Angelaki

Journal of the Theoretical Humanities

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THE PARALLAX OF INDIVIDUATION

Yuk Hui

To cite this article: Yuk Hui (2016) THE PARALLAX OF INDIVIDUATION, Angelaki, 21:4, 77-89

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 ANGELAKI
journal of the theoretical humanities
volume 21 number 4 december 2016

“ here is no real opposition.” Such is the

T first axiom that unites F.W.J. Schelling
and Gilbert Simondon on the question of indivi-
duation. That is, oppositions are considered by
both as the motor towards resolution, as what
drives the ascent to a higher order of organiz-
ation – at which point we observe the emergence
of the third. By constantly overcoming opposi-
tions, a being individuates itself and reveals its
identity in metastable forms – that is, coherence
without stable equilibrium. This view is not
necessarily dialectical in the Hegelian sense,
but rather a model of individuation in which
being is conceived as both unity and difference. yuk hui
It is unity in the sense that it is always an
instance of individuation. It is difference in
the sense that it differentiates from both itself THE PARALLAX OF
and the other. Simondon and Schelling,
however, are to be distinguished by the nature INDIVIDUATION
of the third, and it is the task of this essay to
demonstrate this difference. simondon and schelling
Why bring Simondon and Schelling
together? On the one hand, a philosopher of
technology known in the anglophone world two different perspectives or lenses, thereby
for his Du mode d’existence des objets tech- allowing one to gain a more comprehensive
niques (METO), and on the other, a philoso- understanding of the subject in question.
pher known for his Naturphilosophie? While This parallax arises from two different epis-
it is true that in France Simondon has been temological lenses that in both cases are
read as a philosopher of nature, especially in thoroughly determined by the natural sciences
relation to L’Individuation à la lumière des of their time; moreover, this parallax is sub-
notions de forme et d’information (ILFI),1 I sequently recast into two different metaphys-
am not concerned here with the question of ical registers that do not just take up the
whether there is a philosophy of nature in scientific terminology but transform it at the
Simondon. Rather, my aim is to present a par- same time as appropriating it. In what
allax between Simondon’s and Schelling’s follows, I aim to extract the two elements
concept of individuation. By parallax, I mean most representative of these two epochs: in
the difference produced in a single subject as Schelling’s case, it is the concept of force,
a result of observing this same subject from and for Simondon, the concept of information.

ISSN 0969-725X print/ISSN 1469-2899 online/16/040077-13 © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2016.1229427

77
 the parallax of individuation
A reading of both philosophers through the
notion of the parallax will allow us to grasp a
method of metaphysical thinking that,
instead of being conditioned by epistemology,
rather uses epistemology as a pivot to turn the
question of being in the natural sciences into
the question concerning the ground of being.
In a sense, we can say that this is also an indi-
viduation of thought itself, against itself and
others. Key here is another disjunction that
associates and dissociates these two thinkers:
the concept of form. In Schelling, organic
form plays the role of the principle of indivi-
duation, and metamorphosis is the expression
of the synthesis of forces unified by this
form; in Simondon, one finds a principle of
individuation, based on both his critique of
Aristotelian hylomorphism and the re-appro-
priation of the notion of form in Gestalt psy-
chology, which gives rise to the concept of
information.
Simondon did in fact produce an entry on
Schelling’s concept of the individual in “His-
toire de la notion d’individu,” an appendix to
ILFI. In this article, Simondon correctly
observes the fundamental axiom of Schelling’s
theory of individuation, namely “the living
being is composed of an opposed couple and a
force superior to the opposed couple” (ILFI
516). However, the commentary is only two
pages long and Simondon attempts to provide
summaries of several of Schelling’s works in
that short space. Schelling is, of course, only
one of many philosophers on Simondon’s list
to have proposed a definition of the individual;
however, the links between the two are strength-
ened through recourse to Deleuze’s Difference
and Repetition, particularly the section on the
question of the bêtise. As Derrida noted in his
seminar on transcendental stupidity, it is not
possible to understand Deleuze’s claims about
the individuation of the bêtise without first
understanding Schelling’s concept of ground,
both as original ground (Urgrund) and as
groundless ground (Ungrund). And Deleuze
does indeed cite Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift in
a footnote. Derrida furthers this reading by
quoting a passage from Difference and
Repetition:
Individuation as such, as it operates beneath
all forms, is inseparable from a pure ground
that it brings to the surface and trails with
it. It is difficult to describe this ground, or
the terror and attraction it excites. Turning
over the ground is the most dangerous occu-
pation, but also the most tempting in the stu-
pefied moments of an obtuse will. For this
ground, along with the individual, rises to
the surface yet assumes neither form nor
figure [ … ] It is the indeterminate, but the
indeterminate in so far as it continues to
embrace determination, as the ground does
the shoe. (Deleuze 152; Derrida 50; emphasis
mine)
Derrida is surely right to insist upon the relation
of this passage to Schelling’s concept of the
ground. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that
Deleuze is also referring to Simondon’s theory
of individuation as well as the ground–figure
metaphor that Simondon borrowed from
Gestalt psychology. Difference and Repetition
as a whole is, of course, influenced by Simondon
(Sauvagnargues; Toscano), and Simondon’s
influence on this passage is even more pro-
nounced when one bears in mind that Schelling
does not use the term “figure” to talk of the
ground. And so it is precisely here – via Derri-
da’s reading of Deleuze – that we rediscover
the encounter between Schelling and Simondon.
In what follows, I attempt to sketch the central
principles of individuation in Schelling and
Simondon against the backdrop of the natural
sciences, which will at the same time render
visible the concept of the third. The essay has
three parts: the first two parts will respectively
explore the theories of individuation in Schel-
ling and Simondon before drawing out con-
clusions in the final section.
individuation according to schelling
individuation as bearer of opposition
The first thing worth noting is the German word
used by Derrida for individuation in the above
discussion, Vereinzelung, translated literally
as singularization or atomization. This word is
not itself employed by Schelling but rather by
Heidegger in his lecture course on Schelling,
78

Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Frei-
heit, where one finds the section, “The
Process of the Individuation of Real Evil”
[Der Vorgang der Vereinzelung des wirklichen
Bösen]. It is, of course, very possible that
when Derrida refers to Schelling he is referring
to Heidegger’s Schelling. Schelling does use this
term in other contexts: for example, in Von der
Weltseele, where it describes the instantiation
of original forms (Urformen) (30). But this is
by no means equivalent to individuation in the
sense of genesis. My discussion of individuation
is limited merely to what Schelling calls Indivi-
dualisierung or individualization. For Schel-
ling, the word Individualisierung stands for
both individuation and individualization, while
Simondon distinguishes individuation from
individualization. The latter is understood as
both somatic specialization and psychical sche-
matization. Therefore, when we talk about indi-
viduation in Schelling we refer to
Individualisierung, and for Simondon indivi-
duation as it is in French.
The concept of individuation in the First
Outline of a System of the Philosophy of
Nature is considered as “the highest problem
of the philosophy of nature” and its “chief
problem” (Whistler 3). A number of commenta-
tors on Schelling’s early work have noted
changes in his take on individuation. For
example, Xavier Tilliette, in “La Philosophie
de Schelling et le problème de l’individuation”
points out that the problem of individuation is
transformed from one of biological philosophy
to one of transcendental philosophy. In this
move to transcendental philosophy, Schelling
has imposed a triple restriction or constraint
on individuality: (1) limitation of the common
world of intelligence; (2) limitation by other
intelligences; (3) limitation of the individual
itself (Tilliette 129). On the other hand,
Daniel Whistler has also demonstrated a
change in Schelling’s theory of individuation
from the early Naturphilosophie to the Darstel-
lung meines Systems der Philosophie, in which
Schelling rejects Spinoza’s principle of indivi-
duation: omnis determinotio est negatio.
Instead, Schelling considers determination as a
form of affirmation. My concern here is not to
79
hui
square Tilliette’s and Whistler’s competing
claims, nor am I concerned with elaborating
on the discrepancies in their interpretations.
Rather, I am concerned simply with showing
that there is indeed great difficulty in generaliz-
ing a coherent theory of individuation in the
writings of Schelling. While the problem of
individuation does seem to alter, as both of
the above commentators claim, this change is
nebulous. In view of this difficulty, we limit
our exploration to Schelling’s early works –
that is, from his commentary on Plato’s
Timaeus (1794) to the Erster Entwurf (1799).
What we can find in both Tilliette’s and Whis-
tler’s commentaries is that there is a common
axiom in which the inscription of the infinite
in the finite constitutes a general process of indi-
viduation. I want to focus on this point and to
show how Schelling makes such a claim compa-
tible with the scientific discoveries of his time.
Or, more precisely, how is Schelling able to
make this claim using discoveries in the
natural sciences and at the same time employ
it as the very departure point for philosophy
to individuate itself?
In Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy:
Life as the Schema of Freedom, Bruce Mat-
thews makes explicit a model of individuation
by returning to Schelling’s early writings, such
as the commentary on the Timaeus and Über
die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie
ü berhaupt. Retrospectively, in these early
texts, one can easily identify a mixture of
Plato, Kant and Fichte. For example, the
world soul set out in the commentary on the
Timaeus is a conceptual model of individuation,
which in turn has to be understood as a circular
(or more precisely, recursive) form based on
reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) and community
(Gemeinschaft), two concepts from Kant’s cat-
egories of relations. The soul is the infinite
movement that comes back to itself in a circular
form, and this form can be presented and
grasped only as a finite being. In his Timaeus
commentary, Schelling also refers to Socrates’
description of this form in the Phaedrus:
This form is a gift of the gods to men, which
together with the purest fire was first given to
