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CIVIL PROCEDURE Final - PALS - REM
CIVIL PROCEDURE Final - PALS - REM
CIVIL PROCEDURE Final - PALS - REM
PART I
1. General Principles
Remedial Law is that branch of law which prescribes the methods of enforcing rights and obligations created by substantive
law in case of invasion of these rights.
Since they (remedial law) are promulgated by authority of law, they have the force and effect of law if not in conflict with
substantive law (Ateneo v. De La Rosa, G.R. No. L-286, March 28, 1946)
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2086,
March 8, 1949 Motion for Reconsideration Resolution)
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a
question of degree. It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can
pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. This
being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be
presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a
defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to compile,
revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of
procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones. (Bustos v. Lucero, supra)
According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat: “Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms
of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.” (Priscilla Alma Jose, Vs. Ramon C. Javellana, Et Al., G.R. No.
158239, January 25, 2012)
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time
of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules
on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate
any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that "a person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing
rules of procedure." More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there
were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal. Panay Railways Inc., Vs. Heva Management And
Development Corporation, Pamplona Agro-Industrial Corporation, And Spouses Candelaria Dayot And Edmundo Dayot, G. R. No.
154061, January 25, 2012)
It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application of procedural rules, must
remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice. (Building
Care Corporation/Leopard Security & Investigation Agency And/Or Ruperto Protacio, Vs. Myrna Macaraeg, G.R. No. 19835710
December 2012)
In Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines v. Tanghal-Salvaña, this Court held: Obedience to the requirements of
procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in
the application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. (Mca-Mbf Countdown Cards Philippines Inc., Amable
R. Guiluz V, Amable C. Aguiluz Ix, Cielo C. Aguiluz, Alberto L. Buenviaje, Vicente Acsay And Mca Holdings And Management
Corporation, Vs. Mbf Card International Limited And Mbf Discount Card Limited, G.R. No. 173586, March 14, 2012)
A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not
prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their
strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. (Douglas F.
Anama Vs. Philippine Savings Bank, G.R. No. 187021, January 25, 2012)
The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or
error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable
attempt at compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept that rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to
facilitate the attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for deserving reasons, be subordinated by the need for an apt
dispensation of substantial justice in the normal course. They ought to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial
compliance, consistent with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule 1, Section 6. Not being inflexible, the rule on verification allows for
such liberality. (Felix Martos, Jimmy Eclana, Rodel Pilones, et al. Vs. New San Jose Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 192650. October 24, 2012)
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally construed. However, in these cases, outright
dismissal is rendered unjust by the presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation. The parties therein who prayed for liberal
interpretation were able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court’s
intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity."
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every member of the bar to comply
with these rules. They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by
harking on liberal construction. (Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual, Vs. Spouses Marilyn Lim And George Lim And The Registry Of Deeds
Of Valenzuela City, G.R. No. 191837, September 19, 2012)
The Supreme Court shall have the following power… Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Article VIII, Section 5(5),
1987 Phil. Constitution)
1. The rules provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases;
2. The rules shall be uniform (not different or varying) for all courts of the same grade;
3. The rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. (Article VIII, Section 5(5), 1987 Phil. Constitution)
1.3.2 Power of the Supreme Court to amend and suspend procedural rules
The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or to except a case from their operation when
compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit
suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Migrant Pagbilao Corporation, G.R. No.
159593. October 12, 2006).
In fact, this Court has held that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum
shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case on the merits, pursuant to its inherent power to suspend its own rules
on grounds, as stated above, of substantial justice and apparent merit of the case. (SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.)
and Watsons Personal Care Store, Phils., Inc. Vs. City of Manila, Liberty Toledo, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila,
et al. G.R. No. 197151. October 22, 2012)
1.3.3. Power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules carries with it the power to overturn judicial precedents:
a) The constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure to amend or repeal the same
necessarily carries with it the power to overturn judicial precedents on points of remedial law through the amendment
of the Rules of Court.(Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, G.R No. 170354, June 30, 2006).
1.3.4. Power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules are means for the court to exercise jurisdiction:
The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the courts. In promulgating the Rules of Court, the Supreme
Court is circumscribed by the zone properly denominated as the promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts; consequently, the Rules of Court can only determine the means, ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as
fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be exercised. (Minerva A. Gomez-Castillo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187231,
June 22, 2011)
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rulemaking powers in response to the alarming rise in the
number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. (In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in Favor of Lilibeth Ladaga Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry
Division, et al./In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Angela A. Librado-Trinidad Vs. Major
General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al.In the Matter fo the Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Carlos Isagani T. Zarate Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the
Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al., G.R. No. 189689/G.R. No. 189690/G.R. No. 189691. November 13, 2012)
1.3.6 Power of the Supreme Court to amend and suspend procedural rules
The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or to except a case from their operation when
compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit
suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Migrant Pagbilao Corporation, G.R. No.
159593. October 12, 2006).
In the interest of just and expeditious proceedings, the Supreme Court may suspend the application of the Rules of Court
and except a case from its operation because the Rules were precisely adopted with the primary objective of enhancing fair
trial and expeditious justice (Republic v. CA, et al., L-31303-04, May 31, 1978).
An organ of government belonging to the judicial department the function of which is the application of the laws to
controversies brought before it as well as the public administration of justice (Black’s, 5th Edition, 356).
A court is called upon and authorized to administer justice. Sometimes it refers to the place where justice is administered (20
Am Jur 2d, Courts, § 1, 1965; 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 1).
It is a board or tribunal which decides a litigation or contest ( Hidalgo v. Manglapus, 64 O.G. 3189)
1. A court is a tribunal officially assembled under authority of law; a judge is simply an officer of such tribunal (Wagen Horst
v. Philadelphia Insurance Company 358pa. 55, 55 82d 762).
2. A court is an organ of the government with a personality separate and distinct from the person or judge who sits on it.
The death of the judge does not mean the death of the court (Riano, Civil Procedure; restatement for the bar 2009, p.45).
Constitutional Court - Those which owe their creation and existence to the Constitution. Its existence as well as the deprivation
of its jurisdiction and powers cannot be made a subject of legislation. Example: The Supreme Court (Article VIII, Section 1(1), 1987
Phil. Constitution)
Note: Supreme Court is the only Constitutional Court in the Philippines. All others are Statutory Courts.
Statutory Courts – A court created by law whose jurisdiction is exclusively determined by legislation. It may be abolished by
Congress by simply repealing the law which created them.
Example: Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan/Municipal Courts (created by BP 129), The Court of Tax Appeals
(created by RA 1125) Family Courts, Shari’ah District Courts, Shari’ah Cicuit Courts (P.D. 1083)
b. Court of Equity – decides a case according to the common precepts of what is right and just without inquiring into the
terms of the statutes.
Philippines courts, either original or appellate, exercise both the legal and equitable jurisdictions (U.S. v. Tamparong, G.R. No.
9527, August 23, 1915).
Refers to the power and authority of the court to hear, determine controversies, and decide a case (People v. Mariano, G.R. L-
40527, June 30, 1976)
1. Kinds of jurisdiction:
a) Original Jurisdiction – power of the court to take cognizance of a case at its inception or commencement.
b) Appellate Jurisdiction – power vested in a superior court to review and revise the judicial action of a lower court.
a) General Jurisdiction – authority of the court to hear and determine all actions and suits.
b) Special or Limited Jurisdiction – authority of the court to hear and determine particular cases only.
Example: MTC/MCTC can entertain petition for habeas corpus if there is no available RTC judge:
Hierarchy of courts meant that while the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue original writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, such concurrence does not
accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of court to which filing thereof may be directed. Petitions should be filed with the court
of lower level unless the importance of the issue involved deserves the action of a higher court. (Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533,
July 27, 2007; De los Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006)
General rule: A higher court will not entertain a direct resort to it UNLESS the redress cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower
court.
Exception: In cases of national interest and of serious implications, Supreme Court does not hesitate to set aside the rule and
proceed with the determination of the case (COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla, G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002).
Purposes of Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts; Exception
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts
and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. (United Claimants Association of NEA (Unican) Vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), G.R. No. 187107, January
31, 2012)
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general rule, the
principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case
involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissed
from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention. (United Claimants Association of NEA (Unican)
Vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012)
The rule on hierarchy of courts does not prevent the Supreme Court from assuming jurisdiction where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the resort to such remedy, in which case, the Supreme Court exercises its primary jurisdiction (Agan
vs. Philippine International Air Terminal Co.,[PIATCO], G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003).
Courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction cannot interfere or review with the orders of each other. A court is barred from
reviewing judgments of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction nor power of review.
The doctrine applies with equal force to administrative bodies. When the law provides for an appeal from the decision of an
administrative body to the SC or CA, it means that such body is co-equal with the RTC in terms of rank and stature, and logically
beyond the control of the latter (Civil Procedure [A Restatement For The Bar], Riano, 2007 ed. Citing Sinter Corporation and Phividec
Industrial Authority v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., G.R. No. 127371, 25 April 2002).
The court cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services in determining technical or intricate matters of fact. ( Omictin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
148004, January 22, 2007)
Exceptions:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and,
(l) in quo warranto proceedings.
(Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255)
Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be ousted by the happening of subsequent events even of such character which should
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. “The rule of adherence of jurisdiction (exists) until a cause is finally
resolved or adjudicated”. (Abad, et. al. v. RTC of Manila, et. al. G.R. No. L-65505, October 12, 1987)
Exceptions:
When the change in jurisdiction is curative in character (Abad et. al. v. RTC of Manila et. al., supra)
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff by the filing of his
complaint. (Dilweg v. Phillips, G.R. L-19596, October 30, 1964, citing Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523)
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. (Optima Realty Corporation Vs. Hertz Phil., Exclusive, Inc.
G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013)
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in
court. (Afdal & Afdal v. Carlos, G.R. No. 173379, December 1, 2010)
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required only in an action in personam. Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is NOT a prerequisite in an action in rem and quasi in rem (Gomez v. CA, 425 SCRA 98).
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong (C. J. S., p. 36) and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers (Banco
Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup. p. 216; Ng Si Chok vs. Vera, G.R. No. 45674).
(Reyes v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-48754, November 26, 1941). In other terms, it is provided by law.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
cause or causes of action as alleged in the complaint. (G.R. No. 178193, Danilo S. Ursua Vs. Republic of the Philippines)
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend
upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations
in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted. (Fe V.
Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie F. Aparejado, represented by Edgar Aparejado Vs. Hon. Judge Maximino R. Ables, of RTC-Branch
47, Masbate City; SSGT. Edison Rural, et al. G.R. No. 171855. October 15, 2012)
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is
determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or
acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Well to
emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. (Mendoza
v. Germino & Germino, G.R. No. 165676, November 22, 2010)
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter a ground for annulment of judgment.
As this Court previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. "G" Holdings, Inc., "lack of jurisdiction" as a ground for the
annulment of judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
It does not contemplate "grave abuse of discretion" considering that "jurisdiction" is different from the exercise thereof. As ruled in
Tolentino v. Judge Leviste: Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the
court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. ( Remedios
Antonino, Vs. The Register Of Deeds Of Makati City And Tan Tian Su, G.R. No. 185663, June 20, 2012)
When to raise objections to jurisdiction over subject matter?
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because
jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at
the time of the filing of the complaint. (Lasmis v. Dong-E, G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010)
The defense of lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any stage of the proceeding even on appeal since it
is conferred by law (De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 166, 1995).
A party may be barred from raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction or jurisdiction may be waived on the ground of estoppel
by laches. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968).
Lack of jurisdiction over subject matter vs. lack of jurisdiction over person of the petitioner
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive
law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of
procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other process on the petitioner. A judgment or final order issued by the trial
court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is always void, and, in the words of Justice Street in Banco
Español-Filipino v. Palanca (37 Phil 949 [1918]), “in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw
and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.” But the defect of lack of jurisdiction over the person, being a
matter of procedural law, may be waived by the party concerned either expressly or impliedly. (Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas
Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.)
This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or
stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the
pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10. (De Joya v. Marquez, et. al., G.R. No. 163416, January 31, 2006)
Note: An issue is a single, certain, and material point arising out of the allegations and contentions of the parties; it is a matter
affirmed on one side and denied on the other, and when a fact is alleged in the complaint and denied in the answer, the matters is then
put in issue between the parties (Black’s, 9th Ed. Citing 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure Sec. 357, at 541).
This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as
in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject
matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the
Philippines of a non-resident defendant. (De Joya v. Marquez, et. al., supra)
Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied
by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one
where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will
not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law. (First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of Court of Appeals et. al., G.R. No. 171989, July 4,
2007)
Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and not
the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, the
decision of all other question arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. (Napa v. Weissenhagen, G.R. No. L-9698,
January 6, 1915)
ORIGINAL Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against CA, COMELEC, COA, CTA and
Sandiganbayan.
1. Exclusive
2. Concurrent 1. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against RTC, Civil Service Commission,
Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Other quasi-judicial agencies and NLRC
a. with the CA 2. Petition for Writ of Kalikasan and continuing mandamus pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, effective 29 April 2010)
1. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against courts of the first level and other
b. with the CA, bodies; and
SANDIGANBAYAN and RTC 2. Petitions for Habeas Corpus and Quo Warranto
3. Petition for continuing mandamus pursuant to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, effective 29 April 2010)
c. with RTC Actions affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
Sandiganbayan
Petitions for Review on Certiorari against the CA, Sandiganbayan, CTA en banc, Final judgment
APPELLATE or order in a Writ of Amparo or Habeas Data case and RTC in cases involving:
a. Constitutionality or validity of a treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation
b. Legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll or a penalty in relation thereto
c. Jurisdiction of a lower court, and
d. Pure error or question of law.
ORIGINAL
2. Concurrent 1. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against RTC, Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Other quasi-judicial agencies &
NLRC
2. Petition for Writ of Kalikasan and continuing mandamus pursuant to the Rules of
a. with the SC Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, effective 29 April 2010)
1. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against courts of the first level
and other bodies; and
2. Petitions for Habeas Corpus and Quo Warranto
3. Petition for continuing mandamus pursuant to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, effective 29 April 2010)
b. with SC, Sandiganbayan and
RTC
c. with SC, 1. Petition for Writ of Amparo (Sec. 3, Rule on the Writ of Amparo); and
2. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Data (Sec. 3, Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data)
Sandiganbayan and RTC
1. Ordinary Appeals from RTC, except in cases exclusively appealable to the SC,
APPELLATE Family Courts and Special Commercial Courts
2. Appeal by Petition for Review from Civil Service Commission, SEC, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President and any
other quasi-judicial agency, instrumentality, board or commission in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions
3. Petitions for Review from RTC in cases appealed thereto from the lower courts
ORIGINAL 1. Over all criminal cases arising from violation of NIRC of the TCC and other laws, part of
laws, or special laws administered by the BIR or the BOC where the principal amount of
taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties claimed is less than P1M or where there
is no specified amount claimed;
1. Exclusive 2. In tax collection cases involving final and executor assessments of taxes, fees, charges
and penalties where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties claimed is less than P1M tried by the proper MTC, MeTC and RTC.
1. In criminal offenses (1) over appeals from the judgments, resolutions, or orders of the
APPELLATE RTC in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction and
(2) over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the MeTCs,
MTCs,and MCTCs in their respective jurisdiction;
2. In tax collection cases (1) over appeals from the judgments, resolutions, or orders of the
RTC in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial
jurisdiction and (2) over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of
the RTC in the the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases
originally decided by the MeTCs, MTCs,and MCTCs in their respective jurisdiction.
1. Decisions of CIR in cases involving disputed assessment, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under
Exclusive original or appellate to the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR;
review by appeal 2. Inaction by the CIR in cases involving disputed assessment, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under
the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR where the NIRC or other applicable law
provides s specified period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed an
implied denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local taxes originally decided by them in
the exercise of their original and appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs (1) in cases involving liability for customs
duties, fees or other charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines,
forfeiture, or other penalties in relation thereto, or (2) other matters arising under the
Customs law, or other laws, part of laws or special laws administered by BOC;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving assessment and taxation of real property originally
decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decision of the Secretary of Finance on custom cases elevated to him automatically for
review from the decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the
government under section 2315 of the TCC;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry I the case of non- agricultural product,
commodity or article and the secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product,
commodity or article, involving dumping duties and counterveiling duties under Secs. 301
and 302 of TCC and safeguard measures under RA **)), where the party may appeal the
decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
(RA 9282 and Rule 5, AM 05-11-07-CTA)
2.5.4. Sandiganbayan
ORIGINAL Civil cases filed pursuant to E. O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (PCGG cases for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth)
1. Exclusive
Three conditions:
1. What offenses: offenses must be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan (Hannah Serana vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008).
2. Offender: offender must be a public officer (Escobal vs. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 124644,
February 5, 2004).
3. How committed: it must be committed in relation to their public office (Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999).
2. Concurrent Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary
writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction including quo warranto arising in cases falling
a. with the SC under E.O.s 1, 2, 14, 14-A (PCGG cases for recovery of ill-gotten wealth)
b. with the SC, CA Petition for writ of amparo and habeas data
and RTC
APPELLATE Final judgments, resolutions or orders of RTC whether in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction (RA 8249) over crimes and civil cases falling within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but which were committed by public officers below SG 27
2.5.5. Regional Trial Court (RTC)
2. Actions involving title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, where the
assessed value of such property exceeds P50,000 in Metro Manila, or P20,000 outside
ORIGINAL Metro Manila, except forcible entry and unlawful detainer;
5. Other cases where the demand, exclusive of interest, damages, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs, or the value of the property exceeds P400,000 in Metro Manila, or
P300,000 outside Metro Manila (SC Circular No. 09-94);
9. Admiralty and maritime cases where the demand or claim exceeds P400,000 in Metro
Manila, or P300,000 outside Metro Manila, exclusive of interest, damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs (CLAID);
10. Probate proceedings, testate or intestate, where gross value of estate exceeds
P400,000 in Metro Manila, or P300,000 outside Metro Manila
a. with the SC
1. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against lower courts and bodies;
b. with the SC and CA and
2. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto
3. Petition for continuing mandamus pursuant to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, effective 29 April 2010)
c. with the SC, CA and Petition for writ of amparo and habeas data
Sandiganbayan
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL 1. Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the
latter;
2. Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;
3. Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those
relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living
together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains;
4. Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
5. Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of E.O. No. 209 or the
Family Code;
6. Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent o neglected
children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension,
termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under P.D. No.
603, E.O. No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;
7. Petitions for the constitution of the family home; and
8. Cases of domestic violence against women and children, as defined in sec. 5(k), R.A.
8369, but which do not constitute criminal offenses subject to criminal prosecution and
penalties
9. Cases covered by Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act (RA 9344)
1. Actions involving personal property valued at not more than P400,000 in Metro Manila
ORIGINAL and P300,000 outside Metro Manila;
2. The following cases or actions where the value in consideration does not exceed P400,000
1. Exclusive in Metro Manila and P300,000 outside Metro Manila, in both cases, exclusive of interest,
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs (CLAID):
4. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer, provided that in cases where the defendant
raises the question of ownership and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding on the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only
to determine the issue of possession;
2. Concurrent
a. with RTC
3. Delegated Cadastral and land registration cases assigned by the SC where there is a). no
controversy or opposition, or b). where there is controversy, the contested lot valued at not
more than P100,000.
4. Special Petition for habeas corpus or application for bail in criminal cases in the absence of all
RTC Judges in a province or city (BP 129, as amended, Chapter III, Sec 35)
5. Summary Procedure 2. All other cases, except probate proceedings, where total claim does not exceed
P200,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P100,000 outside Metro Manila, exclusive of interest and
costs.
3. Small claims cases where the amount of the claim for payment or reimbursement of
money does not exceed P100,000.00
1. All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising
ORIGINAL under PD No. 1083;
2. All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
1. Exclusive administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the
property;
NOTE: The Shari’a District Courts 3. Petitions for declaration of absence and death and for cancellation and correction of
are equivalent to the RTC in rank entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI, Book Two of P.D. No. 1083;
which were established in certain
provinces of Mindanao where the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the 4. All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they
Philippines is enforced. have not specified which law shall govern their relations;
3. All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief where the parties are Muslims
or the property involved belong exclusively to a Muslim (Art. 143[2]).
APPELLATE All cases tried in the Shari’a Circuit Court within their territorial jurisdiction.
NOTE: The Shari’a District Court shall decide every case appealed to it on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted as well as such memoranda, briefs or oral arguments as the
parties may submit (Art. 144[2]).
NOTE: The decisions of the Shari’a District Courts whether on appeal from the Shari’a Circuit Courts or not, shall be final. The Supreme
Court shall, however, continue to exercise original and appellate jurisdiction over certain issues as provided by the Constitution (Art.
145).
2.7. Jurisdiction over Small Claims cases:
a. purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of
money, and
b. the civil aspect of criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule of 111.
To be tried before the Metropolitan trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts for payment of money where the value of the claim does NOT exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
exclusive of interest and costs.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk
of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. ( A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma
Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.)
A. Civil Cases:
1. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be
recovered; but attorney's fees shall not exceed P20,000.00.
2. All other civil cases, EXCEPT probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff's claim does not exceed P100,
000.00 or P200,000.00 in Metro Manila, exclusive of interest and costs. (as amended by A.M. 02-11-09-SC, effective
November 25, 2002)
Criminal Cases:
Note:
This Rule shall NOT apply to a civil case where the plaintiff’s cause of action is pleaded in the same complaint with another
cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another
criminal case subject to the ordinary procedure.
