ART.

168- ILLEGAL POSSESION OF FALSE TREASURY/ BANK NOTES

Clemente v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 194367 June 15, 2011

Facts: Accused was a detainee of the Manila City Jail. Allegedly, he gave one Francis dela Cruz a fake
500 peso bill to buy softdrinks. However, the store attendant recognized the bill as fake. Dela Cruz
told the jail officers about this. They agreed that to conduct a surprise inspection on the accused. In
the surprise inspection, the jail officers recovered 23 fake 500-peso bills from the accused. Accused
was charged with violation of Article 168 of the RPC. During trial however, Francis dela Cruz was not
presented as a witness.

Issue: Whether accused should be convicted for the crime as charged.

Held: No. The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are:

(1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or
any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or
falsified by another person;

(2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and

(3) that he either used orpossessed with intent to useany of such forged or falsified instruments.

Hence,possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal
offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with
intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In this case, since Francis dela Cruz was not presented
as witness, the element of intent to use was not established. The jail officers did not have personal
knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz to use the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, is
hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.
FORGERY

Del Rosario v People

(3 SCRA 650)

FACTS: Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and
Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said
forged treasury notes. It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the
Philippine one-peso bills and the Philippine two-peso bill, and inducing him to believe that the same
were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in fact they were genuine treasury
notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had been altered and
changed, the aforementioned defendants had succeeded in obtaining P1,700.00 from said
complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the
manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether the possession of said articles(treasury notes) constitutes a violation of Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Appelant Argument: Being genuine treasury notes of our government, the possession thereof cannot
be illegal.

HELD: Yes.

Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. —
Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any
person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or
falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed in said articles.

ART. 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by
any of the following means;

1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned
therein, the appearance of a true and genuine document.

2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs
contained therein.
It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of
"the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased and or altered, with
knowledge of such notes is punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision
(1), of the Revised Penal Code.
ART. 171 FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER

Maliwat v. CA

(256 SCRA 718)

FACTS:

Maliwat somehow obtained possession of a blank form of 2 TCT, which is public and official
document, and committed acts of falsification by filling up on the blank spaces technical descriptions
of parcels of land in Imus, Cavite; further, by forging the signature of then Register of Deeds Cuevas.

Sometime in October 1975, Maliwat, accompanied by two (2) other persons, went to the office of
Atty. Milagros Santiago, then the acting Register of Deeds of Cavite, to inquire about the originals of
TCT's of the subject parcels of land in Imus. Atty. Santiago examined the owner's duplicate copies
presented to her by Maliwat and upon closer scrutiny, she noticed the annotations on the lower part
of the two (2) titles which read: "reconstituted as per order of CFI/Cavite City dated November 13,
1963 Sgd. Escolastico Cuevas." The same annotation on the two (2) titles aroused her suspicion
because she was familiar with the customary signature of Escolastico Cuevas, and the signatures of
Cuevas appearing in the two (2) titles, appeared to be forged.

Atty. Gutierrez was informed that during her absence, Feliciano Maliwat had applied for
administrative reconstitution of title and that he (Gutierrez) approved the same, based on the
owner's duplicate certificates of title submitted to him.

Maliwat, for his part, denied authorship of the two (2) forged titles and claimed that he bought the
two (2) parcels of land from a certain Benigno T. Aseo. Maliwat averred that he took physical
possession of the lands covered thereby, and paid real estate taxes thereon. He was not aware of any
title adverse to his own titles.

Issue: WON petitioner's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: Yes.

The fact that no proof was introduced to prove or show as to who committed the falsification, does
not exempt or exculpate the accused-appellant from liability. The accused-appellant is the person
who stood to benefit by the falsification of the documents in question as such, "it is presumed that he
is the material author of the falsifications."

The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who
used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification
If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the
falsification.

People v. Reodica

(62 Phil. 567)

FACTS: July, 1931, the appellant was municipal treasurer of Bacuit, Province of Palawan. It was alleged
that he falsified the municipal payroll corresponding to the month of July by making it appear therein
that one, Sinforoso Cordero, rendered services as municipal secretary from July 23 to July 31, which
was not true, for said Sinforoso Cordero was absent from the municipality of Bacuit from July 23,
1931, and did not return until 1933.

It appeared that the said municipal payroll was submitted to the appellant by the municipal president
already prepared. When this payroll was received by the appellant on July 23, it was already signed
and payment thereof approved by the president, with the latter's certification that the services
therein mentioned were rendered.

