required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
Police Power
1. White Light Corp., vs City of Manila
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who
sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance
infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor
of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of
the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that
the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled
in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it
indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due
process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who
needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity
sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected
only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual
rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
1
welfare.
2. MMDA vs Trackworks
Facts: Respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising entered into a
contract for advertising with the Metro Rail Transit Corp. and
thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other
advertising media in different parts of the MRT 3 premises. Sometime
in 2001 MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle said billboards and
signages pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 wherein the MMDA
prohibits the posting, installation, and display of any kind or form of
billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk,
center-island, posts, trees, parks and open spaces. Trackworks
refused the said request and then MMDA proceeded to dismantle the
billboards and similar forms of advertisement. Trackworsk filed a civil
case before the Pasig RTC, a temporary restraining order was issued
against MMDA. The MMDA filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
but denied said petition and affirmed the order of the RTC. Petition
was then filed with the SC which denied the same and eventually this
resolution after a petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the power under its mandate
to cause the dismantling of respondents’ advertisement materials.
Held: No, the Court ruled that MMDA had no power on its own to
dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards and other advertising
materials installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. The MMDA’s
powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installing a system and administration. Nothing in Republic Act 7924
granted MMDA police power let alone legislative power. Trackworks
derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising
media in the MRT 3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement
to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain
advertising income is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement,
MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which
MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during
the time material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering
into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid
exercise of ownership. MMDA also may not invoke that it is
implementing the Buliding Code rules and regulations because the
power to enforce this lies with the DPWH and not in the MMDA. The
DPWH hass not delegated the MMDA to implement such Code. Petition
is denied.
3. Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs Court of Appeals
314 SCRA 315 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Proprietary
Functions – Police Power
conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was
charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently
suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the
validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that
Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it
acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special
conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions
were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the
permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor
is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its
business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the
jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the
mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application
therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of
police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in
the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or
ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the
granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege –
estoppel does not apply.

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to

operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists,
Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached
various special conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent Eminent Domain
upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local optometrists.
Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice optometry within the city
(but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said
2
4 Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also
Reform violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian
“Equal Protection” problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar
These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.
Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights
The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries
includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228
program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights
in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
guaranteed by the Constitution.
thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been
enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially
In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged
superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated
violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed
on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory
to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and
treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first
to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987,
distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation
Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for
beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
prohibition would be premature.
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.
This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, clause.
providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the
enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small
which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the
the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of
suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such
provisions. limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to
share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land,
sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class
the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property
3
with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has
been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification
have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each
other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the
measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal
protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument
that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes
of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There
is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill
of Rights.
4
5. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
Facts:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half
page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The
Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge,
among all candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission
for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine
Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec the
Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise
of the power of supervision(police power) of the Comelec over the
information operations of print media enterprises during the election
period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is
unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It
held that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space”
amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of
the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the
element of necessity for the taking has not been established by
respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not
unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for
public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment
of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench,
there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take
private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
6. FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL RAILWAYS G.R. No. 124795 December 10, 2008
Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and 34387, all of the Registry of Deeds of
Laguna. Said parcels of land were originally registered in the name of
Felix Limcaoco, predecessor-in-interest of Forfom, under Original
Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. (0-326) 0-384 and (0-328) 0-386.In a
cabinet meeting held on 1 November 1972, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project, more
commonly known as the Carmona Project of the President. Per
Resolution No.751 dated 2 November 1972 of the PNR Board of
Directors, its General Manager was authorized to implement the
project. The San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was
implemented with the installation of railroad facilities
appurtenances. During the construction of said commuter line, several
properties owned by private individuals/corporations were traversed
5
as right-of-way. Among the properties through which the commuter
line passed was a 100,128square-meter portion owned by Forfom
covered by TCT Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and T-34387.On 24 August
1990, Forfom filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan,
Laguna a complaint2 for Recovery of Possession of Real Property
and/or Damages. It alleged that PNR, with the aid of military men,
and without its consent and against its will, occupied 100,128 square
meters of its property located in San Pedro, Laguna and installed
thereon railroad and railway facilities and appurtenances. It further
alleged that PNR rented out portions of the property to squatters along
the railroad tracks. Despite repeated verbal and written demands for
the return of the property or for the payment of its price, PNR failed
to comply. It prayed that PNR be ordered to vacate the property and
to cause the eviction of all shanties and squatters that PNR had taken
in as lessees, and that it be restored to the peaceful occupation and
enjoyment thereof. The trial court found that the properties of Forfom
were taken by PNR without due process of law and without just
compensation. Although the power of eminent domain was not
exercised in accordance with law, and PNR occupied petitioner's
properties without previous condemnation proceedings and payment
of just compensation, the RTC ruled that, by its acquiescence, Forfom
was estopped from recovering the properties subject of this case. As
to its right to compensation and damages, it said that the same could
not be denied. The trial court declared that P10.00 per square meter
was the fair and equitable market value of the real properties at the
time of the taking thereof.
and
ISSUES:
1) Can petitioner Forfom recover possession of its property because it has waived its right and is estopped from assailing the takeover of
respondent PNR failed to file any expropriation case and to pay just its land on the ground that there was no case for expropriation that
compensation? was commenced by PNR.

2) Is the time when just compensation should be fixed at the time of 2) Where actual taking was made without the benefit of expropriation
the taking or, as Forfom maintains, at the time when the price is proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the
actually paid? property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, the Court has
invariably ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of taking
HELD: that is controlling for purposes of compensation.51 In the case at bar,
the just compensation should be reckoned from the time of taking
1) In the case at bar, the expropriator (PNR) entered the property of
which is January 1973. The determination thereof shall be made in
Forfom, a private land. The entranceinto Forfom's property was
the expropriation case to be filed without delay by the PNR after the
permanent, not for a fleeting or brief period. PNR has been in
appointment of commissioners as required by the rules.
control,possession and enjoyment of the subject land since December
1972 or January 1973. PNR's entry intothe property of Forfom was
with the approval of then President Marcos and with the authorization
of thePNR's Board of Directors. The property of Forfom measuring
around eleven hectares was devoted topublic use - railroad tracks,
facilities and appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter
Service.With the entrance of PNR into the property, Forfom was
7. Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses Cancio
deprived of material and beneficial use andenjoyment of the property.
It is clear from the foregoing that there was a taking of property within
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
theconstitutional sense.It can be gathered from the records that
Court seeks to set aside the October 17, 2005 decision1 of the Court
Forfom accepted the fact of the taking of its land when itnegotiated
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75092.
with PNR for just compensation, knowing fully well that there was no
Petitioner Philippine Economic Zone Authority is a government-owned
expropriation case filedat all. Forfom's inaction for almost eighteen
and controlled corporation created and existing under and by virtue
(18) years to question the absence of expropriationproceedings and
of RA 7916,2 as amended. It is vested with governmental functions,3
its discussions with PNR as to how much petitioner shall be paid for
including the power of eminent domain, thus enabling it to acquire
its land preclude itfrom questioning the PNR's power to expropriate or
private land within or adjacent to the ecozone for consolidation with
the public purpose for which the power was exercised. In other words,
land for zone development purposes.4
6
On January 15, 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 18115 which reserved certain parcels of land of the
public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of petitioner (then Export
Processing Zone Authority or EPZA) for the establishment of the
Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels
covered by the proclamation, including that of respondent spouses
Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land.
Petitioner eventually laid out the development of the economic zone
and subsequently leased out respondents’ 47,540 sq. m. lot to an
investor in the economic zone, Maitland Smith Inc. (Maitland).
On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot at
P1,100 per sq. m. or P52,294,000 for the whole property. The letter
containing the offer further instructed respondents "to consider and
accept, otherwise we will initiate expropriation proceedings in the
proper court."
Instead of accepting the offer, respondents filed an unlawful detainer
case against Maitland in the Municipal Trial Court of Lapu Lapu City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for
respondents’ property with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu
Lapu City, Branch 54 on August 27, 2001.6 Accordingly, it sought a
writ of possession for the property for which it was willing to deposit
10% of the offered amount or a total of P5,229,400 with the Land
Bank of the Philippines in accordance with Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 50.7
Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply
with RA 8974,8 specifically Section 4(a) thereof, which requires that,
upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property an amount
7
equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes
of the issuance of a writ of possession.
In its January 14, 2002 order (first order), the trial court granted
respondents’ motion.
Petitioner moved for its reconsideration. It argued that RA 8974 was
inapplicable as the payment required under the law applied only to
instances where the property was still in the owner’s possession and
had yet to be transferred to the government. It could not be validly
invoked when the property was already in the government’s
possession, as in this case. It also averred that it should be made to
pay only the price of the land at the time of its taking. Corollarily, if it
was ordered to pay the amount required under RA 8974, it would be
unjustly penalized for its own improvements to the property.
This time, the RTC agreed with petitioner’s position. On February 26,
2002 (second order), the court a quo granted petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that
petitioner should make the required payment under the law because
RA 8974, which took effect before the commencement of the
expropriation case, applied to all actions of such nature regardless of
whether the government agency was already in possession or not.
The court a quo issued its September 5, 2002 order (third order)
which reversed its second order and reinstated the first one.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing
the first and third orders of the RTC. The appellate court sustained the
RTC’s ruling.
Hence, this petition.
The issue before us is whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this a. A writ of possession be issued in favor of plaintiff respecting its
case for purposes of the issuance of the writ of possession.9 It is possession, control and disposition of the land sought to be
petitioner’s stance that it is not. It cited A.O. No. 50 as its legal expropriated including the power or authority to demolish, if any,
authority when it offered to purchase respondents’ property in an improvements thereon, upon showing that the amount equivalent to
amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) higher than the zonal value 10% of the offered amount has been duly deposited.
thereof.10 Consequently, petitioner prayed in its complaint for
In their motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974,14
expropriation11 that it be issued a writ of possession upon a showing
respondents countered that they:
that the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the offered
x x x contest PEZA’s proferred value as it is not a just compensation
amount has been duly deposited. Respondents, on the other hand,
for the property sought to be expropriated.
agree that RA 8974 is the controlling law in this case as the complaint
for expropriation was instituted when said law was already in effect. When petitioner moved for reconsideration15 after the RTC granted
respondents’ aforementioned motion, it argued that:
We deny the petition. RA 8974 governs this case, not A.O. No. 50 as
petitioner insists. The inapplicability of R. A. No. 8974 is further highlighted by the fact
that it requires a deposit based on the current zonal valuation of
A perusal of RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to instances when
the property. To apply such valuation to the instant case would be
the national government expropriates property for national
to violate the cardinal principle in eminent domain proceedings
government infrastructure projects.12 Undeniably, the economic zone
that the just compensation for the property should be its fair
is a national government project – a matter undisputed by both
market value at the time of taking. The nature and character of
parties. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only on August
the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine
27, 2001 or almost one year after the law was approved on November
just compensation to the landowner (National Power Corporation vs.
7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to this case.
Henson, 300 SCRA 751 [1998]). (Emphasis supplied)
We note that this expropriation case is still in its initial stages. The
Clearly, there was a confusion regarding the nature of the amount to
trial court had yet to approve a writ of possession in petitioner’s favor
be paid for the issuance of a writ of possession. In Capitol Steel
when the issue of payment of just compensation cropped up. Both
Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority,16 we clarified that the
parties seemed to have confused the requirement of paying 100% of
payment of the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a
the current zonal valuation of the property (as a prerequisite to the
writ of possession is different from the payment of just compensation
issuance of a writ of possession) with the payment of just
for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on
compensation itself.
the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on
In its complaint filed in the RTC,13 petitioner prayed that:
the prevailing fair market value of the property.1avvph!1.zw+

8
In that case, we agreed with the CA’s explanation17 that:
The first refers to the preliminary or provisional determination of the
value of the property. It serves a double-purpose of pre-payment if
the property is fully expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if
the proceedings are dismissed. It is not a final determination of just
compensation and may not necessarily be equivalent to the prevailing
fair market value of the property. Of course, it may be a factor to be
considered in the determination of just compensation.
Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final determination of
the fair market value of the property. It has been described as "the
just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation." Market
value[s,] has also been described in a variety of ways as the "price
fixed by the buyer and seller in the open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal trade and competition; the price and value of
the article established as shown by sale, public or private, in the
ordinary way of business; the fair value of the property between one
who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell; the current
price; the general or ordinary price for which property may be sold in
that locality." (Emphasis in the original)
There is therefore no need yet to determine with reasonable certainty
the final amount of just compensation in resolving the issue of a writ
of possession.18 In fact, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to
issue the writ upon compliance with the requirements of Section 419
of the law. No hearing is required and the court cannot exercise its
discretion in order to arrive at the amount of the provisional value of
the property to be expropriated as the legislature has already fixed
the amount under the aforementioned provision of the law.20
9
It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be
paid that just compensation will be determined.
In establishing the amount of just compensation, the parties may
present evidence relative to the property’s fair market value, as
provided under Section 5 of RA 8974.21 Thus:
Sec. 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject
of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale. – In order to
facilitate the determination of just compensation, the court may
consider, among other well-established factors, the following relevant
standards:
(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
(c) The value declared by the owners;
(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;
(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or
demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the
value of improvements thereon;
(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of
the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as
well as documentary evidence presented; and
(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners
to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of
approximate areas as those required from them by the
government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as
possible.
This must be so as just compensation should take into account the
consequential benefits and damages which may arise from the
expropriation.22 Furthermore, it is well to remember that the concept
of just compensation does not mean fairness to the property owner
alone. It must also be just to the public which ultimately bears the
cost of expropriation.23
Lastly, RA 8974 provides that "the court shall determine the just
compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the
date of filing of the expropriation case."24 In this case, almost eight
years have passed since petitioner commenced the expropriation
proceedings on August 27, 2001. We, however, hold that it is still
feasible to comply with the spirit of the law by requiring the trial court
to make such determination within sixty (60) days from finality of
this decision, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in RA 8974
and its implementing rules.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
8. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda Martinez
Facts:
After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform,
on November 16,1993, of respondent Martinez's 62.5369-hectare
land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres,Romblon, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian ReformLaw of
1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered
P1,955,485.60 as just compensation, for which respondent rejected.
Thus, the Department of AgrarianReform Adjudication Board, through
its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator conducted summary
10
administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of just
compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL.
On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment
ordering the LBPto pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ
for her property covered withthe total amount of TWELVE MILLION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINETHOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY
TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50).
A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP's
counsel before theSpecial Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional Trial
Court of Odiongan, Romblon.
Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's
decision, filed before the Office of the PARAD a motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution, whichwas eventually granted on November 11,
2003. The PARAD denied LBP's motion for reconsideration and ordered
the issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004.
LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004
PARAD resolution.On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was
yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA, on September 28, 2004 dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when
it issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP's petition for
fixing of just compensation with the SAC?
Held:
In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at
the same time petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule
65. In both proceedings, the parties are identical and the reliefs
prayed for are the same. In the two actions, petitioner also has a
singular stance: the PARAD resolutions should not be executed in view
of the pendency of the petition for fixing of just compensation with
the SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two for a could come
up with conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be
avoided by the rule against forum-shopping.
We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by
the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4,
2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the
consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator's
decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day
period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the
SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its
receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the
reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The
PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.
9. Hon. Vicente Eusebio vs. Jovito Luis
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
11
(CA) dated November 28, 2003, affirming the trial court judgment,
and the CA Resolution2 dated February 27, 2004, denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 53591 and 53589 with an area of
1,586 square meters. Said parcel of land was taken by the City of
Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a municipal road now known as
A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On February 1,
1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15
authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land. However,
the Appraisal Committee of the City of Pasig, in Resolution No. 93-13
dated October 19, 1993, assessed the value of the land only at
P150.00 per square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995,
respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider
P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land.
One of the respondents also wrote a letter dated November 25, 1994
to Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio calling the latter’s attention to the fact
that a property in the same area, as the land subject of this case, had
been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter
when said property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for
conversion into a public road. Subsequently, respondents’ counsel
sent a demand letter dated August 26, 1996 to Mayor Eusebio,
demanding the amount of P5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of
P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents’ property. In
response, Mayor Eusebio wrote a letter dated September 9, 1996
informing respondents that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more
than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee.
Thus, on October 8, 1996, respondents filed a Complaint for 6% per annum from the filing of the instant Complaint until
Reconveyance and/or Damages (Civil Case No. 65937) against herein full payment is made;
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
3. In the event that said properties can no longer be returned to the
155. Respondents prayed that the property be returned to them with
plaintiffs as the same is already being used as a public road
payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per
known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Pasig City, the defendants are
square meter, or P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum
hereby ordered to jointly pay the plaintiffs the fair and
from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or in the event
reasonable value therefore at P5,000.00 per square meter or
that said property can no longer be returned, that petitioners be
a total of P7,930,000.00 with payment of reasonable rental
ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of P7,930,000.00
for its use in the amount of P500.00 per square meter or a
and rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or
total of P793,000.00, both with legal interest at the rate of
P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12% per annum from the
6% per annum from the filing of the instant Complaint until
date of filing of the complaint until full payment. In addition,
full payment is made; and
respondents prayed for payment of moral and exemplary damages,
4. Ordering the defendants to jointly pay the plaintiffs attorney’s fees
attorney’s fees and costs.
in the amount of P200,000.00.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision3 dated January 2, 2001, the
No pronouncement as to costs.
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants: Petitioners then appealed the case to the CA, but the CA affirmed the
RTC judgment in its Decision dated November 28, 2003.1avvphi1
1. Declaring as ILLEGAL and UNJUST the action of the defendants in
taking the properties of plaintiffs covered by Transfer Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied
Certificates of Title Nos. 53591 and 53589 without their per Resolution dated February 27, 2004.
consent and without the benefit of an expropriation Hence, this petition where it is alleged that:
proceedings required by law in the taking of private property
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RULING
for public use;
OF THE LOWER COURT DESPITE THE APPARENT LACK OF
2. Ordering the defendants to jointly RETURN the subject properties JURISDICTION BY REASON OF PRESCRIPTION OF PRIVATE
to plaintiffs with payment of reasonable rental for its use in RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM FOR JUST COMPENSATION;
the amount of P793,000.00 with legal interest at the rate of
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FIXING THE FAIR AND
REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR RESPONDENTS’

12
 PROPERTY AT P5,000.00 PER SQUARE METER DESPITE THE
GLARING FACT THAT AT THE TIME OF TAKING IN THE YEAR
1980 THE FAIR MARKET VALUE WAS PEGGED BY AN
APPRAISAL COMMITTEE AT ONE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS
(PHP160.00);
III. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AWARDING THE AMOUNT
OF P793,000.00 AS REASONABLE RENTAL FOR THE USE OF
RESPONDENTS’ PROPERTY IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE
SAME WAS CONVERTED INTO A PUBLIC ROAD BY A
PREVIOUSLY ELECTED MUNICIPAL MAYOR WITHOUT
RESPONDENTS’ REGISTERING ANY COMPLAINT OR PROTEST
FOR THE TAKING AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH
TAKING DID NOT PERSONALLY BENEFIT THE PETITIONERS
BUT THE PUBLIC AT LARGE; AND
IV. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE P200,000.00 AWARD FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES TO THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL DESPITE THE ABSENCE
OF NEGLIGENCE OR INACTION ON THE PART OF
PETITIONERS RELATIVE TO THE INSTANT CLAIM FOR JUST
COMPENSATION.4
At the outset, petitioners must be disabused of their belief that
respondents’ action for recovery of their property, which had been
taken for public use, or to claim just compensation therefor is already
barred by prescription. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,5 the Court emphasized "that where private property is taken
by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto
either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to
recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe." The Court
13
went on to remind government agencies not to exercise the power of
eminent domain with wanton disregard for property rights as Section
9, Article III of the Constitution provides that "private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation." 6
The remaining issues here are whether respondents are entitled to
regain possession of their property taken by the city government in
the 1980’s and, in the event that said property can no longer be
returned, how should just compensation to respondents be
determined.
These issues had been squarely addressed in Forfom Development
Corporation v. Philippine National Railways,7 which is closely
analogous to the present case. In said earlier case, the Philippine
National Railways (PNR) took possession of the private property in
1972 without going through expropriation proceedings. The San
Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was then implemented with
the installation of railroad facilities on several parcels of land,
including that of petitioner Forfom. Said owner of the private property
then negotiated with PNR as to the amount of just compensation. No
agreement having been reached, Forfom filed a complaint for
Recovery of Possession of Real Property and/or Damages with the trial
court sometime in August 1990.
In said case, the Court held that because the landowner did not act to
question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a very long period
of time and even negotiated with the PNR as to how much it should
be paid as just compensation, said landowner is deemed to have
waived its right and is estopped from questioning the power of the
PNR to expropriate or the public use for which the power was
exercised. It was further declared therein that:
x x x recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act in accordance
longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997
of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than
continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for three competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain and
expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to report to the court the just compensation for the subject property.
the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of The Court reiterated its ruling in National Power Corporation v. Dela
compensation. Cruz11 that "trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial right
that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all."12
x x x It is settled that non-payment of just compensation does not
It was also emphasized therein that although ascertainment of just
entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their
compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners’ findings
expropriated lot.8
may only be disregarded or substituted with the trial court’s own
Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question
estimation of the property’s value only if the commissioners have
the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980 until
applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where
the early 1990’s) and, when asked during trial what action they took
they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where
after their property was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the
the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus,
respondents, testified that "when we have an occasion to talk to
the Court concluded in Forfom that:
Mayor Caruncho we always asked for compensation."9 It is likewise
The judge should not have made a determination of just compensation
undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on
without first having appointed the required commissioners who would
respondents’ property was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval
initially ascertain and report the just compensation for the property
Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are
involved. This being the case, we find the valuation made by the trial
also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are
court to be ineffectual, not having been made in accordance with the
entitled to just compensation.
procedure provided for by the rules.13
Now, with regard to the trial court’s determination of the amount of
Verily, the determination of just compensation for property taken for
just compensation to which respondents are entitled, the Court must
public use must be done not only for the protection of the landowners’
strike down the same for being contrary to established rules and
interest but also for the good of the public. In Republic v. Court of
jurisprudence.
Appeals,14 the Court explained as follows:
The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just compensation
The concept of just compensation, however, does not imply fairness
is that set forth in Forfom.10 Therein, the Court ruled that even if there
to the property owner alone. Compensation must be just not only to
are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just

