Fi!t' with Bythe (» pt . 30.

2017)

POLITICAL LAW
SURVEY OF RECENT SIGNIFICANT CASES
As of September 30. 201 7
by

DEAS S m FRIY M. C ASDU.ARI,",

ATES EO LAW SCIIOOL

Article 1 (National Territorv)

Update of PCA judgment

Magallono v. Ermita. G.R. No. 187167. August 16. 2011

Filets:
• R.A. No. 9522 (New Baselines Law) was passed which shortened one baseline,
optimized the locat ion of some basepoints around the archipelago and classified
adjacent territories (Kalayaanlsland Grou p and Scarborough Shoal) as "Regime of
Islands" under Article 121 ofUNC LOS III.
• R.A. No. 9522 amended R.A. No. 3046, as amended by R.A. No. 5446.
• Petitioners questioned R.A. No. 9522 because ( I) R.A. No. 9522 reduces Philippine
maritime territory as embod ied in the Treaty of Paris and other treat ies; and, (2) R.A.
No. 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels and aircrafts.

Issue:
• Constituti onality of R.A. No. 9522

Ruling:

• R.A. No. 9522 is valid.

I{easoning:
• UNCLOS has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. It regulates sea-use
rights.
• Baselines laws are statutory mecha nisms to delimit the extent of a state's maritime
zones and continental shelves.
• R.A. No. 9522 merely followed the basepoints engaged by R.A. No. 3046, save for at
least nine points that R.A. No. 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints
and adjust the length of one baseline (to comply with UNCLOS llf' s limitation on the
maxim um length o f baselines). This would have the e ffect of increasing the
Philippines' total marit ime space by 145,216 sq. nautical miles.
• The Philippines may pass legislation designating routes with in the arch ipelagic waters
to regulate innocent and sea lane passages. Even without legislation, right of innocent
passage is customary international law. Article 53(12) of UNCLOS 111 allows
innocent passage by ships and aircrafts through archipelagic waters.

Article 2, Section 3 (AFP as Protector) in Relation to Article 14, Section 5

(2) (Academic Freedom)

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First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia of the Philippine Military Academy v. the
Superintende nt of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). G.R. No.1JJ361. February 14.
2015

Facts:
• First Class Cadet Cudia was penalized by the PMA for having lied about the cause of
his tardiness during a lesson examination. He was dismissed after having been found
guilty by the PMA, pursuant to the Honor Code,

Issue:
• Was the dismissal valid?

Ruling:
• PMA complied with due process.

Reasoning:
• The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic
freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations.
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital. not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution. but to its very
survival," In this regard. the Court has always recognized the right of schools to
impose d isciplinary sanctions. which includes the power to dismiss or expel. on
students who violate disciplinary rules.
• As the primary train ing and educational institution of the AFP. it certainly has the
right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and
regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
• Due process in disciplinary cases invo lving students does not enta il proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts o f justice.
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate a cadet' s honor violation need not be clothed with the
attributes of a jud icial proceeding. There is aversion to undue judici alization of an
administrative hearing in the military academy.

Article 2, Sectio n 14 (Eg ua litv Between 'Vornen and !\len ) in relation to

Article 3, Section 1 (Equal Protection) and Article 8, Section 1 (J udicial
Power)

Garcia v. Hon. Judge Drilon, G.R No. J79267, June 15, 10 13

Facts:
• R.A. No. 9262. An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children
(VA \Ve ) is being assailed by a husband for being violative of the equal protection
and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of j udicial power to barangay
officia ls,
• The immediate case: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia sued her husband. Jesus C. Garcia, under
R.A. No. 9262 claiming to be a victim of physical abuse. emotional. psychological.

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and economic violence as a result of infidelity on the part of petitione r, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support .

Issues:
• Is R.A. No. 9262 discriminatory against men?
• Does it violate the principle of undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials through the issuance of BPO by the latter?

Ruling:
• Family courts with jurisdiction to entertain const itutionality of R.A. No. 9262
• There is a valid classification. The unequal power relationship that women are more
likely to be victims of viole nce; and the widespread gender bias and prejud ice against
wome n make for real differences.
• The BPO is issued against a perpetrator to compel him to desist from (a) causing harm
to the woman or her child; and (b) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. This function is purely executive in nature pursuant to the LGC '10
enforce all laws and ordinances" and '1 0 maintain public order in the barangay.

A r t icle 2, Sect ion 12 (Sa nctity of Familv Life; Right of the Unbo r n) in
relation to Ar ticle 3, Section I (Life, Procedural Due Process, Egual
Protection), Article 3, Section 3 (Privacy), Article 3, Section 6 (Freedo m of
Reli::ion), Article 3, Section 18 (lnvoluntarv Servitude), Article 6, Seclion I
(Und ue Dele::ation) and Article 6, Section 26 (O ne-Sub ject-O ne Bill)

Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa. G.R No. 20-/8 /9, April 8, 20U

Facts:
• Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Heahh Act of 20 12 (RH Law)

Issues:
• Right to life of the unborn - even if there is declared policy against abortion.
implementation of RH Law would authorize purchase of hormonal contraceptives.
intra-uterine devices and injectable s which are abortives .
• Right to health and right to protection agai nst hazardous products - contraceptives are
hazardous.
• Right to Religious Freedom - RH Law authorizes use of public funds for purposes
contrary to their beliefs and threatens conscientious objectors as it compel s medical
practitio ners ( I) to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and (2) to provide full and correct informat ion on reproductive health
programs and service against their religious beliefs. Section 5.23 of the 111 - RH Law
excludes skilled health professionals who are public officers as conscientious
objectors and mandatory sex education as an affront to religious beliefs.
• Right again st involuntary servitude - PhilHealth accreditation of medical practitione rs
requires them to provide 48 hours of probono services for indigent women
• Equal protect ion - RH discriminates aga inst the poor

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• Void-for-vagueness - imposition of penalty for "a ny vio lation" is vague; section 7

removes from peop le the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility and services they shall offer.
• Right to free speech - while religious groups are free from the compulsion to explain
the full range of family planning methods. they are not exempt from the requirement
to refer thei r patients to another health care facility.
• Right to privacy - by giving absolute authority to the person undergoing reprodu ctive
health care, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between spouses and parents of a
child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to dete rmine
whether their child should use contrace ptives.
• Undue delegati on - the delegation to the FDA the power to dete rmine what is a non-
abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drug List.
• One subj ect/one bill rule.
• Nat ura l law.
• Autonomy of LGU and ARMM .

Rul in2::

• Petitions partially gra nted. R.A. No. 10354 not unconstituti ona l except as to the
following:

:- Section 7 (in relation to RH-IRR)

(a) requiring health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned by religious group s to refer patie nts, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, to another faci lity.

(b) allow ing minor-parents or minor s who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family plann ing without wr itten con sent from their
parents/guardians.

Section 23(a)(1) (in relation to RH-IRR) - in so far as they punish any heahh ca re
service provider who fails and/or refuses to disseminate informati on programs and
serv ices on reproductive health regardle ss of religious belief

Sect ion 23(a)(2)(i) (in relation to RH·IRR) - in so far as they allow a marr ied
individual. not in an emergency or life-threatening case, to undergo rep roductive
health procedures witho ut consent of the spouse

:- Section 23(a)(2)(ii) (in reiation to RH-IRR) - in so far as they iimit the

requirement of parental con sent only to surgical procedures

Sect ion 23(a)(3) (in relation to RH·IRR) - in so far as they puni sh any hcalthcare
service provider who fails a nd/or refuses to refer a patient not in any emergency or
life-threatening case, to anot her health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conven iently accessible regardle ss of religious belief
.,. Secti on 23(b) (in re lation to RH· IRR and Sect ion 5.24) - in so far as they punish
any public office r who refuse s to suppo rt reproductive health programs regard less
o f religious beliefs

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)- Section 17(in relation to RH·IRR) • regarding rendering probono services in so far

as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation

Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01Ul of RH-IRR which added "primarily" in

defining abortifacients and contraceptives as ultra vires in violation of Article 2.
Section 12

,. On natural law - unless a natura l right has been transformed into written law, it
cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. Natural law is to be used sparingly
only in most peculiar circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law
is applicable.

Article 2, Section 16 (Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology) in

relation to Article 8, Section 5 (2) (a) (Standing); Article 10, Section 2
(Local Autonomv), and Section 59 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act
Paje v, Casino. et al., G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015

Facts:
• Subic Bay Metropolitan authority (SBMA) entered into a MOU with Ta iwan
Cogeneration Corporation (fCC) for the construction of a power plant. Another MOU
was entered into whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power
plant.
• An Environmenta l Compliance Certificate (ECC) by the SBMA Ecology Center in
favor of TCIC, a subsidiary of TCC. Later, TCC assigned all its rights to Redondo
Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy). RP Energy contracted G HD to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the coal-fired power plant and to assist RP
Energy in applying for an ECC with DENR.
• The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued a Resolution objecting to the
coal-fired power plant. Meanwhile, DENR issued an ECC. RP Energy amended its
ECC twice to include new components which DENR approved accordingly. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales and the Liga ng mga Barangay of Olongapo
City issued separate resolutions obj ecting to a coal-fired thermal plant and a coal-fired
power plant, respectively.
• Various petitioners led by Congressman Teodoro A. Casino filed before the Supreme
Court a Petition for Writ of Kaltkasan. The Writ was issued and the Court of Appeals
(CA) was ordered to hear and receive evidence and render j udgment. Meanwhile. a
fourth amend ment to the ECC was applied for.
• At the CA, petitioners contended that the power plant project would cause grave
environmental damage and adversely affect the health of the residents of three
Zambales municipalities and Olongapo City. That the ECC was issued without
approval of the concerned Sanggunians under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code; that the lease development agreement (LDA) was entered into
without prior certification of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
under Section 59 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (lPRA); and that the DENR
had no authority to decide on requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in
the absence of a new EIS.
• Meanwhile. a Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) was issued. DENR also granted the
third amendment to the ECC.

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• The CA denied the privilege of the writ for failure of petitioners to prove that their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened.
However. the CA invalidated the ECC.

Issues:
• DENR - (a) a new EIS is not necessary since the first EIS was within the validity
period; and (b) no permits, etc... from other agencies are required in processing ECC.
• SBMA - (a) since there was not writ issued, CA should not have invalidated the
LDA; and. (b) SBMA has exclusive jurisdiction over projects with the freeport zone
and no prior consu ltations with the sanggunians and (eNO) are necessary. besides the
subsequent issuance of a CNO cured any legal defect.
• RP Energy - CA has no power to grant relies prayed for in the absence of a Writ of
Kalikasan and that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Rulin!!:
• The petitioners failed to substantiate its claims.
• The CA erred in invalidating the ECC.
• The CA erred in invalidating the 1 51 and 2nd amendments to the ECC.
• The CA erred in invalidating the ECC for failure to comply with Section 59 of IPRA.
• The CA erred in ruling that compliance with Sections 26 and 27 are necessary prior to
issuance of an ECC; but validity of the third amendment to the ECC cannot be
resolved as it was not raised during the preliminary conference .

Reasonin!!:
• Requisites under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases: (I) there is an actual or threatened violation of a constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an
unlawful act or om ission of a public official or employee. or private individual or
entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The gravity of environmental
damage is to be decided on a case-to-case basis.
• The DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an Environmental
Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) and a Project Description
Report (PDR) for the first and second amendments.
• The ECC is not a license or permit contemplated under Section 59 of IPRA which
required a CNO; but in the case of the LDA, it is necessary to secure a CNO because
it is necessary to rule out the possibility the proposed lease site encroaches on an
ancestral domain in light of the history of Subic area as traditionally accessed by the
Aetas. However, the LDA cannot be invalidated for reasons of equity as it is the first
time this rule of action has been laid down in relation to Section 59 o f IPRA.
• Prior approval by the sanggunians of the ECC is not necessary and does not violate
the principle of local autonomy because R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992) grants broad powers of administration of SBMA over the
economic zone. The LGC and R.A. No. 7227 should be harmonized. Section 12 (a) (i)
of R.A. No. 7227 states that "Except as herein provided the local government units
comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and
identity.xxx'

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West Tower Condominium Corporation v. FPIC, et ol., G.R No . 194239, June 16, 2015

Facts :
• FPIC operates two pipeline s stretching from Batangas to Metro Manila. A leakage
was detected from one o f the pipelines into the West Tower condominium basement
compelling residents to abandon their units, FPIC initially disowned the leak thus the
residents shouldered the expenses of hauling the waste water requiring the setting up
ofa treatment plant to separate the fuel from the waste water. FPIC later admitted that
the source ofthc Icak is one of the pipelines but placed the blame on the construction
activit ies on the roads. West Towe r Corporati on filed a petition for issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan. It was joined by Civil Society and public interest groups.
• The petition prayed, among others, (a) to check. the structural integrity of the
pipelines; and (b) to open a trust fund to answer for contingencies in the future. The
Court issued a tem porary protection order.

Issues:
• May the precaut ionary principle be involved on the matter of the pipeline' s structural
integrity?
• Maya trust fund be created in a petition for a Writ of Kalilcasan?

Ruling:
• The precauti onary principle does not app ly.
• A trust fund is the proper subject of a separate proceeding .

Rea soning:
• Detectin g the issue of a leak in the pipeline is different from determining whether the
spillage of hazardou s mater ials into the surroundings will cause envi ronmental
damage.
• A trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the
environment. Section 15(e) of the Rules of Procedu re for Environmenta l Cases
proh ibits grant of damages.

LNL v, Aghom Pony List, G. R. No. 209165. April 12,201 6

• LNL ope rates a mining claim in Zambales. It embarked on a project to build a

private, non-commercial port for shipping out ores from the mines. The ECC and
other national penn its were secured. The communities and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sta. Cruz consented to the project. LNL encountered problems with the Mayor
himself who refused to issue business and mayor' s permi ts arguing that there was
leveling of the mounta in on the port site.

• Did LNL violate environmenta l laws, rules or regulation?

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Ruling

• The petition is denied. There was no violation of any environmenta l laws, rules or
regulations and neither was there a leveling of any mountain.

Reasonin g:

• LNL was given a tree cutting permit. The mining law was not applicable to the port
site proje ct.
• There were neither expert evidence nor scientific studies to corroborate the allegation
of levelling a mountain. The elevated landform is neither a mountain or hill, but an
elongated landmass or mound.

lntemational Service for the Acquisition of Agrt-Biotech Applicat ions v. Green peace
Southeas t Asia. et al.. G.R No. 2092 7/, December 8, 2015 and July 26. 2016 (AIR reversing
previous j udgment)

Fact s:
• A petition for Writ of Kolikasan and Continuing Mandamus was filed by respondents
alleging that the field trials of the pest-resistant crop described as "biocngineered
eggplant" {Bt talong} violate the right to health and a balanced ecology.
• Respondent argued that an ECC is required and that Bt talong presumed harmful to
human health and the environment.
• The Court issued the Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus.

