Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Faller Notes
Faller Notes
a. Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very
existence and survival. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.
i. PT&T vs. NLRC 272 SCRA 596 – a policy which prohibits a woman
worker to contract marriage was held to be invalid.
ii. Under RA No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003) – match-
making of Filipino women to foreigners for marriage, or contracting
marriage for purposes of prostitution, forced labor and the like are
illegal.
2. Constitutional protection.
a. Sec. 12, Art. II – The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic social institution.
c. While lawful marriage seeks to create a permanent union between a man and
a woman, it does not shed the spouses’ integrity or their privacy as individuals.
i. Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699 – where a wife, to get evidence of
infidelity in a case for legal separation she filed against her
husband, ransacked his office and forcibly took documents and
letters of the husband addressed to his paramour, the SC ruled
that the wife cannot use said documents and letters as evidence
because they were obtained in violation of the husband’s
constitutional right to privacy.
d. In Duncan vs. Glaxo, 438 SCRA 343, the SC held that an employment
contract requiring employee to disclose to management any existing or
future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies and requiring such employee to
resign should management find such relationship poses possible conflict
of interest was not in violation of equal protection clause as the policy is
considered reasonable aimed against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
e. In Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol, 487 SCRA 228, the SC held as invalid a
company policy which provides that in case two of their employees decide
to get married to each other, one of them should resign, as it failed to prove
a legitimate business interest.
ii. Silverio v Republic, 537 SCRA 373 (2007): Changing of gender in one’s birth
certificate was denied; otherwise, it would result in confusion and would allow
marriage between persons of the same sex which is in defiance of the law, as
marriage is a union between a man and a woman.
iii. In Republic vs. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72 (2008) – where a person is found to
have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where the
person afflicted has both male and female characteristics and organs and where,
through expert evidence, it was shown that the respondent, though genetically a
female, secreted male hormones and not female hormones, had no breast and did
not have monthly menstrual period, the SC held that person as an “intersex
individual” and granted the preference of the person to be considered as a male
person thereby allowing amendment of the birth certificate of the person from
female to male.
Consent
a. The requirements of consent are that it must be (i) freely given and (ii) the same
must be made in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
b. The free consent must be given in the presence of the solemnizing officer “in
order that it may have due publication, before a third person or persons, for
the sake of notoriety and the certainty of its being made.
c. People v Santiago, (51 Phil 68): A marriage entered into by a person whose real
intent is to avoid prosecution for rape is void for total lack of consent. The
accused did not intend to be married. He merely used such marriage to escape
criminal liability.
Facts: Albios contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the
sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways;
that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with
her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage
was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Issue: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
Ruling:
1. Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer.
In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which
was necessary to accomplish their goal.
2. The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.
Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to
create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to
further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.
3. Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does
not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any
attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children
or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with
all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support
a marriage.
Formal Requisites
a. Authority of Solemnizing Officer
b. A valid marriage license except in cases provided in Chapter 2 of this title
c. A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.
b. Priest, Rabbi, Imam or Minister of any Church or Religious Sect. Must be:
a. The marriage license has a validity of 120 days from date of issue and is
effective in any part of the Philippines.
b. It is deemed automatically cancelled at the expiration of the 120-day period
if the contracting parties have not made use of it.
c. The marriage is held valid even if the marriage license was issued in the
place wherein the contracting parties do not reside. (People vs. Janssen, 54
Phil. 176)
4. Marriage ceremony
a. The Family Code does not prescribe any form of marriage ceremony.
However, the minimum requirement imposed by law is that the
contracting parties appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare that they each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least
2 witnesses.
c. Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage
cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular
that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that
they were taking each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows
can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses
who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a
wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be
unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite
unnatural for people not to notice its absence.(Balogbog v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 83598, [March 7, 1997], 336 PHIL 252-262)
1. Garcia v. Recio – The absence of a certificate of legal capacity from the foreign
spouse does not render the marriage invalid as this is merely an irregularity in
complying with the formal requisites of marriage.
2. If the spouses are stateless persons, they are required to to file an affidavit stating
the circumstances showing such capacity
Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage"
under Article 47 of the Family Code. The lower court ruled that petitioners should
have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the trial
court. The Court ruled that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered
by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, therefore, it is void ab initio
because of the absence of such element. According to the Court, it can not be said that
Pepito and respondent have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of
the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife." The Court also ruled that petitioners have
the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void because a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally and can be questioned even after the death of
either party.
The nullity of a marriage on the ground of absence of a valid marriage license upon
evidence that there was in fact no cohabitation for five (5) years contrary to the statements
in the falsified affidavit executed by the parties. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered to be a mere irregularity considering that the 5-year period is substantial
requirement of the law to be exempted from obtaining a marriage license.
There are only two exceptions to this general rule: (i) Art. 35(2) where
either or both parties believe in good faith that the solemnizing
officer has authority to solemnize marriage; (ii) Art. 41 referring to
subsequent bigamous marriage on the good faith belief that the
previous spouse is dead.
In determining the disposition of properties in a void marriage,
good faith and bad faith of one of the parties at the time of the
marriage ceremony are material. In Arts. 147 and 148, when one of
the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children, in their absence or their representatives, the
innocent spouse.
b. The action to declare a marriage void may be filed by either party, even the
psychologically incapacitated. (Ching Ming Tsoi vs. CA, 266 SCRA 324)
c. While a void marriage can be attacked collaterally, there are 3 instances that
a direct attack is required:
ii. For other purposes, such as but not limited to (a) determination of
heirship; (b) filiation of the child; (c) settlement of estate; (d) dissolution of
property regime; (f) criminal case (Ninal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCR 122)
iii. Under Art. 50 in relation to Art. 43(3) and Art. 86(1) on revocation of
donation propter nuptias.
