CASTILLO v. PADILLA, JR.
decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of
[127 SCRA 743 A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984]
PLANA, J.
FACTS:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo was the counsel for the
defendants in Criminal Case for forcible entry before
the MeTC of Caloocan. Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. was
counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on
November 19, 1981, while Castillo was formally
offering his evidence, he heard Padilla say "bobo."
When Castillo turned toward Padilla, he saw the
latter looking at him menacingly. Embarrassed and
humiliated in the presence of many people, Castillo
was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The
court proceedings had to be suspended. Thereafter,
Atty. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for the use of
insulting language in the course of judicial
proceedings.
While admitting the utterance, respondent
denied having directed the same at the complainant,
claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo",
referring to "the manner complainant was trying to
inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters
into the record" while in the process of making an
offer of evidence.
ISSUE:
WON the Atty. Padilla, respondent, should be
disciplined?
HELD:
Yes, respondent is hereby reprimanded for
his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper
appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of
the offense will be dealt with more severely. Among
the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and
(2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of
Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid
all personalities between counsel.
Use of intemperate language uncalled for in
the case at bar, whether directed at the person of
complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the
remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and
uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt
complainant which such cutting remark while the
latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he
exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer
but also to the court. By the use of intemperate
language, respondent failed to measure up to the
norm of conduct required of a member of the legal
profession, which all the more deserves reproach
because this is not the first time that respondent has
employed offensive language in the course of judicial
proceedings. He has previously been admonished to
refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and
warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of
his pleadings.
In Re: ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO
G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970]
CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the
Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, entered his
record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
He alleged that sometime during the first week of
October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in
his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other
respondents, went to him to engage his professional
services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-
24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon.
Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their
conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed
Atty. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two
cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for
hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while the
present case was still pending and the date of hearing
thereof was yet undetermined. He also relied to Atty.
Antonio J. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases
were pending in this Court.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Soriano be granted the plea of
appearance
HELD:
No. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a
case which has long been sealed and terminated by a
final judgment, besides being an unmitigated
absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to
the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore
deviation from normal judicial processes. We find
Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence
in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an
officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence
would merit no less than his suspension from the
practice of the law profession, were it not for his
candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his
mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is
the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as
he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is
further likewise warned that any future similar act
will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present
case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he
has entered as chief counsel of record for the
respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
US v. Ney
[8 Phil 146 G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907]
TRACEY, J.:
FACTS:
In 1902 this court decided that J. Garcia
Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law
in the Philippine Islands, on the ground that after the
change of sovereignty he had elected to remain
Spanish, as such was not qualified for admission to
the bar. In 1904 he made an arrangement with Ney, a
practicing attorney, to carry on business together,
sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque". The
paper was headed "Law Office — Ney & Bosque.
Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español — C.W. Ney,
abogado americano." Since then papers from the
office were signed with the words "Ney & Bosque —
C.W. Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and
the other on September 15, 1906, this court refused
to consider petitions so singed with the names of the
defendants and the practice being repeated, on the
2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to
the Attorney-General to take appropriate action
thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding.
The defendants disclaim any intentional
contempt, and defend their acts as being within the
law under Section 102 of the Code of Civil
procedure.
ISSUE:
WON either of these defendants be thus
punished for contempt?
HELD:
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure
describes contempt as follows: 1. Disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment,
or command of a court, or injunction granted by a
court or judge; 2. Misbehavior of an officer of the
court in the performance of his official duties or in
his official transactions.
In the case, no direct order or command of
this court has been disobeyed or resisted by the
defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant
Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him
the right to practice law. Even had he been entitled
under the statute to practice law without any license
from the court and without an application to it, yet its
order made on his own petition. A mandate of the
court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular
signature to papers, though affixed by his associate,
had his authorization and constitutes a substantial
attempt to engage in practice. The fact stated on the
circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount
to a disclaimer of his professional character in the
Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a
foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified
from practicing law. Consequently, the conduct of
the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an
order made in a proceeding to which he was a party.