!lli!!i
• Whether the precautionary principle applies,

Rulin::.:
• In its December 8. 20 15judgment ( I " Decision), the Court held that the precautionary
principle applies in this case and there exists a possibility of serious and irreversible
harm. It also held that field testing should have been subjected to Environmental
Impact Assessment, co nsidering that it involved new technologies with uncertain
results.

• In its July 26. 2016judgment (MR). the Court granted the motions for reconsideration
on the ground that the field trials have been completed and. therefore, the case has
become moot.

Reasoning:
• In resolving the motions for reconsideration, the Court reasoned out that there is no
perceivable benefit to the public which may be gained from resolving respondents'
petition for Writ of Kalikasan. The exception to the mootness does not apply in this
case.
• The completion of the field tests does not mean that petitioners rna)' inevitably
proceed to commercially propagate. But this is subject to permits and additional
requirements.

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• Resolving the petition for Writ of Ka/ikasan would unnecessarily arrest the results of
further research and testing on Bt talong, and even GMOs in general, and hence, tend
to hinder scientific advancement on the subject matter.
• Besides, there is a new regulatory framework (JOC 0 1-20 16) applied to GMO field
testing which corrects the inadequacies of OAO 08·2002. JOC 01-20 16 provides for a
more comprehensive avenue for public participation and addit ional expertise in the
pool of scientists that evaluates the risk assessment for field trial.

Article 2, Sect;on 16 (Right to a Bala nced a nd Healthful Ecology);n relation

to Article 7, Section 21 (Treaties), Article 16, Section 3 (State Immun ity)
and Article 18, Section 25 (VFA)

Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift, C .R. 206510, September 16, 2014

Facts:
• The USS Guardian requested diplomatic clearance to enter and exit territorial waters
of the Philippines. It ran aground at the Tubbataha Reefs about 80 miles east of
Palawan. The Tubbataha Reefs have been declared as a Natural Park. The U.S.
Ambassador expressed his regrets over the incident and assured the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs that appropriate compensation will be made. Salvaging was
undertaken by the U.S. Naval team.

• Petit ioners sought a directive from the Supreme Court through the issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan and the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts in
violation of environmental laws and regulat ions.

• Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of

the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

Issues :
• May the writ issue?
• May the respondents, representing U.S. Naval forces, be sued?

Ruli ng:
• The writ may not be issued.
• Respondents are immune from suit.

Reasonine:
• In the landmark case o fOposa v. Factoran. Jr., we recognized the "public right" of
citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of

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transcendental importance with inrergenerational implications. Such right carr ies with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
• If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign
from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the max im - par in parem.
non habet impe rium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another. The implication. in broad terms, is that if the j udgment against an
official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed
against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has
not been formally impleaded.
• In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had contro l and supervision over the USS Guardian and
its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of
the USS Guardian on the Tubataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) was committed while
they were perform ing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of
funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
• Under Article 31, [t}he flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or
damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-eomp liance by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the terr itorial sea or with the
provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
• In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of
these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common
security interests under the YFA. It is settled that "[tjhe conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative--v'the political"--departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision."
• The VFA governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine
waters in purs uance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State
immunity under the VFA pertai ns only to criminal jurisdiction and not to spectat civil
actions. such as, the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact. it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately: SEC.
17. /nstitution of separate aetions.- The filing of a pet ition for the issuance of the writ
of kalikasan shall not preclude the fili ng of separate civil. criminal or administrative
actions.

Article 2, Sect ions 25 (Local Auto nomy) and 26 (Political Dvn astv), Article
6, Sections 1 (Und ue Delegation), 25(4) (Special Purpose Fu nd), 25(6)

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Discretionarv Fund for Public Purpose), 27(2) (Item Veto), 29(1) (Pavment
Purs uan t to an A ppropriatio lf), Article 10, S e c t io ns 2 a nd 3 (Loca l
Aut onomy) and Article II , Section I (Public Office and Pu blic T r ust)

Belgica v. Hon. Ochoa. et al., G.R No. 208566..., November 19, 20/3

Fac ts:
• " Pork Barrel" or Priority Development Assistance Fund.
• Definition: "an appro priation of governmen t spend ing meant for local ized projects
and secured safely or primarily to brin g money to a representative ' s distr ict "
• Philippines: " lump- sum discretio nary funds of Members of the Legislati ve and the
Exec utive ."

Issues:
• Constitutionality of the PDAF and the "Presidential Pork" (Ma lampaya Fund and
President Social Fund).

Ruling:
• Relationship of Executive and the Legislature in re: PDAF

Ex ec utlv..c Legislative
• Proposes a budget • Passes the GAA
• Enforces the bud get • Exerci ses the oversight function
• Implem ents the budget over the implementation of law
o nly through scrutiny or
investia ation

• Violation unde r PDAF by Legislat ive Repre sentatives -

> Identification of a rea of project
>- Fund release
>- Realignment
H: No post-enactment measure or a uthority may be exercised by legis lators.

• Violat ion under "Presidential Pork"

( I ) Section 8 of r, D. No. 9 10 provid es provides: (Malampaya Fund)

... . . and for such other purposes as may be he rea fter directed by the President"

(2) Section 12 of P.O. No. 1869 (now, amended by P.O. No. 1993) provides:
(Pres ident Soc ia l Fund)

" , .. to finance the priority infra structu re develop ment projects ...., as may be
directed and autho rized by the Offi ce of the President."

H: Fails the test of non-dele gability of legislative power. However, insofar as the
phrase '''0 finance the restorati on of damaged faci lities due to ca lamities" in Sect ion
12 of P.O. 1869 is co ne rned. it remain ed valid .

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Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public Disclosure)

En Bane Resolution, February 14,2012. In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents
and the Attendance of Court Officials and employees as witnesses under the subpoena of
February 10. 2012 and the various letters for the Im peachment Prosecution Panel dated
January 19 and 25, 20 12.

Fac ts:
• Letters of Impeachment Prosecution Panel requesting for: (a) examination of rollo of
FASAP v. PAL Case, G.R. No. 178083 ; (b) certified true co pies of the Agenda and
Minutes of the Deliberations of the Court in FASAP Case; (e) examine rollo of
Navarro v. Ermita. G.R. No. 180050, April 12. 2011 ; (d) examine rollo of Gutierrez
v. HR Co mmittee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459; and, (e) examine rollo of League of
Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 and 178056.
• Clerk of Court of Supreme Court directed by Impeachment Court to produce
documents subject of the letters-request, such as. recordbooks of Raffle Committee,
letter of Atty. Estelito Mendoza in connection with FASAP Case; PGMA TRO
Petition. Mike Arroyo TRO Petition. CJ Corona's travel order in November 2011 , etc.

Issue:
• May the requested documents be furnished the Impeachment Prosecution Panel?

Ruling:
• Members of the Court, and Court officia ls and employees may not be compelled to
testify on matters that are part of internal deliberations and actions of the court while
testimony on matters external to adjudicatory functions may be subject of compulsory
processes (e.g. bribery charge).
• Rollo - No.
• Decisions, Orders. Resolutions - Yes.

Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public Disclosure) and Article 3, Section 1

(Privacv)

Philippine Savings Bank and Pascual JI. Garcia III v. Senate Impeachment Court. G.R. No.
200238. February 9, 2012

Facts:
• Certiorari and Prohibition with TRO enjoining public respondents from implementing
the Subpoena Ad Testific andum et Duces Tecum against PSB Branch Manager in
regard to certain foreign currency deposits of Chief Justice Corona.

Issue:
• May Prohibition lie?

Ruling:
• Yes.

12
f ill! w ith B'(t he (sept. 30.20171

Rea soning:
• A clea r right to ma intain the confidentiality of the fore ign curre ncy deposits is
provided under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Cu rrency Deposit Act) .
• FCDA establishes absolute co nfide ntiality. The depo sit may only be exam ined upon
written perm ission of thedepositor.
• While impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under R.A.
No. 1405 (law prohibitin g disclosure of an inquiry into deposits with any banki ng
institution), it is not so in f CDA .
• Sect ion 8 of FCDA states that "in no instance shall fore ign currency be exa mined or
inquired into or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office
whether j udicial or administrat ive or legislative, xxx''
• R.A. No . 1405 also includes de posit subject of bribery or litigation.

(NOT E: Some ca ses on R.A. No. 6426 have been the subject of discussions in the conc urring
and dissenting opinions, namely: (a) Saivacton v. Cemrol Bank (343 Phil 539 [1997]),
wherein the Court held that "The rule that exempts dollar deposits (of a transient) from
attachment, garn ishment, or • any other order or proce ss of an y court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body, cannot serve as an instrument of j ustice and
deprivea Philippine national who is the victim of a heinous crime of the dam ages awa rded to
her by the co urt." ; (b) China Banking Corporation v. CA. G.R. No. 140687, December
18,2006, wherein a wa iver by the rightfu l owner was made. ; (c) Ejercito v. Sondiganbayan.
G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 20,2006, which did not involve foreign currency de posits;
and (d) Republic v. Eugenio. G.R. No. 174629 , February 14, 2008, where
it was established that the co nfidentiality of bank. deposits rema ins a basic state policy and
that bank accounts are not co vered by Article III, Section 7 or Article II, Section 28. )

Ar ticle 3, Sectio n 1 (RighI to Life, Liberty and Secur ity; W rit of Amparo &
Writ of Haheas Data)

Burgos v. PGMA. et al., G.R. Nos. 18371 1-13. July 5, 20 11

Fac ts:
• Abdu ction of Jonas Burgos on April 28, 2007 at Ever Gote sco Mall, Commonwealth
Ave ., Quezon C ity by alleged AFP personnel.
• CHR found one Lt . Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. of the 56th Infantry Battal ion, 7th Infantry
Division, PA as one of the abd uctors.
• Consolidated Habeas Corpus, Writ of Amparo and Contempt actions.

Iss ue:
• May the Preside nt be impleaded (then as incumbe nt)?

Ru ling :
• PGMA dropped as party -re spondent.

13
File with Bythe lSept. 30 .2011)

Rodriguez v. PGMA, et al., G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 201 1

Facts:
• Abduction and torture of Rodriguez by the military but was later released through
CHR.
• Petition for Writ of Amparo wh ich included PGMA .

Issue :
• Legal characterization of command responsibility under Philippine law.

Ruling:
• Command responsibility in amparo cases applies.

Reaso ning:
• The principle of command responsibility as customary international law applies
through the doctrine of incorporation.
• Its application is only for the purpose of determining who is acco untable for the
disappearance to ena ble the court to devise remedial measures to protect petitioner' s
rights.
• Elements of command responsibility: (a) superior-subord inate relationship; (b)
knowledge of the superior or reason for the superior to know that a crime was abo ut to
be comm itted or had been committed; and, (c) failure of the superior to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators.

Boac v. Cadapan. G.R. No. 186050. December 13. 20 1 I

Fac ts:
• Disappearance of Cadapan
• Writ of Amparo filed.

Issue :
• Relat ion of command responsibility to writ of ampar o.

Rul ing :
• Comm and responsibility cannot be applied as prelude to cri minal prosecution or
disciplinary adm inistrative proceedings.

Mison v. Hon. Gallegos, G.R. No. 2107 59, June 23, 2015

Facts:
• Interpol of Seoul reque sted Bureau of Immigration Chairperson Mison to locate and
deport Ja Hoon Ku. A Summa ry Deportation Order was issued after charging Ku for
being a risk to public interest under Section 69 of Act No. 271 I. Ku was arrested and
confined at the BI detention center. Ku filed a petition for the issuance of writ of
amparo. Responde nt j udge granted the petition.

14
File w ith Byth e (Sept. 30.2017)

Issue:
• Was the issuance of writ of ampa ro valid?

Ruling:
• The writ may not be issued.

Reasoning:
• The case ca nnot be categorized as one of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance.
Ku was valid ly arrested and there was no refusal to give informati on on his
whereabout s. He afforde d visitorial rights and had access to counsel.

Han. Zarate. et 01. v. H.E. Aquino Ill, G,R, 220028, November 10, 2015

• Members of the Manoho Tribe sought refuge at the United C hurc h of Christ in the
Philippi nes (UCC P) compound in Davao City due to persisting milit arization of their
communities and alleged forcible recruitment to the param ilitary group. Certain
Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that they were deceived into going to Davao
City and we re deprived of their freedom of locom otion and were held against their
will. Their repeated pleas fell on deaf ear until a fellow tribe member was found
dead . Comp laints for kidnapping and anti-trafficking were filed. To determi ne who
would be charged, the complainants were shown "lists" identifying the petitioners in
this case. Petit ioners conten d that they have been unde r surveillance and were being
linked to the com munist rebels. The y sought the issuance of the writs of amparo and
habeas data .

• May the writs issue?

Ruling:

• No.
Reasoning:

• Mere memb ership of petitioners in organizations, such as, Bayanmuna Party-List and
the Gabriela Wom en' s Party and the implication in certain cases do not suffice as an
"actual threat" that entitles one to a writ of amparo .
• Their right to privacy has not been violated given that the information contained in the
"lists" are only their names, positions in the ir respective organizations and
photograph s. All these data are of public knowledge since petitioners are known
personalities.

15
f ile wlltl8yttle (Sept. 30.2017)

Article 3, Section 1 (Substa ntive Due Proce ss)

Valentino L Legaspi v, City of Cebu, et al.lBienvenido P. Jaban, Sr. et ul, v, Coun Of
Appeals, et al.. G.R. No. IJ9/l 0IG.R. No. 159692. December /0,2013

Facts:
• The Sanggu nia ng Pan glun gsod of Cebu City enacted Ordin ance No. 1664 autho rizing
traffi c enforcers to immobilize any motor vehi cle violati ng the par king restr ict ions
defined in Ord inance no. 801 (Traffi c Code of Cebu City) .
• The vehicle will only be released uon payment of the pen alties.

Issu e:
• Whether or not the ordinance authorizin g the c lamping of vehic les is con stitutiona l?

Rilling:
• It is constitutio na l.

Reasoning :
• Th e tests to determ ine if an ordinance is valid and constitutional are divided into the
formal (i.e., wh ether the o rdinance was e nacted within the corporate powers of the
LGU, and wh ether it was passed in accordance with the proced ure prescribed by law),
and the substa ntive (i.e., involving inhere nt meri t, like the conformity of the ord inance
with the limitations unde r the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requ irement s of fairness and reason. and its co nsistency with publ ic pol icy).
• As to substantive d ue process, O rdinance No. 1664 met the substa ntive tests of
val idity and co nstitutionality by its conform ity with the limitatio ns under the
Constitutio n and the statutes, as well as with the req uire ments of fairness and reason.
and its consistency with public policy. Cons idering that traffic co nge stio ns we re
already retardi ng the growth and progress in the popu lation and econom ic ce nters of
the coun try, the plain obj ective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest
and ad vance the gene ral we lfa re in the City of Cebu. Its adop tion was. therefore, in
orde r to fulfill the co mpe lling governme nt purpose.
• With regard to procedural proce ss the c lamp ing of the petit ioners' vehic les wa s within
the exce ptions dispe nsing wit h not ice and hearing. As alrea dy said, the
immobilization of illega lly parked vehicles by clam ping the tires was necess ary
becau se the transgressors were not around at the time of appre hension. Unde r such
c ircum stance, notice and hea ring wou ld be supe rfluous.

