PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.

, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as
Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for
short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and
POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies
of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and
deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA,
to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE
Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over
the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to
Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1
July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take
over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued
for said purpose.
In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are
likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to
Hong Kong on a regional basis.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing
GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong
Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong Kong.
Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary government
processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the temporary suspension of
recruitment by private employment agencies for said skill and host market, the following guidelines and mechanisms
shall govern the implementation of said policy.
I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)
An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take
charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment:
The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities concerned:
1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies
2. Manpower Pooling
3. Worker Training and Briefing
4. Processing and Deployment
5. Welfare Programs
II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or
Principals
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU
in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong.
xxx xxx xxx
X. Interim Arrangement
All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under
the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the HWPU.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong kong a list of their
accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which shall
then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of their respective pools the
only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of
employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong
Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and deployment of
domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment contracts which have been attested by the Hong
Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts
Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.
Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the
new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine
Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed to have
themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in
Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed.
 Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall
submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed processing outside of the
HWPU manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.)
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars
and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:
1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing
said circulars;
2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and
oppressive; and
3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not
complied with.
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment
and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives
and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982
to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas
employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and
duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector
participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor
Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:
3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a
government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . . (Art.
17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in
the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment
for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive.
It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More
and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field
assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature
or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino
landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall
within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs.
Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power
(City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to
"regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the
public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of
petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong
Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers
going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong,
petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other countries and all other classes
of Filipino workers for other countries.
Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive
collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment
agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They are reasonable, valid and justified under the
general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today,
is affected with public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a
remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from the tenor of
Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment
agencies are hereby "temporarily suspended effective July 1, 1991."
The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from
the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private
employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole
recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book
VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte,
unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their
adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three
(3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied,
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book,
each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is
fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of
which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to
make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987).
Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws. (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with
the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.
SO ORDERED.

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME DIGEST

DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.

By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA).
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position
of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer
and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired
portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his
money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary
benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the
respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner],
jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of
EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for
three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary period of three months
only — rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner’s employment contract – applying
the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary,
US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay =
US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was
illegally dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the
applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay,
which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. The
NLRC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. After initially
dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution
which granted the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional
issue raised by petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme
Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of
employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
law in excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract
they form part of his salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:

 Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

 Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal
 Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award

The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not
disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00
covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and
the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and
23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,
violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them
due process.
The Arguments of Respondents
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his
appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired
petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed
part of the minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the
parties.
The Court’s Ruling:
First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on
Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full
protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all
monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in
equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the present case also employs the
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that
the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause
violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in
terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of
illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an
unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their
salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such
prejudice, simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place.
This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause
violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months
and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award,
because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No.
33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage,
exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and
holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given
during the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the
December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is
AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days
computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres Case Digest

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the
Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the
POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the
POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul
the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.

ISSUES:
 1. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in
issuing said circulars;
2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and
oppressive; and
3. whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were
not complied with.
HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article
36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities
of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue
orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the
growing complexities of the modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in
the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise
provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the
basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become
effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases
of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule.
The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book
VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

Prohibition granted.