An action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary
action in the RTC. x x x Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto, ejectment actions are summary in nature, while
accion publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions.48 The
purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful,
speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession
during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the
maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might take the law in his hands
and seize the property by force and violence. An ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full blown trial for the purpose of
determining rights of possession or ownership. (Fiorello R. Jose Vs. Roberto Alfuerto, et al. G.R. No. 69380. November 26, 2012)
Barangay Conciliation:
General rule:
The lupon tagapamayapa of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of ALL disputes
EXCEPT
a. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; however, when it is only one of the contending
parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties (Gegare v. CA, G.R. No. 83907. September 13, 1989)
b. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
c. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 1 year or a fine exceeding P5,000;
d. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
e. Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
f. Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
g. Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the
Sec. of Justice; and
h. Where one of the parties is a juridical entity (Sec. 408, R.A. 7160)
i. Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
j. The submission of disputes before the Lupon prior to their filing with the court or other government offices are not applicable to
labor cases. (Montoya v. Escayo, G.R. No. 82211-12 March 21, 1989)
k. An action for annulment of a compromise judgment which as a general rule is immediately executory and accordingly, beyond the
authority of the Barangay Court to change or modify.(Sanchez v. Tupaz, G.R. No. 76690 February 29, 1988)
l. Proceedings where relief is sought under R.A. No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act (Sec. 33, R.A.
No. 9262)
Other Instances where parties may go directly to court without the need of prior barangay conciliation:
Referral of a dispute to the Lupon is required only in cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a
juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc. (Vda. De Borromeo v. Pogoy, G.R.
No. L-63277. November 29, 1983)
As cited in the case Sanchez v. Tupaz, referral to the Lupon is compulsory (as ruled in the cited case of Morato vs. Go, 125
SCRA 444), [1983] and non-compliance of the same could affect the sufficiency of the cause of action and make the complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity (Peregrina vs. Panis, 133 SCRA 75).
1. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before
the Lupon of said barangay.
2. Actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant
3. All disputes which involved real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or
any part thereof is situated.
4. Disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where the contending
parties are enrolled to study, the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. ( Sec. 409, LGC).
[A]n amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is
binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public order and public policy. This is in accord with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code.
(Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel vs. Jerry D. Montanez, G.R. No. 191336, January 25, 2012)
Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement has the force and effect of
res judicata even if not judicially approved. It transcends being a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, and is akin
to a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. (Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel vs. Jerry D. Montanez, G.R. No.
191336, January 25, 2012)
Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code, such amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by
(1) Execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6) months from the date of settlement, or
(2) by filing an action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-
month period.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-
compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation
under the settlement.
Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the
amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.
It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either under the first or the
second remedy, is only applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement within ten (10) days
from the date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Local Government Code.
If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely,
(1) to enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or
(2) to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041 of the Civil Code, which
qualifies the broad application of Article 2037, viz: “If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party
may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.”
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable
settlement, to wit:
(a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled
thereto; and
(b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.
However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code.
The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the amicable settlement
"may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court,
if beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
directory or merely optional in nature.
The CA took off on the wrong premise that enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the proper remedy, and therefore
erred in its conclusion that the case should be remanded to the trial court. The fact that the petitioner opted to rescind the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos means that she is insisting upon the undertaking of the respondent under the original loan contract. Thus, the CA should
have decided the case on the merits, as an appeal before it, and not prolong the determination of the issues by remanding it to the
trial court. Pertinently, evidence abounds that the respondent has failed to comply with his loan obligation. In fact, the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos is the well nigh incontrovertible proof of the respondent’s indebtedness with the petitioner as it was executed precisely to
give the respondent a second chance to make good on his undertaking. And since the respondent still reneged in paying his
indebtedness, justice demands that he must be held answerable therefor. (Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel vs. Jerry D. Montanez, G.R. No.
191336, January 25, 2012)
Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties embodied in the same complaint,
the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions.
The causes of action in favor of two or more plaintiffs or against two or more defendants should arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 3 (Flores v.
Mallare-Philips, L-66620, September 24, 1986).
3. Civil Procedure
A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong (Rule 1, Section 3(a), Rules of Court). It is governed by ordinary rules on action.
It is one which is also governed by the rules of ordinary civil actions, but subject to the specific rules prescribed for such
particular special civil action (Rule1, Sec. 3[a] 2nd par., Rule 1).
It is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law. (Sec. 3[b], Rule 1)
A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished
from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed. (Ramon Ching and Po Wing Corp. v.
Rodriguez, et. al., G.R. No. 192828, November 28, 2011)
Real Actions are actions affecting title to or the recovery of possession of real property, or an interest therein, or forcible
entry and detainer actions. A real action is “local,” i.e., its venue depends upon the location of the property involved in the litigation.
(Riano).
Personal Actions are actions founded on privity of contract or for the enforcement or resolution of a contract, or for
recovery of personal property (Feria Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, Vol. I). A personal action is “transitory,” i.e., its venue depends
upon the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant at the option of the plaintiff (Riano).
Action to annul Sale and Title over a real property is a Real Action:
Civil Case No. 01-1567, being an action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure by Union
Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is classified as a real action. In Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a case
seeking to annul a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is a real action, viz: An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale
is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is true that
petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his
claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable
property, the recovery of which is petitioner’s primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission
of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover
said real property. It is a real action. (Paglaum Management & Development Corp. And Health Marketing Technologies, Inc., Vs. Union
Bank Of The Philippines, Notary Public John Doe, And Register Of Deeds Of Cebu City And Cebu Province, $J. King & Sons Co., Inc.
Intervenor, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012)
Local Actions are actions which can only be instituted in a particular place. Transitory Actions are actions where the venue of
which is generally dependent upon the residence of the parties regardless of where the cause of action arise.
3.1.7. Actions In Rem, In Personam, Quasi- in- Rem: Issue as to jurisdiction in relation to service of summons (Rule
14):
In Rem:
One which is not directed against a particular person but on the thing or res itself and the relief sought is binding upon the
whole world.
The thing or res may be personal or real property or it may be a status, right, or a particular fact (Primer-Reviewer on
Remedial Law, Vol.I, Civil Procedure, Riguera, 1st ed., 2009).
The object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make any objection against the right sought to be enforced,
hence the judgment therein is binding theoretically upon the whole world, e.g., expropriation (Regalado).
In Personam
One which is directed against a particular person and the relief sought is binding upon such person e.g., action for sum of
money or for specific performance.
Where the action is in personam [footnote: An action in personam is one which seeks to enforce personal rights and
obligations against a defendant and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of
ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. (See
Belen v. Chavez , G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008, 549 SCRA 479, 481.)] and the defendant is in the Philippines, service of summons
may be made through personal service, that is, summons shall be served by handing to the defendant in person a copy thereof, or if
he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time, it is then that substituted service may be made. Personal service of summons should and always be the first option,
and it is only when the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted service.
(Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 19561905 September 2012)
Quasi in Rem:
It is a proceeding where an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property e.g., Quieting of Title where the object is in rem (real property) and the subject
is in personam (defendant). The judgment entered in this proceeding is conclusive only between the parties (Feria Noche, Civil
Procedure, Vol. I)
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam or quasi in rem is determined by its nature and purpose (Yu v. Pacleb, etc.,
G.R. No. 172172, 24 Feb. 2009).
In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. (Rule 111, Section 3)
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following (constitutional) rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages… x x x – Article 32, Civil Code (in italics added for clarification)
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. – Article 33, Civil Code
When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger
to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action. – Article 34, Civil Code
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. – Article 2176, Civil Code
It is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another (Rule 2, Sec. 2).
A cause of action is defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. (Goodland Company, Inc., vs. Asia United Bank, Abraham Co, Atty. Joel T. Pelicano And The Register Of Deeds Of Makati City,
G.R. No. 195561, March 14, 2012)
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
Right of action is the right to commence and prosecute an action to obtain the relief sought, while cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another (Rule 2, Sec. 2).
Where there is failure to state a cause of action in a pleading, the remedy of the defendant is to move for its dismissal on
the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. Rule 16, Sec 1 (g)
Whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
in the complaint (Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, 468 SCRA 63).
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed
by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters
aliunde are not considered.
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated differently, if the allegations in
the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be asserted by the defendant. (Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. vs. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R.
No. 152272, March 5, 2012)
3.2.5. Splitting a Single Cause of Action and its Effects
The act of dividing a single cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts, and bringing the suit for one of such
parts only, intending to reserve the rest for another separate action is the prohibited act of splitting a single cause of action
(Regalado).
Effects
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in
any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others (Rule 2, Sec. 4).
When a single cause of action is split, the remedy of the defendant is to move for its dismissal under Rule 16 on the
ground that:
1) There is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or litis pendentia (Sec. 1[e]); or
2) If the first action has already been finally terminated, on the ground of res judicata (Sec. 1[f]).
The well-entrenched rule is that "a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or adopting a different method of presenting
his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. ” This Court has laid
down the test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and second cases are identical, to wit: would the same
evidence support and establish both the present and former cause of action? If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does
not stand in the way of the former action. (Goodland Company, Inc., vs. Asia United Bank, Abraham Co, Atty. Joel T. Pelicano And The
Register Of Deeds Of Makati City, G.R. No. 195561, March 14, 2012)
Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis
pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two actions are
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based
on the policy against multiplicity of suits. (Philippine National Bank vs. Gateway Property Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 181485, February 15,
2012)
The assertion, in the alternative or otherwise, of as many causes of action as a party may have against another in one
pleading alone is valid. (Rule 2, Section 5)
a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
b) The joinder shall NOT include special civil action or actions governed by special rules;
c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may be
allowed in the RTC provided that:
1) one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and
2) the venue lies therein.
d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be
the test of jurisdiction (Totality Rule, Sec. 33[1], B.P. 129).
a) There must be a right to relief in respect to or arising from the same transaction or series of transaction;
b) There is a question of fact or law common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and
c) Such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue (Sec. 6, Rule 3).
The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is subject to the rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties.
Note: When the joinder refers to joinder of indispensable parties, joinder is COMPULSORY (Sec. 7, Rule 3).
The provision allowing joinder of causes of action which pertains to different jurisdictions under Section 5 (c) of Rule 2 applies
only if the joinder is in the RTC.
Two or more causes of action are joined in one complaint when they should not have been joined. (Rule 2, Section 6)
Misjoinder of causes of action is NOT a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a
party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately (Rule 2, Section 6)
3.3.1. Real parties-in-interest; indispensable parties; representatives as parties; necessary parties; indigent parties;
alternative defendants
The party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
General Rule: Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real party in interest.
Exception: An exception to the rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest is in
the case of representatives as parties (Rule 3, Section 3)
To be a real party-in-interest, the interest must be ‘real’, which is a present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent subordinate or consequential interest (Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624). It is an interest that is
material and direct, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question (Samaniego v. Aguila, 334 SCRA 438).
Meaning of “interest”.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. A real party in interest is the party
who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he does not stand to
be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited
purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is
subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest. (Theodore And Nancy Ang, Represented
By Eldrige Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses Alan And Em Ang, Respondents. G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012)
Real party in interest applies both to the plaintiff and defendant. The suit may be dismissed if neither of them is a Real
party in interest
REMEDY where Real Party in Interest is NOT impleaded:
Amendment of the pleadings or the complaint may be deemed amended to include the RPII.
If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action (Sec. 1[g], Rule 16; Regalado, 2010).
Only parties to the contract may sue. However, a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui may demand its fulfillment.
In Oposa v. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, 1993), minors represented by their parents were held as real parties in interest to file
an action to annul timber licenses issued by the state under the following principles:
a) Inter-generational responsibility;
b) Inter-generational justice;
c) The right of the Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology; and
d) Minors represent themselves and the generation to come.
Court requires that an action must be brought in the name but not necessarily by the real party in interest. In fact, the
practice is for an attorney in fact to bring the action in the name of the plaintiff (Tuason v. Bolanos, G.R. No. L-25894, Jan. 30, 1971).
Indispensable parties
Those without whom no final determination can be had of an action; they must be joined under all conditions (Rule 3, Sec.7).
The definition in the Rules of Court, Section 7, Rule 3 thereof, of indispensable parties as "parties in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action" has been jurisprudentially amplified. In Sps. Garcia v. Garcia, et.al., this Court held that:
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot
be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also
been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action
before it may properly go forward. (Simny G. Guy, Geraldine G. Guy, Gladys G. Yao, And The Heirs of the Late Grace G. Cheu Vs.
Gilbert G. Guy, G.R. No. 189486, September 05, 2012)
The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an indispensable party. An indispensable party is a
party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs
or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a
suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (Living @
Sense, Inc. Vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No. 193753. September 26, 2012)
The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the
parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain
real finality where there is want of indispensable parties. (Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim And Andrew Q. Lim, Vs. Distinction Properties
Development And Construction, Inc. G.R. No. 194024, April 25, 2012)
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff. (39 Amjur [sic] 885). The evident purpose
of the rule is to prevent the multiplicity of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the defendant to include with him,
either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the whole matter in dispute may be
determined once and for all in one litigation. (Palarca v. Baginsi, 38 Phil. 177, 178).
The presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed ( Sepulveda, Sr. v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, 31 January
2005).
The court cannot proceed without their presence. Any judgment rendered by the court would be null and void.
Settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power,
and, it is precisely “when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed” for such absence
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present. (Simny G. Guy, Geraldine G. Guy, Gladys G. Yao, And The Heirs of the Late Grace G. Cheu Vs. Gilbert
G. Guy, G.R. No. 189486, September 05, 2012)
Representative as parties
Someone acting in a fiduciary capacity (i.e. trustees of an express trust, guardians, executors or administrators). In this case,
the rule requires that the name of the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed as the real party in
interest (Rule 3, Sec. 3).
The petitioner’s reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support their conclusion that Atty. Aceron is likewise a
party in interest in the case below is misplaced. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. – Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (Emphasis ours)
Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that the representative is likewise deemed as the real
party in interest. The said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative, the
beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included in the title of the case.
Indeed, to construe the express requirement of residence under the rules on venue as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the
plaintiff would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest", as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-à-vis
Section 3 of the same Rule. (Theodore And Nancy Ang, Represented By Eldrige Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses Alan And Em Ang,
Respondents. G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012)
Necessary Parties
Those who are not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already
parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action; may or may not be joined (i.e. joint debtor is
a necessary party in a suit against his co-debtor) (Rule 3, Sec. 8).
Indigent Parties
A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and
hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities
for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic
notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was
exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise
provides. (Rule 3, Sec. 21)
Requisites:
1) Party must have a gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum
wage of an employee; and
2) Party do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than P300,000.00.
Alternative Defendants
Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of them as
defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right to relief against the other. (Rule 3,
Section 13)
Those without whom no final determination can be had of an action; they must be joined under all conditions (Rule 3, Sec.7).
(indispensable parties must be joined compulsorily)
Requisites:
a) There must be a right to relief in respect to or arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions;
b) There is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or all the defendants; and
c) Such joinder is not proscribed by the provisions of the rules on jurisdiction and venue.
“Series of transaction” means separate dealings with the parties but all of which dealings are directly connected with the
same type of subject-matter of the suit (Regalado).
Both are NOT grounds for the dismissal of the action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court motu proprio or
on motion of any party at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. (Rule 3, Section 11)
A suit brought by or defended by a representative member or members of a large group of persons on behalf of all the
members of the group. (Rule 3, Section 12)
Requisites:
The complaint must specially state that the same is being brought in behalf of others with whom parties share a common
interest (Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345).
If there is a conflict of interest between those sought to be represented and those who filed the action, the class suit will NOT
prosper (Ibañez v. Roman Catholic Church, 12 Phil. 227).
The party bringing the class suit must have legal capacity to do so ( Chinese Flour Importers Assoc. v. Price Stabilization
Board, 9 Phil. 461).
A taxpayer’s suit or a stockholder’s derivative suit is in the nature of class suit, although subject to the other requisites of the
corresponding governing law especially on the issue of locus standi (Regalado P.97).
Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. (This is an instance when a person may
intervene as a matter of right).
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the
CA: The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or
general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court,
conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents
for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to
be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named
individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Biñan, Laguna and other
barangays in San Pedro, Laguna. (Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. vs. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R. No. 152272,
March 5, 2012)
Under Section 1 of Rule 3, only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
However, an entity without juridical personality be sued as a defendant when it has entered into a transaction with the plaintiff.
Two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality to enter into a transaction may be sued under the
name by which they are generally or commonly known but they cannot sue under such name.
In the answer of such defendant, the names and addresses of the persons composing said entity must all be revealed (See
Sec. 8, Rule 14 as to the manner of the service of summons of such entities).
With respect to judgments to be rendered in this situation, Sec. 6 of Rule 36 provides that when judgment is rendered against
two or more persons associated in an entity without juridical personality, the judgment shall set out their individual or proper names if
known (Regalado, 2010).
Whenever a party to a pending action dies AND the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel:
1) To inform the court within 30 days after such death of the fact thereof; and
2) To give the name and address of the deceased party’s legal representative/s.
(Rule 3, Sec.16)
The duty of counsel also applies to death of a party in cases pending appeal (Riviera Filipina v. CA, G.R. No. 117355, April 5,
2002).
No summonses are required to be served on substitute defendants. Instead, the order of substitution shall be served upon the
parties substituted in the action; otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the substitute party ( Ferreria, et al. v. Vda. De
Gonzales, et al., 104 Phil. 143). Proceedings conducted by the trial court after the death of the defendant, and without such
substitution, are null and void (Lawas v. CA, et al., L-45809, 12 Dec. 1986)(Regalado, 2010).
The rule is that in the substitution of the deceased, priority is given to his legal representatives, i.e., the executor or
administrator of his estate. The court may allow the substitution by the heirs instead IF there is unreasonable delay in the appointment
of an executor or administrator or when the estate was extrajudicially settled (Regalado, 201).
3.4. Venue
“(a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b)
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the
subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law
and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.” (Nocum and Philippine Daily
Inquirer v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005)
In the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area where the real property involved or a portion thereof is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the Municipal Trial Court of the municipality or city where
the real property involved or a portion thereof is situated.
If the property is located at the boundaries of two places, file the case in EITHER place at the option of the plaintiff
(Regalado, 2010).
Where the subject matter of the action involves various parcels of land situated in different provinces, the venue is
determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving said parcels of land.
1) Where said parcels are the objects of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court where ANY of the provinces
(places) where a parcel of land is situated (El Hogar Filipino v. Seva, No. 36627, November 19, 1932).
2) If parcels of land are subject of separate and distinct transactions where there is no common venue, separate actions
should be laid in the court of the province where each parcel of land is situated ( Mijares, et al. v. Piccio, et al., L-10458 April 22,1957;
Regalado, 2010).
According to the Rules, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the court that has jurisdiction over the area where the
property is situated. In this case, all the mortgaged properties are located in the Province of Cebu. Thus, following the general rule,
PAGLAUM and HealthTech should have filed their case in Cebu, and not in Makati. (Paglaum Management & Development Corp. And
Health Marketing Technologies, Inc., Vs. Union Bank Of The Philippines, Notary Public John Doe, And Register Of Deeds Of Cebu City
And Cebu Province, $J. King & Sons Co., Inc. Intervenor, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012)
NOTE: All of the abovementioned venues shall be at the election of the plaintiff.
The petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the
enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1)
where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or
the defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced. (Theodore And
Nancy Ang, Represented By Eldrige Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses Alan And Em Ang, Respondents. G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012)
When there is more than one defendant/plaintiff in the case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for
determining the proper venue (Regalado, 2010).
An exception to the general rules on venue is found in civil actions for damages in case of LIBEL whether a criminal case
therefor has been filed or not, as special rules of venue are provided in Art.360 of the RPC, as last amended by R.A. 4363. Said venue
applies to BOTH RESIDENTS and NON-RESIDENTS, assuming that jurisdiction over the latter has been acquired (Regalado, 2010).
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the
place where the defendant resides. In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., this Court held that there can be no election
as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may only
be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides. Thus:
Section 377 provides that actions of this character "may be brought in any province where the defendant or any necessary
party defendant may reside or be found, or in any province where the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff." The plaintiff in this action has no residence in the Philippine Islands. Only one of the parties to the action resides here. There
can be, therefore, no election by plaintiff as to the place of trial. It must be in the province where the defendant resides. x x x
(Theodore And Nancy Ang, Represented By Eldrige Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses Alan And Em Ang, Respondents. G.R. No. 186993,
August 22, 2012)
1) In writing; and
2) Executed by the parties before the filing of the action.
In Sps. Lantin v. Lantion, this Court explained that a venue stipulation must contain words that show exclusivity or
restrictiveness, as follows:
At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules
on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a
case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to
the specified place. x x x
Clearly, the words "exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other venue" are restrictive and used advisedly to meet the
requirements. (Paglaum Management & Development Corp. And Health Marketing Technologies, Inc., Vs. Union Bank Of The
Philippines, Notary Public John Doe, And Register Of Deeds Of Cebu City And Cebu Province, $J. King & Sons Co., Inc. Intervenor, G.R.
No. 179018, June 18, 2012)
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words ( e.g. only, solely, exclusively in this court, in no other court save, particularly,
nowhere else but/except) venue stipulation is merely permissive and not exclusive which means that the stipulated venue is in
addition to the venue provided for in the rules (Polytrade Corp. v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, 1969).
When the stipulation as to venue in a passenger ticket of a vessel would be contrary to public policy of making courts
accessible to all who may have need of their service, the stipulation is void and unenforceable (Sweet Lines v. Teves, G.R. No. 28324,
May19, 1972).
When the action is no longer based on the agreement but ON THE TORTIOUS ACT of sending collection telegrams despite the
fact that the obligation had already been paid, venue is no longer based on the written stipulation but at the ELECTION OF THE
PLAINTIFF as fixed by law (Herrera, 2007 Vol.1, p. 636).
The Supreme Court, to avoid miscarriage of justice, has the power to order a change of venue or place of the trial in civil or
criminal cases or other judicial proceedings (Sec. 5 [4], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Third party complaint must yield to the venue in the main action
It has to be remembered that a third-party complaint is but ancillary to the main action and is a procedural device to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Thus, a third-party complaint has to yield to the jurisdiction and venue of the main action. (Eastern Assurance &
Surety Corp. v. Cui, G.R. No. L-54452, July 20 1981)
3.5. Pleadings
These are written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate
judgment (Rule 6, Sec. 1).
b) Answer - An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses. (Rule 6, Sec. 4)
Kinds of defenses:
1) Negative Defenses - The specific denial (Sec. 10, Rule 9) of the material fact/s alleged in the pleading of the claimant
essential to his cause/s of action. (Sec. 5[a])
Kinds of denial:
1) Absolute denial - the defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and
setting forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial, whenever practicable.
