Can Science Be an Art?

Epistemology as the Vehicle for a Trip from Science to Art and

Back
Author(s): John Stewart
Source: Leonardo, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1989), pp. 255-261
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1575240
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 Can Science Be an Art?
Epistemology as the Vehicle for a
Trip from Science to Art and Back
John Stewart

EPISTEMOLOGY cept; even if we suppose that ABSTRACT

causality exists, that A is really

For those people who are not professional philosophers,the cause of it B, that is quite in- Impervious to the intelle
can be difficult to understand what epistemology issufficient.
all about. Nevertheless, it is un- sights of critical epistemo
most of us continue most
It seems so immediately obvious that the world around us human beings do
deniable that
time to imprison ourselves
consists of real objects (tables, chairs, houses, people,
possess ani-
an idea of causality. The sion that we can and do p
mals, pavements and so on), which we perceive quite paradox
simplyis complete. ality directly 'as it is'. The
as they are (in terms of colours, forms, sounds, touch, Thesmell,
solution to this enigma suggests that one of the f
etc.), that short of following the computer scientist'swas dictum
proposed by Kant. Since it of art may be to render us
scious that reality is wond
("Why make things simple when you can make them com- impossible to ex-
is manifestly
and mysteriously more ri
plicated?") one wonders what more there is to be said.
plain theInorigin of concepts on complex than we are led
the basis of primitive sensory
principle, of course, this attitude is in itself an epistemologi- on the basis of any finite
impressions, these concepts
cal position, which I shall denote by the term 'common- ceptual modes. Finally, h
sense realism'. the possibility that ways o
must exist a priori, that is to say
ing the world constructed
It is quite probable, I think, that were it not for theasad-
a precondition for the act of tists may have a place in t
vent of modern science we would all still be quite content
observation itself. Since any at- toire of art forms.

with the blissful ignorance of common-sense realism.tempt Cer- to explain the origin of
tainly, the development of epistemology is historically re-
concepts on the basis of experi-
I ?? _
lated to the birth and growth of Western science [1]. Locke
ence leads straight to the para-
in particular set out explicitly to put the work of such dox of induction, Kant suggests
"master-builders... as the incomparable Mr. Newton" on thata we should seek instead to expl
secure foundation [2]. His attitude to this task was modestbasis of concepts. This amounts to t
in the extreme: he felt that it was "ambition enough to be
upside-down, and Kant himself spoke
employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a
pernican revolution" in the domain o
little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way Kant's epistemology involves a fun
of knowledge" [3]. By one of the most exquisite ironies between
in reality 'in itself' on one han
intellectual history, it was from these modest beginnings of reality on the other. The relationsh
that the movement of the British Empiricists, continuing itself' and a representation of it is d
through Berkeley and Hume, stumbled upon a major prob- simple reflection as in a mirror, nor
lem, which quite upset the apple-cart. The problem is this:correspondence: a representation is
where do ideas and concepts come from? Take Hume'sbasis ex- of conceptual categories that do
ample: how is it possible to arrive at the notion that A isobjects
the of knowledge themselves. Whe
causeof B? The common-sense answer is that the idea derivestable, for example, the 'green table'
from observation and experience by a process of induction. reality, and it is a great mistake to be
reality directly as it is. From a Kantia
But Hume produces a pitiless reductio ad absurdum that shows
that this is quite impossible. In the common-sense view, sense
we realism is an immense illusion.
would have to suppose that the idea presents itself to us be-Since critical epistemology provides a devastating intel-
cause we observe that B is always preceded by A, and lectual
that refutation of common-sense realism, one might sup-
each time A occurs, B follows. But, asks Hume, how many pose that no one could believe in it any more. But the fact
times would we have to observe such a conjunction in orderof the matter is that common-sense realism is not only alive
and well, it is actually dominant: most of us believe in it most
to be logically justified in arriving at the idea of causality?
Once? Twice? Ten times? A hundred, a thousand, a million of the time. How is this possible? We are not yet 'out of the
woods' of paradox.
times? By dint of asking this question seriously, we are forced
to recognize that the idea of a necessary connection between The issues at stake can be clarified if we take a look at the
A and B can never be strictlyjustified. Worse, if we reallysocial
had process by which facts are constructed in a scientific
no preconceived ideas, it is far from clear that we would even
notice the association between A and B. In short, it seems
John Stewart (research scientist), Centre d'Etudes Transdisciplinaires, 44 rue de la
quite impossible to explain how the formless stream of im- Tour, 75016 Paris, France.

mediate sensory impressions could ever give rise to the con- Received 25June 1987.