TAPAY v. BANCOLO
[A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013]
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
In October 2004, Rodrigo E. Tapay and
Anthony J. Rustia received an Order from the Office
of the Ombudsman requiring them to file a counter-
affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority,
falsification of public document, and graft and
corrupt practices filed against them by Divinagracia,
a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory
Administration. The Complaint was allegedly signed
on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. When
Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon
each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the
case filed against them. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia and declared that the
signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his, which was later alleged to
be forged by the secretary- Mary Jane Gentugao.
Hence, a complaint was filed against Atty.
Bancolo and Atty. Jarder for violation of the Canons
of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment. The
Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the filed cases.
Thereafter complainants filed before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar
Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder.
 The IBP’s resolution, regarding the report of
Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP, pronounce that Atty. Bancolo violated
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder case was dismissed.
Thereby, recommended Atty. Bancolo be suspended
for one year from the practice of law. Hence the
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the resolution of the IBP is correct
finding Atty. Bancolo administratively liable and
dismissed Atty. Jarder case.
HELD:
Yes. The court agreed with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find
reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo
administratively liable. Atty. Bancolo admitted that
the Complaint he filed for a former client before the
Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by
a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a
violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: Canon 9
A Lawyer Shall Not, Directly or Indirectly, Assist in
the Unauthorized Practice of Law. Rule 9.01 - A
lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing. On the other hand, the complainants did not
present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly
involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in
the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him.
Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board
that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty.
Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the
case against Atty. larder.
BONIFACIO v. ATTY. ERA and ATTY.
BRAGAS
[A.C. No. 11754 October 3,2017]
TIJAM, J.:
FACTS:
An illegal dismissal case was lodged against
Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation Complainants therein Abucejon Group
were represented by Era and Associates Law Office
through Atty. Era. The Labor Arbiter found
Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal
dismissal and, consequently, ordered them to pay
Abucejo Group. Thus, a Writ of Execution and a
Notice of Garnishment were issued to implement
decision. Meanwhile, an administrative complaint
was filed against Atty. Era for representing
conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v.
Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, where the Court found Atty.
Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years
from 2013-2015. On the scheduled public auction
Atty. Era actively participated therein. As the parties
were not able to settle regarding the payment of
judgment, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to
Bonifacio's business establishment together with
their clients and several men, and forced open the
establishment to pull out the auctioned properties.
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint
for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing.
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to
appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this
Court during his suspension. Bonifacio filed the
instant administrative complaint. Investigating
Commissioner Cabrera recommended the dismissal
of the instant administrative complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. The IBP Board of
Governors reversed and set aside the Investigating
Commissioner's findings and conclusions,
pronouncing Atty Era of unauthorized practice of law
and thereby suspended for 3 years and Atty. Bragas
for her assistance of unauthorized practice of law
suspended for a month.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review
was filed by either party. Necessarily, the Court will
now proceed to give its final action on the instant
administrative case.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Era and Atty. Bragas ars subject
to disciplinary action
HELD:
Yes. We sustain the findings and
recommendations of the Board of Governors. Atty.
Era's acts constituted ''practice of law". It is
undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following
acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients in
the public auction of the condemned properties; (2)
tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured
the certificate of sale and presented the said
document to the corporation's officers and employees
present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that
his clients are now the new owners of the subject
properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the
premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties;
and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his
law office as regards the payment of the judgment
award with interest instead of pulling out the
properties. Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized
practice of law during his suspension. As mentioned,
Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for
a period of two years. He performed the above-cited
acts on the same year. Indubitably, Atty. Era was
engaged in an unauthorized law practice. Atty. Era's
acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
order of this Court, which under Section 27 Rule 138
of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in
his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must
likewise be reproved. There is no question that Atty.
Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from
the practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to
participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice.
Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Indeed, it
is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not
to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such
duty is founded upon public interest and policy,
which requires that law practice be limited only to
individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. Hence, shall be subject to disciplinary
action.