Article 3, Section I (Substa ntive Due Process; Equal Protection ; Police

Power)

Remman Enterprises. Inc. v, Prof essional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R. No.
/ 97676; February 4, 20/4

Facts:
• R.A. 9646 entitl ed, " Rea l Estate Service Act of the Philippines," was sig ned into law
which a imed to profe ssionalize rea l estate services by requ iring pe rsons and/or

16
File .....ith Bvthe (Sept. 30.20 171

entities to be duly licensed and cenified before entering into the practice of real estate
service. The law exempted any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform
by himselflherself the acts of mentioned in the law with reference to hislher or its own
property, except real estate developers. The latter argued that they are also property
owners and should also be exempt from the requirements.

Issue:
• Is the law violative of equal protection clause?

Ruling:
• No. the law is valid.

Rea soning:
• There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of
property is caused by the implementation of Republic Act No. 9646. If petitioners as
property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of
only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties,
such is an unavoidab le consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure. No right is
absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of
the State. The legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of
real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards
as real property transactions are susceptible to manipulation and corruption.

Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R No. 2//833, April 7, 2015

Facts:
• MCTC Judge Villanueva assa iled the policy of the JBC requiring five years of service
as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level
courts as violative of the equal protection clause. due process and equal opportunity of
employment.

Issue:
• Is the policy unconstitutional?

Ruling :
• No.
Rea so nin g:
• The function of the JBC to select nominees is discretionary. Petitioner has no legal
right to be included in the list.
• Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience. the JBC is merely applying
one of the stringent constitutional standards of proven competence. A five year stint
can also provide evidence of integrity, probity and independence of j udges seeking
promotion. This classification satisfies the "rational basis test."
• There is no violation of due process. The JBC policy is not an administrative rule or
regulation exempted from the publication requirement. Therefore, it should comply
with the publication requirement of the assailed policy and other special guidelines.
However, JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prej udiced petitioner's
private interest.
17
File wit+lllythe (S. pt. :ill.10 17 )

Ferrer, Jr. v, Mayor Bautista, et al. , G. R. No. 210551, June 30,201 j

Faets:
• Two ordinances were imposed by the Quezon City government as follows: (a)
Socialized Housing Tax - a special assessment equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed
value of land in excess of PIOD.OOO which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing
Programs of the City Government; and, (b) Garbage Fee - rates of the imposable fee
depend on land or floor a rea and whethe r the payee is an occupant of a lot,
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment.

Issue:
• Whether the SHT and the garbage fees violates the equal protection clause.

Ruli ng:
• The SHT is con stitut ional.
• The garbage fee is unconstitutional.

Reasoning:
• The SHT is a tax but with a regulatory purpo se in pursuit of the Urban Development
and Housing Act (UDHA) and intended to rehabilitate and deve lop blighted and slum
area s. It does not favor informal settlers over real property owne rs. The disparity
between them as two distinct classes is too obvious.
• The garbage fee vio lated the equal protection clause as it failed to take into account
that there is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot and an occupant of
a unit in a condom inium, socialized housing proj ects or apa rtment. Most likely, the
garbage outp ut prod uced by these types of occ upant is unifo rm and doe s not vary to a
large degree. The rates being cha rged are unjust: a resident of 200 sq. m. unit in a
condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a
resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants. all occupants of a lot with an
area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of PI 00; and the same amount of
garbage fee is imposed regardless of whethe r the resident is from a cond om inium or
from a socialized housing project.

J-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020. April 14. 2015

Facts:
• COMELEC Resolution No. 96 15 proh ibited forms o f elect ion propaganda, such as,
displaying in public utility vehicles and within public transport terminals. Petitioner
sought clarification as rega rds the app lication of the resolution to " privately-owned
public utility veh icles" and private transport term inals.

Iss ue:
• Is the resoluti on violative of right to free speech and the equal protecti on clause?

Rulin g:
• Yes, it is vio lative of Sectio ns I and 4 of Article 3 ofthe Con stitution.

18
File wittlBythe (Sept. 30.2(17)

Reasoning:
• In Adiong v, COMELEC (G.R. No. 103956, March 3 1, 1992) the Court struck down
the COMELEC' s proh ibition against the posting of decals and stickers on " mobile
places". such as. private vehicle s.
• COM ELEC may only regulate the franchise or penn it to operate but not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport term inals unde r Section 4. Article IX·C of
the Co nstitution.
• Th e owner of a thing has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. without other
limitati ons than those estab lished by law, such as, franch ises. However. a franchise is
a limitation only on certai n aspects of the owners hip of a vehicle. but not on the
totality of the right s of the owner over the vehicle.
• On the other hand. prohibition s on the posting of commercial adve rtisements on
windows of buses, because it hinders police authoritie s from seeing whether the
passengers inside are safe. is a regulat ion on the franchi se.

Article 3, Section I (Rieht to ProperlY; Procedural Due Process; Eg ual

Protection in relation to Article 3, Section 2 (Search and Seizure), Ar ticle 3,
Section 3 (Privacy); Article 3, Section 4 (Expression), Article 3, Section 21
(Double Jeopardv) and Article 3, Section 22 (Bill of Attainder), and Article
6, Section I (Und ue Delegation)

Disini vs. Secre tary of Justice. G.R. No . 203335..., February 18.2014

Facts:
• Cyberc rime Preve ntion Act of 20 12 (R.A. No. 10175)

Issue and Rulin ..· .,

Provision SC Decision on Constitutional issue s
,,
a. Section 4(a)(I ) on Illegal Acce ss "strict scrutiny" no "speech " issue
involved

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses . - The

followin g acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punisha ble under this Act :

(a) Offen ses aga inst the confide ntiality,

integrity and ava ilability of computer data
and systems:

( I) Illegal Access. - The access to the whole

or any part of a co mpute r system without
right.

19
File wrth 8ythe (S.pt. 3O.2()17)

b. Section 4{a){3) on Data Interference ., "overbreadth " - none ; failed to prove

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The

following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishab le unde r th is Act:

(a) Offenses again st the confidentiality,

integrity and availability of computer data
and systems:

xxxx

(3) Data Interference. - The intentional or

reck less alteration, damaging, deletion or
deterioration of computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message ,
without right, including the introducti on or
transmission of viruse s.

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cybcr-squattin g ., "domain name" - no violation of

Equal Protecti on Clause; it is the evil
purpose punishable
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offe nses aga inst the confidentiality,

integrity and availability of compu ter data
and systems:

xxxx

(6) Cyber-squatting. - The acqui sition of

doma in name over the internet in bad faith to
profit, mislead. destroy the reputation. and
deprive others from registering the same, if
such a domain name is:

(i) Similar. ident ical, or confusingly similar

to an existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agen cy at the time of
the doma in name registration ;

20
File witll Sytlle (Sept.lO.2017)

Oi) Identical or in any way similar with the

name of a person other than the registrant, in
case of a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with

intellectual property interests in it.

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft ;. "right to privacy" - no violation; if

user made information public, then,
no theft unless used for illegitimate
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The
purpose
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under th is Act:

xxxx

b) Computer-related Offen ses:

xxxx

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. - The

intentional acquisition, use, m isuse, transfer,
possession, alte ration. or deletion of
identifying information belonging to another,
whether natural or j uridical. without right:
Provided: that if no damage has yet been
caused, the penalty imposable shall be one
( I) degree lower.

e. Section 4(c)( I) on Cybe rsex ;. "freedom of expression" - consenting

adults not covered; "business"

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses .- The following

acts constitute the offense of cyberc rime
punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex.-. The willful engagement,

maintenance, control. or operation, directly
or indirectly, of any lascivious exh ibition of
sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid

21
 with Bythe (Sept. 30.2017)

of a computer system, for favo r or

consideration.

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography > In re: to R.A. No. 9775; no violation

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The

following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

x xxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xx xx
(2)Child Pornography. - The unlawful or
prohibited acts defined and punishable by
Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009, committed
through a computer system: Provided,
That the penalty to be imposed shall be
(1) one degree higher than that provided
for in Republic Act No. 9775.
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited > "Spam" is an allowable medium: akin
Commercial Communications to unsolicited ads by mail

> Commercial speech; option to

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The deleteanyway
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:
NOTE: Dispositive portion of SC
xxxx
decision declared this
unconstitutional.
(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Unsolicited Commercial

Communications. - The transmission of
commercial electronic communication with
the use of computer system which seeks to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and
services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affi rmative consent from

22
File with Bythe (Sept 30.20111

the recipie nt; or

(ii ) The primary intent of the communication

is for se rvice and/or admini strat ive
announcements from the sender to its
existing users, subscribers or c ustomers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercia l electron ic

communication contains a simple, valid, and
reliable way for the recipie nt to reject receipt
of further com mercial electronic messages
(opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic

communication does not purposely disguise
the source of the electron ic message; and

(ee) The commercial electronic

communication does not purpo sely include
misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recip ients to
read the message.

h. Section 4(e)(4) on Libel "cyberlibe'" - valid becau se it merely

incorporarcs gj'C libel when
committed thru computer system;
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The
"s imilar means" applied
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(4) Libel. - The unlawfu l or prohibited acts

of libel as defined in Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, comm itted
through a compu ter system or any other
similar means which may be devised in the

23
Filf witll 8ythe 30.2017)

future.

i. Section 5 on Aidin g or Abett ing and > "overbreadth" - e.g. liking;

Attempt in the Commi ssion of commenting; sharing
Cybercrimes
> H: uncon stitutional as in the US Reno
case; but should be applied to other
Sec. 5. Other Offenses . - The following acts
than libel; like Sec 4(a)(I ) - 4(a)(6)
shall also con stitute an offen se:
and computer forgery, fraud. identity
theft or cybersex..
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of
Cybercrime. - Any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission of any of the
offenses enumerated in th is Act shall be held
liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commi ssion of

Cybercrime. - Any person who willfully
attempts to comm it any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

J. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree > simply makes a qualifying

Higher circumstance; valid

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by

the Revised Penal Code. as amended, and
special laws, if committed by, thro ugh and
with the use of infonnation and
communications technologies shall be
covered by the relevant prov isions ofthis
Act: Provided. That the penalty to be
imposed shall be one (I) degree higher 'han
that provided for by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. and specia l laws, as the case
may be.

k. Section 7 on the Prosecuti on under both ,. ex.cept for online libel and online
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. child pornograph y, no double
No. 10175 je opardy

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws . - A

prosecution under this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as

24
File -.ith 8ythe (Sept. 30.2011)

amended, o r specia l Jaws.

I. Sec tion 8 on Pen alti es , valid fixin g of pen alt ies; proportionate
to se verity o f de leteriou s cyberc rimes
Sec. 8. Penalties. - Any person found guilty
of any o f the pun ishable acts enumerate d in
Secti o ns 4(a ) and 4(b) o f this Act shall be
puni shed with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine o f at least Two h undred
thousand pesos (PhP200.000.00) up to a
max imum amo unt commensurat e to the
damage incurred o r both .

Any person found guilty o f the punishab le

act unde r Sect ion 4(a)(5 ) shall be punished
with im prisonme nt o f prision mayor or a fine
of not more than Five hund red thousa nd
pesos (PhP500,OOO.OO) or both.

If pun ishable acts in Section 4(a) are

committed agai nst critical infrastructure, the
penalty o f reclus ion temporal o r a fine o f at
least Five hundred tho usan d pe sos
(PhP500,OOO.OO) up to maximum amo unt
commensurate to the dam age incurred or
both, shall be imposed.

Any person found guilty o f any of the

punishable acts enume rated in Sec tion
4(c)( I ) of this Act sha ll be puni shed w ith
impr isonment of prision mayo r or a fine of at
least Two hundred tho usan d pe sos
(PhP200,OOO.OO) but not exceeding One
milli on pesos (Ph P I,OOO.OOO.OO) or both.

Any perso n fou nd gu ilty of a ny o f the

puni shable acts e numerated in Section
4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the
penalties as enumerated in Repu blic Act No.
9775 o r the " Anti-C hild Porn ography Act of
2009:" Provided, That the pen alty to be
imposed sha ll be on e ( I) degree higher than
that provi ded fo r in Republic Act No . 9775.
if commi tted through a computer system.

25
File with Bvt he (sepl 30.2017)

Any person found guilty of any of the

punishable acts enumerated in Section
4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment
ofarresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty
thousand pesos (PhP50,OOO.OO) but not
exceedingTwo hundred fifty thousand pesos
(PhP250,OOO.OO) or both.

m. Section 12 on Real-T ime Co llection of , information does not co ve r con tent

Traffic Data and identities; but is invalid because it
is too sweeping and akin to a general
Sec. 12. Rea l-Time Collection of Tra ffic warrant
Data. - Law enforcement authorities, with
due cause, shall be auth orized to collect or
record by technical or electron ic mean s
traffic data in real-time assoc iated with
specified co mmu nications tran smitted by
mean s of a computer system.

Tra me data refer only to the

communication' s origin, destination, route,
time, date, size, durat ion, or type of
underlying service, but not content, nor
identities.

All other data to be collec ted or seized or

disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service prov iders are requ ired to cooperate

and assist law enforcement authorit ies in the
collection or record ing of the above-stat ed
informati on.

The co urt warrant required under this section

sha ll only be issued or granted upon writte n
application and the examination under oa th
or affirmation of the a pplicant and the
witne sses he may produce and the showing:
(1) that there a re reasonable ground s to
believe that an y of the crimes enumerated
hereinabove has been co mm itted, or is being
committed, or is about to be committed ; (2)

26
Filewith 8ythe (Sl>pt. W.20171

that there are reasonable grounds to believe

that ev idence that will be obta ined is
essential to the conviction of any person for,
or to the solution of, or to the prevention of,
any such crimes; and (3) that there are no
other means readily available for obtaining
such evidence.

n. Section 13 on Preservat ion of Com puter ,. valid; only preserved upon orders of
Data; law enforcement officers and not
accessible
Sec. 13. Preservation ofComputer Data. -
The integrity of traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication
services provided by a service provider shall
be preserved for a minimum period of six (6)
months from the date of the tran saction.
Content data shall be similarly preserved for
six (6) months from the date of receipt of the
order from law enforceme nt authorities
requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authoritie s may order a

one-time extension for another six (6)
months: Provided, That once computer data
preserved, tran smitted or stored by a service
prov ider is used as evidence in a case, the
mere furnishing to such service provider of
the transm ittal document to the Office of the
Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to
preserve the computer data until the
termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve

computer data shall keep confidential the
order and its compliance.

