:

New
Philosophy
of Social
Science
Problems of Indeterminacy

James Bohman

The MIT Press

Cambridge, Massachusetts
 Pr e face

various institutions and individuais. I would like to thank the

Alexander von Humboídt-Stiftung for a research grant that helped
bring the work to completion. I would also like to thank St. Louis
University both for several summer research grants and for a
course reduction to give me time to complete the work. A Summer Introduction
Institute sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humani-
ties entitled "Interpretation and the Human Sciences" helped to Post-Empiricism, Indeterminacy,
clarify many of the issues discussed here. I would like to thank its
directors, Bert Dreyfus and David Hoy, as well as ali the partici-
and the Social Sciences
pants for their lively discussion. Many people too numerous to
mention have helped as well. I would especially like to thank
Júrgen Habermas and Thomas McCarthy for their criticisms and In sociology we have, up until now, no clear trend of hypotheses.
advice. I would also like to thank Michael Barber for reading Otto Neurath, Foundations of the Social Sciences
several drafts, William Charron for his assistance in the sections
on rational choice theory, Paul Roth for his criticisms of the When these philosophers and their principies each had their day, and
the íatter were found inadequate to generate the nature of things, it was
section on interpretation, and Bill Caspary for reading parts of the once again necessary to inquire into the next kínd of cause.
manuscript. Ali of them made many helpful suggestions. Aristotle, Metaphysics
Most of ali, I want to thank Gretchen Arnold for her support,
companionship, criticism, editorial advice and just about everything
The quotations above represent two different reactions to a certain
else. I dedicate the book to her.
type of discipíinary perplexity. In the first statement, Neurath was
waiting for a unifying trend in sociology that would end its imma-
turity and put it on the secure path of cumulative growth. In the
second passage, Aristotle described the development of natural
philosophy in his day as discontinuous; his lesson was not to seek
unity but instead to multiply the meanings of the explanatory
term, "cause," which provides the answer to any "why" question.
Neurath was, of course, a member of the Vienna Circle and a
positivist. Aristotle opppsed the Platonic unification of the sciences
and wasjnjy[fejí_a_r^
^passage. In this book, I will follow the second rather than the first
strategy and argue thatjnejl:^^ should
fej^Í2££â^"^^^^È^^SISI^^^EI^3ISffiB^^SIp^"
tice oFThe social sciences. ~ *"
IrTthè begínning of that history, the social sciences were not as
epistemologically perpíexing to philosophers as they were to
Neurath. In_j^y_mode£mty^,^hjm^ and engineers
hoped that the social sciences .could, spjye.,emerging,_spciãl^problenB;
few~dõuÍ5te3~tríe character of knowledge they produced. The
_ , . .
day: Hpbbes,
_^ —J——•*"•"- , ,._,^rr>,
saw classicaf
"' — -i—*-,^^--..
mechanics
v,^_ *= -.-«=•—•"* •""
as supplyine
i i j u
the .r/prooer
ir ~
rabstractive" method, wnile nu^heim preferred the holistic fea-
tures of biology. This assumptíon óf a unity of method in the
 Introduction
sciences, however, later proved to be the source of both hope and
despair about the social sciences. Pri_jçhe__pne1^hand,...-refonriers
p|aced , hope in .the ..ability... qf technical knowledge to—aolxie
rjrpWerns. Critiçs,^ pn, the..othe_r__hand, saw such knowledge__as
turning people into objects qf control by experts and arguedjpr
a model of social science that vieweH beings as self-interpreting,
autòhomqus subjects. This dispute about the methods and pur-
poses of social science gave rise to nineteenth century debates
about some essential distinction between the natural and human
sciences, the Natur- and the Geisteswissenschaften. Frpjna,,lhis_disc
Jj£.5CÍejice,followed a host of other
subject matter
in method, between explana-
tipjtt^andjunderstanding; in domam, between objects ajid subjects,
or namre.,,.and,,,culture; in purppsç, between technical contrpl™ãnd
increased^ understanding. Even the opponents ofTKe naturaTistic
conception of social science accepted it as accurate for the parts of
science they rejected as models for the human sciences. In any
case, both sides of the debate - the
approacKes on tKe rjife"riand_antl the hennejieutic_apprqaghej_gn
|tf^pJ^f^^fíou1asKè^~irr"the (heydayj of methods. Each was sure
that its metho^s"Tíãd"TrTe"""dístÍfíc"tivé 'feãtufeTlriat were to define
their privileged place in producing the proper knowledge for the
study of human beings.
