Team Code: 849-949R

8th NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY ODISHA,

INTRA UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

Before

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF INDIA

SLP filled U/ ART. 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition Number 18182/2016

Mr. Shivangi Arora…………………………………………………………………Petitioner No. 1

versus

State Of Sarashutra & ors.…………………………………………………Respondent No. 1

----Clubbed with----

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONER NUMBER 19484/2016 AND 19485/2016

Deen Dayal Charitable Trust………………………………………………….Petitioner No. 2

Versus

State Of Sarashutra & ors.…………………………………………………Respondent No. 1

 Table of Contents

II. List of Abbrevations ............................................................................................................. III

III. Table of Authorities ............................................................................................................ V

IV. Statement of Jurisdiction................................................................................................. VIII

V. Statement of Facts ................................................................................................................. IX

VI. Issues Raised ...................................................................................................................... XI

VII. Summary Of arguments .................................................................................................... XII

1.) Whether the Special Leave Petition no. 18182/2016 , 19484/2016, 19485/2016
Maintainable? .............................................................................................................................. 1

I. All the remedies have not been exhausted. ...................................................................... 1

II. No substantial question of law involved in the present case. ....................................... 2

III. No grave miscarriage of justice. ................................................................................... 2

2.) Whether there is any violation of rights of Ms. Arora by the state? ............................... 3

I. Large public interest ......................................................................................................... 3

II. No mala fide intention .................................................................................................. 4

III. liberty to change the policies ........................................................................................ 5

IV. Court cannot interfere in policy making power of the government ............................. 6

3.) Writ Jurisdiction cannot lie against the trust ................................................................... 7

I. Non performance of public function ................................................................................ 7

II. Not substantially funded by state government ............................................................. 9

4.) Whether the Lokpal and the Lokayukta ACT, 2013 has Jurisdiction over the Trust ? .. 10

I. Lokayukta has jurisdiction over the Lokpal and the Lokayukta act, 2103 .................... 10

II. power to investigate u/n Lokapal and Lokayukta act, 2013 ....................................... 12

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 5.) Wether special police establishment has jurisdiction over the VOilation of FCRA ? ... 13

I. Voilation of FCRA, 2010 ............................................................................................... 13

II. Power of Special Police establishment under FCRA ................................................. 17

Prayer for Relief ......................................................................................................................... XIII

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 II. LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

AIR All India Report

Art. Article

u/s Under section

Vol. Volume

ed. Edition

SC Supreme Court

HC High Court

FCRA Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 2010

vs. Versus

All. Allahabad

HL House of Lords

ors. Others

SCC SC Cases

Ker. Kerala

Pat. Patna

Hon’ble Honorable

Bom Bombay

CriLJ Criminal Law Journal

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AP Andhra Pradesh

Del. Delhi

Mad. Madras

DSPE Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1947

Raj. Rajasthan

UOI Union of India

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FEMA Foreign Exchange Management Act

Anr. Another

SLP Special Leave Petition

KRHC Kerala HC

Punj. Punjab

MP Madhya Pradesh

SCR SC Reports

Cal Calcutta

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 III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madaras, AIR 1950 SC 27 ................................................................... 19

Air Vice Marshal J.S. Kumar v. Governing Council Of Air Forc, (2006) 1 DLT 330 ................. 21

Association for democratic reforms and Anr. V. Union of India and Ors, (2014)3CompLJ41(Del)
............................................................................................................................................. 27, 29

Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh and Ors., 1989 (1) SCR 743 ......................... 21

Bhikhubhai v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 4 SCC 144 ...................................................................... 19

Binny Ltd. and Anr. v. V. Sadasivan and Ors, (2005) 6 SCC 657 ................................................ 22

Brij Bhusan v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1986) 2 SCC 354 .................................................... 17

Camden (Marquis) v. IRC, (1914) 1 KB 641................................................................................ 28

Council for Civil Service Union v. Minister for Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 346 ................... 16

Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats, (2008) 2 SCC 672
................................................................................................................................................... 17

Devi Prasad and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1980 SC 1185............. 19

Director Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. and Ors AIR
2009 SC 461.............................................................................................................................. 31

Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas and Ors. (2003) 10 SCC 733 ............................................. 22

G. Bassi Reddy v. International Croporation Research Institute and Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 225 ... 21

Golden Ahar Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 1999 Delhi 372 ............................................ 17

Hema Mohonot v. State through chief commissioner of Income Tax Administration, AIR 2013 SC
312............................................................................................................................................. 25

K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering, AIR 1998 SC 295. 21

K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, (2015) 4 SCC 670 ...... 22

M. P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v State of M. P., (1982) 1 SCR 750 .................................... 19
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M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. State of M.P. and Ors.(1997) 7 SCC 592 ...................................... 18

Madras City Wine Merchants Asociation v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 5 SCC 509 ................ 17

Mr. Justice Chandrashekaraiah v. Janekere C. Krishna and Ors, AIR 2013 SC 726 ................. 23

Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC ..................................................... 17

Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual AIR 1969 SC 1306.................................................... 21

Ramasaran Das vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1326 ............................... 14

Rangadhar Barik vs. The State, 1996 CriLJ 1531 ........................................................................ 14

Shimnit Utsch India Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development
Corporation Ltd. and Ors., (2010) 6 SCC 303 ................................................................... 16, 18

Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607 ......................................... 20

Shri Situram Sugar Co. Ltd. v Union of India, (1990) 1 SCR 909 ............................................... 19

Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. vs. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC
1314........................................................................................................................................... 15

