196 THIRD QUODLiBET Question 8 197 ——eeten we ‘rock and a donkey. And yet itis not the case that a rockis known or that a donkey is known rather, what is knowa is that a rock is nota donkey. Question 8 Js ita complex [sign] or a noncomplex [sign] ‘that an act of assenting has as an object? ‘Thatit isa complex anact of assenting. But only a complex [sig is proved from the fact vveridical. Therefore, irue. Therefore, e' a habit ofassenting and ject is what is true. 33 For the opposite: The object of faith isthe same as the object of vision. But God is the object of vision. Therefore, he isthe abject of faith as well. ae But speaking now about the second sort of act of knowing or assent claim that such an act is properly a complex act that has a complex is object. For this act is that by which som [what is known is not a thing outside the mi know a rock ora donkey. And tis this at that philosophers commonly speak For they claim thatthe effect of a demonstration is a habit with respect and, consequently, an act corresponding to the hi respect to the conclusion as an object. Philosophers also claim that ‘nothing is known /235/ except what is true, and they are speaking of a true ‘complex [sign]. They also claim that a demonstrative science is based on first and true {principles}. Therefore, only what is true isan object of Here I will first speak in general about the object of assent; second, 1 will speak about the object of faith. FIRST ARTICLE ticle, [aim that just as acts of knowing are of two sorts, so are of two sorts: One sort of assent isan act by which some- thing is known to be such-and-such* or known not tobe such-and-such". For ta rock is not a donkey, and yet I do not know a rock or know that @ rock is not a donkey. Likewise, I assent to its being the case that a human being is an animal, The second sort of assent isan act by which sor ‘known in such a way that the act of know- 5» Acts of thése two sorts are distinc; this is Thesis + now of the first sort of assent, first sort of act is suf intend posted becuse cepa many peter . Ber another For insance isc otal of complex copnitons. | | Speaking noncomplex cognitions ‘when a ordinary person knows is not a donkey, he is not thinking about a proposition at 2 result, he is not assenting to a pro SECOND ARTICLE As for the second article, I claim, in keeping with what has been said, that ‘acts of faith are of two sorts. One is an act by which it is Believed that some-198 THIRD QUODLIBET Question 9 199 thing exists or that something is such-and-such—e.g, an act by which it is believed that God exists, or that God is three persons, or that God is incar- nate. The second is an act by which something is believed in such a way that the act of believing bears.a relation to something, complex [sign] ‘God is hus they have distinet acts ff assent. There are many other arguments for this conclusion, Reply o Problem 2 ‘To the first of these points [re we argument goes through for assent taken in the first way, taken in the second way, As for the second point, I gra \lusion as applied to ac ith, ‘which varies with pa and future-tense propositions, but not as ap. Plied to infused. ‘To the third point I reply that the second sort of assent generally presup- Poses the first sort, though it does not necessarily presuppose Thesis x Speaking now in the first way about acts and habits of believing, I claim that bone should say that, literally speaking, nothing is believed by such an act, just as nothing is known by an act of knowing taken in this way. Rather, by he sense in which it has an objec) is God. Thesis 2 On the other hand, if one is speaking in the second way about these acts and Reply to Problem 2 ‘To the second problem I reply that these and similar arguments all go through for an act of faith taken in the first way, but not for an act of faith taken in the second way. hasasan object. reply ile as an object and another On the other hand, infused faith, which is ‘one, has all the articles as immediate ok sal habit in the way described above.” REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENTS ‘The reply to the main arguments is evident from what has been said, /238) Problem 3 But there are some problems here. First, it seems that assent does not in gen- ceral have a complex [sign] as its object—becaust to what is cognized, whereas once a propos able to assent without any other cognition ofthe proposition; and because therwise faith now and faith under the Old Law would not be of the ‘same type because their objects are of different types, since faith at that time had to do with the future and faith now has to do with the past; and be- sent with respect to a complex [sign] presupposes assent with respect to a thing when the complex [sign] is composed of the cognitions of things. /ay7/ Question 9 Is hope a virtue distinct from faith and charity? : For the opposite: In x Corinthians 13:13] the Apostle claims that itis distinct. ject — the Father and not in the complex [sige] ‘God is REPLY TO THE QUESTION 30. See Quadite! 37, Reply to Problems, S cited from