Though the philqsqphical debate continued ali the while natural-
ism prevaiíed in scientific institutíoris, itjoÕk on new Hf e in the
lafe~T9fTOs and early"T?7Us~as™frTe~swqng and essentialistic distinc-
*> (•• tirínT''berwe^^K:pna:n"ãjI3 natural science began to "BfeaTc^dowrTror
different reasons.1 Surprisin~gly7'pèTha^^^^^
from""'the'""side^of the natural sciences, in the challenges to the
"received vie^""'''ÒT"nã"ruralisnT~by 'põst-empiricist philosophers of
science like Thomas Kuhn^Mary Hesse and Paul Feyera bend.2 The
Standard list of^"Ò1ntHsts"betweên tEi^natural ancrhumanT sciences
had ali derived from a positiyíst and empiricist view oJLs_cJejitific
perience; the idejl^pfj^niypcjilj.a^
'data "ffom theoretical interpretatipji; the belief in the universality
Tríowledge and criteria fõr~tHêqry cHciíce.^fter
riese vièws;"and""the cíistinctions that upheld them
collapsed. With the rejection pf pqsitivism and its__thesis__QLthe
"unity of mefrlõcí^" many of the historie reasons for defending^_the
n "'between the"sciences have simply dísappeared.
Newer versions"õf"the mèfHòdõlõgicardrstinctiveness of the humari
Introduction
like those of TaylQi and Dje^vius, have_rnore t£___d_0MWÍth
moral and politicai issiSTt^n^^KLe.riisteiiioiagirfil ?ind-.sdfi.Qt.ific,
qnès?JSgar3Tess of how much such attempts contribute to our
understanding of politics and morais, they do not contribute much
to a post-empiricist understanding of the social sciences, or to
clarifying the moral and poíitical purposes of natural science.
In many respects, post^ejrnpiricisin.hás jemoved the social
scien^êT^frarrríKelF contentíous and peripheral^ status an3 placed
tííeín^ífectí^in^tHè "center of some new epistemological debates.
In òné súcH "defcate, theJ2IÔld_l^icJ!_^jQi£^sj;jenc£^^_^^
in HempePs deductive-nomoíogicai reconstruction of ali adequate
el^ãliâííolnsTTrrTight" of this' re^constructiÔn^^Hempel tEougííf he
"coul3"sKow why some expíanations Ín the social sciences, sucli as
functionalism, fail and why other cases are successfuí, including
"rational explanations" using "laws" of utility maximization (dis-
cussed in chapter l below). In_place of such highly idealized..and
ahistprical reconstructions, post-empiricism hás turned to the ac-
tual practices aní histories . qf yaripus sciences. TEis " histÓficãl
approacE"has íed to an anti^essentialistjview_pf __what counts^ as
scientific know]^dge^on^_tjiat_denies,jhjtma
riecessary set of features^gualifies a practice to be scientific^^qr an
explarTátion to be ^ae^uate^^íhis historicisjn^and anti-essentialism
dírects^post-empiricism to local and situational features of scientific
practices. Such features are often sociological, as can be seen by
the first _rn.aJOT j>pst-empincist_wqrk, Thomas Kuhn's Stmcture of
Scientific E^olutions^ ---^..^.. . «i.._,.^-,-
In-this^woTk; "Xuhn described the history pf science Ín terms of
long peripds of "'normal... science".._at .wprk pn probíem^golying
wíthin a "paradigm," punctuated py revplutipnary peripds pf theory
charígeTÃs opposed to HempePs account of singfe explanations or
tKe empiricist appeal to privileged representations,-pgst^em£Íricisrn
places_thepries and disciplines in larger ^oçial.^and^^jn^orical con-
texts Ín wKícn tíiey are appíied, change.and^deyelgp^ Imre Lakatõs
cã^lled" tHeseTarger units "research programmes" and judged their
success pragmaticaíly, in terms of whether or not they were
"fruitfully" solving problems or "degenerating" into ad boc defenses
of core hypotheses. Such a contrast Between ^degenerating;_ and
fruitfuí research programs signaled one of the first post-empiricist"
"atfémpt?T6"reiritroclucé' nòrmàtive and rational criteria for deciding
be~tween ÔÕmpêting" fHèories and visions of scientific practice. Still,
it^is' fíofaltògètKér clear that science ever developed in this way,
raising questíons about "rationality and reíatiyism" that have raged
oF science since Kuhn.4
 Introduction
In these debates, two problems emerged that were related to his-
toricism and anti-essentialism. First, with larger units like theories
and paradigms, the problem of incommensurability concerns just
how local and contextuai our descriptions of scientific practice
should be; if they are too local, then no comparison and evaluation
seem possible. Does^tjjjE^umJ^^
mological jujdgments jnerelyJgcalPJSecond, anti-essentialism further
undermines the possibility of rethinking the normative component
of rational reconstruction. Does the lack of a definhe list of uni-
versal^ features of explanatiori Ó r ~ scientific knowledge malceTt
ímpossiBle to^disfiríguish 'berween better^and wõrs_e explanatións?
Thé~ main um-esblved" píoBlem of post-empiricism hás therefòre
been how"'to"Hefive jta^ Jar^s for Jhe comparison and evaluation
of compéTmg^j^anati9^âMj^
back" irifo an 'ãhistorical and essentialist epistemology.
