۔ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ ﺳﯿﺮﯾﻦ ﮐﮩﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻧﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺮﺗﺒہ ﻋﺒﯿﺪه ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻣﺮﺗﺒہ اﯾﮏ آﯾﺖ ﺳﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ درﯾﺎﻓﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﻮ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﮯ ؛ ﭼﭗ ره ! اﺳﺒﺎب‬
‫ﻧﺰول ﺟﺎﻧﻨﮯ واﻟﮯ اس دﻧﯿﺎ ﺳﮯ ﭼﻞ دﯾﺌﮯ۔ ‪ 8‬اﺳﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﯿﻦ ﻧﮯ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﻮ ﻣﺪون ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫۔‬

‫ﻋﻠﻤﯽ ‪:‬‬
‫ﺧﻮد ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﺗﮭﯽ۔ ﺧﺎص طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﻧﺎﺳﺦ ﻣﻨﺴﻮخ ﮐﻮ‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ‪ ،‬آﯾﺎت ﺳﮯ اﺣﮑﺎم ﻣﺴﺘﻨﻄﺐ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﻨﺰول ﮐﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﻨﺎ ﻧﮩﺎﯾﺖ ﺿﺮوری ﺗﮭﯽ‬
‫۔ اور ﯾہ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺟﺮوری ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ ﮐﺌﯽ ﻟﻮگ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﻧہ ﺟﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﺮ‬

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‫ﻣﺳﻠم ‪2313 :‬‬
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‫ﺣﻠﯾہ اﻻوﻟﯾﺎء ‪67/1‬‬
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‫ﺗرﺟﻣہ اﺑن ﻣﺳﻌود ‪256‬‬
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‫ﻣﺣﺎﺳن اﻟﺗﺎوﯾل ‪ ،‬ﺟﻣﺎل اﻟدﯾن ﺑن ﻣﺣﻣد ﺳﻌﯾد ‪ ،‬داراﻟﮑﺗب اﻟﻌرﺑﯾہ ۔‪23 /1‬‬
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‫اﻻﺗﻘﺎن ص ‪56‬‬
 ‫رﮨﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ۔ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ ﻣﺮوان ﺑﻦ ﺣﮑﻢ ﮐﺎ واﻗﻌہ ﻣﺸﮩﻮر ﮨﮯ ﮐہ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ آﯾﺖ " َﻻ ﺗَﺤْ َ‬
‫ﺴ َﺒ ﱠﻦ‬
‫ﻋﺬَابٌ أ َ ِﻟﯿ ٌﻢ'' ﮐﻮ‬ ‫ﺴﺒَﻨﱠ ُﮭﻢ ِﺑ َﻤﻔَﺎزَ ةٍ ِ ّﻣﻦَ ْاﻟ َﻌﺬَا ِ‬
‫ب ۖ◌ َوﻟَ ُﮭ ْﻢ َ‬ ‫اﻟﱠﺬِﯾﻦَ ﯾَ ْﻔ َﺮ ُﺣﻮنَ ِﺑ َﻤﺎ أَﺗ َﻮا ﱠوﯾ ُِﺤﺒﱡﻮنَ أَن ﯾُﺤْ َﻤﺪ ُوا ِﺑ َﻤﺎ ﻟَ ْﻢ ﯾَ ْﻔ َﻌﻠُﻮا ﻓَ َﻼ ﺗَﺤْ َ‬
‫ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ وﻋﯿﺪ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺎ ۔ اور اﭘﻨﮯ درﺑﺎن ﮐﻮ ﺑﮭﯿﺠﺎ ﮐہ وه ﺟﺎ ﮐﺮ اﺑﻦ ﻋﺒﺎس ؒ ﺳﮯ ﭘﻮﭼﮭ ﮐﺮ آﺋﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫اﮔﺮ ﮨﺮ آدﻣﯽ اﭘﻨﮯ ﮐﺎﻣﻮں ﭘﺮ ﺧﻮش ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ اور ﻧﺎﮐﺮده ﮐﺎﻣﻮں ﭘﺮ ﺧﺮاج ﺗﺤﺴﯿﻦ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ‬
‫اﺳﮯ ﻋﺬاب ﮨﻮ ﮔﺎ ﺗﻮﮨﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﻋﺬاب ﺳﮯ ﺑﭻ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﺋﮯ ﮔﺎ۔ ﺣﻀﺮت اﺑﻦ ﻋﺒﺎس ﻧﮯ واﺿﺢ ﮐﯿﺎ‬
‫ﮐہ ﯾہ آﯾﺖ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺑﻠﮑہ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﻧﮯ ﯾﮩﻮد ﮐﻮ ﺑﻼ ﮐﺮ ﻧﺎ ﺳﮯ اﯾﮏ ﺑﺎت ﭘﻮﭼﮭﯽ‬
‫ﺟﻮاﺑﺎ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ اﺻﻞ ﺑﺎت ﭼﮭﭙﺎ ﮐﺮ ﻏﻠﻂ ﺟﻮاب دﯾﺎ ﮔﻮﯾﺎ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﺟﮭﻮٹ ﺑﻮل ﮐﺮ اور اﺻﻞ ﺑﺎت ﭼﮭﭙﺎ ﮐﺮ‬
‫رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﺳﮯ داد ﭼﺎﮨﯽ۔ ‪ 9‬اﯾﺴﮯ ﮨﯽ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﺜﻤﺎن ﺑﻦ ﻣﻈﻌﻮن اور ﺣﻀﺮت ﻣﻌﺪﯾﮑﺮب ﺳﮯ رواﯾﺖ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ‬
‫وه آﯾہ " ﻟﯿﺲ ﻋﻠﯿﮑﻢ ﺟﻨﺎح ﻓﯿﻤﺎ طﻌﻤﻮا " ﮐﮯ ﺷﺎن ﻧﺰول ﺳﮯ ﻧﺎواﻗﻒ ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﮐﯽ وﺟہ ﺳﮯ ﺷﺮاب ﮐﻮ ﺣﻼل‬
‫ﺳﻤﺠﮭ رﮨﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ۔ ﺳﻮ ﺧﻮد ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﻮ ﻣﺪون ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ۔‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺎﺗﯽ ‪:‬‬
‫رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﮐﯽ وﻓﺎت ﮐﮯ ﮐﭽﮭ ﻋﺮﺻﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﮨﯽ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺳﮑﻮل آف ﺗﮭﺎٹ )ﺧﻮارج ‪ ،‬ﺷﯿﻌہ ‪،‬‬
‫ﺳﻨﯽ ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﺘﺰﻟہ‪ ( ،‬وﺟﻮد ﻣﯿﮟ آ ﮔﺌﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ۔ اور ان ﮐﮯ درﻣﯿﺎن ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ آﯾﺎت ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ و ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫اﺧﺘﻼف ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮﮔﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ۔ اس ﻟﯿﮯ ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ و ﺗﺸﺮﯾﺢ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ ﺿﺮورت ﻣﺤﺴﻮس‬
‫ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ۔ﺟﯿﺴﺎ ﮐہ اﺑﻮ ﮨﺮﯾﺮه ؒ رواﯾﺖ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﻣﺸﺮﮐﯿﻦ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺﺳﮯ "ﻗﺪر" ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﺤﺚ ﮐﺮ‬
‫رازی اس ﺳﺒﺐ ﮐﻮ ﻧﻘﻞ‬
‫ؒ‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺎﻟﯽ ﻧﮯ ﺳﻮره ﻗﻤﺮ ﮐﯽ آﯾﺖ ‪ ،48 ،47‬اور ‪ 49‬ﻧﺎزل ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺋﯽ ۔اﻣﺎم‬
‫ٰ‬ ‫رﮨﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ﮐہ ﷲ‬
‫ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﻧﺒﯽ اﮐﺮم ﷺ ﺳﮯ رواﯾﺖ ﮨﮯ ﯾہ آﯾﺖ " ﻗﺪرﯾہ " ﻓﺮﻗہ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ۔‬
‫ﺗﺪوﯾﻦ ﮐﮯ ﺗﯿﻦ ادوار ‪:‬‬
‫ﻋﻠﻢ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﺗﯿﻦ ادوار ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﺪون ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ ۔ﭘﮩﻼ دور ﭘﮩﻠﯽ ﺻﺪی ﮨﺠﺮی ﭘﺮ ﻣﺤﯿﻂ ﮨﮯ ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺻﺤﺎﺑہ‬
‫ﮐﺮام ؒ اور ان ﺳﮯ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﯿﻦ ﻋﻈﺎم ؒ ﺗﮏ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ روﯾﺎت ﭘﮩﻨﭽﯽ ۔ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﯿﻦ ﻧﮯ ااﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ رواﯾﺎت‬
‫ﮐﻮ اﺣﺎدﯾﺚ ﮐﯽ رواﯾﺎت ﮐﯽ طﺮح ﺣﻔﻆ ‪ ،‬رواﯾﺖ اور ﺗﺪاول ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺗﻼﻣﺬه ﮐﻮ ﻣﻨﺘﻘﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ اور ﺗﺒﻊ‬
‫ﺗﺎﺑﻌﯿﻦ ﻧﮯ اﭘﻨﮯ ﺗﻼﻣﺬه ﮐﻮ ﻣﻨﺘﻘﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ‪10‬۔ ﺟﺒﮑہ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ ﺗﺪوﯾﻦ ﮐﺎ دوﺳﺮا دور دوﺳﺮی ﺻﺪی ﮨﺠﺮی‬
‫ﺳﮯ ﭼﻮﺗﮭﯽ ﮨﺠﺮی ﭘﺮ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﮨﮯ۔ﺟﺲ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﺪﯾﺚ و ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﺗﺪوﯾﻦ ﮐﮯ ﺿﻤﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﻠﻢ اﺳﺒﺎب‬
‫ﻧﺰول ﺑﮭﯽ ﻣﺪون ﮨﻮا۔ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ طﺒﺮی ﮐﮯ ﺿﻤﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺌﯽ آﯾﺎت ﮐﮯ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﻮ ﻧﻘﻞ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ۔ﺟﺐ ﮐہ اس‬
‫ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻮم اﻟﻘﺮآن اور اﺣﺎدﯾﺚ ﮐﯽ ﮐﺘﺎﺑﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﻋﻠﻢ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﻗﺮآن ﮐﻮ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﯽ طﻮر ﭘﺮ‬
‫ذﮐﺮ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﮯ ﻟﮕﺎ ۔ﭘﺎﻧﭽﻮﯾﮟ ﺻﺪی ﮐﮯ دوران ﻋﻠﻢ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﯽ ﺑﺎﻗﺎﻋﺪه ﺗﺼﻨﯿﻒ اﻣﺎم واﺣﺪی‬
‫ﻧﮯ ؒ " اﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﻨﺰول " ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮﮐﯽ۔اس ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﻋﻠﻢ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ﺣﻮاﻟﮯ ﺳﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﺗﺼﻨﯿﻒ ﮐﺎ ذﮐﺮ‬
‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﻠﺘﺎ ۔ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی طﻮر ﭘﺮ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﺎ ﺗﻤﺎم ﻣﻮاد ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ﮐﺘﺐ ﺗﻔﺎﺳﯿﺮ ) طﺒﺮی ‪ ،‬رازی ‪،‬طﺒﺮﺳﯽ( ‪ ،‬ﮐﺘﺐ‬
‫اﺣﺎدﯾﺚ ﻧﺒﻮﯾہ )ﺻﺤﺎح ﺳﺘہ وﻏﯿﺮﮨﻢ ( ﮐﺘﺐ ﻋﻠﻮم ﻗﺮآن ) اﻻﺗﻘﺎن ‪ ،‬اﻟﺒﺮھﺎن ( ﮐﺘﺐ ﺳﯿﺮة اور ﮐﺘﺐ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫ﻣﻠﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔‬

‫ﺑﺧﺎری ﺟﻠد ‪ 2‬ص ‪40‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬

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‫اﺑن ﺟرﯾر طﺑری اﭘﻧﯽ ﺗﻔﺳﯾر ﻣﯾں اﺳﺑﺎب ﻧزول ﮐﯽ رواﯾﺎت ﮐو اﻧﮩﯾں اﻟﻔﺎظ ﮐﮯ ﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﻧﻘل ﮐرﺗﮯ ﮨﯾں ﺟن ﺳﮯ اﺣﺎدﯾث ﮐو رواﯾت ﮐﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ‬
‫ﺟﯾﺳﺎ ﮐہ اﺧﺑرﻧﺎ ﯾﺎ ﺣدﺛﻧﺎ ۔۔‬
 ‫اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ‪:‬‬
‫ﻋﻠﻢ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ ﺗﺪوﯾﻦ ﮐﮯ دوران اﺳﺒﺎب ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﻣﯿﮟ ارﺗﻘﺎء ﮨﻮا ﮨﮯ ۔ اﻣﺎم واﺣﺪی ﮐﮯ ﯾﮩﺎں ﺳﺒﺐ‬
‫ﻧﺰول ﮐﺎ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﺧﺎﺻﺎ وﺳﯿﻊ ﮨﮯ اور ان ﮐﮯ ﻧﺰدﯾﮏ ﺟﺲ رواﯾﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ اﻻﯾۃ ﻧﺰﻟﺖ ﻓﯽ ھﺬا ﮐﮯ اﻟﻔﺎظ آ ﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ‬
‫وه اﺳﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﺷﻤﺎر ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔ ﺟﺒﮑہ اﻣﺎم ﺳﯿﻮطﯽ ؒ ﮐﺎ ﺧﯿﺎل اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮﻋﮑﺲ ﮨﮯ ۔ وه ﺳﺒﺐ‬
‫اﯾﮏ ﺧﺎص رواﯾﺖ ﮐﻮ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اور اﮔﺮ اﺳﯽ ﻣﻔﮩﻮم ﮐﯽ اﯾﮏ اور رواﯾﺖ اﺳﯽ آﯾﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ آ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻮ وه اﺳﮯ اﺳﺘﻨﺒﺎط ﺳﻤﺠﮭﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ۔‬
‫اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﺎ ﺗﻔﮩﯿﻢ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺮدار ‪:‬‬
‫ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ‪:‬‬
‫ط ِﻌ ُﻣوا ِإ َذا َﻣﺎ اﺗﱠﻘَوا ﱠوآ َﻣﻧُوا َو َﻋ ِﻣﻠُوا‬
‫ت ُﺟﻧَﺎ ٌح ﻓِﯾ َﻣﺎ َ‬ ‫ْس َﻋﻠَﻰ اﻟﱠذِﯾنَ آ َﻣﻧُوا َو َﻋ ِﻣﻠُوا اﻟ ﱠ‬
‫ﺻﺎ ِﻟ َﺣﺎ ِ‬ ‫ﺳﻮره ﻣﺎﺋﺪه ﮐﯽ آﯾﺖ '' ﻟَﯾ َ‬
‫�ُ ﯾ ُِﺣبﱡ ْاﻟ ُﻣﺣْ ِﺳﻧِﯾنَ '' ﮐﮯ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻟﻔﻆ اذا ﮐﻮ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﮐﮯ‬ ‫ﺳﻧُوا ۗ َو ﱠ‬ ‫ت ﺛ ُ ﱠم اﺗﱠﻘَوا ﱠوآ َﻣﻧُوا ﺛ ُ ﱠم اﺗﱠﻘَوا ﱠوأَﺣْ َ‬
‫ﺻﺎ ِﻟ َﺣﺎ ِ‬
‫اﻟ ﱠ‬
‫ﻣﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ واﻟﻮں اور ﺷﺮاب ﮐﯽ ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻞ ﮐﮯ ﻗﺎﺋﻠﯿﻦ ﭘﺮ رد ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ اور اذا ﮐﻮ ﺑﻤﻌﻨﯽ ﻣﺎﺿﯽ‬
‫ﮐﺎ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻧﺰول ﺳﮯ اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔اس آﯾﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺷﺎن ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺟﺐ آﯾﺖ‬
‫ﺗﺤﺮﯾﻢ ﺧﻤﺮ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﻮ اﺑﻮ ﺑﮑﺮ ؒ ﻧﮯ ﻋﺮض ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐہ ﺟﻮ ﺷﺮاب ﭘﯿﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﻓﻮت ﮨﻮ ﮔﺌﮯ اور اﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم‬
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‫ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ ﷲ ﻧﮯ اس ﮐﻮ ﺣﺮام ﻗﺮار دﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔‬

‫آﯾﺖ ﮐﯽ وﺿﺎﺣﺖ ‪:‬‬

‫ﺳﯿﻮطﯽ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‬ ‫ؒ‬ ‫اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ آﯾﺎت ﮐﯽ وﺿﺎﺣﺖ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﻨﯿﺎدی ﮐﺮدار ادا ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔ اﻣﺎم‬
‫ﮐہ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ﺟﺎﻧﻨﮯ ﺳﮯ آﯾﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯽ واﺿﺢ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اور ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ اﻟﺠﮭﻦ ﭘﯿﺶ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ‬
‫آﺗﯽ ۔ ‪ 12‬واﺣﺪی ﮐﮩﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ آﯾﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﻨﺎ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﮨﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ۔‬
‫ﺷﯿﺦ اﺣﻤﺪ اﻣﯿﻦ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﮐﮯ دور ﻣﯿﮟ ﺧﻼﻓﺖ ﮐﺎ اﯾﮏ واﻗﻌہ ذﮐﺮ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ‬
‫ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﻧﮯ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻗﺪاﻣۃ ﺑﻦ ﻣﻈﻌﻮن ﮐﻮ ﺑﺤﺮﯾﻦ ﮐﺎ ﮔﻮرﻧﺮ ﻣﻘﺮر ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ‪ ،‬ﺣﻀﺮت‬
‫ﺟﺎرود ﻧﮯ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﺳﮯ آﮐﺮ ﺷﮑﺎﯾﺖ ﮐﯽ ﮐہ ﻗﺪاﻣۃ ﺑﻦ ﻣﻈﻌﻮن ﺷﺮاب ﭘﯽ ﮐﺮ ﻣﺪﮨﻮش ﮨﻮ‬
‫ﮔﯿﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ۔ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﻧﮯ ﺟﺎرود ﺳﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺗﻤﮩﺎری اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﮐﻮن ﮔﻮاﮨﯽ دﯾﮕﺎ؟ ﺟﺎرود ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﮩﺎ ﺣﻀﺮت اﺑﻮ ﮨﺮﯾﺮه رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﻣﯿﺮی ﺑﺎت ﮐﯽ ﮔﻮاﮨﯽ دﯾﮟ ﮔﮯ ۔ ﺗﻮ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﻗﺪاﻣۃ ﺑﻦ ﻣﻈﻌﻮن ﺳﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺗﻢ ﭘﺮ ﺷﺮاب ﻧﻮﺷﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺪ ﺟﺎری ﮐﺮوﻧﮕﺎ ۔ اس ﭘﺮ ﻗﺪاﻣۃ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ اﮔﺮ اﯾﺴﺎ ﮨﮯ‬
‫ﺟﯿﺴﮯ آپ ﮐﮩﺘﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﺗﻮ آپ ﻣﺠﮭ ﭘﺮ ﺣﺪ ﺟﺎری ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﮯ اس ﭘﺮ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻌﺎﻟﯽ ﻗﺮآن ﻣﯿﮟ ارﺷﺎد ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ‪:‬‬ ‫ٰ‬ ‫ﻗﺪاﻣۃ ﺳﮯ ﭘﻮﭼﮭﺎ وه ﮐﯿﺴﮯ ؟ ﻗﺪاﻣۃ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﷲ‬
‫ت ﺛ ُ ﱠم ٱﺗﱠﻘَواْ‬ ‫ﻋ ِﻣﻠُواْ ٱﻟ ﱠ‬
‫ﺻ ٰـ ِﻠ َﺣ ٰـ ِ‬ ‫ت ُﺟﻧَﺎ ۬ ٌح ﻓِﯾ َﻣﺎ َ‬
‫ط ِﻌ ُﻣ ٓواْ إِ َذا َﻣﺎ ٱﺗﱠﻘَواْ ﱠو َءا َﻣﻧُواْ َو َ‬ ‫ﻋﻠَﻰ ٱﻟﱠذِﯾنَ َءا َﻣﻧُواْ َو َﻋ ِﻣﻠُواْ ٱﻟ ﱠ‬
‫ﺻ ٰـ ِﻠ َﺣ ٰـ ِ‬ ‫س َ‬ ‫ﻟَ ۡﯾ َ‬
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‫ٱ�ُ ﯾ ُِﺣبﱡ ۡٱﻟ ُﻣ ۡﺣ ِﺳﻧِﯾنَ ۔‬‫ﺳﻧُو ۗاْ َو ﱠ‬‫ﱠو َءا َﻣﻧُواْ ﺛ ُ ﱠم ٱﺗﱠﻘَواْ ﱠوأ َ ۡﺣ َ‬
‫ﯾﻌﻨﯽ ان ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﭘﺮ ﺟﻮ اﯾﻤﺎن ﻻﺋﮯ اور ﻧﯿﮏ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ رﮨﮯ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﮔﻨﺎه ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ وه ﮐﮭﺎ ﭘﯽ ﭼﮑﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ‬
‫ﺗﻘﻮی اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﯾﮟ اور اﯾﻤﺎن ﻟﮯ آﺋﯿﮟ ﭘﮭﺮ‬ ‫ٰ‬ ‫ﺟﺐ وه ڈرﺟﺎﺋﯿﮟ اور اﯾﻤﺎن ﻟﮯ آﺋﯿﮟ اور ﻧﯿﮏ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﭘﮭﺮ وه‬

