path of the arc.

However, when work is being performed on insulator Northwest Power Pool load shedding program was completely
strings with a considerable amount of damage, the best solution of redesigned using improved design methods.
the risk factor problem appears to lie in limiting the line surge level to The disturbances of greatest concern are loss of generation
a known value. This can be achieved through the use of protective incidents or loss of interconnections with other regions. These
gaps. This leads into the third phase of the investigation during disturbances are more probable than the severe short
which the developmental testing of protective gaps was carried out, generating plants disturbances which may be morecircuits near
commonly
so as to extend safe working conditions to strings with damaged studied. Loss of a large block of generation followed by loss of
and/or punctured insulators.
Protective gaps have been developed for live line work methods imports
due to instability can result in very large generation-load
imbalance.
applied to 230 and 500 kV systems. These serve to eliminate the need reduced generator During light load conditions, reduced rotating inertia and
for line outages in cases where the insulator string has sustained faster frequency voltage support cause lower stability levels and
extensive damage. A set of protective gaps, designed for use on the decay.
500 kV system is shown in Figure 1. The desired mode of operation of load Islanding of the Pacific Northwest region with severe generation-
imbalance can lead to unpredictable and possibly severe
such a protective gap requires that it have a protective level, (CFO + consequences. Therefore, Bonneville Power Administration
3a ), lower than the lowest withstand value of the insulator string, adopted a philosophy of installing discrete controls to prevent
lineman, and tool configuration. A second desired characteristic is
that of a withstand level which is as high as possible. This serves to islanding
for relatively high probability disturbances.
eliminate unwanted flashovers due to minor system disturbances. A Discrete stability controls for direct tripping of aluminum re¬
full description of the protective gaps, and of their development for duction plant load have been applied on a much larger scale than
the 230 and 500 kV systems, is given in the paper. previous applications. Sensors at various locations are used to
transfer trip up to 3,000 MW of industrial load. In addition, for loss of
References the Pacific AC Intertie, fast power change controls have been im¬
[1] IEEE Committee Report, "Recommendations for Safety in Live controls plemented on the parallel Pacific HVDC Intertie. Arming levels forthe
are determined from off-line transient stability simulations.
Line Maintenance", IEEE Trans on Power Apparatus and Potential for misoperation is minimized by arming the controls only
Systems, Volume PAS-87, No. 2, February 1968. during critical system conditions.
Load shedding program design was challenging because of a high
coordinating frequency of 58 Hz due to relatively high under-
frequency trip settings at a coal-fired and a nuclear generating plant.
The numerous considerations in load shedding program design are
summarized.
Many load shedding programs have been designed using simple
calculations. This was not possible for the Northwest Power Pool. Of
the many advantages of using large-scale transient stability
programs for design, the ability to represent voltage sensitivity of
loads is particularly important. Because of the longer simulation
times (10-15 seconds) and because of the abnormal voltages and
frequencies which exist, some additions to conventional transient
stability programs are desirable. These additions are outlined in the
paper.
The load shedding program consists of seven steps between 59.3
and 58.7 Hz. For reasons discussed in the paper, substantial
overshedding followed by overfrequency on the order of 62 Hz is
possible. High speed automatic load restoration is used to limit
overfrequency. A unique method, also used to control over-
frequency, is energization of the Chief Joseph 1,400 MW dynamic
brake by an overfrequency relay. This allows more time for governor
Fig. 1. 500 kV Protective Gap control action to be effective.

