Ampatuan vs Puno Case Digest

Calling Out Power, Emergency Powers, Local Autonomy

Facts:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.”
She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by
law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also
issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She
subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended
to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition
under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy
as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to seize the regional
government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred
and that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the
President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be
declared unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under the
Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the
PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

Held:

1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of
the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged
complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated
post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting
Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting
ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of
the ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.
And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested
in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power,
it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then
this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling
out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual
basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it
follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports
also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic
to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive
action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed
groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and
the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the
Court must respect the President’s actions.(Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)

Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20,
2012 (and other consolidated cases)

DECISION
(En Banc)

ABAD, J.:

I. THE FACTS
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo
issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress
convened in joint session to review the validity of the President’s action. But two days later, or on December 12,
2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.

II. THE ISSUES

 Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,
render the issues moot and academic?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and
ACADEMIC.]

YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in
Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be
cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative
department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate
or invalidate the same. xxx.

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must
allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress
defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as
its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in
the hands of the Court.

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in
fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
 Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did
not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue
any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass
arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in
court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight
days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely
populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a
determined and amply armed government presence.

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned
without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.
LAGMAN, VS. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA
G.R. NO. 231658
JULY 4, 2017

FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in
the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May
25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as
required by the Constitution).
The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the
report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City
(and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless
violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.

Proclamation 216 is now assailed by several petitioners:

LAGMAN PETITION
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy
Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed this petition to assail the President’s declaration of Martial Law.

Its main contention is that, the president’s declaration has no sufficient and factual basis – arguing that acts of
terrorism are not equated with rebellion or invasion. Lagman also contends that the seeming affiliation with ISIS
is only mere propaganda, designed to create an appearance of capability for the Maute group.

The petition also cited several facts in the president’s report which was refuted by several media networks and
news articles because they turned out to be false or untrue. Among these was the report about the attack on Amai
Pakpak Hospital, the ransack of the Landbank of the Philippines, and the burning of several schools.

CULLAMAT PETITION
The Cullamat Petition on the other hand avers that the president fails to show any acts of rebellion and invasion
outside Marawi City. Hence, the declaration of Martial Law for the whole island of Mindanao has no sufficient
basis. Cullamat also reiterated the false facts in the president’s report, as pointed out in the Lagman petition.

MOHAMAD PETITION
The Mohamad Petition also avers that the power to declare Martial Law is a remedy of last resort. It contends that
the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the
armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to
declare martial law.

OSG’S CONSOLIDATED COMMENT

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the court should only review Proclamation 216 under
the lens of grave abuse of discretion, and not on the correctness of facts.

The OSG also further argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined based on the
facts/information that were available to the president at the time he made the determination. Doing otherwise will
impose an impossible standard on the president’s exercise of discretion.

ISSUES:
 1. WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII.
2. WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that
have been taken by Congress jointly or separately.
3. WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the
President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2) suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and (3) declaration of martial law.
4. WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:

1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.
2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.
It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power
to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the
ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension,
such a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand,
Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts
presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in an appropriate
proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power
to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or
deny the Court of its power to review.

3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision pertaining to which
extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to
an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at
least initially, lies with the President.
The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-
in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the
President decides which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers
only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration.
The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information
mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.
The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show
that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of
Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither
the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any
probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged
false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.

Monsanto vs. Factoran

Facts:

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of
the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant
city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she
may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her
former position.

Issues:

1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement
to her former position without need of a new appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose
benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done
or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment
but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's
civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss
of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and
novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)
Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec

Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly
stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification cases
against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada
is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that
he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder
which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President Estrada
does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did
not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto
otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same
cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency,
to wit:
“Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.”

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction;
and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states
that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of
the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section
12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the
latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final
judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local
or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble
is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue
is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment
nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes.
It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a
public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since
former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained
to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former
President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)

Saguisag v. Exec Secretary Ochoa July 26, 2016 G.R. No. 212426 EDCA, Treaty,
Executive Agreement, International Agreement

FACTS:
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this Court in Saguisag
et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.
Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
between the Philippines and the US was not a treaty. In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be
in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their
arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.
The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’ disagreement with the
Decision that EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).
Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT because
it provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the
establishment of U.S. military bases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.

RULING:
Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming that the VFA and
MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:

1. Agreed Locations
2. Rotational presence of personnel
3. U.S. contractors
4. Activities of U.S. contractors

We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these provisions. The very
nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement – a class
of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25 restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially
quote the Decision:
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate
with which they are concluded.
As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works
of noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing
policies, rules, laws, or agreements.

They are concluded

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or
(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.
The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international agreements,
ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn instrument – to engagements
concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification.
An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis
d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute,
memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.
Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even
an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international agreements,
and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of
Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two very important features
that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements
under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted
by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn, executive agreements
cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they
purport to implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of
the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions.
Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a
statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An
executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a
treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the
supremacy of the Constitution.

Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an
executive agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole
web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices to state that this Court remains
unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.

We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime
through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s continued policy to enhance our military
capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643, March
25, 2008
G.R.No. 180643, March 25 2008 [Executive Privilege]

FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation
regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of
the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It pertains
to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations
and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies
to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the
President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
- i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.