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‫رازی ‪ ،‬ﺗﻔﺳﯾر ﮐﺑﯾر ‪ ،‬ﺟﻠد ‪ 12‬ص ‪84‬‬
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‫اﻻﺗﻘﺎن دوم ‪71‬‬
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‫)اﻟﻣﺎﺋده ‪(۹۳‬‬
 ‫ﺗﻘﻮی اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮﯾﮟ اور ﻧﯿﮑﯽ ﮐﺎ ﮐﺎم ﮐﺮﯾﮟ۔‬ ‫ٰ‬ ‫وه‬
‫اس آﯾﺖ ﮐﻮ دﻟﯿﻞ ﮐﮯ طﻮر ﭘﺮ ﭘﯿﺶ ﮐﺮ ﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﻗﺪاﻣۃ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ان ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﮯ ﮨﻮں ﺟﻮ اﯾﻤﺎن‬
‫ﺗﻘﻮی اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ اﭼﮭﮯ‬ ‫ٰ‬ ‫ﺗﻘﻮی اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﮐﯿﺎ اور اﯾﻤﺎن ﻻﺋﮯ اور‬ ‫ٰ‬ ‫ﻻﺋﮯ اور ﻧﯿﮏ ﻋﻤﻞ ﮐﯿﮯ ﭘﮭﺮ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﮐﺎم ﮐﯿﮯ اور ﻣﯿﮟ رﺳﻮل ﷲﷺ ﮐﮯﺳﺎﺗﮭ ﺑﺪر‪ ،‬اﺣﺪ ‪ ،‬ﺧﻨﺪق اور دوﺳﺮے ﻣﻌﺮﮐﻮں ﻣﯿﮟ ﺷﺮﯾﮏ رﮨﺎ ﮨﻮں۔‬
‫ﻗﺪاﻣۃ ﮐﯽ ﯾہ دﻟﯿﻞ ﺳﻦ ﮐﺮ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ اس ﮐﻮ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺟﻮاب ﻧﮩﯿﮟ دﯾﺘﺎ؟ ﺗﻮ ﺣﻀﺮت‬
‫ﻋﺒﺪﷲ ﺑﻦ ﻋﺒﺎس رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﯾہ آﯾﺖ ﺷﺮاب ﮐﯽ ﺣﺮﻣﺖ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ‬
‫ﺗﻌﺎﻟﯽ ﻧﮯ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﯾﺎ ﮨﮯﮐہ‪:‬‬ ‫ٰ‬ ‫ﻟﯿﮯ ﻋﺬر ﮨﮯ اور ﺑﺎﻗﯽ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﭘﺮ ﺣﺠﺖ ﮨﮯ ‪ ،‬ﮐﯿﻮﻧﮑہ ﷲ‬
‫ﱠ‬
‫ﭑﺟﺗَﻧِﺑُوهُ ﻟَ َﻌﻠ ُﻛ ۡم‬ ‫ﺷ ۡﯾ َ‬
‫ط ٰـ ِن ﻓَ ۡ‬ ‫ﻋ َﻣ ِل ٱﻟ ﱠ‬ ‫۬‬
‫ﺎب َو ۡٱﻷ َ ۡزﻟَ ٰـ ُم ِر ۡﺟ ٌ‬
‫س ِ ّﻣ ۡن َ‬ ‫ﺻ ُ‬ ‫ﯾَ ٰـٓﺄَﯾﱡ َﮩﺎ ٱﻟﱠذِﯾنَ َءا َﻣﻧُ ٓواْ ِإﻧﱠ َﻣﺎ ۡٱﻟﺧَﻣۡ ُر َو ۡٱﻟ َﻣ ۡﯾ ِﺳ ُر َو ۡٱﻷَﻧ َ‬
‫ﺗ ُ ۡﻔ ِﻠ ُﺣونَ ‪14‬ﺗﺮﺟﻤہ‪:‬اے اﯾﻤﺎن واﻟﻮں ﺑﯿﺸﮏ اور ﺟﻮا اور ﻧﺼﺐ ﮐﯿﮯ ﮔﺌﮯ ﺑُﺖ اور ﻓﺎل ﻧﮑﺎﻟﻨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﺗﯿﺮ ﯾہ‬
‫ﺳﺐ ﻧﺎﭘﺎک ﺷﯿﻄﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﺎم ﮨﯿﮟ ﺳﻮ ﺗﻢ ان ﺳﮯ‬
‫ﭘﺮﮨﯿﺰ ﮐﺮو ﺗﺎﮐہ ﺗﻢ ﻓﻼح ﭘﺎؤ۔‬
‫ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﺒﺪﷲ ﺑﻦ ﻋﺒﺎس رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﮐﯽ ﯾہ دﻟﯿﻞ ﺳﻦ ﮐﺮ ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﺗﻢ ﻧﮯ‬
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‫ﺳﭻ ﮐﮩﺎ ۔‬
‫اﺷﮑﺎ ل رﻓﻊ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ‪:‬‬
‫اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﻣﺮوان ﺑﻦ ﺣﮑﻢ ﮐﻮ اس آﯾﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﻨﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺑﮩﺎم اور اﺷﮑﺎل ﭘﯿﺪا ﮨﻮا‪:‬‬
‫بۖ َوﻟَ ُﮭ ۡم َﻋ َذابٌ‬ ‫ۡ‬ ‫۬‬ ‫ﺳﺑَ ﱠن ٱﻟﱠذِﯾنَ ﯾَ ۡﻔ َر ُﺣونَ ِﺑ َﻣﺎ ٓ أَﺗ َواْ ﱠوﯾ ُِﺣﺑﱡونَ أَن ﯾ ُۡﺣ َﻣدُواْ ِﺑ َﻣﺎ ﻟَ ۡم ﯾَ ۡﻔ َﻌﻠُواْ ﻓَ َﻼ ﺗ َۡﺣ َ‬
‫ﺳﺑَﻧﱠ ُﮩم ِﺑ َﻣﻔَﺎزَ ةٍ ِ ّﻣنَ ٱﻟ َﻌ َذا ِ‬ ‫َﻻ ﺗ َۡﺣ َ‬
‫َ ۬ ‪16‬‬
‫أ ِﻟﯾ ٌم‬
‫ﯾﻌﻨﯽ آپ اﯾﺴﮯ ﻟﻮﮔﻮں ﮐﻮ ﮨﺮ ﮔﺰ ﺧﯿﺎل ﻧہ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ ﺟﻮ اﭘﻨﯽ ﮐﺎرﺳﺘﺎﻧﯿﻮں ﭘﺮ ﺧﻮش ﮨﻮ رﮨﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اور ﻧہ ﮐﺮده‬
‫اﻋﻤﺎل ﭘﺮ ﺑﮭﯽ اﭘﻨﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻮاﮨﺸﻤﻨﺪ ﮨﯿﮟ آپ اﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﺮ ﮔﺰ ﻋﺬاب ﺳﮯ ﻧﺠﺎت ﭘﺎﻧﮯ واﻻ ﻧہ ﺳﻤﺠﮭﯿﮟ اور‬
‫ان ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ درد ﻧﺎک ﻋﺬاب ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اس ﭘﺮ ﻣﺮوان ﺑﻦ ﺣﮑﻢ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﯾہ آﯾﺖ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺎﻧﻮں ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ وﻋﯿﺪ ﮨﮯ ‪،‬ﺟﻮ ﺷﺨﺺ اﭘﻨﮯ ﻋﻤﻞ ﭘﺮ ﺧﻮش ﮨﻮﺗﺎ‬
‫ﮨﮯ اور وه ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﻮ ﻋﻤﻞ اس ﻧﮯ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﯿﺎ اس ﭘﺮ اس ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ۔‬
‫ﺣﻀﺮت اﺑﻦ ﻋﺒﺎس رﺿﯽ ﷲ ﻋﻨہ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﮐہ ﯾہ آﯾﺖ اﮨﻞ ﮐﺘﺎب ﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﺟﺐ رﺳﻮ ل ﷲ ﷺ‬
‫ﻧﮯ ان ﺳﮯ ﮐﺴﯽ ﭼﯿﺰﮐﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﭘﻮﭼﮭﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﺗﻮ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﺑﺎت ﭼﮭﭙﺎ ﮐﺮ ﮐﭽﮭ اور ﺑﺘﺎﯾﺎ اور اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ‬
‫ﯾہ ﮔﻤﺎن ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐہ ﺟﻮ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﻧﮯ ان ﺳﮯ ﭘﻮﭼﮭﺎ اﺳﯽ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﯽ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﺑﺘﺎﯾﺎ ﮨﮯ اور وه‬
‫‪17‬‬
‫ﭼﺎﮨﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ﮐہ اس ﭘﺮ ان ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ۔‬
‫اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول وﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﯽ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼت ‪:‬‬
‫ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﺳﮯ اﺣﮑﺎم ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺒﻂ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ اﺳﺒﺎب ﻧﺰول ﮐﺎ ﺑﮍا اﮨﻢ ﮐﺮدار ﮨﮯ ۔ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻧﺰول ے ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﻓﻘﮩﺎء‬
‫اﺣﮑﺎم ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺒﻂ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔اس ﺑﺎت ﮐﺎ ﻓﯿﺼﻠہ ﮨﻮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺣﮑﻢ ﻋﺎم ﮨﮯ ﯾﺎ ﺧﺎص ۔ﻗﺮآن ﮐﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﯽ آﯾﺖ ' َو ِ ﱠ�ِ‬
‫�ِ ۚ إِ ﱠن ﱠ‬
‫�َ َوا ِﺳ ٌﻊ َﻋ ِﻠﯾ ٌم' ﮐﮯ ﺷﺎن ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ روﯾﮩﺎت ﺳﮯ ﻓﻘﮩﺎء‬ ‫ْاﻟ َﻣ ْﺷ ِر ُق َو ْاﻟ َﻣ ْﻐ ِر ُ‬
‫ب ۚ ﻓَﺄ َ ْﯾﻧَ َﻣﺎ ﺗ ُ َوﻟﱡوا ﻓَﺛ َ ﱠم َوﺟْ ﮫُ ﱠ‬
‫ﻧﮯ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﺣﮑﺎم ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺒﻂ ﮐﯿﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ۔ﺣﻀﺮت ﺟﺎﺑﺮ ؒ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﻧﮯ اﯾﮏ ﻟﺸﮑﺮ ﺑﮭﯿﺠﺎ ﺟﺲ‬
‫ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﺗﮭﺎ ۔ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ راﺳﺘﮯ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺎرﯾﮑﯽ ﻧﮯ ﮔﮭﯿﺮ ﻟﯿﺎ ۔اور ﮨﻤﯿﮟ اﻧﺪازه ﻧہ ﮨﻮ اﮐہ ﻗﺒﻠہ ﮐﺲ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ‬
‫‪14‬‬
‫۔ﺳﻮرة اﻟﻤﺎﺋﺪه‪90 ،‬‬
‫‪15‬‬

