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The Australia Group : An Introduction

The Australia Group is an informal arrangement which aims to allow exporting or


transshipping countries to minimise the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon
(CBW) proliferation. The Group meets annually to discuss ways of increasing the
effectiveness of participating countries’ national export licensing measures to prevent
would-be proliferators from obtaining materials for CBW programs.

Participants in the Australia Group do not undertake any legally binding obligations: the
effectiveness of their cooperation depends solely on a shared commitment to CBW non-
proliferation goals and the strength of their respective national measures. Key
considerations in the formulation of participants’ export licensing measures are:

o they should be effective in impeding the production of chemical and biological weapons;
o they should be practical, and reasonably easy to implement, and
o they should not impede the normal trade of materials and equipment used for legitimate
purposes.

All states participating in the Australia Group are parties to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and strongly support
efforts under those Conventions to rid the world of CBW.

Objectives of the Group


Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) are indiscriminate in their application and their
deadly effects have been known since ancient times. They were first used on a large scale
in the First World War, with soldiers being exposed to poisonous gases, including phosgene
and sulphur mustard (a blistering agent). The result was over one million casualties and
approximately 100,000 fatalities. Since that time, CBW technology has become more
advanced, and hence even more lethal. The use by Iraq of CW in the form of nerve agents
and sulphur mustard in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and the 1995 poison gas (sarin)
attack on the Tokyo underground, provide chilling examples of the indiscriminate and
inhumane effects of these weapons.

The principal objective of Australia Group participants’ is to use licensing measures to


ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and
biological manufacturing facilities and equipment, do not contribute to the spread of CBW.
The Group achieves this by harmonising participating countries’ national export licensing
measures. The Group’s activities are especially important given that the international
chemical and biotechnology industries are a target for proliferators as a source of materials
for CBW programs.

Participants have recognised from the outset that export licensing measures are not a
substitute for the strict and universal observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). All participants in the Australia Group are States Parties to both the BWC and the
CWC. Support for these regimes and their aims remains the overriding objective of Australia
Group participants. Export licensing measures instituted by individual members assist in
implementing key obligations under the CWC (Article I, 1 (a) and (d)) and the BWC (Articles
I and III).

Export licensing measures also demonstrate participants determination of members to


avoid not only direct but also inadvertent involvement in the spread of CBW, and to express
their opposition to the use of these weapons. It is also in the interestS of commercial firms
and research institutes and of their governments to ensure that they do not inadvertently
supply chemicals, chemical equipment, biological agents or biological equipment for use in
the manufacture of CBW. Global chemical and biological industries have firmly supported
this principle.

1980: Iraq invaded iran

Extensive use of chemical weapons

Against Civilians

Australia group is an response to this.:

 helps exports members to identify those exports which need to be controlld .


 this is achieved by members through harmonization of exports controls like using licensing
measures
 apj kalam asserted that” India will not make biological weapons. It is cruel to human beings”

on june 2015 india n us signed a new 10yr defence framework agreement which include

provision to work cooperatively,,,a light weight protective suit effective in chemical n biological hazard
environments

india joinedas 43nd member which could fortify new delhis efforts to become a member of nuclear
suppliers group

*china, Pakistan, iran, n korea rae not members of austrial group

Australian group 1985

NSG: AIMS TO PREVENT nuclear weapons proliferatioin by stopping the sale of items that can be used
to make nuclear arms
china blocking indias entry stating india did not sign NTP(non proliferation treaty) WHICh recognisesfive
permanent MEMBERS OF UNITED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: US, RUSSIA, CHINA, BRITAIN, FRANCE

Wassenaar arrangement

Missile technology control regime. India 34th member to prevent the proliferation of missile and
unmanned aerial vehicle technology capable of carrying a 500kg payload fro atleast 300km

During us visit to india 2010 us announced its support to UN SECURITY COUNCIL THE MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, THE AUSTRALIAN GROUP AND WAASENAAR ARRANGEMENT

SIGNIFICANCE:

The development is significant because it brings New Delhi one step closer to
integrating with the global nonproliferation system. India has been pursuing
membership in the four key technology control arrangements that are part of the non-
proliferation regime – the fourth being the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – for several
years. But membership to the NSG still eludes India, and it is unlikely that it is any
closer today, despite Indian membership in the other three arrangements.

These aforementioned arrangements that India has been pursuing memberships in are
essentially informal groupings where members or participating governments, as they
are called, work together to harmonize national export controls in order to ensure that
export of certain sensitive items do not contribute to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).

WASSENAAR AGREEMENT:

 from cold war ----COCOM: coordinating committee for multilateral exports control(1950-94)
 Non treaty organization.()
 Goal: restricts export of sensitive items that creates international tension n instability
 Particularly communist states

India 42nd member

Features :

1. A global grouping which regulates the transfer n access to conventional weapons n dual use
technologies
2. India entered missile technology controll regime injune 2016

Wassenaar came into force in 1996 to succeed the cold war era coordinating committee for
mutual exports control
The countries subscribe to arms exports control.
Hq Vienna
The countries will promote transparency n greater responsibility in transfer of conventional
arms n dual use goods
Prevent acquisition of terrorist
Members every six communicates exchange of information
War n emunerations, technologies

Significance for india

1. India s memenbrshp will facilitate high technology tie ups with Indian industry
2. Ease access to high tech items for our defence n space prgrms
3. Eligible for certain licensing exemptions

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