State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Nezone Law House, (2008) 5 SCC 609 ....................................... 16

State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd, 1985 Supp SCC 280 ........................................ 28

State of Orissa vs. Sashi Bhusan Kar, 1985 CriLJ 1725 .............................................................. 14

Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 ..................................................................... 19

The Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy and Ors. v. M.K. Bawane, AIR 2013 SC 148...... 19

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheal) 518, 636 (1819) ..................... 28

Union Carbide Corpn. vs. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 ..................................................... 14

Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan and Anr, AIR 1998 SC 295 ............... 20

Union of India and Ors v. Hindustan Development Corpn. and Or, 1193 SCR (3) 128.............. 16

V.T. Industries Ltd. v. Workers' Union, 2001 (1) SCC 298 ......................................................... 21

Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Ors. v. Lakshini Narain and Ors, (1976)IILLJ163SC.......... 22

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Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 56 ............................... 18

Statutes

DELHI SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT ACT, 1946 §5 ................................................................ 30

FOREIGN CONTRIBUTION REGULATION ACT, 2010 .............................................................. 3, 26, 27

LOKPAL AND LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2013................................................................................ 23, 24, 25

THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 ......................................................................................... 14

Books

M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW .................................................................................... 15

V.G.RAMCHANDRA, LAW OF WRITS .............................................................................................. 18

Legislation

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA ................................................................................................................ 29

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 IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondents have the honour to submit before the Hon’ble SC of Republic of India, the
memorandum for the Respondents under the jurisdiction of the SC under Article 32 and Article
136.

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 V. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Deen Dayal Charitable Trust, hereinafter referred as ‘the trust’, in the state of Saurashtra,
hereinafter refered as ‘the state’ established Dronacharya University, hereinafter referred as ‘the
university’ in the Magadh district of the state to promote higher education. The land and initial
capital for the university was provided by Mr. A K Pandey, an IAS officer in the state. The
chairman of the trust was Mrs. Sushila Pandey, wife of Mr. A.K. Pandey IAS. The trust used to
receive grants from various private parties. The trust deed provided for independent functioning
of the trust.

The Dronacharya University, established by the trust, runs in accordance with the bye-laws drafted
by the trust. The executive council of the university is the final decision making authority on all
aspects of administration. The university is highly aspired among the students due to its scholarship
programs.

In July 2013, ‘the State’ comes up with a policy for the years 2013-2016 to provided financial aid
to the students through scholarship by allocating funds to various universities for the same. The
university in collaboration with the state ran a scholarship program called ‘Eklavya Scholarship’
under the scholarship policy of the state under which two students will be given scholarship on the
basis of merit based on an examination and interview by the executive council of the university.
The scholarship consists certain benefits for the students.

Ms. Shivangi Arora, a university student, cleared the examination for the scholarship in June 2015.
She was selected for the grants of Eklavya Scholarship and her tution fee was waived accordingly
but she did not received any stipend as per the policy of the state. On inquiry, she came to know
that the policy of providing scholarship through trust and universities has been withdrawn by the
state. In December 2015, the state introduced a new policy of conducting independent
examinations for the scholarships and disbursing the amount directly to the students for the year
2015-2016 respectively.

Aggrieved by this, Ms. Arora filed a writ petition against the executive council and the state for
withdrawing the policy and arrayed the state, the trust and university as respondents. The Division
bench of the High Court of Saurashtra dismissed the petition of Ms. Arora on certain grounds.
Aggrieved, Ms. Arora filed a Special leave petition against the order of the High Court. Ms. Arora

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also filed a complaint under Lokpal and Lokayukta Act 2013 leading the Lokayukta to issue
notices and directing investigation to be conducted by Special Police Establishment against the
trustee and their family members.

During investigation, the special police establishment found that the trust violated the Foreign
Contribution (Regulation) Act 2010 (“FCRA”) as since 2012, the trust received about Rs. 25 crores
from TexCorp Industries Pvt. Ltd. a wholly owned subsidiary of TexCorp India Holding Pvt. Ltd.
both registered under Companies Act 2013 in which 83.4% shares were held by TexGlobe
Mauritius Ltd, a company registered under law of Mauritius. The Special police hence filed a
charge sheet against the trustees.

The trust then filed two writ petition challenging power and jurisdiction of the Lokayukta under
Lokpal and Lokayukta Act 2013 and jurisdiction of Special Police Establishment over violation of
FCRA. The High Court of Saursahtra upheld the powers and jurisdiction of both Lokayukta and
Special Police Establishment in the current matter.

Aggrieved, the trust filed two Special leave petitions challenging the order of the High Court.

The Supreme court however clubbed the Special leave petition filed by Ms. Arora with the
petitions filed by the trust to which Ms. Arora argued that there was no nexus between the petitions.

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 VI. ISSUES RAISED

1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. 18182/2016 , 19484/2016, 19485/2016

MAINTAINABLE?

2. WHETHER THERE IS ANY VIOLATION OF RIGHTS OF MS. ARORA BY THE STATE?

3. WHETHER WRIT JURISDICTION CAN LIE AGAINST THE TRUST?

4. WHETHER THE LOKPAL AND THE LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2013 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
TRUST ?
5. WETHER SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE VOILATION OF
FCRA ?

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 VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. Special Leave Petition no. 18182/2016, 19484/2016 AND 19485/2016 should not be
maintainable
 All the remedies have not been exhausted.
 No grave miscarriage of justice.
 No substantial question of law involved in the present case.