Issue: WON such act constitutes falsification.

Held: Reodica is not guilty of falsification of pay roll because the president (and not he) is the one who
certifies that the services of the officer(Cordero) were in fact rendered.

However, in view of the leave granted to Sinforoso Cordero from July 23 to July 31, for the purpose of
the payment of his salary, this amounted to his having rendered services during this
period.1awphil.net

While the information likewise states that the appellant certified in the payroll that paid Sinforoso
Cordero's salary on July 31, 1931, it does not allege, however, that this was not true, and although it
appears that the appellant made this payment on July 23, he was not charged Cordero having been in
fact paid, it was immaterial whether this was done on July 23 of July 31.

Such alterations, even granting that the appellant was responsible therefor, do not effect either the
veracity of the document of the effects thereof, and do not constitute the crime of falsification.
(Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 25, 1885, and June 21, 1886.)

Cabigas v. People
(152 SCRA 18)

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Securities Section of the Land Bank of the
Philippines Makati Branch. Assisting him in work is Benedicto Reynes, the securities receiving clerk.

2. On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department delivered to the Securities Section, Makati
Branch of LBP, for safekeeping, 112 pieces of treasury notes and treasury bills worth P46m and for
which a copy of the Securities Delivery Receipt(SDR) was issued to the Fund Mgt Dept. while the
original was kept by the Securities Section. After receiving the securities, the accused would prepare
the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody(DR SDUC) evidencing the securities
transactions and operations of the Makati Brand of LBP.

3. On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasure notes and bills deposited with
them, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six (6) treasury bills.

4. Upon verification that SDR was the source document of the missing securities which were delivered
to them for safekeeping, accused Reynedd crossed out with a red ink in the said document the last
two digits "82" and the addition after them of the figure "76" on the serial numbers A-000064 to A-
000082 of the 19 treasurey bills of the 795th series with a total maturity value of P9.5m. Then at the
bottom of the SDR, Cabigas placed the notation "For adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82".
Cabigas suggested Reynes to report the incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram.

5. Insted of following the draft prepared by Reynes, Cabigas prepared his own report. At the bottom
of DR SDUC, Cabigas placed the notation "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated March 9,
1982" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign which appears after the figure "1,533".

6. On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central Bank of the
Philippines a treasury bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082 in the amount of P5m. Upon
investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered that the LBP Makati Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram,
was the one who negotiated the said treasury bill with the Gainsbo Commodities.

7. On May 24, 1982, Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. Therafter, Cabigas and
Reynes were arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying the SDR dated March 9,
1982.

8. Sandiganbayan convicted the then defendant on the premise that they changed the figures in DR
SDUC pertaining to treasury bill from 1639 to 1622 to conceal the loss or disappearance of 6 treasury
bill worth P3m.

Issue: WON Art. 171 of the RPC lie

Held: No. The accused was acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.

It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par. No. 4 of Article 171, which reads-
"by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts,"-the following elements must concur-

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and

(d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring
a third person.

The petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not present in the case at bar. The correction
of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of treasury under custody is
not falsification because it was made to speak the truth. The adjustment on the erroneous entry was
not effected to hide or conceal the fact that the missing 6 treasury bills were lost.

The Solicitor General also contends that there is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982
for the alleged falsification of which petitioner was convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the
submission of which was or is required by law. It was not an official form of LBP but the petitioner's
own initiative adopted for his own convenience and for reference purposes. Petitioner therefore, was
not under legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth by said DR SDUC. In the absence of such
obligation and of the alleged wrongful intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime of
falsification of public document with which he is charged.

People vs Sendaydiego, et. al.

G.R. No. L-33254 and 33253 January 20, 1978

Facts:

In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969
Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y
Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit,
the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle
from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR
SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two
officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.

The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs.

Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches
that the expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not
signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects.
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is
signed by the provincial engineer. Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and
payment, appropriations and funds being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial
treasurer. Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated
February 28, 1969, certifying that the voucher has been pre-audited and signed by the auditor.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the
provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is
chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. " It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two
part of the voucher.

Issue: Whether or not appellants are liable for the crimes of falsicification of public documents and six
crimes of malversation?

Held:

Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation.
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties: For each
of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years
of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos. For the
malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of
P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO.
23349, L-33252). For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh.
O), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the
sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case
No. 23351, L-33254). For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870
(Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium,
as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23350, L-33253). For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh.
R), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23350, L-33253). For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh.
P), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and
to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). In
the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the
maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years
to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51)
years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533). The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed
forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59
Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58).