14
the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the In this case, the trial court should have fixed just compensation for
cost of expropriation.15 the property at its value as of the time of taking in 1980, but there is
nothing on record showing the value of the property at that time. The
It is quite clear that the Court, in formulating and promulgating the
trial court, therefore, clearly erred when it based its valuation for the
procedure provided for in Sections 5 and 6, Rule 67, found this to be
subject land on the price paid for properties in the same location,
the fairest way of arriving at the just compensation to be paid for
taken by the city government only sometime in the year 1994.
private property taken for public use.
However, in taking respondents’ property without the benefit of
With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed,
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation,
it is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the
the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents’
benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for
proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be countenanced by the
recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of
Court. For said illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held
expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time
liable for damages to respondents. Again, in Manila International
of taking that is controlling.16 Explaining the reason for this rule in
Airport Authority v. Rodriguez,20 the Court held that the government
Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez,17 the Court,
agency’s illegal occupation of the owner’s property for a very long
quoting Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr.,18 stated, thus:
period of time surely resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner. The
The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that —
Court held as follows:
. . . [w]here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation
Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the
proceedings, the value thereof may be enchanced by the public
form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should
purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the
be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of
property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have
taking, from said point up to full payment by the MIAA. This is based
been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the
on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law and follows from
complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of
the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money
private property should be compensated only for what he actually
can accomplish, as of the date of the taking."
loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond
The award of interest renders unwarranted the grant of back rentals
his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his
as extended by the courts below. In Republic v. Lara, et al., the Court
property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation
ruled that the indemnity for rentals is inconsistent with a property
to be paid can be truly just; i.e., ‘just not only to the individual whose
owner’s right to be paid legal interest on the value of the property, for
property is taken,' 'but to the public, which is to pay for it.’19
if the condemnor is to pay the compensation due to the owners from
the time of the actual taking of their property, the payment of such
15
compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the
property; and, hence, there is no basis for claiming rentals from the
time of actual taking. More explicitly, the Court held in Republic v.
Garcellano that:
The uniform rule of this Court, however, is that this compensation
must be, not in the form of rentals, but by way of 'interest from the
date that the company [or entity] exercising the right of eminent
domain take possession of the condemned lands, and the amounts
granted by the court shall cease to earn interest only from the
moment they are paid to the owners or deposited in court x x x.
xxxx
For more than twenty (20) years, the MIAA occupied the subject lot
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without the MIAA
exerting efforts to ascertain ownership of the lot and negotiating with
any of the owners of the property. To our mind, these are wanton and
irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence,
the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in order.
However, while Rodriguez is entitled to such exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees, the award granted by the courts below should be
equitably reduced. We hold that Rodriguez is entitled only to
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees equivalent
to one percent (1%) of the amount due.21
Lastly, with regard to the liability of petitioners Vicente P. Eusebio,
Lorna A. Bernardo, and Victor Endriga all officials of the city
government the Court cannot uphold the ruling that said petitioners
are jointly liable in their personal capacity with the City of Pasig for
payments to be made to respondents. There is a dearth of evidence
16
which would show that said petitioners were already city government
officials in 1980 or that they had any involvement whatsoever in the
illegal taking of respondents’ property. Thus, any liability to
respondents is the sole responsibility of the City of Pasig.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 28,
2003 is MODIFIED to read as follows:
1. The valuation of just compensation and award of back rentals made
by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155 in Civil
Case No. 65937 are hereby SET ASIDE. The City of Pasig,
represented by its duly-authorized officials, is DIRECTED to
institute the appropriate expropriation action over the subject
parcel of land within fifteen (15) days from finality of this
Decision, for the proper determination of just compensation
due to respondents, with interest at the legal rate of six (6%)
percent per annum from the time of taking until full payment
is made.
2. The City of Pasig is ORDERED to pay respondents the amounts of
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and P200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees
________________________________________________
10. Napocor vs Macabangkit Sangkay
Facts:
NPC Constructed an underground tunnel that traversed the property
of Macabangkit Sangkay, the respondents were asking for just
compensation for the NPC's act of inconspicuously constructing the
said tunnel and depriving the respondents of the benefits of the said
land due to the impacts of the tunnel, such as shaking of the ground
and the disturbing noise coming from the facility. Several issues were
raised such as the prescription of the action and the actual existence
of the tunnel which was easily proven by the heirs with the use of
topographical survey and sketch maps.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Heirs awarding them
113,000,000 as just compensation plus damages and an attorneys
fee equivalent to 15% of the awarded claim.
CA affirmed the RTC's decision without any qualification.
Meanwhile, 2 of the respondents Counsel were having a difficulty on
the question of who among the 2, particularly Atty. Dibaratun and
Atty. Ballelos. were entitled to the attorneys fees and how much is
exactly the amount they are entitled to receive.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the amount of Atty. Fee which is 15% of the
equivalent of 113M PHP, is erroneous?
2) What is the standard used in calculating the amount of fee entitled
to an Attorney?
3) Who Among the Counsel is entitled to the fee?
Held:
Both Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos posited that their entitlement
to attorney’s fees was contingent. Yet, a contract for a contingent fees
is an agreement in writing by which the fees, usually a fixed
17
percentage of what may be recovered in the action, are made to
depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed
right. Contingent fees depend upon an express contract, without
which the attorney can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit.71
With neither Atty. Dibaratun nor Atty. Ballelos presenting a written
agreement bearing upon their supposed contingent fees, the only way
to determine their right to appropriate attorney’s fees is to apply the
principle of quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used
as basis for determining an attorney’s professional fees in the absence
of an express agreement.72 The recovery of attorney’s fees on the
basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous
client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel
without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of
the attorney himself.73 An attorney must show that he is entitled to
reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause,
taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the
guidelines for determining the proper amount of attorney fees, to wit:
Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in
determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficult of the questions involved;
c) The important of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of P250,000.00 out of his own pocket to defray expenses from
acceptance of the proffered case; the time of the filing of the motion to execute pending appeal
until the case reached the Court.77 His representation of all
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees
the Heirs of Macabangkit was not denied by any of them.
of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
In fairness and justice, the Court accords full recognition to
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
Atty. Dibaratun as the counsel de parte of the Heirs of
to the client from the service;
Macabangkit who discharged his responsibility in the
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
prosecution of the clients’ cause to its successful end. It is he,
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or not Atty. Ballelos, who was entitled to the full amount of
established; and attorney’s fees that the clients ought to pay to their attorney.

j) The professional standing of the lawyer. Given the amount and quality of his legal work, his diligence
and the time he expended in ensuring the success of his
Whether it is Atty. Dibaratun or Atty. Ballelos, or both, who
prosecution of the clients’ cause, he deserves the recognition,
should receive attorney’s fees from the Heirs of Macabangkit
notwithstanding that some of the clients might appear to have
is a question that the Court must next determine and settle
retained Atty. Ballelos after the rendition of a favorable
by considering the amount and quality of the work each
judgment.
performed and the results each obtained.
Atty. Ballelos may claim only from Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana,
Atty. Dibaratun, the attorney from the outset, unquestionably
Nasser, Manta and Edgar, the only parties who engaged him.
carried the bulk of the legal demands of the case. He diligently
The Court considers his work in the case as very minimal. His
prepared and timely filed in behalf of the Heirs of Macabangkit
compensation under the quantum meruit principle is fixed at
every pleading and paper necessary in the full resolution of
P5,000.00, and only the Heirs of Macabangkit earlier named
the dispute, starting from the complaint until the very last
are liable to him.
motion filed in this Court. He consistently appeared during the
trial, and examined and cross-examined all the witnesses
presented at that stage of the proceedings. The nature,
11. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the
character, and substance of each pleading and the motions he
Philippines, et al.
prepared for the Heirs of Macabangkit indicated that he
FACTS:
devoted substantial time and energy in researching and
preparing the case for the trial. He even advanced

18
At the center of these two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the
issue of the right of the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug
Airport in Cebu City to repurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective
properties.
At the outset, three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized:
First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject
of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were
originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug
Airport.
Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it
had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development as a commercial
complex.
Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its
team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would
be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for
airport purposes. "No less than Asterio Uy," the Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, "one
of the members of the CAA Mactan Legal Team, which interceded for the acquisition
of the lots for the Lahug Airport’s expansion, affirmed that persistent assurances were
given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as the Lahug Airport is abandoned
or transferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to reacquire their
properties." In Civil Case No. CEB-20743, Exhibit "G," the transcript of the deposition of
Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the assurance made had been formally offered in
evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of the RTC Cebu City. In Civil Case
No. CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence, and later the CA,
recognized the reversionary rights of the suing former lot owners or their successors
19
in interest and resolved the case accordingly. In point with respect to the
representation and promise of the government to return the lots taken should the
planned airport expansion do not materialize is what the Court said in Heirs of
Moreno, thus:
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with there exists
an undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had
suggested to the landowners of the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion
scheme that they could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airport’s
venue. Some acted on this assurance and sold their properties; other landowners held
out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain to take its course until finally
coming to terms with respondent’s predecessors that they would not appeal nor block
further judgment of condemnation if the right of repurchase was extended to them. A
handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when they parted with
ownership of their land.
ISSUES:
Whether abandonment of the public use for which the subject properties were
expropriated entitles petitioners Ouanos, et al. and respondents Inocian, et al. to
reacquire them.
HELD:
YES. Providing added support to the Ouanos and the Inocians’ right to repurchase is
what in Heirs of Moreno was referred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the
implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, the purpose of which is to
prevent unjust enrichment. In the case at bench, the Ouanos and the Inocians parted
with their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use the
realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA
can be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to them,
otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that
was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In effect,
the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed
public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated
by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the
basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can
demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the
condemnation price.
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really
without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other
words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will.
Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such
that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose
to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably
deducible from the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to
include any use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit [of the public]." If the genuine public necessity—the very reason or
condition as it were—allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land
ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government’s
retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the
government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the
original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has
been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce
their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that
citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws.
20
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the
property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the
judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play,
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires
unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer
tenable.
Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which
was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract
freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the
duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really
no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is conditional. The taking
of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued
devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated
or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its
reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation
received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter
pill to swallow for the owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and
yield ownership to the government which reneges on its assurance that the private
property shall be for a public purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if the
power of eminent domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit another
with influence and power in the political process, including development firms. The
mischief thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery.
Even as the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted
allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question Ruling: While investigations conducted by an administrative body
to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added dimension to abandon Fery. may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that
under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may

Due Process not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges
and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty
12. LUMIGUED VS. HON. EXEVEA rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is

Facts: simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more

Agrarian Reform — Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through

President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant pleadings. 41 An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect

to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of of due process. 42 As long as a party was given the opportunity to

Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition defend his interests in due course; he cannot be said to have been

for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.The dismissal denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very

was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional essence of due process. 43 Moreover, this constitutional mandate is

Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek

Board of Discipline of the DAR, namely, charged Lumiqued with reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 44 Lumiqued's

malversation through falsification of official documents, private appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured

respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the

(COA) rules and regulations, and charged Lumiqued with oppression committee.

and harassment. Committee hearings on the complaints were Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23

conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the

counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the same Rule, the

July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The penalty of dismissal carries with it "cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture

committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for

appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee reemployment in the government service." The instant petition, which

deemed the case submitted for resolution is aimed primarily at the "payment of retirement benefits and other

Issue: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted benefits," plus back wages from the time of Lumiqued's dismissal until

by counsel during an administrative inquiry? his demise, must, therefore, fail.

21
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is
hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of
the President is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
13. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of
the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing
a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to
the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation
of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty
stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the
interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition.
22
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights
or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights
of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence
over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when
they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals
are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to
grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
14. Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan GR. NO. 148571
Sept. 24 2002
FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon.
Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec.
of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the
USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with
the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an
order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in
order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on
the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-
Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set
for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez
submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer
that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After
he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there
is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
Issue: Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process
Held: NO.
Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process
and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and
fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to
be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will
23
be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance
to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with
the summary nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested
the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
15. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) vs Comelec
FACTS:
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en Banc
issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several
party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the
party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it
failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in
the 2007 elections. PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679,
but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam
of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the
Party-List System Act. The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition
for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.
HELD: COMELEC's decision is annulled.
POLITICAL LAW: delisting of any national, regional or sectoral
party. The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a)fails to participate in
the last two (2) preceding elections; or(b)fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the
two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation
and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to
support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2%
party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood
to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This is how
Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied.
PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner
2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate
24
in the preceding election is something that is not covered by Section
6(8) of RA 7941.From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap
in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. The Court
cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary
authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will
offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists,
then the present case should bring this concern to the legislatures
notice.
On the due process issue, PGBI's right to due process was not violated
for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679.The essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or
the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in
all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of
notice and hearing. PGBI was not denied due process. In any case,
given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for
complaint on due process grounds.
The petition for review is GRANTED.
Equal Protection Clause
16. TELEBAP VS. COMELEC 289 SCRA 25
Facts:
 Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting companies. They are suing the citizens, taxpayers, and
registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates
radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines
under a franchise granted by Congress. The petitioner was affected
by the enforcement of section 92 of B.P. Blg.881 requiring radio and
television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the
COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political
purposes. GMA network Inc., claims that it suffered losses running to
several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and
that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again
this year. Petitioners questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. Blg.
881 which states that:
SEC. 92. COMELEC time. – The Commission shall procure
radio and television time to be known as “Comelec Time” which shall
be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio broadcasting and television station. For
this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television
stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
Issue: Whether or not section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 takes property
without due process of law and without just compensation and denies
radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws?
Ruling
25
Petitioners contend that 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due
process clause] and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution
by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations
without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the
sale of air time to advertisers and that to require these stations to
provide free air time is to authorize a taking which is not a de minimis
temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc.
lost P22, 498,560.00 in providing free air time of one (1) hour every
morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and
Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this year’s
elections, it stands to lose P58, 980,850.00 in view of COMELECs
requirement that radio and television stations provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time. Petitioners’
argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is
thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that any such
franchise or right granted shall be subject to amendment, alteration
or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.
17. People vs Jalosjos (324 SCRA 689)
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and
acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Jalosjos’ primary
argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate
of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in
Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the
functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made
possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases. Jalosjos further
argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical
reasons. Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del
Nortewant their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member
of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to
respect his mandate.
Issue: Whether or not the equal protection clause is applicable in this
case.
Ruling:
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not
show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality
26
nor prejudice shall be displayed. The performance of legitimate and
even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate
of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function
well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending
on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for
that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the
need for its exercise. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law. A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential
lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor
of or against groups or types of individuals. The Court cannot validate
badges of inequality. The Court, therefore, finds that election to the
position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Imprisonment
is the restraint of a man’s personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a
person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. The
instant petition is denied.
 I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. Although it is
a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
18. Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo Vs. The Philippine Truth cause exists as to warrant the filing of information in our courts of
Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 07, 2010 law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or

Facts: administrative penalties or sanctions.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1,

prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to

Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.

corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap."

The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal
to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the protection clause?
presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found
Ruling:
a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the

Thus, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in

establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its

Commission). apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in

Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body
1 reads: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
protection of the laws.”
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to One of the basic principles on which this government was

submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section

and the Ombudsman. To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws

the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
27
been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No.
1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
19. Comelec vs Conrado Cruz et. al November 20, 2009
Facts:
The present petition seeks a review of the RTC’s decision
granting the petition of the respondents on declaring Section 2 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections,
amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991) unconstitutional:
28
Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be
three (3) years
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That
the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected.
Antecedent: Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent
officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a
petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the
above-highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments:
1. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively.
2. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164
would be a violation of the equal protection of the law.
3. Barangay officials have always been a political.
Issue: 1. WON the term limit should apply prospectively and not
retroactively.
2. WON it violates the equal protection of the law.
Ruling: SC affirmed the constitutionality of Section 2, paragraph 2 of
Republic Act No. 9164:
1. No retroactive application was made because the three-
for
term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay
law (RA No. 6679-changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-
consecutive term limit). after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was
continued under the LGC and can still be found in the current law.
 2. No. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution 20-A. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: Nor shall any COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the
person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of
equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY
conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from
one another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the
FACTS:
objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or
circumstances, they may be treated differently in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee

applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on

present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007

barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because elections.

the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these

elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a
The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit
electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the
for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application
Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team
treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that
recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.
protection violation can exist under these conditions. From another
perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as
a standard because the challenged proviso did not result in any After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution

differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA,

officials. et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

29
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec,
Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court. the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the
continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.

ISSUES:
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional bodys
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?
independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?
and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.

SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection
FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid. clause.

POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection

Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole

of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They

election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well

laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, as public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.

orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial

power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were
investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official

Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint

vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same Committee.

provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms
of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is

30
intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial
the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against
merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.
treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and
DISMISSED. Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c
was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to
avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56

SEARCH AND SEIZURE presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.

Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent

20. LIM VS FELIX 194 SCRA 292 court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order
be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the

FACTS: preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge

On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court

the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or

located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of

Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution

Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall

were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another have himself been personally convinced of such probable

security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the cause.

assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit

investigation of the incident then followed. the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against

Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the accused including the petitioners herein.

the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the

Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without

crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and

airport incident. recommendation that a probable cause exists.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an

order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as

issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused.. in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate,

31
he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional
requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse
of discretion.
_____________________________________________
21. Manalili vs CA, 280 Scra 400
FACTS:
The case is about the search and seizure act of 2 police officers. The side of
the policemen were as follows. In the afternoon of April 11, 1998, policemen from the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City were conducting surveillance along A. Mabini St.,
Kalookan City, specifically in front of the cemetery. Said policemen were Pat. Romeo
Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas, along with driver Arnold Enriquez, because they
received reports that drug addicts were roaming around the area. Uppo reaching the
cemetery, they saw a man who appeared to them high on drugs because of the manner
in which he was walking and the redness of his eyes. They approached the man when
he appeared to be avoiding them and asked what was in his hands. The man was Alain
Manalili y Dizon. When he gave his wallet, Espiritu examined it and found what he
suspected was crushed marijuana residue. He was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics
and turned over Cpl. Tamondong, while his wallet was forwarded to the Forensic
Chemistry Section of the NBI for testing, and was subsequently identified as indeed
crushed marijuana leaves. The Defense version was the following: Accused Manalili
was abroad a motorcycle, going home when the motorcycle was stopped by 3
policemen because they were under the influence of marijuana. They were then
brought inside the vehicle of the policemen where they were bodily searched.
Although nothing was found on them, only the tricycle driver was allowed to leave
while Manalili was brought to the police headquarters. He was then asked there at the
HQ to remove his pants, which was turned over a piece of bond paper to look for
32
marijuana, but only dirt and dust was initially found. The accused was then led to a cell,
and was later told that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants. accused
was eventually convicted of illegal possession of marijuana.
Issue: whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the policemen were valid?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the search and seizure conducted was valid. In
its decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the search was akin to a stop-and-frisk, and
in the case of Terry v Ohio, stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of
a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and part him for weapons
if the police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing with may be armed and presently dangerous, where
in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Although in Philippine jurisprudence the general rule in search and
seizure is it must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant, otherwise it is
unconstitutional under section 2, article III of the 1987 Constitution. However, such
rule is not absolute, and in the case of People v Lacerna, it enumerated 5 exceptions to
the rule of warrantless search and seizure: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2)
search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver
by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. And
in the case of People v Encinada, the Court further explained that in these cases, search
and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential element. Stop-and-
frisk has also already been accepted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In Posadas v CA, the Court held that there are many
instances where a search and seizure can be affected without necessarily being In the evening of the same day, Fulgencio informed Seraspi that a
preceded with an arrest, one of which is stop and frisk. In the case at hand, Patrolman third buyer, Ronnie Macabante was transacting with Sucro.
Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red Macabante, upon seeing the police, threw something to the ground
eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according and it was later discovered to be a tea bag of marijuana. When he
to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a was confronted, Macabante admitted that he bought the same from
member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious Sucro. Sucro was likewas arrested and the police recovered 19 sticks
behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and
had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. another teabag from Macabante.
During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner’s possession
The accused questioned the failure of the police officers to secure a

______________________________________________ warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is

22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs EDISON SUCRO (March
lawful
18, 1991)
RULING: YES, the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful.
According to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
FACTS:
one of the instances of a lawful arrest without a warrant is when in

March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, the presence of a police officer or a private person, the person to be

Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. to monitor arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to

the activities of the appellant Edison Sucro, because of information commit an offense and when the offense has in fact just been

gathered by Serasoi that Sucro was selling marijuana. Fulgencio was committed and has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the

positioned under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado which was near person to be arrested has committed it.

a chapel. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something

In the given facts, Fulgencio saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside
which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a
the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. As such
cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he
act of selling drugs was done in the presence of the said officer. As
handled the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. Later the same thing
for the second instance of a valid warrantless arrest, the fact that
happened but Sucro in this case handed it out to a group of persons.
Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the
Fulgencio informed Seraspi of this and the latter told him to continue
marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought
monitoring.
the same from accuse-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just
sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore had just
33
committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal
knowledge.
The arrest in this case is valid.
_______________________________________________
23. People of the Philippines vs Abe Valdez
FACTS
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The
accused was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law,
planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as
Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant
was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, all member of the police force, who
testified how the information was received. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in
his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had
his kaingin and saw (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows,
approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who
owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they
were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing
beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive
result. The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the
34
growing marijuana plants were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was
acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of
Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show
that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second,
that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant
from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which
includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions.
ISSUE
1 Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the
present case is lawful and the seized evidence admissible.
2 Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.
RULING
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police
had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure
is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed
without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both
innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
 With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently
obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves
the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said
plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence
against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a
reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the
seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
_________________________________________________
24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CHUA HO SAN
Facts:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and
other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police
Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his
officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he
intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain
Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats
ordinarily used by fisher folk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1Reynoso
Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there
conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried
a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San.
When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a
multicolored straw bag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing
the police officers, the man changed direction. Badua held Chua’s
right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced
35
themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what
they’re saying. And by resorting of “sign language”, Cid motioned with
his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded to the
request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent
plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later
identified to bemethamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was
then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with
an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure
conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the
warrant requirement.
Ruling:
The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects
or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search
warrant issued in accordance with the Rules.
However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the
following cases, to wit: (1)search of moving vehicles, (2)seizure in
plain view,(3)customs searches,(4)waiver or consent searches, (5)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6)search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting
officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable
cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in them to warrant a cautious man's
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of Chua’s participation in ongoing
criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug
courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that
ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the
area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating
an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable
cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court
likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that
there was a waiver or consented search. If Chua could not understand
what was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the
police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be
inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he
deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against
such an intrusive search. Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject
regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence,
the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
________________________________________________
25. PEOPLE VS MEDEL TANGLIBEN
Facts:
Patrolmen Quevedo and. Punzalan were conducting
surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located
at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. It was around
9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed Medel Tangliben
carrying a traveling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted
36
Tangliben and requested to open the red traveling bag but the latter
refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified
themselves. Marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and
weighing one kilo, more or less, were found inside the bag.
Issue: WON the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused
was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore
inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search
warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of
Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: “Section
12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.”
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides: A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying
marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely
within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful
arrest and is consequently valid.
Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the
transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer
who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced
with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act
quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
_____________________________________________ subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was found on
her person. She was later taken to a room with boxes, garbage, and
26. People vs. Leila Johnson, December 18, 2000
a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some

Facts: change were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to her.

The information against accused-appellant alleged: After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a certain

That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Col. Castillo.

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security

Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously guards came in and threw two white packages on the table. They told

possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge

regulated drug, each bag weighing: and ownership of the packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO
office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a fiscal

1) ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams; for inquest. She claimed that throughout the period of her detention,

2) ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (190.0) grams; from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never allowed to talk

3) ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams, to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her

respectively, relatives in the Philippines.