In the "old" philosophy of science, such questions concerned
claims about the objectivity of science and could be settled by sure
appeals to methodological standards of deductive reasoning and
empirical proof. Under post-empiricist_assumptions, obiectivíty now
concerns the choice^oif a j:e^ea^cj^_progr_ajn^n^_ ofj.ts standards
of eyaluatíon, _which can be^ je^efi__Qnly_Jiy_ap^e_alingTõ^^Eí^r
forras )f Hiejrêticj^ As Habermas
póints out, "The approval of a procedure or the acceptance of a
norm can be supported or weakened by argument; it can at least
be rationally assessed.... This is precisely the task of criticai
theoretical thought."5
The analyses in this book attempt to fulfill the task of develop-
ing fornis of rational assessment for the explanatory power of
theories produced by various ongoing research programs: jational
chpice, ethnomethodology, interpretiye spciaLscience, and the theory
of communicatiye action. I have chosen these particular theories
becaúsé~òf tKeir continuing fruitfulness and the range of explanations
that have been produced by them; they also lend themselves to
inter-theoretical comparison, sharing certain minimal assumptions
about knowledgeable social actors and their capacity to generate
and maintain social life. Each^begins with the problem of actipn
and tj.kes_the_intentional perspective of actors to be a necessary
ingredient ofjjood social science explanation, while dijffering sig-
nifí£antly.^apgut what reajujnsjmd^bj^
an explanatory role.
The book stárts~with problems of the theory of action as con-
ceived by the "old" logic of explanatíon. I will criticize HemgeTs
and Parsons' attempts to determine general and necessary Jeatur.es
íntroduction
of rational and social acfiQp.., Then, I will attempt to reconstruct
the forms of explanation that are typical in specific research
programs and compare them on amsjgiLÍfiçajLL.4s5ue_.in
theory:_the,..esplana.toj.y lmp,Qr.tançeJ,oL.,r.ules,,and...norrns.
Hempei-and..Pai:spns _did not^succeed. in_,discpvering universal
features and law^ ofjiU _socjal__agtiqn,. Jj:, is possible, to. do _a _ more
KSto^any^oriented rational reconstruction of a specific research
program; in doing só, it becpmes possible to assess the structurè
an'â scope of explanations within it. The rèsúlt òf such a recon-
struction is what I wiíí call ari gxplanatpry ^pattern: a Hst__gf
statements that^rejoecessary^^s^^^S^^^^^^^^^^^^^~
tioíT"wTtrIm a certain research program. These conditions can be
used as a Standard or norm: explanations which lack one or more
of such statements or premises are incomplete and hence inadequate.
iSá^JKB^-^íáL^ 4i?c9.Y?r^ Í/
éxamining; ngt_only, the_.w_ritings jof_m^or^eprists_in^each_ program,
b'úT""ãlso by looking at paradigmatic cases of goqd expíanation
tãken ff oiti i¥s research practice. I view these patterns not só much
as~ngÕrÕuTTÕgicãl mferences but more as Kuhnian exemplars: they
are "paradigmatic" ..cases^that, exhibit^the^general.. features of an
adequate and complete explanation of a certain type (chapter 2).6
Similar patterns can be reconstructed for functionalist and macro-
structural explanations (chapter 4) and for criticai social science
(chapter 5), although exemplars of explanations of these latter
types are not confined to particular research programs. Asjexem-
plars, these £attecns_repies,e,nt_-th.e d^stiJUation of successful cases
w^cH_íorm_.th.e,Jlc.oj£.".._o.f. jthe program a.nd can then be_extended
to include^ other_sorts of cases, sp long as they have similar
fèatuféV.7 This process of extension can also show the limits of the
research program, as, for example, in the consistent application of
the core case of rational choice theory, maximizing behavior; while
many activities fit the pattern surprisingly well, many more obvi-
ous cases of rational action, such as voting, do not fit it at ali.
OB£_J9Í^^-KJMary__benefits_ of these_ recon^rj^ion^_is_that_they
provide a form of reflection that is neither general nor local.
Accõfdihg to the view of explanation" developed in this book,
wherever there is such a_ reconstructible pattern, standards of
adequacy can be established._Such a methQd^ of _ ^ddk-range
reconstrctótiori is nonetheless post^enipiricist, since it sees tíTe role
oFtEe philosophy.,pf social science to be reflection upon scientific
practice, which is itself varied, self-réflèctivè ãnS'normafíveJ?!^
"XTnè""sBFfeTlecfiveãspec£olànylsBem^
dífferent explanations of the same phenomenon by rival theories.