2) Partial denial - the defendant shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder.
3) Disavowal of knowledge - the defendant shall state in his pleading that he does not have knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment.
The defendant must positively state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts as alleged.
This denial does not apply where the facts as to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the
defendant’s knowledge, that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue. It is as if that no denial at all has been made.
Negative Pregnant – a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading.
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation are so qualified or modified are
literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted (Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003).
Example: In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, it was alleged that it was clearly and overwhelmingly showed how the respondents stashed
away the country’s wealth to Switzerland amounting to $356M and hid the same under layers of foundations and corporate entities to
prevent detection.
Negative Pregnant: The respondents specifically denies the allegations for it was false, the truth being that respondent’s properties in
the bank were lawfully acquired. Thus, it was implied that they admit that it was stashed to Switzerland.
Affirmative Defenses - an allegation of a new matter which while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of
the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him.
Affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former
recovery, discharge in bankruptcy and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance. (Sec. 5[b])
Counterclaim – It is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party (Rule 6, Sec. 6).
Nature of a counterclaim
A counterclaim is in the nature of a cross complaint such that it must be answered within 10 days from service. It is a cause of
action against plaintiff.
Where to file: A counterclaim which is filed before the MTC must be within the jurisdiction of said court as to the amount
and the nature thereof.
A court (if MTC) has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a set-off or counterclaim in excess of its jurisdiction. A
counterclaim beyond the court’s jurisdiction may only be pleaded by way of defense, the purpose of which is to defeat or weaken the
plaintiff’s claim, but NOT to obtain affirmative relief.
MOREOVER, the amount of judgment obtained by the defendant on appeal cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in
which the action began. Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount,
the appellate court likewise did not have jurisdiction over the same. In such a case, the award in excess of the jurisdiction of the trial
court is void (Agustin v. Bacalan, L-16000 March 18, 1985).
A counterclaim, even if otherwise compulsory, but the amount exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior court, will only be
considered permissive. Hence, the fact that it is not set-up in the inferior court will not bar plaintiff from instituting a separate action to
prosecute it (Calo v. Ajax, L-20865, March 13, 1968).
A counterclaim may be entertained by the RTC regardless of the amount involved provided that, in addition to the other
requirements, it is cognizable by the regular courts of justice (Regalado, 2010).
Requisites:
1) It must arise out of, or be necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim;
2) It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and
3) It must be cognizable by the regular courts.
4) The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to the amount and the nature thereof, EXCEPT that in an
original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
5) It must be existing at the time the defendant files his answer (Sec. 8, Rule 11).
Test of Compulsoriness:
The logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim.
It is a counterclaim which does not arise out of or is necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s
claim. It is not barred even of it is not set up in the original action.
General rule:
Exceptions:
a) If it is a counterclaim which either matured or was acquired by a party after serving his answer. In this case, it may be
pleaded by filing a supplemental answer or pleading before judgment.
b) When a pleader fails to set-up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, excusable negligence, or when justice
requires, he may, by leave of court, set-up the counterclaim by amendment of the pleadings before judgment (Sec. 10, Rule 11).
Effect if compulsory counterclaim is not answered
A plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default principally because
the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint (Gojo v. Goyala, G.R. No.
26768, Oct. 30, 1970).
The filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies . In
the event that a defending party has a ground for dismissal and a compulsory counterclaim at the same time, he must choose only one
remedy. If he decides to file a motion to dismiss, he cannot set up his counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his counterclaim, he may
still plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative defense in his answer (Regalado, 2010).
Under the 1997 Rules, the dismissal of the main complaint will not correspondingly result in the dismissal of the counterclaim
where the defendant had already filed and served the answer with counterclaims upon the plaintiff. The defendant has the option of
prosecuting the counterclaim in the same or in a separate action (Riguera, Primer –Reviewer on Remedial Law).
1) If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule (Rule 16) may be pleaded
as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to
dismiss had been filed.
The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate action
of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer (Sec. 6, Rule 16).
2) Where the plaintiff himself files a motion to dismiss his complaint after the defendant has pleaded his answer with a
counterclaim, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint and is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless within 15 days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action (Sec. 2, Rule 17).
3) If the dismissal is due to the fault of the plaintiff and a counterclaim has been set up by the defendant, the latter may
prosecute such counterclaim in the same or in a separate action (Sec. 3, Rule 17; Riano).
Cross-Claims
– It is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either
of the original action or of a counterclaim therein (Rule 6 Sec. 8).
The dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of a cross-claim which is purely defensive (but NOT a cross-claim
seeking affirmative relief)
– It is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third
(fourth, etc.)-party defendant for:
a. contribution,
b. indemnity,
c. subrogation or
d. any other relief in respect to his opponent’s claim (Rule 6, Sec. 11).
Explaining the application of Section 12, Rule 6, supra, the Court said in Balbastro v. Court of Appeals, to wit: Section 12 of
Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes a defendant to bring into a lawsuit any person "not a party to the action . . . for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of his opponent's claim." From its explicit language it does not
compel the defendant to bring the third-parties into the litigation, rather it simply permits the inclusion of anyone who meets the
standard set forth in the rule. The secondary or derivative liability of the third-party is central — whether the basis is indemnity,
subrogation, contribution, express or implied warranty or some other theory. The impleader of new parties under this rule is proper
only when a right to relief exists under the applicable substantive law. This rule is merely a procedural mechanism, and cannot be
utilized unless there is some substantive basis under applicable law.
Apart from the requirement that the third-party complainant should assert a derivative or secondary claim for relief from the third-party
defendant there are other limitations on said party’s ability to implead. The rule requires that the third-party defendant is "not a party
to the action" for otherwise the proper procedure for asserting a claim against one who is already a party to the suit is by means of
counterclaim or cross-claim under sections 6 and 7 of Rule 6. In addition to the aforecited requirement, the claim against the third-
party defendant must be based upon plaintiff's claim against the original defendant (third-party claimant). The crucial characteristic of
a claim under section 12 of Rule 6, is that the original "defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability
asserted against him by the original plaintiff. (Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., Vs. Felix Paras And Inland Trailways, Inc., And Hon.
Court Of Appeals, G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012)
Accordingly, the requisites for a third-party action are, firstly, that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the
action; secondly, that the claim against the third-party defendant must belong to the original defendant; thirdly, the claim of the
original defendant against the third-party defendant must be based upon the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant; and,
fourthly, the defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.
As the foregoing indicates, the claim that the third-party complaint asserts against the third-party defendant must be
predicated on substantive law. (Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., Vs. Felix Paras And Inland Trailways, Inc., And Hon. Court Of
Appeals, G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012)
The third-party claim need not be based on the same theory as the main claim. For example, there are cases in which the
third-party claim is based on an express indemnity contract and the original complaint is framed in terms of negligence. Similarly, there
need not be any legal relationship between the third-party defendant and any of the other parties to the action. Impleader also is
proper even though the third party’s liability is contingent, and technically does not come into existence until the original defendant’s
liability has been established. In addition, the words ‘is or may be liable’ in Rule 14(a) make it clear that impleader is proper even
though the third-party defendant’s liability is not automatically established once the third-party plaintiff’s liability to the original plaintiff
has been determined. (Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., Vs. Felix Paras And Inland Trailways, Inc., And Hon. Court Of Appeals, G.R.
No. 161909, April 25, 2012)
Complaint in Intervention
– A pleading wherein an intervenor asserts a claim against either or all of the original parties (Rule 19, Sec. 3).
Reply
– A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged
by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new
matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. (Rule 6, Sec. 10).
3.5.2. Pleadings and motions not allowed in small claim cases and cases covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure
SMALL CLAIM:
Pleadings allowed:
Jurisdictional amount
The rule shall govern the procedure before the MTC in actions for payment of money where the value of the claim does not
exceed P100,000, exclusive of interests and costs.
The prohibited pleadings and motions are essentially the same as those prohibited under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The only
difference is that motions to dismiss on whatever ground are prohibited in small claims cases.
SUMMARY PROCEDURE
a. Complaint
b. Compulsory Counterclaim
c. Cross-claim
d. Answer
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint EXCEPT on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the
requirement of prior referral to the Lupon;
2. Motion for bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial or for reconsideration of a judgment or for reopening of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other papers;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third party complaint;
12. Intervention.
Note: The filing of a motion to dismiss after the answer had already been submitted does not constitute prohibited pleading (Heirs of
Olivas v. Flor, L-78343 May 21, 1988).
The defense of lack of jurisdiction may be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings.
While the plaintiff cannot file a motion to declare defendant in default, he may still file a motion to render judgment should
the defendant fail to file his answer.
a) Caption
The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or petition; but in
subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication when
there are other parties.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied
if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the
court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Rule 7, Sec.3)
c) Verification
Rule 7, Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief", or upon "knowledge,
information and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Importance of verification
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. Verification is
deemed substantially complied with when, as in this case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct. (Felix Martos, Jimmy Eclana, Rodel Pilones, et al. Vs. New San Jose Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 192650. October 24, 2012)
Rule 7, Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
The requirement that a petitioner or principal party should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to
corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and juridical persons.
A corporation, however, exercises its powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents.
Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate
by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors (Pascual and Santos, Inc. v. The Members of the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 144880, November 17, 2004).
We emphasize that the rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such eventualities as conflicting final decisions. This
Court has consistently held that the costly consequence of forum shopping should remind the parties to ever be mindful against
abusing court processes. In addition, the principle of res judicata requires that stability be accorded to judgments. Controversies once
decided on the merits shall remain in repose for there should be an end to litigation which, without the doctrine, would be endless.
(Elsa D. Medado vs. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing, G.R. No. 186720, February 8, 2012)
e) Effect of the signature of counsel in a pleading
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied
if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the
court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Rule 7, Sec.3)
What then, is the effect of a complaint filed by one who has not proven his authority to represent a plaintiff in filing an action?
In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically stated that “[i]f a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one]
who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence,
the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.” This ruling was
reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company, where the Court went on to say that “[i]n order for the
court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts
acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected
to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the [MeTC], the same did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of respondent [plaintiff before the lower court]." Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired
jurisdiction over this case and all proceedings before it were null and void. The courts could not have delved into the very merits of the
case, because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all. (Atty.
Fe Q. Palmiano-Salvador Vs. Constantino Angeles, Substituted By Luz G. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, September 3 2012)
1. When the party who signed the verification has sufficient knowledge of its contents
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. (Georgia T. Estel, vs. Recaredo P. Diego,
Sr. and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr., G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012)
[R]ecords show that Soledad signed the verification and certification against forum shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) attached to the petition filed with the CA.
[T]he authority of Soledad includes the filing of an appeal before the CA, including the execution of a verification and certification
against forum shopping therefor, being acts necessary "to protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action necessary
and proper" in relation to their rights over the subject properties.
In addition, the allegations and contentions embodied in the CA petition do not deviate from the claims already made by the heirs in
Civil Case Nos. 00-11320 and 797-C, both specifically mentioned in the SPA. We emphasize that the verification requirement is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. We rule that there was no deficiency in the petition's verification
and certification against forum shopping filed with the CA.
In any case, we reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property
subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter
the court from proceeding with the action. (Elsa D. Medado vs. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing, G.R. No. 186720, February 8, 2012)
As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of respondents’ certification/Certification reveals that they,
in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best of their
knowledge no such other action is pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the
court. This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance on the part of respondents. (Georgia T. Estel,
vs. Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr., G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012)
The Rules of Court provide that a petition for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping. Failure to comply with these mandatory requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Considering that only 3 of the 228 named petitioners signed the requirement, the CA dismissed the case against them, as they did not
execute a Verification and Certification against forum shopping. (Vivian T. Ramirez Et. Al., vs. Mar Fishing Co., Inc., Miramar Fishing
Co., Inc., Robert Buehs And Jerome Spitz, G.R. No. 168208, June 13, 2012)
Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts, omitting
the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
Ultimate Facts are those important and substantial facts which form the basis of the primary right of the plaintiff and which
make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. They are the principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of
which, the entire cause of action rests (Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991).
Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, which should not be alleged in the complaint in the first
place, are considered for purposes of applying the test. (D.M. Ferrer & Associates Corporation vs. University Of Santo Tomas, G.R. No.
189496, February 1, 2012)
A party may set forth 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, EITHER in one cause of action or
defense or in separate causes of action or defense.
A general averment of performance of all conditions precedent shall be sufficient. If condition precedent is required, the
complaint must allege fulfillment or excuse for non-fulfillment.
Fraud, mistake, malice, intent, knowledge and other condition of the mind, judgments, official documents or acts
Rule 8, Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. — In all averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of a person may be
averred generally.
Judgment:
Rule 8, Section 6. Judgment. — In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to
render it.
Rule 8, Section 9. Official document or act. — In pleading an official document or official act, it is sufficient to aver that the
document was issued or the act done in compliance with law.
c) Specific Denials
Rule 8, Section 10. Specific denial. — A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the
remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment
made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
The genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the
adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original
instrument is refused. (Rule 8, Section 8)
The genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply
a) when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument; or
b) When compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. (Rule 8, Section 8)
General rule:
Defenses and objections not pleaded in an answer or motion to dismiss are deemed waived. (Rule 9, Section 1)
Exceptions:
NOTE: These defenses may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, except lack of jurisdiction which may be barred
by laches (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968).
General rule:
A compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim which is not set up is deemed barred. (Rule 9, Sec. 2)
Exception:
If the counterclaim or cross claim matured or was acquired by a party after serving his answer, he may, with the permission
of the court, be allowed to present his counterclaim or cross-claim by filing a supplemental answer or pleading before judgment (Rule
11, Sec. 9).
The filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies. If he decides to
file a motion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his compulsory counterclaim, he may still
plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative defense in his answer. (Finacial Building Corp. v. Forbes Park PARK Association, G.R.
No. 133119, Aug. 17, 2000)
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when
justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment before judgment. (Sec. 10, Rule 11).
NOTE: An after-acquired counterclaim is merely permissive even if it arises from or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject-matter of the opposing party’s claim.
3.5.6. Default
If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with
notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant
to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (Rule 9, Sec. 3)
Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such an answer is only permissive.
But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the original parties to file an answer to the complaint-in-
intervention within 15 days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. This changes
the procedure under the former rule where such an answer was regarded as optional. Thus, Lim’s failure to file the required answer
can give rise to default. Natividad Lim Vs. National Power Corporation, Sps. Roberto Ll. Arcinue and Arabela Arcinue, G.R. No.
178789. November 14, 2012)
A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (Rule 9, Sec. 3(a))
The petitioners’ default by their failure to file their answer led to certain consequences. Where defendants before a trial court
are declared in default, they thereby lose their right to object to the reception of the plaintiff’s evidence establishing his cause of
action. This is akin to a failure to, despite due notice, attend in court hearings for the presentation of the complainant’s evidence, which
absence would amount to the waiver of such defendant’s right to object to the evidence presented during such hearing, and to cross-
examine the witnesses presented therein.(Magdiwang Realty Corporation, Renato P. Dragon And Esperanza Tolentino Vs. The Manila
Banking Corporation, Substituted By First Sovereign Asset Management (Spv-Amc), Inc., G .R. No. 195592, 5 Sep 2012)
When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer
and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented. (Rule 9, Sec. 3(c))
Extent of relief
A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor
award unliquidated damages. (Rule 9, Sec. 3(d))
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared in default than
of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the
parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint. It
provides:
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different
in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
Rationale for limiting the extent of relief
The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not
file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or
different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to
safeguard defendant’s right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of this Court, is akin
to the very essence of due process. It embodies “the sporting idea of fair play”39 and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the
defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard thereon. (Leticia Diona, rep. by her attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona Vs. Romeo
A. Balangue, Sonny A. Balangue, Reynaldo A. Balangue, and Esteban A. Balangue, Jr. G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013)
If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (Rule 9, Sec. 3(e))
Filing a motion to dismiss stall the running of the period within which a party must answer, hence no default shall lie
within the suspended period
As a consequence of the motion to dismiss that defendant Narciso filed, the running of the period during which the rules
required her to file her answer was deemed suspended. When the trial court denied her motion to dismiss, therefore, she had the
balance of her period for filing an answer under Section 4, Rule 16 within which to file the same but in no case less than five days,
computed from her receipt of the notice of denial of her motion to dismiss. Thus:
SEC. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion is denied, the movant shall file his answer within the balance of the period
prescribed by Rule 11 to which he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed
from his receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall file his answer within the period
prescribed by Rule 11 counted from service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.
But apart from opposing defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff Garcia asked the trial court to declare Narciso in default for
not filing an answer, altogether disregarding the suspension of the running of the period for filing such an answer during the pendency
of the motion to dismiss that she filed in the case. Consequently, when the trial court granted Garcia’s prayer and simultaneously
denied Narciso’s motion to dismiss and declared her in default, it committed serious error. Narciso was not yet in default when the trial
court denied her motion to dismiss. She still had at least five days within which to file her answer to the complaint.
What is more, Narciso had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying her motion to dismiss.
No rule prohibits the filing of such a motion for reconsideration. Only after the trial court shall have denied it does Narciso become
bound to file her answer to Garcia’s complaint. And only if she did not do so was Garcia entitled to have her declared in default.
Unfortunately, the CA failed to see this point. (Anita A. Ledda Vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 200868. November 21, 2012)
1) A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, and in order to curb the
unethical practice of misleading the docket clerk in the assessment of the correct filing fee, the SC laid down the rule that “henceforth
all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer therein, and said damages shall be the basis for assessing the amount of the filing
fees.” (SC Circular No. 7, March 24, 1988; Manchester Development v. CA, No. L-75919, May 7, 1987).
2) Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been
left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,
v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989).
3) Payment of filing fees is also required in cases of appeal (Sec. 5, Rule 40; Sec. 4, Rule 41; Sec. 3, Rule 45).
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, nonpayment of which at the time of
filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case for as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
(Sps. Go v. Tong, G.R. 151942, Nov. 27, 2003)
Docket fees based on value of the stocks:
An action seeking for the execution of a deed of assignment of shares of stock is an action for recovery of personal property.
The payment of docket fees should be based on the value of the shares of stock and the amount of damages he seeks to recover.
(NSC v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123215. February 2, 1999)
Exception: Docket fees need NOT be paid at the time of filing of the complaint and may be considered a lien on the judgment in the
following instances:
1. The damages or claim arose after the filing of the complaint/initiatory pleading or if the court awards damages not prayed for
in the complaint (Original Dev’t & Construction Corp. v. CA, 202 SCRA 75;, Sec.2, Rule 141);
2. Indigent litigant (Sec. 19, Rule 141);
3. Failure of the adverse party to timely raise the issue of nonpayment of the docket fee (National Steel Corp. v. CA, G.R. No.
123215, February 2, 1999);
4. Civil action instituted with the criminal action where the moral, exemplary, nominal, and temperate damages are not specified
in the complaint or information (Sec. 1, Rule 141);
5. Petition for Writ of Amparo shall be exempt from the payment of docket and other filing fees (Sec. 1, Rule on the Writ of
Amparo).
6. Indigent petitioner for writ of habeas data is exempt from payment of docket or other lawful fees. (Section 5, Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data A.M. No. 08-1-16 SC)
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is
no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 08-2-
01-0, which denied the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, 11 February 2010; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-
Cortes, 26 February 2010), it is evident that the exemption of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriff’s fees no
longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for
exemption from the payment of legal fees. (Re: In The Matter of Clarification of Exemption From Payment of All Court And Sheriff's
Fees of Cooperatives Duly Registered in Accordance with Republic Act No. 9520 Otherwise Known as the Philippine Cooperative Code
Of 2008, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (Phcci), A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 , March 13, 2012)
In Siapno (505 Phil. 430 [2005]) the complaint alleged in its body the aggregate sum of P4,500,000 in moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees, but the prayer portion did not mention these claims, nor did it even pray for the payment of damages.
This Court held that such a complaint should be dismissed outright; or if already admitted, should be expunged from the records. The
Court explained that the rule – requiring the amount of damages claimed to be specified not only in the body of the pleading but also
in its prayer portion – was intended to put an end to the then prevailing practice of lawyers where the damages prayed for were
recited only in the body of the complaint, but not in the prayer, in order to evade payment of the correct filing fees. As held by the
Court in Manchester:
“To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered
in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.”
In Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion, the Court laid down the following rules as regards the payment of filing fees:
1) It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2) The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered
filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3) Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or, if specified [but] the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
It cannot be gainsaid from the above guidelines that, with the exception of pauper litigants (Section 16, Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court states that "the legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment in favor of the pauper-litigant) without the
payment of the correct docket or filing fees within the reglementary period, jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action
will not vest in the trial court. In fact, a pauper litigant may still have to pay the docket fees later, by way of a lien on the monetary or
property judgment that may accrue to him. Clearly, the flexibility or liberality of the rules sought by the petitioners cannot apply in the
instant case. (Ricardo Rizal, Potenciana Rizal, Saturnina Rizal, Elena Rizal, And Benjamin Rizal, Vs. Leoncia Naredo, Anastacio Lirio,
Edilberto Cantavieja, Gloria Cantavieja, Celso Cantavieja, And The Heirs Of Melanie Cantavieja, G.R. No. 151898, March 14, 2012)
Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court.
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel,
service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where
one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side. (Rule
13, Section 2)
1. Answer to complaint (Sec.1) – 15 days from service, unless different period is fixed by the court
2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity (Sec.2)
NOTE: A non-resident defendant on whom extraterritorial service of summons is made - the period to answer should be at least 60
days.