‫‪16‬‬
‫اﻟﻌﻣران ‪۱۸۸/۳‬‬
‫‪17‬‬
‫ﮨﮯ ۔ﮨﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﭽﮭ ﻧﮯ ﺷﻤﺎل ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ رخ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ﻧﻤﺎز ادا ﮐﯽ اور ﮐﭽﮭ ﻧﮯ ﺟﻨﻮب ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ رخ ﮐﺮ ﮐﮯ ۔‬
‫ﺟﺐ اﻧﺪھﯿﺮ ﭼﮭﮣﺎ ﺗﻮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﮨﻮا ﮐہ دوﻧﻮں ﺟﻮاﻧﺐ ﻗﺒﻠہ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺮﻋﮑﺲ ﺗﮭﯿﮟ ۔ ﺟﺐ ﮨﻢ واﭘﺲ آﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ‬
‫ﺳﮯ اس ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل ﮐﺎ ﺗﺬﮐﺮه ﮐﯿﺎ ۔رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﺧﺎﻣﻮش رﮨﮯ ۔ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻌﺪ ﯾہ آﯾﺖ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ۔اس ﺳﺒﺐ‬
‫ﺳﮯ اﮐﺜﺮ ﻓﻘﮩﺎء ﻧﮯ ﯾہ ﻣﺴﺌﻠہ ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺒﻂ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐہ اﮔﺮ اﯾﺴﯽ ﺻﻮرﺗﺤﺎل ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﻤﺎز ادا ﮐﺮ ﻟﯽ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ وه درﺳﺖ‬
‫ﮨﮯ ۔ ‪ 18‬اﺳﯽ اﯾﺖ ﮐﮯ ﺷﺎن ﻧﺰول ﺳﮯ ﻓﻘﮩﺎء ﻧﮯ ﺑﯿﻤﺎروں اور ﺳﻮاری ﭘﺮ ﻧﻔﻞ ﻧﻤﺎز ادا ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺴﺌﻠہ ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺒﻂ‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ۔‬
‫اﺳﯽ طﺮح ﺳﻮره ﺑﻘﺮة ﮐﯽ آﯾہ " إن اﻟﺻﻔﺎ واﻟﻣروة ﻣن ﺷﻌﺎﺋر ﷲ ﻓﻣن ﺣﺞ اﻟﺑﯾت أو اﻋﺗﻣر ﻓﻼ ﺟﻧﺎح ﻋﻠﯾﮫ أن‬
‫ﯾطوف ﺑﮭﻣﺎ وﻣن ﺗطوع ﺧﯾرا ﻓﺈن ﷲ ﺷﺎﻛر ﻋﻠﯾم' ﮐﮯ ﺷﺎن ﻧﺰول ﺳﮯ اﻣﺎم ﺷﺎﻓﻌﯽ و اﻣﺎم ﺣﻨﺒﻞ ﻧﮯ ﺳﻌﯽ ﮐﮯ‬
‫‪19‬‬
‫وﺟﻮب ﭘﺮ اﺳﺘﺪﻻل ﮐﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔‬
‫ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ﻧﺴﺦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ‪:‬‬
‫ﺷﺎن ﻧﺰول ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ﻧﺴﺦ ﯾﺎ ﻧﻘﺾ ﻧﺴﺦ ﮐﮯ ﺿﻤﻦ ﻣﯿﮟ اﮨﻢ ﮐﺮدار ادا ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ﺟﺐ ﺳﻮرة ﺑﻘﺮة ﮐﯽ آﯾﺖ " وان‬
‫ﺗﺒﺪوا ﻣﺎ ﻓﯽ اﻧﻔﺴﮑﻢ اوﺗﺨﻔﻮه ﯾﺤﺎﺳﺒﮑﻢ ﺑہ ﷲ" ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﺗﻮ ﺣﻀﺮت اﺑﻮ ﺑﮑﺮ ‪ ،‬ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﻤﺮ اور ﭼﻨﺪ دﯾﮕﺮ‬
‫ﺻﺤﺎﺑہ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﮐﯽ ﺧﺪﻣﺖ اﻗﺪس ﻣﯿﮟ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ اور ﮐہ ﯾﺎ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ! اس اﯾﺖ ﺳﮯ ﺷﺪﯾﺪ آﯾہ اﺑﮭﯽ‬
‫ﺗﮏ ﻧﺎزل ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ۔ ﮨﻢ ﻣﯿﮟ ﮨﺮ ﺷﺨﺺ اﭘﻨﮯ دل ﻣﯿﮟ اﯾﺴﯽ ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐہ ﺟﺲ ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ وه ﻗﻄﻌﺎ‬
‫ﯾہ ﭘﺴﻨﺪ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮐہ وه ﺑﺎت اس ﮐﮯ دل ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﺨﺘہ ﮨﻮ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ۔اﮔﺮﭼہ اس ﮐﮯ ﺑﺪﻟﮯ اﺳﮯ دﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺟﻮ ﮐﭽﮭ‬
‫ﮨﮯ وه ﻣﻞ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ۔اﮔﺮ ﺟﻮ ﮔﻔﺘﮕﻮ ﮨﻢ اﭘﻨﮯ دل ﻣﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺗﮯ ﮨﯿﮟ اس ﭘﺮ ﻣﻮاﺧﺬه ﮨﻮﮔﺎ ﺗﻮ ﮨﻢ ﺗﻮ ﮨﻼک ﮨﯽ ﮨﻮ ﮔﺌﮯ‬
‫۔ اس ﭘﺮ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﻧﮯ ارﺷﺎد ﻓﺮﻣﺎﯾﺎ ﮐہ ﺗﻢ ﺗﻮ ﺑﻨﯽ اﺳﺮاﺋﯿﻞ ﺟﯿﺴﯽ ﺑﺎت ﮐﺮ رﮨﮯ ﮨﻮ ﺟﯿﺴﮯ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ‬
‫ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐہ ﺳﻤﻌﻨﺎ و ﻋﺼﯿﻨﺎ ۔ ﺗﻤﮩﯿﮟ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ﮐہ ﺗﻢ ﯾﻮں ﮐﮩﻮ ﺳﻤﻌﻨﺎ و اطﻌﻨﺎ ۔ اس واﻗﻌہ ﮐﮯ اﯾﮏ ﺳﺎل ﺑﻌﺪ ﯾہ اﯾﺖ "‬
‫ﻻ ﯾﮑﻠﻒ ﷲ ﻧﻔﺴﺎ اﻻ وﺳﻌﮭﺎ ' ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﺟﺲ ﻧﮯ ﮔﺰﺷﺘہ آﯾﺖ ﮐﻮ ﻣﻨﺴﻮخ ﮐﺮ دﯾﺎ ۔‬
‫ﻗﺮآﺋﺖ ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ‪:‬‬
‫ﺳﺒﺐ ﻧﺰول ﮐﮯ ذرﯾﻌﮯ ﻗﺮآت ﮐﯽ ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﯽ ﺟﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ۔ﺳﻮره ﺑﻘﺮه ﮐﯽ آﯾﺖ ''إن اﻟﺻﻔﺎ واﻟﻣروة ﻣن ﺷﻌﺎﺋر‬
‫ﷲ ﻓﻣن ﺣﺞ اﻟﺑﯾت أو اﻋﺗﻣر ﻓﻼ ﺟﻧﺎح ﻋﻠﯾﮫ أن ﯾطوف ﺑﮭﻣﺎ'' ﮐﺎ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻧﺰول ﺣﻀﺮت ﻋﺎﺋﺸہ ؒ ﻓﺮﻣﺎﺗﯽ ﮨﯿﮟ ﮐہ‬
‫ﯾہ آﯾﺖ اﻧﺼﺎر ﮐﮯ ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ﮐہ ﺟﺐ وه ﻣﻨﺎت ﮐﺎ ﻧﻌﺮه ﻟﮕﺎ ﻟﯿﺘﮯ ﺗﮭﮯ ﺗﻮ ان ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺻﻔﺎ و‬
‫ﻣﺮوه ﮐﯽ ﺳﻌﯽ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﺰ ﻧہ رﯾﺘﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺟﺐ اﺳﻼم آﯾﺎ ﺗﻮ اﻧﮩﻮں ﻧﮯ رﺳﻮل ﷲ ﷺ ﺳﮯ اس ﺑﺎرے ﻣﯿﮟ‬
‫درﯾﺎﻓﺖ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺗﻮ ﯾہ آﯾﺖ ﻧﺎزل ﮨﻮﺋﯽ ۔ ‪ 20‬اس اﯾﺖ ﮐﯽ ﻗﺮآت ﻣﯿﮟ دو ﻗﻮل ﮨﯿﮟ ۔ اﯾﮏ "' ﻓﻼ ﺟﻧﺎح ﻋﻠﯾہ ان ﯾطوف‬
‫ﺑﮭﻣﺎ اور دوﺳﺮا ﻓﻼ ﺟﻧﺎح ﻋﻠﯾہ اﻻ ﯾطوف ﺑﮭﻣﺎ " ﻟﯿﮑﻦ ﺷﺎن ﻧﺰول ﮐﯽ ﺑﻨﺎ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺼﺤﻒ ﻣﯿﮟ اول اﻟﺬﮐﺮ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺘﻌﯿﻦ‬
‫ﮐﯿﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ۔‬