GUBALLA v. CAGUIOA
[G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977]
SANTOS, J:
FACTS:
Jose Guballa is an operator of a public utility
vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in
an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private
respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. A complaint for
damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner. An
Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by
Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez,
Mercado & Associates. Because Guballa and counsel
failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6,
1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in
default and private respondent was allowed to
present his evidence ex parte. A decision was
thereafter rendered in favor of private respondent
Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration, signed by
Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law firm
was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the
order of default, was denied. Petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals handled by Atty. Benjamin
Bautista, an associate of the same law firm, however
was likewise denied and was then remanded to the
lower Court, presided by respondent Judge for
execution. A Motion for Execution was thereafter
filed by private respondent with the lower Court
which was granted by respondent Judge.
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty.
Isabelo V.L. Santos, filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida
Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not
a member of the Philippine Bar and that
consequently, his rights had not been adequately
protected and his properties are in danger of being
confiscated and/or levied upon without due process
of law.
Judge Caguioa denied the Petition and
directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Hence
the instant Petition.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge’s denial of the
Petition for Relief is proper
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Judge's forthright denial of
the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory
maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be
denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the
person who represented petitioner at the initial stage
of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the
pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member
of the Bar did not amount to a denial of petitioner's
day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent
stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the
judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented
by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a
reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law
and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal
and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's
rights had been amply protected in the proceedings
before the trial and appellate courts as he was
subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover,
petitioner himself was at fault, not only on the
alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial
conference but likewise on his own failure to attend
the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this
petition due course is to countenance further delay in
a proceeding which has already taken well over six
years to resolve.
 In sum, the law firm "Vida, Enriquez,
Mercado & Associates" is hereby ordered to explain
why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the
Answer in Civil when he is not a member of the Bar.
FIVE J TAXI v. NLRC
[G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994]
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and
Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by Five J Taxi,
petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked
for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule.
They were required to pay the daily boundary of
P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-
air-conditioned taxi, P20.00 for car washing, and to
further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any
deficiency in their boundary for every actual working
day. Maldigan in less than 4 months, he already
failed to report for work and later learned that he was
already working for Mine of Gold Taxi Company.
On the other hand, Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab
was held up by his armed passenger who took all his
money and thereafter stabbed him. He was
hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his
home province to recuperate. Thereafter Sabsalon
was re-admitted, however, on several occasions, he
failed to report for work during his schedule.
Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi
for "Bulaklak Company."
Maldigan requested petitioners for the
reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years
but was denied. While Maldigan insisted on the
refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his
services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his On the matter of the car wash payments,
termination from employment was effected when he private respondents are not entitled to the refund of
refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. the P20.00 car wash payments they made. There was
nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning
Private respondents filed a complaint with the
the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their
Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor
P20.00. Also car washing after a tour of duty is a
Relations Commission charging petitioners with
practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated
illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. However,
by fair play. On the of attorney's fees or service fees
was dismissed. The NLRC concurred with
for private respondents' authorized representative,
modification by ordering petitioners to pay private
Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by
respondents the awards stated. Petitioners' motion for
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that
reconsideration was denied by the NLRC. Hence, the
non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any
petition.
labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or
(2) if they represent their organization or the
ISSUE:
members thereof. While it may be true that
WON the NLRC erred in ordering petitioners Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative
to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did
Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence,
wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to
from the date of promulgation of judgment to the attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an
date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
as and for attorney's fees. his client a reasonable compensation for his services
necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-
HELD:
client relationship as a condition for the recovery of
The questioned judgment of respondent attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist
NLRC was modified by deleting the awards for unless the client's representative is a lawyer.
reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's
fees and directing said public respondent to order and
effect the computation and payment by petitioners of
the refund for private respondent Domingo
Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from
the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of
actual payment thereof. The accounting shows that
Sabsalon was able to withdraw his. With respect to
Maldigan's deposits, he should be reimbursed the
amount of his accumulated cash deposits.