 the parallax of individuation
them through Prometheus. Therefore the
ancients (greater men and closer to the gods
than us) have left the story behind, that
everything which has ever emerged out of
unity and multiplicity (plurality), in that it
united within itself the unlimited (apeiron,
universal) and the limit (to peras, unity):
that thus we too in light of this arrangement
of things should presuppose and search for
every object one idea … – It was the gods
then, who taught us to think, learn and
teach like this. (Timaeus 36; Matthews 23)
It is at this point that the contradiction between
the infinite and the finite comes into view, and
out of this contradiction emerges a dynamics
of being. As Ernst Bloch puts it in his commen-
tary on Fichte’s and Schelling’s concept of
matter, a stone “in the eyes of the romantics,
deduces itself as derivate of a process of life
[Lebensprozess]” (88). This concept of the
organic form has an ambivalent relation to
Fichte’s transcendental philosophy. On the one
hand, it is to be distanced from Fichte’s absolute
I and finds a more general form in nature; on the
other hand, it inherits the unconditioned as an
absolute beginning of being – that is, the self-
positing (Selbstsetzend) subject. Only on such
a condition, namely that being is able to con-
dition itself (in other words, independently
from other beings), can an absolute ground be
guaranteed. The self-positing of the organic
form is to some extent detached from matter,
while operating as the principle of the construc-
tion of matter itself. This axiom of the inscrip-
tion of the infinite in the finite is present in all
of Schelling’s early writings on the philosophy
of nature as well as in his Philosophy of Art,
in which the contradiction is expressed in the
artwork of the genius. The genius is able to
inscribe the infinite (apeiron) in the finite
(peras), thereby bringing about the experience
of the sublime. Later we will see that the
apeiron has a different function in Simondon’s
theory of individuation.
Schelling reads §64 and §65 of Kant’s Cri-
tique of Judgment in a similar manner. In
these sections, Kant treats the organic form of
living beings in terms of reciprocity and com-
munity, using the example of the part/whole
relation of a tree. In Ideas for a Philosophy of
Nature, Schelling refers to this passage in
Kant and, more specifically, the idea of absolute
individuality in an organism: “Its parts are poss-
ible only through the whole, and the whole is
possible, not through assembling but through
interaction” (31–32). The unity of the parts
and the whole is accomplished through an idea
instead of through matter. The idea stands as
the third that “contains” two potentially
opposed entities. Nature can be regarded as a
whole – a whole that later takes on the name
of the general organism (allgemeiner Organis-
mus) in Von der Weltseele. This is a whole
that also consists of two opposing concepts: on
the one hand, mechanism, which is “a regressive
series of causes and effects” and, on the other,
purposiveness, which is “independent of mech-
anism, simultaneity of causes and effects”
(Ideas 40–41). These two confront each other
as two irreconcilable parts, but, by unifying
them through idea, nature emerges in circular
form, like the world soul described by Plato:
If we unite these two extremes (mechanism
and purposiveness), the idea arises in us of
a purposiveness of the whole; Nature
becomes a circle which returns into itself, a
self-closed system. The series of causes and
effects ceases entirely, and there arises a reci-
procal connection of means and end; neither
could the individual become real without the
whole, nor the whole without the individual.
(Ideas 40–41; emphasis mine)
Through the third, here taking the form of
idea, which unifies and contains the two
extremes, we discover an isomorphism
between nature and mind. This isomorphism
is revealed in the famous statement in the
Ideas. “Nature should be Mind made visible,
Mind the invisible Nature” (43). The relation
between mind and nature is not constituted by
a monism, but rather they share a generic
model of individuation. Now the question that
has to be posed is the following: whence comes
this organizing force? To posit God as the
answer of creation seems far too easy for the
young Schelling, who identified himself as a Spi-
nozist in an early letter to Hegel. It seems that in
80

