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1 s2.0 0147176786900350 Main PDF
1 s2.0 0147176786900350 Main PDF
1 s2.0 0147176786900350 Main PDF
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Printed in the USA. All rights reserved. Copyright 0 1986 Pergamon Journals Ltd.
CARL B. BECKER
University of Hawaii
ABSTRACT This essay examines Chinese and Japanese attitudes towards speech
communication, particularly in public settings. Social. linguistic, and philosophical
perspectives are used to explain the absence of dialogue and debate. Section one
argues that geodemographic factors influenced East Asia to exalt human-centered
hierarchies over propositional truth in their thought systems. Section two looks at the
hieroglyphic character andgrammaticalpresuppositions of Chinese and Japanese, to
explain a mind-set more oriented towards imagery and sympathetic understanding
than to definition and distinction. Section three traces the views of the leading East
Asian philosophies towards oral communication- Confucianism, Taoism, Zen
Buddhism, and the Ming-chia (School of names), respectively-finding yet other
grounds for East Asian rejection of argumentation. This essay does not intend to
imply the superiority of Western logic or thought patterns to East Asian ones.
Rather, it is intended to alert a Western audience as to the culture-boundedness of
Western appreciation of discussion and debate, as well as to the deep-seated Sino-
Japanese prejudices against these communication styles.
China and Japan have been much in the spotlight recently, for their
political and economic dominance in Asia. Japan is already counted among
the world’s industrial leaders, and China is also undergoing rapid moderniza-
tion. Both countries have adopted the forms of Western governments, media,
and communications systems. Yet communications on a person-to-person
level operate under very different premises than in the West. Western Asia-
watchers expect that Asian languages are very different from Western
languages, and then try to compensate by careful translation and interpreta-
tion techniques. What they often fail to understand until too late, however, is
that both the content of the dialogue and the assumptions about what
represents acceptable and proper communications are very different in the
Orient than in the West.
Carl B. Becker is Assistant Professor of Asian Curriculum Research and Development at the
University of Hawaii.
This paper was first presented at the International Communication Association Convention in
San Francisco, May 14, 1984. The author is grateful for criticisms and suggestions from editors
and colleagues in this research.
75
76 Carl B. Becker
1. SOCIAL HISTORY
(a) China and Japan have been densely populated, labor-intensive rice-
growing cultures since ancient times. Their survival depended upon the
peaceful cooperation of people in each community for the irrigation and
planting of rice. The people were unable or unwilling to change their
vocations and residential areas, for both geographic and political reasons, so
there was little change in their life-patterns from year to year. The cycles of
planting and harvest continued inexorably, and there was little room for
radical experimentation with new methods of agriculture, for if a new
method failed, some of the populace would likely starve. When travel and
change were thus minimized, experience could be accumulated only through
the repetitions of years, and the one who had the most experience was
naturally the village elder. When a flood or plague threatened the com-
munity, the elder was the one consulted about what worked best against such
problems when they last occurred some decades previously.
Through such historical evolution, China and Japan developed hier-
archical societies in which the very notion of two people being absolutely
equal became almost inconceivable. Age became equated with authority, and
even twins addressed each other as “older brother” and “younger brother,”
depending on who emerged a few minutes earlier. Age and rank became the
unquestioned basis for distinction of inferior and superior. Once the superior
person had been identified by age and rank, his word was taken as law,
without further logical examination.
Superiority in society and status in the governing class was the important thing. A
one-sided obedience of the lower class to members of the upper class was empha-
sized.. . This line of thought was easily accepted by the Chinese, because from
ancient times, Chinese society was based upon an order constructed upon the
discrimination of classes. (Nakamura, 1964, pp. 264-265.)
Reasons 77
Such societies left little room for the development of ideals like “liberty,
equality, or individuality.” (Nakamura, 1964, pp. 205207.) Authority and
obligation proceeded not from reason, but from the superior status of the
elderly and the superior power of the landed class.
This perception of the world as a vertical hierarchy rather than as a
community of equals is nowhere better reflected than in the Chinese
translations of Indian Buddhist texts. Chinese scribes literally rewrote many
Sanskrit sums (scriptures), changing phrases such as “he opened his eyes
without looking to his master for help” into Chinese phrases reading, “he
listened to his master’s teaching and accepted it as true.” (Nakamura, 1964,
pp. 208-212). Indian treatises in which students questioned or out-reasoned
their masters were rewritten, since such a phenomenon was incomprehen-
sible to the Chinese. Geneologies were faked, and convoluted histories were
composed to support some doctrines, not on the grounds that they made
logical sense, but so that they could be traced back to some historical master.