The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in
the sum of P57,048.23. Samson and the said estate are solitarily liable for the said indemnity (Art.
110, Revised Penal Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs. SO ORDERED.

US v. Sumangil

(15 Phil. 406)

Facts: On May 16 and 19, 1908, Sumangil, being the municipal treasurer of Cuyapo, maliciously and
criminally abused his office by issuing an official document as a voucher for certain expenses, in which
was set forth a payment of P3.50 and P1.50, respectively:

(1) made to Tomas Daprosa for the transportation, from Paniqui to Cuyapo, of certain boxes
belonging to the municipality, when the sum actually paid was P0.60 and not that herein before
stated; and

(2) to Vicente Defiesta, for the transportation of three cases of oil belonging to the municipality from
Paniqui to Cuyapo, this not being the true amount paid, which was P0.50,

…making such false statement of facts for the purpose of appropriating the balance.

Issue: WON guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been established.

Held: Yes. The court found no error in the proceedings. However, the court is in view of what it seems
to be the excessive penalty imposes by the law, taking into consideration of the degree of malice and
the injury caused by the said crime. Hence, the court recommends clemency.

Siquian v. People

Facts:

Jesusa Carreon went to the office of Manuel Siquian, themunicipal mayor of Isabela, to apply for a job
in the office of themayor. Siquian then appointed her as a clerk in the office of themunicipal secretary
and even said that her salary would beincluded in the budget. Accompanying her appointment is
thecertification, among others, of the availability of funds through aform issued by Siquian and
addressed to the CSC, pursuant to therequirements of the latter.It should be noted that the Municipal
council of Isabela,failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-76. As
such, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-75, was deemed re-enacted. No such
position existedthen.Carreon worked for five months and was supposed toreceive her salary of P120.
She approached the municipal treasurerto ask for the money but the latter said that there was no
moneyyet. She then sued Siquian for falsification of a public document. The RTC and CA ruled in
favour of Carreon. Siquianinterposed the defense of a lack of criminal intent.

Issue: Is Siquian guilty of falsification of public documents?

Ruling: Yes.

He was found guilty under par 4 of art 171, “making untruthful statements in a narration of facts”;

the elements of which are:

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) that he has a legal obligationto disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) That thefacts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.

In this case, all the elements for falsification were met especially when Siquian stated that funds were
available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the
position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated. It is further bolstered by the
fact that when the budget was deemed re-enacted, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal
Secretary, the position to which Carreon was appointed. And there is also no appropriation made in
the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-75 for such position, thus rendering Siquian's statement in
his certification utterly false.

Siquian also had the legal obligation to disclose the truth of such facts. Under the civil service rules
and regulations, a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to
be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an
officer authorized by law to issue the certification, Siquian has a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as to the availability of the
funds for the position being filled up.

He also took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document. Abuse of public office is
considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office
which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a
document. In this case, Siquian was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for
the appointment of Carreon.

Lastly, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified
document is a public document. The SC relied on the Go Tiok case in stating that wrongful intent on
the part of an accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification
of public document. This is because the principal thing punished in falsifying public or official
document is the violation of public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed. In
falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a
document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause
such damage becomes immaterial.
BITRARY DETENTION (ART. 124)

ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 154130)

Facts:

On September 1, 1997, a team was sent to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the government’s campaign
against illegal logging. Upon investigation of the group, Mayor Astorga was found to be the owner of
two boats. A heated altercation ensued and Mayor Astorga called for reinforcements. Ten armed men
arrived in the scene. The offended parties were then brought to Mayor Astorga’s house where they
had dinner and drinks and left at 2:30am. SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go downfrom the house,
but not to leave the barangay. On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until
2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to leave.

Issue: Whether Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention.

Held:

Yes. Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention. Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public
officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person.

The elements of the crime are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. In spite of their pleas, the witnesses and
the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by the
call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issued rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. Given such
circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s statement that it was not "safe" to refuse
Mayor Astorga’s orders. It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect
these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds
of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent
to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

People of the Philippines vs. Trestiza

GR 193833 November 16, 2011

Facts: On Nov. 7, 2002 at about 1:00 AM, Irma Navarro and her boyfriend Lawrence Yu were at a
party in Makati. She went out ahead of Lawrence. She was about to open the door of Lawrence's
Honda Car When 3 armed mend emerged from a van and hit her on the nape. She recognized one of
the three accused as Pineda. The other two were policemen Manrique and Trestiza. She was made to
enter the Honda car. Lawrence, on the other hand, was also accosted and was brought inside the van.
Later on, they were brought together. Their valuables were taken with threats that their families will
be in danger. They were also told that they should call their friends to get the money the accused
asked of them. Two of their friends raised 180, 000 Php. They were then released. Later on, as
accused Pineda kept on calling them for the alleged balance, an entrapment operation was planned.
Pineda was arrested. The other two accused, Manrique and Trestiza, were arrested later. The trial
court found the three accused guilty of the crim of Kidnapping for ransom. The CA affirmed. Only
Trestiza appealed.