Answer earlier filed may be answer to amended complaint, if no new answer is filed.
General rule:
An answer to counterclaim or cross claim is required. Failure to answer is ground for default.
a) Where answer would be a repetition of allegations in the complaint (Navarro v. Bello , L-11647 January 31, 1958);
b) Where the issues raised in the counterclaim are inseparable from those posed in the complaint (Sarmiento v. Juan, No.
56605 January 28, 1983);
c) A plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, principally because
the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations in the complaint (Gojo v. Goyala, G.R. No. L-
26768, 30 October 1970).
5. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint (Sec.5) - within 15 days from service.
6. Reply (Sec.6) – may be filed within 10 days from service of the pleading responded to.
7. Answer to supplemental complaint (Sec.7) - within 10 days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different
period is fixed by the court.
NOTE: The answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to the supplemental complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed.
It may, with permission of the court, be presented as such by supplemental pleading before judgment.
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or cross claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when
justice requires, he may, by leave of court, be set up as such by amendment before judgment.
Requisites:
The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting
the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first
case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of
motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry
receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the
case. (Rule 13, Sec. 3)
If a party avails the services of a private carrier, the date of actual receipt by the court of such pleading and not the date of
delivery to the private carrier, is deemed to be the date of the filing of that pleading (Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 89070 May 18, 1992).
Modes of service
Service of pleadings motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made either personally or by mail. ( Rule
13, Sec. 5)
i. Personal service
Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office
with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office,
then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if
known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. (Rule 13, Sec. 6)
Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to
the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to
the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of
either the senders or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. (Rule 13, Sec. 7)
Under Section 3 Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (2008) and Section 6 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, any pleading and /or document required by the said Rules may be filed with the
court and/or served upon the other parties by fax or email if so authorized by the court. In such cases, the date of transmission shall
be deemed to be prima facie the date of service. (Primer-Reviewer on Remedial Law, Vol.I, Civil Procedure, Riguera, 2nd ed., 2013)
Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by
publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by
publication at the expense of the prevailing party. (Rule 13, Sec. 9)
Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to
papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was
not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed. (Rule 13, Sec. 11)
Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days
after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after
five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. ( Rule 13, Sec. 10)
In Cruz v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that with respect to motions, proof of service is a mandatory requirement. We find
no cogent reason why this dictum should not apply and with more reason to a petition for certiorari, in view of Section 3, Rule 46
which requires that the petition shall be filed "together with proof of service thereof." We agree with the Court of Appeals that the lack
of proof of service is a fatal defect. The utter disregard of the Rule cannot be justified by harking to substantial justice and the policy
of liberal construction of the Rules. Technical rules of procedure are not meant to frustrate the ends of justice. Rather, they serve to
effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. (Emphasis in the original)
Indeed, while an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that service has been made on the other party, it is
nonetheless essential to due process and the orderly administration of justice. Salvador O. Mojar, Edgar B. Begonia, Heirs Of The Late
Jose M. Cortez, Restituto Gaddi, Virgilio M. Monana, Freddie Rances, And Edson D. Tomas, Vs. Agro Commercial Security Service
Agency, Inc., Et Al., G.R. No. 187188, June 27, 2012)
Such service to Atty. Espinas, as petitioners’ counsel of record, was valid despite the fact he was already deceased at the
time. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall be made upon his counsel or one of them,
unless service upon the party is specifically ordered by the court. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a
case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still
alive, or whether its associates are still connected with the firm. (Salvador O. Mojar, Edgar B. Begonia, Heirs Of The Late Jose M.
Cortez, Restituto Gaddi, Virgilio M. Monana, Freddie Rances, And Edson D. Tomas, Vs. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc.,
Et Al., G.R. No. 187188, June 27, 2012)
3.5.8. Amendment
Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the
name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy
may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner. (Rule 10, Section
1)
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of
a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. (Rule 10, Section 2)
Amendment as a matter o right though there is a motion to dismiss
A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading; hence the plaintiff can still amend his complaint as a matter of right.
The right of a plaintiff to amend his pleading once as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served, has been held
to be one which the court should always grant, otherwise mandamus will lie against it since it is a ministerial duty of the court to
accept amendment as a matter of right. (Ong Peng v. Custodio, L-14911, March 25, 1961).
If the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court then the court cannot admit the amended complaint.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the original complaint, the lower court has neither the power nor the
jurisdiction to act on the motion for the admission of the amended complaint, much less to allow such amendment, since it is
elementary that the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein. (Rosario v. Carangdang, G.R. No.
L-7076, April 28, 1955)
The cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an amendment to
introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action was commenced. (Surigao Mine Exploration Co. v. Harris, G.R. No.
L-45543, May 17, 1939)
Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such
leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters
provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be
heard. (Rule 10, Section 3)
Amendment may be made despite substantial change in the cause of action or defense
if such will serve the higher interest of justice or prevent delay and promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case
(Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals).
c) Formal amendment
A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the
court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. (Rule 10,
Section 3)
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to
amend does not effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the
merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
amendment to be made. (Rule 10, Section 5)
Those which aver facts occurring after the filing of the original pleadings and which are material to the mature claims and/or
defenses alleged therein.
Under Section 6, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing supplemental pleadings, the court “may”
admit supplemental pleadings, such as the supplemental petition filed by respondent before the appellate court, but the admission of
these pleadings remains in the sound discretion of the court. Nevertheless, we have already found no credence in respondent’s claim
that petitioner is a corporate officer, consequently, the alleged lack of jurisdiction asserted by respondent in the supplemental petition
is bereft of merit. (Ma. Mercedes L. Barba Vs. Liceo De Cagayan University, G.R. No. 193857. November 28, 2012)
AMENDED
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
PLEADINGS
As to allegations
Refers to transaction, occurrences or events already existing at the Refers to transactions, occurrences or events which have
time of the filing of the original action. happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented.
As to right
Can be a matter of right such as when made before a responsive Always with leave of court.
pleading is served.
As to form
A new copy of the entire pleading must be filed incorporating the No need to file but must serve a copy to the court and the
amendments and indicated by appropriate marks. adverse party.
As to effect
An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received
in evidence against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed
waived. (Rule 10, Section 8)
3.6. Summons
What is summons?
It is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by his voluntary appearance or service of
summons upon him (Minucher v. CA G.R. No.142963, Feb. 11, 2003).
Under Section 15, service of summons only confers jurisdiction over the res and not over the person of the defendant.
Effect if the court has not validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or
through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. If a defendant has not been properly summoned, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over its person, and a judgment rendered against it is null and void. (Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie
Chandumal, G.R. No. 19561905 September 2012)
3.6.1. Nature and purpose of summons in relation to actions in personam, in rem and quasi in rem
1.To give notice to the defendant that an action has been commenced against him; and
2) To afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.
Rule on unknown defendant or when the whereabouts is unknown
Under the old rule, the distinction between the nature of actions was important for it determines the mode of service of
summons to be made. However, in Santos v. PNOC (G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008), the Supreme Court held that the in rem/in
personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable.
Because of this silence, the court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only. This has been changed. The present
rule expressly states that it applied to any action where the defendant is designated as unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action,
whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in
court. (Afdal & Afdal v. Carlos, G.R. No. 173379, December 1, 2010) Thus, voluntary appearance by the defendant is equivalent to
service of summons (Rule 14, Section 20). Even if the summons is defective, jurisdiction over the defendant attaches.
Special Appearance to file a motion to dismiss on grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
NOT be deemed a voluntary appearance.
In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary
appearance in court. In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy we had occasion to state: Preliminarily, jurisdiction
over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary
appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion
seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. (Optima Realty Corporation Vs. Hertz Phil., Exclusive, Inc.
G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013)
When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, she effectively
submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the trial court as the filing of a pleading where one seeks an affirmative relief is equivalent
to service of summons and vests the trial court with jurisdiction over the defendant’s person. Thus, it was ruled that the filing of
motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration is considered voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Court notes that aside from the
allegation that she did not receive any summons, Chandumal’s motion to set aside order of default and to admit attached answer failed
to positively assert the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. In fact, what was set forth therein was the substantial claim that PDB failed to
comply with the requirements of R.A. No. 6552 on payment of cash surrender value, which already delves into the merits of PDB’s
cause of action. In addition, Chandumal even appealed the RTC decision to the CA, an act which demonstrates her recognition of the
trial court’s jurisdiction to render said judgment. (Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 19561905 September
2012)
Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. (Rule 14, Section 6)
Substituted service
If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof. (Rule 14, Section 7)
In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve it personally. In Manotoc v.
Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility
of prompt personal service – the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must describe in the Return of
Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a person of suitable age and discretion – the
sheriff must determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty
to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which matters must be clearly
and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have sufficient knowledge to
understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. Xxx Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 19561905 September 2012)
We agree with the finding that Pua committed delay in prosecuting his case against the respondents. We clarify, however,
that Pua’s delay is limited to his failure to move the case forward after the summons for Ang had been published in the Manila
Standard; he could not be faulted for the delay in the service of summons for Ang.
A 13-month delay occurred between the filing of the complaint and the filing of the motion to serve summons by publication
on Ang. This delay, however, is attributable to the failure of the sheriff to immediately file a return of service of summons. The
complaint was filed on November 24, 2000, but the return of service of summons was filed only on January 3, 2002, after the RTC
ordered its submission and upon Pua’s motion.
Under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, service of summons may be effected on a defendant by publication, with leave
of court, when his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. The Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. – In any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places
and for such time as the court may order.
In Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corporation, the Court authorized resort to service of summons by publication even in actions
in personam, considering that the provision itself allow this mode in any action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi
in rem. The ruling, notwithstanding, there must be prior resort to service in person on the defendant and substituted service, and proof
that service by these modes were ineffective before service by publication may be allowed for defendants whose whereabouts are
unknown, considering that Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court requires a diligent inquiry of the defendant’s whereabouts.
Until the summons has been served on Ang, the case cannot proceed since Ang is an indispensable party to the case; Pua
alleged in his complaint that the respondents are co-owners of JD Grains Center. An indispensable party is one who must be included in
an action before it may properly go forward. A court must acquire jurisdiction over the person of indispensable parties before it can
validly pronounce judgments personal to the parties. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (Pablo Pua Vs. Lourdes L.
Deyto, Doing Business Under The Name Of "JD Grains Center," And Jennelita Deyto Ang A.K.A. "Janet Ang G.R. No. 173336. November
26, 2012)
a) Service upon a defendant where his identity is unknown or his whereabouts are unknown
In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order. (Rule 14, Section 14)
When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein,
or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. (Rule 14, Section
15)
Extraterritorial service may be validly served by telefax or email as the rule provides “in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.”
The court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs.
Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband. She had authority to sue,
and had actually sued on behalf of her husband. (Gemerple v. Schenker, G.R. No. L-18164 January 23, 1967)
However, in the case Valmonte v. CA, Mrs. Valmonte did not appoint Mr. Valmonte as her attorney-in-fact to represent her in
litigations and in court. Mr. Valmonte was merely acting as his wife’s counsel in negotiations with but this cannot be construed as an
authorization. (Valmonte v. CA, G.R. No. 108538. January 22, 1996)
When the defendant is a prisoner confined in a jail or institution, service shall be effected upon him by the officer having the
management of such jail or institution who is deemed deputized as a special sheriff for said purpose. (Rule 14, Section 9)
When the defendant is a minor, insane or otherwise an incompetent, service shall be made upon him personally and on his
legal guardian if he has one, or if none his guardian ad litem whose appointment shall be applied for by the plaintiff. In the case of a
minor, service may also be made on his father or mother. (Rule 14, Section 10)
Rule 14, Section 18. Proof of service. — The proof of service of a summons shall be made in writing by the server and shall
set forth the manner, place, and date of service; shall specify any papers which have been served with the process and the name of
the person who received the same; and shall be sworn to when made by a person other than a sheriff or his deputy. (20)
Rule 14, Section 19. Proof of service by publication. — If the service has been made by publication, service may be proved by the
affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager, to which affidavit a copy of the
publication shall be attached and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post
office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
3.7. Motions
Definition of a motion
A motion is an application for relief other than by a pleading. (Rule 15, Section 1)
Under the rules on Small Claims Cases a motion is an oral or written request asking for an affirmative action from the court,
that includes a letter
A motion is an application for relief other than by a pleading. (Rule 15, Section 1). A motion prays for another relief other than
the main cause of action or the main defense, while a pleading prays for a relief which is directly related to the cause of action or
defense
c) Contents and forms of motions
Contents
A motion shall state the relief sought to be obtained and the grounds upon which it is based, and if required by these Rules or
necessary to prove facts alleged therein, shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other papers. (Rule 15, Section 3)
Form
All motions shall be in writing except those made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial. (Rule 15, Section 2)
Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion
shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice. (Rule 15, Section 4)
Motion Which Does Not Require Notice & Hearing – Writ Of Execution: Opportunity to be heard:
Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing and that there must
be proof of service thereof. The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the above requirements is
considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted upon. The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can
be acted upon by the court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid
requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.
The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the judgment sought to be
executed in this case had already become final and executory. As such, the Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a writ of
execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the same. This right on the part of the Spouses Co and duty on the part of
the RTC are based on Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Spouses Co can have their motion for execution executed as a matter of right without the needed notice and hearing requirement to
petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 where there must be notice to the adverse
party. In the case of Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Virginia D. Vda. De Hernandez, it was written:
It is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not prescribe that a copy of the motion for the
execution of a final and executory judgment be served on the defeated party, like litigated motions such as a motion to dismiss
(Section 3, Rule 16), or motion for new trial (Section 2, Rule 37), or a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal (Section 2,
Rule 39), in all of which instances a written notice thereof is required to be served by the movant on the adverse party in order to
afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application. (Douglas F. Anama Vs. Philippine Savings Bank, G.R. No. 187021, January 25,
2012)
In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if
the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was not considered and resolved
until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified.
Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack of notice of hearing in
a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the adverse party actually
had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held:
“This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the
requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of
hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. As an
integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the
movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be
given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that
the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. The test is the presence of opportunity to
be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it
is based.” (United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. vs. Acropolis Central Guaranty Corporation, G.R. No. 171750, January 25, 2012)
Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. (Rule 15, Section 8)
Exception
Motions arguing that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations (Rule 9, Section 1)
Defense and objections not pleaded either in motion to dismiss or in answer are deemed waived; exceptions.
Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the
condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this
Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure
to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. (Heirs of Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales,
her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922,
January 15, 2014.)
Litigated Motions
They are motions which the court may not act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. Made with notice to
the adverse party to give an opportunity to oppose e.g., motion for reconsideration, motion to dismiss motion to declare defendant in
default.
Ex Parte Motions
They are motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. Made without the presence or
a notification to the other party because the question generally presented is not debatable e.g., motion for extension of time to file
answer, motion for postponement, motion for extension of time to file record on appeal.
g) Pro-forma motions
They are motions which do not satisfy the requirements of the rules and one which will be treated as a motion intended to
delay the proceedings (Riano, 2007 citing Marikina Valley Dev't. Corp. v. Hon. Flojo, G.R. No. 110801, December 8, 1995).
Bill of Particulars –
- a more definite statement of a matter which is not stated or declared with sufficient definiteness or particularity.
Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is
not averted with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a
reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of, the
paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired. (Rule 12, Section 1)
An action cannot be dismissed on the ground that the complaint is vague or indefinite. The remedy of the defendant is to
move for a bill of particulars or avail of the proper mode of discovery (Galeon v. Galeon, G.R. No. L-30380, Feb. 28, 1973).
Remedy if the allegations fails to state a cause of action
If the pleading is not only indefinite or ambiguous but fails to state a cause of action, the remedy of the party is to file a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the pleading states no cause of action. (Primer-Reviewer on Remedial Law, Vol.I, Civil Procedure,
Riguera, 2nd ed., 2013)
When to file?
The motion for bill of particulars shall be filed before responding to a pleading. Hence, it must be filed within the period
granted by the Rules (Rule 11) for the filing of a responsive pleading.
Upon the filing of the motion, the clerk of court must immediately bring it to the attention of the court which may either deny
or grant it outright, or allow the parties the opportunity to be heard. (Rule 12, Section 2)
If the motion is granted, either in whole or in part, the compliance therewith must be effected within ten (10) days from
notice of the order, unless a different period is fixed by the court. The bill of particulars or a more definite statement ordered by the
court may be filed either in a separate or in an amended pleading, serving a copy thereof on the adverse party. (Rule 12, Section 3)
Effect of Noncompliance
If the order is not obeyed, or in case of insufficient compliance therewith, the court may order the striking out of the pleading
or the portions thereof to which the order was directed or make such other order as it deems just. (Rule 12, Section 4)
If the plaintiff fails to obey, his complaint may be dismissed with prejudice UNLESS otherwise ordered by the court (Rule 12,
Sec. 4; Rule 17, Section 3);
If defendant fails to obey, his answer will be stricken off and his counterclaim dismissed, and he will be declared in default
upon motion of the plaintiff (Rule 12, Section 4; Rule 17, Section 4; Rule 9, Sec. 3).
After service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of denial of his motion, the moving party
may file his responsive pleading within the period to which he was entitled at the time of filing his motion, which shall not be less than
five (5) days in any event. (Rule 12, Section 5)
a) Grounds
Note: Under the Rules on Environmental cases Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation is a ground for the dismissal of the action
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.
Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin (422 Phil. 222, 230 [2001]), cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr. (481 Phil. 168, 180 [2004]), the Court held:
“x x x [T]he muto proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or
neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio [sic] dismissal would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard.
Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may muto proprio dismiss a claim when it
appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations. x x x.” Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly
Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and
Larcelita D. Favis, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014)
b) Resolution of motion
After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. (Rule 16, Sec. 3)
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified. (Republic of the Philippines, rep. by the Regional Executive Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 3 Vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila/Samahang
Kabuhayan ng San Lorenzo KKK, Inc., rep. by its vice President Zenaida Turla Vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, G.R. No.
192975/G.R. No. 192994. November 12, 2012)
Exceptions: The action can no longer be re-filed if it was dismissed on the grounds of:
a. Res judicata;
b. Extinguishment of the claim or demand;
c. Prescription; or
d. Unenforceability of the claim
If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to
dismiss had been filed. (Rule 16, Sec. 6)
g) Bar by dismissal
The action can no longer be re-filed if it was dismissed on the grounds of:
a. Res judicata;
b. Extinguishment of the claim or demand;
c. Prescription; or
d. Unenforceability of the claim
DISTINCTION BETWEEN
Motion to Dismiss
Motion to Dismiss under Rule 33 (demurrer to evidence)
under Rule 16
Filed before the service and filing of the answer Made after the plaintiff rests his case
Anchored on many grounds Anchored on one ground, that is, plaintiff has no right to relief
A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. (Rule 17, Sec. 1)
Two-Dismissal Rule
Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon
the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. (Rule
17, Sec. 1) Thus, when the same complaint had twice been dismissed by the plaintiff under Sec.1 by simply filing a notice of dismissal,
the second dismissal shall be with prejudice.
What causes the loss by a plaintiff of the right to effect dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant’s
answer with the court but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Where the plaintiff filed the
notice of dismissal of his action in the court after the filing of defendant’s answer but before service thereof, the plaintiff’s notice to
that effect ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the pending action without need of any order from the trial court ( Go v. Cruz, et
al., G.R. No. 58986, April 17, 1983).
Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior
to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court. (Rule 17, Sec. 2)
The dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim if the counterclaim was pleaded by
the defendant after service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal.
The dismissal shall be limited to the complaint or the defendant can prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action if the
counterclaim was pleaded by the defendant before service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal.
The defendant can revive the compulsory counterclaim within 15 days from notice of such motion.
If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Rule 17, Sec. 3)
It is plaintiff’s failure to appear at the trial, and not the absence of his lawyer, which warrants dismissal (Regalado).
Test of Non-prosequitur
The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due
diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.
(Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc., Vs. Mrs. Leticia B. Magsalin, Doing Business Under The Trade Name "Karen's Trading," Fgu
Insurance Corporation, Godofredo Garcia, Concordia Garcia, And Reynaldo Baetiong, G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012)
Effects of Failure to Prosecute/ Non-Prosequitur
Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is
understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal.
In this case, Pua failed to take any action on the case after summons was served by publication on Ang. It took him more than
two years to file a motion to declare Ang in default and only after the RTC has already dismissed his case for failure to prosecute. That
Pua renewed the attachment bond is not an indication of his intention to prosecute. The payment of an attachment bond is not the
appropriate procedure to settle a legal dispute in court; it could not be considered as a substitute for the submission of necessary
pleadings or motions that would lead to prompt action on the case. (Ma. Mercedes L. Barba Vs. Liceo De Cagayan University, G.R. No.
193857. November 28, 2012)
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the failure on the part of the plaintiff, without
any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court or the Rules, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
may result in the dismissal of the complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant. The failure of a plaintiff to prosecute
the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer
interested to obtain from the court the relief prayed for in his complaint; hence, the court is authorized to order the dismissal of the
complaint on its own motion or on motion of the defendants. The presumption is not, by any means, conclusive because the plaintiff,
on a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause for such failure. The burden to
show that there are compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the case unjustified is on the petitioners.
While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so
within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently. This case had been at
the pre-trial stage for more than two years and petitioners have not shown special circumstances or compelling reasons to convince us
that the dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute was unjustified. (Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. And Trebel International, Inc.,
Vs. Banco De Oro Universal Bank And Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., In His Capacity As Ex-Officio Sheriff Of The Rtc Of Makati City, G.R.
No. 192716, June 13, 2012)
The provisions of this Rule shall apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint. A voluntary
dismissal by the claimant by notice as in section 1 of this Rule, shall be made before a responsive pleading or a motion for summary
judgment is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. (Rule 17, Sec. 4)
3.9. Pre-trial
Pre -trial is a mandatory procedural device by which the court is called upon, after the filing of the last pleading, to compel the
parties and their lawyers to appear before it for the purposes enumerated under Section 2, Rule 18.