In extreme cases, whole scriptures were forged:
True words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not true. A good man does not
argue; he who argues is not a good man . . . . The Way of the Sage is to act but not to
compete. (84)
This rationale of ancient China is still evident in the modern oriental attitude
towards apologies and explanations. Even today, it is far preferable to lie or
equivocate than to directly refuse a request (Ueda, 1972). The Japanese
prefer indirect reference and suggestive intuition to strict oral explanations,
and dislike hearing explanations and excuses given by others (Horikawa,
1970). The important thing is not the reason why one is late, but the fact that
one is very sorry for all the worry and inconvenience he caused the waiting
80 Carl B. Becker
FEATURES OF LANGUAGE
This excerpt is translated in this literal way, not to mock, but to demonstrate
the cryptic and ambiguous style inherent in Chinese. Even the Chinese
philosophers were acutely aware of the shortcomings of their own language
to reflect anything like the richness of human experience (as we shall
examine in greater detail in Section 3).
To this day, the Chinese language remains an efficient but higly am-
biguous medium, which makes few distinctions necessary for in-depth
Reasons 81
is not based upon the law of identity, but takes as its starting point a relative
orientation or rather the relation of opposites. This type of thought evidently
constitutes a different system. [Different from what? How? A system of what? Typical
of Chinese English, Chang does not say.] This system is probably related to the
nature of Chinese characters. (Chang. 1939.)
In the history of Buddhist logic in China, we can observe several striking phenomena.
First, very few logical works were ever translated.. Interest in Buddhist logic was
very slight among the Chinese. Secondly, only logical works of the simplest.kind were
translated. . . . Indian works on epistemology of logical theory were not translated..
Indian logic was accepted only in part, and even the part that was accepted was not
understood in the sense of the Indian originals, Hsuan-tsang, who introduced Indian
logic, seems not to have fully understood it.. . In developing his arguments, he
violated the rules of Indian logic.. . .
Ts’u-en’s work, which was regarded as the highest authority in China and Japan,
contains many fallacies in philosophical and logical analysis. He apparently did not
understand the Indian rule that the middle term should be distributed by the major
term. . . He confused ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi.. . in doing this, he simply
made a mechanical classification, and his explanation is self-contradictory as well as
at odds with the original meaning. (Nakamura, 1964, p. 192.)
The account could go on and on, but the point should be clear by now.
Even the highest authorities on logic in China literally did not know what
they were talking about, and frequently contradicted themselves without
being bothered by it! However, this failure is less to be blamed on the
stupidity and mechanical translation methods of the scholars than on the
intractable opacity and ambiguity of the Chinese language itself. In
Chinese, the fine distinctions and mathematical rules of Sanskrit simply
were untranslatable, did not apply, and seemed to make no difference.
From all these features of Chinese and Japanese language: Their tele-
graphic terseness and consequent ambiguities; their many homonyms; their
inabilities to make fine distinctions and abstractions; the use of language in
noncommunicative ways and of intuition for communication; and in their
lack of logical rules and constraints; we gain further insights as to why
public discussion and debate were considered inconclusive if not futile.
Unlike Indian and Western traditions, the Chinese had no internal
standards for determining when one set of arguments were better than
another, so even if debates had occurred, they could neither be governed
nor judged by a consistent logic. Thus, these whole languages and cultures
tend to frustrate the Western assumptions that reasonable men in free
communication can arrive at truer conclusions, either about the natural
world or the desirability of a given policy, than can a single man without
discussion.
Reasons 85
We have already alluded to reasons for oriental respect for age and hence
antiquity. Few cultures have so valued the study of classical philosophical
and religious texts as have China, Korea, and Japan. In fact, for centuries,
examinations on the classical texts constituted the major screening-method
and stepping-stone to political offices in China and Korea. Although there
were several antagonistic schools of thought in ancient China, which have
dominated the cultural and philosophical scene in the orient ever since, they
each held similarly negative views of speech and language. Let us turn our
attention respectively to Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, and finally
to an opposition school which favored logic and language, to examine their
ideas on speech communication.