Schelling’s early period his affinity to Spinoza
and distance from religion allowed for a Natur-
philosophie and later a speculative physics to
emerge. The claim of this essay is that the orga-
nizing force stems from the concept of force. In
a parallel manner, we will later see in the case of
Simondon that his organizing force is derived
from the concept of information.
the concept of force in individuation
Schelling’s postulation of force as a metaphys-
ical category owes much to Newtonian physics
as well as to new discoveries in magnetism, elec-
tricity and chemistry. Schelling was fascinated
by these three areas of scientific discovery, and
what they have in common is the ability to be
analysed as interactions of forces. In what
follows, I limit myself to Schelling’s discussion
of force in his reading of Kant as well as in his
critique of the French-Swiss physician
Georges-Louis Le Sage. In Metaphysical Foun-
dations of Natural Science, Kant defines matter
as “that which can be moved in space [das
Bewegliche im Raum].” Like Descartes’s meta-
phor of the sponge, matter is the res extensa
that occupies space. In Descartes’s formulation,
substance is identified with extension: in the
universe there is no void, since empty space
does not exist. Kant’s formulation differs in
the way that he attributes to matter a certain
dynamics that is not evident in Descartes.
Kant understands matter as moveable being
and its occupation of space is not due to its
mere existence but to the moving force within it:
Explanation 1: Matter is the movable insofar
as it fills a space. To fill a space is to resist
every movable that strives through its
motion to penetrate into a certain space. A
space that is not filled is an empty space.
(Metaphysical Foundations 33)
Proposition 1: Matter fills a space, not
through its mere existence, but through a
particular moving force. (34)
In the third part of Metaphysical Foun-
dations, Kant goes on to provide a “dynamic
explanation of matter” by attributing two
81
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forces to matter, the repulsive force and the
attractive force. Fichte appropriates these two
forces from Kant and transforms them into
the mechanism of the subject: the expansive
force, the I (das Schrankenlose, das Ich), and
the contracting force, the not-I (das Schran-
kende, Nicht-ich) (Bloch 90). Schelling, for his
part, takes a third path, juxtaposing Kant and
Fichte, and resituating these two forces in the
identification of nature and spirit.
Indeed, the two forces that Schelling appro-
priates from Kant result in a dynamics which
cannot be described either as affirmation or
negation. Like Kant, Schelling sees matter as
the composition of attractive and repulsive
forces; however, unlike Kant, as well as other
mechanists, especially the physicist Georges-
Louis Le Sage (author of Essay on Mechanistic
Chemistry (1758)), Schelling is sceptical that
matter can be presupposed prior to force. In
the Ideas, he claims that “matter is nothing
else [ … ] than the product of an original syn-
thesis (of opposing forces) in intuition” (189).
Whereas Le Sage’s atomism sees matter as divis-
ible particles (163), Schelling asks at what point
division ends. Presupposing the existence of
particles is, for Schelling, merely the common-
sense way to understand nature, not the philoso-
phical way. Schelling’s counter-proposal is
speculative: he refuses the existence of individ-
ual particles as the foundation of matter, and,
instead, insists on nature as a genesis of
forces. When the two forces cancel each other
out, such that equilibrium is attained, then
there is just dead matter (148). This leads to
the question: if active and unbalanced forces
are no longer to be found in dead matter, how
can one explain the existence of such an object
before us? The answer must be: such dead
matter does not, because it cannot, exist in
visible nature. Here also lies Schelling’s critique
of Newton’s interpretation of gravitational
force: gravitational force is for Newton only
attraction, but Schelling argues, on the con-
trary, that it is not enough to deploy attraction
without repulsion; this is merely “a scientific
fiction” that reduces “the phenomenon as such
to laws without thereby intending to explain
it” (Borgmann 252).