It shall be the duty of the plaintiff, after the last pleading has been served and filed, to promptly move ex parte that the case
be set for pre-trial.
The motion is to be filed within 5 days after the last pleading joining the issue has been served and filed (Admin. Circular No.
3-99, Jan. 15, 1999).
If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Clerk of Court shall issue a notice of pre-trial (A.M. No. 03-1-
09-SC, Re: Pre-trial guidelines, Effective August 16, 2004).
The plaintiff need not wait until the last pleading has been actually served and filed as the expiration of the period for filing the last
pleading will suffice (Sarmiento v. Juan, No. 56605 January 28, 1983).
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid
ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.
The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The counsel served with such notice is
charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him. (Rule 18, Sec. 3)
It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused
only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an
amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documents. (Rule 18, Sec. 4)
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at
least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:
(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution, indicating the
desired terms thereof;
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;
(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented stating the purpose thereof;
(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to
commissioners; and
(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.
3.9.6. Distinction between pre-trial in civil case and pre-trial in criminal case
Does not require filing of pre-trial brief but attendance only in a pre-
A pre-trial brief is required trial conference to consider the matters stated in sec 2, rule18
(Regalado)
Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, it is the duty of the plaintiff, after the last
pleading has been served and filed, to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial. On August 16, 2004, A.M. No. 03-1-
09-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use
of Deposition-Discovery Measures) took effect, which provides that:
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial
conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
We note that when the above guidelines took effect, the case was already at the pre-trial stage and it was the failure of
petitioners to set the case anew for pre-trial conference which prompted the trial court to dismiss their complaint.
In Olave v. Mistas, this Court said that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-trial without any justifiable cause for
such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to
the defendant, and there are special and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In
the more recent case of Espiritu v. Lazaro, this Court affirmed the dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute, the plaintiff having failed
to take the initiative to set the case for pre-trial for almost one year from their receipt of the Answer. Although said case was decided
prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, the Court considered the circumstances showing petitioners’ and their counsel’s lack of
interest and laxity in prosecuting their case. (Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. And Trebel International, Inc., Vs. Banco De Oro Universal
Bank)
Any process or procedure used to resolve a dispute or controversy, other than by adjudication of a presiding judge of a court
or an officer of a government agency, in which a neutral third party participates to assist in the resolution of issues, which includes
arbitration, mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, mini-trial, or any combination thereof
Referral to Arbitration
A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least
one party so requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the request of both parties thereafter, refer the parties to
arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
a) Special Rules of Court on ADR (A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC) (Note: this is a very long set of rules and was not included anymore)
3.10. Intervention
What is intervention?
– a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to become a party by intervening in the
pending case after meeting the conditions and compliance with the requirement set by the Rules.
Nature:
Intervention is ancillary and supplemental to an existing action. Hence, it cannot exist independent of the principal action and
the dismissal of the latter shall also cause the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention.
Note:
Intervention is a prohibited pleading in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases under Sec. 13, Rule 70.
A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding. (Rule 18, Sec. 1)
A leave of court is necessary in order that the third party may be allowed to intervene in the action.
An intervention cannot legally alter the nature of the action and the issue joined by the original parties. ( Clardidades v.
Mercader, G.R. No. L-20341, May 14, 1966)
The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (Rule 18, Sec. 2)
Must be filed within 15 days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless otherwise fixed by the court.
1) Appeal;
2) File a petition for mandamus if there is grave abuse of discretion.
3) If the grant of intervention is improper, the remedy available to the parties is Certiorari.
4) File a separate action
3.11. Subpoena
1) Attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action or at any investigation conducted by a competent authority;
2) Give his deposition;
3) Bring with him any books, documents or other things under his control.
A process by which the court to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. (Roco v.
Contreras, et.al., G.R. No. 158275, June 18, 2005, 500 Phil 275)
Ordinary subpoena. Requires a person to whom the order is directed to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an
action or at any investigation conducted by a competent authority or for the taking of his deposition.
Service of a subpoena shall be made in the same manner as personal or substituted service of summons. The original shall be
exhibited and a copy thereof delivered to the person on whom it is served, tendering to him the fees for one day's attendance and the
kilometrage allowed by these Rules, except that, when a subpoena is issued by or on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines or an
officer or agency thereof, the tender need not be made. The service must be made so as to allow the witness a reasonable time for
preparation and travel to the place of attendance. If the subpoena is duces tecum, the reasonable cost of producing the books,
documents or things demanded shall also be tendered. (Rule 21, Sec.6)
In case of failure of a witness to attend, the court or judge issuing the subpoena, upon proof of the service thereof and of the
failure of the witness, may issue a warrant to the sheriff of the province, or his deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him before the
court or officer where his attendance is required, and the cost of such warrant and seizure of such witness shall be paid by the witness
if the court issuing it shall determine that his failure to answer the subpoena was willful and without just excuse. (Rule 21, Sec.8)
Failure by any person without adequate cause to obey a subpoena served upon him shall be deemed a contempt of the court
from which the subpoena is issued. If the subpoena was not issued by a court, the disobedience thereto shall be punished in
accordance with the applicable law or Rule. (Rule 21, Sec.9)
The provisions of sections 8 and 9 of this Rule shall not apply to a witness who resides more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from his residence to the place where he is to testify by the ordinary course of travel, or to a detention prisoner if no
permission of the court in which his case is pending was obtained. (Rule 21, Sec.10)
Court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made, and in any event, at or before the time specified if:
1) It is unreasonable or oppressive;
2) The relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear;
3) The person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof; or
4) The witness fees and the kilometrage allowed by these Rules were not tendered when the subpoena was served.
1) The witness is not bound thereby; where the residence is more than 100km from place of trial.
2) The witness fees and the kilometrage allowed by these Rules were not tendered when the subpoena was served.
“Viatory Right” of the witness – If witness resides more than 100 km from the place where he is to travel by the ordinary course of
travel, or if he is a detention prisoner and no permission is obtained from the court in which his case is pending, then he cannot be
compelled to attend the trial. The right is available only in CIVIL cases.
There is no viatory right in criminal cases. ( People v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-24154, Oct. 31, 1967)
Discovery: (A) device employed by a party to obtain information about relevant matters on the case from the adverse party in
preparation for the trial. (Riano 2011)
The modern pre-trial procedure by which one party gains vital information concerning the case in order to aid him in his litigation.
(Riguera 2013, citing Steven Gifis, Law Dictionary 61 [1975]).
Purpose: to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, to ascertain the facts relative to the issues and enable the parties
to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of issues and facts before civil trials.
The primary purpose of discovery is to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial and thus prevent the situation where trials are carried on in the dark. It makes the parties lay down their cards on the table
so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case. (Riguera 2013, citing Koh v. IAC, 144 SCRA 259).
Modes or Methods of Discovery provided by the Rules of Court:
1) Depositions pending action (Rule 23); or Depositions before action or pending appeal (Rule 24);
2) Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25);
3) Request for admission by adverse parties (Rule 26);
4) Motion for Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27); and
5) Motion for physical and mental Examination of persons (Rule 28).
Availing modes of discovery is not mandatory but the failure to avail may be sanctioned under Rules 25 and 26.
Rules 27 and 28 always require prior leave of court, unlike other modes of discovery which could be availed of without leave of
court as long as the defendant has filed or served a responsive pleading.
a) Meaning of deposition
Deposition is a written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing
upon oral examination or in response to written interrogatories and where an opportunity is given for cross-examination (Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112710, May 30, 2001).
Deposition is a method of pre-trial discovery which consists in taking the testimony of a person under oath upon oral
examination (oral deposition) or upon written interrogatories. The term deposition also refers to the testimony or statement so taken.
(Riguera 2013)
The purpose for which a deposition may be used depends on who the deponent is and on who will be using the deposition.
Rule 23, Section 4(c) lays down the relevant rules:
a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as
a witness. This is a common use of a deposition, to impeach a witness who is under cross-examination.
b) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of the taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:
If the deposition is taken not in the same case but in a former case or proceeding, it is governed NOT by Sec. 4(c) Rule 23 but
by Sec. 47 Rule 130. (Riguera 2013)
If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is
relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts (Rule 23, Section 4(d)) (Primer-Reviewer on REMEDIAL
LAW, Manuel R. Riguera)
General rule:
Exception: Under special circumstances where there is necessity and good reason for presenting a strong case. Thus, there must be
necessity and good reason for the taking of the testimony immediately.
An answer ex abudanti cautela (out of abundant caution or to be on the safe side) does not make their answer less of an
answer and when such answer is filed, deposition may be made without leave of court (Rosete v. Lim G.R No.136051, June 8, 2006).
Scope of Examination
1) Not privileged;
2) Relevant to the subject of the pending action;
3) Not restricted by court order for the protection of parties and deponents;
4) Not meant to annoy, embarrass or oppress the deponent or party.
Subject to the provisions of section 29 of this Rule, objection may be made at the trial or hearing, to receiving in evidence any
deposition or part thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and
testifying. (Rule 23, Sec. 6)
(a) As to notice. — All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a deposition are waived unless written objection is
promptly served upon the party giving the notice.
(b) As to disqualification of officer. — Objection to taking a deposition because of disqualification of the officer before whom it
is to be taken is waived unless made before the taking of the deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the disqualification becomes
known or could be discovered with reasonable diligence.
(c) As to competency or relevancy of evidence. — Objections to the competency of witness or the competency, relevancy, or
materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground, of the
objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time.
(d) As to oral examination and other particulars. — Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner of
taking the deposition in the form of the questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of the parties and errors of
any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly prosecuted, are waived unless reasonable objection thereto is made
at the taking of the deposition.
(e) As to form of written interrogatories. — Objections to the form of written interrogatories submitted under sections 25 and
26 of this Rule are waived unless served in writing upon the party propounding them within the time allowed for serving succeeding
cross or other interrogatories and within three (3) days after service of the last interrogatories authorized.
(f) As to manner of preparation. — Errors and irregularities in the manner in which the testimony is transcribed or the
deposition is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, indorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with by the officer under sections 17,
19, 20 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless a motion to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with reasonable
promptness after such defect is, or with due diligence might have been, ascertained.
d) When may taking of deposition be terminated or its scope limited?
At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion or petition of any party or of the deponent, and upon a showing
that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent
or party, the court in which the action is pending or the Regional Trial Court of the place where the deposition is being taken may order
the officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the taking
of the deposition, as provided in section 16 of this Rule. If the order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter
only upon the order of the court in which the action is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the
deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to make a notice for an order. In granting or refusing such order, the court may
impose upon either party or upon the witness the requirement to pay such costs or expenses as the court may deem reasonable. (Rule
23, Sec. 18)
Under the same conditions specified in section 1 of Rule 23, any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from any
adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is
a public or private corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf. ( Rule 25, Sec. 1)
“The examination may be completed on other matters or adjourned as the proponent of the question may prefer. The
proponent may thereafter apply to the proper court of the place where the deposition is being taken, for an order to compel an
answer. The same procedure may be availed of when a party or a witness refuses to answer any interrogatory submitted under Rules
23 or 25.
If the application is granted, the court shall require the refusing party or deponent to answer the question or interrogatory
and if it also finds that the refusal to answer was without substantial justification, it may require the refusing party or deponent or the
counsel advising the refusal, or both of them, to pay the proponent the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the
order, including attorney's fees.
If the application is denied and the court finds that it was filed without substantial justification, the court may require the
proponent or the counsel advising the filing of the application, or both of them, to pay to the refusing party or deponent the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the application, including attorney's fees.” ( Rule 29, Sec. 1)
If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition,
after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of
such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action
or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable
expenses incurred by the other, including attorney's fees. (Rule 29, Sec. 5)
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with
written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending
appeal. (Rule 25, Sec. 6)
At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party may file and serve upon any other
party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents
shall be delivered with the request unless copy have already been furnished. (Rule 26, Sec. 1)
A request for admission must be served directly upon the party requested. Otherwise, that party cannot be deemed to have
admitted the genuineness of any relevant matters of fact set forth therein on account of failure to answer the request for admission.
(Riguera 2013, citing Lañada vs. CA, 1 February 2002).
Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the
request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on
motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either
admit or deny those matters. (Rule 26, Sec. 2(1))
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested within the period for and prior
to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be deferred until
such objections are resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as practicable. (Rule 26, Sec. 2(2))
Exceptions:
1. The requested party files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either specifically denying or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters., within a period designated in the
request, which shall not be less than 15 days after service thereof or within such further time as the court may allow on motion.
2. When the request for admission is not directly served upon the party requested, the party requested cannot be deemed to have
admitted the genuineness of any relevant matters of fact set forth therein on account of failure to answer the request for
admission. (Riguera 2013, citing Lañada vs. CA, 1 February 2002).
If a party after being served with a request under Rule 26 to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any
matter of fact serves a sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of such
document or the truth of any such matter of fact, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the
reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof, including attorney's fees. Unless the court finds that there were good reasons for
the denial or that admissions sought were of no substantial importance, such order shall be issued. (Rule 29, Sec. 4)
c) Effect of admission
Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending action only and shall not constitute
an admission by him for any other purpose nor may the same be used against him in any other proceeding. (Rule 26, Sec. 3)
Unless otherwise allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice a party who fails to file and serve a
request for admission on the adverse party of material and relevant facts at issue which are, or ought to be, within the personal
knowledge of the latter, shall not be permitted to present evidence on such facts. (Rule 26, Sec. 5)
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material
to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control, or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing
the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the
inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. (Rule 27, Sec. 1)
This mode of discovery is available in an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy.
Examples:
Requisites:
In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending
may in its discretion, order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician.
Since the results of the examination are intended to be made public, the same are not covered by the physician-patient
privilege. Furthermore such examination is not necessary to treat or cure the patient but to assess the extent of injury or to evaluate
his physical or mental condition (Rule 130, Sec. 24[c]).
Requisites:
A copy of the detailed written report of the examining physician may be delivered to the party examined, if the latter should
request.
Where the party examined requests and obtains a report on the results of the examination, the consequences are that:
1) He has to furnish the other party a copy of the report of any previous or subsequent examination of the same physical and
mental examination; and
2) He waives any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same controversy regarding the testimony of
any other person who has so examined him or may thereafter examine him (Regalado).
Rules 27 and 28 always require prior leave of court, unlike other modes of discovery which could be availed of without leave of
court as long as the defendant has filed or served a responsive pleading.
Sanctions:
1. Examination may be completed on other matters, or adjourned, as the proponent of the question may prefer;
2. Upon application by the proponent, the court may compel the deponent to answer the questions;
3. If the refusal was without substantial justification, court may require the refusing party or deponent or the counsel advising the
refusal or both of them, to pay the proponent the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including
attorney’s fees.
The remedies above are available under Rule 23 and Rule 25.
B. Refusal to answer designated or particular questions or refusal to produce documents or things or to submit to
physical examination (Rule 29, Sec.3)
1. Order that the matters regarding which questions were asked shall be taken to be established for purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
2. Refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses;
3. Strike out all or any part of the pleading of the disobedient party;
4. In lieu of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order directing the arrest of any party or agent of any party for
disobeying any such orders, except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to answer question after being directed to do so by the court of
the place in which deposition is being taken, such refusal may considered a contempt of that court.
D. Refusal to admit (Rule 29, (Sec. 4)
The court upon proper application may order the former to pay the reasonable expenses in making such proof, including
attorney’s fees.
If:
1. A party requests for the admission of either:
a. the genuineness of any document, or
b. the truth of any matter of fact
2. The party requested refuses to admit the same and thereafter serves a sworn denial thereof, and;
3. Later, the party requesting for admission proves the genuineness or truthfulness, as the case may be;
then, the party requesting for the admission may apply to the court for an order requiring the adverse party to pay reasonable
expenses incurred in making such proof, including attorney's fees.
1.Strike out all or any part of the pleading of the disobedient party;
2. Render a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
3.Order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney’s fees.
Other sanctions:
Note:
The Republic of the Philippines cannot be required to pay expenses and attorney’s fees under this Rule.
The matter of how and when the above sanctions should be applied is one that primarily rests on the sound discretion of the
court where the case is pending.
3.13. Trial
It is an examination before a competent court or tribunal of the facts or law put in issue in a case for the purpose of
determining such issue.
In a limited sense, trial refers to the stage of a case when the parties present their evidence before the court up to the point
when the case is deemed submitted for decision. (Riguera 2013)
The clerk shall notify the parties of the date of trial, upon entry of the case in the trial calendar in such manner as shall ensure
their receipt of that notice at least 5 days before such date.
General rule: A court may adjourn a trial from day to day, and to any stated time
Exception: The court can go beyond the period provided by law when authorized in writing by the Court Administrator of the Supreme
Court.
A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality
or relevancy of such evidence, and that due diligence has been used to procure it. But if the adverse party admits the facts to be given
in evidence, even if he objects or reserves the right to object to their admissibility, the trial shall not be postponed. (Rule 30, Sec.3)
A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of illness of a party or counsel may be granted if it appears upon affidavit or sworn
certification that the presence of such party or counsel at the trial is indispensable and that the character of his illness is such as to
render his non-attendance excusable. (Rule 30, Sec.4)
The parties to any action may agree, in writing, upon the facts involved in the litigation, and submit the case for judgment on
the facts agreed upon, without the introduction of evidence.
If the parties agree only on some of the facts in issue, the trial shall be held as to the disputed facts in such order as the court
shall prescribe. (Rule 30, Sec.6)
Exceptions: Judgment based on stipulation of facts is not allowed in actions for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of
marriage and legal separation. (Riguera 2013, citing Arts. 48 & 60, Family Code)
Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be
limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:
(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaints;
(c) The third-party defendant if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and fourth-party
complaint;
(d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded by them;
(e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded, shall adduce evidence in support of their
defense, in the order to be prescribed by the court;
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the
furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case; and
(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless the court directs the parties to
argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further pleadings.
If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses appear by different counsel, the court
shall determine the relative order of presentation of their evidence. (Rule 30, Sec.5)
When proper
If the defendant instead of filing a motion to dismiss files an answer, invoking the ground as an affirmative defense
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of
any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated, and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. (Rule 31, Section 1)
When available?
Many authorities held that consolidation may occur even if cases are pending before different courts or tribunal. The necessary
thing is that actions involve the common questions of law or fact (Superlines Transportation v. Victor).
Separate trials.
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
complaints or issues. (Rule 31, Section 2)
The judge of the court where the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties.
However, in default or ex partehearings, and in any case where the parties agree in writing, the court may delegate the reception of
evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any question
or to the admission of exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and the transcripts within
ten (10) days from termination of the hearing. (Rule 30, Section 9)
Who is a commissioner?
Commissioner is the person to whom a cause pending in court is referred, for him to take testimony, hear the parties and
report thereon to the court, and upon whose report, if confirmed, judgment is rendered.
The word "commissioner" includes a referee, an auditor and an examiner. (Rule 32, Section 1)
By written consent of both parties, the court may order any or all of the issues in a case to be referred to a commissioner to
be agreed upon by the parties or to be appointed by the court. As used in these Rules, the word "commissioner" includes a referee, an
auditor and an examiner. (Rule 32, Section 1)
Subject to other specifications and limitations stated in the order, the commissioner has and shall exercise the power to
regulate the proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient
performance of his duties under the order. He may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses, and unless
otherwise provided in the order of reference, he may rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The trial or hearing before him shall
proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court. (Rule 32, Section 3)
Report of commissioner
Upon the completion of the trial or hearing or proceeding before the commissioner, he shall file with the court his report in
writing upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. When his powers are not specified or limited, he shall set forth
his findings of fact and conclusions of law in his report. He shall attach thereto all exhibits, affidavits, depositions, papers and the
transcript, if any, of the testimonial evidence presented before him. (Rule 32, Section 9)
Upon the filing of the report, the parties shall be notified by the clerk, and they shall be allowed ten (10) days within which to
signify grounds of objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. Objections to the report based upon grounds which were
available to the parties during the proceedings before the commissioner, other than objections to the findings and conclusions therein,
set forth, shall not be considered by the court unless they were made before the commissioner. ( Rule 32, Section 10)
Hearing upon report.
Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, the report shall be set for hearing,
after which the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying, or rejecting the report in whole or in part, or recommitting it with
instructions, or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or the court. ( Rule 32, Section 11)
Demurrer to Evidence is a motion to dismiss based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented after the plaintiff
rests his case.
Nature of demurrer to evidence: Only within the province of the trial courts:
The Court has previously explained the nature of a demurrer to evidence in the case of Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa
Santiago as follows: "A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented after
the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated by the
rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case."
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly
be filed before the court renders its judgment.
Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo for
insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to respondents and should not have
been granted, as the RTC had correctly done. Nenita Gonzales, Et. Al. Vs. Mariano Bugaay And Lucy Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008,
February 22, 2012
3.14.1. Ground
A motion to dismiss filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence on the ground
that upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. (Riguera 2013)
1. Defendant shall have the right to present evidence. (Rule 33, Section 1)
2. The date for reception of defendant’s evidence should be set.
3.The order is interlocutory and therefore not appealable but can be subject of petition for certiorari in case of grave abuse of
discretion or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence. (Rule 33, Section 1)
3.14.5. Demurrer to evidence in a civil case versus demurrer to evidence in a criminal case
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL CASES CRIMINAL CASES
As to Requirement to Leave of Court
Leave of court is not required before filing a
It may be filed with or without leave of court (Sec. 23, Rule 119).
demurrer.
As to Right to Appeal
If the demurrer is granted, the order of The order of dismissal is not appealable because of the
dismissal is appealable (Sec. 1, Rule 33). constitutional policy against double jeopardy.
3.15.
But if on appeal, the appellate court reverses Judgments
the order of dismissal, the defendant loses and final
his right to present evidence (Radiowealth orders
vs. Spouses Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739,
July 6, 2000). What is a
judgment?