2. A petition may contain many grounds for nullity of marriage, such as absence of
consent, no marriage license, psychological incapacity of the parties and bigamy, but it
has only one cause of action, which is the nullity of the marriage. (Mallion vs. Alcantara,
GR No. 141528, Oct. 31, 2006)
Any person not listed in Art. 7 or the LGC is not authorized to solemnize
marriage
Good faith marriage is an exception to this rule.
o Tolentino opined that for good faith marriage to apply, the person
who solemnized the marriage must be among those listed by law,
otherwise, there is ignorance of law and not mistake of fact.
c. No marriage license
d. Bigamous or polygamous marriage
Under the Civil Code, mistake in the identity is a ground for annulment,
but in the FC, it is a ground to nullify the marriage.
Mistake in the identity as as ground for nullity covers only those situations
in which there has been a mistake on the part of the party seeking
nullification of the marriage as to the actual physical identity of the other
party. It does not include mistake in the name, character of the person, his
age, religion, pedigree, social standing or previous habits.
ART. 36
1. Santos vs. CA - Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental not
physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to a
marriage as expressed in Art. 68 of the FC. It must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out his ordinary duties. It must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating in marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or even if it were curable, it would
be beyond the means of the party.
2. Ching Ming Tsoi vs. CA – refusal of one of the parties to engage in sexual act for
procreation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one
of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence
of a party's psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown
to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the findings of the trial
court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the
appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. It is not enough
reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as
an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage
as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null
and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to
give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of
all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the
psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the
Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because
they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore
be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner's factual
premises.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to
certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-
aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of
obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at
the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an
inability to engage in intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little
evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to
specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of
inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies
suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have
found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively
correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts.
Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase
(MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified",
that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do
not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and
thus therapy may be long-term.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have
this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance
from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where
to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning
in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 65 TaISDA
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some
individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness
and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral
insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by
impairments in reasoning.
8. Buenaventura vs. CA – 454 SCRA 261: No award of damages and attorney’s fees
in a decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36 because of the absence of bad
faith.
Notes:
1. The incestuous relationship has no limit in the direct line and is limited to the
second degree collaterals, i.e. brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood,
legitimate or illegitimate.
2. The rescission or termination of adoption allows the adopter from marrying the
adopted.
3. Step-parents and step-children as well as parents-in-law and children-in-law are
prohibited from marrying each other.
4. Adoptive relationship
a. The adopter cannot marry the adopted and the surviving spouse of the
adopted.
b. The adopted cannot marry any of the following: (i) the adopter; (ii) the
surviving spouse of the adopter; (iii) the other adopted children of the adopter;
(iv) the legitimate child of the adopter;
c. The adopted child is not prohibited from marrying an illegitimate child of the
adopter because usually the illegitimate child does not live in the same house.
d. An adopted child can marry (i) the parents, (i) illegitimate child, and (iii) other
relatives of the adopter.
e. The adopter can marry (i) legitimate, illegitimate or adopted child of the
adopted; (ii) the natural parents; (iii) the other relatives of the adopted.
f. The adopter or adopted can marry the spouse of the other, if the marriage is
judicially declared void or annulled because the law uses the term “surviving
spouse”.
5. Intentional killing of spouse – no prior criminal conviction by the court for the
killing is required by law.
a. This void marriage also extends to a person who kills the spouse of another to
marry the latter.
7. Under AM No. 02-11-10, which took effect on March 15, 2003, only the husband or
the wife can file a court case declaring the marriage void.
8. Under the Civil Code (superseded by the Family Code), there was no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage for a subsequent marriage to be valid
(People v. Mendoza). However, Article 40 of the FC now requires a final judgment to
declare a previous marriage void for a subsequent marriage to be valid. (Terre v. Terre,
Atienza v. Brillantes)
9. A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void”. That he subsequently
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was immaterial as the crime
had already been consummated. (Mercado vs. Tan, G.R No. 137110, Aug. 1, 2000).
10. Terre vs. Terre, July 3, 1992 - Jordan, as a lawyer, knew that a declaration of nullity
of marriage of his wife Dorothy from his husband must be issued before he could marry
Dorothy, thus his marriage is bigamous.
11. Domingo vs. CA, Sept. 17, 1993 – The marriage here is void from the beginning
as the husband had a prior existing marriage with another woman. The second wife
sought to declare the marriage void, not for purposes of remarriage, but to settle the
property relations. The SC ruled that a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or ground for defense.
The judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for purposes other than
remarriage. Article 40 was interpreted as being a requirement for purposes of remarriage
but not limited for that purpose. Separation of property is also a valid purpose for filing
for a judicial declaration of nullity.
12. Ty vs. CA, Nov. 27, 2000 - The first and second marriages were contracted in 1977
and 1979, respectively, and thus governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The first
marriage being void for lack of licenses and consent, there was no need before he could
contract a second marriage. Thus, the second marriage is valid.
13. Carino vs. Carino, Feb. 2, 2001 - The first marriage to Susan Nicdao without
license is void. However, under Art. 40 of the FC, for purposes of remarriage, there must
be first a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, though void, before
a party can enter into a second marriage.