? 1989 ISAST
Pergamon Press pic. Printed in Great Britain.
0024-094X/89 $3.00+0.00 This content downloaded from 148.210.21.144 on Wed, 21 Jun LEONARDO, Vol.
2017 23:42:47 UTC22, No. 2, pp. 255-261,1989 255
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 laboratory [5]. Lack of space pre- when a social consensus emerges, and this. Consider the extension of critical
cludes going into details here: the this in turn is likely to happen when- epistemology to knowledge in general
crux of the matter is that whenever a ever a hypothesis functions reliably as and to our perceptions in daily life in
social consensus emerges according to though there were a perfect two-way particular. As Gombrich has so aptly
which a hypothesis is 'true', the hy- correspondence between representa- remarked [8], in real-life situations we
pothesis (formulated on the basis of a tion and reality. The catch, of course, act first and think afterwards. If we
priori conceptual categories) under- lies in the 'as though'; the apparent were rash enough to try to keep a 'cor-
goes a metamorphosis and becomes a 'correspondence' is always essentially rect' critical attitude constantly in the
'fact'. There are actually two stages in contingent, being dependent on the forefront of our consciousness, we
this transformation. Firstly, the hy- strictly local context within which would be completely hamstrung. We
pothesis projects a twin image of itself various actors, complete with all their would constantly be assailed by doubts
into the 'real world out there'; and this fears, hopes, attitudes and motiva- about the wisdom of trying to go
twin, absolutely identical in every re- tions, put the hypothesis to practical through a doorway or to climb a stair-
spect with the terms of the hypothesis, use. This contingent locality is re- case, or even of getting out of bed in
takes on an independent existence in vealed by the observation that follow- the morning. When it comes to prac-
the form of a real object. Secondly, the ing a shift in the context of use, often tical action, there simply is no sensible
relationship between hypothesis and but not necessarily accompanied by alternative to common-sense realism.
object undergoes an inversion. Ini- new experiments and observations, a The result is that the would-be lessons
tially it was the hypothesis that gave 'fact' can turn back into a 'hypothesis' of critical epistemology, expressed as
rise to the object; but, rapidly, more and even perish as an 'artefact'[6]. they are in abstract, intellectual terms,
and more reality is attached to the ob- The history of science is quite littered make virtually no impression on us.
with examples of established 'facts' And yet common-sense realism is an
ject and less and less to the hypotheti-
cal statement about the object, until
that have been overturned by subse- illusion; and for reasons that I shall ex-
the point is reached where the object
quent theories. (In twentieth-century plain shortly I think it is a pity to im-
becomes the cause of the hypothesis.physics, examples include the belief prison ourselves by believing in it un-
In practice, the conjuring trick is per-
that the structure of physical space reservedly. The question is, of course,
formed so neatly that the sleight ofcorresponds exactly to that of three- whether anything can be done about
hand is imperceptible and no one dimensional Euclidean geometry; the it.
really notices what has happened. In belief that two events separated in
other words, we arrive at... common- space either are or are not simultane-
sense realism. ous, independent of any motion on ART
It is important to realise that this de- the part of the observer; and the belief
I shall state immediately the central
scription of how the metamorphosis of that any object possesses both an exact
thesis of this section, to wit: art, by im-
hypothesis into 'fact' occurs in no way position and an exact momentum; to
plementing the main insights of criti-
amounts to an epistemological justifi- say nothing of the oscillation between
cal epistemology in an immediately ef-
cation. The metamorphosis occurs corpuscular and wave theories of the
fective way, provides us with a valuable
nature of light. Chemistry, geology antidote to the illusion of common-
Fig. 1. John Stewart, Two silhouettes or a and biology of course furnish their sense realism.
white vase?, ink on paper, 5.5 x 4.9 in, own examples.) In other words, the
1987. This classic example of figure- It will be well to start this section
metamorphosis of hypothesis into
ground reversal provides a particularly with an explanation of why I think the
clear illustration of perceptual 'switch- 'fact' is reversible. But as Feyerabend illusion of common-sense realism is a
ing'. It is instructive to register mentally has pointed out [7], this means that
pity. It is not that I have a puritanical
the switching from one perceptual mode the metamorphosis cannot be deter-
to the other and to exercise conscious objection to illusion or error as such.
mined by any valid set of methodologi- It is rather that when we are under the
control over the process. Although it is cal rules, because in that case the
possible to increase the frequency of spell of the particular illusion of
metamorphosis would never be revers-
switching, it is rigorously impossible to be common-sense realism, when we
in both modes at the same time. ible in this way. We are forced back on
the conclusion that the belief in real- believe that we perceive reality itself
directly as it is, this not only bars us
ism (which is nothing other than the from actual access to alternate modes
psychological dimension of the trans-
of perception, it blinds us to the very
formation of hypothesis into 'fact') is
indeed an illusion. possibility that other modes of percep-
tion could exist. To make myself clear,
I come now to a key point in my
I will put forth a major metaphysical
argument. We have just seen that
postulate (which I cannot strictly jus-
common-sense realism is essentially
tify other than offering it as a value
an illusion. However, what we also
need to realise is that it is an illusion judgement): I believe that 'reality' is
infinitely richer and more diverse than
from which there is no practical
any single representation (or set of
escape. Whenever a representation or
representations) that we human be-
mode of perception functions reliably,
ings are capable of constructing. If this
it is humanly impossible to avoid fal-
is so, then it is indeed an impoverish-
ling into the trap of believing that we
ment to imprison ourselves within the
do perceive reality directly as it is. I
limits of a single mode of perception;
cannot emphasize too strongly that
and the pity is redoubled if we are not
there are sound practical reasons for