As to the Effects of Denial
It is the
Court denies the demurrer: final
consideration
a. if demurrer was with leave, accused may present his evidence. and
determination
If the demurrer is denied, the defendant by a court of the
may proceed to present his evidence. b. if the demurrer was without leave, accused can no longer rights of the
present his evidence and submits the case for decision based parties, upon
on the prosecution’s evidence. matters
submitted to it
in an action or
proceeding.
a) The court or tribunal must be clothed with authority to hear and determine the matter before it ( Riano 2011 citing Acosta
vs. COMELEC, 293 SRA 578, 580) The term "clothed with authority" includes jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over
the person of the defendant, or over the res, in an action in personam or quasi in rem. (spr)(Riguera 2013)
b) Parties must have been given an opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf (Riano 2011 citing Acosta vs. COMELEC,
293 SRA 578, 580). Indispensible parties should have been impleaded. (Riguera 2013)
c) It should be in writing. A verbal judgment is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective (Riano 2011, citing
Corpus vs. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294, 309);
d) It must state clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the judge and filed with the
clerk of court; and
e) It should contain a dispositive part (Riano 2011, citing Cu-Unjieng vs. Mabalacat Sugar Co., 70 Phil. 384) and should be
signed by the judge and filed with the clerk of court.
These are statement of facts and not conclusions of law. Statement of facts in judgment must contain not only the ultimate
facts. The supporting evidentiary facts must as well be established. This rule, however, does not require that the court shall state in its
decision all the facts found in the records. (Riano 2011, citing People vs. Derpo, 168 SCRA 447, 455).
Default judgment –
A binding judgment in favor of either party based on some failure to take action by the other party. Most often, it is a
judgment in favor of a plaintiff when the defendant has not responded to a summons or has failed to appear before a court of law.
It is a judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant after the defending party fails to answer within
the time allowed therefore, upon motion of the claiming party, with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure to answer.
(Sec. 3 Rule 9)
Summary judgment
A determination made by a court without a full trial. Such judgment may be issued as to the merits of an entire case, or of
specific issues in that case.
A judgment rendered by a court without a full-blown trial, if the court finds that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the plaintiff or defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ( Riguera 2013)
Voluntary dismissal –
The lawsuit is terminated by voluntary request of the plaintiff (Secs. 1 & 2 Rule 17)
I) The opinion of the court – Contains the findings of facts and conclusions of law;
2) The disposition of the case – The final and actual disposition of the rights litigated (the dispositive part); and
3) Signature of the judge (Herrera, p. 145)
3.15.3. Judgment on the pleadings
Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may; on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. (Rule 34, Section 1) It is a
judgment based solely on the relief prayed for in the complaint without plaintiff adducing any evidence. ( Riguera 2013)
Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation of the
adverse party’s pleading. However, the trial court cannot direct a judgment on the pleading in the absence of a motion filed for the
purpose by a party litigant (De Luna v. Abrigo, 181 SCRA 150).
Grounds:
2) When answer admits the material allegation of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading (Sec. 1 Rule 34);
3) Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, should the defendant fails to answer the complaint within 10 days from service of
summons (Sec. 6 RSP);
4) Where the defendant is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his
pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence (Sec. 3 Rule 9)
5) During pre-trial, the court may render a judgment on the pleadings if it finds a valid ground therefor. (sec. 2(g) Rule 18).
6) As a penalty for non-compliance or refusal to answer in discovery proceedings, the court may render judgment by default
against the recalcitrant or disobedient party. (Secs. 3 & 5, Rule 29)(Riguera 2013)
The third mode of specific denial may not be availed of when the fact as to which want of knowledge or information is claimed
is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue. The defendant
must aver positively or state how it is that he is ignorant of the fact alleged. Since there is an implied admission of material averments
of the complaint, a judgment on the pleadings may be rendered. (Riguera 2013, citing Capitol Motors vs. Yabut, 32 SCRA 1)
A court may direct judgment on the pleadings only if there is a motion to that effect. ( Riguera 2013, citing Sec. 1 Rule 34)
However, trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings if, after the pre-trial, the facts warrant such a judgment (Regalado, Tenth
Edition, citing Taleon vs. Sec. of Public Works & Communication, L-24281, May 19, 1967)
One who prays for judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of his own allegations, and without giving
the opposing party an opportunity to introduce evidence, impliedly admits the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the
opposing party, and to rest his motion for judgment on those allegations taken together with such of his own are admitted in the
pleadings. (Riguera 2013, citing Sanchez vs. Rigos, 45 SCRA 368). The plaintiff, by moving for judgment on the pleadings, is not
deemed to have admitted irrelevant allegations in the defendant's answer (Regalado, Remedial Law Compenium, Tenth Edition, citing
Araneta vs. Perez, L-20787-8, June 29, 1965), neither is the defendant deemed to have admitted allegations of damages in the
complaint (Ibid., citing Abubakar Tan vs. Tian Ho, L-18820, Dec. 29, 1962). Hence, there can be no award of damages in the absence
of proof. (Ibid., citing Lichauco vs. Guash, 76 Phil., 5).
A judgment rendered by a court without a full-blown trial, if the court finds that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the plaintiff or defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ( Riguera 2013)
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. Such
judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties.
When available?
When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules of Court allow a party to
obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case
summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not
proper.
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine. (Spouses Ramon Villuga And
Mercedita Villuga, Vs. Kelly Hardware And Construction Supply Inc., Represented By Ernesto V. Yu, Executive Vice-President And
General Manager, G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012)
A "genuine issue" is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim. Section 3 of [Rule 35 of the Rules of Court] provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper:
(1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion
for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Spouses Ramon Villuga And Mercedita Villuga, Vs. Kelly
Hardware And Construction Supply Inc., Represented By Ernesto V. Yu, Executive Vice-President And General Manager, G.R. No.
176570, July 18, 2012)
A party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact,
or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to
the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant. (Maritime Industry Authority (Marina) Vs Marc Properties Corporation,
G.R. No. 173128, February 15, 2012)
Genuine Issue – an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and
contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
In actions for:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after
the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof. (Rule 35, Section 1)
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Rule 35,
Section 2)
If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel
shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly. (Rule 35, Section 4)
A judgment not on the entire case but only on the specified factual issues, with the court proceeding to try the other factual
issues
Note: Propriety of Summary Judgment may be corrected only on appeal or other direct review, not by certiorari.
May a partial summary judgment be appealed separately from the judgment in the entire case?
No. A partial summary judgment as a rule is not appealable sepearately from the judgment in the entire case, unless allowed by
the court under Sec.1(f) Rule 41. Hence, the failure to appeal separately from a partial summary judgment or to challenge it by a
special civil action for certiorari does not make the same final and executory. (Riguera 2013, citing Philippine Business Bank vs. Chua,
15 November 2010).
Rule 35 on summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully adjudicated on motion, and judgment is not
rendered upon all of the reliefs sought. In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, we had occasion to rule that a careful reading of its
Section 4 reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it does not "[put] an
end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." In this
case, there was never any final or complete adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayan’s partial summary judgment in
the Swiss Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.
Separate judgment allowed on entirely different subject matter after rendition of partial summary judgment
Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were necessary because some facts existed without
controversy, while others were controverted. However, there is nothing in this provision or in the Rules that prohibits a subsequent
separate judgment after a partial summary judgment on an entirely different subject matter had earlier been rendered. There is no
legal basis for petitioners’ contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion for summary judgment over the Arelma
account. (Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, Vs. Republic Of The Philippines, G.R. No. 189505)
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Certified true copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. ( Rule 35, Section 5)
Should it appear to its satisfaction at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this Rule are presented in bad
faith, or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the offending party or counsel to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur including attorney's fees, it may, after hearing
further adjudge the offending party or counsel guilty of contempt. (Rule 35, Section 6)
3.15.5. Judgment on the pleadings versus summary judgments
As to Its Basis
To Whom Available
As to Issues
There may be issues involved in the case but these issues are The answer fails to tender an issue or there is an admission of
irrelevant material allegations
When Proper
A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court. (Rule 36,
Section 1)
Rendition of judgment is the filing of the same (the decision signed by the judge) with the clerk of court, not the pronouncement of
judgment in open court (which is promulgation). (Riano 2011)
Promulgation of judgment – the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the public or
delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel.
Even if the judgment has already been put in writing and signed, it is still subject to amendment if it has not yet been filed
with the clerk of court and before its filing does not yet constitute the real judgment of the court. (Riano 2011, citing Ago vs. CA, 6
SCRA 530, 535)
It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. (Bernardo de Leon vs. Public Estate Authority, G.R. No. 181970, August 3, 2010)
When a judgment calls for the issuance of a new title in favor of the winning party, it logically follows that the judgment also
requires the losing party to surrender its title for cancellation. It is the only sensible way by which the decision may be enforced. To
this end, petitioners can obtain a court order requiring the registered owner to surrender the same and directing the entry of a new
certificate of title in petitioners’ favor. (Col. Francisco Dela Merced Vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.
167140. November 23, 2011)
When made?
If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final
order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final order
shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and shall be
signed by the clerk, within a certificate that such judgment or final order has become final and executory. ( Rule 36, Section 2)
Importance of Date of Entry
It is the starting point of the 6-month period for filing a petition for relief (Sec. 3 Rule 38), the 5-year period for filing a motion for
execution (Sec. 6 Rule 39), and the 10-year period for filing an action for revival of judgment (Art. 1144 Civil Code). (Riguera 2013)
Kinds of judgment:
It is a judgment without statement of the facts in support of its conclusions. Such a judgment is void for it violates Sec. 15, Article
VIII of the Constitution. Thus, the party adversely affected would be unable to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal the judgment
for he has to speculate on the grounds upon which the judge based his decision. (Riguera 2013)
One rendered to record some judicial act done at a former time but which was not carried into the record. Since the only
function of a nunc pro tunc judgment or order is to place into the record a judicial action actually taken, it cannot correct judicial
errors, however flagrant and glaring these may be. (Riguera 2013, citing Henderson vs. Tan, 87 Phil. 466), nor can it construe what a
judgment means. (Ibid., citing Lichauco vs. Tan Po, 51 Phil. 862).
A judgment rendered by a court against one or more defendants, but not against all, leaving the action to proceed against the
others (Riano 2011, citing Sec.4 Rule 36)
Separate Judgments (Rule 36, Sec.5)
This kind of judgment presupposes that there are several claims for relief presented in a single action. The court may render
separate judgment on one of the several claims. The judgment will terminate the action with respect to that claim and the action shall
proceed as to the remaining claims. The court may stay the execution of the separate judgment until the rendition of a judgment on all
the other claims. (Riano 2011, citing Sec. 5 Rule 36)
Memorandum decision
It is a decision of appellate court which adopts the true findings of fact and conclusion of the trial court if it is affirming the
latter’s decision.
Appeal on either is not allowed unless the court allows the appeal. ( Sec. 1(g) Rule 41). Where an appeal is allowed, the same
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days from notice of the order allowing the appeal. (Sec. 3
Rule 41). (Riguera 2013).
The judgment shall set out their individual or proper names if known.
Sometimes referred to as “conclusiveness of judgments,” “preclusion of issues” or “collateral estoppels” (Riano 2011). Once
judgment becomes final and executory, the judgment can no longer be disturbed.
A judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if
the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that
rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. (Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng, Spouses
Martin and Azucena Ng and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122. September 24, 2012)
Reasons:
Purpose:
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of
justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the
risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. . (Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng,
Spouses Martin and Azucena Ng and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122. September 24, 2012)
Exceptions:
A judgment becomes final and executory upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom and no appeal has been
perfected (Sec. 1 Rule 39)
The judgment attains finality by the lapse of the period for taking an appeal without such appeal or motion for reconsideration
being filed.
1. The prevailing party is entitled to have the judgment executed as a matter of right and the issuance of the corresponding
writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
2. The court rendering the judgment loses jurisdiction over the case so that it can no longer correct the judgment in
substance, except clerical errors and omissions due to inadvertence or negligence.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law
of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its
declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have
been reversed in other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point
that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded
as the law of the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the
law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal. (Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.)
Before finality
After finality
The power to amend a judgment is inherent to the court before judgment becomes final and executory. Once a judgment has
attained finality (expiration of the period to appeal), no further amendment or correction can be made by the court except for clerical
errors or mistakes.
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason
of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights (FAME); or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and
which if presented would probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded
are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.
(Rule 37, Section
1) (acronym supplied)
Fraud in Sec. 1(a) Rule 37 refers to extrinsic fraud, that is, deception or trickery by which the aggrieved party was prevented
from having trial or presenting his case before the court. (Riguera 2013)
Extrinsic Fraud connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by the prevailing party outside of the trial against the losing party
who because of such fraud is prevented from presenting his side of the case (ex. prevent witness from testifying). Fraud, as a ground
for new trial, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or
presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy (Regalado).
Intrinsic Fraud refers to acts of a party during the trial which does not affect the presentation of the case (ex. presentation
of a forged promissory note). It is not a ground for new trial.
When to file?
Motion for new trial or reconsideration must be filed within 15 days from notice of judgment and resolved by the court within 30
days from submission for resolution.
A motion for new trial shall include all grounds then available and those not so included shall be deemed waived. A second
motion for new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when the first motion was made, may be filed within the time herein
provided excluding the time during which the first motion had been pending.
No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order. (Rule 37, Section 5)
If a new trial is granted in accordance with the provisions of this Rules the original judgment or final order shall be vacated,
and the action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded evidence taken upon the former trial, insofar as the same is material and
competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking the same. (Rule 37, Section 6)
An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealed, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or
final order. (Rule 37, Section 9)
The aggrieved party has a “fresh period” of 15 days from the denial of motion for reconsideration or new trial within which to file his
appeal. This applies to Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 (Neypes v. CA, GR 141524, September 14, 2005).
Appeal is a proceeding by which a party seeks from a higher court the review of a judgment or final order of a lower court on the
ground that the judgment or final order is against the evidence or the law. (Riguera 2013)
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable. (Rule 41, Section 1(1))
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. (Rule 41, Section 1(2))
A party may file a Special Civil Action for Certiorari or Prohibition if there is lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion or Mandamus if there is no performance of duty.
d) Modes of appeal
Ordinary appeal
The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall
be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(Rule 41, Section 2(a))
The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42. (Rule 41, Section 2(b))
General Rule
Only questions of law or fact that has been raised in the lower court and must be within the issues framed by the parties can be
raised on appeal.
Exceptions
Period of appeal
The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (Rule 41, Section 3)
Perfection of appeal
A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises,
permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal.
(Rule 41, Section 9)
Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be. (Rule 40, Section 5;
Rule 41, Section 4) If not paid, it could be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
This rule governs appeal from judgment or final order of an MTC to RTC exercising jurisdiction over the area to which the
former pertains.
Where to Appeal
An appeal from a judgment or order of a Municipal Trial Court may be taken to the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the area to which the former pertains.
Title of the Case: as it was in the court of origin. But the party appealing the case shall be further referred to as appellant and the
adverse party as the appellee.
An appeal may be taken within 15 days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days after
notice of the judgment.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
NOTE: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to Regional
Trial Courts. (Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633, 2005)
a. parties
b. judgment or final order appealed from
c. material dates showing timeliness of appeal
NOTE: A record on appeal shall be required only in a) special proceedings and b) in other cases of multiple or separate appeals. The
forms and contents of the record on appeal shall be as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 41.
Appeal Bonds
Appeal bonds under Sec. 3 Rule 40 and Sec. 5 Rule 41 was removed by the Interim Rules. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, appeal bonds are no longer provided therein.
An exception is found under Sec. 46 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (RA 9285) which provides that the losing party
who appeals to the CA from a judgment of the court confirming the arbitral award shall be required by the appellate court to post
counterbond executed in favor of the prevailing party equal to the amount of the award. ( Riguera 2013)
Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered judgment docket and other
lawful fees; otherwise it is a ground for dismissal.
Duty of the Clerk of Court (Sec.6)
a) transmit to the RTC the original record or the record on appeal, with the transcripts and exhibits; and
b) certify them as complete record.
1) Upon receipt of the complete record, the clerk of court of the RTC shall notify the parties of such fact;
2) Within 15 days from notice, the appellant shall submit a memorandum.
3) Within 15 days from receipt of the appellant’s memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the
appellant to file memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal.
Appeals from orders dismissing the case without trial; Lack of Jurisdiction (Sec. 8)
If the appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial
Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be.
In case of affirmance and the ground is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter , the Regional Trial Court, if it has
jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it.
Effect of reversal
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on
appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding
section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in interest of justice.
The other provisions of Rule 41 shall apply to appeals provided herein (Rule 40) insofar as NOT INCONSISTENT WITH or MAY
SERVE TO SUPPLEMENT the provisions.
The provision allowing direct appeal to the Supreme Court on pure question/s of law applies only to a judgment of the RTC,
not that of the MTC. (Riano 2013, citing Sec. 2(c) Rule 41).
Under Sec. 34 of B.P. Blg. 129 on the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC in cadastral and land registration cases, it is provided
that the decision of the MTC shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the RTC. (Riano 2013)
Rule 41 refers to an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the CA in cases where the RTC rendered a decision in the exercise of its
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
An interlocutory Order is an order which does not dispose of the case, but leaves something else to be done by the trial
court on the merits of the case.
The word “interlocutory” refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some
point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. (Ma. Carminia C. Calderon (formerly Ma. Carminia Calderon-Roxas),
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia Vs. Jose Antonio F. RoxasG.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013)
The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:
“The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court
has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order
is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal
may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable; but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The
explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
“xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals.
Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel
the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the
subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the
appeal of the judgment itself.
“The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that
the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.” Priscilla Alma Jose, Vs. Ramon C. Javellana, Et Al., G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 201
a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
b. An interlocutory order;
c. An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
d. An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake
or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
e. An order of execution;
f. A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims
and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
g. An order dismissing an action without prejudice (Sec. 1 Rule 41 as amended by SC Resolution effective 27 December
2007). (SSCC)
h. A judgment of direct contempt (Sec. 2 Rule 71)
i. Compromise judgment
j. Judgments of the court in summary judicial proceedings in the family law (Art. 247 Family Code)
k. Judgments in small claims cases (Sec. 23 Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases).
(Riguera 2013)
A party’s appeal is perfected upon the FILING of the notice of appeal in due time.
2. Record on Appeal
A party’s appeal is perfected upon the APPROVAL of the record on appeal filed in due time.
The court loses jurisdiction ONLY over the subject matter upon:
a) Approval of the records on appeal filed in due time; and
b) Expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties
Residual Jurisdiction
It is the power of the trial court after it has lost jurisdiction but prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal, to:
1) Issue orders for the protection and preservation of the parties' rights which do not involve any matter litigated by the
appeal;
2) Approve compromises;
3) Permit appeals of indigent parties;
4) Order execution pending appeal in accordance with Sec. 2 Rule 39, and;
5) Allow withdrawal of the appeal (Sec. 9 Rule 41). (Riguera 2013)
A party may file a Special Civil Action of Certiorari or Prohibition if there is lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion or Mandamus if there is no performance of duty.
A dismissal for forum-shopping under Sec. 5 Rule 7 is without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the dismissal order. Under
Sec. 1 Rule 41, no appeal lies from an order dismissing a case without prejudice and hence a party may file an appropriate civil action
under Rule 65. (Riguera 2013, citing Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, 26 August 2002).
Ordinary appeal is a matter of right. This means that the appellate court should review the case, and this duty is compellable
by mandamus. Appeals under Rules 42, 43, and 45 are NOT a matter of right. Review is discretionary and the appellate court may
dismiss the petition outright if it finds that the questions raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration. ( Riguera 2013)
Rule 42 refers to a mode of appeal from the RTC to the CA in cases where the RTC rendered a decision in the exercise of its
APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
Within 15 days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.
Upon proper motion and payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of 15 days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed 15 days.
RULE 41 RULE 42
File the notice of appeal with the RTC File the petition for review directly with the CA
If motion for reconsideration is denied, appeal is within the If the motion for reconsideration is denied, the 15-day period starts
remaining balance of the 15-day period. all over again
1) Petition must be filed in seven (7) copies with the original copy intended for Court of Appeals
NOTE: This has been amended in view of A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC, Efficient Use of Paper Rule. In the Court of Appeals, only one
original (properly marked) and two copies with their annexes.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The RTC loses its jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.
Effect of Appeal
Rule: The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
Exception: When the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.
Section 60 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 provides that an appeal may be taken from a decision of the
Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the CA within 15 days from receipt of the notice of the decision. Otherwise,
the decision shall become final. Hence, the proper mode of appeal is by a petition for review under Rule 42 and not through an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41. (Riguera 2013, citing Land Bank vs. CA, G.R. No. 190660, 11 April 2011).
Rule 45
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution
of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.
Section 2. Time for filing; extension. — The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30)
days only within which to file the petition.
Section 3. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of petition. — Unless he has theretofore done so, the petitioner
shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court and deposit the amount of P500.00
for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. Proof of service of a copy, thereof on the lower court concerned and on the adverse
party shall be submitted together with the petition.
Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the
court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse
party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the
material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the
matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a
quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e)
contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.
Section 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and
the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the ground that the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Section 6. Review discretionary. — A review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons thereof. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of the reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the court a quo has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in
a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; or
(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
Section 7. Pleadings and documents that may be required; sanctions. — For purposes of determining whether the petition
should be dismissed or denied pursuant to section 5 of this Rule, or where the petition is given due course under section 8 hereof, the
Supreme Court may require or allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary within
such periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate, and impose the corresponding sanctions in case of non-filing or
unauthorized filing of such pleadings and documents or non-compliance with the conditions therefor.
Section 8. Due course; elevation of records. — If the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the
elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Section 9. Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases. — The mode of appeal prescribed in this Rule shall be applicable
to both civil and criminal cases, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
One test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case it is a question of law, otherwise, it will be a question of fact.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain
set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood
of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 193986, January 15,
2014.)