14. Morigo vs. People, Feb. 6, 2004 – The declaration of nullity of first marriage
retroacts to the date of its marriage, thus, there is no marriage to speak of, hence, the
accused cannot be convicted of bigamy.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
Notes:
9. Republic vs. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20 - where a Filipino seaman wanted to get a
judicial declaration of presumptive death from the court relative to his missing English
spouse, the SC ruled that the Filipino seaman failed go conduct a search for the missing
wife with such diligence to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she was dead.
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio.
Notes:
b. Property Regime – dissolved and liquidated
(party in bad faith shall forfeit
his/her share in favor of the common children or if there are none, children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage, and in case there are none, to the innocent spouse)
c. Donation propter nuptias – remains valid, (but if the donee contracted marriage
in bad faith, donations will be revoked)
e. Succession Rights – Party in bad faith disqualified to inherit from innocent spouse,
whether testate or intestate
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Notes:
1. One of the parties is 18 or above but below 21, and there is no parental
consent.
3. The consent of either party was obtained through fraud (different from
mistake in identity):
a. through non-disclosure of a
previous conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
b. through concealment by the wife of the fact at the time of the
marriage that she was pregnant
by another man;
c. through concealment of a
sexually-transmitted disease, regardless
of its nature, existing at the time of marriage;
d. through concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or
homosexuality/lesbianism.
(Art.46, FC)
Note: TOLENTINO: parents whose consents
were wanting may ratify before 21; this
right can be waived; however, the Code Commission believes that no such ratification
can be made by the parent.
2. Insanity
a. mental incapacity or insanity is a vice of
consent; insanity (1) of varying
degrees, (2) curable being an illness, capable of ratification or convalidation,
(3) has lucid intervals, (4) ground only for annulment in many countries
3. Fraud
e. Concealment of Pregnancy
• fraud against very essence of
marriage; importance of procreation of children;
an assault to the integrity of the union by introducing ALIEN BLOOD
• If husband knew of pregnancy, the
marriage cannot be annulled on the
ground
of concealment. Three (3) months after the celebration of the
marriage, a baby
was born.
Annulment was refused because of
advanced stage of
pregnancy,
which must be patent to the
husband (Buccat v Mangonon)
• If there was coitus before marriage & wife was pregnant at time of marriage
although he may not be the father, marriage cannot be annulled because man
knows wife is unchaste. Principle: one cannot go to court with unclean hands. Prof.
Balane: An isolated case and is not doctrinal.
f. Marriage cannot be annulled on ground that wife concealed the fact that she
had been lewd & corrupt and had illegitimate child (Shrady v Logan)
Buccat v Buccat, 72 Phil. 19
Wife gave birth 3 months after marriage celebration.
Husband filed for annulment. Ground: concealment of non-virginity. Court held that it
was unbelievable that wife could have concealed 6 months of pregnancy.
Aquino v Delizo, 109 Phil. 21
The Supreme Court granted annulment because
the wife concealed the fact that she was 4 months pregnant during the time of the
marriage. It argued that since Delizo was “naturally plump,” Aquino could hardly
be expected to know, by mere looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the
time of the marriage.
It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates
the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and
intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
In a legal separation or annulment case, the prosecuting attorney must first rule
out collusion as a condition sine qua non for further proceedings. A certification
by the prosecutor that he was present during the hearing and even cross-
examined the plaintiff does not suffice to comply with the mandatory requirement.
Ground (Art. 45) Who can file (Art. 47) Prescription (Art. 47) Ratification (Art. 45)
1. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by
Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 [Art. 50(1)]
2. Final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the:
a. properties of the spouses
b. custody and support of the common children
c. delivery of their presumptive legitimes
unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings [Art. 50(2)]
all creditors (of
the spouses/property regime) shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation [Art. 50(2 and 3)]
3. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and lot shall be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom majority of the common children remain (Art. 102 and 129) [Art. 50(4)]
5. Either of the former spouses may marry again AFTER compliance with the
requirements of Article 52, otherwise, the subsequent marriage is void (Art. 53)
LEGAL SEPARATION
The frequency of the act and not the severity of the same is the
determinative factor to grant legal separation.
Even if the act is not repeated or does not involve physical violence, such
act may constitute grossly abusive conduct.
Grossly abusive conduct has no exact definition, and is determined on
a case-to-case basis. Thus, a singular but serious act of “squeezing of
neck, pulling of hair and the like without the intent to kill, may be
included in the phrase.
Use of offensive language toward the other spouse, continually calling
him or her vile and opprobrious names causing unhappiness is
considered a cruel and abusive conduct.
f. lesbianism or homosexuality
g. bigamous marriage
a. Condonation – see Ocampo vs. Florenciano where SC held that that the failure
of the husband to look actively for his adulterous wife after she left the conjugal
home does not constitute condonation.
Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil. 616 (1956) — Continued cohabitation despite
full knowledge of the spouse’s infidelity constitutes implied
condonation.
b. Consent – made before the commission of the offense. There is consent when
either of the spouses agreed to or did not object, despite full knowledge, to the
act giving rise to a ground for legal separation, before such act was in fact
committed.
c. Connivance – this is called “corrupt consenting”. Employment of means or
other persons to induce the commission of the offense.
d. Recrimination or equal guilt – pari delicto; he who comes to court must come
with clean hands.