 Introduction
In the social sciences, this feature is _pjjticjj]ar[y_acc£ritualed, since
there are many~ competing theoretical orientaúons (djie_jnojCÊ_QÍtm
l| to fashiolTHãir^n7tning^else}7 If we accept with post-empiricism
thaf ^êr<PàTé~no invariant fêatures of explanations and theories,
how can we judge between them? Is this possible at ali, if the
theories do not agree even. about the goals of social science? Thç
theories discussed here do agree that the social sciences shouldj^e
empirical in the broad sense of being verified_. pr falsified by_eyi-
dence. But in the absence of neutral description., establishing the
^iata and explaining triem often go hand in hand, as Dqnalc^
Dãvidsón rias põinted out for tnténttonãréxplanations.9 Rather than
implying a lack of critena,_s_uch circularity presents the problem pf
too many criteria, none of which are determining ,or.. definitive. In
íight of such problems of evidence, post-inodern skeptics abandon
the search for even weak standards ^s_"BeirTg só much fruitless
metatKêõnztng""abÕut""locar "and indeterrninate^j)hencimenar10
~My"líf gumerir is* thãt" sucrTskepticism is unfounded, even if we
accept that there may not be a lot that we can say about "science"
in general that wilí resolve the problem. Theories can still__be
judged in terms of the jariouspurppses^ tKéy_ aypw,3õííen__jn
coTmn15n"~w]BriDtner theories. In chapter 5, í argue that any ex-
planatory pãttern can be employecl for the purpose of~sõcjal
criticism. However, not a^l^íjherri are pltr^^^rlJIsmt^^JS
purpose, nor are the"y" ali sufficiently reíTectiye. Jon Elster hás
proposed two general criteria of theÓreticaí adequacy in the social
sciences relative to the purpose of prediction: theories may be
inadequate or indeterminate. Whereas a theory is inadequate when
its theories fail, it is indeterminate "when and to the extent to
which it fails to yield unique predictions."11 Elster admits that a
theory hás explanatory power even if it is not fully determinate;
determinacy is, however, a proper evaluative feature of explanations.
But not ali theories can be evaluated relative to the purpose of
prediction, even in the natural sciences. Like HempePs recon-
structions, Elster presupposes too strong a connection between
explanation and prediction, one which would fail to obtain for
just about every theory in the social sciences. Even the weaker
criterion of determinateness does not decide between very many
theories. The social sciences arejndeed "sciences ofjndeterminacyj5
whose theonês do_npXSu_cc^S..l>y.pxej^clmg..unique-and.,determinate
õútcõrnesT^My hypothesís is that even on post-empiricist assump-
'nõnTTris possible to show how Jndeterminacy excludes neither
rigorous fHeonzmg nor the search for evidence. Tlíe"prÕpef"form
of'explanátiòri in"the" social sciences is both non-reductiõníst and
Introduction
non-determim'st^tr^tmg^henpmena that jire npt_ only_ diyerse ,arid
irregular, but intentional and cprnplex^ The main problem of this
boolTírfoThow Eow explanatory rigor is possible without necessiry
or determinacy.
Since predictive success requires determinacy, empiricist phil-
osophy of social science hás long tried to discover general laws
and powerful formal models. After reconstructing Hempel's account
of rational explanation as a form of causal explanation, in chapter l
I will..show the failurepf,._all. such attempts to, make reasons into
determinate causes, including notions of tKé"Tritèrhalizãtiõh" of
riòrnis" in Parsons'..thepry .pf_..social order and explanations of
sci'«iBfic_beliefs in the so-cailed "strong programme" in the sociòlogy
of science. Both try to overcome the indeterminate character of
'mtentiohs^and beliefs through various ideas of causality; social
causality becomes either pverfy.singular or ill-defined; it is either
the basic mechanism for the social integration of action ("inter-
nalized norms"), òf it is"seén as some""general iníluence of society
that operates independentíy from the content Õf tKé^actors' beliefs
("interests"). With the failure of both these strategies to replace
intentional determinacy, I will turn to explanations which take the
indeterminacy of intentional social action as their starting point
and build into their patterns of explanation ways in which inde-
terminacy is recognized and rigorously explained.
The expíanation of social action is a convenient starting point
for a post-empiricist philosophy of social science, not only because
of íts indeterminacy but because it is the starting point for the
research programs examined in this book. Ali these programs hold
that actions are doubly indeterminate: they are performed by re-
flective and khowledgeablejacfõrs in ínteraction with othèr reflec-
"tTve and knowledgeable social actors. If this is true, explanations
ofrãçti'on
^í***—" '---•-- do "not fail í.predictively
- - * r ,because
- —' -their
—^-..,- . -r theoretical
-,- .. _ _
L _._ .^. laws
_ . or
J i i§
models are weak, but for the opposite reaspn: the rigidity of their
explanatory premises fixes agents' purppses and goak, making
tKemjnto "judgmental dopes", or "rational fools," to borrow apt
characterizations of the failures of Parsonian sociòlogy and rational
choice theories. Indeed, the very identification of an intentional
action is indeterrmnate, ~as"cán~"be~séen irí "Ryle^s "discUssion of the
oíííêrêncès between a twitch and a wink.12 Agents' own self-de-
scriptions enter in,_b_ut there are_^lsp acts tha_f"must be ícTentified"
ás such by others,^ like insults.._ànd.warnings. Whiie Dãvidsón hás
argiied that this indeterminacy establishes that we must use the
same means to interpret ourselves as we would the most distant
culture, it surely also means that actions are open to multiple
-• -
8 Introduction
interpretations, contextuai variations andjforms_^o£^faijure. Each
research program tries to build in interpretive_and,, -.contextuai
comgpn.ents,4ntegrating interpretive iníleterrninacy into a .the.or.gEÍÊal
framework tKât makes it comprehensible. In this sense, too^such
t^iSsilS
planatory understanding"^3 and escape the old dichotomies of the
natuf aí" anH the human sciences^TCe Hybli^^ tHeõne,s...Jiince^EBí:
a^2Kd"ajtemrjteá. These explanations are evidence that the old
dichotomies no longer serve any methodoíogical purpose but only
help to obscure the indeterminacy of social phenomena in two
opposite ways: by denying it, as do the natural science models; or
making it into an insuperable limit on explanation, as do traditional
human sciences.