256 Stewart, Can Science Be an Art?

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even aware that we are imprisoned. ~ ?r* ef-" * Xvv

And yet this is exactly what happens

when we fall prey to the illusion of
W:t : 97~~~~~'"
- .:......
, - . ;.. ' X ....

common-sense realism.

How does art pierce the walls of this

prison? In a major philosophical text
[9], Heidegger says that a work of art
instigates an unceasing tension or
combat between 'The World' (which I
interpret as corresponding to a partic-
ular representation or modality of per-
ception) and 'The Earth' (which I take
as symbolising the receptacle of the
unlimited multitude of alternative

representations which are de facto an-

nihilated whenever we focus on any
single modality of perception). In
other words, the mysterious magic of
a work of art consists in the artist's feat

of bringing a particular representa-

tion to vivid life without falling into the
trap of reducing the totality of reality
itself to this single way of perceiving. It
is worth noting that Heidegger's analy-
sis is centered not so much on the

process of artistic creation as on what

happens when a work of art is actively
experienced. He speaks of the 'Guard-
ians' of a work of art, those in whom
the combat between World and Earth

takes place; without its Guardians, a

work of art is merely a dead, empty
shell.

The best way of communicating this

concept is probably to give some ex-
amples in which works of art induce us
to assimilate the epistemological dis-
tinction between representation and Fig. 2. M. C. Escher, Waterfal, lithograph, 14.9 x 11.8 in
reality. My first example, didactic in its Cordon Art, Baarn, The Netherlands. Reprinted by permis
simplicity, is nevertheless a suitable of perpetual motion, perceptual switching is sustained by t
image in interaction with our own interpretative efforts.
model. We can perceive the well-
known drawing in Fig. 1 either as a pair
of silhouettes facing each other or as
a white vase. Two things are worth though they were what our we everyday
usually perceptions
take are as illu-
noting here. Firstly, each of these two sory asfrustrated.
for reality are systematically dreams. Other schools of art-
modalities of perception annihilates A variant on this themethe is Impressionists,
provided by the Cubists, con-
the other: if we see the silhouettes, the temporary art
Magritte's hyperrealist painting through action painting
infuri-
vase disappears, and vice versa; it is atingly entitled This is and
notbeyond-all contribute, each in
a pipe (Fig.
rigorously impossible to see both at 3). As long as we remain itsobsessed with
own way, to diversifying our reper-
the same time. (This offers a clue to the 'common-sense' question 'What
toire of possible is of perception.
modes
the tenacity of the illusion of common- it really?' the koan-likeIn myconundrum
own experience, the effect of a
sense realism.) Secondly, engaging in paintingwhen
persists; release comes only is not limited
and to the time I
the activity of making controlled pas- if we realise that we arespend actually looking
dealing with at it. It is pos-
sages from one mode of perception to representations, whichsible
are to not
assimilate
to be something of the
the other involves a special quality of artist's vision, so that it becomes avail-
confused with reality itself.
concentrated awareness. The point I With this as a clue, itable isaspossible
an alternativeto
to usual modes