Girdle. “Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs, On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the

which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the woman’s room. dispositive portion of which reads:

The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibit C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered filing the accused

a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu”. offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended

Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st and hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and

Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area condemns said accused to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND

of NAIA, where accused-appellant's passport and ticket were taken PESOS (PHP500,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of

and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.

belongings were itemized. The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total

In her defense, accused-appellant alleged she was standing net weight of 580.2 grams (Exhibit “G”, “C-2”, and “C-3”) are hereby

in line at the last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch clerk of Court

and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken is hereby ordered to cause the transportation thereof to the

to the women’s room. There, she was asked to undress and then was Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law. The

37
accused-appellant shall be credited in full for the period of her
detention at the City Jail of Pasay City during the pendency of this
case provided that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply
strictly with the rules and regulations of the city jail.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her:
(1) “despite failure of the prosecution in proving the negative
allegation in the information; “ (2) “ despite persons may lose the
protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property in public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involves, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems,
signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protection against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
38
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus
been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible
in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her
subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of “shabu” in
her person in flagrante delicto. Anent her allegation that her signature
on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2, and C-3 herein) had been
obtained while she was in custody of the airport authorities without
the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor General correctly points out
the nowhere in the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was
required to affix her signature to the packs. In fact, only the
signatures of Embile and Ramirez theron, along with their testimony
to that effect, were presented by the prosecution in proving its case.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of the
accused-appellant's passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other
personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also
inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and her signature
theron. Rule 126, Sec 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes the search and seizure only of the following:
Personal property to be seized. ¾ A search warrant may be issued for
the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant
should be returned to her. Second. Accused-appellant argues that the
prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or “shabu,”a regulated drug, is not unlawful unless the
possessor or user does not have the required license or prescription.
She points out that since the prosecution failed to present any
certification that she is not authorized to possess or use regulated
drugs, it therefore falls short of the quantum of proof needed to
sustain a conviction.
The contention has no merit. The question raised in this case
is similar to that raised in United States v. ChanToco. The accused in
that case was charged with smoking opium without being duly
registered. He demurred to the information on the ground that it failed
to allege that the use of opium had not been prescribed as a medicine
by a duly licensed and practicing physician.Moreover, as correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is nothing in R.A.No. 6425
or the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, which requires the
prosecution to present a certification that accused-appellant has no
license or permit to possess shabu. Mere possession of the prohibited
substance is a crime per se and the burden of proof is upon accused-
appellant to show that she has a license or permit under the law to
possess the prohibited drug.
Fourth.Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the evidence
presented by theprosecution is not sufficient to support a finding that
she is guilty of the crimecharged.As regards the fine imposed by the
trial court, it has been held that courts may fixany amount within the
limits established by law. Considering that five hundred eighty point
two (580.2) grams of shabu were confiscated from accused-
39
appellant,the fine imposed by the trial court may properly be reduced
to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 110,finding accused-appellant guilty of violation of §16
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,and imposing upon her the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the fine imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to P50,000.00.
Costs against appellant. The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle
and other personal effects not yet returned to the accused-appellant
are hereby ordered returned to her.
SO ORDERED.
_________________________________________________
27. People vs. Malmstedt
Facts
Swedish national Mikael Malmstedt was found carrying
Hashish, a derivative of Marijuana, via a routine Nacotics Command
(NARCOM) inspection at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay Mountain
Province. RTC La Trinidad found him guilty for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Malmstedt filed a petition to the SC for the
reversal of the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made
was illegal because there was no search warrant.
Issue: WON RTC’s decision should be reversed or affirmed because of
the argument that the search and arrest was made without a warrant
Ruling: The RTC decision is affirmed. The constitution states that a
peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a
warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense.
The offense was recognized with the warrantless search conducted by
NARCOM prompted by probable cause: 1. the receipt of information
by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession and 2. Failure of the accused to immediately
present his passport.
________________________________________________
Ruling: NO, military and police checkpoints do not violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is
to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in

28. Valmonte vs De Villa 178 SCRA 211 other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue
its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order
Facts: for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area
suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in
of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider,
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the nherent right of the state to protect
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro
its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless
Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought
search which is however resonably conducted, the former should prevail.
the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by
unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and
the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
community.
Constitution.

________________________________________________
Issues: Whether or not the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the
29. People vs. de Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994] Second
people against unreasonable search and seizures?

40
Division
Facts:
The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat
staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the
Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People
(RAM-SFP) against the Government.
At that time, various government establishments and military
camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group
with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of 30 November
1989 while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the
Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the
government television station.
The surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30 November
1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence
report received by the division that said establishment was being
occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command
post.
At around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching them composed
of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion,
Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion
under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They
were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, five
bundles of C-4 dynamites, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 84 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) M-shells of different calibers, and
"molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar
Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw Rolando De
41
Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping through a door.
De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A
uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result
of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo
and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They
were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the
explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No
search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according
to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and
there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office,
aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The
group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a
certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein.
de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion,
and for attempted homicide (Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-
11756, respectively), which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During the arraignment, de Gracia
pleaded not guilty to both charges.
However, he admitted that he is not authorized to posses any
firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. The parties likewise
stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from November
30 up to 9 December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of attempted homicide, but
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him
to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed.
Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search and
seizure during the height of the December 1989 coup d’etat.
Held:
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar
Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The
raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office
was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there
was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the
Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
refused to open the door despite the requests for them to do so,
thereby compelling the former to break into the office.
In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime
was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the
situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply
for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge
himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed.
Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant
could lawfully be dispensed with.
42
__________________________________________________
30. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs DANGEROUS DRUGS
BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA),
G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
FACTS: In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec.
36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For
the
one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power
when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions
trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to
harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third,
a persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached by said provisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional by reason of violation on the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
RULING: Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g)
are unconstitutional.
Under Section 36 (c) the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicion less drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable
school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll
is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level
students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36
(d) of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices
is justifiable. The random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's
privacy and dignity. The intrusion into employee`s privacy under RA
9165 is accompanied by proper safeguards particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results.
In the case of Sec 36 (f) persons charged with a crime before
the prosecutor`s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
random or suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
Drug testing in this case would violate a person`s right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2 or Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still,
the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a
law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
_________________________________________________
31. POLLO vs CONSTANTINO DAVID ET.AL. G.R. 181881,
October 18, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the
CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public
43
Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC. On January 3, 2007 at around
2:30 p.m., CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an
unsigned letter-complaint tipping off that there are anomalies within
the CSCRO-IV; specifically, the letter alleged that the Chief of the
Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program is the person who is
conducting the anomalies. Because of the seriousness of the
complaint, CSC chairman Constantino-David issued a mermorandum
to back-up the files of the PLAD and Legal Office. The team formed to
conduct the investigative procedure were able to copy the files of
petitioner from the latter’s government-issued computer into 17
diskettes. The investigation was witnessed by Director IV Lydia
Castillo and Director III Engelbert Unite; the latter informed the
petitioner of the investigation being conducted. The petitioner was not
at the office during the investigation. Petitioner also took an extended
leave since the day of the investigation.
From the electronic documents retrieved, CSC Chairman
Constantino-David was able to obtain several legal documents as
evidence proving the complaint that the petitioner was lawyering for
the respondents of several CSC administrative cases. Thus, petitioner
was charged of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 wherein
he was found guilty by the CSC’s quasi-judicial body and petitioner
was dismissed from service by virtue of CSC Resolution No. 071420.
Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari based on
Rule 65 of the Rules of court. The petition alleges that the
constitutional right of privacy and right against illegal searches and
seizures of the petitioner were impaired by the investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation conducted by the team
formed by CSC-Chairman Constantino-David of perusing through
petitioner’s office computer was considered as unconstitutional
because it impairs petitioner’s constitutional right against illegal
searches and seizures?
RULING:
No, the investigation is constitutional. The investigation
conducted by the CSC was made under its capacity as an employer
and not as a law enforcer. Being a government entity does not strip
the CSC of the authority to monitor and regulate the use of its
properties as well as the conduct of its employees; especially if said
monitoring and regulating is necessary to ensure efficient and lawful
rendering of service. Thus, the exception to the prohibition on
warrantless arrests applies to the case at bar. Petitioner cannot
contend that he has a right to privacy to his documents and to the
access of his computer when factual evidence proved, and he himself
admits, that his office is usually open to visitors and that is computer
is easily accessed by other people. Since he does not expect any
privacy, he cannot claim the files within the computer as his personal
property. Furthermore, the use of the government-issued computer
does not transfer ownership to petitioner. The computer remains to
be the property of the government, most particularly of the Civil
Service Commission. Under the Computer Use Policy of the CSC, the
CSC may monitor or regulate anything users create, receive, or send
on the computer. The investigation was a valid exercise of the CSC’s
authority to monitor and regulate. Hence, the petition is denied.
______________________________________________
Writ of Amparo
44
32. SEC. OF DND VS. RAYMUND MANALO
FACTS:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military
men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were
members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention
and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military
officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos
subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their
existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of
the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense
and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court
with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’
custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two
military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records
of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
HELD:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a
continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of
Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or
employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably,
since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty,
and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention,
torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,”
the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)
Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
from a search warrant.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not
be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Art. III,
sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It said that the production order
should be likened to the production of documents or things under sec.
1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that “upon
motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which
45
an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the
moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody
or control.” (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo, October 7, 2008)
_____________________________________
33. Robert Reyes vs. Sec. Raul Gonzales, December 3, 2009
Facts:
For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the February 4, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which dismissed the petition for
the issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as
amended. It also assails the CAs Resolution dated March 25, 2008,
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
February 4, 2008 Decision.
Petitioners filed for petition for a writ of amparo on the ground
that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel.
Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold
Departure Order and that Hold Departure Order No. 45 has no legal
basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.
Respondents argued that the issue of the constitutionality of
the DOJ Secretary’s authority to issue hold departure orders under
DOJ Circulars 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo.
 On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision
dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of the writ
of amparo.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration thereon was also
denied in the assailed Resolution dated March 25, 2008.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or
threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which
would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Ruling: No. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
“SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.”
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place
to another. As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, xxx a
person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by
the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such
cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the
46
jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound
discretion.
In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel
as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against
him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his
right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security,
for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
______________________________________________
33-A. In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
Writ of Habeas Data in favour of Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, et. al., November 15, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti
Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), apeasant organization affiliated
with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the
military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay
Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured
repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA.
When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo andand
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders,
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et. al.
The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres. Arroyo as party- committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look
respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
office or actual incumbency. especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Issues: Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear
1. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his
granted after the writs of amparo and habeas data have tenure and not his term. Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot
already been issued in his favor. use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
2. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a would assess whether, within the context of amparo
respondent on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit. proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the
3. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in abduction of Rodriguez.
amparo and habeas data cases. 3. Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command
4. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for
were violated or threatened by respondents in G.R. No. 191805. crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces
or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
Ruling: domestic conflict. Although originally used for ascertaining
1. No. We held in Yano v. Sanchez that these provisional reliefs criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has
are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious also found application in civil cases for human rights
determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, abuses. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may
they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of
is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege the writ of amparo.
of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the
protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command
petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
to issue a temporary protection order independently of the a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship
former. The order restricting respondents from going near between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the
Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ. crime as his subordinate;
2. No. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was
President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts about to be or had been committed; and

47
 c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-
measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an
perpetrators thereof. Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private
Armies in the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as
4. Yes. We rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through the Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of
substantial evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation,
accountable for the violation of Rodriguezs rights to life, liberty the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the
and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.:
torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the
lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his President" (the Report).
allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte
result, there is no longer any need to issue a temporary (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations
protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps
effect of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos
violating his rights to life, liberty and security. Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
________________________________________________
Thru local TV news (July 2010) and print media, Gamboa’s name had
Right to Privacy
been tagged as one of those politicians alleged to be maintaining a
34. MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in
PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared
his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and
on print media. As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless
P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief,
inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as
Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte G.R.
published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and
No. 193636; July 24, 2012
other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police
FACTS surveillance operations.

48
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials
of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. In her Petition, she prayed for the following
reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos
Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher
PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d)
ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports
against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless
reports.
ISSUE: Whether the forwarding of information or intelligence report
gathered by the PNP to the Commission is an intrusion to Gamboa’s
right to privacy, thus, rendering the remedy of writ of habeas data
proper.
HELD: NO.
PRINCIPLE: The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information,
and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It
seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to
be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other.
GAMBOA’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY NOT VIOLATED
49
It is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state
aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate
objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state
interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and
functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the
latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining
PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those
individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa. This Court holds that Gamboa
was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report
listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling
of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP
to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or
threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence
regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the
Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police
force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the
power to request assistance from the latter.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa
Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and
without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to
privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of
intelligence-gathering and investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally,
Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which
was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs
and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus,
safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
REMEDY OF WRIT OF HABEAS DATA NOT PROPER
Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this
unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs
available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Disposition of the Case: Instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed Decision of the Regional Trial CourtOF Laoag City, insofar as
it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is
AFFIRMED.
_______________________________________________
Privacy to Communication
35. Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)
FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in
Lucena City wnet to the police station to report alledged indecent
show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the
station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and
accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the
headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle
of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of
words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations
made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who
provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man,
50
testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice
recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station
between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan,
which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
ISSUES: Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence
in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wiretapping.
HELD: The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA
4200, which prohibits wiretapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed
by the voice recording he had made. The law prohibits the
overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications
(Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]).
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not
private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question
that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by
the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the
conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons
such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that
he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in the
court was the one he recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape
were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus
laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was
a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the
placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and
(2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro
and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
________________________________________________
36. SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
AND ESTER GARCIA G.R No. 93833. , September 28, 1995
Facts:
Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case for damages in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that Ester Garcia, in a confrontation
in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
“hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to Ramirez’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.” In support to her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim
transcript of event and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and
other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610, 000.00 in addition
to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial discretion.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by Ramirez. As a result of
Ramirez’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
“secretly” taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “ An Act to prohibit and penalize wire
tapping and other elated violations of private communication and
other purposes.”
Issue: Whether or not Socorro Ramirez violates the Republic Act
4200 also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act?
51
Ruling: Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known
as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
Moreover, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are
the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
 _____________________________________ from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and
_________ papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
37. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals (253 SCRA 699)
Issue: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion
Facts: and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent

Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a Ruling:

driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers

The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence
of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
[to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between
recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The
owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs
law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined
owes to the other. The Court denied the petition for lack of merit.

52
_________________________________________________
38. Waterous Drug Corporation and Ms. Emma Co. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission and Antonia Melodia Catolico,
G.R. No. 113271, October 16,
Facts:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous
Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988. On 31
July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice
President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense
NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico’s dismissal
from her employment.
Issues:
1997
1. Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in its findings of facts.
2. Whether or not due process was duly accorded to private
respondent.
3. Whether or not respondent gravely erred in applying Section

medicine to employees chargeable to the latter’s accounts because 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued Ruling
another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other
suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department,
conclusion than that, except as to the third ground, the instant
as this would impair the company’s control of purchases and, besides
petition must fail.
she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio
requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him,
Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico
given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample
and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a
Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying
representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity
Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the
connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense,
dismissal, and illegal suspension. The Labor Arbiter found no proof of
including legal representation.
unfair labor practice against petitioners. Hence, the dismissal was
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the
without just cause and due process.
burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged
an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in
the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that
a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Here, WATEROUS proved
Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to
unequal to the task. It clearly appears then that Catolico’s dismissal
terminate her services. In its decision of 30 September 1993, the
53
was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor
executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the
statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no
probative value.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993,
respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except
as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter’s decision, viz., that
the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having
been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures
which is hereby set aside.
_________________________________________________
39. Marquez v Desierto G.R. No. 135882
Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the
account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the
subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent
jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be
notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may
cover only the account identified in the pending case.
Facts:
Pursuant to an investigation regarding the PEA – AMARI
project, Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce
several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative
54
to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia
Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager..
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in
camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, was based on a pending investigation
at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for
violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint
Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief, seeking to clarify if such
an action will violate RA. No. 1405.
Issue:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera
inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the
law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).
Held:
No. Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there
must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited
to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder
must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court
of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the
Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman
would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge
Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was
no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank
account for inspection. Herein petitioner Senator Blas Ople, filed the case at bar questioning
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. the said A.O. on 3 grounds 1) implementation of a national ID system
The Civil Code provides that” [e]very person shall respect the dignity, requires a legislative act, as such A.O. no. 308 is usurpation of
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other legislative functions. 2) that said A.O. tends to infringe the right to
persons” and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling privacy of citizens 3) the appropriation of funds for the
and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds public officer or implementation of said A.O. is also an exclusive legislative function.
employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation
of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the On the other hand, herein respondent as Executive Secretary refutes
privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised all said arguments.
Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer,
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Issue: Whether or not A.O. no. 308 is a valid exercise of the Executive
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti- power.
Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the
Intellectual Property Code. Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. In holding the A.O.
no. 308 as an invalid exercise of the Presidents Executive power, the
________________________________________________ Court provided the following:

40. BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TORRES G.R. NO. 127685, JULY 23, 1. As raised by petitioner, A.O. no. 308 does indeed infringe upon the
1998 legislature’s exclusive function as it laid down a system whereby
compliance therewith is a condition to transact with the government.
Facts:
On December 12, 1996, then President Ramos enacted Administrative 2. A.O. no. 308 is a potential threat to the Constitutional right to
order no. 308, which laid down the ground work for the Privacy
implementation of a National ID system. The A.O. mandated major as it allows the government to pool various data regarding an
government agencies to pool their resources together to implement a individual
centralized data bank of all citizens which shall be used to streamline without any clear concise direction as to the manner to keeping,
day to day government transactions and minimize rampant red taping safeguards against improper use, and any definite answer as to what
and corruption among government employees.

55
type of information may or may not be used. But what is not arguable
is the broadness, the vagueness, the over breadth of A.O. No. 308
which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger.
3. A.O. no. 308 failed to substantiate any justifiable reason to allow
the would be infringement. To streamline government transactions
and to remove red taping was not sufficiently shown to be valid
reasons to counter act the strict protection of the individual’s right to
privacy.
_________________________________________________
Freedom of Expression
41.TELEBAP VS. COMELEC 289 SCRA 25
Facts:
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting companies. They are suing the citizens, taxpayers, and
registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates
radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines
under a franchise granted by Congress. The petitioner was affected
by the enforcement of section 92 of B.P. Blg.881 requiring radio and
television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the
COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political
purposes. GMA network Inc., claims that it suffered losses running to
several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and
that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again
56
this year. Petitioners questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. Blg.
881 which states that:
SEC. 92. COMELEC time. – The Commission shall procure
radio and television time to be known as “Comelec Time” which shall
be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio broadcasting and television station. For
this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television
stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
Issue: Whether or not section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 takes property
without due process of law and without just compensation and denies
radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws?
Ruling
Petitioners contend that 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due
process clause] and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution
by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations
without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the
sale of air time to advertisers and that to require these stations to
provide free air time is to authorize a taking which is not a de minimis
temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc.
lost P22, 498,560.00 in providing free air time of one (1) hour every
morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and
Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this year’s
elections, it stands to lose P58, 980,850.00 in view of COMELECs
requirement that radio and television stations provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time. Petitioners’
argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is
thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that any such
franchise or right granted shall be subject to amendment, alteration
or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.
_________________________________________________
42. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING vs COMELEC (Jan. 28, 2000)
FACTS:
COMELEC passed a resolution issuing a restraining order on
ABSCBN from conducting exit polls after the 1998 elections, upon the
belief that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count,
as well as the unofficial quick count of the Namfrel. ABSCBN prayed
for a TRO against the COMELEC resolution, which was granted by the
court. The exit polls were then actually conducted and reported by the
media without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUE: Whether or not the freedom of speech and of the press also
protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived
therefrom.
RULING: YES. The freedoms of speech and of the press should be
upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of
information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of
57
suffrage. When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom
of a candidate to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is
invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free
elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate
analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State’s power to regulate
should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections
if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right
to know are unduly curtailed.
______________________________________________________
43. Social Weather Station vs COMELEC
FACTS
On the one hand, Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an
institution conducting surveys
in various fields. Kamahalan Publishing Corp., on the
other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of
general circulation and features items of information including
election surveys. Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the
validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially
section 5.4which provides that surveys affecting national candidates
shall not be published
15days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shal
l not bepublished 7 days before the election. SWS wanted to conduct
an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the
national and local levels and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its part,
intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the
elections on May 14, 2001.

ISSUE Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election
survey constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint
Ruling:Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgement of freedom of speech, expression, and the
press. The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to
ensuring equalopportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as
well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities
for public information and forms among candidates. Here, the
prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this
section pass the O’brient test for content related regulation because
(1) itsuppresses one type of expression while allowing other types
such as editorials, etc.; and (2) the restriction is greater than what is
needed to protect
governmentinterest because the interest can e protected by narrowe
r restrictions such assubsequent punishment.
ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, A.M.
No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001
Facts:
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal
cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of
the press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of
matters of public concern which could only be recognized, served and
satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court
proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the
proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired
transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case
for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court
resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to
prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice.

_________________________________________________ Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press

and right to information of public concern be given more weight than
44. RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
the fundamental rights of the accused.
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF
Ruling:
JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA
The petition is denied. The courts recognize the
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO vs. JOSEPH E.
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the

58
most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the then be totally free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the proceedings.
judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the
overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to ____________________________________________
due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its 45. NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC.VS HON.
constitutional proportions. CEASAR G. DY
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of FACTS:
innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above
Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio stations in
its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and
Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some years undisturbed by
where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force
local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official
or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court,
capacities impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not
where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. "Television can
broadcast at all. These actions have ranged from withholding permits
work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."
to operate to the physical closure of those stations. Petitioner were
The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on
required to submit requirements for the reclassification of the land
the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be
wherein the said stations are operating. Such requirements then as
evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote
required were never listed in the list of requirements in the
of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
renewal/application of any permit issued by Cauayan City. And
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a
notably, petitioners had never been required to submit such papers
right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
before.
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure
that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and ISSUE:
that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous
Whether or not the right to free expression of the petitioners
with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open
was violated by respondents by the closure of the station.
to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the HELD:
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
Yes. The right to free expression of the petitioner was violated
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
by the respondents. That the acts imputed against respondents
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall
respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough.

59
 The circumstances of this case dictate that respondents’
closure of petitioners’ radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives.
It must be pointed out that in the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was
aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in
Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other
members of the Dy political dynasty. Bombo Radyo is a rival station
of DWDY who is also owned by the family DY. Also, in an article found
in the Philippine Daily inquirer dated February 2004, respondent Dy
was quoted as saying that he will "disenfranchise the radio station."
Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents’ denial of
petitioners’ renewal applications on the ground that the Property is
commercial is merely a pretext and that their real agenda is to remove
petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice.
Therefore, the right to free expression of the petitioners’ constitutional
right to press freedom was blatantly violated by the respondents.
___________________________________________
46. Hector C. Villanueva vs. PDI, March 15, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros
Oriental during the May 11, 1992 elections.On March 30, 1990,
Ricardo Nolan, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned for the
disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections. Said
petition, however, was denied by the COMELEC. Two days before the
elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin
Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following story:
60
The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD
candidate for mayor of Bais City
for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave
abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-
charge of the mayor’s office of Bais City. A day before the elections or
on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also
came out with a similar story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as
Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been
convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority
and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the
mayor’s office in the city.
On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as
scheduled. When results came out, it turned out that petitioner failed
in his mayoralty bid.Believing that his defeat was caused by the
publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents
PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for
damages before the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles
were“maliciously timed” to defeat him. He claimed he should have
won by landslide, but his supporters reportedly believed the news
items distributed by his rivals and voted for other candidates. He
asked for actual damages of P270,000 for the amount he spent for
the campaign, moral damages of P10,000,000, an unspecified amount
of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees of P300,000 and costs of suit.
Issues: Whether or not Manila Bulletin and Philippine Daily Inquirer
are liable for damages or libel for the published article.