2. There was no violation of rights of Ms. Arora.

 The state acted in large public interest
 There was no mala fide intention present
 The state has the liberty to change its policies, and
 Court cannot interfere in the policy making powers of the government
 Writ jurisdiction cannot lie against the trust as
 The trust was not performing any public function, and
 The trust was not substantially funded by the government.

3. The Lokpal and the Lokayukta ACT, 2013 has Jurisdiction over the Trust
 Lokayukta has jurisdiction over the Lokpal and the Lokayukta act, 2103
 There was a prima facie case which gives power to investigate u/n Lokapal and Lokayukta
act, 2013.

4. Wether special police establishment has jurisdiction over the Voilation of FCRA ?
 Voilation of FCRA, 2010
 Power of Special Police establishment under FCRA

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 1.) WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. 18182/2016 , 19484/2016, 19485/2016
MAINTAINABLE?

1. The powers mentioned under Art 136 are special and exercisable beyond the purview of
ordinary law and cases where the needs of justice demands interference by the SC.1 Under
Art 136, the discretionary power to grant special leave to appeal against any judgment,
decree, determination, sentence or order in any matter passed by any court or tribunal
within the territory of India is given to the SC. Art 136 of the Constitution provides for
wide discretionary powers to the Hon’ble Court, but the Court has over time developed
some mechanisms for dealing with frivolous petitions.

I. ALL THE REMEDIES HAVE NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED.

2. A petition under Art 136, necessitates the exhaustion of all available alternative legal
remedies before it is entertained.2 But in this case the petitioner has approached the Hon’ble
court without exhausting all its remedies available.
a) ‘Review’ is one of the remedies that could have been raised by the petitioners. 3 A review
petition could have been applied for, in the HC of Saurashtra.4 It is a remedy available to
the parties for the re-examination or the re-consideration of the same court’s decision. For
review the application must be filed by the ‘aggrieved party’5 and in this case Ms. Arora
and Deen Dayal Charitable Trust are the parties aggrieved and can file a review petition.
b) One of the remedies available was an appeal before the SC with the sanction of HC after
proving that there was no substantial question of law involved in the order passed by the
government.6 Art 134 provides that an appeal shall lie to the SC from any judgment, final
order or sentence in a criminal proceeding ofa HC7, if the HC proves that the said case is a

1
Union Carbide Corpn. vs. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584.
2
Ramasaran Das vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1326.
3
THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, § 114.
4
THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, § 114.
5
THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, Order 47, Rule 1.
6
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950, Art 134A.
7
Rangadhar Barik vs. The State, 1996 CriLJ 1531.
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 fit one for appeal in the SC.8
The appellant thus, has not exhausted all the remedies available to him against the order
passed by the state government of Saraushtra and is therefore exploiting the extraordinary
powers of the Hon’ble court.

II. NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT CASE.

3. The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial
would be whether the question would be substantial only if it is of general public
importance, and if there is an open question of law, i.e. it has not been settled by the
Courts.9 The matter in question involves only Ms. Arora, Deen Dayal Charitable Trust and
their directors and not the general public.
4. The issues raised in this petition is already solved as the state has not violated any right of
the Ms. Arora. Also, the question of jurisdiction raised at various level against the
Lokayukta and the special police establishment has no locus standi on the very basis.
.

III. NO GRAVE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.

5. Art 136(1) empowers the SC to grant special leave to appeal in its discretion 10 and its
approach is based on consideration that this power should be exercised whenever there is
a miscarriage of justice. In the present case, there is no violation of Ms. Arora’s right
neither fundamental nor legal. Thus, to conclude it can be said that their rights were
nowhere gravely violated. Thus, the special leave petition under Art 136 is not
maintainable. As far as the Trust is concerned there is wrong committed by the trust which
has lead to the violation of FCRA.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted that by using its discretionary power, the Hon’ble SC

8
State of Orissa vs. Sashi Bhusan Kar, 1985 CriLJ 1725.

9
Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. vs. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314.

10
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (5th ed., 2009) p. 247.
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 should reject the SLP(C) No. 18182/2016, 19484/2016 and 19485/2016.

2.) WHETHER THERE IS ANY VIOLATION OF RIGHTS OF MS. ARORA BY THE STATE?

It is humbly submitted that the actions of State of Saurastra has not violated any fundamental right
of the petitioner.

I. LARGE PUBLIC INTEREST

6. At first sight, the State of Surashtra din’t violate any fundamental right of the petitioner.
This can be made clear by the doctrine of legitimate expectation. It is submitted by the
counsel that the petitioner only have an expectation of being treated in a certain way by an
administrative authority even though they do not have any legal or fundamental right to
receive such treatment, which is not legitimate. In such situations, the court may not order
the administrative authority to act in a certain way.11
7. The question whether the claim and expectation is legitimate is a question of fact which is
to be decided keeping in view larger public interest.12 “Government policy can be changed
with changing circumstances and only on the ground of change, such policy will not be
vitiated. It is always open to the State to give effect to new policy which it wished to pursue
keeping in view ‘overriding public interest.”13
8. In Union of India and Ors. v. Hindustan Development Corpn. and Ors., the court held that
governmental actions cannot be struck down invalid unless there is clear satisfaction that
the action is unreasonable or not in public interest. There is always a presumption that the
Governmental action is reasonable and in public interest and it is for the party challenging
its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with public
interest. This burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the
Court by proper and adequate material. The Court cannot lightly assume that the action
taken by the Government is unreasonable or without public interest.14 Here the
governmental actions were reasonable and were in public interest.