Issue: 1. WON Trestiza's warrantless arrest was lawful. 2. WON Trestiza is guilty of kidnapping with
ransom.

Held:

1. No. It is clear that Trestiza's warrantless arrest does not fall under any of the circumstances
mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113. However, any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of
the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Trestiza failed to make a valid
objection to his warrantless arrest and is deemed to have waived any objection thereto.

2. Yes. It is quite clear that in abduting and taking away the victim, the appelants did so neither in
furtherance of official functions nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. Conspiracy may be
implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent
of each other, were, in fact, connected and copperativem indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment.

Trestiza was positively identified by the victim Lawrence Yu stating that he was "sandwiched" by two
persons while a man was holding a gun in front of him. One of those was Trestiza. It was also him who
was driving the vehicle. The accused got their valuables and arranged to get 180, 000 Php from the
victim's friends as ransom

Miranda v. Arizona

Facts:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial
interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or
a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these
cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the
interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them,
signed statements that were admitted at trial.

Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where
he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two
hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were
presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30
years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s
constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession.

Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a
dress shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad
headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally admitted the robbery
and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he
was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed
the questions and answers. At trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury.
Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment. The
conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.

Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two
Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police station. A report was also received from the FBI that
Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover was interrogated the night of the
arrest and the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the
station. After two-and-a-half hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions,
which had been prepared by one of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies
in California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the California
robberies and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on each count. The conviction was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of
the victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks
stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home. Police also arrested Stewart’s wife
and three other people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five
days, was interrogated on nine different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart
stated that he had robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released
the four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any of them
with the crime. At trial, Stewart’s statements were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that
Stewart should have been advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Issues: Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation” are admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether “procedures which assure
that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be
compelled to incriminate himself” are necessary.

Held:
The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of
action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such,
“the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so
freely.” Therefore, a defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires.”

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the
judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of California
in Stewart.

.
DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS (ART. 125)

PEOPLE vs. GARCIA (G.R. No. 126252)

Facts:

On November 28, 1994, Enmodias and SPO3 Panganiban boarded a passenger jeepney from their to
Baguio City. He took the seat behind the jeepney driver while SPO3Panganiban sat opposite him.
Accused Garcia boarded and sat beside the driver. The policemen smelled marijuana which seemed to
emanate from the bag of the accused.. To confirm their suspicion, they decided to follow accused
when he gets off the jeepney.The policemen followed the accused and later on identified themselves
to him and asked the latter if they can inspect his bag. Upon surrender of the bag, bricks of marijuana
were discovered. As a consequence, the accused was arrested and the bag seized.The next day, the
policemen executed their joint affidavit of arrest and transferred the accused to the Baguio city jail.
Verification by the arresting officers of the records at the Narcotics Command revealed that the name
of the accused was in the list of drug dealers.

Issue:

Whether the police officers were guilty of arbitrary detention and delay in the delivery of detained
persons.

Held:

The police officers cannot be held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at the CIS office. Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes a public officer who shall detain another for some
legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties. In the present case, the record bears that appellant was arrested for
possession of five (5) kilos of marijuana on November 28, 1994 at 2 p.m., a crime punishable with
reclusion perpetua to death. He was detained for further investigation and delivered by the arresting
officers to the court in the afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes
of investigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law, i.e., 36 hours from the time of his arrest.

Sayo vs. Chief of Police

(80 Phil. 859)

Summary: Two suspects of a robbery were arrested upon a complaint of another person.

Rule of Law: Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty except by warrant of
arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant
and his witness.
Facts: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging Melencio Sayo (D) and Joaquin Mostero (D)
with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila,
arrested the Sayo (D) and Mostero (D), and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office
of Manila. When the petition for habeas corpus was heard, the Sayo (D) and Mostero (D) were still
detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed charges against them with
the proper courts justice. This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a
sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila

Issues: 1. Is the warrantless arrest valid? 2. Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the
meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:

1. No. Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his
witness.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the
offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or
the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. A fortiori a police officer
has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the
offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged.

2. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of
six hours."

The words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said
courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person
charged with having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts
as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)

The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to
include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest
or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a
person arrested without warrant.
SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED

Stonehill vs Diokno

20 SCRA 383

Facts:

Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the
offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used
as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

Held:

No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each
of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON

TORRES v. GONZALES (G.R. No. 76872)

FACTS:

1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition
that he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded
against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa.
In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled
the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting
him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet
final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD:

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by
final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.

Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions
thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to
suffer the penalty prescribed.

In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is
not subject to judicial scrutiny.

*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a
generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether
a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the
Government [has] such power been intrusted.
PIRACY

People v. Lol-lo

(43 Phil. 19)

FACTS:

• 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in
the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas
manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for
themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of
the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were
made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession.
2 of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2
women were able to escape.

• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy

• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility.

• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.

• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.

• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes."

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether the accused committed the crime of piracy – YES

2. Whether Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case – YES

3. Whether the Spanish Penal Code provisions on piracy are still in force – YES

RATIO:
1. The accused are guilty of priracy.

Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo
furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. All of the elements of the crime of piracy
are present.

2. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case.

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against
all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, “for those limits, though neutral to
war, are not neutral to crimes.

3. The Spanish Penal Code provisions on piracy are still in force.

The provisions of the Spanish Penal Code on piracy are still in force in the Philippines even when there
is a change in the sovereign power from Spain to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris
(1898). While political laws are necessarily changed with the change in the sovereign, municipal laws
remain in force as long as they are consistent with the U.S. Constitution, the laws of the U.S., or the
characteristics and institutions of the government.

As such, laws of municipal character designed to secure order and peace in the community subsisting
during the time of the transfer of sovereignty remain in force until altered or repealed by the new
government through direct action. The Penal Code provisions on piracy are held not to be
inconsistent with the laws of the U.S., since the Penal Code provisions on piracy have similarities to
statutory provisions elsewhere and to concepts of public law, while the laws of the U.S. on piracy rest
on the universal conception of piracy under the law of nations.

Using this construction, the word “Spain” in the Penal Code should be substituted by the words
“United States” and the word “Spaniards” should be substituted by the expression “citizens of the
United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands.”

-----

The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of
persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.

At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage
was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural
effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
People vs Siyoh

(141 SCRA 356)

(Qualified Piracy, a special complex crime)

FACTS:

• Julaide Siyoh and Omarkyam Kiram, together with Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were
accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder

• On July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants
like him (Danilo Hiolen. Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman) were on their way to Pilas
Island, Province of Basilan, to sell goods they received from Alberto Aurea.

• They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and
slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island. Who also helped them from selling
their goods to different Islands near Pilas.

• Before the incident happened, Antonio, the lone survivor saw that Kiram was talking with another
two persons that he can only recognize in their faces somewhere near the house where they were
selling the goods

• On July 14, 1979, When they were heading back to Pilas Island from Baluk-Baluk Island through
riding a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine.

• On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about
200 meters away from their pumpboat Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their
pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them

• There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman
recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk
Island.

• When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de
Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island.

• On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money
and their goods by Kiram. Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to
undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on.

• With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark,
Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into
the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him,
injuring his back. But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the
mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He
was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he
received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela,
Basilan province.

• On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw
Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run.
When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat.
Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram

ISSUE: WoN the respondent-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANTS

1. Since it was contested by appellants that there guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since
the prosecution did not present evidence that the accused were also the one who killed Anastacio de
Guzman because his remains are never recovered.

2. The Credibility of the Witness—since only 1 witness was presented

3. Appellants claim (Siyoh and Kiram) that they were not the assailants but also the victim

HELD: They were said to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified piracy with triple murder and

frustrated homicide

1. Number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy, not material; Piracy, a special complex crime
punishable by death—but the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. PD
532 considers qualified piracy as a special complex crime punishable by death. Therefore, the guilt of
respondent were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

2. There was no other evidence presented on why should the lone survivor tell lies and fabricate story
as to apprehend the accused.

3. Appellants claim that they were not the assailants but also the victim and that the two persons they
have identified (Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali) is baseless as view in the proven conspiracy
among the accused. The Conspiracy was established through the testimony of the lone witness and
survivor- De Guzman."