want to make is this: actively experi-
encing works of art leads us to develop
a capacity for concentrated awareness,
which in turn can radically modify and
enrich our experience of life.
Consider the drawings of Escher
(Fig. 2). Their fascination derives
from the fact that our best attempts to
construe these representations as
see the same theme running of perception.
throughThus, for example, it
the whole of Magritte's work,
sometimes and
happens to me, at table or
indeed through the whole of that
in the street, theI suddenly see the
Surrealist movement. The Surrealists faces of friends or strangers with the
were-and are-concerned to blur deep lineal clarity of a Dfirer portrait
the cut-and-dried distinction between (Fig. 4). When this sort of thing hap-
dreams and reality, to show that the pens, art is effectively implementing
dream-world is as real as what we usu- what critical epistemology affirms in-
tellectually: I am reminded that the
ally take for reality, and conversely that

Stewart, Can Science Be an Art? 257

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 Music is the art form that offers the

most serious resistance to my 'epis-

temological' interpretation. I find it
difficult to determine whether this is

because or in spite of the fact that in

our culture music is a particularly ab-
stract, intellectual form of art (it is the
one most commonly appreciated and
practised by scientists). Music, and in-
strumental music in particular, has of
course an exceptional capacity to
transport us into a 'world' of its own.
The trouble (from my 'epistemologi-
cal' point of view) is that this other
world bears no recognizable relation-
ship to anything in our ordinary world.
The result of this 'schizophrenia' is
e . net'ftA twe pz . that when we return from a musical