Problems of indeterminacy arise in quite diverse contexts, and
the chapter headings denote one such context, each with its own
form of indeterminacy: causaíity, rules, interpretation, the micro-
macro link, and social criticism. I regard these traditional catego-
res _ _ _ _
^ to .solve: to Hiscoyer anH explaín regularíties in
^^ to understand common frames^ofj^renc^aiic^ ^xpecta-
tions, to understand trjongsjrom jm agentes £ojnt^pf yj6^ to g^Ilp
phenomena. píj^a^e^sco^e^nH^scale, and to critkizj^._SeiLefs_and
structures_in a society. Because tlíe research programs examined
rlere are aíl comprehensive, their styles of explanation have been
employed for ali of these purposes. Each chapter begins by devel-
oping alternative theoretical approaches to these problems and
then turns to case studies that illuminate the fundamental difficul-
ties in resolving each type of indeterminacy. As opposed to many
other books in the phiíosophy of social science, my case studies
are taken primarily from actual explanations, most of them from
sociology, and are meant to contrast successes with failures. While
many of my discussions are criticai, each chapter includes a suc-
cess story of an actual explanation which is adequate to the
various purposes of social science. In the rest of the introduction,
I wiil give a general indication of the problems and results of
each chapter. If the reader does not wish a summary without the
accompanying argumentation, she may go ahead to the discussion
of the concept of indeterminacy that closes the introduction.
Chapter l takes up problems of causaíity related to explanations
of social action. No causal account offered só far yields anythirig
like predictions: causal theories are neither adequate with respect
to the diversity of social actions, nor true with respect to their
general laws. Reasons cannot be determinate causes that would
Introduction 9
fulfill the requirements for adequate causal explanation in my two
case studies in this chapter: (í) Durkheim's explanations of the
reíation between collective moral beliefs and suicide rates and (2)
the explanations of scientific beliefs in the strong programme,
in particular Paul Forman's analysis of the influence of Weimar
culture on quantum physics. Once the assumption of causal
determinacy is abandoned, successful explanations can appeal to
mechanisms which specify how the context in which social action
occurs influences practices of belíef formation.
The various explanatory patterns developed in chapter 2 result
from abandoning the methodoíogical assumptions of determinacy
and generality; each theoretical approach develops core cases of
explanations based on distinct features of social action: choice
under constraint (rational choice theory), reílective accountability
to other actors (ethnomethodology), and communicative interaction
(the theory of communicative action}. In light of these patterns for
explaining action, different forms of indeterminacy with regard to
rufes and rule following can be addressed: frequent exceptions and
free rider problems in choice situations constrained by sanctions;
•the indeterminacy in the elaborative and ad boc application and
employment of rules; and the failure of an action to fulfill norma-
tive expectations. My yiewjsj:hatrule fQnowing,dQes,Apt..cpnstitute
the basis_for a distinct approach in the social sciences, but makes
séns<s only_ in^the ^
foÍlowing_and ._use._ rules-,as-explanatory.._terms. _ By employing the
rêsources of each pattern, this indeterminacy does not excíude the
possibility of both explaining rules and using rules in adequate
explanations, despite the fact that they do not predict any unique
outcõmes or have a fixed reference in actual behavior.
Chapter 3 deals with the source of much indeterminacy in the
social sciences: the problem of interpretation. Many argue that
post-empiricism and the end of the natural-human science dicho-
tomy together imply that "everything is interpretation" or that, in
Stanley Fish's phrase, "interpretation is the oníy game in town."
Charles Taylor hás described this view as the "pleasing fantasy" of
"old guard Diltheyeans," their shoulders hunched from years-long
resistance to positivism, who now "suddenly pitch forward on
their faces as ali opposition ceases to the reign of universal
hermeneutics."14 I will argue that the claim that "everything is
interpretation" arises only because of the holistic character of cur-
rent theories of interpretation. On this account, interpretation aíways
takes place within a certain background or context of relations
(such as the webs of beliefs or the practices of a form of life).