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‫‪http://quran.ksu.edu.sa/tafseer/qortobi/sura2-aya115.html#qortobi‬‬
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‫‪http://quran.ksu.edu.sa/tafseer/qortobi/sura2-aya158.html‬‬
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‫‪http://quran.ksu.edu.sa/tafseer/qortobi/sura2-aya158.html#qortobi‬‬
The Genealogy of Freedom in Islam: Contemporary Challenges and Conflicts

Research Draft by Manzar Imam

Abstract: Freedom is a basic value practised across the world. What does it mean and how is it exercised
by individuals and groups and implemented by the systems that people live in and, the religions they
follow? Can a precious value like freedom be left to the wishes and whims of an individual to use it as
and when he or she wishes? What does freedom mean and entail for a Muslim? What are the
contemporary challenges to the very idea? Are those challenges and questions similar and harmonious
or contradictory and conflictual across cultures and countries? The essay struggles to grasp with these
and other competing ideas and questions and their subsequent arguments that either support them or
oppose them. As a system of belief Islam regards freedom to be a primary value by virtue of which an
individual strives to make his life better and nurture his or her dreams. But it also maintains a degree of
restriction in order that no one’s rights are violated by misuse of freedom and liberty. The concept of
freedom has undergone change from being a mere religious and social value to becoming a legal and
constitutional right. Freedom today amounts to a legal right guaranteed by various national and
international laws under state protection. It has entered different spheres of life and society beyond the
barriers of religion, region, nationality and gender, to the extent that it covers even the rights of
animals, birds and other living species. Given the vastness of the subject and range of issues related to
it, this essay tries to narrow it down to the specific domain of Islam and the contemporary challenges it
faces. It tries to trace the origin of the idea with the help of its primary sources as well as with some case
studies from a historical point of view and, then examines as how it applies to human beings across the
world beyond the borders of Islam.

Key words: Qur’an, Islam, human rights, freedom, freedom in Islam, conversion, apostasy, women in
Islam, Turkey, liberty, justice, equality.

Introduction

Islam both as a religion and as a subject of academic discipline and public discourse is confronted with
multiple challenges. There is nothing new or surprising about it. For from its advent, Islam itself, in a
sense, has posed some challenges before other faiths and belief systems, even though they might not
turn out to be challenges per se, all the time, they are often assumed to be so. As a system of beliefs and
practices, Islam stands for reform. And as know, reform involves criticism. And, criticism seeks either
improvement, at times lesser and at times greater or, even complete change and overhaul.

As a religion Islam has whole sets of ideas and actions both of which sometimes conform to other ideas
and actions while some other times they stand in conflict with and opposition to them. Prophet

1
Muhammad stood in opposition to the wrongs. Irfan Ahmad writes: Like other prophets Moses and
Jesus, Muhammad was a critic of the Meccan social order… He critiqued the prevalent tenets, practices,
and traditions… 1 Looked from this perspective, conflicts and challenges are bound to emerge. What then
would be important is not to ignore them but to look at the different ways through which those
challenges are countered and questions answered.

Freedom is one of the principle ideas of Islam which has been both accepted and appreciated and,
challenged and confronted. The acceptance, as can be understood, has come mostly from Muslims as
followers of the tradition but, also from others, from time to time, both as its sympathisers or as its
positive critics. The challenges and questions or objections have come from various fronts. Some of
these questions and objections are: If freedom is so valued why doesn’t Qur’an mention it? Why do you
have to reject all gods to be a Muslim? Why can’t a Muslim drink wine? Islam restricts freedom and
liberty. Islam does not allow one to leave it and accept other faith/religion. Islam asks women to cover
their heads. It degrades and subjugates women, as Edward Lane once remarked: “The fatal point in
Islam is the degradation of woman.” 2 It does not allow free inter-mingling of sexes, so on and so forth.
Most of these questions and objections are directly or indirectly related to freedom. Before plunging in
the details of some of these questions and objections a working definition of freedom must be found.

What is freedom?

The most common Arabic word for freedom is ‘hurriya’. The word hurriya has been translated by Al-
Mawrid as freedom, liberty; unrestraint, license, full swing (p.465). Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern
Written Arabic defines hurriyah as freedom, liberty; independence, unrestraint, license. The latter
meaning is indicated to be poetic (p. 165). Misbah-ul-Lughat, defines hurr to be free; to be of noble
origin; to be thirsty (p.144).

Putting freedom under the category of values, Andrew Heywood defines it as “the ability to think or act
as one wishes.” 3

Heywood also brings other opinions and explanations related to the term like negative freedom and
positive freedom in which negative freedom means non-interference: the absence of external
constraints upon the individual while positive freedom is linked to the achievement of some identifiable
goal or benefit, usually personal development or self-realisation. 4

1
Irfan Ahmad, Religion as Critique: Islamic Critical Thinking from Mecca to Marketplace (New Delhi, Oxford
University Press, 2017), p.15.
2
Edward William Lane, Selections from Kuran (London, 1843, Reprint 1982), p.xc, (Introduction), cited by Robyn
Emerton, et all in International Women’s Rights Cases (London, Cavendish Publishing, 2005) p.247.
3
Andrew Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, Reprinted in India 2005), p.129.
4
Ibid, pp.129-30

2
Muslims lexicographers as well as theorists and jurists have given their own definitions of the term. But
what is common in most lexicographical definitions, in fact, is the sense or exact presence of what two
English words are frequently interchangeably used for it: freedom and liberty.

From a normative idea to its broader application in the realms of religion and politics, freedom itself
struggles to define its role and limits. From individual to group freedom to freedom of action and
expression, Islam is exposed to a whole range of arguments and counter-arguments related to the
notion of ‘hurriya’ and that is where this essay intends to focus and present the arguments in a
dispassionate manner for a critical evaluation.

So far as genealogy of freedom in Islam is concerned, it is found across groups of scholars that they trace
it first and for most from the Quran and then supplement their stand with prophetic traditions, then
with stories of the companions and so on.

Most Muslim scholars take freedom is the context of what is defined as positive freedom but it is
different from what I. Berlin has talked about in his Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, Oxford university
Press, 1958). The Islamic view of freedom is opposed to the view of anarchists who do not wish to see
any state intervention. Muslim scholars here are at par with modern liberals and socialists who justify
the responsibilities of the state. They also stand with the conservatives who wish to recognize duties
and responsibilities. However, Islam and Muslims across the spectrum disagree with the fascists who
demand “unquestioning obedience to the leader and the absorption of the individual into the national
community.” 5

Justice forms an important part of discussion about freedom in Islam. Bringing about the idea of justice
and equality in the debate of freedom, General Secretary of Islamic Fiqh Academy, India, Khalid Saifullah
Rahmani, writes that:

… everyone has freedom of expression. The Quran describes it as “Nahy an al-munkar” (Preventing from
wrong); but (this) freedom (of expression) can be enjoyed to the extent that it does not hurt others’
sentiments. You can twist and turn your stick in the vacuum but you must mind that your stick does not
hit someone on the head. In the name of individual freedom no one has the liberty to hit others and
injure the passersby. This is not freedom, rather wantonness and waywardness. 6

There seems no problem with the idea as such unless one looks at later stages of the history of Islam
and Muslims where the notion undergoes change and, further, where it comes in direct or close contact
with competing notions of freedom and different categories of it, ranging from religious to legal, moral
domains, etc.

5
Ibid, p.130
6
Khalid Saifullah Rahmani, “Keynote Address: Islam Mein Azadi Ka Tasawwur (New Delhi, Islamic Fiqh Academy,
2014, p.25.

3
Normatively, however, there is no problem with the idea per se. But when one looks at it from a
historical lens, one is countered with contradictions and conflicts within Islamic society, leave aside the
conflicts found outside the Muslim world and beyond the confines of Islam.