11
Council for Civil Service Union v. Minister for Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 346.
12
State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Nezone Law House, (2008) 5 SCC 609.
13
Shimnit Utsch India Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. and
Ors., (2010) 6 SCC 303.
14
Union of India and Ors v. Hindustan Development Corpn. and Or, 1193 SCR (3) 128.
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 9. In Golden Ahar Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India, the court dismissed the plea of the
petitioner on the ground that since “the change in the policy of the government was in
larger public matter, the policy was reasonably reframed.”15
10. In the concerned case, earlier the policy was set up for providing scholarship through the
university but later the government changed the policy by conducting the examinations
independently. This action can be said to be done in large public interest as now the
government has direct control over the scholarship policy which will ensure transparency
in the process and free flow as now the government won’t have to indulge in long process
by disbursing funds through the universities.

II. NO MALA FIDE INTENTION

11. It is submitted that while reframing the policy of providing scholarships, the government
has no mala fide intentions nor it changed the policy due to any malice towards the
petitioner. Wisdom and advisability of policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial
review. In matters relating to policy making issues the Government has, while taking a
decision, right to "trial and error" as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within
the limits of the authority.16
12. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is
not mala fide, it will not be in Public Interest to require the Court to go into and investigate
those areas which are the function of the executive.17 In Brij Bhusan v. State of Jammu &
Kashmir the Court rejected the writ petitions holding that in the absence of material to
show that the State had acted mala fide or out of improper or corrupt motive or in order to
promote the private interest of someone at the cost of the State.18 Since the decision taken
by the State of Saurashtra was in public interest and there was no mala fide intention of the
government to give the effects of the policy retrospectively, the court cannot go in further
investigation against the government.
13. The claim based on legitimate expectation can only be sustained or questioned or
challenged in the court of law, provided that the action of the government against which

15
Golden Ahar Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 1999 Delhi 372.
16
Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats, (2008) 2 SCC 672.
17
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC.
18
Brij Bhusan v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1986) 2 SCC 354.
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 the petitioner has claimed relief is found to be unreasonable.19 Since it is being proved that
the government action of changing the policy was not unreasonable, the petitioner does not
have any legitimate claim against the State of Saurashtra as it was acting in large public
interest.

III. LIBERTY TO CHANGE THE POLICIES

14. It is humbly submitted that the State has liberty to amend its policies at any point of time.
It is open to the government to frame and reframe, change and re-change its policies. If the
policy is changed and the court does not finds it arbitrary, the claim of the party does not
make a decision of the government vulnerable20 Policy decision is in the domain of the
executive authority of the State and the court should not embark on the adequacy of public
policy and should not question the efficacy or otherwise of such policy so long it falls
within the constitutional limitations and does not offend any provision of the statute.21
15. In Shimnit Utsch India Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure
Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors.22, the court ruled that “government policy can be
changed with changing circumstances and only on the ground of change, such policy will
not be vitiated. The government has discretion to adopt a different policy or alter or change
its policy calculated to serve public interest and make it more effective.”23 It is neither
within the domain of the courts nor the scope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry
as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be
evolved. Nor are the courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a Petitioner
merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been fairer or wiser or
more scientific or more logical.24
16.In Shri Situram Sugar Co. Ltd. v Union of India, the court pointed out that “what is best
for the public at large and in what manner the policy should be formulated and implemented
is a matter for decision exclusively within the province of the Government and such matters

19
Madras City Wine Merchants Asociation v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 5 SCC 509.
20
V.G.RAMCHANDRA, LAW OF WRITS , Vol 1 (3rd ed., 2006) p. 76
21
M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. State of M.P. and Ors.(1997) 7 SCC 592.
22
Shimnit Utsch India Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. and
Ors., (2010) 6 SCC 303.
23
Supra at 15.
24
Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 56.
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 do not ordinarily attract the power of judicial review. It was also held that even if some
persons are at a disadvantage and have suffered losses on account of the formulation and
implementation of the government policy, that is not by itself sufficient ground for
interference with the governmental action.”25 Mere hardship without anything arbitrary in
the rule does not call for judicial intervention, especially when it flows out of a policy
which is not basically illegal.26 Though the petitioner claims that they have suffered any
hardship due to the new policy of the State of Saurashtra, it cannot be considered legitimate
because the policy was the policy of the government was legal and valid.
17. It is the administrator’s right to trial and error and so long as it is bona fide and within
limits of the authority, the administrator is at liberty to make such decisions.27 The duty of
the court is to confine itself with question of legality. Its concern should be whether a
decision making authority has abused its power or exceeded its power.28 If no such points
are present, the state has full freedom and liberty to make any decisions regarding
reframing or changing of policy.
Here, since the State of Saurashtra was exercising its powers under its limitation and no
such abuse of power was committed, it was at liberty to change the scholarship policy.