(a) Confucius is often known as the father of Chinese philosophy and
culture, although he in turn relied heavily upon odes and classics composed
centuries before the 6th century B.C. in which he lived. From Confucius’
reliance on ancient sources to vindicate his own teachings, we may again
observe the recurring theme that it is preferable to copy old solutions to
problems rather than inventing and discussing new ones. Confucius’empha-
sis is continually on being humble and respectful, rather than bold, assertive,
or innovative. He sets up a trilemma which virtually precludes the use of
persuasive speech:
The superior man is diligent in duty but slow to speak (1, 14).
The superior man is slow to speak but quick to act (IV, 24).
In antiquity [the ideal time], men were loath to speak (IV, 22).
86 Carl 8. Becker
We need not belabor the point. The phrase “slow to speak” can also be
translated, “slow of speech, halting, hesitant, reticent, taciturn.” The danger
which Confucius feared was that speech would outstrip one’s knowledge or
abilities.
Central to Confucius’ philosophy was the principle of hsin ( d-i”, )-that
one’s words should always be in accordance with that which one does, lives,
and practices. It is not that the Confucian cannot speak at all, but that he
must always speak with discretion only of that which he is prepared to act
upon or commit himself to (cf. Lau, “Introduction,~ Analects, 1979, p. 25).
Naturally, this principle put a damper on bold or persuasive speech.
The superior man acts before speaking and speaks according to his action (II, 13).
Immodest statements are hard to live up to. . . . A superior man is ashamed of his
words outstripping his deeds (XIV, 20.27).
In Confucius’ idea of hsin, we can again discern the Chinese idea of the
identity of the man and the ideas he voices. Words are not to be treated as
sounds, ideas, or propositions which exist independently of their utterers, to
be judged by criticai linguistic analysis. They are inextricably interrelated to
the person who utters them. Their truth depends on his character, and his
truth depends on the character of his words. Thus, it becomes impossible to
scrutinize or criticize an idea without casting aspersions on the character of
the person who voices it. Since one of our primary duties is to be respectful
to men (Am/em I, 13), then we should sooner allow their mistakes to pass
uncriticized than exhibit a lack of proper respect for their words and hence
their selves (Am/em, XIV, 29). Confucius taught that ordinary men were to
learn from the life and deeds of the superior man, and not from his logic or
language.
In overview, then, Confucius opposed eloquent and clever speech, advo-
cating hesitancy over brilliance, and he grounded this criticism of speech
deeply within his philosophy of the ideal man. This Confucian attitude still
persists widely in East Asia.
(b) The ancient Taoist school of Chinese philosophy is best represented by
the Tao-te Ching of Lao-tzu and by Chuang-tzu. In contrast to the
Confucian concerns with public behavior, etiquette, and politics, the Taoists
were more interested in man’s finding peace within himself and within
nature. The Taoists tended to be hermits and recluses whom, even sym-
pathetically, we should have to call quietistic. It is hardly surprising that we
find further opposition to speech and rhetoric within the Taoist philosophy.
The classic text of the Tao-te Ching advocates silence from the beginning:
The greatest skill seems clumsy and the greatest eloquence stutters (45).
He who knows does not talk; he who talks does not know.
Keep your mouth shut (56).
Such radical statements are not designed merely to shock the hearer nor to
take issue with all authority. Like Confucius’ opposition to speech, the
Taoists’ is also grounded in their philosophy, although their reasons are
different from Confucius’. The Taoists were acutely aware of the artificiality
of names and labels, the inability of their hieroglyphic language to capture
the fullness of experience, and the inappropriateness of most linguistic
distinctions to the real world. Thus we are told:
The Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao (1).
As soon as there are names, know that it is time to stop (32).
The sage, however, remains at peace, because he does not distinguish good
and bad, desirable and undesirable, proper and improper:
Common folk make distinctions and are clear cut. 1 [the sage] alone make no
distinctions (20).
Thus, within Taoism, language and precision are thought to be the root of
contention and dissatisfaction, therefore a barrier to contentment and
sagehood.
Chuang-tzu takes the arguments of the Tao-te Ching a step further into a
total perspectival relativism, in which nothing can be judged true or false,
and no one can really know the mind of another person. Chuang-tzu
specifically alludes to debate, averring that it is always inconclusive,
inconsequential, unarbitrable, and opposed to the proper harmony of things
(Chuang-tzu, in Chan, 1963, pp. 189-190). He denies that we can even truly
know whether we ourselves are awake or dreaming, much less know such
things of others (Chan, 1963, p. 200).