Another major problem lies with the lens of history used especially by traditional Muslim theologians
who look at it only as a normative value making some apparent texts the reference point and criterion
for terming anything, including freedom, right and reliable or, even wrong and unreliable. This approach,
which historian Collingwood terms as the “medieval view of history” 7 which, while negates the role of
history, culture and human agency in the changing of situations and circumstances, it also makes a
narrow study of some of the primary sources of Islam like the Quran and Hadith, leaving hardly any
scope and space for human intellect and imagination in thinking and innovation – something which the
Quran reiterates to apply.

This paper therefore will make a survey of the Qur’anic idea of thinking and imagination to understand
what freedom entails as an idea for a believer.

Abul A’la Maududi writes that book which has taken greatest lead against the man’s slaver is the
Quran. 8

The Qur’an, writes Mufti Muhammad Arshad Farooqui, Head of the Department of Ifta at Jamia Imam
Muhammad Anwar, Deoband, has not mentioned the word ‘hurriyat’. However, other words of similar
meaning driven from the same root like ‘Hurr’ ‘Tahreer’ and ‘Muharra’ have been used on different
occasions. Farooqui then gives definition of the term as offered by various fuqaha (jurists/theorists)
before describing the Islamic concept of freedom.

Almaghrib looks at it in the context of slavery and uses the phrase ‘Tahreer al-Raqabah’ meaning freeing
a slave.

M’ujam Lughat-ul-Fuqaha sees it in terms of exercising one’s authority and, on man’s being free from
slavery of (another) man.

Al-T’arifat by Al-Jurjani defines it to actually mean as freedom from all that relates to the universe and
from others. Another meaning of it is freedom is that attempt of man which he does to avoid falling in
any one’s slavery other than Allah’s. 9

Almost a similar definition like that of Al-Jurjani’s is also given by Ibn al-‘Arabi who defined freedom as
‘slavery to God’. 10

7
R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford University Press, 1946), p.56.
8
Abul A’la Maududi, Tafheemat “Azadi Ka Islami Tasawwur” (Pathankot, Jamaat-e-Islami, 2nd edition), p. 88,
accessed online from www.rekhta.org on 16 November, 2018.
9
Mufti Muhamad Arshad Farooqui, “Islam mein Azadi ka Bunyadi Tasawwur”, Islam Mein Azadi Ka Tasawwur
edited by Dr Safdar Zuber Nadwi, (New Delhi, Islamic Fiqh Academy, 2014), p.242.

4
Maududi also writes that the essential outcome of Tauheed (Oneness of God) is freedom, which means
denouncing all the merits of Lord for every being other than the One Lord including denouncing for
them the right for ‘sovereign authority’. 11

The main contentions about the Islamic idea of freedom in contemporary times can be seen prominently
in three broad areas: 1. Faith and religion; 2. Thought and expression; and 3. Issues related to women’s
freedom. Even then, the first and last are widely debated and hotly discussed. Many other discussions
actually stem from these two. Therefore the notion of freedom vis-à-vis religious and women’s would be
discussed first before entering in the discussion about the historical journey of freedom in with a specific
case study of Turkey.

Yet again, before venturing on the debate of freedom in Islam, a little and inquiry is needed to be made
about the major sources from which arguments are made. First and foremost in that is the Qur’an, then
hadith, then ijma’ and qiyas.

Revealed to Prophet Muhammad between 610 and 632, the Qur’an and, Prophetic traditions are the
two main sources of Islam. Then comes the number of ijma’ (consensus of scholars) and qiyas (analogy).
This paper will examine the Qur’anic philosophy and Prophetic traditions about the concept of freedom
related to religion, apostasy and individual as well as group liberty.

What does the Qur’an say about freedom?

As quoted earlier the Arabic word for freedom is not mentioned anywhere in the Qur’an. However, its
derivatives have been used on a number of occasions to convey the message. Philosophers and thinkers
have drawn different meanings and conclusions of their idea of freedom based on how they look at it.
Islam is one of the greatest proponents of freedom and liberty and considers it a right to be enjoyed
equally by all. With reference to a Qur’anic verse 12, Waris Mazhari writes that over dozens of occasions,
Qur’an asks people to use their intellect instead of following anything blindly and, it has termed people
who don’t use intellect lower in degree than animals. 13 For Professor Abdul Sattar Kassem of Najah
National University, Palestine ‘freedom in the Quran is natural, and it supersedes any earthly laws and
instructions’. 14

10
Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (Edinburgh, Edinburgh
University Press, 2011), p.133.
11
Maududi, Tafheemat, p.89.
12
Many are the Jinns and men we have made for Hell: they have hearts wherewith they understand not, eyes
wherewith they see not, and ears wherewith they hear not. They are like cattle, - nay more misguided: for they are
heedless (of warning). The Quran 8:179.
13
Waris Mazhari, “Azadi-e-Fikr-o-Nazar Aur Muslim Mu’ashare Ki Surat-e-Haal”, Alsharia, Gujranwala, July, 2013.
14
Abdul Sattar Kassem, “The Concept of Freedom in the Quran”, American International Journal of Contemporary
Research, Vol. 2, No. 4, April 2012, p.165.

5
However, it should be noted that Islam allows freedom within particular context in order that it does not
cross the limit to enter the domain of injustice. For unbridled and unrestricted freedom leads to injustice
and conflict. In the Islamic worldview other views are important. That is freedom ends when injustice
begins and, while Islam gives enough freedom to nurture human abilities and aspirations, it restricts
them when they start hurting and abusing others’ right to do the same. Therefore freedom in Islam runs
along the idea of justice.

One of the commonest attacks against Islam is that it is against religious freedom. The example often
cited to support it is in the form of the rare cases of apostasy and blasphemy.

A historical evaluation of those cases and a note about the verses of the Qur’an that talk about religious
freedom is given here. Besides, the background of the Prophetic sayings frequently quoted in favour of
the alleged forced conversion and execution of the apostates would also be presented.

Freedom of religion

The most often quoted by advocates of freedom of religion and, perhaps the most important verse in
this regard in the Qur’an, is the verse 256 of chapter 2: la ikraha fi al-din “there is no compulsion in
religion”. Lakum deenukum wa liya deen, To you be your Way and to me mine (109:6) is another verse
which speaks about freedom of choice.

Those blaming Islam of forcing conversion and ordering of life sentence to the apostate quote other
verses and cite few examples in support of their claim that Islam is antithetical to freedom and liberty.
Verse 5 of chapter 9 (fight and slay the Pagans wherever you find them) is quoted by many to justify
their claim. In The World of Fatwas or the Shariah in Action (New Delhi, ASA Publications, 1995), Arun
Shourie quotes this small portion of the verse. 15 But what he does is leave the context and preceding
and succeeding portions of the verse, and all the verses which mention the whole context, which ups
the ante, something that can rightly be termed as ‘academic dishonesty’.

There are four famous cases which are frequently quoted to assert the claim that Islam suggests killing
of the apostate and it prohibits conversion to other religion. There are other sporadic cases, but these
four have long been discussed and widely cited. They are: 1. The 1985 Sudan President Jaafar Numeri’s
instruction to execute Mahmud Muhammad Taha, a political reformer and author of the controversial
book, Second Message. 2. Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of
Iran’s decree against Salman Rushdie, post-publication of the infamous book, The Satanic Verses. 3. The
ruling in Egypt against Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, found guilty of apostasy. Zayd went on exile in The
Netherlands. 4. In Afghanistan Abdul Rahman Abdul Mannan was found guilty of apostasy. He was
imprisoned and separated from his wife. He was given political asylum in Italy. Some sporadic cases of
ruling against apostasy also came to light in Malaysia. I wouldn’t go much into details of each. However,
a brief note about the four prominent cases can help reveal certain facts.

15
Fight and slay the Pagans wherever you find them (9:5). Note: At least from verse one to fifteen, the whole
context has been left that deals with important aspects of agreement which in fact shows great leniency of Islam
to followers of other fait and respect for human life even during war times.

6
Siti Zubaidah Ismail and Muhammad Zahiri Awang Mat write about the four cases. 16 In the case of
Muhammad Taha the decree was issued not for apostasy but because he was seen as a “threat to the
established order”. In Rushdie’s case the author was guilty of not just blasphemy but for ridiculing Islam
and hurting religious sentiments across the world. The words of the Court of Cassation in the Abu Zayd
case went: “… Certain religious laws … consider a difference of religion an impediment to marriage
which prevents its conclusion, and they consequently impose separation or divorce. The same applies
when one of the spouses embraces another religion. This does not violate the freedom of belief [Italics
added]. Abdul Rahman who had lost the custody battle of his children, was suspected of mental illness
and was freed from prison after a court dropped charges of apostasy quoting lack of evidence.

It is evident from the above note that all these cases were not cases of mere apostasy, or blasphemy
and conversion, there were other important elements like character assassination, causing public
disorder, hurting sentiments, etc for which there are different laws in different countries.

Further, these were matters related more to state than religion. And each state as sovereign and
independent unit of global social and political structure has its own laws to deal with different issues
including matters of law and order. Fazlur Rahman writes “… with all its concern for a liberal pluralism of
institutions and basic individual freedom, the Qur’ān, under certain conditions, admits that the state,
when representing society, is paramount.” 17

And freedom in Islam is not only concerned and connected with faith. It also touches upon other
important aspects of life. Fazlur Rahman says: With perfect justification have the lawyers of Islam
emphasized four fundamental freedoms or rights ― life, religion, earning and owing property, and
personal human honor and dignity (‘irđ), all of which it is the duty of the state to protect. 18

Freedom and conversion

Related to religious freedom is the argument of conversion. It should be noted that it is not only Islam in
which the issue of conversion appears. Other Abrahamic religions like Christianity and Judaism also see
it. Of late, even Hinduism, which according to Scriptural evidences, is not even religion, has seen a surge
of such cases. The verse la ikraha fi al-din clearly refutes the idea of forcing faith.

Encyclopedia of Islam says: Conversion to Islam is a remarkably simple process, normally entailing than
no more saying, with the proper intent, the SHAHADA: I declare that there is no god but God, and that
MUHAMMAD is the messenger of God. 19

16
Siti Zubaidahismail and Muhammad Zahiri Awang Mat, “Faith and Freedom: The Qur’anic Notion of Freedom of
Religion vs. the Act of Changing Religion and Thoughts for the Implications for Malaysia”,
www.mdpi.com/journal/religions, 2016, p.10
17
Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an, p.29
18
Ibid, p.31
19
Juan E. Campo, Encyclopedia of Islam (New York, Facts on File, Library of Congress, 2009), p.165.

7
So far as forcing one’s faith on another person is concerned, the Encyclopedia says: The QURAN
explicitly rejects imposition of religious belief, and Islam has historically allowed great freedom to other
religions. 20

After the death of Prophet Muhammad, when Muslims ‘burst out’ of the Arabian Peninsula and
conquered the Byzantine and an Islamicate empire was established “Islam was the religion of the state,
but members of other religious groups were allowed freedom of worship as DHIMMIS, or “protected
subjects.” 21

In fact, it were the Muslims first whose freedom was not only restricted but they were also subjected to
persecution for using their right to choose their path. Amir Ali says that “Many of his (Muhammad’s)
disciples took refuge with a good Christian king in Abyssinia, whilst others remained to suffer ill-
treatment and persecution by the side of their teacher. On the death of Abû Tâlib and Khadija, which
happened shortly after, the Koraish redoubled their persecutions. Hopeless now of success among the
Meccans, Mohammed bethought himself of some other field for the exercise of his ministry [read
freedom]. He accordingly proceeded to Tâyef, but the people there drove him from their city, pelting
him with stones. Mohammed returned to his native town sorely stricken in heart. 22

Women’s freedom

Many scholars have disagreed with the idea of comparing Islam with the West arguing that comparison
needs to be made between things of equal importance and weight. While Islam is a religion West is a
civilization. Therefore, the comparison is either misplaced or stretched too far. Some say that if a
comparison has to be made it should be made of Islam with Christianity or Judaism or, of East with
West.

Coming to the point of women’s position in Islam, a major problem with most critics is that they pick up
the story from where Islam appears in the Arabian Peninsula leaving a whole history of misdeeds and
practices that were norm rather than aberration. Therefore, a pre-Islamic historical account must be put
in place to locate the issue and situate with the Islamic position as elaborated in the Quran and
established through prophetic traditions.

Since Prophet Muhammad had to directly deal with the Bedouins, it would be nice and a rational way to
have some understanding of the culture that time. This will also establish a relationship with the history
and make it what Collingwood calls “reflexive thought” because “there is also a history of religion.” And
“The task of religious thought and religious practice is to find the relations between these two opposed
conceptions of myself as finite and God as infinite. The absence of any definite relation the difference of

20
Ibid, p.165.
21
Ibid
22
Syed Amir Ali, A Short History of the Saracens, (New Delhi, Kitab Bhavan, 2001, 6th Edition), p.9.

8
the two, is the problem and torment of the religious mind.” 23 In The Arabs, Philip Hitti writes about
women of the Bedouin, whom he terms as “The Original Arab” that:

The Bedouin woman, whether Islamic or pre-Islamic, enjoyed and still enjoys a measure of freedom
denied to her sedentary sister. She lived in a polygamous family and under a baal system of marriage, in
which the man was the master; nevertheless she was at liberty to choose a husband and leave him if ill-
treated. 24

So far as Islam is concerned it neither differentiates between man and woman nor does it degrade her.
When it talks about difference it does not say that a woman is any lesser than a man. It is clear in the
verse: O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into
nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the
most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full
knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things). 25

Freedom in Turkey: A case study of the Young Turk Revolution

As it would be too wide and beyond the space of this paper, analyzing the different periods of Muslim
rule and locating the idea of freedom as adopted and accommodated or excluded therein, I would just
have a brief look at an important period of Muslim rule in the Ottoman Turkey and try to understand
what freedom stood for then and how it was applied there.

Before doing that it should also be in the fairness of academics to acknowledge the misdeeds of some
Muslim rules at different stages of history. And there is nothing wrong about acknowledging the wrongs.
For example Patricia Crone writes that “the Arabs conquered the civilized the world from Spain to India,
destroying one empire in the process and severely mutilating another, in some 50 years,…” 26

To bring Islam, once again to the debate of state is the fact that to acknowledge that as against some
other religions Islam has never shied to claim to be religion where politics forms an essential part of it. In
fact, poet philosopher Muhammad Iqbal eulogizes this aspect of Islam. Crone goes to say that “it [Islam]
is a political religion with a strong activist tradition, which explains why Islam, unlike other world
religions, can be used to mobilize the masses for the creation of a modern state today.” 27 [Italics
original]

23
The Idea of History, p.314
24
Philip K. Hitti, The Arabs: A Short History, (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1970, second revised edition), p.19.
25
Qur’an (49:13).
26
Patricia Crone, “The Tribe and the State”, in J. A. Hall, ed., States in History (The British Library, 1986, ch.2, pp.48-
77), p.458.
27
Ibid, p.461.

9
The Ottoman history extends from 1299 to 1922 with the break of Khilafat. An important period in this
long history is the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II from 1876 to 1908. My reason for choosing this period
is the emergence of a new group of reformers that came to be known as Young Turks around this time.
The Young Turks are known for their unquestionable faith in addition to sort of a liberal outlook for
society and politics.

Before so doing, it would pertinent to have a look at the society and its general conditions in which
Prophet Muhammad was born and preached his ideas. Historian Amir Ali notes:

In the days of which we are speaking, there was no law or order in any city in Arabia. Different factions
were at strife with each other, and general lawlessness and confusion prevailed in the Peninsula.
Mohammad applied himself first to the task of introducing order in Medîna, and organising the
commonwealth upon a proper basis. With this object he issued a Charter, by which all blood-feud was
abolished and lawlessness repressed. Equal rights were granted to the Jews, who lived in large numbers
in and about Medîna, whilst they on their side bound themselves to help the Moslems in defending the
city. 28

Following the above note about the time of Prophet Muhammad’s Arabia, now a brief background of
the emergence of the group as well as its impact on the future politics of Turkey would be important.

Abdul Hamid II was born on 21 September, 1842 and died at the age 75 on 10 February 1918. His rule
was spread over three decades.

Study of his period is important among other reasons, primarily for the fact that the remaining vestiges
of Caliphate almost ended with him or it was the beginning of its end. The causes of one of world’s most
powerful empires makes many historians pause and look back at history from different angles. For
history, as pointed out by Collingwood, is not merely a series of events, rather it is about imagination.

In the context of freedom which this papers is addressing, what is significant to find in the reign of Abdul
Hamid II is extent to which freedom was exercised both by the ruler and those ruled. This will determine
the outcome both of its use and misuse. For freedom in Islam is intended to give wings to imagination
for nurturing of human ambitions and shaping them for individual and collective goodness.

28
Syed Amir Ali, A Short History of the Saracens, pp.11-12

10