IV. COURT CANNOT INTERFERE IN POLICY MAKING POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT

18.It is humbly submitted that the court’s interference is not called for in matters regarding
policy making of the government. In the case of The Secretary, Department of Atomic
Energy and Ors. v. M.K. Bawane, the court held that, “Normally, Courts should not
interfere with just policies framed by Government.”29
19. As a general rule, it is accepted that courts have no power to interfere in the actions taken
by administrative authority in exercise of their discretionary power.30 In M. P. Ration
Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P, the court stated that “the frame of a scheme is a
matter of Government policy in which Court's interference could not be called for.” 31 The

25
Shri Situram Sugar Co. Ltd. v Union of India, (1990) 1 SCR 909.
26
Devi Prasad and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1980 SC 1185.
27
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651.
28
Bhikhubhai v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 4 SCC 144.
29
The Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy and Ors. v. M.K. Bawane, AIR 2013 SC 148.
30
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madaras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
31
M. P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v State of M. P., (1982) 1 SCR 750.
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 court thus, cannot interfere in discretion making power of the State of Saurashtra which
very well includes framing of policy.
20.In Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan and Anr, the court stated that
“the court's interference would be called for only if it is shown that any condition was
purely subjective or designed to exclude any individual or group of private operators/travel
agents, i.e., bordering on malice.”32 Since it has been proved in the previous sub-issue that
State of Saurashtra did not acted under any malice or mala fide intention, the court thus
cannot interfere in this matter of the government.
21. In K. Nagaraj and Ors. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr, the court ruled that “the
court’s interference will only be called for if there is any matter regarding unreasonable
and irrational decision taken by the government, otherwise courts have no power to
interfere in the discretionary powers of the government.” Thus, court cannot interfere in
the discretionary power of framing policies of the state of Saurashtra.
It is humbly submitted by the counsel of the respondents that there was no violation of the
fundamental rights of the petitioners as the framing of the policy was reasonable and in
public interest and thus court cannot interfere in the said matter.

3.) WRIT JURISDICTION CANNOT LIE AGAINST THE TRUST

It is humbly submitted that since the Deen Dayal Charitable Trust is a private party, it cannot be
proceeded against writ jurisdiction.

I. NON PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC FUNCTION

22. Since Deen Dayal Charitable Trust does not perform any public function, it cannot be
proceeded against writ jurisdiction.Reference in this connection may be made to the
decisions of Court in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani in which this Court
ruled that “it is only in the circumstances when the authority or the person or private body
performs a public function or discharges a public duty that Article 226 of the Constitution

32
Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan and Anr, AIR 1998 SC 295.
7
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 can be invoked.”33 To bring a party under the jurisdiction of Art. 226 of the Constitution
of India, it has to be proved that the said party should be performing any public duty or
public function.34 The Deen Dyal Charitable trust does not perform any public duty or
public function.
23. The main point of contention is that whether the trust was performing any public function
or duty. To make a conclusion on this, it is important to understand what is a public
function. “Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can
reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable
by the State in its sovereign capacity.”35 In a matter of private bodies, if
no public duty element is involved the, writ will not lie.36
24. The court in Air Vice Marshal J.S. Kumar v. Governing Council Of Air Force held that
“A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may
become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory
obligations.”37 There is nowhere stated that the trust was compelled to perform any public
duty by the State of Saurashtra nor any statutory obligation was imposed on it. In State of
Gujarat v. M.P. Shah trusts,” the Court held that the trust was obligated under a certain
statute to perform certain public functions, failure to do so would give rise to a complaint
under Article 226 against a private body. The Court held that when an authority has to
perform a public function or a public duty if there is a failure a writ petition Under
Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable.”38 In the concerned case, the Deen Dayal
Charitable Trust was not obligated under any statute to perform a public function or public
duty. Thus, writ jurisdiction could not be invoked against it.
25. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution could not be
invoked against any authority unless it is made clear that it was involved in any kind of
public duty.39 In Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual, the court stated that “a writ

33
Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607.
34
K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering, AIR 1998 SC 295.
35
G. Bassi Reddy v. International Croporation Research Institute and Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 225.
36
Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh and Ors., 1989 (1) SCR 743.
37
Air Vice Marshal J.S. Kumar v. Governing Council Of Air Forc, (2006) 1 DLT 330.
38
State of Gujarat v. M.P. Shah Trusts, 1994 (3) SCC 552.
39
V.T. Industries Ltd. v. Workers' Union, 2001 (1) SCC 298.
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 under Article 226 can lie against a "person" or “party” if it is a statutory body or performs
a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty.”40 Since it is clear that neither
the trust was a statutory body nor it was performing any public function or duty, it cannot
be proceeded against writ jurisdiction.
26. The court in Binny Ltd. and Anr. v. V. Sadasivan and Ors. held that “It is the nature of duty
performed by such person/body which is the determinative factor as the Court is to enforce
the said duty and the identity of authority against whom the right is sought is not relevant.
Such duty, the Court clarified, can either be statutory or even otherwise, but, there has to
be public functionary element in the action of that body.”41 Since public function or duties
are those similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign
capacity, the trust was not performing any such function and thus is not amenable to writ
jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.

II. NOT SUBSTANTIALLY FUNDED BY STATE GOVERNMENT

27. A private body can only be proceeded against in writ jurisdiction only if it is either
performing a public function or it is being substantially funded by the government. The
same reasons have been also stated in the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree
College, Shamli and Ors. v. Lakshini Narain and Ors. where the court held that “a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against
a private body running substantially on State funding; or
a private body discharging public duty.”42 In another judgement, the Supreme Court stated
that “private bodies which are substantially running or are substantially funded by the state
government are amenable to writ jurisdiction.”43
28. In K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, the Court held
that “ICID is a private party with no state funding. Also though it was working for the
development and advancement of certain aspects, the same are voluntarily undertaken and
there is no obligation to discharge certain activities which are statutory or of public

40
Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual AIR 1969 SC 1306.
41
Binny Ltd. and Anr. v. V. Sadasivan and Ors, (2005) 6 SCC 657.
42
Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Ors. v. Lakshini Narain and Ors, (1976)IILLJ163SC.
43
Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas and Ors. (2003) 10 SCC 733.
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 character. Thus a writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked against it.”44 This makes it clear that
the private parties which are not substantially funded by the state and having no obligation
to perform any function which is of public or statutory in nature cannot be proceeded
against in writ petitions. Keeping in mind the same facts and circumstances in the
concerned case, the trust cannot be proceeded against in any writ petition.
29. Here, neither the trust is running substantially on funding received from the state nor it is
discharging public duty or is obligated to perform any statutory or public functions, writ
petition cannot stand against the trust.