10 Introduction
Moreover, ínterpretation is circular and hence can be evaluated
only in light of other Ínterpretation; there is no escape from the
hermeneutic circle. While such holistic constraints on determinate
Ínterpretation do hoíd~fÕFthe social sciences, I areue that skeptical
\- - ,_,, , - - "-• ----
concítistõ^^ljgt^^^^HgnonlHc^ ng^jallgw fronx .them. My case
stucties in this chapter focus on the role of Ínterpretation in debates
engendered by two skeptical social scientific analyses of "represen-
tation": James Clifford's analysis of cultural anthropology and Steve
Woolgar's sociology of science. Even if Ínterpretation is unavoid-
ably indeterminate, it follows only that there is no unique best
Ínterpretation, not that there is no way to distinguish better from
worse interpreta ti ons. Such comparative distinctions can be made
in two ways: in light of available evidence, but also in light of the
moral responsibility to the other in the dialogical situation that
characterizes acts of Ínterpretation. 'Ilie_a£rjiejJ_to eyjdence_jmd
responsibility imply that qu£stions^^]ntej^e^tiojL,e^lDe^set^d
without semantic theory. Social theories inform our Ínterpretation
by puttihg them in larger contexts"ò7J'^idence and respqnsipility.,
not by avoiding interpretive indeterminacy altogetfier.
In chapter 4, I cónsidèr what" tHesè larger contexts might be by
discussing the problem of explanation in macrosociology. In general,
debates between individualists and holists are angtherjljgãgy^of
trTè~~dêmãjcation pTõ^Hn~TrrtEê™sociáT sciences. Indlvidualistsiave
tÕ^sTlíafuraI scientific moHels and" holists
hás also demarcated the sqciajjsciences
from psychoiogy and hás been 'úsed^f^^fêsísTIré^^tiom^ni^^ití1
rêlgaTd to"s"òciarfa"cts. Irídéêd, "classicãr'sòciàí theory" often clairned
tò~"bé""1;iHH:~tõ"^fo^ of
individual actions and" 6eIiêH™in'"'tèrm¥ of~properties of~society as
a wrlolêTTurfcfiõrrdisr explanatiunsrf õT^éxãífíprè^ "expiam'" a plrâc-
tice'or a set of beliefs in terms of some social purpose or benefit
for society as a whole, as in the case of the integrating effects
of rituais. Objections to such explanations typically trade on ex-
planatory indeterminacy: many different practices, actions or beliefs
could have fulfilled the same purpose in a different way; conversely,
any practice or belief can be said to provide some benefit or another.
This indeterminacy hás led some to argue that holistic explanations
tend to be vacuous and that whatever explanatory force they have
is carried by the actions or interactions of individuais which they
imply. However, t^e-^esx^^_urrent,-.macr£tl.e^.d..^£^na_tio^_iare
neither collective nor individualist; rather, they seek to integrate
micro- anel macro-Tevels of explanation. I wilí argue that such
líiõkages can go ih^eifhêrdirecfiõrirmicrb-level explanations can be
Introduction 11
structuresmustbe trajisJjte4Jji1^^^ .^c-
Tntêrãctions . Without such linkages, both micro- and
—M-fr^-IO^^^^^^i^^.-H_^ explanations remain incomplete and inadequate, with
little explanatory power. Case studies in this chapter deal with
successful and unsuccessful micro-macro íinks, including debates
about functionalism, Marxist base-superstructure explanations, and
Habermas's system-lifeworld reformulations.
In chapter 5, I argue that any valid pattern of explanation can
be put to use in criticai social science. Even interpretations may be
employed by social critics, só long as they depart sufficiently from
generally accepted ones. Desrjite^JjsJarge^resources, criticai social
science shares^jh^in^ejtexmjnaçy^c^^l^ the for^^_exr>lanation
d^cusse^greviously, including problems of interpretive correctness
^ ^ a n d Hesires. B u t by_ attempting .fcTBe ^criti-
cai, explanations ..açcept the- burden _of, normative-practical criteria
of adequacy, as well as further burdens of the indeterminacy of
critiçism _itseíf,..Criticism raises fundamental questions about the
pragmatic character of social scientific knowíedge; if the descrip-
tion given in this book is correct, then it is a decidedly practical
and reflective form of knowíedge, rather than a technical and an
objective one. Indeed, one. pf. the ,putmpded _diçho.tomies_of_the
natural-human science controversy - namely, that between .."facts"
and/^values^'. - is blurred and is^np-longer the logical distinction
modern^philospphers haye.:thQught.it tp be. What is "fact" and
what is "value" is itself indeterminate, dependent upon the re-
flective status oí norms and bí knowíedge cláims in tfie theory
employécl by ~trí<T cfltic/ Once social science begins to explain and
intérpref norms and practices, there is no theory-neutral' ' way to
ássign~~stat:enierits_ to_either side pf the distinction. "But rather jhan
being a threat to the possibility of criticai social science, the
cõHapse of this stm^n]]jm^^i^ÍI^£ãri^
òFjectiqns to it^jt undermines cláims to ethical neutrality as in
Weber's .account of values, as well as the-force.of the,-naturalistic
faílacy (that is, that critica] ....social scjence_con^sj^is_a.nd_,Qught).