Conclusiveness of Facts
General Rule:
The findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the SC. Thus, only questions of
law are entertained by SC under Rule 45.
Exceptions:
A party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA en banc may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure (sec.19, R.A. 1125, as amended by Sec. 12, R.A. 9282)
(Primer-Reviewe on REMEDIAL LAW Manuel R. Riguera).
The CTA’s decision is no longer appealable to the CA. The appeal to the CTA shall be by petition for review under a procedure
analogous to that provided for under Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules of Court. However, it is not governed by the technical rules of
evidence. (RA 9282, March 30 2004).
SECTION 1. Appeal to Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. – A party adversely affected by a decision or ruling
of the Court en banc may appeal therefrom by filing with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari within fifteen
days from receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution, as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. If such party has filed a motion
for reconsideration or for new trial, the period herein fixed shall run from the party’s receipt of a copy of the resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration or for new trial.
SEC. 2. Effect of appeal. – The motion for reconsideration or for new trial filed before the Court shall be deemed abandoned if, during
its pendency, the movant shall appeal to the supreme Court pursuant to Section 1 of this Rule.
See also Rule 43 which is discussed under “o) Review of final judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies”
l) Review of final judgments or final orders of the Comelec
Rule 64
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.
Section 2. Mode of review. — A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. (n; Bar
Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
Section 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution,
if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned
from notice of denial.
Section 4. Docket and other lawful fees. — Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court the
docket and other lawful fees and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs.
Section 5. Form and contents of petition. — The petition shall be verified and filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. The
petition shall name the aggrieved party as petitioner and shall join as respondents the Commission concerned and the person or
persons interested in sustaining the judgment, final order or resolution a quo. The petition shall state the facts with certainty, present
clearly the issues involved, set forth the grounds and brief arguments relied upon for review, and pray for judgment annulling or
modifying the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. Findings of fact of the Commission supported by substantial evidence
shall be final and non-reviewable.
The petition shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, final order or resolution
subject thereof, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other
documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The requisite number of copies of the petition shall contain plain copies of all documents
attached to the original copy of said petition.
The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein, and shall contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
The petition shall further be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof on the Commission concerned and on the
adverse party, and of the timely payment of docket and other lawful fees.
The failure of petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
Section 6. Order to comment. — If the Supreme Court finds the petition sufficient in form and substance, it shall order the
respondents to file their comments on the petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof; otherwise, the Court may dismiss the
petition outright. The Court may also dismiss the petition if it was filed manifestly for delay or the questions raised are too
unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
Section 7. Comments of respondents. — The comments of the respondents shall be filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. The
original shall be accompanied by certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein together with
other supporting papers. The requisite number of copies of the comments shall contain plain copies of all documents attached to the
original and a copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner.
No other pleading may be filed by any party unless required or allowed by the Court.
Section 8. Effect of filing. — The filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the execution of the judgment or final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed, unless the Supreme Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. (n)
Section 9. Submission for decision. — Unless the Court sets the case for oral argument, or requires the parties to submit
memoranda, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the comments on the petition, or of such other
pleadings or papers as may be required or allowed, or the expiration of the period to do so.
Administrative Disciplinary Cases Appealable to the CA via Petition for Review Under Rule 43
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. — Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary,
the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent
wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a
ground for disciplinary action against such officer.
(Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)
Appeals from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are no longer appealable to the
SC but to the CA via a petition for review (Rule 43) (Fabian v. Desierto, GR. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998). However, the remedy of an
aggrieved party from a decision or order of the Office of the Ombudsman in a criminal case is to file a petition for certiorari before the
SC (Perez v. Ombudsman, GR. No. 131445, May 27, 2004).
The decision and final orders of the COA, and COMELEC are also reviewable by the Supreme Court.
The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the answer of the appellee. The
decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. ( Article 223,
Labor Code)
Since it is final and executory, the only remedy is certiorari under Rule 65, which must be first lodged in the Court of
Appeals before the Supreme Court according to the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. ( St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130886,
September 16, 1998)
Administrative Disciplinary Cases Appealable to the CA via Petition for Review Under Rule 43
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
Section 3. Where to appeal. — An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the
manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Section 4. Period of appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only
one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before
the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days. (n)
Section 5. How appeal taken. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with
the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy
of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees
and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may
be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the
motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
denial.
Section 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved
and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last
paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed
herein.
Section 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the
contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
Section 8. Action on the petition. — The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition not a
motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Section 9. Contents of comment. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies
and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with other
supporting papers. The comment shall (a) point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues; and (b)
state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such
service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals. (9a)
Section 10. Due course. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or
allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the filing thereof, and on the records the Court of Appeals
finds prima facie that the court or agency concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of
the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss
the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court
of Appeals.
Section 11. Transmittal of record. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the
Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record
of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The
Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record. (8a)
Section 12. Effect of appeal. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.
Section 13. Submission for decision. — If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral
argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed
submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by these Rules or by the court of Appeals.
A petition for relief is an equitable remedy and is allowed only in exceptional cases from final judgments or orders where no
other remedy is available (Regalado, 10th Ed., citing Palmores vs. Jimenez, 90 Phil. 773). It will not be entertained if the proper
remedy is appeal or certiorari (Ibid., citing Fajardo vs. Bayona, 98 Phil. 659).
Petition for Relief under Sec. 1 is similar to a motion for new trial on the ground of FAME, the difference being that the motion
for new trial under Rule 37 is filed before the judgment becomes final, while a petition for relief in this section presupposes a final
judgment or order (Riguera 2013)
A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken (Rule 38, Sec.3)
The 6-month period is computed from the date of entry of the order or judgment. However, as now amended, the date of the
finality of the judgment or final order is deemed to be the date of its entry (Regalado, 10th Ed., citing Dirige vs. Biranya, L-22033, July
30, 1966).
The two periods for the filing of a petition for relief are not extendible and never interrupted (Regalado, 10th Ed., citing Quijano vs.
Tameta, L-16472, April 20, 1961). Thus, a petition for certiorari does not suspend the periods prescribed by this section (Ibid., citing
Palomares vs. Jimenez, 90 Phil. 773), and neither does a motion for reconsideration of the order subject of the petition for relief (Ibid.,
citing Cruz vs. Oppen, L-23861, Feb. 17, 1968), especially if filed in the wrong court. These periods cannot be subject to a condition or
a contingency as they are devised to meet a condition or a contingency (Ibid., citing Vda. de Salvatierra vs. Garlitos, 103 Phil. 157).
Both periods must be complied with (Ibid., citing Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Arciaga, L-29701, Mar. 16, 1987).
Contents of petition
Nature
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when
other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily
abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. (Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and
Nenita Ng, Spouses Martin and Azucena Ng and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122. September 24, 2012)
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for
the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the
dispensation of justice by the courts. (Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng, Spouses Martin and Azucena
Ng and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122. September 24, 2012)
“The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment.
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest.” (Leticia Diona, rep. by her attorney-in-fact,
Marcelina Diona Vs. Romeo A. Balangue, Sonny A. Balangue, Reynaldo A. Balangue, and Esteban A. Balangue, Jr. G.R. No.
173559. January 7, 2013)
Annulment of a Judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. x x x
A person who is not a party to the judgment may sue for its annulment provided he can prove that the same was obtained
through fraud or collusion and that he would be adversely affected thereby. An action for annulment of judgment may be availed of
even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or implemented. ( Regalado, 10th Ed., citing Isalmic Da’Wah
Council of the Phil. Vs. CA, G.R. No., 80892, Sept. 29, 1989).
1) Grounds for Annulment of Judgment of RTC in Civil Cases (Rule 47, Sec.2)
a. Extrinsic fraud – not available as a ground if availed of earlier in a motion for new trial or petition for relief
Fraud is extrinsic, according to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals (265 SCRA 168, 180 [1996]), “where the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar
cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be
sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.” (Pinausukan Seafood House-
Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014)
2) Lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of Jurisdiction refers to either jurisdiction over the person of the defending party, or over the subject matter of the claim,
since in either case the judgment or final order and resolution are void. (Regalado, 10th Ed.)
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a
judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon
mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
(Leticia Diona, rep. by her attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona Vs. Romeo A. Balangue, Sonny A. Balangue, Reynaldo A. Balangue, and
Esteban A. Balangue, Jr. G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013)
IMPORTANT CONDITION
For the remedy under Rule 47 to be available, the petitioner must have failed, with sufficient justification, to either:
If he failed to avail of those remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for annulment provided in
this Rule, otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence (Regalado, 10th Ed.)
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case
may be. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake
with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading. The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together
with sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions, specifically: (a) the certified
true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and
indicated as such by the petitioner; (b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense; and (c) the
sworn certification that the petitioner has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the CA or the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the said courts
and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom. (Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and
Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.)
a. For extrinsic fraud – within four years from discovery; (Rule 47, Sec.3)
b. Lack of jurisdiction – same period for annulment of contracts on that ground, under Art. 1371, NCC (within 4 years from
discovery of fraud), as well as the time when the period starts to run ( Regalado, 10th Ed.); must be filed before action is barred by
estoppels by laches
The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. (Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank
and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014)
c) Effects of judgment of annulment
A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and
void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution
is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new
trial had been granted therein. (Rule 47, Sec.7) The judgment may include the award of damages, attorney’s fees and other relief.
(Rule 47, Sec.9)
A collateral or incidental attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is made
as an incident in said action. This is proper only when it is patent that the court which rendered such judgment had no jurisdiction.
Execution under Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court is a remedy afforded by law for the enforcement of a judgment, its
object being to obtain satisfaction of the judgment on which the writ is issued. It issues by order of the court a quo, on motion of the
judgment obligee, upon finality of a judgment or order sought to be enforced, and is directed to an officer authorizing and requiring
him to execute the judgment of the court. (CAGAYAN DE ORO VS CA, .R. No. 129713. December 15, 1999 )
Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law. A judgment that is left unexecuted is nothing but an empty
victory for the prevailing party. (AYO VS VIOLAGO, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1445. June 21, 1999)
3.17.1. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FINALITY OF JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL; FOR PURPOSES OF EXECUTION
The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as distinguished from one which has ‘become final’ (or ‘executory’ as of right [final and
executory]), is definite and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to
be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the
trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that
dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as
far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more
remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal ), this is what is referred to as the final judgment for
purposes of appeal.
Ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or, to use the established
and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory.’ (HEIRS OF RETERTA VS MORES & LOPEZ, G.R. No. 159941, August 17,
2011)
Judgment in latter sense is more precisely referred to as “final and executory” in order to avoid confusion with final
judgment in the first sense (Riguera 2013)
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon
the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought
to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to
issue the writ of execution.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right,
and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. It is axiomatic that once a decision attains
finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it
may contain. (BUAYA VS STRONGHOLD INSURANCE, G.R. No. 139020. October 11, 2000)
A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation of law. Its finality becomes a fact when the
reglamentary period to appeal lapses, and no appeal is perfected within such period . The admiralty case filed by private
respondent with the trial court involved multiple defendants. This being the case, it necessarily follows that the period of appeal of the
February 18, 1991 RTC Decision depended on the date a copy of the judgment was received by each of the defendants. Elsewise
stated, each defendant had a different period within which to appeal, depending on the date of receipt of the Decision. ( VLASON VS
CA, G.R. NOS. 121662-64. JULY 6, 1999)
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 24-94, a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution must contain a notice to the
adverse party --
“Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding
upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may forthwith be applied for in the lower court from
which the action originated, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or the final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellatte court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to
issue the writ of execution.” (italics supplied) (PALLADA VS RTC OF KALIBO, G.R. No. 129442. March 10, 1999)
General Rule
Where the judgment or order has become executory, the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution.
Exceptions
a) When the subsequent facts and circumstances transpire which render such execution unjust or impossible;
b) On equitable grounds, as when there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable
(Albar v. Carandang, L-18003, 29 Sept. 1962);
c) Where the judgment has been novated by the parties (Dormitorio v. Fernandez, et al., L-25889, 21 Aug. 1976);
d) When a petition for relief or an action to enjoin the judgment is filed and a preliminary injunction is prayed for and granted
(see Sec. 5, Rule 38);
e) When the judgment has become dormant, the 5-year period under Sec. 6 of this Rule having expired without the judgment
having been revived (Cunanan v. CA, et al., L-25511, 28 Sept. 1968); or
f) Where the judgment turns out to be incomplete (Del Rosario v. Villegas, 49 Phil. 634) or is conditional ( Cu Unjieng, etc. v.
Mabalacat Sugar Co., 70 Phil. 380) since, as a matter of law, such judgment cannot become final (Regalado).
MANDAMUS is the proper remedy when a motion for execution (as a matter of right) is denied. However, if the appellate court
reversed the decision of the lower and the latter denies the motion for execution for the same, the judgment obligee may file with the
appellate court a motion to direct the lower court to issue the writ of execution. Mandamus is not proper since there is a plain,
adequate, and speedy remedy under Sec. 1 Rule 39 (Riguera 2013, citing Jose Feria, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 115 [1997]).
b) Discretionary execution
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal . – On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on
appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or
final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments.— A several separate or partial judgment may be executed under the
same terms and conditions as execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.
Requisites:
1. There must be a motion filed by the prevailing party with a notice to the adverse party;
2. There must be a hearing of the motion for discretionary execution;
3. There must be good reasons to justify the discretionary execution; and
4. The good reasons must be stated in a special order. (Civil Procedure, Bar Lecture Series by Willard Riano, 2011
Ed. Page 661)
A primary consideration for allowing execution pending appeal would be the existence of good reasons. In turn,
"good reasons" has been held to consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes
illusory. Such reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should
the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment.
In upholding the disallowance of the execution pending appeal ordered by the trial court, albeit on different grounds, we are
guided by the rule that execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the general rule. So,
too, execution pending appeal is not to be availed of and applied routinely, but only in extraordinary circumstances. Here, with the
alleged collapse of petitioner's business operations rendered doubtful, we find no good reason to order execution pending appeal.
(CORONA INTERNATIONAL VS CA, G.R. No. 127851. October 18, 2000)
As provided in Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules., the existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a Court . . .
to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. The reasons allowing execution must constitute superior circumstances demanding
urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should be losing party secure a reversal of the judgment ." (JACA V. LUMBER CO.,
G.R. NO. L-25771, MARCH 29, 1982; 113 SCRA 107, 121)
Whatever doubts may have been generated by early decisions have been clarified in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
It is not intended obviously that execution pending appeal shall issue as a matter of course. "Good reasons," special,
important, pressing reasons must exist to justify it; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, it may well become a
tool of oppression and inequity. But to consider the mere posting of a bond a "good reason" would precisely make immediate execution
of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be executed immediately, as a matter of
course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to answer for damages that might result
therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, neither contemplated nor intended by law. ( EUDELA VS CA, G.R. No. 89265 July 17,
1992)
A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment
may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations.
Execution by motion
The prevailing party shall ask the court to issue a writ of execution by simply filing a motion in the same case within 5 years
from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
The prevailing party should file an action for revival of judgment after 5 years but within 10 years from the date of its entry.
(Art. 1144[3], Civil Code) When the judgment has been revived, the prevailing party can then enforce it by motion within 5 years from
the date of entry of the revived judgment.
Remedy: File another civil action for the revival of judgment (Execution by independent Action) which must be filed before it is barred
by the Statute of limitations.
Qualify whether the action for revival of judgment is a real or personal action.
If the action affects title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, the action for revival must be filed with the
court having jurisdiction over the place where the real property or any portion thereof is situated. Otherwise, the action for revival of
judgment is a personal action wherein the venue lies with the residence of either the plaintiff or defendant, at the option of the plaintiff
(INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO.156596, 24 AUGUST 2007).
Five and ten year period not applicable in special proceedings: imprescriptible:
The five- and ten-year periods do not apply to special proceedings, such as land registration and cadastral cases where the
right to apply for a writ of possession is imprescriptible (Rodil vs. Benedicto, 95 SCRA 137 [1980]). This is so because a party in a civil
action must promptly enforce a judgment that is secured against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same makes it
unenforceable. In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, right or a particular fact; in land registration proceedings,
the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established (TING VS. HEIRS OF LIRIO, G.R. NO. 168913, 14
MARCH 2007).
a. Shall issue in the name of the Republic of the Philippines from court which granted the motion;
b. State the name of the court, case number and title, and the dispositive portion of the judgment order;
c. Require the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the writ according to its terms.
a. If judgment is against property of the judgment obligor – Out of real or personal property with interest.
b. If against his real or personal property in the hands of the personal representatives, heirs, devisees, legatees, tenants, or
trustees of the judgment obligor – Out of that property, with interest.
c. If for sale of real or personal property – To sell property, describing it and apply the proceeds in conformity with judgment.
d. If for delivery of possession of property – Deliver possession of the same to the party entitled to it, describing it, and to satisfy
any costs, damages, rents, or profits covered by the judgment out of the personal property of the person against whom it was
rendered, and out of real property if sufficient personal property cannot be found.
e. In all cases – writ of execution shall specifically state the amount of the interest, costs, damages, rents, or profits due as of
date of issuance of writ, aside from principal obligation.
(a) Immediate payment on demand. - The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the
judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor
shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of
payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the
same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver
the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same
day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amount to a fiduciary account in
the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality.
The clerk of court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account of the court that issued the writ
whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall
be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In
no case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable to him.
(b) Satisfaction by levy. - If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other
mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind
and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does
not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, an then on the real properties if the personal
properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied
upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell
only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property,
may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. - The officer may levy on debts due the judgment obligor and other credits, including
bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable of manual delivery in the possession
or control of third parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession or
control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the
judgment and all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from service of the notice of garnishment stating
whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds or credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the report shall state
how much funds or credits the garnishee holds for the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check issued
in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment obligee within ten (10) working days from service of
notice on said garnishing requiring such delivery, except the lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the court.
In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the judgment obligor, if
available, shall have the right to indicate the garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount due; otherwise, the
choice shall be made by the judgment obligee.
The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with respect to delivery of payment to the
judgment obligee.
Based on the foregoing, the sheriff is required to first demand of the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full
amount stated in the writ of execution before a levy can be made. The sheriff shall demand such payment either in cash, certified
bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods
immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which of his properties can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this
option immediately or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal
properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. ( VILLARIN VS
MUNASQUE, G.R. No. 169444, September 17, 2008)
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff
is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold
for another man's debts.
A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The sheriff may be liable for
enforcing execution on property belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no justification, for the
action is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ.
The levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor may be had by the executing sheriff only if the judgment obligor cannot
pay all or part of the full amount stated in the writ of execution. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in
cash, certified bank check, or other mode acceptable to the judgment obligee, the judgment obligor is given the option to immediately
choose which of his property or part thereof, not otherwise exempt from execution, may be levied upon sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option immediately, or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives
such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are
insufficient to answer for the judgment. Therefore, the sheriff cannot and should not be the one to determine which
property to levy if the judgment obligor cannot immediately pay because it is the judgment obligor who is given the
option to choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. (LEACHON VS PASCUA,
A.M. No. P-11-2972, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011)
Scope:
If a judgment directs a party who execute a conveyance of land or personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents,
or to perform any other specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may
direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done
shall have like effect as if done by the party.
If real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may be an
order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of
law. (Section 10 (A), Rule 39)
Judgment for Specific acts pertains to a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or
other documents or to perform any specific act which may be performed by some other person, or in some other way provided by law
with the same effect, as in the present case, section 10, and not said section 9 of Rule 39 applies; and under the provision of said
section 10, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party, by some other person appointed or designated
by the court, and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party himself. ( CALUAG VS PECSON, October 29,
1948, G.R. No. L-1403)
a) Motion;
b) Notice to the adverse party;
c) Hearing;
d) Special order;
e) Reasonable time to remove improvements
When a judgment requires the performance of any act other than those mentioned in the two preceding sections, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the
same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished
for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
Special Judgment refers to a specific act which the party or person must personally do, because his personal qualification
and circumstances have been taken into consideration in accordance with the provision of article 1161 of the Civil Code. (CALUAG VS
PECSON, October 29, 1948, G.R. No. L-1403)
The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment obligee over the right, title and interest of the judgment
obligor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to liens and encumbrances then existing.
(1) There are certain properties exempt from execution enumerated under Sec. 13, Rule 39:
(a) The judgment obligor‘s family home as provided by law, or the homestead in which he resides, and the land necessarily
used in connection therewith;
(b) Ordinary tools and implements personally used by him in his trade, employment, or livelihood;
(c) Three horses, or three cows, or three carabaos, or other beasts of burden, such as the judgment obligor may select
necessarily used by him in his ordinary occupation;
(d) His necessary clothing and articles for ordinary personal use, excluding jewelry;
(e) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the judgment obligor and his
family, such as the judgment obligor may select, of a value not exceeding 100,000 pesos.
(f) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for four months;
(g) The professional libraries and equipment of judges, lawyers, physicians, pharmacists,
dentists, engineers, surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not exceeding
300,000 pesos;
(h) One fishing boat and accessories not exceeding the total value of 100,000 pesos owned by a fisherman and by the lawful
use of which he earns his livelihood;
(i) So much of the salaries, wages, or earnings of the judgment obligor for his personal serviceswith 4 months preceding the
levy as are necessary for the support of his family;
(j) Lettered gravestones;
(k) Monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance;
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the
government; and
(m) Properties specially exempted by law (Sec. 13, Rule 39) .
(2) If the property mentioned in Sec. 13 is the subject of execution because of a judgment for the recovery of the price or
upon judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage upon the property, the property is not exempt from execution.
It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set and proved to the sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption (SPOUSES
VERSOLA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 164740,31 JULY 2006).
(1) If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes
an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon
the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless
such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not
less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court
issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless
the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third party claimant if such bond is
filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate
action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who
filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of
such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be
represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National
Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.