'trip' our habitual modes of percep-

tion are not necessarily enriched. Is it
a total coincidence thatjazz musicians
Fig. 3. Rene Magritte, The Betrayal ofImages, oil on canvas, 21.5 x 28.5 in, 1928-1929.
(?1987, ADAGP, Paris, France. Reprinted by permission.) "This is notare notorious
a pipe?- Wellusers of psychoactive
drugs
what on earth is it then?" How many readers get the point unaided? The thatauthor,
present present similar problems?
for one, had to have it explained to him. The perceptual switch involved here is at
Be that as the
it may, in my own case the
level of epistemological thought. way in to an epistemological perspec-
tive on music has come through opera
blase complacency with whichmust I ha-both enter into and 'live' the and
partsong. Indeed, my epistemological
bitually observe the world is infinitelyhe is playing and yet at the same time musings have contributed to a quan-
narrow and meagre compared to keep thecontrol so as not to 'lose' himself
tumjump in my appreciation of opera.
unbounded richness of reality. in the role, provides another meta- Hitherto, opera had left me somewhat
So far I have spoken only ofphor the for the essence of what I am try-less than indifferent: squalling prima
graphic arts, but the 'epistemological donnas on the radio definitely did not
ing to say. It is therefore not surprising
perspective' applies equally to thatall the greatest of playwrights pro-
appeal to me, and on the rare occa-
forms of art. The art form that is most vides me with a quotation that expres- sions when I actually went to the
directly and obviously related to the ses perfectly my fundamental meta- opera, the idea of people actually sing-
way we habitually perceive the world physical
is article of faith: ing at each other seemed patently ab-
probably literature, and in particular surd. It was here that the 'epistemo-
There are more things in heaven
the novel. In all the great novels (from and earth, Horatio, logical' attitude came to my aid by
Thackeray and Eliot, through Dos- Than are dreamt of in your helping me to relax: to staywith my ini-
toevsky, Tolstoy, Flaubert, Stendhal philosophy.... tial impression as long as I was in that
(Hamlet, Act I, Scene 5)
and Melville, to Lessing and Fowles) mode of perception, but to remain
we are presented with an open invita- And the relationship between open art to the possibility that an alterna-
tion to perceive those around us (in- and daily life that derives from tive my mode might supervene. And thus
cluding ourselves) in a new way. To be it was that the magic moment so well
'epistemological perspective' is stated
more precise, it seems to me that thesequite straightforwardly in another known to opera-lovers finally came to
novels organise, with deliberate but quotation from the same author: me: the moment when the marvellous
tender irony, a back-and-forth 'switch- emotional intensity that lies dormant
All the world's a stage
ing' between two distinct modes of And all the men and women merely and unsuspected beneath the surface
perception (analogous to the 'switch- of the most banal or absurd of situa-
players....
ing' between vase and silhouettes in (As You Like It, Act II, Scene 7) tions suddenly breaks forth in full
my basic metaphor). On the one splendour.
In my own experience, this consti-
hand, we can identify with the closed, I would like to conclude this sec-
tutes an alternative mode of percep-
self-centered consciousness that the tion, therefore, by claiming that it
tion that offers fascinating possibilities
characters have of themselves; on the does seem feasible to perceive art as a
for 'switching'. It is more or less as
other, we can take a step back and par- way of putting flesh and blood onto
though I said to myself, in a real-life sit-
take of the lucid external vision that the dry bones of the intellectual
uation, "These people are not really X,
the author brings to bear, which by insights of critical epistemology. Of
Y and Z; they are actors impersonating
contrast reveals the narrow vanityX, ofYand Z". The results of this switch
course, this is a somewhat unusual way
our usual way of perceiving things. of thinking about art; the mainstream
are frequently hilarious: people gener-
It is with theatre that the vital ten- of philosophical thought has been pri-
ally caricature themselves with such
sion of a mode of perception that must marily concerned with the basis of aes-
merciless precision! The fact that we
be both convincingly established and thetic values, as exemplified by Kant in
do this quite unconsciously of course
at the same time revealed as illusion the Critique of Judgement [10]. How-
only adds spice when we do manage to
reaches its paroxysm. The basic ex- ever, the 'multiple worlds' view of art
see the joke.
istential problem of the actor, who that I have advocated here is not

258 Stewart, Can Science Be an Art?

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unprecedented: it is in line with Finally, the theory and practice of would now like to examine more