In Ong vs. Ong, 505 SCRA 76 (2006), where the husband subjected the
wife to physical beatings sought the dismissal of the case for legal
separation filed against him by the wife on the ground of equal guilt
contending that the wife abandoned him, the SC rejected the contention
because the abandonment was not “unjustified”.
e. Collusion – corrupt agreement between husband and wife for one of them to
commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having
committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense.
f. Prescription – 5 years
3. Procedure
a. cannot be tried before 6 months shall have elapsed. See Pacete vs. Carriaga, 231
SCRA 321, where the SC voided a decision as the trial court failed to observe
the cooling-off period.
d. After the filing of the petition, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately.
e. In the absence of a written agreement, the court shall designate the spouse who
shall administer the ACP or CPG.
In Sabalones vs.CA (1994), the SC held while spouses and joint
administrators of the ACP or CPG, Art. 61 provides that the court may
appoint an administrator upon the filing of the petition for legal
separation in the absence of a written agreement of the parties.
f. Support
4. Death of either party during petition for legal separation terminates the action.
(Lapuz vs. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177)
Exemption: One spouse living abroad or there are valid and compelling
reasons (Art. 69, Par 2)
Exemption to Exemption: Incompatibility
with the solidarity of the family
(Art. 69, Par. 2)
Nota Bene:
b. Observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity Render mutual help and support
(Art. 68)
c. Fix the family domicile.
In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide.
(Art. 69, Par. 1)
d. Jointly support the family. (Art. 70)
From the conjugal property/income
of
the fruits of their separate properties
In case of
absence/insufficiency, from their separate properties (liable in
proportion to their properties)
a. In case the other spouse neglects his or her duties or commit acts which
tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the family, the aggrieved party
may apply the court for relief. (Art. 72)
Injury contemplated is physical,
moral, emotional, or psychological, not financial.
b. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, without need for
consent of the other.
The other spouse may only object on
valid, serious, and moral
grounds.
Notes:
Property relations between Filipino spouses are governed by Philippine laws, regardless
of the place of marriage and their residence (Nationality Rule- Art 15, NCC).
Hence—
The rule that ACP is the default mode of property relations absent any marriage
settlement applies to all Filipinos, regardless of the place of the marriage and their
residence.
Exceptions—
1. Where both spouses are aliens
2. As to the extrinsic validity of contracts
3. Contrary stipulation
4. General Rule: All modifications to the marriage settlement must be made before
the marriage is celebrated. (Art. 76)
Exceptions:
• Legal Separation (Art. 63 (2), FC)
o The property regime is dissolved.
• Revival of the former property regime upon reconciliation if the spouses agree
(Art. 66 (2))
• A spouse may petition the court for:
o Receivership
o Judicial separation of property,
o The authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership
If the
other spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family. (Art. 128)
Judicial Dissolution (Arts. 135 and 136)
Note Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite, Dec. 10, 2012, where the SC held that modification
can be made after the marriage ceremony, but such post-marriage modification shall
need judicial approval and should only refer to the instances provided in Arts. 66,67,
135 and 136.
Notes:
2. Donations excluded—
• Ordinary wedding gifts given after the celebration of the marriage
• Donations in favor of future spouses made before marriage but not in
consideration thereof
• Donations made in favor of persons other than the spouses even if founded on the
intended marriage
5. Rules
Exception:
Exception:
Moderate gifts on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
The donation between common-law spouses falls within the provision prohibiting
between spouses during Grounds for revocation - In Art. 86
The donation made by a man to a woman was held valid because no proof was shown
that they were still living in a common-law relationship at the time of the donation.
• When the marriage takes place without the
consent of the parents or guardians,
as
required by law.
• When the marriage is annulled, and the
donee acted in bad faith.
• Upon legal separation, if the donee is the
guilty spouse.
• If there is a resolutory condition, and it is not
complied with.
• When donee has committed an act of
ingratitude: (Art. 765, CC) (PCS)
Notes:
1. All properties owned by the contracting parties before the marriage ceremony and
those which they may acquire thereafter shall comprise the absolute community
of property.
Also, in partial separation of property regime, the property not agreed upon as
separate shall pertain to the ACP.
2. The spouses become co-owners of all the properties in an ACP regime. However,
no waiver of rights, interests, shares and effects of the ACP can be made except
upon judicial separation of property.
3. The ACP shall commence that the precise moment of the celebration of the
marriage.
4.1. Only those stated under Article 92 of the FC are excluded from the ACP. There is
a presumption that all properties are part of ACP.
6. Gains in games of chance are part of the ACP; losses, however, shall be separate
liability of the loser-spouse.
7. The administration and enjoyment of the absolute community shall belong to the
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, husband’s decision shall prevail, subject
to recourse by the wife to the court for property remedy which shall be availed
within 5 years.
8. Either spouse may dispose by will his or her interest in the ACP.
9. Neither spouse can donate any community property without the consent of the
other; however, moderate donations are allowed in times of family rejoicing or
family distress.
a. Spouse who leaves the family abode without just cause shall not be
supported.
b. In case consent is necessary in any transaction required by law, judicial
authorization shall be obtained.
c. Spouse present may petition the court for authority to administer or
encumber specific separate property of the absent spouse, and use fruits
or proceeds thereof to satisfy latter’s share.
12. If a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with marital,
parental or property obligation, the aggrieved party may petition the court for: a)
receivership; b) judicial separation of property; c) authority to be the sole
administrator of the ACP.
Presumption: spouse who leaves the dwelling for a period of 3 months, or fails to
provide whereabouts for the same period, is presumed to have no intention of returning
the conjugal dwelling.
Net profits for purpose of forfeiture shall mean the increase in value between the market
value of the ACP at the time of the celebration of the marriage and its present value at
the time of dissolution.
14. Upon death of either spouse, ACP shall be liquidated in the settlement
proceedings. If no judicial settlement proceedings are instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the ACP either judicially or extrajudicially within 1 year
from death of the deceased spouse. After lapse of the said period, and no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance is void. In case of
remarriage and no settlement or liquidation, complete separation of property
shall govern the subsequent marriage.
Notes:
1. Under CPG, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products,
fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or
both during the marriage through their efforts or by chance, and in the event of
dissolution of CPG, the net gains or benefits shall be divided between the spouses.
2. CPG shall commence the precise moment of marriage celebration; and no waiver
of interests shall be valid, except in case of judicial separation of property.
3. CPG is a special form of partnership. Hence, a partner is a co-owner with his other
partner of specific partnership property. Every partner must account to the
partnership every benefit derived by him without the consent of the other from
any transaction.
5. Either spouse retains right of ownership and administration to his or her separate
property. The administration of separate property may be transferred to the other
spouse through a public instrument which shall be recorded in the register of
deeds. Alienation of separate property terminates administration of the other
spouse. Each spouse may mortgage, encumber or alienate separate property,
without the consent of the other.
6. Property donated or left by will to the spouses jointly and with designation of
shares, shall pertain to him or her as exclusive property, and in case of no
designation of shares, share and share alike, without prejudice to right of accretion.
7. In donations which are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne by the
exclusive property, whenever they may have been advanced by the CPG.
9. All properties acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary appears. Proof of acquisition during
the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption.
(Jocson vs. CA, 170 SCRA 333)
a. Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund.
b. Those obtained from labor, industry, work or profession of either or both
of the spouses.
c. The fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage
from the common property as well as net fruits from the exclusive property
of each spouse.
d. Share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the
finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found.
e. Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting.
f. Livestock existing upon dissolution of marriage in excess of the number of
each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse.
g. Those acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting;
losses, however, shall be exclusively borne by the loser-spouse.
Article 118 contemplates a situation where installment was initiated prior to the marriage
and ended after the marriage. When property is bought on installment basis partly by
exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly by conjugal funds, the ownership of
the property is determined by the time when the title is vested. If vested before marriage,
it is exclusive property; if during the marriage, conjugal, in each case, reimbursement
shall take place.
In Jovellanos vs. CA, 210 SCRA 126, the SC held that a property whose last installment
was made during the second marriage by the conjugal funds of said marriage and partly
by conjugal funds of the first marriage, it is considered conjugal property.
12. In a situation where one of the spouses has in his or her favor a credit payable in
installments or, in any case, a credit which will be fully paid during the marriage,
all payment made on the principal during that marriage are considered exclusive
property but interest on principal falling due during marriage shall belong to the
CPG.
14. Charges upon and obligations of the CPG are the same as those in the ACP.
a. Rule in case of debts or obligations incurred by the husband alone which
are chargeable to CPG
b. Personal debts and fines and pecuniary liability of one spouse incurred
prior to the marriage are, as a rule, not chargeable to CPG. However, after
satisfaction of the charges enumerated in Article 121 have been satisfied,
and the concerned spouse has no separate property or is insufficient, the
CPG may advance the payment. This is different from ACP.
15. The rules on administration and enjoyment of conjugal property are the same as
those stated in ACP.
20. Rule in termination of marriage by death of one spouse concerning CPG similar to
ACP.
21. Rule in simultaneous liquidation of two or more marriages contracted prior to FC
in CPG similar to ACP.
Notes:
1. If the husband and the wife, prior to the marriage, did not execute any written
marital agreement providing that the separation of property regime will govern
their property relation, they cannot, after the marriage ceremony, alter their
property relations without judicial approval.
a. Civil interdiction
b. Judicial declaration of absence
c. Loss of parental authority decreed by the court
d. Abandonment or failure to comply with marital or parental obligations
e. Abuse of power of administration
f. Reconciliation is highly improbable and separation in fact lasted for at least
1 year.
For (a), (b) and (c), mere presentation of final judgment sufficient to grant separation of
property.
If the other spouse is not qualified or there is conflict of interest, court may appoint
someone else.
2. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own
property without need of consent from the other. They shall also respectively own
the earnings and income of their separate property.
3. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or in
case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their
separate properties.
4. Liability to creditors for family expenses shall be solidary.
Notes:
ARTICLE 147
1. This applies to common-law relationship who are capacitated to marry each other,
and to marriages that are void including those marriages where there is absence
of consent, authority of the solemnizing officer, a valid marriage license, a
marriage ceremony as provided for in Article 4 of the FC.
ARTICLE 148
a. The salaries and wages are separately owned by the parties and if any of
the spouses is married, his or her salary is the property of the ACP or CPG
of such legitimate marriage.
b. Property solely acquired by funds of any of the parties belong to such party.
c. Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
d. The respective shares of the parties over properties owned in common are
presumed to be equal. However, proofs may be shown to show that their
contribution and respective shares are not equal.
e. The rule and presumption mentioned above shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
f. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the ACP or CPG existing in such valid marriage.
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
Article 147. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith.
I. FAMILY
Basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects hence, no suit between
members of the family shall prosper unless compromise between parties has failed.
B. General Rule
For a suit between members of the same family to prosper, the following are required:
• Earnest efforts towards a compromise have
been made
• Such efforts have failed
• Such earnest efforts and the fact of failure
must be alleged
Hontiveros v. RTC, (1999)
Whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family members,
the requisite showing of earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory, as such
inclusion of a stranger takes the case out of the ambit of FC 151.
Art. 332 of the RPC provides for absolutory causes or exemption from criminal responsibility in
crimes against property, such as theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed by the
following persons:
Note: In Intestate Estate of Manolita vda. De Carungcong vs. People, Feb. 11, 2010, the SC held
that Art. 332 applies to parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.
Art. 1109 – Prescription does not run between husband and wife, even if there is separation of
property, either in marriage settlement or by judicial decree. Neither does prescription run
between parents and children, during minority or insanity of the latter, and between guardian
and ward during the continuance of the guardianship.
V.FAMILY HOME
Guidelines—
1. It is deemed constituted from time of actual occupation as a family residence
2. It must be owned by person constituting it
3. It must be permanent
4. Rule applies to valid and voidable and even to common-law marriages under Arts.147 and
148
5. It continues despite death of one or more spouses or unmarried head of family for 10 years
or as long as there is a minor beneficiary (Art.159)
6. Can only constitute one family home (Art. 161)
7. Family home must be part of ACP or CPG, or the exclusive property of either spouse, with
his/her consent, and may be constituted by an unmarried head of the family on his or her own
property.
8. Property on conditional sale on installment may be constituted as family home.
9. The value of family home at the time of its constitution must be P300,000 in urban areas and
P200,000 in rural areas.
A. General Rule
B. Exceptions in the exemption of the family home from execution (Art. 155)
1. Nonpayment of taxes.
2. Debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.
3. Debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution.
4. Debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
Olivia-De Mesa vs. Acero, Jan. 16, 2012, summarized the rules of exemption of family home
from execution:
Note: Benefits of family home from execution under FC may be waived as this is a personal
right.
Requirements for the sale, alienation, donation, assignment, or encumbrance of the family
home—
Versola v. Mandolaria, (2006)
The proof that the house is the family home must be alleged
against creditors; Applied the rule in Art. 160, FC.
Patricio v. Dario III, (2006)
WON the grandson of the deceased is a beneficiary according to
Art. 154 FC. The beneficiary should satisfy all requisites; he must be dependent on the head of
the family.
Arriola v. Arriola, (2008)
This case involves half brothers and a second wife; the family home
includes the land it is built on. The rule in Art. 159 of the FC regarding the 10 year period is
applied, the parties involved must wait before it can be the subject of partition.
a. physical impossibility to sex within first 120 days of 300 days after birth
because of (i) impotence; (ii) physical separation of husband and wife; (3)
serious illness of the husband.
b. Biological or scientific reasons.
c. Written authorization or either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence.
12. Child is legitimate even if the mother declares against its legitimacy or is sentenced
as an adulteress.
13. In Macadangdang vs. CA, 100 SCRA 73, the SC ruled that the following:
a. if the sperm of the husband was used by the wife without the consent of the
former, the former may impugn legitimacy.
b. If husband acceded to the request using the sperm of the another man and
he fails to comply with the procedure, and let prescriptive action to set it,
child is legitimate.
15. Woman marrying 2nd time within 300 days after termination of the first marriage:
a. child born before 180 days after the marriage celebration is considered
conceived during the first marriage provided born within 300 days after the
termination of the 1st marriage.
b. Child born after 180 days following marriage celebration is considered born
on the second marriage.
16. Legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child born after 300 days following the termination
of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
19. For birth certificate to be admitted as proof of filiation, it must be established that
the father has a hand in its preparation or signed the same.
Cases:
Acebedo v. Arquero, (2003)
Baptismal certificates are only conclusive of the sacrament
administered, and cannot be used as proof of filiation.
Eceta v. Eceta (2004)
Signature of the father on the birth certificate is considered as an
acknowledgement of paternity and mere presentation of a duly authenticated copy of such
certificate will successfully establish filiations.
20. Action to claim legitimacy may be brought during the lifetime of the child. Heirs of
the deceased child have 5 years to institute action.
21. Rights of legitimate children:
22. Filiation of illegitimate children is established same as that of the legitimate children.
23. Action to claim illegitimacy is brought during the lifetime of the illegitimate child or
within 5 years in case of the heirs of the deceased illegitimate child, or during the
lifetime of the putative parent if the proof is open and continuous possession or
other means allowed by the Rules of Court.
24. Article 176 has been amended by RA 9255, which now reads:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled o support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public instrument or private handwritten instrument is made by the father, Provided, the father
has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his
lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of the
legitimate child.
25. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below 18
years of age, may be legitimated.
26. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The
annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
27. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children.
28. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child’s birth.
NOTES IN ADOPTION
1. Nature of Adoption
a. Adoption is the juridical act that creates between two persons certain relations, purely
civil, of paternity and filiation. The adopted becomes a legitimate child of the adopter
with reciprocal rights and obligations arising from that relationship. Consequently, the
adopted has the right to bear the surname of the adopter, receive support and to inherit
(Teotico vs. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406).
b. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does
not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the
adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the
adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of
adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the
adopter (Santos, Jr. vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 379). Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parent. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter’s but not of the relative of the adopter.
c. The rights of a legitimate child given to an adopted child do not include the acquisition
of the citizenship of the adopter (Cheng Ling vs. Galang, L-11931, Oct. 27, 1958). The
citizenship of the adopter is a political matter, and not civil in nature.
d. The policy of the State as stated in RA 8552 is to ensure that every child remains under
the care and custody of his natural parents. Only when such efforts prove to be
insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the child’s extended
family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that
the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.chan robles virtual law library
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
b. For as long as the statutory qualifications, exclusions and requirements for adoption are
met, relatives by blood and affinity are not excluded from adopting one another. An individual
who has already adopted a child or who has legitimate or illegitimate children may still adopt
(Hofilena vs. Republic, 34 SCRA 545). An elder sister can adopt a younger brother (Tavera vs.
Cacdac, 167 SCRA 636) and a stepfather can adopt his step-child (Malkinson vs. Agrava, 54 SCRA
66).
c. The adopter must be emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children. He
or she must likewise be financially capable of supporting the child to be adopted. The law
provides that he or she must be in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping
with the means of the family.
d. The age of the prospective parents is an important but not the sole or controlling
consideration in determining what is best for the child.
e. Aliens are now allowed to adopt Filipino children for as long as they have all the
qualifications. In addition to the basic qualifications, aliens must show that their countries have
diplomatic relations with the Philippines and must be living in the Philippines for at least 3 years
prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, and that he or she is certified by the diplomatic
or consular office to have legal capacity to adopt and that his or her government allows the
adopted to enter his or her country.
f. Under the law, joint adoption of husband and wife is mandated for the maintenance of
harmony within the family, except in cases provided in RA 8552.
a. After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her
approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:
4. Procedure of Adoption
a. Pre-adoption service
1. Counseling Service. — The DSWD shall provide the services of licensed social workers to
the following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) — Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after the
birth of his/her child. No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before
the birth of his/her child. A period of six (6) months shall be allowed for the biological parent(s)
to reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for adoption before the decision becomes
irrevocable. Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also be offered to the biological
parent(s) after he/she has relinquished his/her child for adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and all
alternatives for the child's future and the implications of each alternative have been provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) — Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars, among
others, shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible adoption issues
and to prepare him/her for effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee — Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she
understands the nature and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her views on
adoption in accordance with his/her age and level of maturity.
2. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the DSWD or the child-
placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her
unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and
subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.
b. Hurried decision - In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof that the
biological parent(s) has been properly counseled to prevent him/her from making hurried
decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child, and to sustain that all measures to
strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any prolonged stay of the child in his/her
own home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.
c. Case Study - No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social
worker of the Department, the social service office of the local government unit, or any child-
placing or child-caring agency has made a case study of the adoptee, his/her biological
parent(s), as well as the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and recommendations on the
matter to the court hearing such petition.
At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned social worker shall
confirm with the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth
of the adoptee was not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the
concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is registered.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for adoption and
that the documents to support this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the
adopter(s) shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that the adoption is in the best
interest of the child.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of the
case studies, that the petition should be denied. The case studies and other relevant
documents and records pertaining to the adoptee and the adoption shall be preserved by the
Department.
d. Supervised Trial Custody - No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the
adopter(s) has been given by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six (6)
months within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and emotionally to each
other and establish a bonding relationship. During said period, temporary parental authority
shall be vested in the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds the
same to be in the best interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of the
period. However, for alien adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-month trial custody
except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s) through
a pre-adoption placement authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall
enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled from the date the adoptee is
placed with the prospective adopter(s).
e. Decree of Adoption - If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been complied
with, and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the case
studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence submitted,
the court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to adopt, and that the adoption would
redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall
be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case
the petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of
the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by which the child is to be known.
f. Civil Registry Record. — An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil
Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of
the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname. The original certificate of birth shall be
stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its
place and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to
the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.
g. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. — All hearings in adoption cases shall
be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to
the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for
purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interest of the
adoptee, the court may merit the necessary information to be released, restricting the
purposes for which it may be used
5. Effects of Adoption
a. Parental Authority. — Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the
same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
c. Succession. — In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the
adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession
shall govern.
6. Rescission of Adoption
a. Only the adoptee is given the legal standing to rescind the adoption decree. If the
adoptee is a minor, he or she shall be assisted by the DSWD. If the adoptee is incapacitated, he
or she shall be assisted by the DSWD.
(i) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling;
(ii) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
(iii) sexual assault or violence; or
(iv) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations
c. Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code.
a. An attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants or
ascendants.
b. The person disinherited has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
the penalty of imprisonment of 6 years or more if the accusation has been found groundless or
false.
c. The person disinherited causes the testator to make a will or to change one already
made by fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
d. Refusal without just cause to support the testator, the children or descendants.
e. Conviction of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator.
f. Maltreatment of testator by word or by deed.
g. Leading dishonorable or disgraceful life.
h. Civil interdiction. Final conviction is required. Civil interdiction is imposed with the
principal penalties of death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal.
d. Effects of rescission
If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known,
or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each
other shall be extinguished.
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the
adoptee and restore his/her original birth certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment
of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties
imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven.
A person who has, prior to the effectivity of RA 8552 simulated the birth of a child shall not be
punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of
the child and that he/she has been consistently considered and treated by that person as
his/her own son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth
registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of
RA 8552 and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with the
procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined by the
DSWD.
Inter-Country Adoption
1. Policy of the State - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide every
neglected and abandoned child with a family that will provide such child with love and care as
well as opportunities for growth and development. Towards this end, efforts shall be exerted to
place the child with an adoptive family in the Philippines. However, recognizing that inter-
country adoption may be considered as allowing aliens not presently allowed by law to adopt
Filipino children if such children cannot be adopted by qualified Filipino citizens or aliens, the
State shall take measures to ensure that inter-country adoptions are allowed when the same
shall prove beneficial to the child's best interests, and shall serve and protect his/her
fundamental rights.
2. Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. — The Board shall ensure that all
possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and that
inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall set
up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines before
the child is placed for inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum number
that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first
five (5) years.
3. Who May be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country
adoption. Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed
to the Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code. In order that such
child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the
Board:
(a) Child study;
4. Who May Adopt. — An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file
an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the
child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the
child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent:
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority
under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited
counselor in his/her country;
(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral
values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to
implement the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose
government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is
allowed under his/her national laws; and
(i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in
other applicable Philippine laws
5. Procedure - An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either with the
Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board, through an
intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and accredited agency, in the
country of the prospective adoptive parents, which application shall be in accordance with the
requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and regulations to be promulgated by the
Board.
The application shall be supported by the following documents written and officially translated
in English.
During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the governmental agency
or the authorized and accredited agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a
progress report of the child's adjustment. The progress report shall be taken into consideration
in deciding whether or not to issue the decree of adoption.
The Department of Foreign Affairs shall set up a system by which Filipino children sent
abroad for trial custody are monitored and checked as reported by the authorized and
accredited inter-country adoption agency as well as the repatriation to the Philippines of a
Filipino child whose adoption has not been approved.
SUPPORT
a. spouses
b. legitimate ascendants and descendants
c. parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of
the latter; and
d. legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
a. Spouse who leaves the conjugal dwelling without just cause is not entitled to
support.
b. Spouse is the who cause of separation is not entitled to support, innocent spouse
entitled to support.
c. Wife committing adultery is not entitled to support.
d. Support pendente lite
4. Illegitimate children of the legitimate children of the parents are entitled to be
supported by the latter because they are related by blood.
5. Illegitimate brothers and sisters are also entitled to support each other, except when
the need for support is due to the fault or negligence of such brother or sister.
6. Support of illegitimate children, parents and brothers and sisters shall come from the
separate property, if not sufficient from the ACP or CPG, considered as an advance.
a. spouse
b. descendants in the nearest degree
c. ascendants in the nearest degree
d. brothers and sisters
9. In case obligation to support falls upon two or more persons, payment shall be divided.
In case of urgency, one may pay, subject to reimbursement from the others obligated to give
support.
10. If two or more persons are entitled to be supported by one and the same person, the
order of priority shall be observed in case of insufficiency of properties to satisfy all claims,
except as between the spouse and the child, the child must be preferred to be supported.
11. Support shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities
of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or
increase in the necessity and the means.
12. Obligation to give support demandable from the time it is needed, but can only be paid
upon demand. Payment shall be made within first 5 days of each month.
13. Persons obliged to support shall have the option of (1) paying the allowance fixed, or (2)
by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has the right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed in case there is a moral or legal obstacle
thereof.
16. contractual support in a will, excess amount may be attached or levied on execution.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
1. Parental authority is a natural right. It includes caring and rearing of children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being.
3. In Santos vs. CA, 242 SCRA 407, even if the father took away his child from the custody
of grandparents through deceit or false pretenses, the SC ruled that father has a custody since
he is not unfit.
Parental authority of the mother over the illegitimate child is proper when (1) paternity
is unknown or in doubt; (2) father is not living with the mother and the child.
5. In case of death of either parent, the present parent shall exercise parental authority.
Marriage of the surviving parent will not affect parental authority over the children
6. In case of legal separation, parental authority shall be exercised by the one appointed by
the court.
Maternal Preference Rule: Children below 7 years old shall not be separated from the mother.
Will only apply as a “tie-breaker” when parental qualities are even or balanced.
In Espiritu vs. CA, 242 SCRA 362, the SC reversed the CA when the latter awarded the
custody of children who are 7 years old to the mother who has been unfaithful to the father or
is a prostitute, and despite the choice of the children to go the father. The SC ruled that the sole
and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child.
In David vs. CA, 250 SCRA 82, where it was shown that the father was well-off compared
to the mother but the latter can decently support the children, the SC awarded the custody to
her.
Child’s welfare is the cardinal principle in determining right between the parents.
In all custody proceedings, case study of DSWD is required. Habeas corpus may be
availed also to regain custody.
9. Marital privilege – the husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, can not be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, except in civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for the crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants.
a. surviving grandparent
b. oldest brother or sister over 21 years old, unless unfit
c. child’s actual custodian, over 21 years old unless unfit or disqualified
3. Special parental authority given to the school, administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody. SPA shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
a. They shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the minor,
while the parents have subsidiary liability.
d. In Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil. 843, an elementary student and boy scout
attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the
boy boarded a jeep, took its wheel and drove it recklessly that it turned turle resulting in the
death of two of the passengers. The boy was convicted for double homicide. The SC exculpated
the school on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades under Art. 2180.
e. In Mercado vs. CA, 108 Phils. 414, a student cut a classmate with a razor blade
during the recess time, and the parents of the victim sued the culprit’s parents for damages.
The SC likewise exculpated the school.
f. In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, 41 SCRA 548, a 16-year old student was killed by a
classmate with its fist blows in the laboratory of a school. Although the wrongdoer, who was
already of age, was not boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge were
held solidarily liable with him by declaring that for as long as the students are in attendance in
school including recess time, the school has custody.
g. In Amadora vs. CA, 160 SCRA 315, Amadora went to school to submit his physics
experiment as a prerequisite for graduation. While at the auditorium, he was shot to death by a
classmate. The school claimed that it is not liable because Amadora was no longer in its custody
because the semester had already ended. Although the SC found the school not liable, it ruled
that as long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues.
a. parents and other persons exercising PA shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children provided (a) said
children are living in their company; and (b) they are under their parental authority.