 the parallax of individuation
Nevertheless, the two forces, negative and
positive, are equally not enough, for Schelling
goes on to introduce a third force: gravity
(Schwerkraft). Gravity is the force that contains
and unifies the two oppositional forces, and
brings the ideal into the real:
If Kant’s expansive and attractive forces (he
names “attractive” what we have called
“retarding” up to this point) represent
nothing other than the original opposition,
then he cannot complete the construction of
matter from two forces alone. He still
requires the third force which fixes the oppo-
sition, and which, according to us, is to be
sought in the universal striving toward indif-
ference, or in gravity. (First Outline 189)
Gravity is the unifying force, and yet it is not
simply one of many synthesizing forces but
the appearance of absolute identity, the indiffer-
ence between the material and the ideal
(Toscano 119). As a result, we need to bear in
mind that this indifference is not the cancella-
tion of all forces, nor is it the void; rather, it
is the full cohesion of the universal in the par-
ticular (like sand) or the particular in the univer-
sal (like liquid). The absolute identity expressed
in gravity does not concern being but the
ground of being itself. In the Darstellung, this
becomes even clearer in the relation between
gravity and light: the former stands as the
dark ground that escapes (entflieht) into the
night – the night in which lights first appears
(Sä mmtliche Werke IV: 163).
Such a physical-cum-metaphysical paradigm
for force is also to be found in the idea of an
organism. The emergence of life cannot be
explained merely by chemical operations,
though they are what give rise to the inorganic
nature that is necessary for organic nature
(and, indeed, Schelling admits that chemical
operations are the only graspable determinate
form (bestimmte Form) (Sä mmtliche Werke
II: 498)). In his discussion of the principle of
life, Schelling is responding to Johann Friedrich
Blumenbach’s concept of the Bildungstrieb
(driving force for formation), a concept at
stake, of course, in Kant’s third Critique
(Lenoir 79). Schelling’s critique of the
Bildungstrieb is that it alone cannot act as the
primary cause of life. The Bildungstrieb accord-
ing to Schelling is “only an expression [Aus-
druck] of every original unification of freedom
and lawfulness [Gesetzmä ßigkeit] in all for-
mations of nature, but not a fundamental expla-
nation [Erklä rungsgrund] of this unification
itself” (Weltseele 178). Let us reiterate the
above thesis: if Schelling rejects the Bildung-
strieb, it is because life demands both forces
and a third that is able to retain the contradic-
tion and strive for indifference. There are
many more fundamental principles of nature
which underlie the process of individuation.
These principles are not material, but abstract
principles that can be postulated in terms of
two opposing tendencies, namely unification as
the positive principle and differentiation as the
negative principle. In Von der Weltseele, Schel-
ling points out that Brown’s theory of animal
excitability (tierische Erregbarkeit) and powers
of excitation (erregende Potenzen) correspond
to the positive and negative principles of life.
It is in the First Outline that Schelling’s
deployment of the concept of the third is most
evident. The two opposing forces give rise to a
third which contains them. The clearest
example is the whirlpool. Imagine the pro-
ductive force like a running stream; when it
encounters an obstacle (e.g., a stone) it is hin-
dered, and a whirlpool is produced. However,
it is not one, stable whirlpool, for whirlpools
change constantly according to the axis of time
and the forces within the flow:
Every original product of nature is such a
whirlpool, every organism. The whirlpool is
not something immobilized, it is rather some-
thing constantly trans-forming – but repro-
duced anew at each moment. Thus no
product in nature is fixed, but it is re-pro-
duced at each instant through the force of
nature entire. (We do not really see the sub-
sistence of Nature’s products, just their con-
tinual being-reproduced.) Nature as a whole
co-operates in every product. (First
Outline 18)
The visual example of the whirlpool demon-
strates the becoming of the infinity of nature
82

and its manifestation in finite beings, and situ-
ates them in a system in which such finite
beings are carried along by the force of nature,
whether one of generation or of corruption.
The productive force of nature is not homo-
geneous, but rather can be seen in terms of a
multiplicity of fundamental qualities or
actants (24). The actants continuously deter-
mine the process of metamorphosis according
to the degree of the constituting forces:
crystal, leaf, human. In other words, the cohe-
sive force of nature does not proceed in one
direction, but is always a composite force
balanced by multiple actants, like Proteus:
The Proteus will draw all qualities into his
circle, gradually assimilating them, as infi-
nitely manifold as they may be, and, as it
were, throughout infinitely many attempts,
seek the proportion in which the universal
unification of all individual actants of
Nature in one collective product is attainable.
(38; emphasis mine)
The development of opposite sexes exemplifies
the movement of individuation from simple
organisms to complex ones. Schelling writes:
“The moment of acute individualization is
really the first moment of complete sexual devel-
opment, the complete separation of the
product” (40). Tilliette points out that in some
of Schelling’s marginal notes, probably written
after 1799, the development of opposing sexes
is something that nature hates, while also
being its inevitable destiny (Tilliette 127;
Sä mmtliche Werke III: 325n.). Here we see a
contradiction in this “last step towards indivi-
duation” (Tilliette 126). The contradiction
does not exist in the individual, but in the
species, of which individuals are merely instru-
ments. The individuals disappear while the
species remains (Tilliette 138; Sämmtliche
Werke III: 53–54). In the Introduction to the
First Outline, Schelling states:
Nature is the laziest of animals and curses
separation because it imposes upon it the
necessity of activity; Nature is active only
in order to rid itself of this compulsion.
The opposites must forever shun, in order
forever to seek each other; and forever seek,
83
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in order never to find each other; it is only
in this contradiction that the ground of all
the activity of Nature lies. (First Outline
231; see further Tilliette 127)
The foregoing is intended as an exposition of
the basic axiomatic of Schelling’s theory of indi-
viduation. It hinges largely on the contradiction
between two seemingly opposing forces, which
consequently results in the third that acts as a
container as well as a unifier. Individuation
occurs through the development of these two
forces: that which carries this opposition
marks its individuality. Individuation is the
process by which tensions and oppositions are
perpetually maintained through a dynamic
form that realizes the productive force of
nature. The unification of the infinite in the
finite, contingency in necessity, and unity in
multiplicity does not, however, result in a
static being. Nature does not stop at unification
but constantly returns to itself, destroying or
reconstructing the existing metastability.
With this notion of individuation from Schel-
ling in view, I can now return to Derrida’s dis-
cussion of transcendental stupidity. As we
have seen, it is here that readings of Schelling’s
and Simondon’s theories of individuation con-
verge. The reference to Schelling made by
Derrida is drawn from Deleuze’s reference to
Schelling in the “The Image of Thought”
chapter of Difference and Repetition. Here,
Deleuze writes: “Schelling wrote some splendid
pages on evil (stupidity and malevolence), its
source which is like the ground become auton-
omous (essentially related to individuation),
and on the entire history which follows from
this” (321). What does it mean for the ground
to become autonomous? It means that it
becomes detached from form. Citing Deleuze’s
claim that “animals are in a sense forewarned
against this ground, protected by their explicit
forms” (Deleuze 152), Derrida wonders about
the impetus behind this “vague” and “out of
focus” sentence that seemingly comes out of
nowhere. Derrida wonders, “Couldn’t we say
that man also has explicit forms that forewarn
him ‘in a sense’ against the ground, that is,
against stupidity?” (Derrida 51). Derrida’s
 the parallax of individuation
equation of stupidity and ground here is proble-
matic, for Deleuze – in the very next sentence of
Difference and Repetition, which Derrida
surely read but does not cite – already provides
a negative answer: “Stupidity is neither the
ground nor the individual” (Deleuze 152).
Deleuze continues further: “But rather this
relation in which individuation brings the
ground to the surface without being able to
give it form” (ibid.). This means that the
relation between ground and form is perverted,
such that the ground can no longer give form,
thought can no longer individuate; it rather dis-
individuates itself. It is not possible to under-
stand this, however, without a discussion of
Simondon’s theory of individuation.
individuation according to simondon
individuation as resolution of tensions
Simondon’s theory of individuation is broader
than Schelling’s, since, in addition to an expo-
sition on the individuation of physical and
living beings, Simondon also introduces a
theory of individuation for the psychical
being. This extension of individuation to psy-
chical beings emerged out of Simondon’s
reading of Jung’s theory of individuation and
also the emerging discipline of social psychol-
ogy, particularly Kurt Lewin’s and Jacob
Moreno’s work (Guchet 47). It is, of course,
not possible to compare Schelling and Simon-
don in respect to psychical and collective indivi-
duation, but it is, nevertheless, still possible
and valid to draw from Simondon’s theory an
axiomatic comparable to Schelling’s own. Like
Schelling, individuation in Simondon necess-
arily demands tensions. However, these ten-
sions are not necessarily oppositions, but they
rather arise out of an incompatibility within
the individual, and between the individual and
its milieu.
As I already remarked at the beginning of
this essay, there is a difference between the
role of the third in the process of individuation
for Simondon and for Schelling. For Schelling
the third acts as a “dynamic container” of ten-
sions between opposing forces and principles,
while for Simondon the third appears to
resolve these tensions – that is, it does not
carry them so much as it is the result of a dis-
charge of tensions. It is a resolution in the
sense that something metastable is produced
out of this process. The term “metastable”
that I have employed throughout is derived
from Simondon, and designates the fact that
individuation is a continuous process in which
the appearance of the individual can be seen as
achieving a transitional state, rather than
simple equilibrium. Equilibrium means only
death, since the being in question will have
already exhausted its potential. For this
reason, Simondon believes that the ancients
could not adequately describe individuation
since they knew only one form of equilibrium,
i.e., stable equilibrium, not metastable equili-
brium (ILFI 25). On the contrary, “metastable”
describes a transitional state through which the
individual as product is given to us, but further
individuation can take place when the individual
is stimulated by external information or by ener-
getic excitation from within. The passage from
individuation to metastability and from meta-
stability to further individuation is a process
that is determined by a dynamics modelled on
quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics opens a way to a new
metaphysics in the twentieth century, as is evi-
denced in the works of Gaston Bachelard.
From his reading of Bachelard, Simondon
developed a new theory of individuation distin-
guished from the model of individuation based
on classical mechanics and the theory of organ-
ism. In quantum mechanics, energy is discrete
instead of continuous: when the electron
moves from one energy level to another, it
acquires a fixed amount of energy, without
which it would not stay at the same energy
level. When energy is added to the electron,
e.g., by being hit by a photon, it can be
excited to move to another energy level. Indivi-
duation, according to Simondon, is like the
process in which a quantum leap is produced.
However, instead of a simple change in energy
level, in the individuation process the being
in question undergoes a transformation that
leads to different phases of individuation:
84

destructuration, restructuration and the arrival
of a new metastable status.
Like Schelling’s natura naturans that desig-
nates the infinite productive force of nature,
for Simondon nature is the a priori of individua-
tion, providing a pre-individual reality to the
individual. Individuation always departs from
the pre-individual, namely a reality given to
and carried by the individual as potentiality.
Individuation never exhausts this pre-individual
reality; instead, it is conserved in the individu-
ated being and becomes the primary condition
for future individuations. Simondon claims to
have learned this from the Ionian natural philo-
sophers, especially from Anaximander’s notion
of apeiron. In my earlier discussion of Schelling,
I have already shown how this apeiron is
inscribed in the peras and how both together
constitute the dynamic of the individual. In
Simondon’s account, however, the apeiron
takes the form of potentiality, rather than move-
ment, as the condition of all individuations. It is
more than unity as well as more than identity
(ILFI 25); or, it is the hidden excess:
This pre-individual reality that the individual
carries within it could be named nature,
thereby rediscovering in the word “nature”
the meaning that the pre-Socratic philoso-
phers gave it: the Ionian physiologists
found in it the origin of all species of being
prior to individuation; nature is the reality
of the possible, a species of that ἄπειρον
out of which all individuated forms emerge,
according to Anaximander: Nature is not
the opposite of man, but the first phase of
being, the second phase being the opposition
of the individual and the milieu. (ILFI 297)
The pre-individual is part of the ground that
gives form. That which gives energy is not the
forms but rather the ground which carries
forms. The ground is the system of virtualities,
potentialities and forces, while form is the
system of actualities (Du mode d’existence des
objets techniques (MEOT) 72). When the
ground–figure relation is subverted or per-
verted, bêtise emerges as a loss of form, and
this is because the ground is not able to give
rise to it. This ground–form relation can be
85
hui
ideally observed in the process of crystallization,
Simondon’s favourite illustration of individua-
tion. When heat energy is added to a supersatu-
rated solution, it starts to crystallize and when
ions are structured as germs, they release
energy that extends to other parts and triggers
more crystallizations. Here we see two phenom-
ena: firstly, the process of amplification, i.e., the
transmission of germs is speeded up because of
the energy released during crystallization and,
secondly, there are tensions created between
ions, as crystallization becomes the means of
resolving tensions in order to achieve a meta-
stable status.
Transduction is to be understood as a phys-
ical, biological, mental, social operation, by
which an activity spreads further and
further into the interiority of a domain,
while grounding this propagation in a struc-
turation of domain that operates in specific
places: each region of the constituted struc-
ture serves as principle of constitution for
the subsequent region, with the result that
a modification extends just as progressively
as this simultaneous structuring operation.
A crystal – growing and extending from a
very small germ in all directions in its
water-mother – provides the simplest image
of a transductive operation: each molecular
layer that is already constituted serves as
the structuring base of the layer that is in
the process of being formed; the result is an
amplifying reticular structure. Transductive
operation is an individuation in progress.
(ILFI 32–33)
Unlike Schelling’s examples of magnetism,
electricity and chemistry, which are based on
the conceptualization of forces, Simondon
finds subtler categories in quantum mechanics
and psychology, which are operative through
tensions at the microscopic level. Matter in
Schelling’s era, as we have seen already, is con-
sidered to be a product of the dynamics of
forces; matter in Simondon’s era is understood
as energetic and informational being. Hence,
in the latter, force is no longer an explanatory
category. The question yet to be answered is:
whence comes the concept of information and
what is its role in the process of individuation?
 the parallax of individuation
the concept of information in
individuation
Simondon’s concept of information is grounded
in early cybernetics (associated with names such
as Claude Shannon, Norbert Wiener, etc.), in
which information is to be associated with prob-
ability or more general calculable entities
(Barthélémy, Simondon; Hui). Simondon aims
to reconceptualize this notion of information
in order to explain individuation. In his view,
ancient philosophical models of individuation
such as substantialism and hylomorphism are
insufficient and even become obstacles to under-
standing individuation. New paradigms place
not only the previous scientific paradigms but
also ancient philosophical models into question.
Simondon launched a series of critiques against
the erection of form as the cause of individua-
tion in Aristotelian hylomorphism:
The pure notion of form should be saved
twice from a technological paradigm that is
too basic: firstly in relation to ancient
culture because of the reductive use that is
made of it in the hylomorphic schema; and
secondly, in modern culture, in order to
save the notion of information as signification
from the technological theory of infor-
mation. (ILFI 35)
Simondon therefore sees an unfinished pro-
gression in the transition from hylomorphism
to Gestalt theory to information theory. The
theory of hylomorphism approaches the idea
of an individual as if it were a composition of
form and of matter, as demonstrated in the
moulding of a brick. Such a conception cannot
think real genesis, and therefore it cannot recon-
cile being and becoming. It is not the unification
of matter and form that gives us the brick but
rather the brick is offered through an operation
that is much richer than the concepts of form or
matter can countenance. The reason why hylo-
morphism cannot explain individuation is
firstly because form is an already individuated
being and secondly because the clay is already
pre-formed in the artisan’s preparations. Form
and matter can be understood as a game of
forces, but this cannot account for individuation
either. Instead, individuation should be under-
stood as an informational operation which
involves complex informational processes, e.g.,
between the gains of the clay, the hands of the
worker, the clay and the walls of the mould,
etc. All these informational processes produce
“internal resonance” under the condition of
high temperature, and give rise to the individu-
ated brick.
Between classical hylomorphism and infor-
mation theory there is also a reinvention of the
notion of form in Gestalt psychology. For
Simondon, the concept of Gestalt enables an
explanation of individuation through the
notion of “good form.” The good form is the
form that seems the most stable and the one
which has attained the greatest degree of equili-
brium. Gestalt theory constitutes progress in
comparison with hylomorphism, but it too
remains insufficient to explain individuation,
since it always presupposes an equilibrium
where individuation stops. The notion of
“good form” presupposes stable structures and
equilibriums without taking into account ten-
sions prior to their formation. Let us take an
example of the formation of images on the
retina. Before perceiving the unity of an image
there are disparations between the retinal
images and what is compatible with them that
need to be resolved.2 These disparations are ten-
sions that finally lead to a resolution. The
relation between form and information can
thus be expressed as follows: “Information is
neither form nor the ensemble of forms; it is
the variability of forms, the contribution of a
variation in relation to a form” (MEOT 190).
This allows us to understand the very title of
Simondon’s L’Individuation à la lumière des
notions de forme et d’information. What is
articulated here is the search for a theory of indi-
viduation that Gestalt psychology and cyber-
netic information theory have failed to
provide. Simondon defines the individual as a
result of the encounter of three conditions: the
energetic condition, the material condition and
the informational condition, which is generally
non-immanent (ILFI 79). The informational
condition is what allows the resolution of the
tension between the material condition and the
86

energetic condition. Let us consider the simple
case of crystallization: it is not the result of an
encounter between brute matter (which does
not really exist in any case) and an arbitrary
form, but it results from an operation that
expands throughout the milieu by structuring
layer onto layer, and so by resolving the tensions
between the relative configuration of molecules
and the energetic conditions of a superior
order. Hylomorphism has no place in this
process. Simondon writes:
Would it be possible to appeal to a theory of
information to enrich and correct the notion
of form in Gestalt theory? Would it be poss-
ible to appeal to the theory of Shannon,
Fischer, Hartley and Norbert Wiener?
What all these authors who have founded
information theory have in common is that,
for them, information corresponds to an
inverse of probability. (548)
What Simondon wants to say is, firstly, that for
the cyberneticians mentioned above infor-
mation is a notion derived from the technologies
of communication that describes a relation
between an emitter and a receiver. The trans-
mission of information depends on the
reliability of the channel of communication.
Secondly, information is a quantity that can be
measured in terms of a logarithm, i.e., it is
quantifiable. We know that, contrary to what
Simondon affirms, information defined by
Wiener and information defined by Shannon
have opposing signs. For Wiener, information
is a measure of the degree of organization in
opposition to entropy (which measures the
degree of disorganization), i.e., information is
negentropic. For Shannon, on the contrary,
information is the measure of the degree of
incertitude, which is normally reduced by
redundancy.3 To put it another way, Simondon
wants to develop a theory of information that is
more general and more fundamental and thus
capable of explaining the becoming of individ-
uals in the most heterogeneous regimes:
One cannot accept the information theory
from the domain of social psychology
without modification, because in this
87
hui
domain it should be possible to specify some-
thing that permits the qualification of the
best form as that which possesses the
highest degree of information, and this
cannot be done from the negentropic
schema, from mere probability research. In
other words, it is necessary to import a
non-probabilistic term into information
theory. Perhaps it would be possible – and
this is the point of departure for the thesis
I want to present – to speak of a quality of
information, or a tension of information.
(ILFI 549)
The relation of an individual to its exterior
milieu is two-fold: it is simultaneously the
nature natured, the product of individuation
and the nature naturing (263). This is because
the individuated being does not exhaust its
pre-individual reality; rather, it contains it
always, and so forever has the potential for
further individuation. This view is compatible
with Schelling’s and illustrates the partial Spi-
nozism of both philosophers. Simondon’s
model, like that of Schelling, resists dualism
while at the same time refusing recourse to
any extremities or to reductionism for a com-
plete explanation. Whereas Schelling attempts
to reconcile idealism with realism, Simondon
refuses both a transcendental and immanent
explanation (ibid.), instead offering what
Deleuze later termed a transcendental empiri-
cism. The dualism of transcendental–immanent
is founded on the separation of mind and body
as two totally distinct activities, or more pre-
cisely the spiritualization of mind and the psy-
chosomatization of body. Here we must
remind ourselves again of the difference
between individualization and individuation in
Simondon. Individualization concerns somatic
specialization and psychical schematization,
which is continuous and normally takes place
slowly over time. Individuation can only
happen in the form of a quantum leap, when
enough energy is accumulated to break the
threshold.
For Simondon, the individualization of sexu-
ality plays a different role than it does for Schel-
ling. As we have seen above, for Schelling “the
moment of acute individualization is really the
 the parallax of individuation
first moment of complete sexual development.”
Schelling did not advance beyond a concern for
metamorphosis, while Simondon delves further
into ontogenesis with his distinction between
individuation and individualization, precisely
because he was also influenced by Jungian psy-
choanalysis. Sexuality is not presented as the
contradiction of nature, but rather it becomes
part of nature:
There are innate structures and psychoso-
matic dynamisms that constitute a mediation
between the natural (pre-individual phase)
and individuality. Sexuality is one such
[structure]; in a sense, one could say that
the fact that individuals are sexed forms
part of individuation; and in fact sexuality
could not exist if the psychosomatic distinc-
tion of individuals did not exist; however,
sexuality does not belong to the individual,
it is not the individual’s property, and it
necessitates a couple to gain a signification.
(ILFI 299)
Sexuality is what mediates between individuali-
zation and individuation. Sexuality for the indi-
vidual is the psychosomatic immanence of the
pre-individual. That is, sexuality is at the same
time a product of individualization as well as
the passage between the pre-individual nature
and the individuated being. It is with such a
notion of sexuality that Simondon can further
develop Jungian psychoanalysis to describe the
third type of individuation, to which Schelling
had no access, namely psychic and collective
individuation.
conclusion
The approaches to individuation found in the
early Schelling and in Simondon resonate with
each other. Both operate with a similar axio-
matic that describes a base of tensions and oppo-
sitions in expectation of the third, which is able
to preserve and affirm identity. In such a form,
which we can broadly call “dialectical,” the way
tensions are expressed, the form that carries
metastability and the nature of the third all
characterize the singularity of their philosophi-
cal thinking. In the case of Schelling, such a
singularity corresponds to recursive force and
in the case of Simondon, to the signification of
information.
There is then a parallax of individuation in
Schelling and Simondon – one which illustrates
the extent to which their metaphysical thinking
re-appropriates the scientific discoveries of
their time. The value of reading these two thin-
kers in tandem lies in its contribution to a
form of true “interdisciplinarity” that is not
exactly a “history of science” but rather a philo-
sophical thinking that looks for new alliances in
external fields of science and thus desires to
individuate itself repeatedly in accordance with
its constantly changing milieu.
To articulate a philosophy of
nature today, it is our task to
address the question of individua-
tion and the concept of nature
with new epistemological lenses.
disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by
the author.
notes
The author would like to thank Louis Morelle for
many long discussions on this subject.
1 Notably, Jean-Hugues Barthélémy’s Penser l’indi-
viduation. Simondon et la philosophie de la nature
and Pierre Montebello’s recent book Métaphysi-
ques cosmomorphes. La Fin du monde humain.
2 Simondon uses the word “disparation” to
describe incompatibility within the individuating
being, as in the case of retinal images. Following
other commentators on Simondon (Andrea
Bardin; Alberto Toscano), I leave “disparation”
untranslated.
3 This difference has led to two different points of
view in contemporary research on information, as
Giuseppe Longo and others have shown: on the
one hand, Shannon–Brillouin emphasize the trans-
mission of information, while, on the other hand,
Turing–Kolmogorov–Chaitin focus on
programmation.
88

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Yuk Hui
ICAM
Leuphana University
Scharnhorststraße 1
21335 Lü neburg
Germany
E-mail: yuk.hui@leuphana.de