Dewey's Art as Experience [11 ], and has science as it is actually performed in closely what is at issue here.
been explicitly developed by Eco [12]. the laboratory epitomize the 'multiple In terms of my 'epistemological per
And even more to the point, I have a worlds' view. The very concept of mod- spective', as I have schematically sum
precise reason for proposing this 'epis- elling (both descriptive and norma- marized it, art is effective just in so fa
temological perspective': to equip my- as it succeeds in maintaining a vita
tive) recognizes the metamorphosis of
self with a tool for coming to grips with one world into another: the method of
tension between two complementar
the subject of the next section, that is, multiple working hypotheses-in use
requirements: Firstly, a work of ar
can science itself become an art form, for almost a hundred years-cham- must create a fresh mode of percep
and if so what would it be like? pions the creativity of holding severaltion, a 'World' as Heidegger woul
simultaneous explanations; the tech- say, that is incommensurable with ou
nique of brainstorming and the simi- usual way of perceiving things. More
SCIENCE lar approach of lateral thinking bothover, this new World must be convin
the the fullest support to the divorceing enough to detach us from ou
The links between science, art and give
between an idea and its 'real' counter- complacent common-sense realism,
'multiple worlds' view are many and
part by suspending evaluation of ve- which leads us to believe that our ha-
varied; I cannot here do more than
racity. bitual perceptions correspond to all
briefly cite a few of the more impor-
However, although these numer- that there is. But secondly, a work of
tant cases. Popper [13] has made the
ous links are definitely suggestive of art must also manage to communicate
fundamental point that scientific
possibilities, they are not in themselves this new World in such a way as to in-
knowledge is not a 'reflection' of real-
sufficient to show that science, as it crease our awareness that not only our
ity, but is based on hypotheses that
currently exists, really attains the sta- habitual modes of perception, but all
(provisionally) escape falsification.
tus of an art form. Heidegger, for ex- particular modes of perception, in-
Gregory [14] has drawn a formal
ample, clearly had strong reservations cluding the new World itself, are
seven-point analogy between this 'hy-
on this score, perhaps best summed merely representations of reality, and
pothetical' structure of scientific
up in his famous phrase "science does that we will impoverish ourselves if we
knowledge and that of human knowl-
not think" [20]. Thus, whereas he con- fall into the illusion of taking them
edge in general; and Gombrich [15]
sidered that there is a close relation- singly or collectively as the totality of
has demonstrated the relevance of the
ship between poetry (taken as the
reality itself.
Popper-Gregory approach to an un-
epitome of artistic expression) and Now it seems to me that in the case
derstanding of perception in the
visual arts. thought (i.e. philosophical thought),
of science, in particular as it is com-
municated to the general public, these
he manifestly felt that science belongs
Kuhn [16] has pointed out that sci-
to a different register altogether. I requirements tend to work against
two
entific progress is not just a question
of the continuous accretion of ever
I 3 If-. fr 1 (r
more precise and detailed knowledge.
Such periods of 'normal science' Fig.are4. Albrecht >... -, ^ e^
Diirer, The
punctuated by 'scientific revolutions',
in which whole conceptual paradigms Mother of the 1^.=eft i7 1
* ?r-
\, " W 0 w.^T
Artist, charcoal
shift in such a way that the world -> ? 9 g % ,* ;s
drawing, 16.6 x
visions of successive epochs may11.9 bein, 1514. *~~ ~ 5] ; a s; r*--
largely incommensurable. In a related
The vision of an
vein, Holton [17] has described the artist can affect
range of different 'themata' that may us beyond the
underlie scientific thought, and Po- time we actually
lanyi [18] speaks of the 'heuristic pas- spend looking at
the image. This
sion' with which scientists adopt par-
portrait of Bar-
ticular paradigms or themata. He also bara Diirer (nee
extends these concepts to the arts, re- Holper), drawn 2
calling E. M. Forster's distinction be- months before
tween 'flat' and 'round' characters in her death at the

age of 63, is one

a novel: we say that a character is
of the master-
round if it can 'convincingly surprise'
the reader. pieces of Euro-
pean art. The
Bohr, author of the complementar-present author
ity principle in quantum mechanics,feels that its emo-
has proposed an extension of switch-
tional intensity is
ing between perceptual modes to an'engraved in his ." i
.. *.

soul', so that,
''

understanding of human knowledge .rI.

! .

having experi-
in general [19]. enced it, he finds :'V
Science, tragedy and comedy havethe world is no
been associated since their common
longer the same
origins in classical Greece; their place.
con-
tinuing links have been extensively ex-
plored.