Held: For liability in libel cases to arise without offending press
freedom, there is this test to meet: "The constitutional guarantees
require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual
malice’— that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are privileged communication and constitute
a valid defense in an action for libel or slander for as such, no malice
can be aptly be presumed on them. The rule on privileged
communication had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech
and of the press. As early as 1918, in
United States v. Cañete, this Court ruled that publications which are
privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.In the instant case,
there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of
public interest. These are matters about which the public has the right
to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the
election itself. For this reason, they attracted media mileage and drew
public attention not only to the election itself but to the candidates.In
the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published
articles in question were written with knowledge that these were false
or in reckless disregard of what was false or not.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned
out to be false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not
prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any
61
scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith
and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a
point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the
choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of
fact as well as form is judgment. Only by giving them much leeway
and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical
agencies in our democracy. A newspaper, especially one national in
reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with
minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on
criminal or civil charges for malice or damages,
i.e.libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the
standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general
community. As aptly observed in
Quisumbing v. Lopez, et al.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and
reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the
circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the
freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway
and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of
stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their
deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, They
should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. We find respondent's
entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege,
growing out of constitutional guaranties in our Bill of Rights. We
cannot punish journalists including publishers for an honest endeavor
to serve the public when moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded
by their sense of responsibility as news media to report what they
perceived to be a genuine report.
___________________________________________
47. GSIS & Winston Garcia vs. Dinnah Villaviza, et al. 2010
Facts
PGM Garcia, as GSIS President and General Manager, filed separate
formal charges against respondents and eventually found them guilty
for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service, to serve the penalty of 1 year suspension plus
accessory penalties. The charges contained that respondent, wearing
red shirt together with other employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit
in a rally of protest and support for Messrs. Molina and Velasco
on appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the
GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not
amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. Their
actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate
therefrom.
Issue
WON the unruly mass gathering of 20 employees during office hours
inside office premises to protest falls within the purview of the
62
constitutional guarantee to freedom of expression and peaceful
assembly
Ruling
Yes. The concerted activity proscribed must be coupled with the intent
of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands of force concession (Sec 5 Resolution No. 02-1316).
Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending public hearing, bringing
recording gadgets, clenching fists, and badmouthing the guards and
PGM Garcia are acts not constitutive of an (a) intent to effect work
stoppage or service disruption and (b) for the purpose of realizing
their demands of force concession.
Not all collective activity or mass undertaking or government
employees is prohibited. Otherwise, those working in the government
service would be totally deprived of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression.
Respondents’ freedom of speech and of expression remains in-tact
and CSC’s resolution no. 02-1315 defining what a prohibited
concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated
these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents did not
amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action.
____________________________________________
48. SORIANO VS MTRCB MARCH 15, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the
Ang Dating Daan, a popular television ministry aired nationwide
everyday from 10:00 p.m. to midnight over public television. The
program carried a "general patronage" rating from the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). The Ang Dating
Daan’s rivalry with another religious television program, the Iglesia ni
Cristo’s Ang Tamang Daan, is well known. The hosts of the two shows
have regularly engaged in verbal sparring on air, hurling accusations
and counter-accusations with respect to their opposing religious
beliefs and practices. Thus, Michael and seven other ministers of the
Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint against petitioner Soriano before
the MTRCB. Acting swiftly, the latter preventively suspended the
airing of Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan television program for 20 days,
pursuant to its powers under Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree
1986 and its related rules. Petitioner Soriano challenged the validity
of that preventive suspension before this Court in G.R. 164785.
Meanwhile, after hearing the main case or on September 27, 2004,
the MTRCB found Soriano guilty as charged and imposed on him a
penalty of three months suspension from appearing on the Ang Dating
Daan program. Soriano thus filed a second petition in G.R. 165636 to
question that decision. The Court consolidated the two cases. On April
29, 2009 the Court rendered a decision, upholding MTRCB’s power to
impose preventive suspension and affirming its decision against
petitioner Soriano with the modification of applying the three-month
suspension to the program And Dating Daan, rather than to Soriano.
Issue:
Whether or not the suspension imposed constitutes prior restraint and an
abridgment of his exercise of religion and freedom of expression.
Ruling:
We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is
per se beyond review by the respondent [MTRCB]. Its public broadcast
63
on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal
belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the
clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is
duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding
interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez
faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal
mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as
religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country
today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest
wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this
stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the
fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. For
when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not
stand still.
Taking into account all the factors involved and the arguments
pressed on the Court, the suspension of the program is a sufficiently
limited disciplinary action, both to address the violation and to serve
as an object lesson for the future. The simple but stubborn fact is that
there has been a violation of government regulations that have been
put in place with a laudable purpose, and this violation must
accordingly be dealt with. We are not unmindful of the concerns on
the restriction of freedoms that may occur in imposing sanctions upon
erring individuals and institutions, but it cannot be over-emphasized
that the freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights are far from absolute.
Each has its own limits, responsibilities, and obligations. Everyone is
expected to bear the burden implicit in the exercise of these freedoms.
So it must be here.
___________________________________________
49. Facts: Southern Hemisphere vs Anti-Terrorism Council
Facts:
The case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA
9372, “An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations
assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected “communist fronts”
by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the
“transcendental importance” doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like
“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace”
and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts.
Issue: Whether or not a penal statute may be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners.
Held: No. A limited vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism”
in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent charge
against them. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lack comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as
64
applied” challenge. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire
law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be
possible.
_______________________________________
Freedom of Assembly
50. BAYAN, KARAPATAN et.al. vs. EDUARDO ERMITA et. al.
FACTS:
Bayan, et al allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were
violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) No. 880. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas
Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human
rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that
B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger.
It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the
freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause,"
"opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some
cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum
tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 violated
the right to freedom of assembly.
RULING:
No, B.P. No. 880 does not violate the right to freedom of
assembly and it cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not
curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. It is
very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the
time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. A fair and
impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 readily shows that it refers to all
Kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
"peaceable" and entitled to protection.Petitioners’ standing cannot be
seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful
assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a
permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and
parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies
65
without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit
can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee.
_________________________________________
51. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. JOSE LITO
ATIENZA G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010
FACTS:
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National
President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City
Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of
Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be
participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-
sectoral organizations. Respondent issued a permit dated June 16,
2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated
therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge,
which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006. The permit issued
did not state any reason why the venue applied for was
modified. Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari; however, the petition was not acted upon
within 24 hours. Thus, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari because of the inaction of the Court of Appeals.
The petition was denied for being moot and academic since the rally
still pushed through on June 22, 2006 at the Mendiola Bridge after
the petitioners coordinated with the Manila Police District. The MPD
thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action,
against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally
at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a
Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006. Hence, the filing of the present
petition for review on certiorari, to which respondent filed his
Comment of November 18, 2008 which merited petitioners Reply
of October 2, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether or not the modification made by Hon. Atienza is
unconstitutional as it infringes the rights of freedom of assembly of
the petitioner?
RULING:
Yes, Hon. Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when
it modified the venue of the rally without stating the cause of
modification. Section 6(C) of the Public Assembly Act provides “If the
mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit,
he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the
matter.” The court cited Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, which stated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people
to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters
of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent. x x x
Also, the court cited Reyes vs Bagatsing which provided:
66
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. x x x
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his
discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should
have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of
the venue.
_________________________________________
52. BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF
THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act
of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the
State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such
right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal
protection of the law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
 (a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march,
parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted
action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a
lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public
on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state
of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning
the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public
meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be
governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall
be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and
other concerted action in strike areas by workers and
employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by
the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard,
avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park,
plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership
where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of
restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the
place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade
67
or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system
and similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written
permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and
hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom
park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in
which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned
and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules
and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or
rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by
law are not covered by this Act.
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit
shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the
names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or
streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the transport and the public
address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and
responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor
of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended
activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
 (d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to
his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
convenience, public morals or public health.
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
the application within two (2) working days from the date the
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
Court.
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are
a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on hereby allowed.
the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public
to have been filed.
assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any
grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the
applicant who must be heard on the matter. participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that
there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on
commerce and trade.
the application within twenty-four hours.
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the
law.
68
terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe
following: the following guidelines:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with
permit; the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their
nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and
prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful
must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein
activities of the public assembly;
defined;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not
law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held
carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or
peacefully;
riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not
or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
go beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest
anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly
any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of
is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence,
other persons not participating in the public assembly.
or deliberate destruction of property.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public
enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public
assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an
assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law
assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police
assembly as follows:
officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer
(100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace
of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of
and order at all times.
the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative
prevent any possible disturbance;
for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other
the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that
harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police
their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising
or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage
their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is
to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
69
 contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful
disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed; assembly;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the (b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit
preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any
officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue other official acting in his behalf.
a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or
allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall
acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the
immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying
be made during the public assembly unless he violates during
the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any
Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the
law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public
Revised Penal Code, as amended:
assembly;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a group
for dispersal. (g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred
(100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the
or on the occasion thereof;
public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required,
the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. 1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or
device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations
of this Act: 2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act 3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or
by any leader or organizer without having first secured that thoroughfares;
written permit where a permit is required from the office 4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law
concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any enforcement unit;
place other than those set out in said permit: Provided,
however, That no person can be punished or held criminally

70
 5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be
holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of
vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems. the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any
of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding Section
shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by
imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of
instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
amended, or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item Approved, October 22, 1985.
4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six
_________________________________________
months and one day to six years;
Freedom or Religion
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without 53. Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006
prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
Facts:
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g)
Escritor, a member of the Jehovah’s Witness, was charged for
shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
immoral conduct for co‐ habiting with a man without the benefit of a
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the
marriage, their relationship bearing a child. She secured a
country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness,” indicating their church’s
establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in
approval of their union in accordance with the beliefs of the Jehovah’s
their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be
Witness.
centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and
meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior
Issue:
permit.
Whether or not Escritor may be sanctioned in light of the Free
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective
Exercise clause.
mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six
months from the effectivity of this Act.
Ruling:

71
 No. The state has the burden of satisfying the “compelling
state interest” test to justify any possible sanction to be imposed upon
Escritor. This test involves three steps:
1) The courts should look into the sincerity of the religious
belief without inquiring into the truth of the belief.
2) The state has to establish that its purposes are legitimate
and compelling.
3) The state used the least intrusive means possible.
The case was remanded to the Office of the Court
Administrator so that the government would have the opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in
opposing Escritor’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise
protection.
Since neither Estrada, Escritor nor the government has filed a
motion for reconsideration assailing the August 4, 2003 ruling, the
a compelling interest enforcing the concubinage charges against
Escritor. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Even assuming that there was
a compelling state interest, the state failed to show evidence that the
means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the
least restrictive to Escritor’s religious freedom.
Hence, Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized
as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her
right to freedom of religion.
___________________________________________
54. SORIANO VS. LA GUARDIA G.R. NO. 164785. APRIL 29,
2009
Facts:

2003 decision has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case.
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the
Any attempt to reopen this ruling constitutes a contravention of
program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks
elementary rules of procedure. Worse, insofar as it would overturn
against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
the parties’ right to rely upon the Supreme Court’s interpretation
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and
which has long attained finality, it also runs counter to substantive
seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
due process.
(INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
In its June 20, 2006 ruling, the Supreme Court held that,
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in
Escritor’s sincerity is beyond serious doubt. She procured the
petitioner‘s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of
certificate 10 years after their union began and not merely after being
the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. Issue: Whether or not Soriano‘s
implicated. The free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that
statements during the televised ―Ang Dating Daan‖ part of the
enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights. The state’s broad
religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the family is not

72
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and
considering the adverse effect of petitioner‘s utterances on the
viewers‘ fundamental rights as well as petitioner‘s clear violation of
his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from
appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it
cannot be properly asserted that petitioner‘s suspension was an
undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint
or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above
(re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character
of a broadcaster‘s role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided
has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be
expressed by the use of less offensive language.
The SC ruled that ―Soriano‘s statement can be treated as obscene,
at least with respect to the average child, and thus his utterances
cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the
US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be
―context based and found the utterances to be obscene after
considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time
of the show, and the ―G rating of the show, which are all factors that
made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court
emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by
a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.
The SC also said ―that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but
rather a ―form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent
punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of
73
suspension, the majority said that ―it is a sanction that the MTRCB
may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free
speech clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the
suspension ―is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to
continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was
already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for ―the
indecent contents of his utterances in a ―G‖ rated TV program.
___________________________________________
55. Austria v. NLRC G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
FACTS:
Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the Seventh-Day Adventists
(SDA) for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991. He started as
a literature evangelist and worked his way up until he became District
Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA. In January 1991, Austria was
transferred to Bacolod City. He held the position of District Pastor until
his services were terminated on October 31, 1991. Before his
termination, Austria had received communications from Mr. Eufronio
Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking Austria to admit
accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings
collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which
amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros
Mission. Austria reasoned in his written explanation dated October 11,
1991 that he should not be made accountable for the unremitted
collections since it was Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate
who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since Pastor
Austria was very sick to do the collecting at that time. On October 16,
1991, Austria went to the office of Pastor Buhat, who was the
president of the Negros Mission, to persuade Buhat to convene the
Executive Committee to settle a dispute between Pastor Austria and
Pastor David Rodrigo. But that meeting ended in a heated altercation
between Austria and Buhat. The next day, the Austria couple received
an invitation to attend the Executive Committee meeting on October
21, 1991 to discuss the non-remittance of the church collection and
the events that transpired on October 16, 1991. A fact-finding
committee was created to investigate Austria. Sensing that the
investigation would be one-sided, Pastor Austria wrote to Pastor
Rueben Moralde, president of the SDA and chairman of the fact-
finding committee, to request that certain members of the fact-finding
committee be excluded in the investigation and resolution of the
case. Out of the six (6) members requested to inhibit, only two (2)
were actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo. On
October 29, 1991, Austria received a letter of dismissal citing
misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust,
serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and
commission of an offense against the person of employer’s duly
authorized representative as grounds for the termination of his
servicesPetitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal, and sued the SDA for reinstatement and backwages plus
damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner. SDA appealed
to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
ISSUE: Was the termination of Pastor Austria’s services an
ecclesiastical affair and, as such, involved the separation of church
and state?
74
HELD: No. An ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between
the church and its members and relates to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. While the
matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister, it does
not give the case a religious significance. What is involved is the
relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the
practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. Pastor Austria
was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA
but was terminated from employment. As pointed out by the OSG in
its memorandum, the grounds invoked for Austria’s dismissal are all
based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just
causes for termination of employment. It is palpable by this alone that
the reason for Austria’s dismissal from the service is not religious in
nature. Coupled with this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with
a copy of Austria’s letter of termination which again is an eloquent
admission by the SDA that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. SDA
even registered petitioner with the Social Security System (SSS) as
its employee. As a matter of fact, the worker’s records of Austria have
been submitted by SDA as part of their exhibits. It is clear from all of
these that when the SDA terminated the services of Austria, it was
merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee
which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of
the case and to determine whether the SDA, as employer, rightfully
exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This
is in consonance with the mandate of the Constitution to afford full
protection to labor.
_________________________________________
56. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003
Facts: Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a non-
governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the
Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a
federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of
international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Dawah
Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World
Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue
halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions
petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on
halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and
manufacturers. IDCP alleges that, on account of the actual need to
certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers
request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures
based on the Quran and the Sunnah for the analysis of food,
inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same
year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified
products and food manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, OMA has the exclusive authority to
issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official
halal certification since those without said certification had not been
subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its
derivatives. As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food
manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.
75
Issue: Whether or not EO violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State?
Ruling: Yes. We find no compelling justification for the government
to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their
religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that
the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning
to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The
protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right to health are
already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government
agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the
market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and
safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious
freedom of Muslims.
OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697
(EO 697) to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the
mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs,
customs, traditions, and institutions. OMA deals with the societal,
legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a
national cultural community and not as a religious group. Thus,
bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and
State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into
purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause
and the free exercise of religion provision found in Article III, Section
5 of the 1987 Constitution. Only the prevention of an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show
the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the
affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable
freedom of personal and religious activity.
______________________________________
57. Velarde vs Social Justice Society (428 SCRA 283)
Facts:
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
(SJS Petition) before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid
co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the
interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the
separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate
for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock
to vote for a specified candidate. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted,
within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss.
Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde,
filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L.
Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the
extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the
Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common
grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no
justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by
way of advisement, which was closely followed by another Order
denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie
Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider
the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to
file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order
by submitting his Memorandum. The Court denied the Motions to
76
Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike
Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo,
which raised no new arguments other than those already considered
in the motions to dismiss. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde,
be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily,
may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?
Ruling: The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER
ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious
consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional
issue to be of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it
concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus, despite
the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court,
thE Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt
that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition
on the merits. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince
the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the
paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts
supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision. At best, SJS
merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question, merely
sought an advisory opinion. Indeed, the assailed Decision was
rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no
findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed
legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to
review, affirm, reverse or even just modify. It is a time-honored rule
that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only
if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a
justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights
of the parties concerned. the Petition for Review of Brother Mike
Velarde is GRANTED. Declaring the decisions of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 49) as NULL AND VOID and thus SET
ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for
failure to state a cause of action.
_______________________________________________
58. Dominador L. Taruc, et al., vs. Bishop Porfirio B. De La Cruz,
et al. G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005
Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent
Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de
la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest,
respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by
Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another
parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the
records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political
party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the animosity between the
two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political
camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for
transferring Fr. Florano to another parish.
Meanwhile, hostility among the members of the PIC in
Socorro, Surigao del Norte worsened when petitioner Taruc tried to
organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z.
Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed
Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from
pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the
clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest
were in doubt. The Bishop also appealed to petitioner Taruc to refrain
77
from committing acts inimical and prejudicial to the best interests of
the PIC. He likewise advised petitioners to air their complaints before
the higher authorities of PIC if they believed they had valid grievances
against him, the parish priest, the laws and canons of the PIC.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary
injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of
Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin
T. Bordas on the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to have
petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC. They
contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without
trial thus violating their right to due process of law.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before the
lower court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied.
Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied so they elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the
court a quo and ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice
to its being re-filed before the proper forum. Petitioners appealed from
the above decision but their petition was denied. Their motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied, hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case
involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution.
Ruling: We rule that the courts do not.
Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution specifically provides that: “No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be -Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or a former government official) initiated this original action seeking
political rights.” (1) to prohibit and “enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from
privately entering
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the

institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It
is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines
and/or abroad — including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and
(2) to “compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and

for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related
to or relating to such negotiations and
just church regulations.
agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs.” Chavez is the
In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, we
same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their
enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving religious institutions
cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and
or organizations, there is one area which the Court should not touch:
the systematic subjugation of the country's economy; he says that
doctrinal and disciplinary differences. Thus, The amendments of the
what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2
constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of
bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997.
faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith,
These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule
dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the
banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
share these assets.
courts.

_____________________________________ PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all

Right to Information negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering

the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the
59. CHAVEZ VS PCGG – CASE DIGEST (CONSTI 2: RIGHT TO
alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount
INFORMATION)
public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's
economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of
Facts:

78
the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know
the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the
government.
RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's
action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked
the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even
if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure,
since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.
PETITIONER INVOKES
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest.
RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer
to completed and
operative official acts, not to those still being considered.
79
Issue: Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to
the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the
Marcoses.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and
Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and
the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for
being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its
officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may
be directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to
disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise
settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-
gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this
Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.”
RD: The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject
provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and
extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations
within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty
may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized
restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information - there is a
governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters. 24 But where there is no need to protect such state secrets,
the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other
information, 25 provided that they are examined "in strict confidence"
and given "scrupulous protection."
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions -trade or industrial secrets
(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other related laws)
as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act 28) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure
(3) criminal matters- Also excluded are classified law enforcement
matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution
and the detention of criminals, which courts neither may nor inquire
into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective
law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access
to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the
whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covertcriminal activities.
(4) other confidential information - The Ethical Standards Act 31
further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging
"confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public." Other
acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions
of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of
the Supreme Court.
In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the
information sought must be "matters of public concern," access to
which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public
disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and
may also be "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public
concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
elucidated: “In determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. “ “Public
concern" like “public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition.
80
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.”
Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court believes
that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information
on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information,
though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in
the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage.
There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on
disclosure of information in general, as discussed above— such as on
such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign
relations, intelligence and other classified
____________________________________
60. Francisco Chavez vs Public Estates Authority (July 2002)
FACTS:
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about
to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares
of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD:
No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The
592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in
a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also
seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
________________________________________
81
61.NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN
deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using
their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate
Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated
for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried
to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent
a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA
and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate
vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent
committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time
that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three
(3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:The communications are covered by executive privilege.
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees
to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.),
does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This
is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where
the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of
the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received”
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
82
judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with
the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his
claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary
in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well
as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply
put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President.
Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the compliance with the law and the purpose thereof, but especially in the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud.”
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC could be compelled to release the
petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional
source code to CenPEG
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if RULING: Yes, pertinent portion of Section 12 of RA 9369 is clear in
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made that “once an Automated Election System technology is selected for
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he implementation, the COMELEC shall promptly make the source code
was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly of that technology available and open to any interested political party
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the or groups which may conduct their own interview thereof.”
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this
executive privilege.
requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
source code was that it was not yet available when Cen PEG asked for
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
security reasons, “under a controlled environment.” The elections had
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
passed and that reason is already stale.
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, _________________________________________
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
Right to Form Association
provided by law.
63. In Re: Edillon
__________________________________________

62. CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT vs COMELEC (Sep. FACTS

21, 2010)
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to

FACTS: COMELEC failed to provide the plaintiffs with the source code pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of

of identified canvass machines despite repeated requests and Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of

demands. CenPEG is now praying for the issuance of a writ of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of

mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 2010 elections, claiming that membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He

the source code remained important and relevant “not only for contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in
83
order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty
and property and thereby null and void.
ISSUE Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation
of liberty and property of the respondent.
RULING The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as
distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP
however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a
member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance
of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the
purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of
regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not
infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid
exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with
regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken
out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the
bar.
________________________________________
64. MALABANAN vs RAMENTO 129 SCRA 359
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M,
on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
84
students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and
Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such
permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second
floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and
vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same
day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued
their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they
rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the
same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal
assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they
were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the
holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and
Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of
illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit
granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation.
The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary
action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right
to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic.
They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded
and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking
place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and
present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without
prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are
guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their
exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent
punishment unless there be a showing of aclear and present danger
to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a
corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of
the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character
of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy
of disorderunder the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may
be aired beingsusceptible to correction through the ways of the law.
If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be
sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to
deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such
permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the
assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the
non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its
terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the
offense.
__________________________________________
65. UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION VS HON.
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
85
FACTS:
The petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears
that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification on
behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal,
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the
route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible
for union membership under the first sentence of Art 245 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees-Managerial employees are not eligible
to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees
shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for
resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, so far declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form,
assit or join unions, contravenes Article III, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial
employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates
Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.
 Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro
Manila. On various dates in September and October 1990, petitioners
RULING: Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the
did not report for work and instead, participated in mass actions by
Constitution. The real intent of Article III, section 8 is evident in
public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of
Lerum’s proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to
petitioning the government for redress of their grievances. Petitioners
organize of government workers, supervisory employees and security
were administratively charged with such offenses as grave
guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law,
absolute constitutional rights to organize for labor purposes should be
rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to
deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers. Nor
perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the
is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section 8 of the
best interest of the service and absence without official leave.
Constitution infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming
Petitioners failed to answer these charges. Following the
a union. The guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is subject to the
investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating committees,
condition that its exercise should be for the purposes “not contrary to
Secretary Cariño found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their
law.” In the case of Art 245, there is rational basis for prohibiting
immediate dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed and the
managerial employees from forming or joining labor organization. For
CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cariño to six (6) months
the reason that these managerial employees would belong to or be
suspension without pay.
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty
to the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The union also Appeal to CA: Denied
becomes company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership. ISSUE: Whether Petitioner’s participation in the mass actions was an
exercise of their constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and
__________________________________________
petition the government for redress of grievances

HELD: These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike;
they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from, work which it was the teachers’ sworn duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons. The ability to strike is
not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute,
66. Acosta vs. Court of Appeals, June 28, 2000
public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work
stoppages for any purpose.