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer ,. akin to subpoena;valid when done

Data with judicial intervention; exec utive
has power.
Sec. 14. Disclosure ofComputer Data. -
Law enforcement authorities, upon sec uring
a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring
any person or service provider to disclose or

27
File with Byth e (Sept. 30.2017)

submit subscriber' s information, traffic data

or relevant data in his/its possession or
control within seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt of the order in relation to a val id
complaint officially docketed and assigned
for investigation and the disclosure is
necessary and relevant for the purpose of
investigat ion.

p. Section 15 on Search. Seizure and , valid; merely outlines duties of law

Examination of Co mputer Data enforcement officers

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of

Comp uter Data. - Where a search and
seizure warrant is prope rly issued, the law
enforceme nt authorities shall likewise have
the following powers and duties.
•

Within the time period specified in the

warrant, to conduct interception. as defined
in this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a

computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy ofthose

computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant

stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or

examination of the computer data storage
medium; and

(e) To render inaccessi ble or remove those

computer data in the accessed computer or
computer and communications netwo rk.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement

authorities may order any person who has
knowledge about the functioning of the
computer system and the measures to protect
and preserve the computer data therein to

28
Filew":h (Sept. 30.2017)

prov ide, as is reason able, the nece ssary

informa tion, to en ab le the undertaking of the
searc h, seizure and examination.

Law en forcement autho rities may requ est for

an exten sion of time to co mplete the
examinatio n ofthe co mpute r data storage
medium and to make a return there on but in
no case for a per iod lon ger than thirt y (30)
days from date of approv al by the court .

q. Section 17 on Destru cti on of Co mputer > no violation of prop erty right; user
Data cou ld preserve information by himself

Sec. 17. Destruction ofComputer Data. -

Upon expiration of the period s as provided in
Sections 13 and 15. servic e providers and
law en forcement authorities. as the case may
be, shall imme diate ly and completely destroy
the computer data subj ect ofa preservation
and exam ination.

r. Sectio n 19 o n Restricti ng o r Blocking ;- Sol-Gen concedes invalidity; violate s

Access to Com puter Data freedom of express ion and search and
seizu re rules; no judicial warrant

Section 19 empo wers the Department of

Justice to restrict o r block access to computer
data :

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to

Computer Data.- When a co m puter data is
prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the OOJ shall issue an
order to restri ct o r block access to such
com puter data.

s. Section 20 o n Ob struc tion of Justice ;- val id; not bill of attainder; merely
incorporate s the elements of P.O. No.
1829;judicia l determ inat io n of guilt
Sec . 20. Noncompliance. - Fa ilure to
still necessary
comply with the pro visions of Cha pter IV
hereof spec ifica lly the o rders from law
enforcement a utho rities sha ll be pu nished as

29
File wrttl8vttle (Sept . 30.21)17)

a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829

with imprisonment ofprision correctional in
its maximum period or a fine of One hundred
thousand pesos (PhpIOO.OOO.OO) or both, for
each and every noncompliance with an order
issued by law enforcement authorities.

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation » valid; passed tests of completeness

and Coordinating Center (CICC); and and sufficiency; no undue delegation

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and

Coordinating Center> There is hereby
created, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act. an inter-agency body
to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the
administrative supervision of the Office of
the President, for policy coordination among
concemed agencies and for the formul ation
and enforcement of the national
cybersecuriry plan.

u. Section 26(a) on CICC 's Powers and l> same, valid cybersecurity plan.
Functions.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions> The CICC

shall have the following powers and
functions:

(a) To formula te a national cybersecurity

plan and extend immediate assistance of real
time commission of cybercrime offenses
through a computer emergency response
team (CERT); x x x.

Article 3. Section 1 (Procedural Due Process; Trial by Publicity) in relation

to Article 3. Section 4 (Freedom of the Press) and Article 3, Section 14
(Rights of the Accused; Public Trial)

RE: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage 0/ the Multiple Murder Cases Against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al.•A.M. Nos. and June
14,2011

30
Filewith Bythe (Sept. 3O.2011J

Fact <;l :
• Death of 57 people (including 32 journalists and media practitioners) in
Maguindanao.
• 57 coun ts of murder and rebelli on aga inst 197 accused (People v. Datu Andel
Ampatuan, Jr., et 01.).
• Journalists and broadca st media sought live telev ision and radio coverages.

Issues:
• Revisit 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage ofthe Hearing of President
Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case and 200 I ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage
ofthe Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President
Joseph E. Estrada.
• Standard s/gu idelines/tests which may be applied.

Ruli ng:
• Partially granted pro hac vice the request. subject to guide lines.

Reasoninl!:
• The 1965 case of Estes v. Texas relied upon in Aquino and Estrada was borne out of a
jury system as distinguished from a judge. Members of the j ury are not norm ally
schooled in the law unlike the j udge.
• Later j urisprudence in Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 ( 198 1) and trends in 50
states of the U.S.A. allow varying degrees of openne ss.
• The "totality of circumstances" test in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v.
Desierto must app ly. There must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a
judge to render a bias-free decision.
• The Ampatuan Coverage Guidelines: (a) audio-visual recording for documentary
purposes and tran smittal to live radio and television broadcasting; (b) letter of
application by media ent ities; (c) installati on of a single fixed compact camera
operated by Supreme Court; (d) transmittal of the audio-visual recording with the
least physica l disturbance of the proceedings; (e) continuous broadcasting of enti rety
of proceedings; (1) no commerc ial break; (g) no voice-over s in general ; (h) no repeat
airing until after finality of j udgment; (i) original audio recording deposited in the
National Museum; m
recordin g under control of the court ; (k) special committee; (I)
appl y all other prese nt directives.

Article 3, Section 2 (Sea rc h a nd Seizu re) in relati on to Article 3. Section 3

(Right to Privac v) Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public Disclosure)

Polio v. Chairperson Constomino-David (Civil Service Comm ission). G. R. No. 181881,

October18, 20 11

Fac ts:
• Memo issued by esc Chairperso n to back up all the files in the computers found in
CSC's two division s headed by Polio. triggered by an allegation that Polio is
lawyer ing for an accused governm ent emp loyee with a pendin g case in CSC.

31
f ile . " h Byt he (sept. 30 .20 17)

• 40-42 documents found in computer files containing draft pleadings/letters in

connection with administrative cases in eSc.

Issue:
• Legality of the search conducted in Pa llo' s computer in a government agency.

Ruling:
• Valid search. Employee- Pallo had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

Reaso ning:
• Cited 0 'Connor test stating that public employers, unlike criminal law enforcers,
have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is
conducted in a proper and efficient manner. A probable cause requirement in this
case would impose intolerable burdens on public employers.
• Special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the probable cause
requirement impracticable, for legitimate, wor k-related misconduct.
• Cited US v, Simons where a warrantless entry into Simon's office wa s reasonable
ground for suspecting that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct. such
as, downloading pornographic images. (Here. the CIA later secured warrants to search
Simon's office and copied contents of computer, etc...)
• As applied to the Polio case, the following tests will be employed:
(a) Employee' s relationship to the item seized; (b) Whether the item was in the
immediate control of the employee; and, (c) Whether the employee took actions to
maintain his privacy in the item.
• Thus, where the employee used a password on his computer. did not share his office
with co-workers and kept the same locked. he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy.(US v, Ziegler)
• Pallo failed to allege he had a separate closed office or password. There was also an
express o ffice MEMO policy on use of the computer. The policy stated that the use
of password does not imply privacy.
• Pollo' s case is distinguished from a court employee who used his personal computer
during working hours to prepare pleadings for personal cases. The Court did not
allow evidence obtained from the personal computer.

Ar ticle 3, Section 3 @iehlto Privacv)

Spo uses Bill And Victoria Hing v, Alexander Choac huy, Sr. And Allan Choachuy, G.R. No.
179736. Jun e 26.2013

Facts:
• Petitioner spouses Hing are registered owners of a parcel of land used for business
beside Aldo Development and Resources, Inc. owned by respondents.
• The respondents set-up and installed on the building of AIda two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioners' property.

Issue:
• May the cameras be allowed?

32
File with B'(lnt 30.20171

Rulin g:
• The cameras should not be allowed.

Reasoning:
• An individual ' s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access.
• The phrase "prying into the privacy of another' s residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private, including a
business office. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone.
• The installation of these cameras, however. should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual. whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained.
• Simply put, a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his property,
whether he uses it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of
video surveillance camera s directly facing his property or coveri ng a significant
portion thereof, without his consent. is a clear violation of their right to privacy.

Article 3, Secti on 3 (Right to Privacv ; Writ o(Habeas Data)

Mison V. Gal/egos, 760 5CRA 363 - Korean not emitted to writ ofamparo; RA 985/ did not
apply to his case as "involuntary disappearance "

Rhonda Ave S. Vivares v. St. Theresa 's College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29. 20/4

Facts:
• Two students from St. Theresa' s College Cebu City took pictures of themselves while
changing their swimsuits for a beach party. They were clad only in their
undergarme nts.
• The pictures were uploaded by one Angela on her facebook profile. A computer
tracher reported the matter.
• The students were all barred from j oining the commencement exercises on account of
their actions.
• Petitioner-parents sought issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data arguing that their children
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Issue:
• May the Writ issue?

Rulin2:
• The petition is denied.
Reasoning:
• The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee , or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gather ing, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary
33
Fil.. with Byth.. (S..pt. 30 .20 17 )

remed y designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, inform ation, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one' s right to the truth
and to inform ational privacy. It seeks to protect a person' s right to contro l information
regarding one self, particularly in instance s in which such informatio n is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
• Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network
activit y, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petiti oners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, thr ough the
empl oym ent of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibil ity. And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN ' s privacy
tools. In other word s, util ization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world , of the user ' s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Pu blic," it can be surm ised
that the photograph s in que stion were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petiti oners' children positively limited the disclosure of the photograp h. If
such were the ca se, they cann ot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.
• That the photos are viewabl e by "friends only" docs not nece ssarily bolster the
petiti oners' co ntention. In this regard, the cyber co mmunity is agreed that the digital
images under thi s sett ing still remain to be out side the ca nti nes of the zones of
privacy in view of the following: (1) Facebook "all ows the world to be more open and
connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any co nce ivable way";
(2) A good number of Facebook users " befriend" other users who are total strangers;
(3) Th e sheer number of " Friends" one user has is usually by the hun dreds; a nd (4) A
user's Faceboo k friend can "share" the former' s post, or "tag" others who are not
Face book friend s with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own
Faceb ook friends. It is well to emphasize at thi s point that setting a post' s or profil e
detail ' s privacy to " Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
• Without proof that they placed the photograph s subject of this case with in the ambi t
of their protected zone of privacy, they ca nnot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photograph s in quest ion.

Dr. Joy Margate Lee v. P/Supt. Neri A. /lagan, G.R. No. 203254, October S, 2014

Facts:
• Petitioner and Dr. Lee were co mmon-law partners. He visited Lee at the latter ' s
condominium and rested for a whil e and thereafter, proceed ed to his office. Upon
arr ival, petit ioner noticed that his digital camera was missing .
• He confro nted Lee rega rding a purported sex video she discovered from the came ra
involving petiti oner and another woman . Hagan slammed Lee ' s head sgainst a wall
and walked away.
• Lee used the video as evidence against petitioner for violation of Anti-VA we law.
• Petitioner claimed that Lee ' s acts of reproducing the video and threatening to upload
it in the interne violated his right to priva cy, thus he sought issuan ce of the Writ of
Habea s Data .

Issue:
• May the Writ issue?

34
File with 8ythe (Sept. 30.2011)

Ruling:
• The petition is den ied.

Reason ing :
• The Court find s that Hagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy
in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction a nd threatened dissemination of the subj ect sex video. While Hagan
purpo rts a privacy interest in the suppressio n of this video - which he fears would
somehow find its way to Qutapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption - he failed to explain the co nnection between such intere st and any
violation of his right to life, libert y or security.
• Indeed, court s can not speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the
rules and ex isting j urisprudence on the matter evoke, a lleging and eve ntually prov ing
the nexus between one's privacy right to the cogent rights to life. liberty or security
are cruci al in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certain ly
renders a habeas data petition disrnissible, as in this case.

Article 3, Section 4 (E xp ress ion)

GAIA Network; Inc. v, Commission On Elections. et al., G.R. No. 20535 7, September 2,2014

Facts:
• COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous
COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime limitati ons on political adverti seme nts.
The resoluti on computed the airtime on an aggregate basi s involving all the med ia of
broadcast communications compared to the past where it was done on a per
station bas is. Thi s effected a dra stic reduction of the allowable minutes within which
candida tes and political parties wou ld be able to campaign through the air .

Issue:
• Whether th is is within the power of the Come lccto do or not.

Ruling:
• It is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so.

Reason ing :
• The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airt ime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as
it unduly restricts and cons train s the abilit y of cand idates and political parties to reach
out and communicate with the people. Here. the adve rted reason for imposi ng the
"aggregate-based" airt ime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute a
compelling state intere st which would j ustify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and politi cal parties to communicate their ideas. philosophies.
platfcrrn s and programs of govern ment. And, this is specially so in the abse nce of a
clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
• Wha t the COMELEC ca me up with doe s not measure up to that level of requ irement
and accou ntab ility which e levates ad ministrative rules to the leve l o f respectability
and acceptability. Those governed by ad ministrative regulations are ent itled to a

35
Filewith Bytlw 30.20171

reasonabl e and rational basis for any changes in those rules by which they are
supposed to live by, especially if there is a radical departure from the previous ones.
• The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime
should be based on the totality (aggrega te) of poss ible broadcast in all television or
radio stations. Senator Cayetano has called our atte ntion to the legislative intent
relative to the airtime allowed - that it should be on a "per station" basis.

Diocese ofBacolod et. al v. Comelec. G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

Facts:
• Petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin, approximately six feet by ten feet in
size, was posted on the front walls of the cathedral within publ ic view.
• The first tarpaulin contains the message " IBASURA RH Law" while the second
contained the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro- RH) Team Patay" with an ..x.. mark.
• The tarpaulins were neither sponsored nor paid for by any cand idate.
• COMELEC ordered he tarpaulins removed for being oversized.

• Would the rem oval ofthe tarpaulin violate the constitutional ri ght of the petitioners?
Rulin2 :
• Yes, this violated the freedom of speech of petitioners.

Reasoning:
• COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expression made by private citizens. The
tarpaulins were not campaign materials belonging to candida tes. Existing election law
provisions on the subject refer to matters done by or on behalf of and in consideration
with candidates and political parties.
• Section 79 of B.P.SSI defines an election campaign as an "act designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office," It also
provides that " Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues...
shall not be construed as patrt of any election campaign, or part isan politica l
activity.. ."
• The tarpaulin in question conta ins speech as a matter of public concern with in the
realm of petitioners ' right to freedom of exp ression. Every citizens expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
• COMELEC contend s that removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. But
petit ioners found it as content-based as it applies to political speech. Assuming
arguendo that the size restriction is a mere time, size and manner regulation, it is still
unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexuswith constitutionally
santioned objective, There is no compelling state interest endangered by the posting
of the tarpaulin.
• Finally, the tarpaulin rema ind the private property of petitione rs even if readily seen
by the public. Their right to property is likewise protected by the Constitution,
• The tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech. It did not convey any religious
doctrines of the Catholic church.