4.) WHETHER THE LOKPAL AND THE LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2013 HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE TRUST ?

The Lokpal and Lokayukta act, 2013 has power over the Trust for issuing notice and seeking
information from the trust and also has the power of investigation under Section 20 of the act.

I. LOKAYUKTA HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE LOKPAL AND THE LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2103

30. It is humbly submitted before the honorable Supreme court that the Lokayukta has
jurisdiction to issue notice and seek information from the trust because under Section 6345
“every state shall establish a body to be known as the Lokayukta for the state, if not so
established, constituted or appointed, by a law made by the state legislature, to deal with
complaints relating to corruption against certain public functionaries, within a period of
one year from the date of commencement”46
31. This act makes it compulsory for all the states which does not have an already established
Lokayukta is to establish one which makes provisions for the establishment and
functioning of the Institution of Lokayukta to inquire into the allegations against public
functionaries.
32. The historical setting behind drafting the Lokpal and the Lokayukta act is briefly discussed

44
K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, (2015) 4 SCC 670.
45
LOKPAL AND LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2013, § 63.
46
LOKPAL AND LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2013, § 63.
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 in the case of Mr. Justice Chandrashekaraiah v. Janekere C. Krishna and Ors.47which laid
down that
“So far as the Lokayukta is concerned, we envisage that he would be concerned with
problems similar to those which would face the Lokpal in respect of Ministers and
Secretaries though, in respect of action taken at subordinate levels of official hierarchy, he
would in many cases have to refer complainants to competent higher levels. We, therefore,
consider that his powers, functions and procedures may be prescribed mutatis mutandis
with those which we have laid down for the Lokpal. His status, position, emoluments, etc.
should, however, be analogous to those of a Chief Justice of a High Court and he should
be entitled to have free access to the Secretary to the Government concerned or to the Head
of the Department with whom he will mostly have to deal to secure justice for a deserving
citizen. Where he is dissatisfied with the action taken by the department concerned, he
should be in a position to seek a quick corrective action from the Minister or the Secretary
concerned, failing which he should be able to draw the personal attention of the Prime
Minister or the Chief Minster as the case may be. It does not seem necessary for us to spell
out here in more detail the functions and powers of the Lokayukta and the procedures to
be followed by him.”
The above case makes it clear that the intention behind having the law of Lokayukta are to
be analogous to the Lokpal and Lokayukta act and hence the powers of the Lokyukta are
similar in nature as to the powers of the Lokpal.
33. Therefore under Lokpal and Lokayukta Act the Lokayukta has power to issue notice to the
trust for seeking details of the assets of the trustees and the family members. The
respondent will further like to bring to your notice that the board of trustees of the trust
were retired bureaucrats or relatives of serving bureaucrats48 the honorable court that
applying the above principal
Hence, under Section 14(1)(f)49 proviso which says that “such officers whi have served in
connection with the affairs of the union but are working in connection with the affairs of
the state or in any body or board or corporation or authority or company or society or trust

47
Mr. Justice Chandrashekaraiah v. Janekere C. Krishna and Ors, AIR 2013 SC 726.
48
Moot Propositin,
49
LOKPAL AND LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2013, § 14.
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 or autonomous body established by the act of the satte legislature or wholly or partly
financed by the state government, the Lokpal will have jurisdiction under this act, only
after obtaining the consent of the state government.
Here, the inclusion of the Lokayukta to issue notice and seek information implies that the
state government has given its consent.
34. In the writ petition number 927/2016 the honorable high court upheld the powers of the
Lokayukta to issue notice/ call for information and direct investigation.50

II. POWER TO INVESTIGATE U/N LOKAPAL AND LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2013

35. It is further brought to the notice of the honorable Supreme court that under section 20(1)51
of the Lokpal and the Lokayukta act, 2013 ‘the Lokpal on recipt of the complaint can order
investigation by any agency when there exits a prima facie case.
36. Now a question arise as to what is a prima facie case a better and clearer statement of law
would be that if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence,
a court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exists, and so, frame a charge
against him for committing that offence.52
In this case there also there is a ground of presuming that there exits a prima facie case of
corruption as the complaint filed by Ms. Arora.
37. The meaning of the word 'presume'. In Black's Law Dictionary53 means "to believe or
accept upon probable evidence. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary54 it has been
mentioned that in law 'presume' means "to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is
forthcoming", Stroud's Legal Dictionary has quoted in this context a certain judgment
according to which "A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts (either
certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged.
38. Ms. Arora was granted a scholarship for the academic year 2015-2016 in June 2015 and
her tution fees was waived accordingly, but her stipend amount was not given to her despite
requests and inquries.55 The counsel for petitioner number 2 would like to contend that the

50
Moot Proposition, ¶ 11.
51
LOKPAL AND LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2013, § 20.
52
Hema Mohonot v. State through chief commissioner of Income Tax Administration, AIR 2013 SC 312
53
“BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY” Henry Campbell Black (4th Edn, 1951) West Publications.
54
“SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY” (6th Edn, 2007)
55
Moot Proposition, ¶ 6.
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 policy was withdrawan in the month of December 2015. Then where is the stipend amount
of six months, which presumably raises the question of corruption, and bring into picture
the prima facie case.