86
Further, herein petitioners, are being penalized not because they
exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of
grievances but because of their successive unauthorized and
unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their
students for whose education they are responsible.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, “It is not the exercise by the
petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which
resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and
classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there
are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions
in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for
redress of grievances.”
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however
temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of
the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees.
It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and
noble intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify
their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their
righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.
_______________________________________
Non-Impairment Clause
67. Pacific Wide Realty and Dev’t Corp vs. Puerto Azul Land,
Inc.
87
FACTS:
Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto
Azul Complex situated in Ternate, Cavite. In order to finance its
operations, it obtained loans from various banks. However, PALI was
unable to keep up with the payment of its obligations, both current
and those that were about to fall due. One of its creditors, the Export
and Industry Bank (EIB) – later substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and
Development Corporation (PWRDC) – filed foreclosure proceedings on
PALIs mortgaged properties. PALI filed a petition for suspension of
payments and rehabilitation, accompanied by a proposed
rehabilitation plan and three (3) nominees for the appointment of a
rehabilitation receiver.
On December 13, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision approving PALIs
petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation.
In G.R. No. 178768
On March 3, 2005, EIB filed an urgent motion to order PALI and/or
the mortgagor TUI/rehabilitation receiver to pay all the taxes due on
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 133164. EIB claimed that the
property covered by TCT No. 133164, registered in the name of TUI,
was one of the properties used to secure PALI’s loan from EIB.
PALI opposed the motion, arguing that the rehabilitation courts stay
order stopped the enforcement of all claims, whether for money or
otherwise, against a debtor, its guarantors, and its sureties not
solidarily liable to the debtor; thus, TCT No. 133164 was covered by
the stay order.
The court reiterated that TCT No. 133164, under the name of TUI,
was excluded from the stay order. In order to protect the interest of
EIB as creditor of PALI, it may foreclose TCT No. 133164 and settle
the delinquency taxes of third-party mortgagor TUI with the local
government of Pasay City.
PALI filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
rehabilitation court in allowing the foreclosure of a mortgage
constituted over the property of an accommodation mortgagor, to
secure the loan obligations of a corporation seeking relief in a
rehabilitation proceeding.
On July 27, 2009, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions.
ISSUE
whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in
violation of the non-impairment clause
RULING
No. The terms of the rehabilitation plan are reasonable and does not
violate the non-impairment clause
Under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, rehabilitation is defined as the restoration of the debtor
to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that
its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors
can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the
plan, more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is
immediately liquidated.
We find nothing onerous in the terms of PALIs rehabilitation plan. The
restructuring of the debts of PALI is part and parcel of its
rehabilitation. Moreover, per findings of fact of the RTC and as
88
affirmed by the CA, the restructuring of the debts of PALI would not
be prejudicial to the interest of PWRDC as a secured creditor.
We also find no merit in PWRDCs contention that there is a violation
of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
mandates that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be
passed. This case does not involve a law or an executive issuance
declaring the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its
creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non-
impairment clause may not be invoked.
____________________________________________
68. Hon Heherson Alvarez vs PICOP Resource, Inc.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement
(TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for
Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to
sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all
the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into
an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for
Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969
Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Issue: Whether or not the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-
impairment clause by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the
IFMA).
Held: NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment
clause. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked. The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner,
be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive
possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result
in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign
power to control and supervise the exploration, development
and utilization of the natural resources in the area.
_____________________________________
69. DIAZ VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE- Value Added Tax (VAT)
Issue: May toll fees collected by tollway operators be subject to VAT?
Held: YES.
(1) VAT is imposed on “all kinds of services” and tollway operators
who are engaged in constructing, maintaining, and operating
expressways are no different from lessors of property, transportation
contractors, etc.
(2) Not only do they fall under the broad term under (1) but also come
under those described as “all other franchise grantees” which is not
89
confined only to legislative franchise grantees since the law does not
distinguish. They are also not a franchise grantee under Section 119
which would have made them subject to percentage tax and not VAT.
(3) Neither are the services part of the enumeration under Section
109 on VAT-exempt transactions.
(4) The toll fee is not a user’s tax and thus it is permissible to impose
a VAT on the said fee. The MIAA case does not apply and the Court
emphasized that toll fees are not taxes since they are not assessed
by the BIR and do not go the general coffers of the government. Toll
fees are collected by private operators as reimbursement for their
costs and expenses with a view to a profit while taxes are imposed by
the government as an attribute of its sovereignty. Even if the toll fees
were treated as user’s tax, the VAT can not be deemed as a ‘tax on
tax’ since the VAT is imposed on the tollway operator and the fact that
it might pass-on the same to the tollway user, it will not make the
latter directly liable for VAT since the shifted VAT simply becomes part
of the cost to use the tollways.
(5) The assertion that the VAT imposed is not administratively feasible
given the manner by which the BIR intends to implement the VAT
(i.e., rounding off the toll rates and putting any excess collection in
an escrow account) is not enough to invalidate the law. Non-
observance of the canon of administrative feasibility will not render a
tax imposition invalid “except to the extent that specific constitutional
or statutory limitations are impaired”.
_____________________________________________
Freedom to Courts
70. RE: REQUEST OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
AID TO EXEMPT CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND
OTHER FEES.
FACTS:
On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution
No. 24, series of 2008.The resolution requested the IBPs National
Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the
payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid
offices in the various IBP chapters. Resolution No. 24, series of 2008
provided: RESOLUTION OF THE IBPMISAMIS ORIENTAL CHAPTER FOR
THE IBP NATIONAL LEGAL AID OFFICE TO REQUEST THE COURTS
AND OTHER QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION
CENTER AND PROSECUTORS OFFICES TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID
CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES
INCIDENTAL TO THE FILING AND LITIGATION OF ACTIONS, AS
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS OR ON APPEAL.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 24 series of 2008 be approved
by the Supreme Court
RULING: The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal
Fees of the Clients of the NCLA and of the Legal Aid Offices in the
Local Chapters of the IBP is approved, thus, the request of the
Misamis Oriental Chapter for the exemption from the payment of
filing, docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of
the various IBP chapters is granted.
90
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free
access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid
service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters
nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance.
Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP
chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from the
payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint
or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section
11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is
increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major
roadblock.
The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the
most important pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized
sectors of our society. Access to justice by all, especially by the poor,
is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a
democracy and in the rule of law. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be
without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there
must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and
efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible
is no remedy at all. The IBP, pursuant to its general objectives to
improve the administration of justice and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively, assists the Court in providing
the poor access to justice. In particular, it renders free legal aid under
the supervision of the NCLA.
______________________________________________
Custodial Investigation
71. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment Adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 entry into force 26
June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1)
The States Parties to this Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that those rights derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter, in particular
Article 55, to promote universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
Having regard also to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General
Assembly on 9 December 1975,
Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the
world,
Have agreed as follows:
91
PART I
Article 1
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or
national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider
application.
Article 2
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war
or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be
invoked as a justification of torture.
Article 3
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds,
the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations
of human rights.
Article 4
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences
under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit
torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or
participation in torture. 2. Each State Party shall make these offences
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their
grave nature.
Article 5
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the
following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers
it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases
where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its
92
jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any
of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with internal law.
Article 6
1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available
to it, that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose
territory a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to
in article 4 is present shall take him into custody or take other legal
measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other legal
measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may be
continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or
extradition proceedings to be instituted.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the
facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph I of this article shall
be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest
appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national, or,
if he is a stateless person, with the representative of the State where
he usually resides.
4. When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into
custody, it shall immediately notify the States referred to in article 5,
paragraph 1, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the
circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes
the preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article
shall promptly report its findings to the said States and shall indicate
whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
Article 7
1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person
alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found
shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite
him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as
in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law
of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the
standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in
no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred
to in article 5, paragraph 1.
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection
with any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed
fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.
Article 8
1. The offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included
as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between
States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as
extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded
between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another
State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider
this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such
offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided
by the law of the requested State.
93
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable
offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by
the law of the requested State.
4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition
between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the
place in which they occurred but also in the territories of the States
required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 5,
paragraph 1.
Article 9
1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect
of any of the offences referred to in article 4, including the supply of
all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.
2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph I of
this article in conformity with any treaties on mutual judicial
assistance that may exist between them.
Article 10
1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information
regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the
training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical
personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in
the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to
any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
2. Each State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or
instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of any such
person.
Article 11
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation
rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for
the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest,
detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with
a view to preventing any cases of torture.
Article 12
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other
persons to compensation which may exist under national law.
Article 15
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established
to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of
torture as evidence that the statement was made.

Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed Article 16
to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable
1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under
ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any
its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
territory under its jurisdiction.
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I,
Article 13 when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has
an official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles
been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the
10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to
right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially
torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading
examined by, its competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure
treatment or punishment.
that the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-
treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his complaint or any 2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the
evidence given. provisions of any other international instrument or national law which
prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or
Article 14
which relates to extradition or expulsion.
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of
PART II
an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation, including the means for as full Article 17
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a
1. There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter
result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to
referred to as the Committee) which shall carry out the functions
compensation.
hereinafter provided. The Committee shall consist of ten experts of
high moral standing and recognized competence in the field of human

94
rights, who shall serve in their personal capacity. The experts shall be
elected by the States Parties, consideration being given to equitable
geographical distribution and to the usefulness of the participation of
some persons having legal experience.
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot
from a list of persons nominated by States Parties. Each State Party
may nominate one person from among its own nationals. States
Parties shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who
are also members of the Human Rights Committee established under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and who are
willing to serve on the Committee against Torture.
3. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at biennial
meetings of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. At those meetings, for which two thirds of the States
Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the
Committee shall be those who obtain the largest number of votes and
an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States
Parties present and voting.
4. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the
date of the entry into force of this Convention. At. Ieast four months
before the date of each election, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to
submit their nominations within three months. The Secretary-General
shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated,
indicating the States Parties which have nominated them, and shall
submit it to the States Parties.
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four
years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated. However,
95
the term of five of the members elected at the first election shall
expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election the
names of these five members shall be chosen by lot by the chairman
of the meeting referred to in paragraph 3 of this article.
6. If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or for any other cause
can no longer perform his Committee duties, the State Party which
nominated him shall appoint another expert from among its nationals
to serve for the remainder of his term, subject to the approval of the
majority of the States Parties. The approval shall be considered given
unless half or more of the States Parties respond negatively within six
weeks after having been informed by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations of the proposed appointment.
7. States Parties shall be responsible for the expenses of the members
of the Committee while they are in performance of Committee duties.
Article 18
1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They
may be re-elected.
2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these
rules shall provide, inter alia, that:
(a) Six members shall constitute a quorum;
(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of
the members present.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the
necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the
functions of the Committee under this Convention.
4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the
initial meeting of the Committee. After its initial meeting, the
Committee shall meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules
of procedure.
5. The States Parties shall be responsible for expenses incurred in
connection with the holding of meetings of the States Parties and of
the Committee, including reimbursement to the United Nations for any
expenses, such as the cost of staff and facilities, incurred by the
United Nations pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article.
Article 19
1. The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the measures
they have taken to give effect to their undertakings under this
Convention, within one year after the entry into force of the
Convention for the State Party concerned. Thereafter the States
Parties shall submit supplementary reports every four years on any
new measures taken and such other reports as the Committee may
request.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the
reports to all States Parties.
3. Each report shall be considered by the Committee which may make
such general comments on the report as it may consider appropriate
and shall forward these to the State Party concerned. That State Party
may respond with any observations it chooses to the Committee.
4. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide to include any
comments made by it in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article,
together with the observations thereon received from the State Party
concerned, in its annual report made in accordance with article 24. If
so requested by the State Party concerned, the Committee may also
96
include a copy of the report submitted under paragraph I of this
article.
Article 20
1. If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it
to contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically
practised in the territory of a State Party, the Committee shall invite
that State Party to co-operate in the examination of the information
and to this end to submit observations with regard to the information
concerned.
2. Taking into account any observations which may have been
submitted by the State Party concerned, as well as any other relevant
information available to it, the Committee may, if it decides that this
is warranted, designate one or more of its members to make a
confidential inquiry and to report to the Committee urgently.
3. If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article,
the Committee shall seek the co-operation of the State Party
concerned. In agreement with that State Party, such an inquiry may
include a visit to its territory.
4. After examining the findings of its member or members submitted
in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the Commission shall
transmit these findings to the State Party concerned together with any
comments or suggestions which seem appropriate in view of the
situation.
5. All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in paragraphs I to
4 of th is article s hall be con fidential , and at all stages of the
proceedings the co-operation of the State Party shall be sought. After
such proceedings have been completed with regard to an inquiry
made in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee may, after
consultations with the State Party concerned, decide to include a refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Committee
summary account of the results of the proceedings in its annual report and to the other State;
made in accordance with article 24.
(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it under this
Article 21 article only after it has ascertained that all domestic remedies have
been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this
generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be
article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive
the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably
and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims
prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is
that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under this
the victim of the violation of this Convention;
Convention. Such communications may be received and considered
according to the procedures laid down in this article only if submitted (d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining
by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard communications under this article; (e) Subject to the provisions of
to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall subparagraph
be dealt with by the Committee under this article if it concerns a State
(e), the Committee shall make available its good offices to the States
Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications
Parties concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on
received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the
the basis of respect for the obligations provided for in this Convention.
following procedure;
For this purpose, the Committee may, when appropriate, set up an ad
(a) If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving hoc conciliation commission;
effect to the provisions ofthis Convention, it may, by written
(f) In any matter referred to it under this article, the Committee may
communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party.
call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph
Within three months after the receipt of the communication the
(b), to supply any relevant information;
receiving State shall afford the State which sent the communication
(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b),
an explanation or any other statement in writing clarifying the matter,
shall have the right to be represented when the matter is being
which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, reference
considered by the Committee and to make submissions orally and/or
to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending or available in
in writing;
the matter;
(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months after the date of
(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States
receipt of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report:
Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving
State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to