^ Even without the comfort of the distinction between facts and
values, criticai social science must not simply assume its standards
of critiçism but must instead develop them out of its successful
forms of explanation. Nor can it clairh the status òf "objective"
knowíedge typícàl Òf some forms of orthodòx Marxism. There are
prablems òf.....in^ferrninacy related to the act of critiçism itself:
problerns^reíated to the appli^bihty^pf the critíc's stancíards, of
the direction and.cpnsequences of. the,.çntic's a"cts^T~c6rnmunication
12 Introduction
íhosecntiazecL, and^of the
necessary for etfecfíve^cfiticism. In this chapter, I will
as an exemplar of
criticai social science, and my case studies will concern various
attempts to reformulate its theoretical basis: Elster's conception of
social irrationality; "Woolgar and Latour's criticism of the "ideol-
ogy of representation" in science; and Habermas's idea of ideology
as distorted communication, or communication distorted by power
and domination. As in the micro_^macro _ . ^ ^ òTfòrms of indeterminacy in the social sciences discussed above ali
are the ^ derive from special problems concerning the role of agency in;
Kãsed i _ . ,, . -
directin a n d p r o r ^ d í Í L i t s ,
16 _ are not simrjly the passiye bearers of social forces of"~judgêrnéntal^
restrictions^o^rative^jii J:hdr^ liyes; and they ar^ejgractical in that
_ gractices_ which^they
^ negatively
evaluate^ It is clear from these case studies that certain criticai
theori_e_sj:an^
make slimTar criticisms, feminist criticisms of science are more
adequate qua criticai social science than current "ethnographies of
science." They not only develop a more adequate criticai frame-
work, but suggest persuasive alternatives to current concepts and
practices and give indications of how such social realities might be
changed and who might change them. Hence, the theoretical goals
and practical purposes of social critics establish the characteristics
of theories that help to change people's beliefs and attitudes, to
transform existing practices and to formulate alternativa ones.
For ali these reasons, the concept of mdeterminaçy can serve^a
nurnb^r,.,Qf,different purposes Jn^hisJx>pTk: it can serve as a_o:itÍQgl
foi^,£ori..oJjle£^ritêHa^õí:;;ãdequacy, iljustratc the_.ha_sic problems_of
a post-empiricist philosp_r^y_^l.j,Q,cial_tjclen,ç.e and revea]___a_new
lô^iF"foFJ^rãnonal . r£construction of actual expianatory^ractice^
Given its organizing role in*tKis BoõE, pernapíTTFls important to
distinguish the use of the term here from other current ones.
Indeterminacy_ here..has__nothing to do with "indetorninism," the
doctrine that free actions musT^5ê~uncau"sêd;' "TF also is not directly
r el ate3^tB"clíali^^^mfóm
with the specTãl~cõn3itiOTÍs of knowhd^^^ov^Tmr^ c^uântumjn£-
c^^^^T^m^^mo^^uín^^ã^ument ÍOT the_"mcfeterminac^ of
translation" rnakes a strong_er case for the undecidabiíity between
alternatives than í want to make here, again tecause of the special
conditions. govermng" "rSHícál 'translation and tHeõries''of'meamHg
that are not applicable here. In order to make the indeterminacy
of translation more than a case of the underdetermination of
empirical theories, Quine argues that competing translation manuais
Introduction 13
can be consistem with ali the avaiíable evidence and inconsistent
with each other.16 But social^scienceJ.s not like radical translation:
and_ spurces__^oT
there is no
they are similar
^ecide the njatter between competing alternatives
in advance. Rather than having any of these- meanings, the variety
explanations. D^^e^^ajl^the^the^qr^^jto^l^ contrary, social actorsí
dopes within a cultural order. Èquipped^ j^ha carjacities ifof
jna^^Ke^^
this is the case, then the ._sociaí
scences .ace..e,epex.prQems.__Qindetermina£y,_^ thei? ,%ilu^
to yield unique_|>_redictions^like the TnaturaL.s._cie.n_ces (as Elster hás
arguedj. If jigents pecome ^^^^gí^^à^^ãJ^^^^^^J^ííS^S^
under which they act, no factor or j_et. of^ factors can . fully or
• dêterminiteTjrêxpíain a soclaj eyent or action^By_hecjaniing_j;ware
ÓjFsociaí influences on them, agents^ may^undermine..jheir^ causal
.efficacy. Causal explanations in the social sciences, then, cannot be
expressed in terms of universal, and hence determinate, laws. Or,
to use an example from the cultural order, a rule or norm never
fuíly_implie_s how ií_must be carried out or can be apj>lied in_ various
situations. Nor d^^micti£naj^r^£rj^to£aj^ Heter-
.nn"natel'y""descn5é recurrent patterns of action, since the samè
stmclu1Fl^"~íunction^ma7^b"é""malntained"^by an inâeKnite number
oT^fKêT*"ãcttorTs^F 'beHaviours^ Thus, the protean character of
rêfiectívè7""social agency evades ali attempts to Bíscover..some .de-
fêlmiHaK"tKèorèticaÍ use of alí such explanatory terms in the social
sciences.