5.) WETHER SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE VOILATION
OF FCRA ?

I. VOILATION OF FCRA, 2010

39. It is humbly submitted before the honorable Supreme Court that there is blatant violation
of Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 2010. It is asserted that under Section 14(1)(h)56
prohibis the trusts to foreign contribution from any foreign source under foreign
contribution act, 2010.
40. The term foreign contribution is defined under section 2(c) of FCRA which means
donation, delivery and transfer made by any foreign source which section 2(j)57 of FCRA,
2010 includes a company within the meaning of the companies act, 1956, and more than
one half of the nominal value of its share capital is held, either singly or in the aggregate,
by corporation incorporated in a foreign country and foreign territory.58
41. It would be relevant to note that the term 'Foreign Source' is not exhaustively defined under
the Act and it assumes significance that the legislature has chosen to employ the word-
'includes', which signifies that the entries contained in the said provision are only
illustrative of what could constitute a 'Foreign Source'.
42. The reason for providing an ' inclusive definition' seems to be that the legislature, at the
time of enacting the Act, was not in a position to exhaustively foresee the myriad means
through which foreign contributions could be channelized into India. The debates have also
recognized that such operations are covert in their innate nature and the foreign powers are
known to have operated behind the cloak of 'dummy-organisations' and adopt ingenious

56
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTION REGULATION ACT, 2010 § 14.
57
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTION REGULATION ACT, 2010 § 2.
58
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTION REGULATION ACT, 2010 § 2(j).
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 means to perforate the polity of nations. With a view to address such a mischief, enacting
an 'inclusive definition' seems to provide the best remedy since it lends the necessary
flexibility to bring within its purview certain situations which do not stand expressly
covered therein, lest loopholes of law may be explored and exploited in future.
43. It would be pertinent to note that the term 'corporations' has not been defined under the
Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010. Section 2(2) of the Foreign Contribution
Regulation Act, 201059 prescribes that Words and expressions used herein and not defined
in this Act but defined in the Representation of the People Act, 1950 or the Representation
of the People Act, 1951 or the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 shall have the
meanings respectively assigned to them in those Acts.
44. The petitioner wpould further like to elaborate on the facts where Texcorp Global
Maruitius limited a company incorporated under the laws of Mauritius, which holds 83%
shares of one Texcorp India Holding private Limited, a company incorporated under
companies act, 1956 which has another subsidiary as Texcorp Industries Private Limited
which is also a company incorporated under companies act, 1956.
45. While investigation made by the special police establishment about the trust it was found
that since 2012 the trust is receiving money from Texcorp Industries private limited and as
of yet has received Rs. 25 crore.
46. Now the issue which arises here is about the interpretation of FCRA over the violation
done by the Trust. The understanding of the anatomy of a legislation would require a
cognizance to be taken of the attending circumstances in wake of which the legislation was
enacted. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Bill, 1973 was introduced in the
Parliament which finally culminated into the Act No. 49 of 1976 being passed.60
47. Therefore it can be safely gathered that amidst a spate of subversive activities sponsored
by the Foreign Powers to destabilize our nation, the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act,
1976 was enacted by the Parliament to serve as a shield in our legislative armoury, in
conjunction with other laws like the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, and insulate
the sensitive areas of national life like - journalism, judiciary and politics from extraneous

59
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTION REGULATION ACT, 2010 § 2(2).
60
Association for democratic reforms and Anr. V. Union of India and Ors, (2014)3CompLJ41(Del).
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 influences stemming from beyond our borders.61
48. However, the term - 'corporation' is not defined in either of the statutes referred above.
Even the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not assign meaning to the term 'corporation'.
Therefore, we must traverse beyond in order to ascertain the true meaning and import of
the term 'corporation', which has not been defined under the Foreign Contribution
(Regulation) Act, 1976 or the statutes prescribed therein.
49. It has been pertinently observed in the decision reported as Camden (Marquis) v. IRC62:-
“It is for the court to interpret the statute as best it can. In so doing the court may no doubt
assist itself in the discharge of its duty by any literary help which it can find, including of
course the consultation of standard authors and references to well known and authoritative
dictionaries.”
50. The Supreme Court has held in the decision reported as State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper
Mills Co. Ltd.63 that the court may take the aid of dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of
a word in common parlance, where the word has not been statutorily defined or judicially
interpreted.
51. Black's Law Dictionary64defines the word-'corporation' in the following terms:-
corporation, an entity (usually a business) having authority under law to act as a single
person distinct from the shareholders who own it and having rights to issue stock and exist
indefinitely; a group or succession of persons established in accordance with legal rules
into a legal or juristic person that has a legal personality distinct from the natural persons
who make it up, exists indefinitely apart from them, and has the legal powers that its
Constitution gives it. Also termed corporation aggregate; aggregate corporation; body
corporate; corporate body.
52. A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law. It possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it."
65

61
Id.
62
Camden (Marquis) v. IRC, (1914) 1 KB 641.
63
State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd, 1985 Supp SCC 280.
64 th
9 edition
65
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheal) 518, 636 (1819).