97
(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the
Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts
and of the solution reached;
(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached,
the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts;
the written submissions and record of the oral submissions made by
the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report.
In every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States
Parties concerned.
2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States
Parties to this Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1
of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States
Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may
be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General.
Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter
which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under
this article; no further communication by any State Party shall be
received under this article after the notification of withdrawal of the
declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the
State Party concerned has made a new declaration.
Article 22
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this
article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive
and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject
to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State
Party of the provisions of the Convention. No communication shall be
98
received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not
made such a declaration.
2. The Committee shall consider inadmissible any communication
under this article which is anonymous or which it considers to be an
abuse of the right of submission of such communications or to be
incompatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, the Committee shall bring
any communications submitted to it under this article to the attention
of the State Party to this Convention which has made a declaration
under paragraph I and is alleged to be violating any provisions of the
Convention. Within six months, the receiving State shall submit to the
Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter
and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.
4. The Committee shall consider communications received under this
article in the light of all information made available to it by or on behalf
of the individual and by the State Party concerned. 5. The Committee
shall not consider any communications from an individual under this
article unless it has ascertained that:
(a) The same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under
another procedure of international investigation or settlement;
(b) The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies; this
shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is
unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective reliefto the
person who is the victim of the violation of this Convention.
6. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining
communications under this article.
7. The Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned
and to the individual.
8. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States
Parties to this Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1
of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States
Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may
be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General.
Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter
which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under
this article; no further communication by or on behalf of an individual
shall be received under this article after the notification of withdrawal
of the declaration has been received by the SecretaryGeneral, unless
the State Party has made a new declaration.
Article 23
The members of the Committee and of the ad hoc conciliation
commissions which may be appointed under article 21, paragraph I
(e), shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and immunities of
experts on mission for the United Nations as laid down in the relevant
sections of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations.
Article 24
The Committee shall submit an annual report on its activities under
this Convention to the States Parties and to the General Assembly of
the United Nations.
PART III
Article 25
99
1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. 2. This
Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 26
This Convention is open to accession by all States. Accession shall be
effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the
SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.
Article 27
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the
date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after the
deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the
Convention shall enter into force onthe thirtieth day after the date of
the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 28
1. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this
Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not recognize
the competence of the Committee provided for in article 20.
2. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with
paragraph I of this article may, at any time, withdraw this reservation
by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 29
1 . Any State Party to this Convention may propose an amendment
and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The
SecretaryGeneral shall thereupon communicate the proposed
amendment to the States Parties with a request that they notify him
whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of
considering an d voting upon the proposal. In the event that within
four months from the date of such communication at least one third
of the States Parties favours such a conference, the SecretaryGeneral
shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United
Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties
present and voting at the conference shall be submitted by the
Secretary-General to all the States Parties for acceptance.
2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph I of this
article shall enter into force when two thirds of the States Parties to
this Convention have notified the Secretary-General of the United
Nations that they have accepted it in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes.
3. When amendments enter into force, they shall be binding on those
States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties still
being bound by the provisions of this Convention and any earlier
amendments which they have accepted.
Article 30
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from thc date of the
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the
organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the
dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity
with the Statute of the Court.
100
2. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Con
vention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself
bound by paragraph I of this article. The other States Parties shall not
be bound by paragraph I of this article with respect to any State Party
having made such a reservation.
3. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this article may at any time withdraw this reservation
by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 31
1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation becomes
effective one year after the date of receipt of- the notification by the
Secretary-General .
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State
Party from its obligations under this Convention in regard to any act
or omission which occurs prior to the date at which the denunciation
becomes effective, nor shall denunciation prejudice in any way the
continued consideration of any matter which is already under
consideration by the Committee prior to the date at which the
denunciation becomes effective.
3. Following the date at which the denunciation of a State Party
becomes effective, the Committee shall not commence consideration
of any new matter regarding that State.
Article 32
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States
Members of the United Nations and all States which have signed this
Convention or acceded to it of the following:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under articles 25 and 26;
(b) The date of entry into force of this Convention under article 27
and the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article
29;
(c) Denunciations under article 31.
Article 33
1. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified
copies of this Convention to all States.
___________________________________________
72. REPUBLIC ACT N0. 9745
AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN
AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT AND
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR
Section 1. Short Title. - This Ad shall be known as the "Anti-Torture
Act of 2009”.
Section 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of
the State:
101
(a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full
respect for human rights;
(b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including suspects,
detainees and prisoners are respected at all times; and that no person
placed under investigation or held in custody of any person in
authority or, agent of a person authority shall be subjected to
physical, psychological or mental harm, force, violence, threat or
intimidation or any act that impairs his/her free wi11 or in any manner
demeans or degrades human dignity;
(c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado
or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out
with impunity, are prohibited; and
(d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the absolute
condemnation and prohibition of torture as provided for in the 1987
Philippine Constitution; various international instruments to which the
Philippines is a State party such as, but not limited to, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W)
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant
international human rights instruments to which the Philippines is a
signatory.
Section 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
(a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information
or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/she or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating
or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person
in authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain
or Buffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.
(b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment"
refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not
enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority against a person under
his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing suffering,
gross humiliation or debasement to the latter.
(c) "Victim" refers to the person subjected to torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined above
and any individual who has suffered harm as a result of any act(s) of
torture, or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment.
(d) "Order of Battle" refers to any document or determination made
by the military, police or any law enforcement agency of the
government, listing the names of persons and organizations that it
perceives to be enemies of the State and that it considers as
legitimate targets as combatants that it could deal with, through the
use of means allowed by domestic and international law.
Section 4. Acts of Torture. - For purposes of this Act, torture shall
include, but not be limited to, the following:
102
(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by
a person in authority or agent of a person in authority upon another
in his/her custody that causes severe pain, exhaustion, disability or
dysfunction of one or more parts of the body, such as:
(1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with
truncheon or rifle butt or other similar objects, and jumping on the
stomach;
(2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or
human excreta and other stuff or substances not normally eaten;
(3) Electric shock;
(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil,
acid; by the rubbing of pepper or other chemical substances on
mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly on the wound(s);
(5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with
excrement, urine, vomit and/or blood until the brink of suffocation;
(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;
(7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects
into the sex organ or rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals;
(8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such
as the genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.;
(9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;
(10) Pulling out of fingernails;
(11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme
cold;
(12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head
to the point of asphyxiation;
(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception,
memory. alertness or will of a person, such as:
(i) The administration or drugs to induce confession and/or reduce
mental competency; or
(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a
disease; and
(14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and
(b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by a
person in authority or agent of a person in authority which are
calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine a person's
dignity and morale, such as:
(1) Blindfolding;
(2) Threatening a person(s) or his/fher relative(s) with bodily harm,
execution or other wrongful acts;
(3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;
(4) Prolonged interrogation;
(5) Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or public
humiliation of a detainee or prisoner;
(6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from
one place to another, creating the belief that he/she shall be
summarily executed;
(7) Maltreating a member/s of a person's family;
(8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person's
family, relatives or any third party;
(9) Denial of sleep/rest;
(10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading
him/her in public places, shaving the victim's head or putting marks
on his/her body against his/her will;
(11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any
member of his/her family; and
(12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.
103
Section 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. - Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a
person in authority or agent of a person in authority against another
person in custody, which attains a level of severity sufficient to cause
suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The
assessment of the level of severity shall depend on all the
circumstances of the case, including the duration of the treatment or
punishment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the
sex, religion, age and state of health of the victim.
Section 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, An Absolute Bight. - Torture and
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as
criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of war or a threat
of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency, or
a document or any determination comprising an "order of battle" shall
not and can never be invoked as a justification for torture and other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
Section 7. Prohibited Detention. - Secret detention places, solitary
confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention,
where torture may be carried out with impunity. Are hereby
prohibited.
In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and other law enforcement. agencies
concerned shall make an updated list of all detention centers and
facilities under their respective jurisdictions with the corresponding
data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein
such as, among others, names, date of arrest and incarceration, and
the crime or offense committed. This list shall be made available to
the public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at the
respective national headquarters of the PNP and AFP. A copy of the
complete list shall likewise be submitted by the PNP, AFP and all other
law enforcement agencies to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
such list to be periodically updated, by the same agencies, within the
first five (5) days of every month at the minimum. Every regional
office of the PNP, AFP and other law enforcement agencies shall also
maintain a similar list far all detainees and detention facilities within
their respective areas, and shall make the same available to the public
at all times at their respective regional headquarters, and submit a
copy. updated in the same manner provided above, to the respective
regional offices of the CHR.
Section 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. - Any
confession, admission or statement obtained as a result of torture
shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings, except if the
same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of
committing torture.
Section 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other
Persons Involved. - A victim of torture shall have the following rights
in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture:
(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and
by agencies of government concerned such as the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the PNP, the National
104
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the AFP. A prompt investigation
shall mean a maximum period of sixty (60) working days from the
time a complaint for torture is filed within which an investigation
report and/or resolution shall be completed and made available. An
appeal whenever available shall be resolved within the same period
prescribed herein,
(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of
harassment; threat and/or intimidation as a consequence of the filing
of said complaint or the presentation of evidence therefor. In which
case, the State through its appropriate agencies shall afford security
in order to ensure his/her safety and all other persons involved in the
investigation and prosecution such as, but not limited to, his/her
lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and
(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she
testifies and presents evidence in any fora in order to avoid further
trauma.
Section 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and
Habeas Data Proceedings and Compliance with a Judicial 07'der. - A
writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of habeas data
proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the victim of torture or other
cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment or punishment shall be
disposed of expeditiously and any order of release by virtue thereof,
or other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be
executed or complied with immediately.
Section 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. - The CHR and the PAO
shall render legal assistance in the investigation and monitoring
and/or filing of the complaint for a person who suffers torture and
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or for
any interested party thereto.
The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance from the
Barangay Human Rights Action Center (BRRAC) nearest him/her as
well as from human rights nongovernment organizations (NGOs).
Section 12. Right to' Physical, Medical and Psychological
Examination. - Before and after interrogation, every person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall have the right to he
informed of his/her right to demand physical examination by an
independent and competent doctor of his/her own choice. If such
person cannot afford the services of his/her own doctor, he/she shall
he provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor to
conduct physical examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the
victim with psychological evaluation if available under the
circumstances. If the person arrested is a female, she shall be
attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore, any person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, including his/her
immediate family, shall have the right to immediate access to proper
and adequate medical treatment. The physical examination and/or
psychological evaluation of the victim shall be contained in a medical
report, duly signed by the attending physician, which shall include in
detail his/her medical history and findings, and which shall he
attached to the custodial investigation report. Such report shall be
considered a public document.
Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked to
conduct physical, psychological and mental examinations, the medical
reports shall, among others, include:
(a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim;
105
(b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or victim;
(c) The name and address of the person who brought the patient or
victim for physical, psychological and mental examination, and/or
medical treatment;
(d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim's injury,
pain and disease and/or trauma;
(e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain, disease
and/or trauma was/were sustained;
(f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were
sustained;
(g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and
(h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the patient.
Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this
pr<;lvision may knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights in
writing, executed in the presence and assistance of his/her counsel.
Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who actually
participated Or induced another in the commission of torture or other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or who
cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment by previous or
simultaneous acts shall be liable as principal
Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior
government official who issued an order to any lower ranking
personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall be held
equally liable as principals.
The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP
or the immediate senior public official of the PNP and other law
enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal to the crime
of torture or other cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment for any act or omission, or negligence committed by
him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or allowed, whether
directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates.
If he/she has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known that acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is being
committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates or by
others within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, did not take preventive or corrective action either before,
during or immediately after its commission, when he/she has the
authority to prevent or investigate allegations of torture or other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment but failed to
prevent or investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or
due to negligence shall also be liable as principals.
Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she
has knowledge that torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment is being committed and without having
participated therein, either as principal or accomplice, takes part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
(a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit
from the effects of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment and/or destroying the effects or
instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; or(c) By
harboring, concealing or assisting m the escape of the principal/s in
the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
106
punishment: Provided, That the accessory acts are done with the
abuse of the official's public functions.
Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon the perpetrators of the following acts:
(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;
(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;
(3) Torture with rape;
(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of
torture, the victim shall have become insane, imbecile, impotent, blind
or maimed for life; and
(5) Torture committed against children.
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who
commit any act of mental/psychological torture resulting in insanity,
complete or partial amnesia, fear of becoming insane or suicidal
tendencies of the victim due to guilt, worthlessness or shame.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who
commit any act of torture resulting in psychological, mental and
emotional harm other than those described 1n paragraph (b) of this
section.
(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have
lost the power of speech or the power to hear or to smell; or shall
have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have lost
the use of any such member; Or shall have become permanently
incapacitated for labor.
(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have
become deformed or shall have lost any part of his/her body other
than those aforecited, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have
been ill or incapacitated for labor for a period of more than ninety (90)
days.
(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if, in consequence of
torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for
mare than thirty (30) days but not more than ninety (90) days.
(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall
have been ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty (30) days or less.
(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in
Section 5 of this Act.
(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those
who establish, operate and maintain secret detention places and/or
effect or cause to effect solitary confinement, incommunicado or other
similar forms of prohibited detention as provided in Section 7 of this
Act where torture may be carried out with impunity.
(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the
responsible officers or personnel of the AFP, the PNP and other law
enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her duty to maintain,
submit or make available to the public an updated list of detention
centers and facilities with the corresponding data on the prisoners or
detainees incarcerated or detained therein, pursuant to Section 7 of
this Act.
Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. - Torture
as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other
crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a means in the
107
conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be treated
as a separate and independent criminal act whose penalties shall be
imposable without prejudice to any other criminal liability provided for
by domestic and international laws.
Section 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty Law. -
In order not to depreciate the crime of torture, persons who have
committed any act of torture shall not benefit from any special
amnesty law or similar measures that will have the effect of
exempting them from any criminal proceedings and sanctions.
Section 17. Applicability of Refouler. - No person shall be expelled,
returned or extradited to another State where there are substantial
grounds to believe that such person shall be in danger of being
subjected to torture. For the purposes of determining whether such
grounds exist, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) and the Secretary of the DOJ, in coordination with the
Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable and not limited to, the
existence in the requesting State of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
Section 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. - Any person who
has suffered torture shall have the right to claim for compensation as
provided for under Republic Act No. 7309: Provided, That in no case
shall compensation be any lower than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00). Victims of torture shall also have the right to claim for
compensation from such other financial relief programs that may be
made available to him/her under existing law and rules and
regulations.
Section 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. - Within one (1)
year from the effectivity of this Act, the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), the DOJ and the Department of Health
(DOH) and such other concerned government agencies, and human
rights organizations shall formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation
program for victims of torture and their families. The DSWD, the DOJ
and thc DOH shall also call on human rights nongovernment
organizations duly recognized by the government to actively
participate in the formulation of such program that shall provide for
the physical, mental, social, psychological healing and development
of victims of torture and their families. Toward the attainment of
restorative justice, a parallel rehabilitation program for persons who
have committed torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
punishment shall likewise be formulated by the same agencies.
Section 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. - An Oversight
Committee is hereby created to periodically oversee the
implementation of this Act. The Committee shall be headed by a
Commissioner of the CRR, with the following as members: the
Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
the respective Chairpersons of the House of Representatives'
Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and the Minority Leaders
of both houses or their respective representatives in the minority.
Section 21. Education and Information Campaign. - The CHR, the
DOJ, the Department of National Defense (DND), the Department of
108
the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and such other concerned
parties in both the public and private sectors shall ensure that
education and information regarding prohibition against torture and
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be
fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or
military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who
may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any
individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
The Department of Education (DepED) and the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) shall also ensure the integration of human rights
education courses in all primary, secondary and tertiary level
academic institutions nationwide.
Section 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions
of the Revised Penal Code insofar as they are applicable shall be
suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission of any crime
punishable under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) and Title Nine
(Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of the Revised Penal
Code is attended by any of the acts constituting torture and other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined
herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period.
Section 23. Appropriations. - The amount of Five million pesos
(Php5,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated to the CHR for the initial
implementation of tills Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOJ and the
CHR, with the active participation of human rights nongovernmental
organizations, shall promulgate the rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of tills Act. They shall also ensure the full
dissemination of such rules and regulations to all officers and
members of various law enforcement agencies.
Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected
thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders
or rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 27. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
_____________________________________________
73. Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING
AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of
every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.
109
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation;
Duties of Public Officers. –
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of
an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by
him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to
confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel,
he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the
investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the
investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read
and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or
by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language
or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such
investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in
the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver,
and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his
spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor,
or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such
extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
 (e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall
be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel;
otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be
allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family,
or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-
governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human
Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly
accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family"
shall include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or
sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and
guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer
for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly
affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those
charged with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the
following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person
is chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person
is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;
110
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality
where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such
municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City
Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting
counsel before the province pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the
suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand
pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not
more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted
of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or
anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who
fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if
the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member
of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by
him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting
 and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or
from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent
cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos
(P4,000.00).lawphi1©
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures
as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby
repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations,
or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992
___________________________________________
74. Inquest Procedures (DOJ Circular No. 61, 1993) Evidence
Needed for an Inquest Proceedings
SECTION 1.Concept .—Inquest is an informal and summary
investigation con-ducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases
involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a
warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of deter-mining
whether or not said persons should remain under custody and
correspondingly be charged in court.
111
SEC. 2.Designationof Inquest Officers.—The City or Provincial
Prosecutor shall designate the Prosecutors assigned to inquest duties
and shall furnish the Philippine National Police (PNP) a list of their
names and their schedule of assignments. If, however, there is only
one Prosecutor in the area, all inquest cases shall be referred to him
for appropriate action. Unless otherwise directed by the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, those assigned to inquest duties shall discharge
their functions during the hours of their designated assignments and
only at the police stations/headquarters of the PNP in order to
expedite and facilitate the disposition of inquest cases.
SEC. 3.Commencement and Termination of Inquest.—The
inquest proceedings shall be considered commenced upon receipt by
the Inquest Officer from the law enforcement authorities of the
complaint/referral documents which should include:
a. the affidavit of arrest;
b. the investigation report;
c. the statement of the complainant and witnesses; and
d. other supporting evidence gathered by the police in the
course of the latter’s investigation of the criminal incident
involving the arrested or detained person. The inquest Officer
shall, as far as practicable, cause the affidavit of arrest and
statements/affidavits of the complainant and the witnesses to
be subscribed and sworn to before him by the arresting officer
and the affiants. The inquest proceedings must be terminated
within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. *
SEC. 4.Particular Documents Required in Specific Cases.—The
submission, presentation of the documents listed herein below should
as far as practicable, be required in the following cases by the Inquest
Officer.
Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)
a. a list/inventory of the articles and items subject of the
offense; and
b. statement of their respective value
Illegal Possession of Explosives (PD 1866)
a. chemistry report duly signed by the forensic chemist and
b. photograph of the explosives, if readily available.
Violation of the Fisheries Law (PD 704)(now RA 8550)
a. photograph of the confiscated fish, if readily available; and
b. certification of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources;
Violation of the Forestry Law (PD 705)
a. scale sheets containing the volume and species of the forest
products confiscated, number of pieces and other important
details such as estimated value of the products confiscated;
b. certification of Department of Environment and Natural
Resources/Bureau of Forest Management; and
c. seizure receipt. The submission of the foregoing documents
shall no absolutely be required if there are other forms of
evidence submitted which will sufficiently establish the facts
sought to be proved by the foregoing documents.
112
SEC. 5.Incomplete documents.—When the documents presented
are not complete to establish probable cause, the Inquest Officer shall
direct the law enforcement agency to submit the required evidence
within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; otherwise, the Inquest Officer shall
order the release of the detained person and, where the inquest is
conducted outside of office hours, direct the law enforcement agency
concerned to file the case with the City or Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action.
SEC. 6.Presence of the detained person.—The presence of the
detained person who is under custody shall be ensured during the
proceedings. However, the production of the detained person before
the Inquest Officer may be dispensed with in the following cases:
a. if he is confined in a hospital;
b. if he is detained in a place under maximum security;
c. if production of the detained person involve security risks;
or
d. if the presence of the detained person is not feasible by
reason of age, health, sex and other similar factors.
The absence of the detained person by reason of any of the foregoing
factors must be noted by the Inquest Officer and reflected in the
record of the case.
SEC. 7.Charges and counter-charges.—All charges and counter-
charges arising from the same incident shall, as far as practicable, be
consolidated and inquested jointly to avoid contradictory
inconsistent dispositions.
SEC. 8.Initial duty of the inquest officer .—The Inquest Officer
must first deter-mine if the arrest of the detained person was made
in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section
5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
which provide that arrests without a warrant may be effected:
a. when, in the presence of the arresting officer, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; or
b. when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the
arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it. For this
purpose, the Inquest Officer may summarily examine the
arresting officers on the circumstances surrounding the arrest
or apprehension of the detained per-son.
SEC. 9.Where arrest not properly effected.—Should the Inquest
Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules,
he shall:
a. recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b. note down the disposition of the referral document;
c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the
action taken; and
d. forward the same, together with the record of the case, to
the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
113
or
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is
approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on
hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the
order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said
detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee
the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the
copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavits or sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting
evidence.
SEC. 10.Where the arrest property effected.—Should the Inquest
Officer find that the arrest was properly effected, the detained person
should be asked if he desires to avail himself of a preliminary
investigation, if he does, he shall be made to execute a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with
the assistance of a lawyer and, in case of non-availability of a lawyer,
a responsible person of his choice. The preliminary investigation may
be conducted by the Inquest Officer himself or by any other Assistant
Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned by the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, which investigation shall be terminated within fifteen(15)
days from its inception.
SEC. 11.Inquest proper .—Where the detained person does not opt
for a preliminary investigation or otherwise refuses to execute the
required waiver, the Inquest Officer shall proceed with the inquest by
examining the sworn statements/affidavits of the complainant and the
witnesses and other supporting evidence submitted to him. If
necessary, the Inquest Officer may require the presence of the
complainant and witnesses and subject them to an informal and
summary investigation or examination for purposes of determining
the existence of probable cause.
SEC. 12.Meaning of probable cause.—Probable cause exists when
the evidence submitted to the Inquest Officer engenders a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the arrested
or detained person is probably guilty thereof.
SEC. 13.Presence of probable cause.—If the Inquest Officer finds
that probable cause exists, he shall forthwith prepare
corresponding complaint/information with the recommendation that
the same be filed in court. The complaint/information shall indicate
the offense committed and the amount of bail recommended, if
bailable. Thereafter, the record of the case, together with the
prepared com-plaint/information, shall be forwarded to the City or
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
complaint/information may be filed by the Inquest Officer himself or
by any other Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned
by the City or Provincial Prosecutor.
SEC. 14.Contents of information.—The information shall, among
others, contain:
a. a certification by the filing Prosecutor that he is filing the
same in accordance with the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, in
cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court;
b. the full name and alias, if any, and address of the accused;
114
c. the place where the accused is actually detained;
d. the full names and addresses of the complainant and
witnesses;
e. a detailed description of the recovered item, if any;
f. the full name and address of the evidence custodian;
g. the age and date of birth of the complainant or the accused,
if eighteen (19)years of age or below; and
h. the full names and addresses of the parents, custodians or
guardians of the minor complainant or accused, as the case
may be.
the
SEC. 15.Absence of probable cause.—If the Inquest Officer finds
no probable cause, he shall:
a. recommend the release of the arrested or detained person;
b. note down his disposition on the referral document;
The c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the
action taken; and
d. forthwith forward the record of the case to the City or
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
If the recommendation of the Inquest Officer for the release of the
arrested or detained person is approved, the order of release shall be
served on the officer having custody of the said detainee. Should the
City or Provincial Prosecutor disapprove the recommendation of
release, the arrested or detained person shall remain under custody,
and the correspond-ing complaint/information shall be filed by the
City or Provincial Prosecutor or by any Assistant Prosecutor to whom
the case may be assigned.