In a classic dialogue with his friend Hui, as they walked along a dam
looking at the fish in the river, Chuang-tzu said, “The white fish swimming
easily in the river are so happy!” Answering with Chuang’s own relativistic
logic that no one can know another’s mind, Hui responded: “You are not a
fish. How do you know its happiness ?” To this, Chuang retorted again, “You
are not I. How do you know that I do not know?” (Chan, 1963, p. 210).
Indeed this is the logical conclusion of the argument from relativism, which
shows us the dilemma of any thoroughgoing relativism including the
Taoists’. On the one hand, no one can ever challenge any one else’s
assertions, because no one can know another’s mind and its insights. On the
other hand, since there are no criteria for meaning, no standards of
intersubjectivity, and no objective grounds for criticism, all assertions
ultimately become subjective, vacuous, nonreferential. Chuang-tzu says:
88 Carl 3. Becker
Even though your eloquence be like a rushing torrent, it is nothing but hell-producing
karma [activity]. . . . Students become attached to words and phrases.. . and cannot
gain enlightenment. (deBary, 1972. p. 227.)
Rinzai Zen inveighs against studying the words of the past classics; it calls
words “dreams and illusions,” and it specifically criticizes those who spend
their days “in idle talk” about rights and wrongs, landowners and thieves,
laws and politics (deBary, 1972, p. 230).
In Zen, truth is thought to be intuited only in silent meditation and
incommunicable through language. This is one reason that Zen masters
frequently beat their logically-minded disciples, or give them insoluble
language-tangles called kQa~s to contemplate until they realize the futility of
discursive reason. To their students’ logical inquiries, some masters respond
with cries, some with blows. Some lift tea trays or put their sandals on their
heads. Many simply remain silent to the most serious and important of
questions, or walk out of the room (Suzuki, 1961, pp. 294-296). Hundreds of
such examples have been compiled into the classic literature of Zen, which
itself disavows classic literature and scripture. Zen in turn became the model
for bushido, the martial code of the Japanese Samurai, which was drummed
into the heads and hearts of the educated classes for centuries in Japan.
While Westerners may be fascinated or bemused by Zen anecdotes of cries
Reasons 89
and cat-cutting, we must not forget that such tales also represent the deep-
seated religious rejection of logic and denial of rational communication in
China and Japan.
(d) It is not true that there never existed logicians and debaters in China.
The Ming-chia (literally, “School of Names”) philosophers were a class of
lawyers analogous in role and history to the Sophists of Greece. They early
became known for their debates about whether white horses were horses and
whether criminals were men. In fact, these were very logical arguments
designed to demonstrate (1) that there are distinctions within classes of
objects, as among horses and among men; (2) that a man sets himself apart
from other men by committing criminal deeds; (3) that in so doing, he
sacrifices his human right to life and liberty, and therefore (4) capital
punishment is justifiable, for taking the life of a criminal is not the same as
taking the life of an ordinary man. To the average man, however, the state
had the power to kill or free criminals without needing such justifications,
and the debates of the Ming-chia seemed purest sophistry. As Chuang-tzu
criticized: “They can subdue others’ mouths but cannot win their hearts”
(Chan, 1953, p. 233).
Even in their own day, the Ming-chia were loathed by other scholars.
Historian Ssu-ma T’an wrote (around 110 B.C.):
Some Ming-chia lawyers were indeed highly successful in getting their own
suspects sentenced or acquitted, and were at the same time accused of
turning wrong into right. The typical reaction of both people and govern-
ment was summarized by philosopher Han Fei-tzu: “When discussion of
hardness and whiteness appear [the standard examples of Ming-chia logic],
then the governmental laws lose their effect”(Fung, 1948, p. 82). Popular as
well as official opinion militated against the Ming-chia; their school was
consequently short-lived, and their name remained more as an epithet for
vacuous language-manipulation than as a respectable title of a school of
logicians. Thus, the history of Chinese and Japanese thought is dominated
by three major philosophico-religious schools: Confucian, Taoist, and
Buddhist; and all of them opposed debate, public speech, and even
communication. The single small school famous for debate and logical
argumentation soon defeated its own purposes; by being too good at
argument, it lost the trust of the people and government forever.
4. CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
ABSTRACT TRANSLATIONS