Stewart, Can Science Be an Art? 259

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 each other, so that in the end neither ologists, sounds, colours, smells, and who is right. In a similar vein, the de-
of them is fully realized. To start with so on-the most direct of our sensory ployment of a scientific attitude in an
the second count, contemporary impressions-do not really exist as everyday situation has distinct comic
Western society is so thoroughly im- such. They are merely the illusory re- possibilities. Le Lionnais [24] has
bued with scientific technologies that sult of a rather clumsy conjuring trick pointed out that, from the scientific
manifestly work, that the general pub- that nature plays on us. The only point of view, it is little short of in-
lic understandably identifies 'scien- things that really exist are particles credible that if one lifts up a pencil
tific' with 'true', as in the common (atoms) and electric charges (elec- and lets it go it drops back to the table
phrase: 'it is scientifically proven trons) in various states of motion, and and stops there, or that when one
that . . .'. Indeed it may not be too these things themselves are com- picks up a cup, it does not slip between
much to say that with the general de- pletely colourless, soundless and taste- one's fingers like greased lightning.
cline in institutional religious belief, less. Even Thomas, who doubted what So we could imagine a play or a film in
science has taken the place of the he saw, believed when he touched; but which an absent-minded professor
Church as the major social reference that most tangible (sic) of realities falls takes his science seriously, and starts
point for 'truth'. Of course working equally under the aegis of this aston- asking why (and if) we really can pick
scientists, who have daily experience ishing doctrine. up pencils and cups and put them on
of the fluctuating status of scientific If this is not enough, consider a the table. Here again, it is not (simply)
hypotheses, know that this image of third example: genes. According to ge- a question of poking fun at science; we
science as revealing a single, fixed neticists, these microscopic entities, are looking for the balance-point that
truth is a travesty. This probably which live as parasites in every one of makes us wonder who is right. A final
explains their instinctive reticence the cells of which our bodies are made, variant is to deploy the technique of
the theatrical switch that I referred to
towards most attempts at popularizing are transmitted unchanged from gen-
science. But the straightforward appli- eration to generation. Not only are previously. Readers who have the
cation of this corrective-insisting these genes impervious to the vicissi- opportunity of attending a scientific
that the current hypothesis is only a hy- tudes of our life experiences, but they meeting should try saying to them-
pothesis, that there are numerous un- actually have the effrontery to pro- selves, "That speaker is not really a
tidy details which do not fit in, and so gramme all our actions with the sole scientist, she is an actor caricaturing a
on-effectively militates against the aim of ensuring their own reproduc- scientist." In my own experience, the
first requirement, which is that a dis- tion, thus reducing our most cher- result can be devastatingly funny-
tinctive scientific 'vision of the world' ished hopes and fears to the status of and in no way precludes switching
be convincingly communicated. superficial epiphenomena [23]. back and listening with renewed ap-
It may therefore be worth exploring I am not trying to ridicule science. preciation to what the speaker (thinks
an alternative strategy for fulfilling the On the contrary, I am trying to convey she) is saying.
second requirement. In terms of my the strength as well as the essential The second major possibility for or-
'epistemological perspective', I have weirdness of scientific perceptions of ganising switching consists of setting
suggested that a basic technique for the world. Science as art would then up an 'internal' equilibrium between
involve establishing a switching rela- several rival scientific theories in such
achieving this second requirement
consists of purposely providing at least tionship between such visions on thea way that the spectator is unable to de-
two alternate modes of perception be- one hand and familiar everyday modes cide definitively in favour of any of
tween which switching can occur. If we of perception on the other. In thisthem. The history of science (and, as
apply this to science, in the hope of case, there would be no need to water working scientists know well, contem-
raising it to the status of an art form, I down the sharpness of scientific vision;porary science) abounds with exam-
see two major possibilities. on the contrary, everything could be ples of controversies that remained
The first possibility is to set up an done to exacerbate the shock, to bring open over a significant length of time.
'external' equilibrium between a sci- out the fascination of this terrifyingThese could serve as starting points. If
entific vision on one hand and an way of perceiving things, which has the we choose the appropriate historical
everyday way of perceiving things on power to impress itself on our minds viewpoint, it should not be difficult to
the other. The potential here is surely as being at least as 'real' as our ordi-set up the required equilibrium. A
tremendous. As Bachelard [21] has nary modes of perception. model of what I have in mind is pro-
noted, scientific thought is character- I can imagine a number of variants vided by Latour, who illustrates the re-
ised by an 'epistemological breach'- on this theme of setting up an exter- versible metamorphosis between hy-
in plain language, the basic notions of nal equilibrium between scientific andpothesis and 'fact' by recounting the
science are an outright affront to com- everyday modes of perception. One, nightmare of a sociologist haunted by
mon sense. In this, I think he is right; of particular relevance to our present successive theories of dinosaurs [25].
just consider a few examples. condition, would be to arrange a con- Another amusing example, this time
Inertial motion. According to physi- frontation between an 'expert' and aof role reversal, has actually been pub-
cists, any object, if simply left to itself, 'layperson'. The point is not to make lished in a scientific journal in the
will continue moving indefinitely in a the expert an object of derision, but form of a "One-Act Play" [26]. It might
straight line. As Koyre [22] has simply to redress the usual imbalance,also be instructive to rehabilitate a
pointed out, this is a strikingly non- which leads us so often to submit pas-frankly obsolete theory, the simpler
empirical notion: no one in her right sively to 'expert opinion'. We are look- the better-we could bring in an un-
mind has ever seen or heard of such a ing for that critical point where we canshakable believer in the flat earth, for
thing. example, or a lost, lonesome time-
see things both from the expert's
Primary and secondary qualities. Ac- point of view and from the layperson's,traveller, unable to convince his hosts
cording to physicists and neurophysi- so that we end up really wondering(sympathetically concerned for his

260 Stewart, Can Science Be an Art?

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sanity) that atoms, electrons and so on thank Cordon Art, Baarn, The Netherlands, for 14. R. L. Gregory, 'The Confounded Eye", in
permission to reproduce Escher's Waterfall;Gregory and Gombrich [8].
actually exist. Let me emphasize again ADAGP, Paris, France, for permission to repro-
15. E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion (New York:
that the aim is to arrive at a point duce Magritte's Ceci n 'estpas unePipe; and Editions
Pantheon Books, 1961).
Cercle d'Art, Paris, France, for permission to re-
where everyone really wonders who is
produce the drawing La mere de 'artiste from their 16. T. S. Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions
right. Finally, the 'internal' and 'exter- book Direr, Dessins. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
nal' approaches could also be com- 17. G. Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific
bined. Something along the lines of References
Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
the fable of the miller, his donkey and Press, 1973).
1. B. Russell, The Wisdom of the West (London:
his son could serve as an example: a Macdonald, 1959). 18. M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge-Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge and
'fall guy' lets himself be convinced in 2. J. Locke, quoted in Russell [1] p. 215.
Kegan Paul, 1958).
turn by each of a series of mutually 3. J. Locke, quoted in Russell [1] p. 215.
19. N. Bohr, Physique atomique et connaissance
contradictory scientific theories. The 4. I. Kant, quoted in Russell [1] p. 238. humaine (Paris: Gauthier, 1961).
final moral-he would have done bet-
5. B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The20. M. Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullin-
ter to trust his own common sense- Social Construction of ScientificFacts (London: Sage,gen: Nesker, 1959).
1979).
would be worthwhile only if everyone 21. G. Bachelard, Epistmnologie, (Paris: Presses
6. Latour and Woolgar [5]. Universitaires de France, 1971).
was convinced at the time, along with
the anti-hero. 7. P. Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New 22. A. Koyre, Etudes galileennes (Paris: Hermann,
Left Books, 1975). 1966).
These are of course only a few sug-
8. E. H. Gombrich, "Illusion and Art", in R. L. 23. R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford
gestions, designed principally to illus-
Gregory and E. H. Gombrich, eds., Illusion in Na- University Press, 1976).
trate my point. My hope is that I have ture and Art (London: Duckworth, 1973).
24. F. Le Lionnais, "Science Is an Art", Leonardo
communicated my conviction that, al- 9. M. Heidegger, "Der Ursprung des Kunst- 2, No. 1, 73-78 (1969).
though science is arguably not fully anwerkes", in Holzwege (Frankfurt/Main: Kloster- 25. B. Latour, "The Three Little Dinosaurs, or A
mann, 1949).
art form at present, it could perhaps Sociologist's Nightmare", Fundamenta Scientiae 1
become one if we put our minds to it. 10. I. Kant, Critique ofJudgement (London: Mac- (1980) pp. 79-85.
millan, 1950).
26. M. Mulkay, "The Scientist Talks Back: A One-
Acknowledgments 11. J. Dewey, ArtAsExperience (New York: Minton, Act Play with a Moral, about Replication in
Balch, 1934). Science and Reflexivity in Sociology", Social Stud-
I would like to thank the reviewers of Leonardo for
ies in Science 14 (1984) pp. 265-282.
12. U. Eco, OperaAperta (Milan: Bompiani, 1962).
their constructive criticisms, and for their permis-
sion to incorporate certain of their comments 13. K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
into the revised version of this text. I also wish to (London: Hutchinson, 1959).

Stewart, Can Science Be an Art? 261

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