SEC. 16.Presence at the crime scene.—Whenever a dead body is
found and there is reason to believe that the death resulted from foul
play, or from the unlawful acts or omissions of other persons and such
fact has been brought to his attention, the Inquest Officer shall:
a. forthwith proceed to the crime scene or place of discovery
of the dead person;
b. cause an immediate autopsy to be conducted by the
appropriate medico-legal officer in the locality or the PNP
medico-legal division or the NBI medico-legal office, as the
case may be;
c. direct the police investigator to cause the taking of
photographs of the crime scene or place of discovery of the
dead body;
d. supervise the investigation to be conducted by the police
authorities as well as the recovery of all articles and pieces of
evidence found thereat and see to it that the same are
safeguarded and the chain of the custody thereof properly
recorded; and
e. submit a written report of his finding to the City or
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
SEC. 17.Sandiganbayan cases.—Should any complaint cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan be referred to an Inquest Officer for
investigation, the latter shall, after conducting the corresponding
inquest proceeding, forthwith forward the complete record to the City
or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
115
__________________________________________
75. PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985
FACTS:
The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a
robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously
for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence.
There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something
drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the
investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically.
Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken.
A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and
beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into
a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any
more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and
the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted
what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the
confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures
as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him.
RULING: Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer
does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be
informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead
there should be several short and clear questions and every right
explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person
under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing
that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that
he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about
two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver
of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted
by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted
by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
____________________________________
77. People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001]
Facts:
On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep
in her house together with her husband (Danilo Ramos) and children,
Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. Nairube slept close to her "on
the upper part" of her body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke
her up because he sensed someone going down the stairs of their
house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she
was sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call
of nature. Nairube's blanket was also no longer at the place she slept
but that her slippers were still there. After three minutes of waiting
for Nairube's return, she stood up and began calling out for Nairube
but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw
that the backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through
the backdoor to see if Nairube was there but she was not. She found
116
a pair of rubber slippers on top of a wooden bench outside of her
backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the strap was a
combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not belong to any
member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma
Diaz to ask her for help. Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997,
she went to the police station to report the loss of her child. She also
reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to SP02 Quirino Gallardo.
She then went home while the police began their search for Nairube.
At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the
searching team. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which
she recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the panty, she
cried. She was thereafter ordered to go home while the others
continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and
found a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the
end of the sleeve hanging on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt
to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria informed him that the two items were
worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to the house of Violeta
Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on
the basis of the pair of slippers and the black T-shirt. He then brought
Lugod to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At
first, the accused denied that he did anything to Nairube but after he
told him what happened to the girl. Later, although he admitted to
having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement
regarding the same. After having been informed that the body of
Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members
of the PNP, the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued the
search but they were still not able to find the body of Nairube. It was
only when they brought Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the
location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they found the
body of Nairube. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape
with homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod with the assistance of
counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8
October 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna
found Lugod guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to death,
and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Nairube Ramos
the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and
P37,200.00 as actual damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Lugod’s confession and subesequent act of pointing
the location of the Nairube’s body may be used against him as
evidence.
Held: Records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to
remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have
counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there
is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights.
Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the
waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel.
Consequently, Lugod's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he
raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be
used against him for having transgressed Lugod's rights under the Bill
of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be
disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed
may be. In the same vein, Lugod's act in pointing out the location of
the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the Lugod's right
to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled
confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we
were to assume that Lugod was not yet under interrogation and thus
not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to
117
the police station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his apprehension cannot
be characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the
peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession was
elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him
if he told the truth. Furthermore, when ugod allegedly pointed out the
body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police force as well as
nearly 100 of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo
Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards Lugod
and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was
apprehended and taken to the police station up until the time he was
alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was
highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous response.
Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was
beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious
doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-
Mayor, who testified that when he visited Lugod in the jail cell, he
noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face, corroborated Lugod's
assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the confession of
Lugod cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which
was established by the prosecution is the fact that several persons
testified having seen Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube
and on several other occasions wearing the rubber slippers and black
T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia
respectively as well as the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle
driver who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16
September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without
slippers. These pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature. The
combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to
the irrefutably logical conclusion that Lugod raped and murdered
Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of
the other prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's
whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of
the crime and nothing more. Lugod was acquitted.
_____________________________________
78. People of the Philippines vs. Edralin Taboga, G.R. Nos.
144086-87, February 06, 2002
Facts:
Francisca Tubon, a widowed septuagenarian, was robbed,
stabbed and burned beyond recognition when her house built of
strong materials was set on fire.
For the commission of the above felonies, Edralin Taboga was
charged in Criminal Case No. 1818-K with Robbery with Homicide.
That on or about the 1st day of April 1998, in the municipality of
Magsingal, province of Ilocos Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to gain, and with violence against person[s], did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of one Francisca
Tubon, and and stab Francisca Tubon, thereby inflicting upon her
mortal wounds which necessarily caused the death of said Francisca
Tubon.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas
of “Not Guilty” to the crimes charged. The cases were thereafter tried
jointly. The Court finds the accused Edralin Taboga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide with all the aggravating circumstances alleged in the
118
information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty
of DEATH by lethal injection, to indemnify the heirs of Francisca
Tubon; (2) In Criminal Case No. 1819-K, the Court finds the accused,
Edralin Taboga, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Destructive Arson
and hereby sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua.
The case is now before us on automatic review pursuant to
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Issues:
1. Whether or not he trial court erred in admitting in evidence
the extrajudicial confession made by the accused to a radio
reporter for the latter was acting as an agent for the
prosecution and hence the procedural safeguards enshrined
in the constitution should have been observed.
2. Whether or not he trial court erred in finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide for the robbery or theft was not proven without the
said extrajudicial confession and hence only the crime of
homicide exists.
Ruling:
The first assigned error is untenable. There is nothing in the
record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police
authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant.
Neither is there anything on record which even remotely suggests that
the radio announcer was instructed by the police to extract
information from him on the details of the crimes.
 Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, an
extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be a sufficient
ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti. The court a quo did not err in admitting in evidence accused-
appellant’s taped confession. Such confession did not form part of
custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but to a
media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy.
Hence, accused-appellant’s second assigned error that his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt must likewise fall.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. The
rules on evidence and case law sustain the conviction of the accused
through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur:
(1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
____________________________________
79. PEOPLE VS. BALOLOY 381 SCRA 31
Facts:
At Barangay Inagasan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the
evening of August 3 1996, the body of 11 years old Genelyn Camacho
was found at the waterfalls at the said barangay. Autopsy report found
the Genelyn was raped before she was drowned. The one who caused
its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, Who
claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in
the nearby creek. While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to
119
the barangay captain that he only wanted to frighten the girl but
ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine. While in the
custody of authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by Judge
Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not yet in
custodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession,
coupled with circumstantial evidence, the trail court violated Section
12 (1) of Article III of the barangay captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon.
According to him, the two failed to inform him of his Constitutional
rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the
incriminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon
are not police investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent
upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While
these rights may be waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He
concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the
barangay captain was amissible.
Ruling:
Yes, as to his confession with the barangay captain Ceniza, it
has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial
investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the
crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a
suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under
investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure
of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, Juanito
voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he rapes Genelyn and thereafter
threw her body into the ravine. This narration was spontaneous
answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinaty manner. It was
given before he was arrested or place under custody for investigation
in connection with the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito
did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the party
of Ceniza, which could have compelled her testify falsely against him.
_________________________________________
Right to Bail
80. GOVERNMENT OF USA VS PURGANAN G.R. NO. 148571
Facts:
This Petition is a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of
Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion where the court held that Jimenez was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States
of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on
18 May 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was
docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter
alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15
April 1999.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that Jimenez’s
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001
Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
120
hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the
accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an
alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed
to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June
2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. Hence,
this petition.
Issues: 1.Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before
a warrant for his arrest can be issued
2. Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending
Held:
1. No.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination — under oath or
affirmation — of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear
the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
***Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form
and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion,
the judge may require the submission of further documentation or
may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie
finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of
the judge.
2. No.
Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal proceedings.
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be
heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process
and fundamental fairness.
________________________________________
81. Narciso Vs. Sta Romana
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge
before bail can be granted to the accused. Absent such hearing, the
order granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of
121
discretion. In parricide, the accused cannot be considered an offended
party just because he was married to the deceased. In the interest of
justice and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister
of the victim may be deemed to be an "offended party"; hence, she
has the legal personality to challenge the void order of the trial court.
The Case
We invoke the foregoing principles in rejecting the Petition for Review
on Certiorari before us, assailing the February 26, 1998 Decisionand
the June 29, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA),which
reversed and set aside the Order of Executive Judge Pedro T. Santiago
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101, in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Joselito V. Narciso."The dispositive portion of the challenged CA
Decision reads: Esmmis
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the
order granting bail is annulled and set aside."The
assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The full text of the August 3, 1992 RTC Order, which the Court of
Appeals annulled and set aside, reads as follows:
"Accused who is present filed thru counsel a Motion to Allow Accused
Joselito V. Narciso to Post Bail. Me-sm
"Considering that the Presiding Judge of Branch 83 who is hearing this
case is on leave and the Pairing Judge Honorable
Salvador Ceguerra is no longer within the
premises, there being no objection by the City
Prosecutor Candido Rivera to the accused
posting a cashbond of P150,000.00, the
undersigned in his capacity as Executive Judge
hereby approves the same.”
The Facts of the Case
The undisputed antecedents of the case were summarized by the
Court of Appeals as follows:
"1) After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of
Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito Narciso, Asst. City
Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and
thereafter filed, the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso
on November 13, 1991, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179.
"2) Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the prosecutors
resolution [before] the Department of Justice (DOJ) which was
however denied. Joselito Narciso moved for reconsideration, which
was still denied by the DOJ.
"3) Failing before DOJ, the accused on February 6, 1992, filed in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 an "Omnibus
Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the
Warrant of Arrest". The Motion was granted and
the case was set for reinvestigation by another
prosecutor. Esmso
"4) Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom the case was
assigned for reinvestigation, found no reason to
disturb the findings of the previous prosecutor
and recommended the remand of the case to the
court for arraignment and trial.
"5) On August 3, 1992, accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex
Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito
Narciso to Post Bail. The Public Prosecutor
registered no objection and said motion was
granted on the same day, allowing accused to
post bail at P150,000.00.
xxxxxxxxx
"6) On August 14, 1992, the private prosecutor representing private
complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a
sister of accuseds deceased wife, filed an
"Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To
Post Bail.
"7) Accused objected to the aforesaid urgent motion by filing a Motion
to Expunge 1) Notice of Appearance of the
Private Prosecutor and the 2) Urgent Motion to
Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail".
"8) Arraignment was conducted on September 14, 1992 and the case
was set for hearing on November 9, 16, 23,
December 2, 9, 1992, January 6, 13, 20, 27,
1993, February 3, 7, 10 and 24 1993.
"9) On October 15, 1992, private complainant through counsel filed
her opposition to the motion to expunge [filed
by] accused.
"10) On November 3, 1992 private complainant moved for the
postponement of the trials set on November 9,
16 and 23 and the subsequent hearings thereon
pending the resolution of their Urgent Motion to
Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail.
122
"11) On November 9, 1992, the court issued the first assailed order
stating therein to wit:
ORDER
Counsel for the accused, upon being informed of the motion for
postponement dated November 3,
1992 filed by the private complainant,
through counsel, offered no objection
to the cancellation of todays trial but
not the trial set on November 16, 23
and December 2 and 9, 1992 for the
reason that the trial can proceed
independently of the pending Urgent
Motion to Lift Order Allowing the
Accused to Post Bail.
WHEREFORE, the trial set for today is hereby cancelled and re-set on
November 16, 1992 at 10:30 oclock
in the morning, as previously
scheduled.
SO ORDERED.
"12) On November 16, 1992, the court cancelled the hearing upon
motion of the public prosecutor because no
prosecution witness was available.
"13) [I]n the hearing of November 23, 1992, the private prosecutor
again moved for postponement because of the
pendency of his Motion to Lift Order Allowing
Accused to Post Bail. On the same date, the
court issued the second assailed order which
reads:
ORDER
On motion of the Asst. City Prosecutor, for the reason that there is no
showing in the record that the private
complainant was duly notified, hence
there is no available witness this
morning, the trial set for today is
hereby cancelled and reset on
December 2 and 9, 1992 both at
10:30 oclock in the morning, as
previously scheduled.
Let a subpoena be issued to complainant Corazon [sic] Sta. Romana-
Narciso, the same to be served
personally by the Deputy
Sheriff/Process server of this Court.
The accused is notified of this Order in open court.
SO ORDERED.
"Not obtaining any resolution on her Motion To Lift Order Allowing
Accused to Post Bail, private complainant filed
this petition [before the CA]."
As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted private
respondents Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this recourse to us via Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
Petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals this alleged error: Korte
"The Respondent Court of Appeals has erroneously decided questions
of substance, in a manner not in accord with law,
the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence,
as exemplified in the decisions of this Honorable
Court, when it reversed and set aside the order
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
granted the petitioner his constitutional right to
bail, considering the absence of strong evidence
or proof of his guilt, and more especially when
the public prosecutors, who have direct control
of the proceedings and after assessment of the
evidence, have themselves recommended the
grant of bail."Respondent, on the other hand,
poses the following issues:
Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the Order of the Regional Trial Court which
granted bail to the petitioner is substantially and
procedurally infirm notwithstanding the absence
of any opposition from the public prosecutor.
Whether or not the private respondent has the legal personality to
intervene in the present criminal case."
To resolve this case, the Court believes that two issues must be taken
up; namely, (1) the validity of the grant of bail and (2) private
respondents standing to file the Petition before the CA. Court
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.First Issue: Validity of the Grant of Bail
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
123
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution." Rtc spped
Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable
with reclusion perpetua, he argued before the CA that he was entitled
to bail because the evidence of his guilt was not strong. He contended
that the prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount
to a finding that the prosecution evidence against him was not strong.
Calr-ky
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such
finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for
bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten
minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused
and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed
sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We
agree with the CA.
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to
determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held:
Supreme
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may
rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before
the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of
judicial discretion requires that the evidence of
guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner
having the right of cross examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
xxxxxxxxx
"Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a
capital offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion
of the court, must actually be conducted to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. A summary
hearing means such brief and speedy method of
 receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose
of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the
weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence
for or against the accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered and admitted.
The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself
to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination. If a party is denied the opportunity
to be heard, there would be a violation of
procedural due process." (Emphasis supplied.)
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct
the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands
charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the
prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the
judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is
doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is
tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial
discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong.
Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition
for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.” Imposed in
Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory duty to conduct a hearing despite
the prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. We quote below the pertinent portion
of the Decision therein: Sjcj
"The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases
wherein the Court ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails
to interpose an objection to the motion for bail,
it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching questions from which it
may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt,
or the lack of it, against the accused."
"The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving capital
offenses when the matter is left to the sound
discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not
124
in the determination whether or not a hearing
should be held but in the appreciation and
evaluation of the prosecutions evidence of guilt
against the accused. x x x A hearing is plainly
indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to
be in a position to determine whether the
evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong."
And in Concerned Citizens v. Elma,the Court ruled: Chief
"It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. However, such
discretion may only be exercised after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of
the accused for the purpose of determining
whether or not he should be granted liberty."
Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several cases that emphasized the
mandatory character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case.
It enunciated the following duties of the trial judge in such petition:
Esm
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether
or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8,
supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19,
supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."
The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now
leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of
bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing
in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would
amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof." Ky-calr
Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which
should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such
evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The
summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process
for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate
the grant or the denial of the application for bail. Clearly, the grant of
bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of
discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him. Ky-
le
Second Issue: Respondent's Standing to File the Petition
Petitioner attacks respondents legal standing to file the Petition for
Certiorari before the appellate court, maintaining that only the public
prosecutor or the solicitor general may challenge the assailed Order.
He invokes People v. Dacudao,which ruled:
"x x x A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act
for the People of the Philippines before this
Court. It is the Governments counsel, the
Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases
or incidents before the Supreme Court. At the
very least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the
conformity of the Solicitor General, should have
raised the issue (of whether or not the
prosecution was deprived of procedural due
process on account of the grant of bail to the
accused without any hearing on the motion for
bail) before us, instead of the private prosecutor
with the conformity of the Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Cebu."
He also cites Republic v. Partisala which held as follows: Sda adsc
"We make it known that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. Henceforth actions filed in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines if not initiated
by the Solicitor General will be summarily
dismissed." Missdaa
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo,[however,
provided an exception to the above doctrines in this manner:
"While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor
General may bring or defend actions on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent
the People or the State in criminal proceedings
pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals
(Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]),
the ends of substantial justice would be better
served, and the issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition
125
at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case,
private petitioner has sufficient personality and
a valid grievance against Judge Adaos order
granting bail to the alleged murderers of his
(private petitioners) father.
"In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled that
the offended parties in criminal cases have
sufficient interest and personality as "person(s)
aggrieved" to file the special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the
liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order
to promote their object, thus:
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before
petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid
that respondents have sufficient
interest and personality as person(s)
aggrieved by petitioner judges ruling
on his non-disqualification to file the
special civil action under sections 1
and 2 of Rule 65. Recently, in line with
the underlying spirit of a liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in
order to promote their object, as
against the literal interpretation of
Rule 110, section 2, we held,
overruling the implication of an earlier
case, that a widow possesses the
right as an offended party to file a
criminal complaint for the murder of
her deceased husband." (Id., p. 699)
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of the
appellate courts ruling on this point. Clearly, the assailed Order of
Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any
right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of
law; it is likewise a court of justice. To rule otherwise would leave the
private respondent without any recourse to rectify the public injustice
brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the
standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law against
the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse
to address a substantive issue in law.
Moreover, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that "it is
too late in the day for the petitioner to challenge the legal personality
of private respondent considering that it was never disputed by [him] leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She
during the preliminary investigation of the case, in his appeal to the
directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing
Department of Justice and during the reinvestigation of the
case."Corollary to the question of standing, petitioner submits that its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
even if the exception were made to apply, private respondent is not
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC. She
an "offended party" who is granted the right to challenge the assailed
RTC Order. He maintains that only the compulsory heirs of the argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
deceased, who are the accused himself and his minor child, may file
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
the instant action. We disagree. Sclex
It should be remembered that the crime charged against the private hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction
respondent is parricide; hence, the accused cannot be regarded as an
over her person as she has neither been arrested nor has she
offended party. That would be a contradiction in terms and an
absurdity in fact. Nor can one expect the minor child to think and to voluntarily surrendered. The hold departure order was also
act for himself. Hence, we rule that in view of the peculiar
issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She likewise argued
circumstances of this case, the sister of the deceased is a proper
party-litigant who is akin to the "offended party," she being a close that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right
relative of the deceased. There is no closer kin who may be expected
to travel and freedom of speech.
to take up the cudgels of justice for the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. ISSUE: Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired? NO

______________________________________________ RULING: On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be
82. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs VASQUEZ (Jan. 27, 1993)
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
FACTS: Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. An order
jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte
of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release fixed at
Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond" wherein she expressly
P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under
Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the required trial
the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of
and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond
P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked for
she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that
the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional
by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the
release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the
custody" of said court. Santiago cannot now be heard to claim
arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order against
otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped
Santiago by reason of the announcement she made, which was widely
from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the
publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be
126
jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over shortage, the prosecution then rested its case For its part, the
the aforestated pleadings she filed therein. defense, in its bid to overturn the presumption of malversation and
shatter the prima facie evidence of conversion, offered the testimony
Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she
of the following witnesses: petitioner Elvira Agullo; Rene
holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
Briones Austero, Cashier III of the Department of Public Works and
court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during
Highways (DPWH), Region VIII; and Engracia Camposano-Camaoy,
the pendency of the case. Parties with pending cases should apply for
Barangay Captain of Hinabuyan, Dagame, Leyte. Striking down the
permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in
defense as “incredible and without basis,” the Sandiganbayan
the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such
rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of the
applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since
crime of malversation of public funds, ratiocinating principally that
they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications
“no evidence has been presented linking the loss of the government
or implications thereof.
funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused.
_______________________________________
ISSUE Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked
Presumption of innocence certain evidence of substance which violates the petitioner’s
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
83. Agullo vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS
Petitioner, Elvira, was charged of malversation germinated from an RULING The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan
audit conducted on 14 July 1986by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance
III, as a result of which a P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication
on petitioner’s accountability. In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner of petitioner’s guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be
Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted the findings in the presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Uponthorough scrutiny of
Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the Letter of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that
Demand. In effect, she admitted the fact of shortage in the amount petitioner Agullohas satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by
stated in the Information. Notwithstanding, petitioner Agullo, at all competent proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as to
stages of the criminal indictment, persistently professed exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this
her innocence of the charge and categorically denied having end, petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a
malversed or converted the public funds in question for her own single centavo of the missing funds was used for her own personal
personal use or benefit. With petitioner’s admission of the fact of cash benefit or gain. Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner,

127
obviously relied more on the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence Issue: Whether or not there is a quantum of proof required to
presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit of the overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
prosecution’s evidence This course of action is impermissible for the
evidence of the prosecution clearly cannot sustain a conviction “in an
unprejudiced mind. All told, this Court, through the scholarly ponencia Ruling: In pursuance to the doctrine that appeals involving reclusion
of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz in People vs. De Guzman,inked in vivid perpetua are subject to a review de novo, this Court pored over the
prose the premium accorded to the right of an accused to be entire records of both lower courts and concluded, after careful
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to wit: deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. The
circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution fails to evoke
“The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty
moral certainty that appellants are guilty. The totality of the
platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to
prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading
balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest
beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused. The Constitution
between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines
mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State fails
that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused
to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the
must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond
constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an acquittal
the whisper of doubt.”
regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense. By
__________________________________________ constitutional fiat, the burden of proof is accordingly vested on the
prosecution. In acquitting the herein appellant, this Court is not
84.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BATO January 16, 1998
decreeing that he did not participate in the killing. It is merely ruling
Facts: that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Sergio and Abraham Bato were found guilty of murder by a
lower court. Both accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On ____________________________________________
January 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the guilt but
85.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DE GUZMAN
increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Appellants raised the
defense of denial. They maintained that their identification as the
alleged perpetrators of Ernesto’s murder is merely an afterthought,
FACTS:
necessitated by a death of strong evidence on the part of the
prosecution.

128
 This is an appeal by Ronaldo De Guzman in a decision of the
trial court found De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in a Decision dated June 26, 2008. He argues that the
prosecution failed to show that the police officers complied with the
mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. In particular, he points
to the fact that the seized items were not marked immediately after
his arrest; that the police officers failed to make an inventory of the
seized items in his presence or in the presence of his counsel and of
a representative from the media and from the Department of Justice
(DOJ); and that no photographs were taken of the seized items and
of appellant. Appellant also claims that the unbroken chain of custody
of the evidence was not established. Further, appellant contends that
the failure of the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the
police blotter before the said operation, the lack of coordination with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and the failure to
observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 have effectively
overturned the presumption of regularity in the performance of the
police officers’ duties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the degree of proof has been met.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that contrary to De Guzman’s
contention, the trial court correctly found that the buy-bust
transaction took place. The buyer (SPO1 Llanillo) and seller (De
Guzman) were both identified and the circumstances of how the
purported sale of the illegal drugs took place were clearly
demonstrated. Thus, the prosecution successfully established the first
129
and third elements of the crime. However, there is a problem in the
prosecution’s effort to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti. In
a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence
of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction. The
dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime. The chain of
custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed. The failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A.
No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained. The justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. In this case,
it was admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator,
who marked the seized items, and only upon seeing the items for the
first time at the police station. Moreover, there was no physical
inventory made or photographs of the seized items taken under the
circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. Moreover, the
failure to observe the proper procedure negates the operation of the
presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general
rule, the testimonies of the police officers who apprehended the
accused are accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption
that they have performed their duties regularly. But when the
performance of their duties is tainted with failure to comply with the
procedure and guidelines prescribed, the presumption is effectively
destroyed. Thus, even if the defense evidence is weak, the
prosecution’s whole case still falls. The evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.
_____________________________________
Right to be Heard
86. PEOPLE VS. MAGSI, 124 SCRA 64
Facts:
Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970,
his arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of
San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled
for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date,
despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio
counsel for the accused, hearing was reset to September 8, 1970 on
motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of
accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the
next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel
and it was favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At
the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio
and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case,
the hearing was reset for the next day and the court appointed Atty.
Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third
hearing date, neither the de partenor the de officio counsel was in
Court, so Atty. Rivera was re-appointed that day as de officio counsel
for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea
of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the
crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other co-
accused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the
death penalty.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the
accused.
130
Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not
be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. Citing
People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should
exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of
guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused
fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the
consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and
significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing
to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the
accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of
guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to
genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by
the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was
conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he
understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not
sufficient compliance.
________________________________________
87. People vs Rivera, July 31, 2001
Facts
Rolando Rivera was charged willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
maliciously having carnal knowledge of his 13 yo daughter Erlanie
against her will and without her consent.During arraignment, the
accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and trial was held.
The prosecution’s witnesses are: Erlanie, Her aunt Marietta, and Dr.
Barin who conducted the physical exam of the complainant. The
defense also presented its evidence and its witnesses are: the
accused, his sister Conception, and Records Officer of the Escolastica
Romero District Hospital Natividad Pinlac.
The accused denied that he raped Erlanie. He alleged that the rape
charge against him because his wife had a paramour and resented
him because he hurt her. The defense presented a letter to accused
written by his wife, asking him to sign a document so that she could
attend to it before he got out of prison. The defense also offered as
evidence a document, designated as Waiver of Rights, signed by
accused, in which he acknowledged that he was a tenant of a parcel
of land and that he waived and voluntarily surrendered his right over
the said landholding to Ponciano Miguel, a cousin of his wife. He said
that he signed the document because his wife’s relatives promised
him that he would get out of prison after signing the document.
Concepcion also testified that the accused stayed in their house during
the entire month of March, except March 19, 1997. Records Officer
Pinlac stated that Zaira Rivera was confined at that hospital from
March 1-2 1997.
On June 1999, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged.
Issue: WON the court failed to consider the evidence of the accused
and ruled with partiality in violation of the accused’s right to be heard.
Ruling: NO. the court did not fail to consider the evidence of the
accused and did not rule with partiality violating the accused’s right
to be heard.
131
Accused-appellant failed to show any reason why the Court should
disbelieve complainant’s testimony. Also, despite the evidences
presented, the defense failed to convince the court.
One basis of the accused’s contention that he was denied of his right
to be heard is the refusal of the trial judge to allow Atty. Mangalindan’s
questions concerning the other alleged acts of molestation committed
by accused-appellant against complainant. Section 6, Rule 132,
Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the witness may be cross-
examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing
upon the issue.
There was no showing on how the defense’s questions had any
bearing on complainant’s credibility or on the truth of her claims. One
is led to suspect that the purpose of these questions was to confuse
complainant into committing mistakes in her answers during cross-
examination that accused-appellants counsel could later use to
possibly put complainants credibility, not to mention her character, in
question.
_______________________________________
88. People of the Philippines vs Alcanzado
Facts:
On the early morning of June 17, 1998, the Barangay Tanods of
Bel-Air, while on duty, which is adjacent to TGIF American Bar,
heard two (2) shots; when they investigated they found a dead body
of the victim with two (2) gunshot wounds inside the storeroom of
TGIF being guarded by the accused. The accused, who was the
security guard of the TGIF, surrendered his service firearm to
policeman Bagon which was found to have spent two (2) spent shells.
The ballistic report states that the two (2) spent shells were fired from
the gun surrendered by the accused to policeman Bagon. The accused
opted to file demurrer to evidence which was denied by the Court,
instead of testifying and could have explained what really happened
and why he surrendered his service firearm. The Court finds the
presence of a qualifying circumstance of treachery, when the accused
fired at the victim one on his shoulder and another at his head in close
range. There was no eye-witness to the shooting incident. The RTC
relied principally on the admission of appellant to the police officer
that he shot the unknown victim when he surrendered his service
firearm. It is the only link that would positively connect appellant to
the shooting of the victim, for the service gun may belong to him and
it may have been used in the shooting of the victim, but the missing
link is the ascertainment of whether he was the one who shot the
victim. Without the testimony of the police officer that appellant had
verbally acknowledged to him having shot the victim, the herein-
before quoted circumstantial evidence enumerated by the RTC do not
support the conviction of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Issues:
Whether or not the admission made by appellant to the police officer is
admissible in evidence.
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in outrightly
convicting the appellant who has not been given the opportunity to produce evidence
in his defense.
132
Ruling:
The Court finds that while the admission made by appellant to
PO2 Bucalan may not be admitted in evidence considering that the
alleged verbal admission made by appellant before him as homicide
investigator was made without appellant being informed of his right
to remain silent and right to counsel and after appellant had been
established as the suspect by the police officers who had arrived at
the scene of the crime before PO2 Bucalan came. However, the Court
cannot disregard the testimony of SPO1 Bagon who, together with his
co-police officers, responded to the call of the barangay tanod and
immediately upon his arrival, appellant spontaneously told him that
he had shot the victim. This particular admission was made when
appellant has not been taken into custody by the police officers and
therefore admissible in evidence. The constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement not
elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused readily admitted having committed the
crime.
Consequently, for purposes of determining whether the demurrer
to evidence should have been granted, the connection between the
service gun and appellant as the perpetrator of the shooting, without
any countervailing evidence, had been sufficiently established. Thus,
the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
demurrer to evidence but it committed grave abuse of discretion in
outrightly convicting appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing
him to suffer reclusion perpetua when appellant has not been given
the opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, pursuant to Section
15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
______________________________________
Right to be Informed him as will enable him to make the defense; (2) to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for
89. FACTS: PEOPLE VS BAYYA G.R. NO. 127845 MARCH 10,
the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so
2000
that it may decide whether the are sufficient in law to support a
Facts:
conviction, if one should be had.

Some time in 1994, when victim was still 12 years old, her father, the
The Information does not allege the minority of the victim although
accused, forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse
the same was proven during trial as borne by the records. It matters
with him. He repeated the bestial act in their house about twice a
not how conclusive and convincing evidence of guilt may be, but an
week afterwards, and then later used her four (4) times a month, the
accused cannot be convicted of any offense not charged in the
last she remembered being on July 5, 1995.
Complaint or Information on which he is tried or therein necessarily
included.
During the trial, appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal
knowledge of his daughter twice but theorized that he was "out of his
The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent are
mind" when he committed the incestous rape. In view of the facts
the special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority which
established, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction,
had the capacity of increasing the penalty by degrees.
sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is AFFIRMED

Upon appeal, appellant questioned thepenalty imposed under R.A.
with the MODIFICATION that appelant LODRIGO BAYYA is adjudged
7659, considering that the Information filed against him was silent
guilty of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
about the applicability of the same. He alleged denial of his
perpetua.
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. ________________________________________

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right 90. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALANCING G.R. Nos.
to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him 131736-37. March 11, 2002

HELD: A careful perusal of the Information indicting the appellant

FACTS:
reveals a crucial omission in its averments of the minority of the
This is an automatic review for the joint decision of the RTC
victim. The objectives of the defendant's right to be informed are: (1)
of Cabanatuan City convicting appellants (which are brothers) of two
to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against

133
counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death
for each count. Joey Malansing denied participation in the killing but
he admitted boxing Jorja in the face to prevent her from shouting
while Mario Malansing was assaulting the husband of the former.
Mario claimed that he was solely responsible for the deaths. He said
that he`s brother has nothing to do with the crime and he just killed
the couple out of anger after the wife told him that he was going to
be ejected as a tenant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and taking
advantage of nighttime
Code, a plea of guilty on arraignment is a mitigating circumstance.
Insofar as Joey is concerned, there was no voluntary surrender and
no voluntary plea of guilt, thus no circumstance is available to him to
mitigate his crime.
The Court noted that abuse of superior strength and dwelling
were not alleged in the information. In accordance then with Section
8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, abuse of
superior strength and dwelling may not be appreciated to convict the
brothers. At the outset, the Court discount nocturnity as an
aggravating circumstance, since in this case, the darkness of the night
was not purposely sought by the offenders to facilitate the commission
of the crime nor to ensure its execution with impunity.