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 53. The term 'Corporation' has also been defined in the Concise Law Dictionary by P.
Ramanatha Aiyar, Third Edition, in somewhat similar terms “Artificial persons established
for prescribing in perpetual succession certain rights, which, if conferred on certain natural
persons, would fail in process of time. A corporation is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible and existing only in contemplation of law. Being, the mere creature of law it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly or as incidental to its very existence. They enable a corporation to manage its
own affairs, and to hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and
endless necessity, or perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to
hand.”
It is a body corporate legally authorized to act as a single person66
Section 2(7) of the Companies Act, 1956 defines 'corporation', as under:-
Definitions.--In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires
"body corporate" or "corporation" includes a company incorporated outside India but does
not include—
(a) a corporation sole;
(b) a co-operative society registered under any law relating to co-operative societies; and
(c) any other body corporate not being a company as defined in this Act which the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf;
Thus, it is unequivocal that the term 'corporation' ordinarily includes within its meaning
entities like a company; amongst others.
54. As also held in the case of Association for democratic reforms and Anr. V. Union of India
and Ors.67where in the judgemnet it was held that the legislature in its wisdom has defined
the term 'Foreign Source' in a wide and an expansive manner with a view to suppress the
mischief. The Court cannot impose artifices and thereby restrict the natural/ordinary
meaning of the words contained in the definition, lest it would frustrate the legislative intent
and render the provision redundant. We see no reason why an entity such as a company
would not fall within the ambit of the term 'corporation' employed in the Foreign

66
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950, Art 19(6)(ii).
67
Association for democratic reforms and Anr. V. Union of India and Ors, (2014)3CompLJ41(Del).
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 Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976.
55. Analysis of the meaning that has been ascribed to 'corporations' in various law lexicons
and other legislations operating in our country, establishes beyond a pale of doubt that a
'corporation' incorporated in a foreign country or territory for the purpose of Section
2(e)(vi)(c) includes within its fold, companies incorporated outside the territory of India,
such as Texcorp Global; which is incorporated in Mauritius.
56. It is not disputed by the petitioners that more than one-half of the nominal value of the
share-capital of Texcorp India Holdings Private Limited is held by Texglobal Mauritius
Limited. It has already been held by us in the preceding paragraph that Texcorp is a
corporation incorporated in a foreign country or territory within the meaning of Section
2(e)(vi)(c) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010. Therefore, this leads to the
irresistible conclusion that the present case is also squarely covered under Section
2(e)(vi)(c) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010
57. Now let us focus on the objective behind the legislation of Foreign Contribution Regulation
Act “An Act to consolidate the law to regulate the acceptance and utilisation of foreign
contribution or foreign hospitality by certain individuals or associations or companies and
to prohibit acceptance and utilisation of foreign contribution or foreign

II. POWER OF SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT UNDER FCRA

58. It is humbly submitted before the honorable Supreme court that the Special Police
Establishment Act has power and Jurisdiction over the violation of FCRA because under
section 568 of special police establishment act the central government may by prder extend
to any area a state, not being a union territory the powers and jurisdiction of members of
the Delhi police establishment for investigation of any offences or classes of offences
specified in a notification under section 3.
59. It is further contended that the special police establishment was given directions under
Lokpal and Lokayukta Act for the investigation on the violation of FCRA. Under Section

68
DELHI SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT ACT, 1946, §5.
17
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 2069 of the Lokpal and Lokayukta Act inquiry and investigation can be done by special
police establishment act.
60. The learned counsel would further like to submit that when investigation was commenced
on Mr. A.K Pandey an officer of Indian Administartive service (Saurashtra cadre) he was
an officer of centeral government. After investigation it was conclusively proved that Mr.
A.K. Pandey did the violation of FCRA because of which there was a charge sheet filled
against them. Thus, special police establishment had power to investigate into the matter
in terms of Section 5 of Delhi Police Establishment Act.
61. Another change made by the Act of 1952 was that the functions of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment were not restricted to offences committed in connection with Departments
of the Central Government. No constitutional significance can be attached to this change.
It was open to Parliament to enlarge the original jurisdiction and powers of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment in the Part C States. Our conclusion, Therefore, is that the
Act of 1952 did not make any change in the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946,
which could be said to conflict with Entry 80 of the Union List of the 7th Schedule of the
Constitution or with any other provision of the Constitution.70
62. Coming to the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, sight cannot be lost of the
settled legal position that investigation into cognizable offences is a statutory duty of the
State and when a crime is alleged to ' have been committed, investigation becomes
imperative to find out the actual facts, therefore, it would not be permissible to prevent an
investigating agency from discharging its statutory obligation, that too casually71.

69
LOKPAL AND LOKAYUKTA ACT, 2013, § 20.
70
Managemnet of the Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Gurudasmal, Supdt. Of Police and Ors., AIR 1968 SC 456
71
Director Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. and Ors AIR 2009 SC 461.
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 19
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 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, it is prayed, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities
cited, that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to:

1. To hold and declare that the State of Saurashtra did not violate any fundamental right.
2. To hold and declare that the Deen Dayal Charitable Trust does not falls under the
jurisdiction of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. To hold and declare that the Lokayukta does has jurisdiction over the Deen Dayal
Charitable Trust under Lokpal and Lokayukta Act 2013.
4. To hold and declare that the Special Police Establishment has jurisdiction over the
violations of Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 2010.

And pass any other order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of Justice,
Fairness, Equity and Good Conscience. For this act of kindness, the Respondents shall duty bound
forever pray.

The Respondents.

Sd/-

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