July 1981, p. 3486 July 1981, p. 3496

Northwest Power Pool Transient
Stability and Load Shedding Controls
for Generator-Load Imbalances
C W. Taylor, Member IEEE
Bonneville Power Administration, Portland, Oregon
F. R. Nassief
Northwest Power Pool, Portland Oregon
R. L. Cresap, Member IEEE
Bonneville Power Administration, Portland, Oregon
New transient instability patterns have evolved within the Pacific
Northwest and the western North American interconnection. In¬
creased use of Pacific Northwest hydro generation for peaking along
with development of base loaded coal-fired generation in the Rocky
Mountain states contribute to reduced stability levels during light
load, heavy import conditions.
When the potential for transient instability and islanding of the
Pacific Northwest with large generation-load imbalance became
apparent, rather unique discrete transient stability enhancement
methods were rapidly developed and implemented. In addition, the
PER JULY 1981
Distribution Arrester Research
M. V. Lat and J. Kortschinski
Ontario Hydro Research Division, Toronto, Ontario
In recent years experience with distribution class arrester failures,
many of them explosive, prompted an extensive investigation by
Ontario Hydro Research Division. The study concentrated primarily
on 21 kV rated arresters for 27.6 kV systems and comprised of field
survey, laboratory testing, and development of remedial measures.
Field Survey of Arrester Failures
To contribute to the establishment of different mechanisms of
surge arrester failure a survey was carried out over a period of three
months in the summer of 1978. From a population of over 300,000
units about 250 failed arresters of all ratings were collected. A
combination of field reports and laboratory assessment enabled
accurate determination of the cause of failure of 98 per cent of the
samples received as indicated in Figure 1. Most of the arrester
failures, 85.6 per cent, were caused by moisture ingress while 10.4
per cent were due to either surges or contamination condition. It
should be noted that the surge failures appeared to be caused by low
magnitude, short duration currents well below the duty required by
national standards. Moreover, it is alarming that some 30 per cent of
the arresters failed explosively in a potentially dangerous mode.
49
Laboratory Tests Related to Field Failures
Laboratory inspections and tests indicated that over 50 per cent of (b)
all cases of moisture ingress could be attributed to inadequate seal
design while about 25 per cent appeared to be related to quality
control problems. Until appropriate tests for arrester seal integrity
and life are developed solutions to the moisture ingress problem will
likely continue to be elusive.
Laboratory discharge-current withstand tests and duty cycle tests
on complete units of 11 different models indicate that the industry
practice of applying pro-rated tests for arrester evaluation may not
be valid. As shown in Figure 2 only 25 per cent survived the required
65 kA discharge current. Large disparities in arrester duty cycle
performance also are evident. Even special features such as "large"
valve blocks seemed to make very little, if any, difference to the
withstand levels.
Statistical methods may be more appropriate in defining uniform
and effective production test standards. The laboratory tests in¬
dicate also that about 90 per cent of arresters tested exceeded their
published discharge voltage levels for 20 kA.
Laboratory contamination testing confirmed the superiority of
non-linear resistance grading over capacitive or linear resistance
grading. 2 0.1 10 5090 95 98
PROBABILITY OF ARRESTER WITHSTAND %
Safety Aspects of Arrester Failures
Assessment of the hazard due to exploding arresters was carried Fig. 2. Log-Normal Probability distributions of (a) 65 kA (6 x
out employing mode-of-failure tests on contemporary arrester 17[isec) discharge withstand tests and {bj 20kA(8x 20 ßsecj duty
designs with 5 kA fault currents. Virtually all units, except those cycle tests at 18 kV.
equipped with pressure relief devices, failed explosively. A few had
only the end-caps torn off, or broken off at the neck, but in most cass
the explosions were severe. Approximate calculations made from
high speed films indicated that fragment velocities were as high as July 1981, p. 3506
23m/s(100mph).
Two possible approaches can be considered to prevent arresters A Rational
from exploding, one directed at the development of explosion proof Approach to Structural
arresters and the other based on limiting the energy input into a
faulted arrester. Several manufacturers are currently pursuing the Design of Transmission Line
former approach but those considered appear to fall short of Elias Ghannoum
completely eliminating all hazards. A series current limiting fuse can Hydro-Quebec, Canada
be installed in series with the arrester to limit energy input. While
this may be an effective method application studies are as yet
incomplete. Finally a novel idea of a current-limiting disconnector, Loadings and resistance of transmission lines are discussed in this
capable of interrupting a fault current similarly to a current limiting paper. Loadings are classified as per table I and divided into two
fuse is being developed by Ontario Hydro. basic conditions: intact system loadings that are mandatory while
damaged system loadings are optional. In normal practice, if
engineers elect not to design for these latter loads, they should at
least look at their consequences and be prepared to accept them.
Since a transmission line is composed of many interactive
elements, each components's resistance must be related to the
others. Therefore a prefered sequence of failure is established in
,100r-
which suspension towers are the weakest elements and conductors
85.6 are the strongest.
The use factor of each component (the ratio of stresses due to limit
loads and failure stresses) must also be controlled because it can
modify the chosen resistance sequence.
Selection of optimum limit loads (or reliability level) is done
through optimisation of the total cost of a transmission line. This
cost is the sum of the initial investment and the cost of failure during
CONTAMINATION the economic life of a line. It can be expressed by the following
equation:
MISAPPLICATION
Ct C,
=
2 rnPfCf
UNKNOWN
Ct, C,, Cf are respectively total, initial and failure costs
Pfisthe probability of failure (probability of exceeding limit loads)
CAUSES OF FAILURES m is an actualization factor
n is the economic life of a line
A numerical example of a 120 kV line is discussed in the paper.
Using the present approach, engineers should be involved in the
following steps:
Fig. 1. Causes of Distribution Arrester Failures. 1. Establishing the distribution functions of climatic loadings
2. Preliminary choice of the best suitable components
3. Calculating initial cost variation as a function of limit loads
4. Estimating failure costs or at least their range of variation
5. Choice of the optimum reliability level (or limit loads)

50 PER JULY 1981