RULING: The Court disagree with the trial court that the offenses
committed by appellants could be qualified as murder. They are guilty ______________________________________________

only of double homicide. Hence, it is improper now to impose the 93. Republic Act No. 8493 February 12, 1998
death penalty on each of them. None of the aggravating
AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE
circumstances were alleged in the information nor in the amended
SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
information with specificity as a qualifying circumstance elevating
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING
either killing to murder. Thus, conformably with Gario Alba, the
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
offenses committed by appellants only constitute two counts of
homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for homicide under 249 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal or an imprisonment assembled::

for an indefinite period of 17 years, and 4 months as minimum to Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998."
twenty (20) years as maximum for each count of homicide, with
Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the
accessory penalties provided by law it is incorrect to sentence both
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional
appellants to death.
Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order
The trial court did err when it failed to appreciate Marios plea of
a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
guilty to the two charges against him. Under Article 13 (7) of the
(a) Plea bargaining;

134
 (b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered into
during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused
and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused.
The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the
approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a
lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same
is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy.
Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the accused
or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an
acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial justice or judge may
impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an
order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order
shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course
of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime,
except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the
justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for
the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial
calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the
entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial,
135
except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between
Arraignment and Trial.- The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared
before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last
occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least
fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from
arraignment as fixed by the court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she
interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an
affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove
such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be tried
again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty
(30) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the court
retrying the case may extend such period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability
of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within
thirty (30) days impractical.
Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this
Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit
with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Section 7 of this Act
shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period the time
limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period
the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80)
days.
Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing
the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing
on his/her mental competency, or physical incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the
accused;
(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;
(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided,
That the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days,
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings
relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid
prejudicial question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty
(30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is
actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the
accused or an essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall
be considered absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in
addition, he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or
Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which a
his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An accused or
justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under
an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her
subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are as follows:
136
whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by
due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally
incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and
thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, or any
offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay from the
date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would
commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a
co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom
the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or
judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the
request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such
continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served
by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall
be excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of
the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of
justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best
interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
 (a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would
be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a
miscarriage of justice.
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex,
due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise,
that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of
time established by this Act.
No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted because of
general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to
obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.
Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the public
attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained, either
because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is
charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal
institution, the public attorney shall promptly:
(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a
notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner mandating
such person to so advise the prisoner of his/her right to demand trial.
(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall
promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand
trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody
that he/she demands trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be
sent promptly to the public attorney.
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to
obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.
137
(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public
attorney a properly supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner
for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that public attorney.
Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If
an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act
as extended by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused.
The accused shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the
prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection
with the exclusion of time under Section 10 of this Act.
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall
consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution
on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of justice. Failure of the
accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute
a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.
Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public
prosecution or public attorney:
(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact
that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;
(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally
frivolous and without merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which
he/she knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a
continuance; or
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent
with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any
appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to be instituted by the
 proper party against the erring counsel if and when warranted, punish any
such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with
the defense of an accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty
percent (50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in
connection with his/her defense of the accused;
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public
prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00);
and
(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right
to practice before the court considering the case for a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days.
The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to
any other authority or power available to the court. The court shall follow
the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel or
public prosecutor pursuant to this section.
Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules,
regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the
disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars
formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who willfully fail to
proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act.
Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations,
administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the allocation of
the Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional
amounts as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.
138
Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No provision
of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required
by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules
and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation: Provided,
That Section 7 of this Act shall become effective after the expiration of the
aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Section 9 of this Act.
Approved: February 12, 1998
___________________________________________
94.A RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE
OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINSTMAGUINDANAO
GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., A.M. NO. 10-11-5-
SC/A.M. NO. 10-11-6-SC/A.M. NO. 10-11-7-SC.
Facts:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media
practitioners were killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in
Maguindanao. This tragic incident came to be known as Maguindanao
massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and additional
charges of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a year later on
November 19 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines
(NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc.,
relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media
entities and members of the academe filed a petition before this court
praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in this
criminal cases be allowed, recording devises be permitted inside the
court room to assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the
use of device.
Issue: Whether or not the petition to cover the Maguindanao
Massacre Trial in both radio and television is allowed.
Held: The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioner’s prayer for a
live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to certain
guidelines as enumerated. The present petition which asserts the
exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a
fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government
for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom
of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the
impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial
must pass the totality of circumstances´ test, applied in People v.
Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused
to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive
publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair
trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible
undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
__________________________________________
94. JOSEPH ESTRADA VS MACAPAGAL & DESIERTO 353 SCRA
452
Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the
beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but
surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started
on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on
air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited
reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20
p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo
Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of
Erap’s surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the
Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Erap’s legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was

139
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going
to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not
shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge
after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained
if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now
in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still,
he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
____________________________________________
94A. Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the
multiple murder cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy
Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-
SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.
Facts:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners
were killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident came to
be known as Maguindanao massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and
140
additional charges of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a year later on November
19 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives of the victims, individual
journalists from various media entities and members of the academe filed a petition
before this court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in this
criminal cases be allowed, recording devises be permitted inside the court room to
assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the
broadcast coverage and the use of device.
Issue: Whether or not the petition to cover the Maguindanao Massacre Trial in both
radio and television is allowed.
Held:
The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioner’s prayer for a live broadcast of the
trial court proceedings, subject to certain guidelines as enumerated. The present
petition which asserts the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information,
right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for
redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject
to regulations to be issued by the Court. Respecting the possible influence of media
coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the
totality of circumstances´ test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v.
Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press,
that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial,
and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to
render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount
to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
___________________________________________
95. CARIAGA VS CA (CASE DIGEST) Issue: Whether or not Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible
as evidence and Siton is a credible witness.
Facts:
Held: The sworn statement of Ricardo is not admissible and Siton is
Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power Company
a credible witness. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn
(DLPC). He received reports that some private electricians were
statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule
involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He initiated a covert operation
130 of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on
to ascertain the matter and catch the perpetrators. In October 1988,
Criminal Procedure both speak of admissibility of a testimony of a
he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber
witness “unable to testify” in court. In Tan v. CA , the Court has held
Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an
that “unable to testify” does not cover cases of witnesses subpoenaed
undercover agent under the pseudonym “Canuto Duran”. ‘Duran’
but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was
became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he
neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat
said that his ‘boss’ needs some electrical materials to be used in
which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao. The Court must
Diwalwal, a gold panning area. Ricardo offered to supply the materials
exercise its coercive power to arrest, but, it did not in the present
saying that his cousin can supply the same to him. ‘Duran’ was able
case.
to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his cousin
named Jonathan Cariaga (accused). Jonathan was the driver of a The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of
DLPC service truck. On November 1988, ‘Duran’ and Jonathan were Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it violates
introduced to each other. After which, more transactions were made the fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses against
between the two. ‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end when Sgt. him face to face. Hence, Ricardo Cariagas sworn statement is not
Villasis ‘apprehended’ him on February 1989. ‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ admissible under Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court
in order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to come out with for failure of the prosecution to comply with the strict requirements of
the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the police station and said rule, to wit:
confessed to their participation as “fence” for Jonathan Cariaga. The
a] Ricardo Cariaga did not orally testify in the labor case;
prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness as
b] Inability to testify must be for a grave cause almost
the subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan
amounting to death and the prosecution must exhaust all
Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement pertaining to the
available remedies to secure the presence of its witnesses
stealing for a labor case between Jonathan and DLPC for the latter’s
at the trial;
alleged illegal dismissal.

141
 c] That the former proceeding must also be criminal in
nature.
The appellate court erred in holding that the lone testimony of the
prosecutions alleged eyewitness who is a paid witness and whose
testimony was admittedly corrected or revised on the witness stand
and which materially and significantly varies with his previous sworn
statement on very vital and pivotal details is sufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellate court erred in failing to appreciate the reasonable doubt
engendered by the exculpatory statements of the superiors of the
accused in favor of the latter.
______________________________________
98. People of the Philippines vs. Alicia A. Chua, G.R. No.
128280, April 04, 2001
Facts:
In September 1992, accused Chua received a facsimile
message from Harmony Electronics Company in Taiwan. The message
was written in Chinese characters except for the names of To-ong
Zenon Tumenlaco and Tercenio Domingo Fornaliza. Harmony asked
her to call up To-ong and Tercenio and tell them that they were
needed in Taiwan. Accused Chua contacted To-ong and told him the
message.
In October 1992, To-ong and Tercenio went to the office of
accused Chua, and the latter told them that she could send them to
Taiwan upon payment of a placement fee of P15,000.00 each. She
142
also asked them to secure NBI clearances and medical certificates. On
October 29, 1992, Tercenio, together with private complainant Lonito
Baluis, went back to the office of accused Chua and submitted the
requirements. Tercenio and Lonito Baluis paid P15,000.00 each for
which they were issued a receipt bearing the name Man Tai Trading
and General Services with accused Chua's signature.
Accused Chua assured Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they
would be able to leave for Taiwan soon. Three months passed, but
they were not deployed. Tercenio became apprehensive and told
accused Chua that he would withdraw his application and ask for
refund of the placement fee. Accused Chua repeatedly promised that
she would give back the money to him, but she never did. After a few
more months, Tercenio could not anymore locate accused Chua.
Accused Chua used the same modus operandi on the other private
complainants. After requiring each complainant to pay a placement
fee of P15,000.00 each, to secure NBI clearances and to undergo
medical examinations, she would go in hiding.
In time, complainants inquired from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA) about accused Chua's activities.
The POEA issued a certification that accused Chua was not
licensed to recruit persons/workers for overseas employment.
On October 3, 1995, the trial court promulgated a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads: Alicia A. Chua is hereby found:
(1) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
committed in large scale in Criminal Case No. 93-127418 and is
therefore sentenced to serve a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P100,000.00;
(2) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in 8 Criminal
Cases filed against her.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch V
erred in finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale and sentencing her to life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00, and eight (8) counts of
estafa sentencing her to various penalties therefor?
Ruling: We find the appeal devoid of merit. Appellant interposes the
defense that the approval of her application for a service contractor's
authority on April 13, 1993 should be given a retroactive effect as to
make all her previous recruitment activities valid. However, this issue
was not raised in the trial court. She cannot now be allowed to raise
it for the first time on appeal without offending basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process.
As to her claim of denial of the constitutional right to
compulsory process, we find the same to be without merit. The 1973
and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process
which now includes the right to secure the production of evidence in
one's behalf. By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid down the
requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses, may be applied
to this expanded concept. Thus, the movant must show: (a) that the
evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in
previously obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the
evidence will be available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar
evidence could be obtained.
_____________________________________
99. People vs Malimit 264 scra 167
Facts:
143
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Malaki
was attending to his store. Malakis houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the
other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen
located at the back of the store. Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a
farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki to purchase chemical for his rice
farm. Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking proceeded directly
to the store to ask his employer if supper is to be prepared. As he
stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant
coming out of the store with a bolo while his boss, bathed in his own
blood, was sprawled on the floor struggling for his life.
Rondon, who was outside and barely five meters away from
the store, also saw Malimit rushing out through the front door of
Malakis store with a blood-stained bolo aided by the illumination
coming from a pressure lamp (petromax) inside the store. Outside the
store, he met Rondon. After a brief conversation, they rushed to the
nearby house of Malakis brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed
him of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy,
went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in
a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that
the stores drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki
was missing from his pocket.
Malimit was convicted of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. In is appeal, he asked acquittal alleging that the trial
court committed the following errors, to wit:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ON
THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS
THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC) THEY
REVEALED THEIR ALLEGED KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIME MORE THAN
FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT.
2.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE
WALLET AND ITS CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH LEAD TO ITS PRODUCTION WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
3.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Issue: WON appelants right against self incrimination was violated.
Ruling: The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our
fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States,x x x is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications
from him x x x. It is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the [accused]s own lips, against his will, admission of his
guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought
to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object
evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his
treatise on evidence, thus, said:
If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his
[physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical
control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a
guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and
indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in
evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles a
144
clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely
compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, *** but testimonial
compulsion.
These are the so-called Miranda rights so oftenly disregarded
by our men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made
during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded
by law or rules,is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course
of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of
his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the
investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did
he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the
constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-
cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malakis wallet, identification
card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing
other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to
establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the
night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and
keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to
prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even
assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible,
the same will not detract from appellants culpability considering the
existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing appellants
identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.
________________________________________
100.People vs. Rounder G.R. 125687, December 9, 1999
FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick
and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was
later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no
sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several
circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of
his hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victim’s
right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained
undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-
appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express
written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he
contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution,
to wit:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
145
ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s
hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him?
HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually
proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused-appellant and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For
instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be
received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and
morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as
evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant
insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted
to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted
in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in
nature acquired from the accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken
from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken
without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-
appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her
husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline
without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution.
Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the
poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be
used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence
taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-
appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his
constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure,
inadmissible in court as evidence.
_______________________________________________
102. BENGZON vs SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, 203
SCRA 767
FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife
together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched
themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained
with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s
brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest
business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank,
Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech
alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations
which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The
motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa
refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a
pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his
right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically
denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and
malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour
upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The
SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.
146
are Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to
subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in
proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage,
prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon
et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
RULING: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of
Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA
No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the
relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection
with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy
to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is
not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose
within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation
is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the
Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not
call for the banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation
of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the
proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against
a witness testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges
before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows him
to interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed
or when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse
to take the witness stand completely.
______________________________________________
106. PEOPLE V. ECHEGARAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1997
Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-
year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during
which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the
Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that
precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against
147
the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no
substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense
counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-
Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the
Philippines. (FLAG)
______________________________________________
107. People vs. Mercado, 2000
FACTS:
Defendants Elpidio Mercado and Aurelio Acebron were convicted by
the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and
sentencing them the punishment of death. The defendants raised the
constitutionality of death penalty and the alleged haste of the trial
court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors
committed in convicting the accused.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment."
2. Whether or not the trial court’s haste in deciding the case resulted
to grave and serious errors to the prejudice of the defendants.
RULING:
1. No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. It was settled in
People vs. Echagaray that death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's
 power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil".
Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct
application are established.
2. No. A review of the trial court's decision shows that its findings
were based on the records of this case and the transcripts of
stenographic notes taken during the trial. The speed with which
the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to
the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not
supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings
have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that
a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the
promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period
between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the
promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their
arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the
trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice
in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot
be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The
trial court in this case committed no reversible errors and,
consequently, except for some modification, its decision should be
affirmed.
_____________________________________________
108. Cuizon vs Court of Appeals 289 SCRA 159
Facts:
On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-
3554 finding accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond
148
reasonable doubt and therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years
and 1 day of [p]rision [m]ayor as [m]inimum to 12 years and 1 day of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal as [m]aximum, for each offense, with the accessories provided by law and
to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the
amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the
modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. The accused
elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the
Supreme Court denied the said petition on December 1, 1993. The case was remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan for promulgation of the decision. However,
respondent Judge promulgated on April 4, 1995 the decision of the Court of Appeals
only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the
accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.
Issues: Whether or not the Respondent Court erred and gravely abused its discretion
in not holding that the filing of the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus dated June
28, 1995 by the Solicitor General violates the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy.
Ruling: The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of
Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused
to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard
only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal
act. Otherwise stated, the promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the
liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the other
part, the imposition of the criminal accountability.
Promulgation of Conviction Not Barred by Double Jeopardy. To substantiate a claim of
double jeopardy, the following must be proven:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the estafa thru falsification of public document, and Criminal Case No. 91-
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly 6762, for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both
terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same cases.
offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioner’s

commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And legal jeopardy arraignment on March 18, 1992, pre-trial was held, which was

attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a terminated on October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the cases were

competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea scheduled for continuous trial in December 1994, and in January and

[has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise February 1993, but the hearings were cancelled because the Presiding

terminated without the express consent of the
The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution
includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity.Hence, a decision
in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities
of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of
the case, but not the criminal.
We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the
aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases
have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet
attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. We
must stress that Respondent Courts questioned Decision did not
modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It merely ordered the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full execution of
the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.
Judge of the court was elevated to this Court and no trial judge was
immediately appointed/detailed thereto.
On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite
due notice. Hence, upon motion of petitioner’s counsel, respondent
court issued the following order:
When this case was called for hearing, private complainant is not in
Court despite notice. Atty. Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto
Almario, moved that the case against the latter be dismissed for
failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a
speedy trial.
The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in
the acquittal of the accused since the right of the accused to speedy
trial has not been violated, and its dismissal having been made upon
the motion of the accused there is no double jeopardy.

________________________________________
Issue: whether, in petitioner's cases, double jeopardy had set in so

109. ROBERTO P. ALMARIO v. COURT OF APPEALS that petitioner's constitutional right against such jeopardy had been
violated.
Facts:
Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for
149
Held: It must be stressed, however, that the dismissals were
predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These
cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the
right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated
by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their
right against double jeopardy.
The resolutions of the Court of Appeals upheld the orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139, in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
6761-62, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
_________________________________________________
110. MANANTAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 107125.
January 29, 2001
FACTS:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging
petitioner Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly
committed as follows: That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the
municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of
an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated
the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in
a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws,
regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness
and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger
jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said
150
automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of
said automobile
The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide. The respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect
of the lower court’s judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from his criminal
liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify the
aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the petitioner against double jeopardy is violated
RULING:
Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect. In the
instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case
No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal
became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of
Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. The
Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal
offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal
offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower courts
judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order
the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously,
therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. For double jeopardy to exist, the
following elements must be established: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior
to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense as the first.
___________________________________________
113. Potot vs. People, 383 SCRA 449
Facts:
Petitioner Potot was charged with homicide.
arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge. Thereupon, the trial
court convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner
manifestation with motion that he is not appealing from the decision.
However, the wife of the victim, filed a motion
reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that
the case be heard again because “there were irregularities committed
before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice.” The
trial court granted private complainant's motion and set aside its
Decision and ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor “for re-evaluation of the evidence
and to file the corresponding charge.” Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
issue the order as the Decision had become final, and that the said
order “would place the accused in double jeopardy.” This was denied
for the reason that the State is not bound by the error or negligence
of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.”
Issue:
Whether or not the assailed orders violate the petitioner’s
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
Yes. We agree with the petitioner that the assailed orders
would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such
right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime
of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective
151
is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring
the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and
anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.
Upon
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2)
filed a
the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded
to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
for
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
These requisites have been established. Records show that
petitioner was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 under
a valid information before the trial court which has jurisdiction over it.
He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of
his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the corresponding
penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of
homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
first offense charged.
___________________________________________
114. PEOPLE vs. ASTUDILLO
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, convicting appellants Clarence Astudillo,
Crisanto Astudillo and Hilario Astudillo of the crime of Murder;
sentencing them to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua and ordering
them, jointly and severally, to pay damages to the heirs of the
deceased. Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.
On March 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting
appellants of the crime of Murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration contending that
the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and, assuming that it did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, not having been alleged in the information, cannot
be appreciated against them. Appellants’ motion for reconsideration
was denied in an Order dated July 13, 1998. However, an Amended
Decision was rendered where the phrase “abuse of superior strength”
was replaced with “TREACHERY” in the body of the Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the right against
double jeopardy when the trial court rendered the second decision
RULING: Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction
may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court, with the consent
of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7, a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the
accused. These provisions changed the previous rulings of the Court
to the effect that such modification may be made upon motion of the
fiscal, provided the same is made before a judgment has become final
or an appeal has been perfected. The requisite consent of the accused
to such motion for reconsideration or modification is intended to
protect the latter from having to defend himself anew from more
serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may
have overlooked. Accordingly, once the judgment has been validly
promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest
substantial error, even if unwittingly committed by the trial court
through oversight or an initially erroneous comprehension, can be
made only with the consent or upon the instance of the
152
accused. Errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the
accused consents thereto, or himself moves for reconsideration of, or
appeals from, the decision.
However, the protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing
rules may be waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused himself
files or consents to the filing of a motion for reconsideration or
modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the accused
waived his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion. His
motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to
reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make
them conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the new
judgment it has to render. In effect, a motion for reconsideration or
modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire
evidence open for the review of the trial court without, however,
conducting further proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof.
Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court which
aspects of the judgment of conviction should be reviewed. Having
filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or
in the alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of homicide,
appellants waived the defense of double jeopardy and effectively
placed the evidence taken at the trial open for the review of the trial
court. At any rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying circumstance
in the case at bar was squarely raised by the appellants in their
alternative prayer for conviction for the lesser offense of homicide in
view of the erroneous appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in the
information. Hence, the court a quo is not only empowered but also
under obligation to rectify its mistake in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength instead of
treachery. Verily, it is precluded from considering the attendance of a
qualifying circumstance if the complaint or information did not allege
Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA
such facts. Even before the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took
3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the
effect on December 1, 2000, qualifying circumstances were required
crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among
to be so specified in the complaint or information, otherwise they
crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension
cannot be appreciated against the accused.
from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which
violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post
facto law. According to the RPC suspension from employment and
115. Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan (Case Digest)
public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not
a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if
Facts:
acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the during suspension, and does not violate the constitutional provision
Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged against ex post facto law.
involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit
assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he
employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the
is currently occupying a position different from that under which he is
teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of
charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that
fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the
any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the government of several
under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving
millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on July 25, 1987, while Bayot
fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever
ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January
stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from
1980. But on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision
office. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which the
convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but
officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under
one of the thirty two cases filed against them. On Mach 16, 1982 Batas
which he was charged.
Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.

Issue:Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional

guarantee against an ex post facto law.
153
118. Paul Joseph Wright vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113213, August 15, 1994
Facts:
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between
Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of
crime, the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the
7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a
Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and
became effective thirty (30) days after both States notified each other
in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of
the Treaty have been complied with. Under the Treaty, each
contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution
of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State
for an extraditable offense." A request for extradition requires, if the
person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State
of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of
the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge
against the person sought to be extradited.
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian
authorities for indictable crimes in his country. Extradition
proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which
rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner. Said
decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner
came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the
order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the
Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to
an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
154
Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his
extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the court below
failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country.
Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner before this
Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by
the government against him.
Issues:
1. Whether or NOT enforcement of Article 18 of the Treaty states
a prohibition for the retroactive application of offenses
committed prior to the date of its effectivity
4. Whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of
the Constitution for being an ex post facto law
Ruling:
Affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and Deny the
instant petition for lack of merit
As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1)
statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was
not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating
new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which
prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4)
laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially
easier to convict a defendant.
As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a
piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It
merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution
of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed
or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified." In signing the
Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is
within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of
Australia regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal
offenses in either country.
119. LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the
ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually
transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said
incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before
the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.
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The accused filed separate motions questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said
law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one
or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with Salary
Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent
or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However,
pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved
amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
“principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A.
7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.
8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply
to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of
the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong
Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto
statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the
Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the
a
accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether
the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
jurisdiction.
RULING:
1.) RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED.
Petitioner and intervenors’ contention that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were
presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by
the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases
involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in
Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner
and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
2.) NOT EX POST FACTO LAW.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not
apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal
in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or
those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975,
as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not
a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes
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rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
3.) RTC HAS JURISDICTION.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the
information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting
of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to
the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not
established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that
the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of
official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in
the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan.