ww

ww....
.

1
1
:
:
::
..
:. .
:. .. .. ..

A Brief History of Memory Research

GORDON H. BOWER
READ

Background: Associationism
connecting together in memory simple ideas
based on sensations that are experienced
conPsychology as a discipline developed out of tiguously in time and/or space. The
memory philosophical discussions regarding the na- that sensory quality or event A was
experiture of the mind and mental life. The study of enced together with, or immediately
precedmemory and learning arose from philosophi- ing, sensory quality or event B is
recorded in cal questions regarding how people come to the memory bank as an
association from idea know things about their world. Learning is as- a to idea b.
Reviving these associative sesuredly the primary way we acquire knowl quences from
memory (when recurrence of edge, and remembering is a primary means by event A
makes us think of event B) is the prewhich people support knowledge claims, as sumed
method by which people's past experiwhen a witness in court asserts "I remember
ences cause their later thoughts to progress seeing Jones with a revolver in his hand."
from one idea to the next. This basic notion
Philosophical speculations about learning can be elaborated to account for the way
huwere prominent among advocates of empiri- mans develop coordinated expectations
about cism, which is the view that sensory experi- properties of objects, expectations
about ences are the only ultimate source of knowl- causal sequences of events,
predictions about edge and truths about the world (contra innate future events,
explanations of how or why ideas or religious authorities). People's ideas something
came about, and plans of action deabout the world are alleged to derive from signed to
bring about particular outcomes, sense impressions either as simple copies or These
are basic abilities of the mind. as combinations of simple ideas. Objects such
Throughout the seventeenth to nineteenth as oranges, dogs, and houses are allegedly
centuries, empiricist philosophers such as constellations of many sensory qualities (e.g.,
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas the color, shape, taste, and texture of an or-
Brown speculated about various factors that ange).
might affect the degree or strength of particuThe empiricist program required some lar
associations (Warren, 1921). They recogmeans for learning these constellations. Thus
nized that associations would vary in their was introduced the fundamental theory of as-
strength according to the vividness or distincsociation by contiguity (Warren, 1921).
Com- tiveness of the original experience, its duraplex ideas are allegedly formed in the
mind by tion (study time), its frequency (repetitions),
.
..
...
....
:

4
STUDY OF MEMORY
and its interest for the observer. Revival of as- (Darwin, 1859). Human learning was
seen as sociations from memory was hypothesized to an adaptive mechanism that
evolved over milvary with the resemblance of the stimulating lions of years throughout
the animal kingdom cue to the memory, the recency of the experi- by small variations
and minor accretions in ence, the coexistence of fewer alternative asso- the neural
hardware that carries out the variciates to the cue (called "interference"), and ous
learning tasks with which organisms are "temporary diversities of state" (intoxication,
confronted. This "biological continuity” view delirium, depression). Such conjectures
have justifies the many comparative studies by psygenerated much experimental
research on chologists of behavioral adaptation and learnlearning and memory, and
every learning the ing in lower animals. Since animals do not ory deals with these
factors in some way talk, those studies led in turn to a strong be(Bower & Hilgard,
1981).
haviorist orientation toward learning. Thus,
The scientific investigation of association learning came to be viewed as a change in an
formation began with the work of a German sci- organism's behavioral dispositions in
particuentist, Hermann Ebbinghaus, whose pioneering lar situations (S-R habits) as a
result of its exresearch (with himself as sole subject) was pub- periences. It was
recognized, of course, that lished in his treatise On Memory in 1885. Dis the responses
may be complex skills and the cussion of his work will be postponed in order stimuli
may be those stemming from a comto examine briefly another major influence on plex
environment, including intricate and studies of learning-namely, the doctrine of be-
subtle social situations. haviorism, which became wedded for many Behaviorist
approaches to learning were years to the doctrine of associationism.
greatly encouraged around the turn of the twentieth century by the pioneering
studies of
conditioned reflexes by the Russian
physioloBehaviorism and
gist Ivan Pavlov (1927) and by early studies
 of "trial-and-error" (instrumental) learning
by S-R Psychology
Edward Thorndike (1898, 1903), an influential
educational psychologist in America. This
beThe Behaviorist Philosophy
haviorist orientation was promulgated by

many influential psychologists throughout

the Behaviorism is a positivist philosophy which
first half of the twentieth century—from
John argues that all that observers can ever know
Watson (1919, 1924), to Clark Hull (1943),
to about other persons or animals is provided by
B. F. Skinner (1953, 1957). This orientation
close observations of their overt actions or be
pe- strongly affected the way in which human
haviors in specific situations (and human be
learning was studied and explained. That
orihavior includes speech). Behaviorism grew entation began to fade with the coming of
the out of a desire for scientific objectivity in ob- "cognitive revolution" that began in the
late servations and for parsimony in explanations; 1950s and early 1960s. However,
before disit was especially critical of the undisciplined,
cussing those events, we return to the
earlier introspective "mentalism" that at the turn of
work of Hermann Ebbinghaus, and the
rote the century was being passed off as an expla
learning tradition that followed his
pioneering nation for behavior. On the behaviorist view,
studies. The rote learning tradition was
charto predict someone's behavior, all one needs is
acterized by a fusion of associationism
and bea catalog of specific facts and generalizations haviorism. about his or her past
responses to situations resembling the present one. These generaliza
out a person's past situation-to-action Ebbinghaus and the Rote regularities are
presumably carried in his or learning Tradition
 Learning Tradition her nervous system as
a set of stimulus-response (S-R) habits.
Ebbinghaus (1885) set out to investigate the
formation of novel associations using
conAntecedents of Behaviorism
trolled systematic experiments with careful
measurements of his own learning. He
introWhile antecedents to behaviorism were many, duced strict controls regarding the
timing and an assured one was Charles Darwin's theory of number of study trials, recall
time permitted, biological evolution, which suggested the con- and retention interval (to
study forgetting). He tinuity of all species, including Homo sapiens invented the notion of
the nonsense syllable
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH
5
-
-.--.
-.
-
-
.
-.
-.
...

(like DAX, QEH) to provide himself with test, and relationships among several
sets of learning materials of homogeneous difficulty, materials being learned. As
variables have thus avoiding the variability of familiar words been isolated and
studied, a huge backlog of or prose. He taught himself by studying serial
empirical information has accumulated about lists of 6 to 20 syllables, reading
them aloud in how humans learn in these situations. And sequence in pace with
a metronome and then many theoretical hypotheses have been protrying to
recite the series from memory. The posed and tested to integrate and account for
serial list was his analog of the associative the evidence surrounding specific
topics. chain of ideas about which philosophers had speculated.
Analysis of Laboratory Rote
Ebbinghaus introduced many important
Learning Tasks ideas and
methods (see the Ebbinghaus symposium published in the July 1985 issue
(vol. The rote learning tradition was established ume 11) of the Journal of
Experimental Psy- around the intensive study of three different chology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition). kinds of learning paradigms-serial
learning, He measured the difficulty of learning a list by paired-associate
learning, and perceptual-mothe number of study trials required for him to
tor skill learning. We will briefly characterize attain one errorless recitation
of it. He noted each of these learning tasks and a few of their how difficulty
increased disproportionately findings. with the length of the list being
learned. He introduced the idea of measurable "degrees of
Serial Learning learning" (or
forgetting) by noting the savings in relearning a list he had learned earlier. The
The task Ebbinghaus used is called serial percent savings was the difference in
trials for learning, an analog of learning the alphabet or original learning (say, 9
trials) minus those learning to put letters in sequence to spell a needed for later
relearning (say, 3) divided by word: the subject learns to output in a specithe
original learning trials (so, (9-3)/9 = fied order a small set of temporally ordered,
67%). Using this measure, he was able to plot discrete items (letters, nonsense
syllables, his famous forgetting curve relating percent written or spoken words,
pictured objects, savings to retention interval. This curve (fig- sentences).
Subjects are asked to remember ure 1.1) showed very rapid losses over the first
both the items and their serial order. Retrieval few hours or days, with more
gradual but may be tested by asking subjects either to resteady decline over
subsequent days, weeks, produce (recall) all items in the order preand months.
Ebbinghaus also found that for- sented, or to recall what item followed a
spegetting of a list decreased with multiple re- cific cued item, or to reconstruct
the presented learnings of it, that overlearning increased re- order when given
the items (on flashcards) in tention, and that widely distributed study scrambled
order. In some experiments, a numtrials (say, 1 per hour) were more effective ber
of series are presented only once for recall than closely packed trials (say, 1 per
minute) (e.g., for measuring the immediate memory for long-term retention.
span). In other experiments, the same
items Ebbinghaus's new paradigm (adults learn- may be presented many times
in the same oring lists of nonsense materials) defined a task der for repeated
study and test trials to examin which a multitude of variables can be de- ine
accumulative learning. fined and their influences on "remembering" Studies of
serial learning have uncovered behaviors observed. The phenomena that he
many facts, Increasing the study trials and discovered, his ideas, and his
methods cast a time per item increases learning; increasing long shadow
throughout the twentieth century the time subjects are given to anticipate the of
research on human memory. Subsequent re- next successor in the series
improves their search has invented several other paradigms performance. While
making the items very and teased out many variables that determine similar to
one another (e.g., XON, NEH, XEH, memory performance in these settings. The
NOH) improves their recallability, this simimemories established can be tested by
either larity creates many confusion errors about recall, recognition, and
reconstruction, or by a their ordering. A robust finding is that items variety of
indirect measures. The nature of the at the beginning and end of the list are
easier materials can be varied, as can their mode of to learn than items in the
middle (see figure presentation, strategies subjects use in study. 1.2), a fact that
has provoked many explanaing them, expectations regarding the memory tory
attempts (Johnson, 1991).
JWUNALLA. L
I ." TW. ARAW
L
.
T
12
-
..
.-..
.
-
-
-
-
-

IMMEDIATE RECALL

20 MIN.
SAVINGS
I HR.

409HR.
9 MR.

oted
0
12

RETENTION INTERVAL (DAYS)

Figure 1.1 Ebbinghaus's forgetting curve. The savings percentages are plotted as a function of
retention interval. After Ebbinghaus (1885).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ERRORS

LLLLLLLL
DATA
OTHEORY
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1

Figure 1.2 Predicted and observed relative serial position error curves for 8-, 11-, and 14-item
lists. Data from Hovland (1940). The fit to the data is provided by Johnson's theory of relative
distinctiveness of different serial positions. (From figure 1 of "A distinctiveness model of serial
learning" by G. J. Johnson (1991). Psychological Review, 98, pp. 204-217, Reprinted by
permission.)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
13
14

SERIAL POSITION
-
-

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH

7
SS.
-
-
-
-
--

Conjectures regarding the effective stimu- ones for which subjects can easily
discover lus for the next response in the series have meaningful relationships.
This issue will be also provoked much research. The natural hy- revisited later.
pothesis is that the series is learned by chaining together a set of pairwise
associations, so
Skills that the series A-B-C-D is
stored as the unordered pairs C-D, A-B, B-C. Thus, item C is Many categories of
human skills have been both a response to its preceding cue, B, and in studied
systematically since the turn of the turn a cue for its successor, D. However, pre-
century (for reviews, see Rosenbaum, 1991; dictions from this pairwise chaining
hypothe- Schmidt, 1988). They vary greatly and include sis frequently fail,
suggesting that some more (1) perceptual motor skills such as typing and
abstract "mental slots" for relative position telegraphy, athletic skills such as
diving and (“first-A, second-B, ... last-D”) may be shooting basketball, musical
skills such as viothe effective cues for the ordered associations. lin and piano
playing, and laboratory tasks
such as pursuit rotor tracking and
reversePaired-Associates Learning

mirror tracing; and (2) cognitive skills such

as computer text editing, computer
programSoon after Ebbinghaus's studies, an American ming, chess playing, and
geometry theorem investigator, Mary Galkins (1894), introduced proving (see
Anderson, 1995). The skills differ the method of paired-associates learning. In in
the degree to which they can be imparted this task, subjects study a set of pairs
of dis- by verbal instruction and by the learner imicrete units (syllables, words,
pictured objects) tating the performance of a coach or model. and are asked to
learn to recall a specific The development of skills in everyday life member of a
pair (the "response") when tested typically requires a huge amount of practiceby
presenting the other member of the pair hundreds and perhaps thousands of
hours of (the "stimulus"). The retrieval test might also patient, deliberate practice.
Laboratory tasks request discrimination ("recognition") of stud- are selected for
study so that significant imied pairs compared to rearranged pairs. Exam-
provement can be tracked over a few minutes ples of paired associates include
learning or hours of practice. Skills are almost always French to English
vocabulary with flashcards, tested by subjects' ability to perform (rather names to
faces, names of wife-husband pairs, than verbally describe) the requisite activity
at countries with their major exports, and so on. some level of competence. In
many respects, paired-associate learning An early hypothesis was that skills
could closely mimics the S-R associationist analysis be well represented in
memory as a linear of all learning; for that reason it came to be chain of
associations in which proprioceptive favored for many rote learning studies.
(and external) feedback following a given
rePaired associate learning involves three sponse component provided the stimulus for
distinct but overlapping phases: (1) learning the next response component in the chain.
the nominal response terms as integrated units That hypothesis has been replaced,
however, (e.g., French words, nonsense syllables, etc.); by more complex modern
hypotheses involv(2) discriminating and reducing confusions ing hierarchical control of
integrated motor among the stimulus terms of the many pairs programs (see
Rosenbaum, 1991). being learned; and (3) associating the correct A major finding is
that the curve plotting response term to its appropriate stimulus. In- performance (e.g.,
time to do the task) against creasing the prior familiarity and meaningful practice trials
almost always approximates a ness of the response terms (e.g., English versus power
function of the form P= aN", where P Turkish words) lowers the difficulty of the is
performance, Nis number of practice trials, first phase. Increasing the similarity among
and b (negative when P is time) determines the nominal stimuli in the list of pairs in the
rate of improvement per practice trial. creases the difficulty of the second, discrimi- This
function (called the "No pain, no gain" nation phase; confusions between two similar
principle) says that performance speed imstimuli persist until the subject selects a dif-
proves rapidly at first, but then increasingly ferentiating cue that distinguishes between
slowly as practice proceeds. But improvethem (e.g., noting that the stimuli QEH and
ments can always be eked out by further pracHEQ differ in order). The difficulty of the
tice--captured in the slogan "The difference third, associative phase is reduced by using
between ordinary and extraordinary is that litwords that are already weakly associated
or tle bit extra."
-
---
-
-

8
STUDY OF MEMORY
PETIT

Second, as practice proceeds, the skill can

The Nature of S-R Theory be carried out
with progressively less attention and cognitive effort (on "automatic pi
for Rote Learning lot”), enabling the
person to attend to other The several tasks mentioned have been studmatters. This
aspect of automatization is often ied in many variations along with attendant conveyed
in the slogan "When the going gets theories of how humans master the tasks. For
tough, the tough get going"-meaning that reviews, see McGeoch and Irion (1952), Hall
high-level performance can be maintained in (1971), Kausler (1974), and later chapters
in the face of stress and distractions.
this handbook. An important development
Third, the basis for most perceptual motor was that the investigation of human learning
skills is largely nonconscious, not available to was expropriated in the 1930s and 1940s
by conscious introspection, beyond the skilled strong proponents of S-R behaviorism-a
marperson's ability to describe in useful detail riage that was to lead to a stormy
separation how he or she does the skilled action. Highly later during the "cognitive
revolution.” To ilskilled baseball hitters cannot adequately de- lustrate the nature of an
S-R theory of human scribe how they know where the pitched ball learning, its analysis
of paired-associate learnis going to be and how to adjust their swing to ing in which
subjects learn a collection of S-R hit an inside versus outside pitch (the same pairs will
be reviewed. inarticulateness characterizes golf putters or Considering each paired
associate alone, tennis pros hitting a graceful backhand). De- the general idea is that
reinforced repetitions spite this unverbalizable character of high- of the pair gradually
build up its associative level skills, some of the very best, most effec- strength (S-R
habit) toward a maximum, as iltive instruction is conducted by athletic lustrated in figure
1.3. Associative strength of coaches and music instructors who provide the pairing is
presumed to be reflected in the daily demonstrations and subtle feedback to probability
and latency (retrieval time) for the bring out the very best in their pupils. (Even correct
response to the stimulus as well as its tennis pros continue to have coaches.) Guri-
resistance to later forgetting. In figure 1.3, two ously, no such intense coaching occurs
in aca different thresholds are postulated: the S-R demic subjects such as mathematics
or psy- strength must be above the lower, “recognichology
tion" threshold in order to support the sub

100 T
recall threshold
recognition threshold
ASSOCIATIVE STRENGTH

o
i
Ź
6
3 4 5 TRAINING TRIALS

7
8
...
.
.

Figure 1.3 Hypothetical curve of increase in associative strength of an S-R habit as it

receives rewarded practice. A lower "recognition threshold" and higher "recall threshold"
are indicated.
-
-
.
.-
-
-
-
-

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH

9
6
F
R.
"
-
-
-
11
III
TIL
III
LA
T
ARLA 1.9

ject's accuracy on a pair recognition test; and STIMUL

RESP
ONSES the strength must be above the upper, "recall" threshold in order to
support accurate response recall to the stimulus member of the pair.
Strengths below these thresholds lead to errors or omissions. If the
momentary strength fluctuates somewhat from trial to trial around
KING
T
ABLE the mean plotted in figure 1.3, then correct response proportions will
gradually increase PRINCE
T
HRONE from zero to one rather than abruptly shifting from zero to one
when the mean crosses the threshold.
DOG
CAR
These two thresholds reflect the general belief that recognition tests are
easier than recall
Figure 1.4 Hypothetical
stimulus (left) to retests, and are more sensitive for detecting
sponse (right) associations
involved in learnsmall differences among weak associations.
ing three noun-noun pairs. The
direct, correct Three implications follow: first, that any S-R
associations (solid lines)
must overcome compair that is recalled can also be recognized;
petition from the generalized
error associasecond, that initial study trials can build up
n build up tions (dashed lines) to produce correct recall.
tior associative strength to the
S-R connection in a
Adapted from Gibson (1940).
"subthreshold" manner, even before these effects are revealed in accurate
recognition or recall (this will also produce savings in re- strengthened
sufficiently to win out in compelearning of "forgotten" pairs); and third, repe-
tition with both the preexisting and the genertitions beyond the point of
recall ("overlearn- alized associates. ing") continue to strengthen the habit,
and This generalization analysis explains the this would be revealed in its
retrieval speed fact that pairs with similar stimuli and/or reand its resistance
to later forgetting.
sponses will lead to many
confusion errors These remarks about single S-R connec- (e.g., saying
throne to king more often than to tions need to be elaborated somewhat to
deal car) and thus take longer to learn. The analywith subjects' learning of
a list of many pairs. sis also recognizes that preexisting associaFirst,
suppose that subjects are learning a list tions that conflict with the correct
response of 12 pairs that include the pairs king-table, (such as king-throne)
and that are strongly prince-throne, and dog-car. The association- primed
by other pairs in the list can create ist would first note that the stimulus
words many errors of commission ("intrusions") behave preexisting
associations from past learn- fore the correct, novel association wins out.
ing, such as king having associates of queen, (Obviously, if the preexisting
associate were royalty, throne, Arthur, Henry, and so on. the correct one for
this list, this would be a Thus, the new, to-be-learned association king
positive influence.) table must be strengthened sufficiently to Two other
aspects of this analysis may be overcome these preexisting ones.
noted. First, subjects are often observed to Second, the theory imagines
that each stim learn such novel pairs (king-table) by finding ulus word will
show initial generalization or and utilizing preexisting associations, such as
confusions (based on the similarities of their king-[Arthur-roundtable)-table.
These are appearance or meanings) to other stimuli in called mediators
and they chain together inthe list. These generalization tendencies are il
ternal (covert) associates that successively cue lustrated by dashed lines in
figure 1.4. These one another and lead to the correct response.
generalization tendencies can produce errors Note that these mediating
associates are asby evoking the wrong response to a similar sumed to act
like internal "responses" that stimulus. However, the correct response to
provide stimulating aftereffects, so in some each stimulus will be rewarded
each trial (by sense they preserve the stimulus-response knowledge of
results), and thus strengthened, character of the theory despite being (for
the whereas generalized responses (e.g., saying moment) unobservable.
Moreover, an "editing throne to king, or table to prince) will be non monitor"
needs to be postulated to enable the reinforced (punished) and hence
extinguished model (subject) to withhold the mediators (not or inhibited.
Thus, over repeated study trials, to say Arthur to king) but to give overtly
only the correct association is expected to be the correct response. It has
often been noted
.
Swimwear
W
o
www..com.mm
***
:

10
STUDY OF MEMORY
that such mediators serve as only a temporary Implicit in this emphasis on the
association crutch during early learning; as practice pro- value of to-be-learned material
was an imporceeds and the direct king-table association is tant underlying idea-namely,
that people repeatedly reinforced, it is retrieved more learn most easily by relating the
new material quickly, thus short-circuiting (and beating out) to things they already know.
They look for the the mediating associative chain that then "mediators" mentioned
previously. They try drops away.
to transform (recode) the to-be-learned mateA
second aspect of this generalization-dis- rial into something familiar or close to
somecrimination analysis is that after learning- thing that is meaningful to them. Thus,
the which, remember, occurred by inhibiting the nonsense syllable MIK is recoded as
"MIKE preexisting and generalized responses-the with the E missing" and JQA as "the
initials passage of a retention interval allows the inhi- of John Quincy Adams" (see
Montague, 1972). bition of errors to decay, thus leading to the Learners then remember
their recoding, and partial recovery of errors over time. Therefore, convert it back into
the to-be-remembered sealthough once inhibited, error responses such ries when they
are asked to recall. as throne-king may recover in strength over a This observation led
different investigators delay interval, creating forgetting via errors of in three different
directions. One direction commission. While this hypothesis (due to was to account for
the kind of mediators subGibson, 1940) explains forgetting in terms of jects came up
with; for example, Montague the familiar conditioning concept of spontane- and Kiess
(1968) showed that learning of a ous recovery, it must be admitted that it fares paired
associate was highly predictable from poorly against the evidence (see Underwood, the
ease with which adults came up with a 1961). For example, contrary to implication,
mediator for it; and Prytulak (1971) predicted once learned, high-similarity
paired-associate the memorability of different nonsense trilists are not forgotten at a
higher rate than low grams by how complicated were the "mental similarity lists.
steps" subjects required to convert them into familiar words. A second and predominant
di
rection for researchers was to abandon use of
Materials Variations
nonsense materials (as too variable) for study
 ing elementary learning and move on to
studThe foregoing illustrates that even in Ebbing- ies of learning of already meaningful
materials haus's earliest experiments, it was clear that such as words, sentences, texts,
pictures of learning depended greatly on the nature of the common objects, and video
events; this prematerials—whether numbers, nonsense sylla- dominant trend accounts
for the fact that nonbles, words, meaningful sentences, coherent sense-syllable learning
studies practically disprose, or poetry. These vary greatly in their fa- appeared in the
memory literature after the miliarity and meaningfulness for subjects for late 1960s. The
third direction for researchers example, in how much prior experience sub was to
examine carefully how past learning jects have had with such materials and how was
brought to bear upon a person's current rich the network is of associations subjects
learning. These were called studies of "transhave surrounding the units to be learned.
fer" of past knowledge—a topic to be dis
Researchers in the Ebbinghaus tradition cussed briefly now. soon noticed that even
their favored nonsense syllables differed greatly in how many words and other
associations they evoked among learners, and that syllables evoking more asso
Transfer of Knowledge ciations were
learned more easily. To deal with this variability, researchers tested many By
assumption adult learners always come subjects to tabulate "association norms" or into
a given learning situation with consider"meaningfulness norms" for collections of able
knowledge, learning strategies, and spenonsense syllables (Glaze, 1928), other non-
cific associations that they use as best they can sense materials (consonant trigrams
such as to optimize performance on the given task. XMQ; Witmer, 1935), and words
(Noble, 1952; These transfer effects include both general Noble & Parker, 1969). These
norms were used methods of attack for solving particular learnto compose lists of
materials that were of spec ing problems and more specific associations ified
associative difficulty,
among units employed in the new task.
.
!! .
. " TITA

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH

11
wwwsw
" " + " " - di
•••••
•
• •
• • vi

Nonspecific Transfer
useful techniques for learning educational ma
terials (e.g., history or science
textbooks), inGeneral (nonspecific) transfer includes strate- cluding how to
analyze texts for important gies for studying particular kinds of materials, ideas
and their relationships, memorize, orgaselecting discriminating cues from the
nomi- nize one's study time, and recite and review nal stimuli, composing
mediators for particu- the material (see, e.g., Dansereau, 1978; Mayer, lar
materials, optimizing use of immediate 1987; O'Neil, 1978). memory, and
adjusting to the temporal pacing of the study and test trials in the laboratory
Specific Transfer task. An
example of such general transfer effects is demonstrated in an experiment
by The second class of transfer studies examine Thune (1951). His
college-student subjects the influence of specific prior associations, learned
three new unrelated lists of 10 paired and these are of two types. One type
of study adjectives on each of 5 successive days, each examines subjects'
preexisting associations list practiced for 10 trials. The average correct
learned over a lifetime, and investigators then responses over the first 5
trials on each list (in notice how these operate in transfer to new figure 1.5)
reveals a swift rise in performance learning situations-understanding, of
course, across the three new lists within each day (re- that these past
learnings may vary widely flecting "warm up" adjustments, along with a
across subjects owing to their differing experislower improvement across
days (reflecting ences. An example here is the use of familiar "learning to
learn" lists of this kind). Many words rather than unfamiliar letter strings as
studies of this general kind have examined the learning materials. The
perceptual system dibenefits of explicitly teaching subjects various vides or
segregates stimuli into discrete mnemonic devices (Bower, 1970a), as well
as groups or "chunks," and looks for a match in
i
egen
WSPS.ME
---
--
--
--

Mean Number Correct in Five Trials On a acestea

TTTTTTTTTTT

‫اﻟﻠﯿﻞ‬
-

‫ﻻﻻﻻﻻﻻﻻﻻﻻﻻﻻﻻااا‬
1 2 3 Day 1
1 2 3 Day 2
1 2 3 Day 3
1 2 3 Day 4
1 2 3 Day 5
Figure 1.5 Trends in nonspecific transfer with practice. Three paired
associate lists were learned for 10 trials on each of 5 days; average
number of correct responses over first 5 trials on each list is plotted.
Contrast the large gains within sessions with the smaller ones between
sessions. (From L. E. Thune (1951), "Warm-up effect as a function of level
of practice in verbal learning." Journal of Experimental Psychology, 42, pp.
250–256. Reproduced by permission.)
12
STUDY OF MEMORY
memory to these perceptual chunks. A chunk stimulus are closely related in meaning.
Havis defined as a familiar collection of more ele- ing learned prince-throne, for
example, submentary units that have been interassociated jects would be quick to learn
prince-chair, and stored in memory repeatedly and that act presumably because the first
associate is used as a coherent, integrated group when retrieved as a mediator to aid
learning of the second (Miller, 1956; Simon, 1974). The brain's mech- pair. anism for
learning begins its operation of The topic of transfer is far richer and more association
formation) by linking together complex than this brief discussion can indielementary
units into larger chunks. The dif cate. For example, psychologists have examference
can be seen in comparing, for exam- ined the generally positive transfer that occurs ple,
letter strings such as IBF versus FBI ver- when adults learn two computer programming
sus FIB: the first is three chunks, the second a languages or two computer text editors
(see meaningful but unpronounceable chunk, and Singley & Anderson, 1989). In those
situations the third a pronounceable and meaningful positive transfer appears to arise
owing to simword. A simple rule is that novel material will ilar problem-solving steps that
are utilized in be remembered more easily the fewer chunks the two domains, despite
differences in decontained in it. This, of course, requires a suit- tails. For example, the
general plan for how to ably educated person who has the requisite fa- "cut and paste"
text must logically be nearly miliarity with the verbal units.
the same for every text editor (so that that
plan Beyond examining these preexisting lan transfers), whereas the specific key
strokes reguage chunks, however, investigators may aim quired may differ somewhat in
the two edito study the composition of transferable habits tors, causing minor negative
transfer at that and their mode of operation by explicitly level. teaching subjects prior
associations and then noticing how these affect later learning of re
Forgetting lated material. Different
arrangements can produce either positive, negative, or zero transfer The
stimulus-response approach easily acon a second learning task,
commodates three basic reasons for forgetting Classic cases of negative transfer arise
associations after they have been learned. The when subjects must learn a new
arbitrary re first reason is simply autonomous decay in the sponse to an old stimulus.
For example, hav- strength of the S-R association due to physing already learned who
is married to whom iological and metabolic processes that cause (e.g., Bill-Sally and
Dan-Ruth), subjects then progressive erosion of the synaptic changes in learn new
pairings as couples divorce and re- the brain that had encoded the original associmarry,
 requiring new associations such as ation. The second reason for forgetting is
perBill-Jane and Dan-Sally. This situation pro formance loss due to a type of stimulus
generduces large negative transfer relative to a con- alization: the training cue (or total
stimulus trol condition, because the prior specific asso- complex) is allegedly
progressively altered beciations compete with and interfere with the tween training and
testing owing to natural subject's quickly learning the new associa- forces, so that the
full stimulus complex is not tions. The old associations keep coming to reinstated at
testing, resulting in progressively mind and blocking retrieval of the new associ- poorer
retrieval of the original association. As ations. The effect here is similar to that in the a
hypothetical example, suppose that the full earlier illustration of king-throne interfering
training complex were composed of the simulwith remembering king-table. The amount
of taneous cues A, B, C, D, all associated with negative transfer is greater the more the
first response R. If only cue A were present later learned associations are aroused by
the second (because B, C, D are altered, missing, or forgotstimuli. Thus, if the
word-stimuli in list 2 ten), then A is unlikely to retrieve the whole were close in meaning
to the stimuli in list 2, associative complex, so response R will not be then the earlier
associations will generalize to recalled. The B, C, D cues in this example the second-list
stimuli, creating more negative might refer to any of a diverse set of what are transfer
the greater their similarity. In con- called "contextual stimuli”-internal postrast, transfer is
rather different when the rela- tural, sensory stimuli plus emotional and astionship of the
nominal response terms in the sociative responses of the subject, as well as successive
pairs is varied. When words are environmental cues besides those experimentused as
paired associates, positive transfer is ers explicitly recognize in their description of
observed when the successive responses to a the stimulus situation.
-
-

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH

13
.
.
-1
.
,
'.
.
LAN
A
.
M
.
.
.
M
..
L
.
a ra Street CSGHEKAMERA
.
..
...

A third reason in S-R theory for forgetting by prior learning of a first list
(A-B). The conis that other associations learned before or trol subjects in
this case learn only the A-C after the target association in question may list.
come over time to compete with, displace, or Many facts are known about
forgetting block out and interfere with retrieval of the caused by such
interference (see Postman, target material. This happens, for example,
1971). First, the stronger the training of the when people have trouble
remembering the target response compared to the competing asname of a
woman's second husband because sociates, the better it will withstand
interferher first husband's name is quite familiar and ence from other
associates. Second, the it keeps coming to mind and getting in the stronger
or more numerous are the interfering way. Another example is that people
often associates (e.g., multiple lists such as A-C, Amisremember attributes
of a person they met D, A-E learned before or after the A-B target earlier by
intruding those appropriate to the list), the greater the decrement in recall of
the ethnic stereotype that they had assigned to target associates.
Examples of these relationthat person.
ships are shown in figure 1.6 (from Briggs, The evidence for each of these
three causes 1957): in this study, after 2, 5, 10, or 20 trials of forgetting is
simply overwhelming. Through- of second-list training, subjects were asked
to out the history of research on forgetting, at give the first response that
each "A" stimulus tempts have been made to eliminate theoreti- brought to
mind. The panels of the figure cally one or another factor, or to explain one
show the data for subjects who received 2, 5, factor as really due to
another (e.g., decay 10, or 20 trials of original learning (OL) in figeliminated
in favor of interference—see Mc- ure 1.6 on A-B. The more A-C trials that
accuGeoch & Irion, 1952; or decay eliminated in mulated, the more A-C
came to the fore; but favor of progressive drift over time in the re- the more
original learning (A-B) trials, the trieval context--see Estes, 1955). Because
all longer A-B predominated before losing out. three factors are usually
highly correlated, Another fact about interference is that a these attempts at
colonization are typically in- longer interval or gap between learning of the
sufficient, often requiring assumptions that two lists reduces the extent to
which they inare equivalent to the other factors to account terfere with one
another. Furthermore, as the for the full range of data.
interval from the second-learned
list to testing The interference factor has been most often is lengthened,
proactive interference increases studied in the laboratory. In the paradigm
whereas retroactive interference decreases. most easily studied, subjects
learn two or Such results are explicable by the ideas that more lists of
associations bearing particular re- all associative strengths decay, and that
comlationships to one another. To illustrate with peting associates
suppressed during learning paired associates, let A-B denote a generic list
recover somewhat as time passes and their of many pairs, where A and B
denote the ge- suppression dissipates. neric stimulus and response terms,
respec Interference effects are not solely a function tively. In retroactive
interference studies, re- of overt intrusion errors of the explicit comcall of a
first learned list of homogeneous A peting responses. The subject may
think of the B pairs is substantially impaired after subjects competing
response but recognize it as not the learn a second list with the same
stimuli but requested target-response, so withhold it (a different responses
(denoted generically as A- process called "list discrimination"). On other C).
The amount of retroactive interference is occasions, interference arises as
a total blockassessed by comparison to a control condition ing or inability of
the subject to think of any in which subjects learn the A-B list but then
relevant response (an "omission" error). Thus, rest or engage in a
distracting task for an for example, if after learning two lists in an
Aequivalent time before receiving a recall test B, A-C relationship subjects
are asked to recall with their A-B list. This A-B, A-C arrangement both
responses to the stimulus terms, they can is the same as that noted earlier
that produces recall both responses to some extent, but pronegative
transfer in learning the second asso- gressively more C's and fewer B's, the
greater ciation. Indeed, across conditions, negative the amount of training
they have just received transfer in second-list learning correlates on the
second (A-C) list (Barnes & Underhighly with the amount of later forgetting
pro- wood, 1959). duced by interference. Proactive interference Although
interference effects have been ilconditions are the converse, examining the
lustrated with paired-associate learning, the decrement in second-list (A-C)
recall caused basic ideas apply to analyses of forgetting in
..
.
...
.
..
...
.
....
.
..
.
..
***
A
.
..17.0,
.
www
A
14
STUDY OF MEMORY
OL - 2
OL-5
IIIIIIO
A-8
A-8

kes o
10

MEAN NUMBER RESPONSES

OL - 10
L-20

I
NUMBER OF TRIALS A-C

Figure 1.6 Relative frequencies of the originally learned response (A-B) and the newly
learned response (A-C) during learning of the new response. The four graphs are from
four different groups of subjects given 2, 5, 10, or 20 trials of original learning (OL).
(From G. E. Briggs (1957), "Retroactive inhibition as a function of original and
interpolated learning." Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53, p. 64. Reprinted with
permission.)
all learning situations such as serial learning, cation) theory, with its concepts of encoding free
recall, memorizing addition and multipli- and decoding messages, and the concept of cation
tables, and remembering in which of "limited capacity," which applied to any commultiple lists
(or contexts) particular items oc- munication channel (for a review, see Garner, curred. It also
applies to forgetting sentences, 1962). The metaphor was that the human perparagraphs, and
stories when similar concepts ceptual system analyzed the stimulus array, are involved (see
Anderson, 1995).
extracted information from it in the form of neural codes (e.g., in visual or auditory
modal
ities), and that these codes entered into mental
Cognitive Psychology
programs designed either to store them in

memory, or to reason, make decisions, and The

Information
 guide actions. Donald Broadbent (1958) Processing
Perspective
adapted several ideas from this approach in
his studies of selective attention, especially While
interest in cognitive (thought) processes using the dichotic ("two ears") task in which had been a
continuing minor sideline through- adults with earphones immediately followed out the first half
of the twentieth century, ma in mimicry ("shadowed") speech heard in one jor momentuin to
cognitivism was imparted ear while trying to ignore a message piped into by developments in
the 1950s and 1960s. One the other ear. Broadbent's studies led him to of the antecedents was
information (communi- postulate selective sensory filters along with a
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH
15
.
.
.
. .
.

brief short-term memory that could hold unat- Karl Pribram (1960), and Cognitive
Psychology tended speech sounds for several seconds be- by Ulric Neisser
(1967). These inspirational fore attention could be switched over to deal books
provided arguments and exciting new with them.
agendas for an "information processing" view
of humans. People were seen as taking
inforComputer Models
mation into a perceptual system, selectively
of Cognition
attending to parts of it, encoding or transform
ing it for use by their cognitive abilities,
storA second impetus to cognitive psychology ing it in memory, and later retrieving it
from was the work of Allen Newell and Herbert Si- memory when an appropriate plan
and remon (1961, 1972), who constructed computer trieval cue were activated. The
analysis of perprograms designed to simulate details of the ception, attention,
immediate sensory memothought processes that people go through as ries, short-term
memory, and the structure of they solve various kinds of problems (e.g., long-term
memory became prominent topics. logic proofs, analogies, chess playing, intelli- Since
S-R theory had very little to contribute gent search). Such simulation programs to these
topics, the major developments in clearly had to have very large memories of memory
theory began breaking away from the structured knowledge about a given domain S-R
perspective. (such as rules and moves of chess), have a means for putting new
information into the
Critiques of S-R Theory system (e.g.,
an opponent's chess moves), have a means for reasoning about the current situa
Concurrent with these developments from tion by manipulating symbolic expressions in
communication engineering and artificial ina central processor (or "short-term memory'),
telligence were a series of effective critiques of and have some means for reporting out
the S-R theory as a means for dealing with com"actions" (moves) the program had
decided to plex varieties of human cognition. The critake. These activities are easily
viewed as tiques attacked the S-R accounts of motor analogous to activities of the
human mind. Si- skills (Lashley, 1951), thinking (Bruner, Goodmon and Newell noted
that the stimulus-re now, & Austin, 1956; Newell, Shaw, & Simon, sponse analyses of
problem solving were of no 1958; Newell & Simon, 1961), pattern recognihelp
whatsoever in deciding how to structure tion (Neisser, 1967; Selfridge & Neisser, 1960),
the knowledge base of the programs in order memory (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Asch,
to carry out efficient retrieval, or how to rea- 1969; Bartlett, 1932; Bower, 1970c; Tulving
& son effectively to achieve specific goals. Along Madigan, 1970), and language (Fodor,
Bever, & with other researchers in artificial intelli- Garrett, 1974; Chomsky, 1959, 1972).
Even in gence, they proceeded to create a number of the traditional S-R domain of
conditioning, computer programs that, by manipulating new investigations of higher
cognitive prosymbols, displayed an impressive amount of cesses in nonhuman animals,
especially simulated "intelligent behavior" of a sort for higher primates and dolphins,
were introducmerly carried out only by humans (see an ing major revisions in
conceptualizations of early account by Feigenbaum & Feldman, cognitive processes
(and learning) in lower 1963). This included not only reasoning pro- organisms (e.g.,
Roitblat, Bever, & Terrace, grams but also learning programs (the EPAM 1984).
program of Feigenbaum, 1959; Simon & Fei- One of the most well-known critiques was
genbaum, 1964; Richmond & Simon, 1989) that by the linguist Noam Chomsky (1959,
and many others. For reviews, see the hand- 1972) in his review of B. F. Skinner's book
books by Barr and Feigenbaum (1981a, 1981b) Verbal Behavior (1957). In his book,
Skinner, and Cohen and Feigenbaum (1981),
the radical arch-behaviorist, attempted an S-R Memory theorists were inspired by such
account of language acquisition and use. developments to step outside the strictures of
Chomsky argued that Skinner's account (and S-R theory and to begin to theorize about
per- by implication, all S-R accounts) was doomed ceptual and attentional processes,
as well as to superficiality since it ignored the obvious strategies and knowledge
structures that were cognitive processes that intervene between a learned and used to
acquire new knowledge. situation and language utterances. He argued The "call to
revolution" was urged in two im- further that extrapolations of terms such as portant
books: Plans and the Structure of Be- "stimulus," "response," "reinforcement," and
havior by George Miller, Eugene Galanter, and "discrimination" from their
animal-laboratory
16
STUDY OF MEMORY
setting (the "Skinner box") to interpret lan- bled orders, and repeatedly recalled. A
freguage behavior were vague, metaphorical, and quent finding is that items presented
at the beno better than common sense. Moreover, ginning ("primacy") and end
("recency") of Chomsky argued strongly that the simple the list are typically recalled
earlier and more ideas of S-R associationism were inadequate often than items
presented in the middle of in principle to account for the way children the list (see figure
1.7). Longer lists and learn their language from experience. Children shorter study times
per item cause poorer learn nonconscious linguistic rules that are far overall recall,
except for the final ("recency") more abstract and complex than warranted by items of
the list. These effects are obvious in the language samples they hear, especially the the
recall curves of figure 1.7. realistic samples containing their many errors, Free recall
was difficult for S-R theories to back-ups, false starts, and ungrammatical ut explain,
since no specific stimulus appeared terances (see Chomsky, 1968, 1972). Chomsky to
be involved and subjects were not obvisimilarly argued that S-R concepts were not
ously making overt responses as they were exrich enough to adequately explain the
com- posed to the study list. Moreover, subjects' plexities of humans' abilities to
comprehend performance seemed to reveal a variety of "orand generate sentences in
context.
ganizational processes" at work-a fact emChomsky's critique and those of his associ-
phasized by Tulving (1968, 1962). For examates established a new direction for the
study ple, when multiple study and recall trials are of language; the new field of
psycholinguistics given with the same list of supposedly unredrew its ideas and
inspiration from new lin- lated words, subjects' improving recall is usuguistic theories
rather than S-R psychology ally accompanied by increasing stereotypy or (Fodor,
Bever, & Garrett, 1974; Miller & Mc- consistency in what items they recall together Neill,
1969). In turn, psycholinguistics had a as clusters (Tulving, 1962). The clusters are
ofvery strong influence on ideas of memory re- ten idiosyncratic groups of 3 to 7 list
words searchers who recognized that some day they among which a subject finds some
kind of would have to understand in detail how and meaningful relationship. With
training, these what people learn from language inputs- subjective clusters grow longer
(include more which, after all, is the medium through which items) and become more
stable. Recall can be most education proceeds.
substantially increased by using words in the
list that have strong prior connections (e.g.,
inPopularity of Different
 stances of a taxonomic category), since
subMemory Tasks
jects are likely to discover these inter-item re
lationships and use them for organizing
their As noted, experiments within the S-R para- recall (see also Bower, 1970c;
Mandler, 1967). digm intensively investigated serial learning Such results suggest that
learners are not the and paired-associate learning. With the advent passive tabula rasa
(blank slate) assumed in of the cognitive approach to memory, some traditional
associationism; rather, they are what different questions about memory were very active
in using what they already know asked, leading to different memory paradigms to
search for meaningful relationships among that became popular because they provided
a the learning materials that they can utilize to means for studying different kinds of
memory ease their memorization task. processes. These experimental arrangements
Another impressive fact about free recall is were free recall, context judgments about
that subjects know far more of the list words memorized events, and indirect memory
tests, than they are able to recall when given the along with a renewed emphasis on
short-term general request to "recall the words of that list memory. We shall discuss
these newly popu- you studied." When provided with more spelar memory tasks.
cific associative cues (e.g., a category name),
subjects now recall many list items they
forFree Recall
merly failed to retrieve (Tulving & Pearlstone,
1966; Tulving & Psotka, 1971). In an
impresIn a free recall task, following presentation of sive tour de force regarding the
power of rea set of discrete experiences (words, pictures trieval cues, Mäntylä (1986)
had subjects write of common objects, actions), subjects are 3 meaningful associates to
each of 600 target asked to recall them in any order that they words, with no instructions
for remembering. choose for convenience. The set of items may Seven days later they
received a recall test. be repeatedly presented, often in new scram- When given none of
their associates as cues,
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH
17
1.00
40-1
PROBABILITY OF RECALL
30-1

fall bear.com
20-1
00 L

0
ILIUIUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

SERIAL POSITION

Figure 1.7 Serial position curves for free recall of lists of 10, 15, 20, 30, or 40
words each presented for 1 or 2 seconds of study (e.g., 15-2 denotes 15 words
presented at a 2-second rate). (From B. B. Murdock, Jr. (1962), "The serial
position effect of free recall." Journal of Experimental Psychology, 64, pp.
482-488. Reprinted by permission.)
they recalled only 6% of the target words; in the earlier, specified list (called a
"recogniwhen given their 3 associates as cues, they re- tion memory" test). If items
were presented in called 65% of the 600 target words. Mäntylä several different lists,
subjects may be asked and Nilsson (1988) produced even more dra- to indicate in
which list, if any, the test item matic recall (94% at 3 weeks), even without was
presented. Items may be presented several instructions for memorizing, by asking sub-
times in each of two or more distinguishable jects to produce unique and/or distinctive
as lists, and subjects later may be asked to indisociates during original exposure to the
target cate how often a test item was presented in words. The results illustrate the
differing each list. Subjects may also be asked to recall power of different retrieval cues
(viz., one's aspects of the "source"—who said the word, associates versus "the list
studied"). It sug- where or when it was presented, in what mangests that when a
memory is claimed to have ner of voice (male or female speaker), or charbeen
forgotten, the claim should be limited to acteristics of its visual presentation (type font
the particular kind of retrieval test that failed. of word, size, colored vs. black-and-white
If one retrieval cue fails, perhaps a more po- slides). Some experimenters refer to all
these tent set of cues could be found that would re judgments as "source memory,"
whereas othvive the temporarily inaccessible memory. ers distinguish "recognition
memory” judg
ments (which could be based on an undiffer

Context Judgments
entiated feeling of recent familiarity of an
from Memory
item) from the other explicit source judg
ments, In this paradigm, having been
presented with one or more sets of discrete items, subjects are Source Memory. Source
memories are labopresented with a copy of the old items (and ratory analogs of people
remembering where perhaps similar new ones) and asked to re- and from whom they
learned certain informatrieve and judge something about that item's tion. The difficulty
these performances raise context of earlier presentation. The judgment for an S-R
theory is that in no case are subjects may be whether or not the item was presented
overtly responding to these aspects of the ex
18
STUDY OF MEMORY
perience as they are studying the items. cific time, place, and mode of presentation (its
Rather, it seems that the perceptual system is "context," as he says). As evidence,
Hintzman almost automatically recording something like found that subjects were often
able to retrieve sensory images that are retrieved later to sup- some contextual details
about each presentaport such judgments.
tion of an item, almost in the manner of a vidA basic finding of source memory is that
eotape recording. For example, subjects might remembering which source provided
particu- experience presentation of a long list in which lar information grows worse the
more similar 30 unrelated words are presented once mixed are the salient properties of
the several in among 15 presented twice and 10 presented sources. For example,
people are more likely four times, all scattered randomly throughout to confuse in
memory which of two unfamiliar a 100-presentation list. Upon later testing with speakers
said a particular message if the the test word table, a hypothetical subject speakers look
and sound alike. Source confu- might be able to report correctly that "the sions also
increase the less associated are the word table was presented twice: its first
precontents of the messages with their respective sentation was in the first quarter of
the list and sources. For example, readers are more likely was spoken in a male voice;
its second presento ascribe their memory of an alien abduction tation was in the third
quarter of the list and it story to having read it in the National En- was presented visually
in red Gothic letters." quirer than in the more credible New York While such contextual
details are generally Times.
poorly recalled (as would be expected by the A
second fact is that material people imag- similarity-based interference they suffer), their
ine or produce themselves (e.g., as associates moderate accuracy indicates that
subjects are to something they saw) can be confused later often successfully storing
detailed records of in memory with something they actually saw several different
experienced presentations of or heard. This discrimination of "my internal the same
word. This in turn supports the mulvs. his external" event improves the more tiple-trace
over the strengthened single-trace thinking or cognitive effort subjects engage in
account of how repetition works in memory. while generating the imagined scene origi-
With higher frequencies (10 or more), individnally. This is likely due to the fact that the
ual memories of a given item's presentations imagined scene was stored along with a
record greatly interfere with one another, and subof the cognitive operations needed to
create jects appear to shift to a "frequency estimathe scene. Later retrieval of these
traces helps tion" rather than "memory counting" strategy people judge the memory as
an imagined one for making judgments of these higher frequen(see Johnson & Raye,
1981; Johnson, Hash- cies. troudi & Lindsay, 1993).
Another interesting type of contextual judgment is the relative recency of
an event. For
example, the subject might be asked to
estiFrequency Judgments. Frequency judgments mate how many items back in a series
(or how ask subjects how often a given word or picture long ago) the word table (vs.
prince) had been was presented in a list. Hintzman (1976; presented. In general,
accuracy of judgments Hintzman & Block, 1971) has brought these declines as a power
function of intervening frequency-in-context judgments to bear upon items or time
elapsed; and discrimination of a fundamental issue in memory theory which of two items
was more recent follows a namely, how multiple repetitions of the nomi- logarithmic
function—that is, discrimination nally same item are treated by the memory varies with
the ratio of their recency differsystem. The traditional theory is that different ence
divided by the recency of the more recent presentations of, say, the word table simply
one (Yntema & Trask, 1963). A multiple-trace strengthen the one association of that
memory theory also provides a better account of how unit to the list context, and that
later judg- repetitions of an item affects its apparent rements of its presentation
frequency could be cency judgment (Flexser & Bower, 1974). derived from the strength
of this one association.
The alternative view favored by Hintzman Recognition Memory. In recognition
memory is that each presentation of the same nominal experiments, subjects judge
whether or not a stimulus establishes a new memory trace, test item was explicitly
presented on a list each associated with its accompanying spe- studied earlier. A basic
fact is that access to an
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH
19
Pogg-
am-bn hann
es

item's memory requires that subjects interpret The primed word is also more likely to be
gen(or "encode") the item at test in roughly the erated as a member of a category (list
some same manner as they did when it was origi- birds) or as an associate to a related
cue nally studied. This basic fact has been demon- ("Perched in a tree is a red-breasted
strated for a variety of stimuli that have ambig - "). In such indirect tests, the subject
uous (multiple) interpretations, including may produce the primed item with a fresimple
drawings (the duck-rabbit picture; the quency far above an unprimed baseline, and
young wife-old crone picture), naturalistic yet have no subjective awareness of
rememsounds (trotting horses vs. tap dancers), and bering any specific episode from
his or her polysemous words (kitchen TABLE vs. math past. The nature of indirect
memory tests and TABLE). The point is that the nominal stimu- their relation to direct
tests are topics of great lus during the test must arouse the same per- interest in current
research (see, e.g., Bower, cept or meaningful interpretation it did during 1996; Tulving
& Schacter, 1990), and several study in order for it to make contact with the chapters of
this handbook will touch on these memory trace of the original event. This is the issues.
sense of the "encoding specificity principle" proposed by Tulving (1983; Tulving &
Thom- Short-Term Memory Models son, 1973).
Tulving believes the principle applies far In the early 1960s, considerable interest
arose more widely than with just ambiguous words in the study of immediate (or
"short-term") or pictures, since the context of presentation memory. While the limits of
immediate memcan activate somewhat different properties ory and the "memory span"
had been known and associations to thousands of words or pic- since Ebbinghaus (and
described by William tures that are otherwise unambiguous. For ex- James, 1890), the
novel, startling fact observed ample, people think of different aspects of a by Lloyd and
Margaret Peterson (1959) was piano if they speak about tuning it versus lift- that people
very rapidly forget a few unrelated ing it. The aspect aroused by the word during letters
or words (such as TGK or glass, pen, its original context of presentation can then wood)
that they have just read if they are disserve later as the more potent retrieval cue for
tracted and occupied with another task for just re-arousing that memory.
a few seconds. Figure 1.8 illustrates this rapid
loss as subjects were engaged for 1 to 18
secIndirect Memory Tests
onds in a simple subtraction task (subtracting
successive 3's from a starting number)
before The tasks above are called "direct" tests since being asked to recall the three
items they had subjects are asked explicitly to try to remem- just read. Early
investigators had apparently ber an earlier episode, perhaps to recall sev- overlooked
this rapid fall-off in memory for eral features of the context surrounding the trivially small
amounts of material because presented event. These tests may be con- they typically
had used serial lists well betrasted with indirect tests of memory in which yond subjects'
capability for perfect immedisubjects answer general knowledge questions ate recall.
Such results suggest a short-term that presumably do not refer to recent, specific
memory of extreme fragility, lasting only a few experiences (Richardson-Klavehn &
Bjork, seconds after the subject's attention is drawn 1988; Schacter, 1987). Yet it can be
shown that elsewhere. This rapid loss may be contrasted recent experiences affect the
speed and con- to the long-term memories for information tent of what is retrieved from
one's general people have stored in their knowledge base. knowledge.
The next decade in memory research was The prototypic example is repetition prim-
filled with many studies of such short-term ing wherein a word (or picture of a common
memories: many different paradigms were inobject) is accessed more readily if it is a
repeti vestigated, and many variables that controlled tion of one recently presented.
Such priming short-term retention were investigated. As evi(say, of robin) shows up in
facilitated percep- dence accumulated, several formal theories tual identification (seeing
it more accurately were proposed to explain the interaction bein a degraded or quick
flash), in lexical deci- tween short-term and long-term memory. sions (that robin is a
word, but ribon is not). These built on the earlier proposals of Broadand in fragment
completion ("Give the first bent (1958), Bower (1964), and Waugh and word you can
think of to complete r_bi_") Norman (1965) (reviewed in Murdock, 1974).
ESAPARE
..
. AVERDAD
E
20
STUDY OF MEMORY
Recall probability
LLLLLLLLL

TTTTTTTTTT,
3
IIIII 6 9 12 15 18
Recall interval (sec)
Figure 1.8 Correct recall of 3 letters as a function of a retention interval filled with a
"counting backwards" distraction task. (From L. R. Peterson and M. J. Peterson (1959),
"Short-term retention of individual verbal items,” Journal of Experimental Psychology,
58, pp. 193– 198. Copyright 1959 by the American Psychological Association.
Reprinted by permission.)
The most popular model of this period was transfers into the more durable long-term
that proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968, memory information about the
associations 1971) because it was the most explicit and was being studied. Information
transferred to longapplied to the widest range of results.
term memory can also be forgotten, but at a
much slower rate than the information in A
Popular Model of
STM. A to-be-remembered item will be even
tually displaced or lost from STM since newly
Short-Term Memory
arriving information enters STM and bumps
Figure 1.9 shows the general structure of the out the earlier items. The greater the
demands three memory stores postulated: a sensory
or difficulty of the interpolated task, the more
store that held briefly glimpsed (or heard) rehearsal suffers and so the poorer the reten
pes for a couple of seconds before their tion of the target items. traces decayed. Stimulus
traces in the sensory store that are attended to, identified, and re
Benefits of the Short-Term coded are thereby
entered into a short-term
 Memory Model memory (STM). The STM
is of limited capac
ity, holding at most only a few items (e.g., 4 Several features of such models should be
emwords or 2 paired associates). If the items are phasized. First, they permit flexibility in the to
be learned, the central-control processes initial encoding of the input coding. For norinitiate a
plan for memorizing, such as covert mal speakers, many to-be-remembered stimuli rehearsal
(silently going over the words). The will be encoded by their names or descriptors. model
assumes that each rehearsal cycle also Thus, later confusions in recall of letter or
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH
21
Short-term memory

(STM) Temporary working memory

Sensory registers
Environmental
input
Long-term memory
(LTM) Permanent memory store
Visual
Control processes:
Auditory
Rehearsal Coding Decisions Retrieval strategies
Haptic
Response output
Figure 1.9 The flow of information through the three memory stores postulated in
Atkinson-Shiffrin's model. (From R. C. Atkinson and R. M. Shiffrin (1971), "The control
of short-term memory," Scientific American, 225, pp. 82-90. Copyright by Scientific
American. Reprinted by permission.)
word strings will often be greater for items strategies--such as concentrating rehearsal
on with similar pronunciations (e.g., recalling the some high-valued (or surprising) items
at the similar letters B, T, V, C versus the dissimilar expense of low-valued items, or
searching in B, X, W, Q-see Conrad, 1962, 1964). Second, LTM for mediators (of the
type mentioned earmultiple study trials aid later recall by accu- lier) as a way to aid
association learning. This mulating strength of the association recorded approach
allows a role for motivational and in LTM. Third, the model distinguishes mem-
individual-ability differences in partly deterory structures from the momentary plans
mining memory. ("control structures") that utilize these mental The STM models were
partly inspired by structures to help memorization or recall. One neurological patients
(the famous H.M.) with such memorizing plan is verbal rehearsal and organic amnesia
caused by bilateral damage to Atkinson and Shiffrin developed their model's the medial
temporal lobe and hippocampus. main predictions by assuming that motivated Such
patients have an intact short-term memsubjects in a learning situation engage in ory
and long-term memory, but are greatly imsteady verbal rehearsal when they have the
paired in transferring new verbal information opportunity. One implication of the verbal
re- to long-term memory, This is exactly the pathearsal strategy is that the number of
items tern to be expected if the STM-LTM transfer that can be held in the rehearsal
STM in process were impaired. creases with their covert speech rate. Thus, Such
STM-LTM models had a ready explaimmediate memory span would be lower for nation
for the serial position curves seen in longer words, for people who speak slowly free
recall (see the earlier figure 1.7). The bet(e.g., younger children), and for languages ter
recall of the beginning words ("primacy" whose digit names take longer to pronounce
effect) was due to their entering an empty (see Baddeley, 1986, 1990).
STM and thus receiving greater amounts of reThe model's distinction between memory
hearsal compared to later words before being structures and control processes
(strategies) displaced; the better recall of the end-final permits an understanding of the
differing re- items ("recency") was due supposedly to subsults that arise if subjects use
other learning jects reading them out of STM at list's ending
22
STUDY OF MEMORY
before they return to LTM to retrieve earlier that structures that produce durable list
items (see the curves in figure 1.7). Items long-term traces may be somewhat
indepresented for more study (2 vs. 1 sec in figure pendent from those responsible for
1.7) transfer more information into LTM, thus short-term maintenance of information.
raising recall levels of early and middle items.
In reaction to such criticisms, more recent
Shortcomings of the
theorists have revised and recast important
Short-Term Memory Models
aspects of the Atkinson-Shiffrin model. Bad
deley (1986, 1990) has hypothesized
several Although STM models explained many facts,
modality-specific short-term stores that he
they suffered from several shortcomings that
calls working memories—a phonological
store caused the basic ideas to be altered and elabo
for speech-based material, a
visuo-spatial store rated. Included among these shortcomings are
for visual images, and an "executive
controlthe following:
ler" that holds plans that program and coordi1.
In order for a familiar word or chunk to nate the activities of the separate short-term
be identified, the stimulus must first ac- stores. Anderson (1983, 1995) has argued that
cess its matching code in LTM. Thus, it rather than a separate "storage place,"
shortseems as though the diagram in figure 1.8 term memory should be conceived as
the temshould have LTM accessed by the stimu- porary activation of information chunks
in a lus before its code is entered into STM. single memory. According to this view,
items Alternatively, it may be more logical to can be in various states of momentary
activaconsider STM as only an activated portion tion. Items that are highly activated are
readily
of LTM (see, e.g., Anderson, 1995). available for recall or for entering into other 2.
Several secondary tasks (e.g., repeating cognitive activities. To deal with long-term re
4 digits) were found to have little or no call, Anderson supposes that different memeffect
on free recall memory for visually ory traces also differ in their strength or ability
presented word lists. This suggested to to be reactivated later by relevant cues. We
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) that adults will return later to discuss the representation
could place sinall amounts of irrelevant of memories in the long-term store. verbal
material (the digits) into a repetitive articulatory loop whose operation The
Episodic/Semantic did not interfere with subjects encoding
Memory Distinction and learning the visual
words. The implication is that adults have multiple re Following observations by
philosophers writgions for short-term storage of stimuli ing about memory (e.g.,
Bergson, 1911; Rusreceived from different sensory modal- sell, 1921), Endel Tulving
(1972) introduced ities (see Baddeley, 1990).
to psychologists the distinction between epi3.
Fast, repetitive, going over of verbal sodic memory and semantic memory. An epi
items results in very little memory sodic memory is about a specific event that
oclater--that is, "mindless" rehearsal per curred at a particular time and place,
such as se is not sufficient to create durable your memory of getting a traffic
ticket or obmemories. Rather, some kind of mean- serving a car accident. In
contrast, semantic ingful associations and elaborations memory is the "mental
thesaurus, organized (some "deeper processing" to use the knowledge a person
possesses about words term of Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & and other verbal
symbols, their meaning and Tulving, 1975), connecting the new ma- referents,
about relations among them, and terial with old chunks of knowledge al about
rules, formulas, and algorithms” for maready in memory, are needed to create
nipulating them (Tulving, 1972, p. 386). In more durable memories.
these terms, the memories typically being
ac4. The model assumes that STM is the "en quired and tested in verbal learning experi
trance" to transferring materials into ments are episodic (e.g., "I just studied the LTM;
but several neurological patients pair king-table"). Semantic memories are the were
soon reported (Shallice & Warring abstracted words, concepts, and rules stored ton,
1970, 1974) who could learn visual in our long-term memory whose context of acpaired
associates quite normally despite quisition was long ago forgotten (e.g., most having
severely impaired auditory im- people cannot say when they first learned the mediate
memory. Such patients suggest meaning of the word king).
.
:"..::..
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH
23
Tulving noted several properties of these ing, and learning. Appreciable
developments two classes of memories. First, episodic mem- also arose in
computer models for natural lanories are more susceptible to forgetting. Sec
guage understanding and learning from lanond, retrieval of an episodic memory
is usu guage input. A computer model that attempts ally accompanied by an
explicit or implicit to understand language (typed into it) obviously reference to,
and image of, the time and/or needs several components: a word lexicon that
place of the episode (e.g., "In the list you just calls up a network of interrelated
concepts in learned, what was king paired with?"). Third, long-term memory; a
syntactic component that retrieval of any information is itself another will take in a
sentence, parse it, and assign a episode that creates its own episodic memory
grammatical structure to its constituents (e.g., (e.g., people can remember a test
trial and how word classes, noun phase, verb phrase, logical they performed).
Fourth, autobiographic mem- roles of agent, action, object), and an interpreter
ories are typically dated episodic memories that splices together the grammatical
structure although people also have many abstract gen- with the indicated
concepts to compose a full eralizations about long stretches of their life
interpretation of the sentence in the context (see that are not themselves distinct
episodes (e.g., Harris, 1985; Schank & Riesbeck, 1981; Winopeople can recall
that they went to college for grad, 1972, 1983). A final necessity is a senfour
years, although they may not now be re tence-production module that is called
upon to calling any specific incident).
paraphrase what it has been told, draw
inferTulving (1983) believed the differences be ences, and answer questions based on what it
tween episodic and semantic memories were has been told or can retrieve from memory (see
sufficiently striking and hard-wired that he references cited). hypothesized the existence of two
different In such systems a primary concern is in memory systems-episodic and semantic. how
knowledge units are to be represented in (Later he added a procedural memory system the
memory of the model. Many proposals in recognition of perceptual motor skills.) have been
advanced on this topic. An early These memory systems were contrasted in proposal is that the
unit of knowledge should terms of their conditions and consequences be elementary
propositions such as subjectof retrieval, nature of the stored information, predicate structures
(e.g., Anderson & Bower, vulnerability to interference, and interde- 1973; Kintsch, 1974).
Propositional structures pendence. This hypothesis has led to much may be either one-place
predicates ("Roses are discussion in the literature (see, e.g., the dis- red” rendered as
Red(roses)); two-place predicussion around the article by Tulving, 1986, cates (Mother-of (Mary,
Jesus)); or three-place in Brain and Behavioral Sciences). Critics con- predicates (loaned
(library, book, John)). The tend that semantic knowledge consists of ab- "arguments" in such
propositions are constractions in LTM derived from many episodic cepts that exist in long-term
memory; the memories (e.g., occasions when a word was proposition asserts (and records) a
new kind used or spelled correctly for the person); they of property or relation among the
concepts. argue that although the two classes of memo- When someone comprehends a
proposition, ries clearly differ in their contents, strengths, the theories conceive of that act as
establishand specific time-place contextual references, ing in his or her memory new
associations corthe two classes are otherwise similar in their responding to the asserted
relationships properties. This productive discussion has among the concepts. Thus, in
comprehending continued over the years; a recent develop- "A man gave a book to a woman,"
people are ment has proposed use of brain neuroimaging setting up in memory a giving
predicate that data gathered during episodic versus semantic interrelates instances of their
preexisting conretrieval tasks in hopes of obtaining discrimi. cepts of man as the donor, woman
as the renating evidence for the brain-basis for the dis cipient, and a new instance of a book as
the tinction (see Buckner, 1996).
object transferred. Note that in such cases the

verb (give) comes with a collection of

exKnowledge Structures in
pected roles--donor, recipient, object, implic
itly a time and place of the event, and a set of
Long-Term Memory
inferences (e.g., the woman now has the
book). These roles act like empty slots to be
Propositions
filled by the other concepts (arguments) in the
We noted above the development of computer proposition. This is an elementary example of
models to simulate reasoning, problem solv- a "schema," a notion elaborated below.
...
".
.
.
IL

24
STUDY OF MEMORY
types, and routine, stereotyped actions
(e.g., Concepts and Schemas
making a telephone call, visiting the
dentist, As noted, language understanders require a buying cinema tickets,
buying groceries at a huge network of concepts and their interrela- check-out
counter, attending a classroom lections. Psychologists have speculated exten-
ture). Each stereotyped activity is composed of sively about the nature of
concepts and how an ordered sequence of actions to achieve they might be
structured in human memory. some goal, and it "runs off" in behavior (and
Concepts are obviously represented in terms in recall chunks) more or less
automatically. of their associated properties, perceptual fea- People use their
schema knowledge not only tures, intended uses or functions, and their re- to
guide their actions but also to understand lations to other concepts. While an
early view those of others (as viewed or described in narwas that concepts
should be represented in ratives). Through experience people acquire memory
as a set of defining features that are schemas regarding novel activities (e.g.,
rollerall necessary and jointly sufficient to recog blading, talking on cellular
phones). They also nize instances (e.g., the concept of a triangle), acquire
schemas for familiar narrative forms, the more comprehensive view that has their
coherence (e.g., the hero acts in order to emerged proposes that naturalistic
concepts resolve some problem), and the genre of differare better represented in
memory as probabi ent narratives (e.g., cowboy Westerns, science listic
prototypes (like a summary). Different fiction, parodies). It is often claimed that
peofeatures of the prototype are more or less diag- ple understand events (or
their narration) by nostic, and features that are not at all diagnos being able to
explain them by fitting them into tic may nonetheless be so characteristic of the
familiar schemas-familiar abstract patterns class that they are used for rapid
identification of relationships. Thus, movie viewers underof instances (see Smith
& Medin, 1981; stand immediately why a sheriff in a Western Rosch & Mervis,
1975). If concepts are proba- movie jumps on his horse to chase bank robbilistic
prototypes, different examples will bers: his motivations flow from his role and
vary in how closely they match the prototype, his plans along with constraints
imposed by and hence vary in how "good" (or typical) an his limited resources.
example they are of the concept. For example, A final point is that these
structured schea robin is a very typical bird, a stork somewhat mas can be
viewed as simply large clusters of less, and an ostrich or chicken a very poor ex-
elementary associations (or expectations) such ample of a bird.
as those studied in the laboratory. When a In
addition to such object concepts, seman- subject hears a sentence asserting new relatic
memory includes many concepts about re tionships (e.g., "President Clinton is now
vislations such as spatial prepositions (on, in, iting South Africa"), memory theorists can
around, left of) and actions. Actions are typi- think of this as the person recording into
cally represented as verbs in English, and have memory a novel set of associations that
the associated frames or schemas that stipulate subject did not have
before-associations roles for participants in the action scenario. which can be used to
answer questions Verbs like buy, rent, or steal denote schemas ("Where's Clinton
now?") and to draw inferthat put together concepts in a certain sce- ences using other
knowledge (e.g., "He's probnario. So, "John bought Bill's car" means that ably not
speaking at the U.N. today"). Bill transferred ownership of a car to John, The new
wrinkle that is added to tradiand John transferred ownership of something tional
associationism is that the associations valuable (probably money) to Bill in exchange
are labeled according to their logical type or for his car.
schematic role (see Anderson & Bower, 1973: Schemas (or frames) are good
candidates Norman & Rumelhart, 1975). To illustrate, cafor how long-term memory
might be struc nary is associated with the concepts of bird, tured (Rumelhart & Ortony,
1977). Schemas yellow, legs, and Tweety, yet people apprecicapture clusters of
organized expectations and ate the different relationships-namely, that a represent
abstract knowledge about some do- canary is a kind of bird, yellow is a property main.
Schemas can be of any "size" or "grain," of its appearance, legs are a part of canaries,
and some schemas (e.g., eyes and mouth) can and Tweety is an example of a canary.
These be embedded within other schemas (human kinds of relations are appreciated as
rapidly as face). Common examples of schemas come the items themselves. Moreover,
relations are from common objects (e.g., birds, horses, cars, useful for carrying out
directed search and refaces, rooms), ethnic and personality stereo- trieval operations,
as when people are asked
..
...
4
....
..
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH
25
to "List some parts of canaries.” So, in more manner are stored in an "imagery' memory recent
models of memory, the associations are store that is more durable than the verbal assumed to
be recorded into memory along memory store. Although the two coding syswith an attached
relational label specifying its tems are closely interconnected (so people can type (see, e.g.,
Anderson & Bower, 1973; Nor translate between them), memory traces estabman & Rumelhart,
1975).

lished in the two systems are functionally in

dependent. A picture of a common object is
Visual Imagery
remembered better than its name because pic
tures typically have more distinctive codes
Before the 1960s, most memory research ex that suffer less interference. A word that
amined verbal memory for language units, and evokes a corresponding image (either
spontathe verbal associations to these language units neous or by instruction) will be
better rememwere emphasized. Starting in the 1960s and bered because its
presentation lays down two thereafter, a contingent of memory researchers redundant
memory traces at least one of began investigations of visual imagery and its which is
more likely to survive over a retenproperties, including image associations and tion
interval. memories for words. This movement was led While Paivio emphasized the role
of imagby Allan Paivio (1969, 1971) with support by ery in verbal learning, Kosslyn
(1981), ShepRoger Shepard (1978; Shepard & Metzler, ard (1978) and Finke (1984)
concentrated on 1971), Stephen Kosslyn (1975, 1981), Lee how memory images could
be manipulated in Brooks (1968), and others (Bower, 1970a, reasoning and used to
extract information. 1970b, 1972; Finke, 1984). Paivio conceived of the image
manipulations studied included nonverbal imagery as a form of coding and scanning
across or around a two-dimensional symbolic representation of information that image,
enlarging or shrinking it, rotating it in was alternative to the verbal coding system. either
the picture plane or in depth, and so on. He brought forth a number of compelling facts
Measurements taken as subjects perform such in support of his emphasis on the role of
men- tasks suggest that operations on the mental imtal imagery in learning. Let us
consider a few age are closely isomorphic to their correof these.
sponding perceptual operations. Moreover,
First, words differ greatly in the extent to evidence was obtained for modality-specific
which they evoke imagery. While this is usu interference (Brooks, 1968; Farah, 1985;
ally correlated with whether they refer to con Segal & Fusella, 1970): that is, requiring
peocrete objects (apple) or abstract ideas (fidel- ple to process external sounds or
spatial ity), many nonconcrete but image-arousing arrays caused selective degradation
in audiwords exist (e.g., unicorn, ghost, angel). Pai- tory or visuo-spatial images,
respectively. vio found that the imagery-arousing value of a While acknowledging these
strong effects word was the most potent determinant of its of imagery on memory, the
critics of the imagrate of learning-whether in paired associates ery approach have
raised questions regarding or free recall. Second, subjects learning paired the
interpreted categorical, and "propositionassociates with high-imagery words were like,"
features of many images (Anderson, more likely to report spontaneous imagery me-
1978; Pylyshyn, 1973). Anderson has sugdiators ("mental pictures") to learn the associ-
gested that most imagery effects can be modations; and pairs for which imagery
mediators eled with an associative network using propowere reported were learned
more rapidly. sitions referring to points in space connected Third, subjects instructed to
use visual imag- with spatial predicates, and that computaery to relate word pairs
together learned far tional processes can be provided that will opmore rapidly than
uninstructed subjects or erate over these networks to simulate manipuother subjects
instructed to use verbal repeti- lations of images (e.g., magnifying, rotating tion (Bower,
1970a, 1972). Fourth, Paivio them). Clearly, this is what is being done in found that
pictures of common concrete ob- the visual graphic design and graphic display jects (or
presentation of the objects them- programs (such as Adobe Photoshop) for modselves)
were even more effective items for ern computers. learning than were their names.
From such facts Paivio (1971) argued that Multiple Memory Systems verbal and nonverbal
codes provide the inputs to two separate memory stores. Imagery pro- With the proliferation of
theories about differvides a coding system; items coded in this ent kinds of
memories-short-term/long-term,
-

26
STUDY OF MEMORY
WET

visual/auditory sensory stores, precategorical/ experience. On the other hand,

requests to repostcategorical stores, episodic/semantic, ver trieve specific
episodic memories typically bal/imagery, cognitive/motor-it was perhaps bring
forth the subject's feeling of being in inevitable that attempts would be made to
co- mental contact and conscious of a specific moordinate these different types
of memories to ment experienced in the past. Tulving, Kapur, different parts of
the mammalian brain. This Craik, Moscovitch, & Houle (1994; also Nyresearch
has proceeded on several fronts-ex- berg, Gabeza, & Tulving, 1996) conjectured
that amining behavioral effects of specified brain retrieval of these two types of
memories--the lesions created in animals and of brain dam conscious, explicit
episodic ones versus the age that humans accidently suffer due to head primed
semantic ones-utilizes two different injuries, strokes, tumors, and cerebral disor-
parts of the frontal cortex. This speculation ders. Additionally, the activity of the
human has already generated considerable research brain may be recorded
indirectly (via blood- that has led to advances in the understanding flow patterns)
using functional magnetic reso- of the brain basis of memory. The successes of
nance imaging as people work on a variety of the past decade in relating
cognitive and cognitive or memory tasks.
memory functions to different parts of the
These researchers have found that parts of brain have been quite remarkable and may
be the medial temporal and hippocampus region expected to accelerate into the future.
seem to be needed for humans to store new episodic memories, but not for learning
procedural or motor skills or for showing repetition The Everyday Memory Theme
priming (Squire, 1987). Parts of the posterior parietal cortex are strongly implicated in
men. The research reviewed above has all been tal imagery and visual memory. The
left tem- based on laboratory work, either that of norporal and right parietal cerebral
cortices are mal subjects learning tasks involving artificial especially implicated in verbal
and visual materials or brain-injured patients being memory, respectively (Kolb &
Whishaw, 1991; tested in the neurological clinic. In reaction to Kosslyn, 1991). The
amygdala and limbic sys- this dominant laboratory tradition, a group of tems of the brain
seem closely related to stor- researchers have argued that attention should age of
highly emotional memories. The cere be turned to the ways in which people use bellum,
motor, premotor cortex and basal memory in their everyday tasks (Neisser, ganglia are
closely linked to learning and per- 1978, 1982). This movement toward
"ecologiformance of motor skills. The primary sensory cal validity" stemmed from
concerns that the cortices (striate and occipital for vision, tem- principles learned from
laboratory studies of poral for audition, somatosensory for touch) memory may not help
elucidate many everyare intimately involved in the modality-spe day memory
phenomena and may not aid in cific memories displayed in repetition prim such practical
tasks as rehabilitation of stroke ing. The frontal and prefrontal cortex appear or
Alzheimer's patients who suffer from parto serve working (short-term) memory, with
ticular disorders. different parts specialized for briefly main As a consequence, a
plethora of research taining either verbal, object pattern, or spatial has been published
on the extent and frequenlocation information. The prefrontal cortex cies of common
types of memory errors and also is strongly implicated in strategic aspects mental slips
in everyday life, on how people of performance and memory; it supports peo- commonly
remember appointments, mediple's ability to follow lengthy recall plans, cine-taking
schedules, names, faces, dogs, keep things in order, search for obscure mem- cars,
license plates, shopping lists, errands, ories, and update working memory in rapidly
parts of machinery, and so on. (An infinity of changing scenarios (e.g., air traffic
controllers domains could be studied.) Detailed studies keeping track of many airplanes
entering and have also been made of memory experts, how leaving their air space).
they perform their feats, and what memory One of the fascinating mysteries is to relate
mechanisms are involved. Examples are studthe person's sense of conscious
recollection to ies of people who were trained to achieve a selective activation of
different parts of the digit span of 80 (Ericsson, Chase & Falloon, brain. It is clear that
many indirect tests that 1980; Chase & Ericsson, 1981), novice taxi utilize primed
semantic knowledge are per- drivers learning city routes (Chase & Ericsson, formed
without people being aware that their 1981), musicians who memorize complex and
facilitated performance stems from an earlier lengthy musical scores (Ericsson, Krampe,
&
.
......
-
-
-
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH
27
Wh
rices
a
t
L

Tesch-Romer, 1993; Rubin, 1995), restaurant used to behave (or their former
opinions) to waiters who remember large number of meal be more consistent
with their opinion of today orders (Ericsson et al., 1993), and repertory (Ross,
1989). These and other tendencies sugactors who memorize and must rapidly
re- gest that social, motivational, and personality trieve lengthy roles in several
plays (Noice, factors play a significant role in the way mem1991, 1992). These
studies often provide valu- ories are altered over time. More studies of able
insights into the means by which people this kind can be expected as the field
aduse limited resources very efficiently in order vances and makes better contact
with other to surmount limitations of memory. However, branches of psychology,
Banaji and Crowder (1989) have argued that the "everyday memory" movement
has turned up very few novel phenomena or principles
References that had not already been
known for many Anderson, J. R. (1978). Arguments concerning years based on
laboratory research. (For op- representations for mental imagery. Psychoposing
arguments, see articles in the American logical Review, 85, 249-277. Psychologist,
January 1991 (volume 46, Issue Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of #1], pp.
16-48.)
cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
UniOne especially fascinating aspect of the ev. versity Press. eryday-memory
movement is its investigation Anderson, J. R. (1995). Learning and memory: of
autobiographical memory (e.g., Rubin, An integrated approach. New York: John 1986;
Conway, 1992; Conway & Bekerian, Wiley. 1987; Conway & Rubin, 1993). By collecting
Anderson, J. R., & Bower, G. H. (1973). Huand classifying phenomenological reports,
man associative memory.
Washington, psychologists have constructed theories of
D.C.: D. H. Winston. how people
structure in memory large seg
Asch, S. E. (1969). Reformulation of
the probments of their life, how they use salient
lem of association. American Psychologist,

24, 92-102. "marking events" (e.g.,

graduations, marriage,
Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M.
(1968). Hubirth of a child, beginning a job, moving) as
man memory: A proposed system
and its signposts for ordering and reconstructing the
control processes. In K. W.
Spence & J. T. temporal and logical sequence of events. Al
Spence (Eds.), The psychology of
learning though people clearly have conceptual knowl and motivation: Advances in
research and edge corresponding to long stretches of their theory (Vol. 2; pp. 90-197).
New York: Acapast, different event memories are also multi demic Press. ply
cross-indexed in memory according to life Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1971). The
themes, what happened, where it happened, control of short-term memory. Scientific
who was involved, and what the significance American, 225, 82–90. was of the event for
one's life. Some of the Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memory. Oxknowledge is in the
form of personal episodic ford: Oxford University Press. memories that are experienced
in recall with Baddeley, A. D. (1990). Human memory: Theimagery and often some
emotion; and it has ory and practice. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. been noted that these
specific memories can Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working often be a mistaken
blend of fact and fiction
memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The
Psychol(Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). In addition to these
ogy of Learning and Motivation:
Advances episodic memories, large portions of people's
in research and theory (Vol. 8; pp.
47-90). autobiography are in narrative generalizations
New York: Academic Press. with no
more sense of "personally being
Banaji, M. R., & Crowder, R. G. (1989). The
bankruptcy of everyday memory.
Amerithere" than they have for the knowledge that
can Psychologist, 44, 1185–1193.
they were born on a specific date.
Barnes, J. M., & Underwood, B. J.
(1959). Fate An interesting aspect of autobiographic
of first-list associations and transfer
thememory is that it is intimately tied to concep

ory. Journal of Experimental

Psychology, tions of self-of who and what we are. Many 58, 97–105. studies
have found that memories are recon- Barr, A., & Feigenbaum, E. A. (Eds.).
(1981a). structed to satisfy self-serving motives, and The handbook of artificial
intelligence. Volthat people remember themselves in a more ume 1. Los Altos,
CA: Kaufman. favorable light than is warranted (see Green- Barr, A., &
Feigenbaum, E. A. (Eds.). (1981b). wald, 1980; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). People
The handbook of artificial intelligence. Volalso tend to distort their memory of how
they ume 2. Los Altos, CA: Kaufinan.
Makes
.I
.
.
y
RESA
Tu
...
...
.
.N
LIN.
. .::
LVIW
I
LI
.
..
..
..
.
::
::.
:.:
.

28
STUDY OF MEMORY
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study
in experimental and social psychology.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bergson, H. (1911). Matter and memory. Lon-
don: Allen & Unwin. Bower, G. H. (1964). A descriptive theory of
memory. Speech presented at the Second International Inter-Disciplinary Conference
on Learning, Remembering, and Forgetting, Princeton, New Jersey. (Published in D. T.
Kimble (Ed.) (1967), The Organization of Recall (pp. 112–185). New York:
New York Academy of Sciences. Bower, G. H. (1970a). Analysis of a mne
monic device. American Scientist, 58,
496-510. Bower, G. H. (1970b). Imagery as a relational
organizer in associative learning. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 9,
529-533. Bower, G, H. (1970c). Organizational factors
in memory. Cognitive Psychology, 1,
18-46. Bower, G, H. (1972). Mental imagery and asso
ciative learning. In L. Gregg (Ed.), Cognition in learning and memory (pp. 51-88).
New York: John Wiley. Bower, G. H. (1996). Reactivating a reactiva-
tion theory of implicit memory. Conscious
ness & Cognition, 5, 27–72. Bower, G. H., & Hilgard, E. R. (1981). Theo
ries of learning (5th ed.). Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall. Briggs, G. E. (1957). Retroactive inhibition as
a function of original and interpolated learning. Journal of Experimental Psychol.
ogy, 53, 64. Broadbent, D, E. (1958). Perception and com

munication. London: Pergamon Press. Brooks, L. (1968). Spatial and verbal

compo
nents of the act of recall. Canadian Journal

of Psychology, 22, 349-368. Bruner, J. F., Goodnow, J., & Austin, G.

(1956). The study of thinking. New York:
John Wiley. Buckner, R. (1996). Beyond HERA: Contribu-
tions of specific prefrontal brain areas to long-term memory retrieval.
Psychonomic
Bulletin Review, 3, 149-158. Calkins, M. W. (1894). Association, Psycholog
ical Review, 1, 476–483. Chase, W. G., & Ericsson, K. A. (1981).
Skilled memory. In J. R. Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skills and their acquisition (pp.
141-189). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of Skinner's
"Ver
bal Behavior," Language, 35, 26-58. Chomsky, N. (1968). Language and mind.
New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
Chomsky, N. (1972). Psychology and ideol
ogy: The case against B. F. Skinner. Cogni
tion, 1, 11-46. Cohen, P. R., & Feigenbaum. E. A. (Eds.).
(1981). The handbook of artificial intelli
 gence. Volume 3. Los Altos, CA: Kaufman, Conrad, R. (1962). An association
between
memory errors and acoustic confusions of
speech. Nature, 93, 1314-1315. Conrad, R. (1964). Acoustic confusion in im
mediate memory, British Journal of Psy
chology, 55, 75-84. Conway, M. A. (1992). A structural model of
autobiographical memory. In M. A. Conway, D. C. Rubin, H. Spinnler, & W. A.
Wagenaar (Eds.), Theoretical perspectives on autobiographical memory (pp. 167-193).
Dordrect, The Netherlands: Kluwer. Conway, M. A., & Bekerian, D. A. (1987). Or
ganization in autobiographical memory.
Memory and Cognition, 15, 119-132. Conway, M. A., & Rubin, D, C. (1993). The
structure of autobiographical memory. In A. E. Collins, F. E. Gathercole, M. A. Conway,
& T. E. Morris (Eds.), Theories of memory (pp. 103-137). Hillsdale, NJ: Erl
baum. Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Lev
els of processing: A framework for memory research. Journal of Verbal Learning
and Verbal Behavior, 11, 671-684. Craik, F. I. M., & Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of
processing and the retention of words in episodic memory. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 104, 268–294. Dansereau, D. F. (1978). The development of
a learning strategies curriculum. In H. F. O'Neil Jr. (Ed.), Learning strategies (pp. 1
29). New York: Academic Press. Darwin, C. (1859). Origin of species by means
of natural selection. London: John Murry. Ebbinghaus, H. (1885). On memory (H.
A. Ru
ger & C. E. Bussenius, Trans.). New York: Teachers' College, 1913. Paperback
edi
tion, New York: Dover, 1964. Ericsson, K. A., Chase, W. G., & Falloon, F.
(1980). Acquisition of a memory skill. Sci
ence, 208, 1181–1182. Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. E., & Tesch
Romer, G. (1993). The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert
performance. Psychological Review, 100, 363
am 1964
406.
Estes, W. K. (1955). Statistical theory of spon
taneous recovery and regression. Psycho
logical Review, 62, 369-377. Farah, M. (1985). Psychophysical evidence
for a shared representational medium for mental images and percepts. Journal of Ex
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH
29
perimental Psychology: General, 114, 91-
103. Feigenbaum, E. A. (1959). An information pro
cessing theory of verbal learning. RAND
Corporation paper, P-1817, October. Feigenbaum, E. A., & Feldman, J. (1963). Com
puters and thought. New York: McGraw-
Hill. Finke, R. A. (1984). Mental imagery and the
visual system. Scientific American, 254,
no. 3, 88-95. Flexser, A. J., & Bower, G. H. (1974). How fre
quency affects recency judgments: A model for recency discrimination. Journal
of Experimental Psychology, 103, 706-716. Fodor, J. A., Bever, T. G., &
Garrett, M. F.
(1974). The Psychology of language: An introduction to psycholinguistics and genera
tive grammar. New York: McGraw-Hill. Garner, W. R. (1962). Uncertainty and struc
ture as psychological concepts. New York:
John Wiley. Gibson, E. J. (1940). A systematic application
of the concepts of generalization and differentiation to verbal learning. Psychological
Review, 47, 196–229. Glaze, J. A. (1928). The association value of
nonsense syllables. Genetic Psychology,
35, 255-267. Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego:
Fabrication and revision of personal his
tory. American Psychologist, 35, 603-618. Hall, J. F. (1971). Verbal learning and
reten
tion. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. Harris, M. D. (1985). Introduction to natural
language processing. Resten, VA: Resten
Publishing. Hintzman, D. L. (1976). Repetition and mem
ory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 10; pp.
47–91). New York: Academic Press. Hintzman, D. L., & Block, R. A. (1971). Repeti
tion and memory: Evidence for a multiple trace hypothesis. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 88, 297–306. Hovland, C. I. (1940). Experimental studies in
rote-learning theory: Number 7. Distribution of practice with varying lengths of list.
Journal of Experimental Psychology,
27, 271-284. Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior: An
introduction to behavior theory, New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts. James, W. (1890). The principles of psychol-
ogy, New York: Henry Holt. Johnson, G. J. (1991). A distinctiveness model
of serial learning. Psychological Review, 98, 204-217
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay,
D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. Psycholog
ical Bulletin, 114, 3–28. Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1981). Reality
monitoring. Psychological Review, 88,
67-85. Kausler, D. H. (1974). Psychology of verbal
learning and memory. New York: Aca
demic Press. Kintsch, W. (1974). The representation of
meaning in memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erl
baum. Kolb, B., & Whishaw, I. Q. (1991). Fundamen
tals of human neuropsychology (3rd. ed.).
New York: W. H. Freeman. Kosslyn, S. (1975). Information representa
tion in visual images. Cognitive Psychol.
ogy, 7, 341-370. Kosslyn, S. (1981). Image and mind. Cam
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Kosslyn, S, M. (1991). A cognitive neurosci
ence of visual cognition: Further developments. In R. Logie & M. Denis (Eds.), Mental
images in human cognition: Advances in psychology series (Vol. 80; pp. 351
381). Amsterdam: North Holland. Lashley, K. S. (1951). The problem of serial or
der in behavior. In L. A. Jefress (Ed.), Cerebral mechanisms in behavior (pp. 112
131). New York: John Wiley. Loftus, E. F., & Ketcham, K. (1994). The myth
of repressed memory: False memories and allegations of abuse. New York: St. Mar
tin’s. Mandler, G. (1967). Organization and mem
ory. In K. Spence & J. T. Spence (Eds.), The psychology of learning and motivation
(Vol. 1; pp. 327-372). New York: Aca
demic Press. Mäntylä, T. (1986). Optimizing cue effective
ness: Recall of 500 and 600 incidentally learned words. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cogni
tion, 12, 66–71. Mäntylä, T. & Nilsson, L-G. (1988). Cue dis
tinctiveness and forgetting: Effectiveness of self-generated retrieval cues in delayed
recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 14, 502
509. Mayer, R. E. (1987). Educational psychology:
A cognitive approach. Boston: Little,
Brown. McGeoch, J. A., & Irion, A. L. (1952). The psy
chology of human learning. New York:
Longmans & Green. Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number 7,
plus or minus 2: Some limits on our capac
it
30
STUDY OF MEMORY

bijulish
ity for processing information, Psychologi-
cal Review, 63, 81-97. Miller, G, A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H.
(1960). Plans and the structure of behav
ior. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Miller, G. A., & McNeill, D. (1969). Psycholin
guistics. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The Handbook of social psychology (pp.
666-794) 2nd ed., vol. 3; Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley. Montague, W. E. (1972). Elaborative strategies
in verbal learning and memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and
motivation: Advances in research and theory (pp. 225-302). New York: Aca
demic Press, Montague, W. E., & Kiess, H. O. (1968). The
associability of CVC pairs. Journal of Experimental Psychology Monograph, Sup
plement 78, no. 2, part 2, 1-23. Murdock, B. B., Jr. (1962), The serial position
effect of free recall. Journal of Experimen
tal Psychology, 64, 482–488. Murdock, B. B., Jr. (1974). Human memory:

Theory and data. Potomac, MD: Erlbaum. Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology.
New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the im
portant questions? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical
aspects of memory (pp. 1-24). London: AC
ademic Press. Neisser, U. (Ed.). (1982), Memory observed:
Remembering in natural contexts. San
Francisco: Freeman, Newell, A., Shaw, J. C., & Simon, H. A.
(1958). Elements of a theory of human problem-solving. Psychological Review, 65,
151-166. Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1961). Computer
simulation of human thinking. Science,
134, 2011-2017. Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human
problem-solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall. Noble, C. E. (1952). An analysis of meaning.
Psychological Review, 59, 421-430. Noble, C. E., & Parker, G. V. C. (1969). The
Montana scale of meaningfulness (m). Psy

chological Reports, 7, 325-331. Noice, H. (1991). The role of explanations

and plan recognition in the learning of theatrical scripts. Cognitive Psychology,
15,
425-460. Noice, H. (1992). Elaborative memory strate
gies of professional actors, Applied Cogni
tive Psychology, 6, 417–427. Norman, D. A., & Rumelhart, D. E. (Eds.).
(1975). Explorations in cognition. San Francisco: Freeman,
Nyberg, L., Cabeza, R., & Tulving, E. (1996).
PET studies of encoding and retrieval: The HERA model. Psychonomic Bulletin &
Re
view, 3, 135-148. O'Neil, H. F., Jr. (Ed.). (1978). Learning strate
gies. New York: Academic Press. Paivio, A. (1969). Mental imagery in associa
tive learning and memory. Psychological
Review, 76, 241-263, Paivio, A. (1971). Imagery and verbal pro
cesses. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Win
ston, Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned reflexes. Lon
don: Clarendon Press, Peterson, L. R., & Peterson, M. J. (1959).

Short-term retention of individual verbal items. Journal of Experimental

Psychology,
58, 193–198. Postman, L. (1971). Transfer, interference and
forgetting. In J. W. Kling & L. A. Riggs (Eds.), Woodworth and Schlosberg's
Experimental Psychology (3rd ed., pp. 1019
1132). New York: Holt, Reinhardt, & Win
ston. Prytulak, L. S. (1971). Natural language medi
ation. Cognitive Psychology, 2, 1–56. Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1973). What the mind's eye
tells the mind's brain: A critique of mental
 imagery. Psychological Bulletin, 80, 1-24. Richardson-Klavehn, A., & Bjork, R. A.
(1988). Measures of memory. Annual Re
view of Psychology, 36, 475–543. Richman, H, B., & Simon, H. A. (1989). Con
text defects in letter perception: Comparison of two theories. Psychological Review,
96, 417-432. Roitblat, H. L., Bever, T. G., & Terrace, H. S.
(Eds.). (1984). Animal cognition. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum. Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family re
semblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7,
573-605. Rosenbaum, D. A. (1991). Human motor con
trol. San Diego: Academic Press. Ross, M. (1989). Relation of implicit theory to
the construction of personal histories. Psy
chological Review, 96, 341-357. Rubin, D. C. (Ed.). (1986). Autobiographical
memory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni
versity Press. Rubin, D. C. (1995). Memory in oral tradi
tions. New York: Oxford University Press. Russell, B. (1921). The analysis of
mind. Lon
don: Allen & Unwin. Rumelhart, D. E., & Ortony, A. (1977). The
representation of knowledge in memory. In R. C. Anderson, R. J. Spiro, & W. E.
Montague (Eds.), Schooling and the acquisition
....
--

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEMORY RESEARCH

31
..."
o

of knowledge (pp. 99-135). Hillsdale, NJ:

Erlbaum. Schacter, D. L. (1987). Implicit memory: His
tory and current status. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and
Cognition, 13, 501-518. Schank, R. C., & Riesbeck, C. K. (1981), In
side computer understanding. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum. Schmidt, R. A. (1988). Motor control and
learning: A behavioral emphasis. Cham
paign, IL: Human Kinetics. Segal, S. J., & Fusella, V. (1970). Influence of
imaged pictures and sounds on detection of visual and auditory signals. Journal
of
Experimental Psychology, 83, 458-464. Selfridge, O. G., & Neisser, U. (1960).
Pattern
recognition by machine. Scientific Ameri
can, 203, 60-80. Shallice, T., & Warrington, E. K. (1970). Inde
pendent functioning of verbal memory stores: A neuropsychological study. Quar-
terly Journal of Experimental Psychology,
22, 261-273. Shallice, T., & Warrington, E. K. (1974). The
dissociation between short-term retention of meaningful sounds and verbal
material.
Neuropsychologia, 12, 553–555. Shepard, R. N. (1978). The mental image.
American Psychologist, 33, 125–137. Shepard, R. N., & Metzler, J. (1971). Mental ro-
tation of three-dimensional objects. Sci
ence, 191, 952-954. Simon, H. A. (1974). How big is a chunk? Sci
ence, 183, 482-488. Simon, H. A., & Feigenbaum, E. A. (1964). An
information processing theory of some effects of similarity, familiarization, and
meaningfulness in verbal learning. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 3,
385-396. Singley, M. K., & Anderson, J. R. (1989). The
transfer of cognitive skill. Harvard Univer-
sity Press: Cambridge, MA. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human be
havior. New York: Macmillan. Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Smith, E. E., & Medin, D. L. (1981). Catego
ries and concepts. MA: Harvard University
Press. Squire, L. R. (1987). Memory and brain. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence:
An experimental study of the associative processes in animals. Psychological Re
view, Monograph Suppl., Vol. 2, no. 8. Thorndike, E. L. (1903). Educational psychol-
ogy. New York: Lemcke & Buchner.
Thune, L. E. (1951), Warm-up effect as a func
tion of level of practice in verbal learning, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 42,
250-256. Tulving, E. (1962). Subjective organization in
free recall of "unrelated" words. Psycholog
ical Review, 69, 344-354. Tulving, E. (1968). Theoretical issues in free
recall. In T. R. Dixon & D. L. Horton (Eds.), Verbal behavior and general behavior
theory (pp. 2–36). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren
tice-Hall. Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving &
W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of memory (pp. 381
403). New York: Academic Press. Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic mem
ory. New York: Oxford University Press, Tulving, E. (1986). Episodic and
semantic
memory: Where should we go from here?
Behavioral Brain Sciences, 9, 573-577. Tulving, E., Kapur, S., Craik, F. 1. M.,
Moscovi
tch, M., & Houle, S. (1994). Hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry in
episodio memory: Positron emission tomography findings. In Proceedings of the
National
Academy of Science, 91, 2016-2020. Tulving, E., & Madigan, S. A. (1970).
Memory
and verbal learning. Annual Review of Psy
chology, 21, 437-484. Tulving, E., & Pearlstone, Z. (1966). Availabil
ity versus accessibility of information in memory for words. Journal of Verbal Learn
ing and Verbal Behavior, 5, 381-391. Tulving, E., & Psotka, J. (1971). Retroactive
in
hibition in free recall: Inaccessibility of information available in the memory store.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 87,
1-8. Tulving, E., & Schacter, D. L. (1990). Priming
and human memory systems. Science, 247,
301-306. Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encod
ing specificity and retrieval processes in episodic memory. Psychological Review,
80, 352-373. Underwood B. J. (1961). An evaluation of the
Gibson theory of verbal learning. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), Verbal learning and verbal
behavior (pp. 197–217). New York: McGraw
Hill. Warren, H. C. (1921). A history of the associa
tion philosophy. New York: Charles Scrib
ner's Sons. Watson, J. B. (1919). Psychology from the

standpoint of a behaviorist. Philadelphia:

J. B. Lippincott. Watson, J. B. (1924). Behaviorism. New York:
Norton.
sat SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
Tort
e
San
SSSR
32
STUDY OF MEMORY
Waugh, N. C., & Norman, D, A. (1965). Pri
mary memory. Psychological Review, 72,

89-104. Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural

language. New York: Academic Press. Winograd, T. (1983). Language as a
cognitive
process. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Witmer, L. R. (1935). The association value of
3-place consonant syllables. Journal of Ge
netic Psychology, 47, 337–360. Yntema, D. B., & Trask, F. P. (1963).
Recall as
a search process. Journal of verbal learning and verbal behavior, 2, 65-74.
......
"