36
Fil...... ith Byt"" (S..pt, 30.2017)

Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, et aJ. G.R. No. 1941 92, June 16, 2015

Facts:
• Private respondents are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao
City Water District (NAMADACWAD) who were charged with several
administrative casesdue to acts committed during the fun run anniversary celebration
of DCWD, such as, wearing of t-shirt s with inscriptions and posting of bond papers
outside the designated places. The inscriptions and postings bore employees'
grievances.
• The private respondents were found administratively liable.

Issue:
• Were the constitutional rights to assemble and petition for redress of grievances
violated?

Ruling:
• Yes, there was a violation of Section 4 of Article 3.

Reasoning:
• The prohibition on concerted mass action done within the regular government office
hours pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of CSC Resolution No. 021316 is anchored on two
operative phases, namely: (a) "any collective activity"; and, (b) "work stoppage or
service disruption." Without intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the
concerted activity is not prohibited, even if done within government hours.
• The wearing oft-shirts with inscriptions during the fun run fall within the description
of"any sports attire" that the office memo allowed to be worn.

SWS and Pulse Asia v.COMELEC, G.R. No. 20806 2, April 7, 20 15

Facts:
• COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 pursuant to the Fair Elections Act required SWS
and Pulse Asia as well as "other survey firms of similar circumstance" to submit to
COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys published from
February 12, 2013 to April 23, 20 13, including those of their "s ubscribers".

Issue:
• Whether the resolution violates petitioners' freedom of speech (political speech) and
the non-impairment clause in relation to Section 26 of Article II, Section 4 of Article
IX-C and Section 26 of Article XIII which guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service.

Ruling:
• There is no constitutional violation.
37
File with lSept. 30.2011)

Reason ing:
• Petitioners' free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair Elections Act' s
purpose o f ensuring polit ical equality and, therefore, the speech of others who want to
partic ipate unencumbered in our political spaces.
• While election surveys are not per se election propaganda, when published, however,
the tendency to shape voter preference comes into play. In th is respect, these surveys
partake of the nature of election propaganda, hence. subject to regulation under
Section 5.2 of the Fair Elections Act.
• The resolution does not suppress expre ssion but mere ly regulates the manner of
publication by disclosing those who commissioned andlor paid for, including those
subscribed to, published election surveys.
• Existing contracts of petit ioners with third parties must be understood to have been
made in referen ce to possible exerci se of the COM ELEC' s regulatory powers.

Article 3, Section 5 <Freedom of Religion)

Perfecto v. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323 - f alsification ofpublic document; administrative liability
of judge; religious or moral grounds not considered

Article 3, Section 7 (Right to Information)

Sereno v. Committee. G.R. No. 175210, Feb. 2, 20/6 - request / or minutes of meetings and
other documents of N£DA regarding issuance of £ .0. No. 486 which lifted suspension of
tariffreduction on petrochemical residue; denied

Article 3, Section 9 (Eminent Domain)

NPC v, Manalastas. G.R No. 196140, Jan. 27. 2016 - inflation rate taken into account in
determining j ust compensation

Article 3. Section 10 <Non-Impair ment Clause)

Goldenway v. Equitable Bank, G.R. No. 195540. March 13. 2013

Facts:
• Goldenway execu ted a Real Estate mortgage in 1985 favor of Equitable Bank to
secure a loan. Golde nway failed to settle the loan obligation and the propertie s
mortgaged were sold.
• Goldenway 's counsel offered to redee the properties but was informed that it is no
longer possible because R.A. 8791 app lied and, therefore. barred the redemption.

38
File wit h B'('lhe (Se pt. 30 .2017)

• Goldenway argued that Act No.3 t 35 should instead apply which allowed a one-year
period of redemption and not the shorter tenn under R.A. 879 1, othe rw ise it would
impair its obligation of contract.

Issue :
• Was the right of Goldenway violated when the amendatory law, R.A. &79 1, was in
effect when the mortgage was foreclosed?

Rulim::
• The re is no impainn ent of the obligation of contract.

Rea son ing :

• Section 47 of RA . 8791 did not divert juridical persons of the right to redeem
foreclosed propert ies but only modified the time for the exe rcise of such right by
reduci ng the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3 135.
• The re is, likewi se. no retroactive application of the new redemption period because
Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties forec losed prior to its
effec tivity and whose owners retain redempti on rights under Act No. 3 135.

Article 3, Section 13 (Right to Bail)

Enrile v, Sandiganhayan, 767 SCRA 282 - social and political standing taken into account;
not a jlight risk; f ragile health

Article 4, Sect ions 2 and 3 (C itizens hip) in relati on to Article 12, Sections 7
and 8 (Acquisition of Private Land Distinguished fr om Publ ic Land )

Casan Macode Maq uiling V. Commission On Elections, Rommel Amado Y Cogoco, Linog G.
Balua, G.R. No. 1956-19. April 16, 2013 and (MR) July 2. 2013

Fa cts:
• Respondent Amado, a natural born Filipino citizen, acq uired Amer ican citize nship by
natural ization. He later on reacqu ired Filipino citizenship by takin g an Oath of
Allegiance to the Philippines and Renounced his American citizenship. Later, Amado
used his U.S. passport at least four times.
• Petitioner contends that Am ado should be deemed to have been disqualified to run for
public o ffice even as he has already finished his te rm of office in Ma y 20 10 under the
the Loca l Government Code.

Issue :
• Whether or not respondent Amad o is disqualified to run for a local elective office?

Ruling:
• Respondent is disqual ified.

39
File with BythelSept. 30.20171

Reasonine :
• The act of using a foreign passport does not divest one of his Filipin o cit izenship.
which he acqu ired by repatriatio n. However. by representing himself as a foreign
citizen, he vo luntaril y and effective ly reverted to his earl ier status as a dua l citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant he represented himself as
a foreign citizen by using his fore ign passport.
• Dual citizens by naturalization arc required to take not only the Oath of Alle giance to
the Republi c of the Philippines but also to perso nally renounce foreign citizenship in
orde r to qualify as a candidate for public office. If by the time an aspiring candidate
filed his certificate of candidacy, he was a dual citizen enjoying the right s and
privileges of Filipino and foreign citizen ship, he was qualified to vote . but by the
express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was
not qual ified to run for a local elective position. By being barred from even becom ing
a candidate, his certificate of ca ndidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
• Being a non-candidate. the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted . This
leaves the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore.
the rule on success ion unde r the Local Government Code will not apply.

David v, Editha A. Agbay and People ofthe Philippines. a .R. No. 19911. March 18, 2015

Facts:
• In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became Canadian citizen by
naturalizatio n. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the
Philippines. Sometime in 2000. they purchased a 600-squa re meter lot along the beach
in Tambong, Gloria, Or ienta l Mindoro where they con structed a residential house.
However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is pub lic land and part of the salvage zone.
• On April 12, 2007, petit ioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease application (MLA) over the
subject land whe re with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) at the Community Environment and Natura l Resource s Office (CEN RO) in
Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that the is a Filipin o Citizen. A
complaint was filed against petitioner for falsification of publ ic documents.
• Meanwh ile. petitioner re-acquired Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225 as evidenced
by Identification Certi ficate No. 266-10-07 issued by the Consulate-General of the
Philippines in Toronto. Canada on October 11 ,2007.
• Private respo ndent, Editha A. Agbay opposed the appl ication on the ground that
petitioner, a Ca nadian citizen. is disqualified to own land.

• Is the petitioner disqualified to own land in the Philippines and, there fore. subject to
prosecution for falsification of public documents?

Ruling:
• Petit ioner may be proceeded again st for violation of the Revised Pena l Code based on
a misrepresentation that he is a Filipino citizen quali fied to acqu ire land.

Reasoning:
• When petit ioner re-acqu ired Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225. the falsificati on wa
already a con summated act and the law did not have a retroactive effe ct insofar as his
dual citizenship status is concerned.
40
 File.....itll 8ytlle (sept . 30.21]11)
,
• Besides, while Section 2 of R.A. 9225 states the general policy that filipinos who
have become citizens of another country shall be deemed " not to have lost their
Filipin o c itizenship," such is qualifi ed by the phrase " under the cond ition s of this
Act."
• Section 3 of R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
• The first paragraph of Section 3 refers to re·acguisition while the second paragraph covers
retention of citizenship.
• Petitioner belongs to the first category wherein retroactivity of natural-born Filipino
citizenship cannot be applied. Besides, even assuming that the principle applies, it will not
work for petitioner' s cause because he had not alleged that he applied for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the public land application that he is a
Filipino.
• The rule that a favorable interpretation in favor of petitioner applies to a penal statute and not
to R.A. 9225 which is not a criminal statute.

Article 4, Sections 1,2 and 3 (Citizenship)

Poe-Ilamansares v. COMELEC. G.R No. 221697, March 8. 2016 - foundling: natural-born

Citizen; probability test.

Article 5, Section I (SulTrage)

Kabataan Partv-Ltst \'. CO.\fELEC. G.R. Xo. 2:!J3 IH. December 18. 20 15 - Biometrics valid:
mere regulati on: procedural not substa ntive limitation on right of suiTrage .

Article 6, Section 1 (Undue Delegation of Legislative Power) in relation to

Article 7, Section 17 (Ensure Faithful Execution of Laws) and Article 3,
Section 1 (Equal Protection)

Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No.5. 192935, 193036, December 7, 2010

Facts:
• E.O. No. I of July 3D, 2010 created the Philippine Truth Commiss ion. founded on P-
Na y' s anti-co rruptio n drive, with the " powers of an invest igative body under Section
37, Chapter 9, Book 1 of the Adm inistrative Code of 1987" and tasked to conduct a
fact-find ing investigation of the reported ca ses of graft and corru ption durin g the
"previous adm inistration ."

• Co nstitutionality of E.O. No . I: (a) separation of powers; (b) quas i-judic ial powers;
and, (e) equal protection .

Ruling:
• E.O. No .1 in uncon stitutional in so far as it is violative ofthe equal protection clause.

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f ile w ith Byt lle (sept. 30 .21)11)

Rea soning:

• PTe cannot determine if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an

information; neither could it impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.
• PTC is different from truth commissions in other states emerging from periods of
internal unrest to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice. The main goals range
from retribution to reconciliation.
• The PTC could not be borne out of the power of the President to "reorganize" under
Section 3 1 of the Revised Administrative Code because this contemplates situations
where a body or an office is already existent. Neither is it j ust ified by the power of
control.
• The PTC, however, is j ustified by Article 7. Section 17 on the duty of the President to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Ad hoc investigating committees have
been resorted to by the Chief Executive in the past, (PCAC. PCAPE. PARGO,
Feliciano Commission. Melo Commission and Zenarosa). No quasi-judic ial powers
vested in these committees.
• There is no "appropriation" for PTC but mere allocation of existing funds.
• By singling out the previous administration. the PTe embarks on "an adventure in
partisan hostility". Neither will E.O. No. I, Section 17 be able to save the infirmity of
singling out PGMA by stating that "If and when in the j udgment of the President there
is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section I hereof to
include the investigation of cases during the prior administrations. such mandate may
be so extended accordingly by way of a Supplemental Executive Order." There is no
guarantee that other administrations would be covered.
• In the case of PCGG, Virata v, Sandiganbayan declared the PCGG Charter as valid
and does not violate the equal protection clause (without any explanation though).

Article 6, Sect ion 1 (Undue Delegation) in relation to A r ticle 7, Sec tion 21

(Treaties) and Article 8. Sect io n 14 (Standards in Deci sion )

Deutsche Bank v. CIR, G.R No. 188550. August 19, 2013

Facts:
• Deutsche Bank alleged that it made an overpayment of P22.562.851.17 representing
its branch profit remittance tax (BPRn and thereby sought a refund. It also requested
from the International Tax Division (ITAD) of the BIR confirmation of its entitlement
to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

• S IR denied the claim for refund on the ground that the application for a tax treaty
relief was not filed with the ITAD prior to the payment by Deutsche Bank of its
BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB Genn any, or prior to its
availment of the preferential rate of 10% pursuant to the treaty under the 15-day
period mandated by Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-200 following the
Supreme Court Resolutions in Mirant dated 12 November 2007 and 18 February 2008
in G.R. No. 168531.

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File with 8yttHo (Sfopt. 3O.2Q171

Issues:
• Was there a violati on of the principle on undue de legation of legislative p(wo'er in
relation to our treaty obligation?
• Does Article 8, Section 14 apply to SC Resolution s?

Ruling :
• SIR sho uld not impose new requirements to burden or negate resort to tax reliefs
unde r the treaty.
• The purpose of a tax treaty is to eliminate precisely international j uridical double
taxations and to encou rage the free 0 0 \\· of good s and service s. capital . technol ogy
and persons.
• The MIRANT ruling in a Minute Resolution is not a binding precedent. Besides,
MIRANT does not a pply to Deutsche Bank's case because the latter 's case is a refund
case wh ich does not require compliance with the 15-day period enunciated in
MIRANT.

(NOTE: In C BK Power Co. v, CIR, 746 SCRA 93, the Supreme Co urt reiterated this
rul ing.)

Article 6, Section 5 (I), (3), (4) (Legi slative Districts)

Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Fac ts:
• R.A. No. 9716 entitled "A n Act Reapport ioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2 nd) Legislat ive Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and The reby
Creating a New Legislative District from Such Reapportionment."
• CamSur Population - 1,693,821 with four (4) legislative districts.
• The new d istrict. wh ich will now be the 2nd legislative district. was carved out of the
l " district (5 towns) and the former 2nd district (2 towns).
• The result is that the new 151 district had a populati on of only 176.383 while the new
2nd district has 250.000. The rest of the 3 districts have more than 250.000 population.

Issue:
• Whether or not R.A. No. 97 16 violates the requirements under Article 6, Section 5(1).
(3), (4) of the Co nstitution.

Rulin g:
• R.A. No. 9716 is valid.

Reasonin g:
• The 250,000 populat ion requirement doe s not apply to creation of legislative districts
in prov inces. This only applies to creat ion of a legislative district in a city.
• There is no fixed popula tion requireme nt for the reapportionment of districts in
provinces.
• Population is not the only factor but is ju st one of several other factors in the
composition of additional district.

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File with 8ythe (Sept .lO.20 17j

(NOTE: Read this with Mariano v. Come/ceo 312 Phil. 259 (1995), which dealt with
conversion of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City with the effect of creat ing an
add itional legislative district. The Supreme Court sustained the add itional distri ct even if
the 1990 census of Makati stood at 450,000 because the application of the
250,OOOrn inimum popu lation for cities is limited to its initial legislative district. It does
not have [0 increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district. The same rule should apply then to add itional districts in province s, cons ide ring
that a provin ce is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless
of the populatioo. The earlier case of Tobias v. AboloJ.239 SCRA 106 (1994). had raised
the issue of the lack of showing that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requ irement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify separation into 1\\'0 legislative
districts. But the Cou rt merely applied the presumption of validity in favo ur of the
passage of the law converting the munic ipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City. In another related case of Samson v, Aguirre, 3 15 SCRA 53 (1999 ), the Supreme
Court inquired into the allegat ion of oppositors to the creation of Novaliches City out of
15 barangays of Quezon City that there were no ce rtifications as to income, population
and land area presented to the Congre ss dur ing the deliberations on R.A. No. 8535 . Only
an oral man ifestation was made by the NSO representative that the population in the
proposed city of Novaliches would comprise 347,3 10. Congress presumed that the
requirements were met in the passage of R.A. No. 8535. But in Aldaba v, Comelec. G.R.
No. 188078, Ja nuary 25, 20 10, R.A. No. 9591, creating a separate legislative district for
Malolos City and amending the City Charter of Ma lolo s, was questioned. The Court laid
down the rule that the requireme nt of 250,000 minimum population for a city to have a
legislative district ca nnot be based on an assumption. Th us, R.A. No. 959 1 was declared
unconstitutional. Malolos failed to meet the requirement even on a growth rate projection
by 2012 elections . It will be noted that Malolos City was part of the First Legislative
District of Bulacan together with 5municipalities. The certification issued by the Regional
NSO Director projecting 254 ,030 population by 2010 is without legal effect because he
has no auth ority to do so, un less declared official by the National Statistics Coord ination
Board . Finally, in Serna v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, July 16,2008, the Supreme Cou rt
emphasized that the powe r to create a legislative district is legislative in character and,
therefore, the ARM M Regional Assembly cannot create the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the lSI District of Maguindanao.)

Article 6, Section 5(2) (Partv-List!

Along Pag/aum v. Comelee. G.R. No. 203766. Apri/ 2, 2013

Facls:
• COMELEC disqualified more than 52 party-list group s and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-Jist elections either by denying petitions for
registration or cance llation of registration and accreditatio n as party-list organizations.

Issue:
• Was there GADLEJ on the pan of COMELEC?
• Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT v, COMELEC should be applied by the COMELEC in
the May 2013 party-li st elections?

44
File witll9ythe (Sept. 30.2017)

Ruling :
• No GADLEJ but remand cases applying new parameters.
• New parameters laid down by the Co urt:

I. Three d ifferent groups may participate in the party-list system: ( I) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations,

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need

to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidate s in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or net, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register underthe party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their political advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented: include
labor, peasant., fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, (he elderly, women and the youth.

5. A majority o f the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "we ll-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.

Article 6, Sectio n 5(2) (Pa rtv-List)

Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505, September 20, 2015 - intromurals within Party-list
resulted to ouster of l " nominee; COMELEC with power to settle struggle for leadership but
without power 10 expel Ltco which is left /0 the House of Representatives

45
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Article 6, Section 23 (2) (State of Emergencv) in relation to Article 7,

Section 17 (Executive Power of Contro l) and Ar ticle 10, Section 16
(Presidential Supenrision over Autonomous Regions)

Ampatuan v, Secretary Puno. G.R. No. 190259. June 7. 2011

Fac ts :
• PGMA issued Proclamation 1946 plac ing the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a "state of emergen cy" and directi ng the AFP
and PNP to undertake measures as may be a llowed by the Co nstitut ion and by law to
prevent and suppress a ll incidents of lawless violence.
• Three day s later. Admin istrat ive Order 273 "transferring" supe rvising of ARMM
from the O.P. to the DILG but this was amended by Administrative Order 273·A
"delegating" supervision of ARMM to DILG.

Issue:
• Co nstitutiona lity of Proc lamation 1946 and Admin istrat ive Order 273 to 273-A .

Rulin g:
• Valid and con stituti ona l.

Rea soning:
• DILG Secretary did not exercise control. Vice- Governo r Adiong assumed the
vacated post of Ampatuan based o n succe ssion provi sion in R.A.No. 9054 (ARJ\1M
Law)
• PGM A only exercised ca lling out powe r which did not requ ire co ngressional
authority .
• The Supreme Court may inqu ire into the factual basis of the Procl am at ion. (Note:
Read these cases in relation to Lacson v. Perez. 410 Phil 78. and Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary. 466 Phil 482 . on the superfluity of a dec laration of a state of
rebellion for purpo ses of ca lling ou t the AF P.)

Ar ticle 6, Section 25(5) in relation to Article 6, Section 290 )

Araullo v. President Aquino. G.R. No. 209287, July J, 20/.1 and f ebruary 3. 2015 (MR)

Facts:
• Disbursemen t Allocation Program (DA P) sourced funds from :

( I) unreleased approp riations unde r personnel services

(2) unprogrammed fund s
(3) carry-ove r appro priations unreleased from previous years
(4) budgets from slow-moving items o r projects that had bee n real ized to support
faste r-disburs ing projects

Issue:
• Did this violate standards under Article 6, Sectio n 25(5)?

46
FUe wit h Bythe (Se pt. 30 .2017 )

Ruling:
• DAP is not a fund or appropriation but a program of prioritizing spendi ng in pur su it
of Executive Power to faithfully execute the laws. Th e re is no need for a law to
validate the program.
• But, unreleased appro priati ons and w ithdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP
were not savi ngs and the use of suc h vio lated Articl e 6, Sec tio n 25 (5).
• The GAA 20 II and 2012 gave open-ended power to the President ( 0 use "savings" for
even outside the Exec utive (cross-border).
• The: GAA 2013 correc ted the deficit but other requisites we re still not com plied with
such as the definition of sav ings an d the need for augmentati on.
• Operative fact - As a rule, it applies o nly to a law and an executive act, not a mere
admin istrative practice. There sho uld be a ruling or regu lati on by an ad min istra tive
body not j ust a n admin istrative pract ice. DA P is covered by a c irc ular and not just a
mere pra ct ice wh ich produced effect s. Th e good faith rule still app lies. The Co urt
extended thi s to the propon ents and implementors of DAP.

Ar ticle 7, Section IS (Appointments)

Velicaria-Grafel v. OP.. 758 SeRA .JU • March 10. 2010 (U cut-off f or all appoirumems
under PGAfA)

Article 7, Section 8 ( Callin2 -Out Power)

Jamar M. Kulayan. et al. v. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan, £1AI.. G.R No. 187298. July 3.2012

Facts:
• Governor Tan of Sulu declared a state of emergency in Sulu citing the kidnapping of leRe
members. describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act. He also invoked
Section 465 of the Local Government Code bestowing him the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities. and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
• The Proclamation further called upon PNP and Civilian Emergency Force to set up
checkpoints. conduct general search and seizures, including arrests. and other actions to
ensure public safety.

hsue:
• Does the Governor have such powers pursuant to Section 465 in relation to Section 16 of the
Local Government Code?

Ruli n!!::

• The Governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President.
• A provincial governor is no t end owed with the power to call upon the armed forces at
his own biddin g. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitutio n is
exclusive to the President. and an exercise by another o fficia l. even if he is the local
chie f executive. is u ltra vire s. and may not be j ustified by the invocation o f Sec tion
465 of the Loc al Govern me nt Code. Ne ither is the pro vin cial go vernor authorized to
convene a local ci vilian gro up or an organiza tio n o f priv ate citizens as it is pro scribed

47
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pursuant to th e national policy to establish one police force and under Sec . 24 of
Artic le XV III of the Constitution.

Art icle 7, Sec tion 19 ( Pard on) in relation to Article 9-C, a nd Section 5
(COl\l ELEC a nd Recommenda tion)

Arty. Alicia Risos-Vtdol v. Alfredo Lim. G.R No. 206666, January 21,2015
Facts:
• Former President Estrada was extended clemency, by former President Arroyo, by way of
pardon, as follows: " .. .. Whereas. Joseph Eje rcito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office.. . He is hereby restored 10 his civil and political
nights .. ."
• The pardon was received and accepted by former President Estrada..
• Later, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. He lost during that
elections.
• He would again file a Certificate of Candidacy this time for the position of Mayor of the City
of Manila.
• A petition for disqualification is filed against former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. which
disqualified a candidate unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty in cases
where the candidate have been previously sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude.

• Is former President Joseph Estrada qualified to run?

Ruling:
• He is qualified to run as Mayor.

Reason ine::
• Fonner President Estrada was granted absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, including the right to seek public elective office.
• The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action as provided in
Articles VII, Section 19 and IX-C, Section 5 of the Constitution. Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot be interpreted to mean a diminution of the President' s power.
• Jt is appar ent from th e foregoing constitutiona l provision s that the on ly instances in
wh ich th e President may not extend pard on remain to be in: (I) im peachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final co nviction ; a nd (3 ) case s involving
violatio ns o f elect ion laws. rules and regulat ions in which there was no favorable
recommendat ion coming from the CO ME LEC . Th erefore, it can be arg ued that any
ac t of Cong ress by way o f statute ca nnot ope rate to de limit the pardo ning power o f
the President.
• Th e d isqualificati on o f the former President under Sectio n 40 in relation to Sec tion 12
of th e O EC was rem oved by his acc eptance o f th e abso lute pardon.
• The preambular prov isio n is not an essen tia l part of an act and neither did it make the
pardon conditional.

Ar ticle 7, Sec tion 14 (in relation to AS, Section I (.Jud icial Powe rs)

San Diego v. People, 755 SCR 260 - RTC judge cannot impose j udgment which bears
clemency

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Arliele 7, Section 17 (Failhful Exeelllioll of Laws)

Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Enrique: - Interment of Marcos remains in Libingon nX mga

Bayani is valid (.July 4. 20 /7)

Article 7, Section 18 (Commallder-ill-Chief Powers )

Lagmun v. Hon. Medialdea. G.R. J3165 8, 23/7 7/, and 23 177../. 4, 20 /7

Declaration o.f Martial Law in .\ Iindanao is \'UUd

Article 7, Sections 20 and 21 (Loan A2reement)

Lanbank ofthe Philippines v. Atlanta Industries, 729 SeRA 12 - loan between Landbank and
the IBRD is an executive agreement; terms therein were incorporated in a loan between
Landbank and lligan City exempt from bidding under R.A. 918-1

Article 7, Section 21 (Peace Treaties; International Agreements; Foreign

Relations Power)

vinuya. et a/. v. Romulo. G.R. No. 162230, Apri l 28, 2010 and August 12, 20 14 (MR)

Erap was extended pardon and " restored to his civil and political rights."

In the Preamble

Facts:
• A group called MALAYA-LOLAS, alleged victims of Japanese military sexual
slavery and abu ses du ring the 2nd Worid War, sought to compel the Exec utive
Department (DOJ, OFA, and 050) to espo use their cla ims for official apology and
other fOnTI S of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and
other international tribunals.

Issues:
• May the Executive be compelled. through an injunct ive rel ief, by the Co urt?

Ruling:
• No, The Court ca n only urge and exhort the Execut ive Department.

Reasoning:
• Espousal of claims on beha lf of nationals is a di scretionary act lodged in the
Executive Branch.
• It is not the individual' s rights that are being asse rted, but the state's own rights.
• There is no sufficient ev idence to establish a general international obligation for states
to exercise dip lomatic protection of their own nationals abroad.
• The San Franci sco Peace Treaty of J 951 and the Bilateral Reparati ons Agreement of
1956 have dealt with all claim s of the Philipp ines and its nationals referring to Article
14 of the Treaty of Peace on payment of reparations for damage and suffering ca used

49
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by Japan and a waiver of all reparation claims arising out of any actions taken by
Japan.
• International settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims thereby
terminat ing any recourse under domestic law.
• Tokyo courts have dismissed suits by fanner comfort women.
• The US tribunals have also dismissed similar suits.
• The Asian Women' s Fund was established in 1995by Japan representing the
government's concrete attempt to address its moral responsibility. A MOU was signed
in 1997 by the Philippines and Japan for medical and welfare support programs for
comfort women.
• No showing that crimes committed as of the Treaty of Peace constituted jus cogens.
Neither is the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes an ergo omnes
obligation or part of j us cogens.

Bayan Muna v. Exec. Sec. Romu lo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1,2011.

Facls:
• In 2000, the Philippines signed the Rome Statute.
• In 2003, through an exchange of diplomatic notes, a Non-Surrender Agreement
(NSA) between U.S. and the Philippines sought to protect "pe rsons" of R.P. and U.S.
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals. The agreement prohibits surrender or transfer to any
international tribunal, many other entity or third state for the purpose of surrender or
transfer to any international tribunal, unless the tribunal has been established by the
U.N. Security Council.
• The Philippines considered the exchange of d iplomatic notes as mere executive
agreement while the U.S. treated it as legally binding under international law which
did not require the advice and consent of Senate.

Issue :
• Whether or not the NSA contravenes our obligation under the Rome Statute and
universally recognized principles of international law.
• Whether or not the NSA requires concurrence by the Senate.

Rulin g:
• NSA is valid and constitutional.

Reasoning:
• Characterization of intemational agreements is not cast in stone. Choice of the fonn is
based on intent of parties.
• The principle of complementarity underpins the creation of ICC. Besides under
Article 98 of the Rome Statute, the ICC "may not proceed with a request for surrender
which would require the requested State to act inconsistent ly with its obligations
under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the court can first
obtain the cooperat ion of the sending State for the giving of consent for the
surrender."
• The Philippines is a mere signatory State not ratifying State and, therefore, merely
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.

50
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• But even under Article 90(4) of the Rome Statute, " if the requesting State is a State
not Party to thi s Statute, the reque sted State, if it is not under an interna tional
obligation to extradite the person to the reque sting State, shall give prior ity to the
request for surrende r from the Co urt."
• NSA does not amend R.A. No. 9851 on International Human itarian Law, specifically
Secti on 17 (Ju risdiction) which provides options for the Philippine authorities, in the
event another court or intern ational tribunal is already condu cting investigation or
undertaking prosecution of crimes covered by R.A. No. 9851. The Philippine
auth oritie s have the option to surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in
the Philippines to an international cou rt or to anothe r State pursuant to extradition
laws and treat ies. R.A. 985 1 is a subsequent law to the NSA.

Chinn National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria. 665 SeRA 189 [February 7,
2012J

llilll
• Documents signed :
(l) MO U between CN MEG and NO RTH RAIL - feasib ility study on Railway line
Manila - San Ferna ndo, La Union.
(2) MO U between EX IMBANK of China and DOF/ORP - China to give Preferent ial
Buyer' s Credit to GRP to finance Northrail Project.

(3) NOTE: [China designated EXIMBAN K as lender

GRP named OOF as borrower
(P 400,000,000 ; 20 )'1'. to pay ; 3% I yr. interest)
CN MEG as Prime Contractor
(4) Northrail and CN MEG Contract to Construct - USS 421,050,000
(5) GRP and EXIMBAN K Co unterpart Financial Agree ment or Buyer Credit Loan
Agreement - EXIMBANK to extend Preferential Buyers Cred it (US$
400,000,000) to finance co nstruction of Northrail.

• Co mplaint to annul (1) Co ntract to Co nstruct and (2) Loan Agreement

Issues:
• Nature of: (a) CN MEG - as agent of Chinese governm en t.
(b) Northrail Project as product of executive agreement
(c) Transaction as jure imperii

Held: (a) CN M EG is not imm une fro m suit.

(b) Contract ag reement is not an executive agreement.

Reasoni ne :

• Two types of sovere ign immunity: (a) absolute; and, (b) restrictive.
• Prevailing practice is "restrictive immunity" in matters of purel y commercia l
activities of states.
• CN MEG is enga ged in propriet ary activity - con struct railwa y.
• Read the Contra ct Agreement between CN MEG and Northrail in relation to other
documents (MQUs) showing that it is CN MEG ' s initiative not the Chinese
Government's intent to carry out transaction.
51
f ile with Byttle (Sept 30.2011)

• CNMEG is a "state corpo ration" within PRe. but, the use of the term is only
descr iptive of its nature as a GOCC and its assignment as Primary Contractor did not
imply it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latter' s sovereign
functions. It is akin to a GOCC without an original charter and, therefore, may be
sued and could sue under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
• The Loan Agreement is not an executive agreement. The choice of laws of PRC as
governing law. There is a waiver of immunity. The Loan Agreement must be viewed
in relation to the Contract Agreement. i.e.• purely commercial in nature.
• The certification executed by the Economic and Commercial Office of PRe s
Embassy stating that the Northrail proj ect is in pursuit of a sovereig n activity is not
the kind of certificat ion that can establish CNMEG's entitlement to immunity from
suit. Neither would the OSG's and OGCC' s indorsements be sufficient.
• An agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, similar to the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 is an implicit waiver of immunity from suit. The place of
arbitration shall be in Hong Kong International Arbitration Center.
• The Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement because the contract shall be
construed in accordance with Philippine laws. It is but an ordinary commercial
contract.

Saguisag v. Execut ive Sec retary Ochoa. G.R. No. ]/]./26. July 12, 20 J6 - EDCA is an
executive agreement ; mere imp lementation of VFA

Government of v, M unoz. C. R. No. ]073./2, August J6, 2016 - Principle

. .p ecialty in the RP- /IK extradition agreement warrant... the that crime o f oc..cepting an
advantage (IS an agelll did 1101 have the equivalent under Rf' I{('II'.

Article 8, Section 1 in relation to A I? (JlI sticiabilitv; Consitlltional

Amend me nts)

Phi/ coma r'. (;/'11, G.R. /I.'m. 218·U)(j, 2 I JoI 761, 20../355, l/JoI../07 all d ! 0-l35.J - The
Framework Aj(reemem on Bangsamoro is subject 10 iniplcmentution through the Bangsamoro
Busic Law. Any q uestion on the FAB 's constitutionality is premature.

Article 8, Section 5(2)(a) (Operative Fact)

Film Development Co uncil, 758 SeRA 536 - amusemenl lax ; burdensome 10 return billions
collecte d by L G Us ; operative /act applies

Article 8, Section 5(5) (Rule-Making Authority of the Sup reme Co urt)

Estipona Jr. ". HoI/. Lobrigo , G.R. .\'0. 2266 79, AugU.\115, ]0 17 - Section 23 of R.A. 9165,
prohibiting plea-bargaining, violates the rule -making authorit y of the Supr('1II1! Court.

Art icle 8, Sect ion 8 a nd 9 (J BC : Nominations; Clustering)

52
Fill! with Bythe (Sept. 3O.2017)

Hon. Aguinllldo \.'. President Aquino. G.R. 224302, November 29. 2016 and f.\lR) AUj!USl 8.
2017 The clustering of nominations distributed among the six (6) meant positions a s
Associate Justices of the Sandiganhayan is unconssiuuional

Article 10, Section 6 (Just Share in Nationa l Taxes) and Article 10, Section
10 (C rea t io n of C it ies) in relation to Article 3 (E q ua l Prot ection )

League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 176951 , 177499, 178056,
November 18, 2008 ; March 31, 2009; December 21.2009; Augu st 24. 2010 ; February 15.
20 11; April 12. 20 11; Ju ne 28. 201 1

Facts:
• Co nstit utional ity of C ityhood Laws
111
• 11 Co ngress - 33 mun icipa lities converted 10 cities but 24 other municipalities
not acted upon .
• l2'h Congress - R.A. No. 9009 (30 June 2001) amended LGC. Section 450
increasing an nual income requirement for conversion of a
mun icipality into a city from P20 milli on to PIOO million.
- Joint Resolution No. 29 sought to exempt from the PIOO milli on
th
inco me requ irement the 24 mun icipal ities but the 12 Congress
ended
without Senate approving JR No. 29.
• 13th Congress -House of Representatives re-adopted JR No . 29 as JR No . I but
Senate failed to approve.
16 of the 24 mun icipalities filed cityh ood bills. with a co mmon
provi sion exempting them from PIOO mill ion inco me requirement,
which were ap proved by both Houses (except Naga, Cebu which
was passed later); cltyhcod bills lapsed into law.

Issues:
• Allege d violatio n of Article 3 (eq ual protec tion) and Artic le 10, Secti ons 6 and 10.

R uling:
• November t 8, 2008 (Carp io) - City hood Laws unconstitu tional (6-5)
• March 31. 2009 (MR) - Denied MR (6-6)
• Apri l 28. 2009 - Den ied 2"' MR (6-6)
• December 2 1. 2009 (Velasco) - Co nstitutional (6-4)
• August 4. 2010 (Carpio) - Unco nstitutional (7-6)
• February 5. 2011 (Be rsamin) - Co nstitutiona l (7-6)
• April 12, 20 11 (Bersa min) < Ad Cautelam MR den ied (6-6)
• June 28, 20 II (Bersamin) - MR den ied and Entry of Judgment granted (7·5)

Re asoning:
• Article 10. Secti on 10. which sets the standard for the creation of LGUs by
mentioning the "c riteria established in the loca l go vernment code and subject to the
app roval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebi scite in the politica l units directly
affected," has been interpreted to mean that:

53
File wit h Bythe (Sept . 30.2017)

"Congress can. via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler,

single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of
viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the Local
Government Code. albeit this Code is the ideal repository to ensure, as
much as possible. the element of unifonnity. Congress can even, after
making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding it to the
existing layers of indicators earlier codified ... In this case, the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009 upped the already codified income
requirement from PhP20 million to PhPI OO million. At the end of the
day. the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment
of laws, i.e.• the c lryhood laws specifically exempting a particular
political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in
enacting the exempt ing law/s, effectively decreased the already
codified indicators."
• No substantial reduction in "j ust share" of LCP after Cityhocd Laws. Shares. in fact.
increased.
• The deliberations in the Senate (between Drilon and Pimentel) indicated the non-
retroactivityof R.A. No. 9009 to pending cityhocd bills.
• There is substantial distinction because the 16 respondent LGUs had pending
cityh ood bills before R.A. No. 9009. They complied with all the requisites under the
old Section 4500f the LGC. The extraneous circumstances which left the bills
unacted upon by Congress were not attributable to respondent LGUs.

Article 10, Sections 10 (Creation of Province)

Navarro v. Ermita.G.R. No. 180050,July 20, 2012 (I " Decision) and April 12, 2011 (MR)

Facts:
• R.A. No. 9355 created Province of Dinagat Islands out of Surigao del Norte.
• Petitioners opposed the law because Dinagat had 802.12 sq. kms. only and a
population of only 106,95 1 contrary to the requirement of Article 10. Section 10 of
the Constitution and Section 46 1 of the Local Government Code.
• The LGC provides for 2,000 sq. kms. and 250.000 population for creation of a
province.

Issue:
• Constitutionality ofRA. No. 9355.

Ruling :
• I JI decision - unconstitutional.
• 2nd decision - constitutional.

Reasoning:
• Under Article 9 (2) of the IRR of the LGC: "The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of I or more islands."
• In Section 442 and 450 of the LGC if the LGU to be created is a municipality or a
component city. consisting of I or more islands. then. these are exempt from the land

S4
Filt with Bytht lsept. 30.20171

area requirement. Th is is a bsent in section 461 of the LGC (referring to a provi nce)
but is in Art icle 9 (2) of the IRR of LGC.
• There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
munic ipalities, but not to prov ince s. There was an inadvertent omiss ion in Section 46 1
of the LGC. The IRR intended to correct the Congressiona l ove rsight.

Article 10, Sections 15-22 (ARMM), in relation to Article 6, Section 1

(Legis lative Power), Article 6, Section 16 (2) (Majority Vole), Article 6,
Section 26 (2) (Urgent Bills), Article 7, Section 16 (Appointmcnt), and
Article 18. Sections 1.2 a nd 5 (Transitorv Provisions)

Abas Kida v. Senate, G. R. Nos. 196271, 196305, 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392, 191454,
October 18, 20 II

Facts:
• R.A. No . 10153 of 20 11 was passed providing for the synchro nizatio n of the e lectio ns
in ARMM with national and loca l elections and it also granted the President the
power to appo int O ICs for the Reg ional Go vernor a nd Me mber s of the Regional
Legislative Assembly .
• Since the passage of the O rgan ic Act for ARMM (R.A. No. 9054). several
amendments also allowed re-setting of ARMM regional electi ons.

Issues:
• Validity of sync hron ization of elect ions.
• Val idity of passage of R.A.No. 1015 3 in relation to Art icle 6, Secti on 26 (2),
• Validity of a supennajority vote and pleb iscite (213 of both Houses voting separately)
in amending or rev ising ARMM Law R.A.No. 9054 in relation to Artic le 6, Section 1
and 16 (2).
• Is ARMM autonomy violated ?
• Va lidity of grant of power to the President to appoint Ol e s.
• Validity ofspec ia l elec tions.

Ruling :
• R.A. No. 10153 is con stituti o na l.

Re as on ing :
• The Transitory Pro visions contemplat ing synchronizati on of nationa l and local
elections incl ude regional elections {vlocal ").
• Presidential certificatio n of R.A. No . 10 153 as urgent is allowed with a waiver of the
" 3-separate da ys read ings" requirement pursuant to Arti cle 6, Section 26 (2), as
interpreted in Tolentino v. Sec retary of Ftnance.
• R.A.No. 10 153 a nd R.A. No . 9333, which re-set ARMM electi on s, did not amend the
ARMM Law R.A. No . 9054 because the latter did not fix the date of the regular
elections in ARMM but merely fixed the first ARMM e lectio ns.
• The supermajo rity vot ing in R.A. No . 9054 is unconstit utional because even Article 6,
Section 16 (2) o nly requ ires a simple majority to con stitute a quorum to do business.
To allow a supennajority vote would give R.A.No. 9054 the chara cter of an
irrepealable Jaw.

ss
File with Bythe(Sept. 30.2017)

• Even the plebiscite requirement under R.A. No. 9054 for amending the date of
ARl\1M elections is incons istent with Article 10. Sect ion 18 of the Con stitution
because only amendments to the Organic Act in the follow ing instances require
not ification through a plebiscite:
(a) Basic s/ruc/ure 0/ regional governmenl; (b) region 's j udicial system; and, (c)
granl and exteru 0/ legis/alive powers cons titut ionally conceded 10 the regional
government under Article 10, Section 20 of/he Constitution.
• The appointment of DIes as interim measure has been done in the creation of Quezon
del Sur and Dinagat Islands. Holdover violate s the express mandate under Article 10.
Section 8 of the Con stitution. Holdover. by except ion. has been allowed only in
regard to baranga y or Sanggunian Kabataan officials whose term s of office are not
explicitly provided for in the Constituti on. Come lee has no power to order special
electi ons except as prov ided by another Act of Congress., or upon orders of a body to
whom Congress may have delegated a power to ascertain or fill-in details. B.P.No.
881 only allows Comelec to postpone elect ions due to unforeseen circumstances.
• The power to appoint OICs is j ustitied by Article 7. Secti on 16 on the third group of
officers., i.e.• "those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint: ' R.A.
No. 10153 is the source of such power in this instance .
• Autonomy is not violated. Besides autonomy cannot defeat national policies and
concerns.

Article 11, Section 3 (5) (Simultaneous Rererral or Complaints)

Gutierrez v. House ofRepresenmttves, G.R. No. 193459. February 15. 201 1

Facts:
• On July 22. 2010, Rissa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment comp laint
against Om budsman Mercedita s N. Gutierrez upon endo rseme nt of Party List
Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Delio.
• On July 27. 20 I O. the complaint was transmitted to House Speaker Belmonte.
• On August 3, 20 10, Renato Reyes. et al. filed another impeachment com plaint against
the Ombudsman with a resolution of endorsement by another group of Party List
Representatives. On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted
the Rule of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14 th Congress.
• On August 10. 20 10. the two complaints were included in the Order of Business for
the following day, August 11, 2010.
• On August II , 20 10, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to the Committee of Justice.
• On September 1.2010. the Comm ittee on Justice found both compla ints suffic ient in
fonn and considered these as having been referred to it at exactly the same time .
• Meanwhile. the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress
was published on Septembe r 2, 20 10.
• On September 7. 2010. Ombud sman Gutie rrez applied for inj unctive reliefs with the
Supreme Cou rt. A status quo ante order (SQAO) was issued by the Court en bane.

Issue:
• Validity of simultaneous referral of impeachment complaints.

56
Fill! wrth Bythl! [Sept. 30.2017)

Ruling:
• Valid referrals.

Reasoning:
• In exercising its power ofjud icial review, the Court noted that " (t)he unusual act of
simultaneously referring to public respondent (Committee on Justice) two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke jud icial power."
• The Court was asked by the Ombudsman to look into the narration of facts
constitutive of the offenses in relation to her submission disclaiming the allegations in
the complaints. To this the Court reiterated the Francisco ruling that such
determination is a "purely political question."
• On the matter of provisional adoption of the Rules of Impeachment of the 14th
Congress, to meet the exigency of early filing, the Court found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the House of Representatives.
• Neither would the absence of publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of
general circulation amount to a violation of due process in light of the "disc retion of
Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules."
• Finally, the Court found nothing objectionable to the simultaneous referral of multiple
complaints filed. Applying the Francisco ruling, the Court said that "referring the
complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding."

(NOTE: The Supreme Court rulings on impeachment cases have so far indicated that the
Court will readily review questions of law arising from impeachment proceedings.
However, there is no indication concretely of a matter which has been raised from the
impeachment trial itself that has been ruled upon by the Court except for the fact of
declaring that the impeachment trial has been rendered f unctus officio in the Estrada case,
including the possibility of prosecution of the respondent thereafter. The all-embracing
provision of Article 8, Section 1 of the Constitution on the power of the Supreme Court to
declare an act of the Impeachment Court as in grave abuse of discretion amount ing to
lack or excess of jurisdiction remains to be tested. The following cases are also
instructive:
(a) Romulo v. YFligue:

On August 13, 1985, more than one-fifth (115) of all members of the
Batasan signed Resolution No. 644 calling for the impeachment of President
Marcos together with a verified complaint for impeachment. The Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government found the complaint not sufficient in
form and substance and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint.
Attempts by the petitioners, mostly opposition members in the Batasan, to recall
from the archives Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint were disapproved
by the Batasan.

On August 17, 1985, in G.R. No. L- 71 6 8 8, IBP members Arturo M. De

Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, filed a petition to annul the Resolution of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government but the Supreme
Court held in a Resolution dated September 3, 1985 that the action of the
Committee involves a political question. The Court further noted that the petition
failed to allege that the Batasan had violated any provision of the Constitution. It
emphasized:

"x x x The fact that the Committee on Justice dismissed the petition on the same
day it was filed after deliberating on it for several hours as reported in the
newspapers, radio and television (which must have been the bases of petitioners'

57
FU. with 8ythe (Sept . 30.2017)

claim that the Committee had acted with undue haste in unceremoniously
dismissing the complaint for impeachment) does not provide basis lOr concluding
that there had been a violation of any provision of the Constitution which would
j ustify the Court ' s tntervenuon to ensure proper observance of constitutional norms
and conduct."

Finally, the Coon maintained that ""(t)he interpretat ion and application of
(impeachment) rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review," It declined to
issue a "Til of mandamu s against the Batasan in deference 10 the doctrine of
separation of powers.

The present petitioners. Romulo, et al., alleged that Sections -I, 5, 6 and 8 of the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitut ional principally
because these rules "empowered a smaller body 10 supplant and overrule the
complaint 10 impeach endorsed b)' the req uls lti ve 115 of all the members of lhe
Batasan Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derai l the impeachment
proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power
to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to Batasan
Pambansa as a collective body."

The Supreme Court noted that petitioners arc seeking relief "in order that the
impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith by the Batasan as a body."
Answering in the negative, the Court found no inconsistenc y in the Rules in
relation to the Constitution."

(b) In Raul .\1. Gonzales

A letter-complaint against Justice Marcelo B, Fernan dated December 14.

1987 was filed by Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court before the
TanodbayanlSpecial Prosecuto r Raul M. Gonzales. The latter endorsed the letter 10
the Supreme Court on March 16. 1988.

The leiter contained, among others, charges for disbarment of Justice

Fernan. On February 17, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the charges for utter
lack of merit and required complainant 10 show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against
Justice Fernau.

In dismissi ng the charges against a sitting magistrate, the Supreme Court

reasoned out in the following manner;

" It is important to underscore the rule of constitutiona l law here Involved. The
principle may be succinctly forrnulared in the following terms: A public offic er
who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a
qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only
by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of
such public officer. Further, such public officer. during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any court with any offense which
carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which
would amoun t to remova l from office."

The Coun emphasized the underlying rule behind the strict constitutional
route under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:

"The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of j udicial independence and
separation of powers x x x. Without the protection of this rule. Members of the
Supreme Court would be vulnerab le to all manner of charges which might be
brought against him by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties
who. for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial
authority by the Court,"

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File wit h BV1he (Sept_ 30_20 17)

(c) Estrada v. Desierto

On October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. accused President

Estrada of receiving P220 million in j ueteng money from Governor Singson from
November 1998 to August 2000 and that the President took from Governor Singson
P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for llocos Sur. A jo int
mvesugeuon was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Commtnee and the
Comminee on Justice. On the pan of the House of Representatives, a similar
investigation was conducted by the Comminee on Public Order and Security.
Other representatives moved to impeach the President.

On Nov-ember 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar, presiding over a

tumultuous session, transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed b)- 115
representatives to the Senate. Supreme COU!1 Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
presided over the trial.

The testimony of Clariss.a Ocampo revealed that IDe was one foot away
from the President when he affixed the signature -Jose vetarce" on documents
involving a P500 million investment agreement with Ocampo' s bank on February
4,2000. Further revelations by other witnesses led to an intensified trial.

On January 16, 2001, on an 11-10 vote, the senator-judges ruled against

the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing
the President held PJ.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose
Velarde." This triggered a walkout by the public and private prosecutors and
spontaneous outburst of anger by the public.

On January 17, 2001 the public prosecutors tendered collective resignation

and withdrew their appearance with the impeachment court. Senator Raul Roco
moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until
resolution of the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors.

Meanwhile, mass action against the Estrada Administration led to the

change in power in favor of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo .

On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution Nc. 83 declaring that the

Impeachment Court isf unctus officio and has been terminated.

Fonner President Estrada later faced criminal charges before the Office of
the Ombudsman. He instituted the present suits principally to enjoin the
Ombudsman from resolving the criminal cases.

The Supreme Court addressed. among others. the issue of .. Whelher

conviction in the impeachm ent proceedings is a condition precedem f or the
cri minal pr osecution ofpe titioner Estrada. "

The COU!1 ruled that "since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio,
it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual
bar against his prosecution."

(d) Francisco v. The How e ofRepeesemativ..es. er at.

59
Filewrth Bytht lSept. 3O.2017J

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution (H.

R. No. 260), sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manne r of disbursement s and expend itures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary De...elopment Fund (JDF ). l o is would later on
trigger on June 2, 20t)3 the filing of an impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Justices.

On October 13, 2003, the House Committee on Justice ruled that the
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss it on October
22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report was not sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Cons titution.

Later, a second impeachment complaint was filed four months and three
weeks since the filing of the first complaint on June 2, 2003 by Representative
Gilberte C. Teodoro and Felix William B. Fucntebella against Chief Justice
Davide, Jr . founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the
Resolution No. 60. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
Resolution of Endorse ment/Impeachment signed by at least one-third ( 1/3) of all
the Members of The House of Representatives.

The Supreme Court's exercise of its power of j udicial review was pleaded
by petitioners in determ ining the validity of the filing of a 5eCOf1d impeachment
allegedly in violation of the "one impeachment in one year" rule under Section 3(5)
of Article Xl of the Constitution.

Of special interest is the argument raised by the legislators on the need for
j udicial restraint in addressing issues confronting the Impeachment Court. The
Supreme Co urt categorically declared that "the power of judicial review includes
the power of review over justi ciable issues in impeachment proceedi ngs."

Speaker de Venecia raised the fear that j udicial review of impeachment

might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between Congress and the Judiciary. But
according to the Supreme Court "3 constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court
to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases."

The Court proceeded to inquire into the validity of Sections 16 and 17 of

Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules in relation to Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Co nstitution on the meaning of the term "initiate."

Citing the Cons titutional Commission proceedings, the Court found that
LIte word ' initiate' in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it." Amicus curiae Father Joaquin G. Bernas,
SJ. explained:

-x x x that when Section 3(5) S8)'s.. 'No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a peri od of one year,' it means that
no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action."

Thus, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,

providing a different meaning to the term "initiate," ran afoul the constitutional
standard. Initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachm ent complaint

60
Fie with 8ythe lSe'pt. 10.2017)

and referral to the House Committee on Justice. Co nsidering that the first
impeachment complaint was filed on June 2, 2003 and referred to the Hou se
Committee on Justice on August S , 2003 , the second impeachment complaint on
October 23. 2003 violates the Constitution.

Article 11, Section 13 (Powers of the Ombudsman; Injunctions against

Investi2ation conducted bv Ombndsman) in relation to " Condonat ion
Doctrine"
Carpio -Morales v. CA, 774 SCRA 43/ - Section / 4 of OMBUDSM4N Act which prohibits all
remedies aga in issuances of Omb udsman except nile 45 allowing a remedy to the Supreme
Court on pure questions oflaw takes away the special civil action ofcertiorari in denigrat ion
ofjudicial power: condonation doctrine in Administrative Law practice is abandoned

Article 12, Section 10 (in relation to A 14, Section 15 a nd A3, Section 9

(Histor ic Sites : Ar ts and C ultu re and Expropriation )

Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes. C.R. Na . 2 1 April 25. 201 7 - No taw

prohibits construction of building behind Rizai Monu mem.

Ar ticle 12, Sect ion II (Delinition or Ca pitol!)

Roy /II \I . Chairperson Herbosa. C.R . No. 20 72-16, November 22, 20 /6 - SEC-Me No. 8 is
no! contrary 10 IIw court 's interpretation of rcapttal" i ll Gamboa I'. Teves, G.R. So. 176579.

Article 12, Secti on II (Foreign Ownership in Public Utility)

Gamboa v. Secretary Teves. et al.• G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011 (pI. Decision) and
October 9. 2012 (M R)

Facts:
• PLOT a te lecom franch ise holde r licensed in 1928 .
• In 1969, GTE, an American co mpany- maj or stoc kholde r of PLOT so ld 26% of
outstanding common shares to Philipp ine Telecom Investment Corporation (PTIC)
• In 1977, Prime Holdings (PHI) became owners of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC
but these sha res (46 .125 of outstanding ca pital stoc k of PTIC) were sequestered by
PCGG a nd dec lared as owned by the Republic.
• In 1999. First Pacific. a Bermuda-registered. Hong Kong-based firm, acqu ired 54% of
outstanding capital stock of PTIC.
• In December 2006, Parallax Venture Fund bid for the 46.125% of outstanding capital
S10ck of PTIC.
• First Pacifi c announced its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder and intere st to
buy the 46.125% shares, but failed to do so.
• In Feb ruary 2007, First Pacific, through its subsid iary, MPAH , entered into a
co ndit ional sale of the 46.125% shares.
• PTIC bei ng a stoc kholder of PLDT, the sa le of 46.125% of ?TIC shares is an indirect
sa le of 12 million shares or 6.3% of outstanding common shares of PLDT.

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f ile wit h Bytl1e(sept. lO .ztI17J

• With the sale. First Pacific' s common shareholding in PLDT increased from 30.7% to
37%, thereby increas ing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLOT to 81.47%

Issue :
• Does the transaction violate Section II of Article 12 wh ich limits foreign ownership
of the capital of a public util ity to not more than 40%?
• What docs "capital" mean in Sect ion 11 of Artic le 12?

Rul in:::

I $t Decision
• The term "ca pital" refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capita l
stock (common and non-voting preferred shares).

2nd Oecision- Motions for Recon sideration denied.

• The Cou rt emphasized that the term "ca pital" refers to shares with full beneficia l
ownersh ip. Thi s is precise ly because the right to vote in the election of directors,
cou pled with full beneficial ownership of stocks. translates to effective control of a
corporation.

Reasoning:
• The interpretation is consi stent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
place in the hands of Filipino cit izens the control and manag ement of public utilities.
The deliberations of the Con -Com reveal that "capita l" refers to voting stock or
controlling interest.
• By way of illustra tion. the re will be a glaring circumventi on of the Constitution if a
broad defin ition of capital were to be applied as follows: " Let us ass ume a corporation
has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-vot ing preferred
shares owned by Filip inos, with both classes of share having a par value of one peso
(PI. OO) per share. Under the broad defin ition of the term capi tal. such corporation
would be considered compliant with the 40% constitutional limit on foreign equity of
public utilities... This is obviously absurd. In the example given, only the foreigners
holding common shares have voting rights in the elect ion of directors. even if they
hold only 100 shares."
• PLOT does not dispute that, in fact, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares
while Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 (64.27% • 35.73% ratio). This is effective
control by foreigners.

Art icle 13, Se ct ion 4 (R ights of Farm ers a nd Farmworke rs) in Relation to
Art icle 3, Section HDue Process) and Art icle 3, Section IO(C on t ra ct Clause)

Hacienda Luis ita Inc. "'. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. et al.. G.R. No. 1711 01. July
5,20 11

Fac ts:
• Hacienda Luisita (HL) was bought by TA DECO (owned by Jose Cojuangco) from
Ca mpania Tabacalera in 19505.

62
File w ith Bythe (Sept. 30.2017)

• On May 7, 1980 the Martial Law Administration filed a suit before RTC-Manila
against TADECO, et al. to surrender HL to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that
the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. The RTC ordered TADECO to
surrender HL.
• On March 17, 1988 the OSG moved to withdraw the government's case against
TADECO which Court of Appeals granted but subject to the obtention by TADECO
of PARC' s approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP). R.A. No. 6657, Section 31
allows either land or stock transfer as options for fanner beneficiaries.
• TAOECO later organized a spin-off corporation, HU, as vehicle to facilitate stock
acquisition. TADECO assigned and conveyed to HU 4,915.75 hectares in exchange
for HLI shares of stock.
• On May 9, 1989, 93% of farmworker-beneficiaries complement of HL voted for SDP
and a MOA was entered into by TADECO, HLI and farmworkers.
• On October 14,1989 5,117 farmworkers, in a follow-up referendum by DAR, opted
to receive shares while 132 chose actual land distribution.
• On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for conversion of 500 hectares to industrial use.
Another 80.51 hectares were detached from coverage as part of SCTEX, only
4,335.75 hectares remained of the 4,9 15 hectares TADECO ceded to HU .
• In 2003, a Supervisory Group of HLI sought revocation of the SDDA .
• DAR Secretary Pangandaman recommended revocation and the acquis ition of HL
through compulsory acquisition scheme. The PARC endorsed DAR' s actions. A
Mediation Panel failed to settle various disputes arising from the emergence of a new
faction from the farmer-beneficiar ies.

Issues:
• Validity of PARC' s revocation of the SDQA in relation to vested property rights of an
innocent purchaser for value over portions of converted property covered by notice of
coverage.
• Constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, Section 31 (stock distribution).

Ruling:
• PARC has authority to revoke the SDOA by necessary implication from R.A. No.
6657 wh ich gives it authority in the first place to approve the SDOA.
• There is no impingement of the impairment clause. A law authorizing interfere nce in
contractual relations is deemed read into the contract. The SOOA is a special contract
imbued with public interest. The rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the
SDOA are governed by R.A. No. 6657, a special law. The present impasse between
HU and private respondents is not an intra-corporate dispute.
• R.A. No. 6657, Section 31 is constitutional and does not violate Article 13, Section 4.
Besides, R.A. No. 6657, Section 31 vis-a-vis stock distribution has now been
amended by R.A. No. 9700, Section 5 which provides: "That after June 30, 2009, the
modes of acquisition shall be limited to vol untary offer to sell and compulsory
acquisition."
• Article 13, Section 4 has not been violated insofar as it provides fanners who are
landless to own directly orcollectively the lands they till.
• Innocent purchasers for value of converted portions of HL are protected.
• 6,296 qualified fann er-beneficiaries have the right to choose whether to remain as
HLI stockholders or not, pursuant to the 2010 Compromise Agreement.

63
 • Filewith 8'(the IStpL 30.20171
•

• The reckoning date for "taking" is November 21, 1989 when PA Re approved HLI' s
SDP.

On Motion for Reconsideration (November 22. 20)l):

Motion for Reconsideration partially granted with respect to the option granted to the
original fannworker-bene ticiarie s of HL to remain with HLI which is recalled and set
aside.

Ar t icle 14, Se ction '" (3) in relati on to A6. Sect io n 28 (3) (Ta x Exe mpti ng
Ed uca tiona l In stitutions

CIR v. DLS U. G.R. Nos . }1)65 96. 1988-1 1, (lnci J98941 - Only income prove d 10 have been
used uctuallv. directly and exctustvelv fo r educational purposes are exempt f ront duties and
f(L-res.

64