m i ;B"uf íhis recognition of the inevitability of indeterminacy in so-
cial scientifíc explanations does not, I will argue, exclude the
possibility of constructing adequate and fruitful explanations that
can fulfill a variety of purposes. How the social sciences can
operate within the constraints of indeterminacy and still offer a
whole range of explanations is one of the basic themes of this
book. In each chapter, I will begin by developing the problem
of indeterminacy for each type of explanation; I wiíl then state as
precisely as possible its scope and criteria of adequacy. These
reconstructions of various types of explanations will take the form
of the full statement of a "pattern" or scheme for the use of
? • - • :"•• '

14 Introductton Introduction 15

various indeterminate, yet explanatory, terms. The statemerits of position to deveíop a new logic of social scientific practice. The
the pattern make up the conditions of application of ^the.±ermJn new approaches in the social sciences are now the proper context
anjt4ejguate^xplanatipn. I will also try to show that itJs-precjsely to ask some of the important philosophical questions about rea-
by reco^nizing^ sucH indeterminacy that thejsqdal sciences can 'son, action, and the good life, as they emerge in attempts to
ftefíqrm their practical tasícs, sucfí ""ãs~intèrpreting pjtherr.,cuitures ,
explaining scientific knowledge, or criticizing social._ instjjEutions,.
m interpret, explain and criticize the social-cultural world. At least
from the side of phiíosophy, the first step toward such a coopera-
ÃíftEese last rémarks 'reveal, for ali its emphasis on indeter-
minacy and its post-empirical prientation, this book is profoundly
m tive relation will have been taken when it sees social scientific
research and theorizing for what it already is. T^main contribu-
anti-skep tical. I take both indeterminacy and post-empiricism to be -tipn of r^pst-empirici§m_is_to get^us started:,jt..re.pÍaces .N_éuratES
primarily negative theses: the íbrmer criticizes inadequate_.a_çço.uats exjectatiqn_qf sdej:errninacy, and unity with Aristqtle's recognition
of expÍanafionLJnrithe ; .sociar sciences , while the, Jatterjindermines of indeterminacy and muitiplicity.
olde£_iorms__.pf.._the.-jQgiç_p^^pJ_an^a_tion. Both simply serve __as_
starting ppints5,J,n, th_at-.the,y,ido= not contributé mucfiTinliKé way of
positive proposals pther than that the social sciences must recognize
agençy^and that. epistemoÍQgy,,,,must he.sQciaiized and historicized.
Instead of skepticism, they only require that we change what
norma tive questions we ask and that we '"broactén" wKat counts as
science or explanation. Under post-empiricist " àssumptions, the
phiíosophy of any science must at least understand its current
practice and past history. It cannot be in the busmess__o.f .deciding
once and for _3\\. js : scientuic.. and what .is. , npt; suçh consid-
erátions are_^generally irreleyant to actual practice.18 Since the
pracfice_of a science^_^mte_j^j|ed,_philosophicaj_self-reflection
should not tãke upon itself the authority to eliminate aítefrmfivè
,.._.,_ __ ___, ___ JT _. t v ._____. . . l L , J , , _ _ _ _ ^ . ,,. ^-^^,ltf.r. --- ,•*«£*•—É»—m-—"*" "•-*.- . - ; — _ . . - _____:^.^- -- -'-í — •— -

directions and itheories. Instead, it should take up a comparative

but no less normative role, ]udging'"^s^£ch^ogrjjns_ancl...me,ir
typical explanations to be better in some respects_ and worse in
such còmpãràtive™críteria of

toLÍ^^J^13^-?0^^^ ^at t^e3{_w,⣣iílt-

They may also provide solutions to the problems of inHeterminacy,
to the extent that they can be resolved.
With the turn to history and practice, post-empiricism places the
phiíosophy of social science at the center of epistemology. I hope
that this book can help to define its new normative role in de-
veloping a logic for making comparative judgments of adequacy
between competing ciaims and approaches according to practical
criteria. Certainly, there are unresolved problems with the theories
and research programs examined here. But philosophical reflection
on them will succeed if it is íike the theories it studies,, that is, if
it is criticai, practical and self-reflective in its understanding of
knowledge as a social-historical endeavor. Its success depends upon
the extent to which new forms of explanation are now in a