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Ashok K Behuria

A couple of days before Prime Minister Gilani confirmed General Kayani͛s extension beyond his own
tenure, we met some US officials for a discussion on the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Among
other things, they argued very passionately that Kayani deserved an additional tenure. They were
impressed with, what they outlined as, his resolve to keep the army out of politics, his growing
commitment to fight terror and his willingness to listen to the Americans. They also hinted that the
US would not like a change of guard at this critical juncture when Afghan situation was in a state of
flux. A friend of mine from Islamabad called in next evening to tell me that Kayani͛s term has been
extended and referred to the glowing tributes Gilani paid to the Army Chief that he had ͞successfully
led us in this war and his staying on is in our best interests͟. He further emphasised: ͞I want to give a
message to the nation that at this time, the prime minister, president, CJP and COAS are now in a
secure position till 2013. They must now work within the ambit of Constitution͟.

What Prime Minister Gilani left unsaid was that Kayani͛s extension was too critical for the survival of
his government in the face of the restive opposition and the declining economic and security
situation at home. Or conversely, if Kayani͛s tenure would not have been extended, it would have
posed critical challenges to the existence of his government. Would it have resulted in a coup or if
Kayani͛s term was not extended? Were there no other General available to lead the army at this
moment?

Curiously, Gilani also dragged in the case of ͚security͛ of the Chief Justice in his statement. Was it a
signal to the CJ that he also did not face any threat from either his government or the Army?

Anyway, the Zardari-Gilani duo needed to assure General Kayani that they did not intend to disturb
the equation with him. Moreover, labouring under the overbearing image of Musharraf and Kayani,
the army was unable to throw up any alternative leadership at this hour, when situation in
Afghanistan was in for a change. Gilani forcefully argued that for the sake of ͞consistency and
continuity͟ in the ongoing war on terror, ͞we have already given extension to the ISI director general
and some other generals and may do so in future as well͟.

Ever since Musharraf͛s fortunes plummeted, Kayani͛s stars have been on the rise. Kayani has quietly
but firmly carved out his niche in the emerging political system of Pakistan, where the institution of
judiciary has assumed some significance in the wake of country-wide lawyers͛ movement that saw
the back of a well-entrenched dictator (Musharraf). He insulated himself from the tussle between
Zardari government and the Chief Justice and earned respect from both. He assumed centre-stage
during the Pak-US strategic dialogue and led the process of collating the ͚wish list͛ from the Pakistani
side. In fact, he called all federal secretaries to the GHQ to brief him on Pakistan͛s needs which could
be presented to the US government during the first strategic dialogue in Washington. Such is the
stature of the Pakistani army that even if the delegation was led by the foreign minister, Kayani, the
US papers wrote, was the star attraction in the delegation. Kayani also demonstrated his willingness
to oblige the Americans by his operations in Swat and FATA. His hobnobbing with Taliban and his
much-touted secret dealings with Karzai for reconciliation with Taliban might have provoked the ire
of the Americans to some extent. However, it was submerged the overwhelming hatred that the
Americans now carry against Karzai. Americans, upset with the secret parleys between ISI officials
and Karzai, would rather blame Karzai more than Kayani for keeping the US out of the loop.

The Americans all along knew that the only institution that mattered for them in Pakistan was the
army. They have consistently maintained their links with Pakistani army without bothering too much
about its implications for the ongoing democratic transition in Pakistan. Earlier too, the American
commitment to democracy has sub-served their strategic interests in the region. The US
contribution to dominance of the army in Pakistani politics has not received the attention it
deserves. In the case of Kayani͛s extension, which resolved beyond doubt the primacy of army in the
evolving system, the American nod played a crucial role. Observers in Islamabad point out that the
soft and invisible coup in Islamabad could not have been there without tacit American blessings.

Kayani͛s extension puts him in the driver͛s seat for various reasons. During his second, and possibly
last tenure (if he does not step in invoking the doctrine of necessity), he will be less amenable to
pressures from the civilian government. He has already expressed his views on India, Afghanistan
and the neighbourhood and will continue with his search for parity with India at one level and
strategic depth in Afghanistan on the other. He may get Pasha͛s tenure (his trusted lieutenant)
extended to coincide with his own. Last but not the least, he will play a crucial role in the next
elections in early 2013.

The political situation within Pakistan is likely to remain unstable. PML-N and religious parties seem
to come together to take on Zaradri government over various issues ranging from declining
economic situation, Afghanistan to situation in Balochistan and FATA. Any such political instability
will strengthen the hands of the army further.

Known for his hardline stand vis-a-vis India, Kayani will take every possible measure to isolate India
in Afghanistan and constrain its activities there. It is also quite probable that he will intensify the
level of insurgency in Kashmir. As situation will turn in Pakistan͛s favour in Afghanistan, it is certain
that efforts will be made by Pakistan army to divert the attention of jihadis towards Kashmir, to take
advantage of the political turmoil in the valley. The possibility of Pakistan using Afghanistan as a
training ground for these forces remain strong as ever.