Certain remedies available to a third person not party to the action but whose property is the subject of execution:
(a) Terceria - By making an affidavit of his title thereto or his right to possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or
title. The affidavit must be served upon the sheriff and the attaching party (Sec. 14, Rule 57). Upon service of the affidavit upon him,
the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under attachment except if the attaching party files a bond approved by the court.
the sheriff shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, if such bond shall be filed.
(b) Exclusion or release of property – Upon application of the third person through a motion to set aside the levy on
attachment, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in
the performance of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment. The court may order the sheriff to release the property from
the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. In resolving the application, the court cannot pass upon the question of
title to the property with any character of finality but only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not
(CHING VS. CA, G.R. NO. 124642, FEBRUARY 23, 2004) .
(c) Intervention – This is possible because no judgment has yet been rendered and under the rules, a motion for
intervention may be filed any time before the rendition of the judgment by the trial court (Sec. 2, Rule 19).
(d) Accion Reinvindicatoria - The third party claimant is not precluded by Sec. 14, Rule 57 from vindicating his claim to the
property in the same or in a separate action. He may file a separate action to nullify the levy with damages resulting from the unlawful
levy and seizure. This action may be a totally distinct action from the former case.
Third party claim under rule 39 pertains to an affidavit made by a third person who claims to be entitled to the property in
custody of a sheriff by virtue of a writ of execution.
a) Judgment obligor or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property;
b) Redemptioner or Creditor having lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment, or mortgage on the property sold subsequent
to the lien under which the property was sold.
1) The judgment obligor, whether exercising a first or subsequent registration, has one year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale to redeem property sold by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with 1% per month
interest plus any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after purchase with interest on said amount at 1% per month.
Once he redeems, there shall be no further redemption. In no case may the judgment obligor redeem beyond the one-year period.
2) The redemptioner exercising first redemption has the same one-year period within which to redeem.
3) The redemptioner exercising a subsequent registration has a period of 60 days after the last redemption within which to
redeem. The redemptioner may redeem even beyond the one-year period provided it is within 60 days after the last redemption.
Effect of Redemption
If the judgment obligor redeems, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a redemption by a
redemptioner, whereupon, no further redemption shall be allowed and he is restored to his estate. The person to whom the
redemption payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption acknowledged before a notary public or other
officer authorized to take acknowledgments of conveyances of real property. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the registry
of deeds of the place in which the property is situated, and the registrar of deeds must note the record thereof on the margin of the
record of the certificate of sale. The payments mentioned in this and the last preceding sections may be made to the purchaser or
redemptioner, or for him to the officer who made the sale (Sec. 29).
1. Copy of the judgment or final order under which he claims the right to redeem.
2. If he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of record
3. Original or certified true copy of any assignment
4. Affidavit executed by him or his agent.
Purchaser or redemptioner shall not be entitled to receive rents and income of property sold inasmuch as these belong to the
judgment obligor until the expiration of the period of redemption.
Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given (Sec.33)
When the return of a writ of execution issued against property of a judgment obligor, or any one of several obligors in the
same judgment, shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the judgment obligee, at any time after such return
is made, shall be entitled to an order from the court which rendered the said judgment, requiring such judgment obligor to appear and
be examined concerning his property and income before such court or before a commissioner appointed by it, at a specified time and
place; and proceedings may thereupon be had for the application of the property and income of the judgment obligor towards the
satisfaction of the judgment. But no judgment obligor shall be so required to appear before a court or commissioner outside the
province or city in which such obligor resides or is found.
When the return of a writ of execution against the property of a judgment obligor shows that the judgment remains
unsatisfied, in whole or in part, and upon proof to the satisfaction of the court which issued the writ, that a person, corporation, or
other juridical entity has property of such judgment obligor or is indebted to him, the court may, by an order, require such person,
corporation, or other juridical entity, or any officer or member thereof, to appear before the court or a commissioner appointed by it, at
a time and place within the province or city where such debtor resides or is found, and be examined concerning the same. The service
of the order shall bind all credits due the judgment obligor and all money and property of the judgment obligor in the possession or in
the control of such person, corporation, or juridical entity from the time of service; and the court may also require notice of such
proceedings to be given to any party to the action in such manner as it may deem proper.
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of
the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition,
status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged
in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It
lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits
in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. (Selga vs SONY,
G.R. No. 175151, September 21, 2011)
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case
that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action . In this instance, the judgment in the first
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein.
This is the concept of res judicata known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered
on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies,
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of
that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second
if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res
judicata in its aspect as a “bar by prior judgment” would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties
can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of judgment” applies. (SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION VS RIZAL POULTRY, G.R. No. 167050, June 1, 2011)
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as
long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the Court
pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Bank’s right
to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present
case. (LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014)
Section 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order, is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago
accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the
requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines.
Under Rule 39, Section 48, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to
the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity. (ST. AVIATION SERVICES VS GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, G.R. NO. 140288, OCTOBER 23, 2006)
PART II
3.18. Provisional remedies
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant
to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final
judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action,
and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. The subject orders on
the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage. (Ma. Carminia C.
Calderon (formerly Ma. Carminia Calderon-Roxas), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia Vs. Jose Antonio F. Roxas,
G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013)
Provisional remedies are not causes of action in themselves but merely adjuncts to a main suit. They are temporary
measures availed of during the pendency of the action and ancillary because they are mere incidents. [Estares v. Court of Appeals,
459 SCRA 604]
The provisional remedies denominated attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, and delivery of personal property,
provided in Rules 59, 60, 61, and 62 of the Rules of Court, respectively, are remedies to which parties litigant may resort for the
preservation or protection of their rights or interest, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. If an action,
by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, said remedies can not be applied for and granted. [Calo v. Roldan, G.R.
No. L-252, March 30, 1946]
MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs. [B.P. 129, Sec. 33]
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a
plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken
into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. [Davao Light v. Court of Appeals,
204 SCRA 343]
Grounds for issuance of writ of attachment
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause of
action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with
intent to defraud his creditors;
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or
an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other
person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the
property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an
authorized person;
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which
the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his
creditors; or
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served
by publication. [Rule 57, Sec. 1]
Requisites
A writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a provisional remedy to be issued based on mere abstractions of fraud. Rather,
the rules require that for the writ to issue, there must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual circumstances manifesting that the
debtor practiced fraud upon the creditor at the time of the execution of their agreement in that said debtor had a preconceived plan or
intention not to pay the creditor. [Equitable v. Special Steel, G.R. No. 175350, June 13, 2012]
The remedy of attachment is adjunct to the main suit, therefore, it can have no independent existence apart from a suit on a
claim of the plaintiff against the defendant. When Aboitiz and Company, Inc. withdrew its complaint, the attachment ceased to have a
leg to stand on. [Adlawan v. Tomol, G.R. No. L-63225, April 3, 1990]
An order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action
is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the
property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the
applicant's demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the
order, which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the property to be attached as stated by
the applicant, exclusive of costs. Several writs may be issued at the same time to the sheriffs of the courts of different judicial regions.
[Rule 57, Sec. 2]
An order of attachment shall be granted only when it appears by the affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person
who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in section 1 hereof,
that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the
applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is
granted above all legal counterclaims. The affidavit, and the bond required by the next succeeding section, must be duly filed with the
court before the order issues. [Rule 57, Sec. 3]
The party applying for the order must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by
the court in its order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged
to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto. [Rule 57, Sec. 4]
Ex parte grant of the writ is allowed because it is possible that during the course of the hearing, the part against whom the
writ is sought may dispose of his property or abscond before the writ is issued. [Filinvest v. Relova, G.R. No. L-50378, September 30,
1982]
The sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in
the action, only so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or
gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the
value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs. No levy on attachment pursuant to the writ issued under section 2 hereof shall
be enforced unless it is preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint,
the application for attachment the applicant's affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment, on the defendant within the
Philippines. [Rule 57, Sec. 5 (1)]
Exceptions
The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply where the summons could not be served
personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the defendant is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent
therefrom, or the defendant is a non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in rem or quasi in rem. [Rule 57, Sec. 5 (2)]
Manner of attaching real and personal property; when property attached is claimed by third person
Real and personal property shall be attached by the sheriff executing the writ in the following manner:
(a) Real property, or growing crops thereon, or any interest therein, standing upon the record of the registry of deeds of the
province in the name of the party against whom attachment is issued, or not appearing at all upon such records, or belonging to the
party against whom attachment is issued and held by any other person, or standing on the records of the registry of deeds in the name
of any other person, by filing with the registry of deeds a copy of the order, together with a description of the property attached, and a
notice that it is attached, or that such real property and any interest therein held by or standing in the name of such other person are
attached, and by leaving a copy of such order, description, and notice with the occupant of the property, if any, or with such other
person or his agent if found within the province. Where the property has been brought under the operation of either the Land
Registration Act or the Property Registration Decree, the notice shall contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title, the
volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered, and the registered owner or owners thereof.
The registrar of deeds must index attachments filed under this section in the names of the applicant, the adverse party, or the
person by whom the property is held or in whose name it stands in the records. If the attachment is not claimed on the entire area of
the land covered by the certificate of title, a description sufficiently accurate for the identification of the land or interest to be affected
shall be included in the registration of such attachment;
(b) Personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping it in his custody, after issuing the
corresponding receipt therefor.
(c) Stocks or shares, or an interest in stocks or shares, of any corporation or company, by leaving with the president or
managing agent thereof, a copy of the writ, and a notice stating that the stock or interest of the party against whom the attachment is
issued is attached in pursuance of such writ;
(d) Debts and credits, including bank deposits, financial interest, royalties, commissions and other personal property not
capable of manual delivery, by leaving with the person owing such debts, or having in his possession or under his control, such credits
or other personal property, or with his agent, a copy of the writ, and notice that the debts owing by him to the party against whom
attachment is issued, and the credits and other personal property in his possession, or under his control, belonging to said party, are
attached in pursuance of such writ;
(e) The interest of the party against whom attachment is issued in property belonging to the estate of the decedent, whether
as heir, legatee, or devisee, by serving the executor or administrator or other personal representative of the decedent with a copy of
the writ and notice that said interest is attached. A copy of said writ of attachment and of said notice shall also be filed in the office of
the clerk of the court in which said estate is being settled and served upon the heir, legatee or devisee concerned.
If the property sought to be attached is in custodia legis, a copy of the writ of attachment shall be filed with the proper court
or quasi-judicial agency, and notice of the attachment served upon the custodian of such property. [Rule 57, Sec. 7] (See also Sec. 5)
1) The debtor has posted a counterbond or has made the requisite cash bond [Rule 57, Sec. 12];
2) The attachment was improperly or irregularly issued as where there is no ground for attachment under Section 1 of this
Rule [Rule 57, Sec. 13];
3) The bond filed is defective or insufficient [Rule 57, Sec. 13];
4) The attachment is excessive, but the discharge shall be limited to the excess [ Rule 57, Sec. 13];
5) The property attached is exempt from execution, hence exempt from preliminary attachment [Rule 57, Sec. 2 and 5]; or
6) The judgment is rendered against the attaching creditor [Rule 57, Sec. 19]
A discharge of the attachment must be made only after hearing. Ex parte discharge is a disservice to the orderly
administration of justice. [Peroxide Philippines Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92813, July 31, 1991]
Purpose of counter-bond
Jurisprudence adds that counter-bonds are also replacements of the property formerly attached, and just as the latter, may be
levied upon final judgment. [Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tri-Infante, 468 SCRA 526]
If judgment be recovered by the attaching party and execution issue thereon, the sheriff may cause the judgment to be
satisfied out of the property attached, if it be sufficient for that purpose in the following manner:
(a) By paying to the judgment obligee the proceeds of all sales of perishable or other property sold in pursuance of the order
of the court, or so much as shall be necessary to satisfy the judgment;
(b) If any balance remains due, by selling so much of the property, real or personal, as may be necessary to satisfy the
balance, if enough for that purpose remain in the sheriff's hands, or in those the clerk of the court;
(c) By collecting from all persons having in their possession credits belonging to the judgment obligor, or owing debts to the
latter at the time of the attachment of such credits or debts, the amount of such credits and debts as determined by the court in the
action, and stated in the judgment, and paying the proceeds of such collection over to the judgment obligee. [ Rule 57, Sec. 15]
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing
substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the
requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In the absence of the same, and where facts are
shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having
been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. (Palm Tree Estates, Inc., et al. Vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 159370. October 3,
2012)
Preliminary Injunctive Writ
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon a
showing of the applicant’s “clear legal right” being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant. “Clear legal right,” within the
meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right “clearly founded in or granted by law.” Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal
right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of
law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering
in such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature
of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even beforeadverse
judgment is rendered against them. (Executive Secretary, et al. Vs. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7,
2013)
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 58 issues only upon a
showing of the applicant’s “clear legal right” being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant. “Clear legal right,” within the
meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right clearly founded in or granted by law. Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right
precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law,
as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in
such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of
such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse
judgment is rendered against them. (Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District collector of customs,
Port of Aparri, Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union, and Head of the Land Transportation Office v.
Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013)
Existence of a clear legal right required during the pendency of the action
As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an existing legal right to be protected
during the pendency of the principal action. The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened
violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. TML
Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January 7, 2013)
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lists the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
Sec.3. Grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists un restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) that a party, court, agency, or a person doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the right of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual
Definitions and differences: preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order; status quo ante order
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in
itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue
the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims
can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. [Estares v. Court of Appeals, supra]
Purpose of injunction
It is issued by the court to prevent threatened or continuous irreparable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and adjudicated. [Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village, 471 SCRA 358]
For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear showing of extreme urgency to prevent irreparable injury and a clear and unmistakable
right to it must be proven by the party seeking it. The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory,
is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.
A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until
it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. [Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. CA,
G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000]
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with
a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. [Bacolod City Water District
v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157494, December 10, 2004]
The following elements must concur for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
Kinds of injunction
Preliminary injunction
- An order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order:
a) Requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a performance of a particular act or acts (preventive or
prohibitive injunction); or
b) Also requiring the performance of a particular act or acts (mandatory injunction). (Section 1, Rule 58, Rules of Court;
Regalado 2008 ed.)
Final injunction:
a) Granted if, after the trial of the action, it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined
b) May perpetually restrain the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming
the preliminary mandatory injunction. (Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court)
Case law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had already become fait accompli
(meaning, an accomplished or consummated act). Hence, since the consummation of the act sought to be restrained had rendered
Sps. Alindogs injunction petition moot, the issuance of the said injunctive writ was altogether improper. (Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez
and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014)
Grounds for objection to, or for the dissolution of injunction or restraining order
The application for injunction or restraining order may be denied, upon a showing of its insufficiency. The injunction or
restraining order may also be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or person
enjoined, which may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits. It may further be denied, or if granted, may be dissolved, if it
appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof,
as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for
such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all damages
which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. If it appears that the extent of the
preliminary injunction or restraining order granted is too great, it may be modified. [Rule 58, Sec. 6]
If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to
be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at
a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be effective for sixty
(60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining, order issued by the Supreme Court or a member
thereof shall be effective until further orders. [Rule 58, Sec. 5]
Within the said 20 day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause why the injunction should not be
granted. Also, within the same period, the court shall determine whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted and then
issue the corresponding order. [Australian Professional, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, 668 SCRA 253]
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith.
Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing
to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In
no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-
two hours provided herein. [Rule 58, Sec. 5 (2)]
The rule against the non-extendibility of the 20 day effectivity of a TRO is absolute if issued by the RTC. The failure of the trial
court to fix the period in the TRO does not convert it to a preliminary injunction. [Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, supra]
In relation to R.A. No. 8975, ban on issuance of TRO or writ of injunction in cases involving government infrastructure projects
No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private
acting under the government direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/ project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
In after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the
circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any
liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws. [ R.A. 8975, Sec. 3]
When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party
or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons,
together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the
Philippines. [Rule 58, Sec. 4 (c)]
However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse
party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a non-resident thereof, the requirement of prior or
contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply. [Rule 58, Sec. 4 (c) (2)]
3.18.5. Receivership
Purpose of receivership
Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at making more secure, existing rights. It cannot be used as an instrument
for the destruction of those rights. [Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., 33 SCRA 799]
Who is a receiver?
A receiver is a person appointed by the court in behalf of all the parties to the action for the purpose of preserving and
conserving the property in litigation and prevent its possible destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the
parties. The appointment of a receiver is not a matter of absolute right. [Commodities Storage v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 439]
Upon a verified application, one or more receivers of the property subject of the action or proceeding may be appointed by
the court where the action is pending or by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the following cases:
(a) When it appears from the verified application, and such other proof as the court may require, that the party applying for
the appointment of a receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is the subject of the action or proceeding, and that such
property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a receiver be appointed to administer and preserve it;
(b) When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure of a mortgage that the property is in danger of being
wasted or dissipated or materially injured, and that its value is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt, or that the parties
have so stipulated in the contract of mortgage;
(c) After judgment, to preserve the property during the pendency of an appeal, or to dispose of it according to the judgment,
or to aid execution when the execution has been returned unsatisfied or the judgment obligor refuses to apply his property in
satisfaction of the judgment, or otherwise to carry the judgment into effect;
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible means of
preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation.
During the pendency of an appeal, the appellate court may allow an application for the appointment of a receiver to be filed in
and decided by the court of origin and the receiver appointed to be subject to the control of said court. [Rule 59, Sec. 1]
A receiver is not an agent or representative of any party to the action. He is an officer of the court exercising his functions in
the interest of neither plaintiff nor defendant, but for the common benefit of all parties in interest. [Pacific Merchandising Corporation v.
Consolacion Insurance, 73 SCRA 564]
Requirements before issuance of an order
1) Verified application for the appointment of a receiver based on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 59; and
2) Bond filed by the applicant and executed to the party against whom the application is presented, in an amount to be fixed
by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party all damages the latter may sustain by reason of the appointment of
such receiver in case the applicant should have procured the same without sufficient cause.
The court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such
damages
Subject to the control of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending a receiver shall have the power to bring and
defend, in such capacity, actions in his own name; to take and keep possession of the property in controversy; to receive rents; to
collect debts due to himself as receiver or to the fund, property, estate, person, or corporation of which he is the receiver; to compound
for and compromise the same; to make transfers; to pay outstanding debts; to divide the money and other property that shall remain
among the persons legally entitled to receive the same; and generally to do such acts respecting the property as the court may
authorize. However, funds in the hands of a receiver may be invested only by order of the court upon the written consent of all the
parties to the action. [Rule 59, Sec. 6]
Another bond is the one which the court may require, at any time after the appointment of the receiver as further security for
damages. [Riano, supra]
Termination of receivership
Whenever the court, motu proprio or on motion of either party, shall determine that the necessity for a receiver no longer
exists, it shall, after due notice to all interested parties and hearing, settle the accounts of the receiver, direct the delivery of the funds
and other property in his possession to the person adjudged to be entitled to receive them and order the discharge of the receiver from
further duty as such. The court shall allow the receiver such reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant, to be
taxed as costs against the defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires. [Rule 59, Sec. 8]
3.18.6. Replevin
Nature of replevin
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action
itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional
remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. [Tillson vs. Court
of Appeals, 197 SCRA 587]
The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is
so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam-in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is
concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is the right of the
plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein.
[BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 102]
A party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property may, at the commencement of the action or at any time
before answer, apply for an order for the delivery of such property to him, in the manner hereinafter provided.
The applicant need not be the owner of the property. It is enough that he has a right to its possession. [ Yang v. Valdez, G.R.
No. 73317, August 31, 1989]
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief ;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of
execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or
custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property. [Rule 60, Sec. 2]
If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot
immediately require the return of the property, but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to
the applicant, require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in
double the value of the property as stated in the applicant's affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be
adjudged, and for the payment of such sum, to him as may be recovered against the adverse party, and by serving a copy of such
bond on the applicant. [Rule 60, Sec. 5]
Sheriff’s duty in the implementation of the writ; when property is claimed by third party
Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party, together with a copy of the application,
affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his
custody. If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be
not delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and take the property into his possession. After the sheriff
has take possession of the property as herein provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the
party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same. [Rule 60, Sec. 4]
The rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. Under Section
6, Rule 60, the Sheriff should have waited no less than 5 days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the
sufficiency of the bond. [Hao v. Andres, A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008]
If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the
bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant's bond
or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient
and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not
delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. [Rule 60, Sec. 6]
If the property taken is claimed by any person other than the party against whom the writ of replevin had been issued or his
agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds therefor, and
serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the property and a copy thereof upon the applicant, the sheriff
shall not be bound to keep the property under replevin or deliver it to the applicant unless the applicant or his agent, on demand of
said sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the
property under replevin as provided in section 2 hereof. In case of disagreement as to such value, the court shall determine the same.
No claim for damages for the taking or keeping, of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of such property, to any such third-party claimant if such
bond shall be filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property,
or prevent the applicant from claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim, in the
same or a separate action.
Rule in case writ was issued in favour of the Republic: Bond not required
When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of
such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a result of the replevin, he shall be represented by the
Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of
the funds to be appropriated for the purpose. [Rule 60, Sec. 7]
Interlocutory and Final orders; application to provisional remedies especially to support pendente lite.
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued
pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage and are therefore interlocutory. They did
not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of
psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support, and conjugal assets. (Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her
Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013)
Burden of Proof
We stress that in a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public respondent for his issuance of the
impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion is present “when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.” In other words, the tribunal or administrative body must
have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious or despotic manner. Petitioner failed to discharge that burden and
perforce the petition must fail. (Isabelita P. Gravides Vs. Commission on Elections and Pedro C. Borjal, G.R. No. 199433. November 13,
2012)
At the outset, it must be pointed out that petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
inappropriate. Petitioners’ remedy from the adverse Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. As
such, this petition should have been dismissed outright for being a wrong mode of appeal. Even if the petition is to be treated as filed
under Rule 45, the same must still be denied for late filing and there being no reversible error on the part of the CA. Records show that
petitioners received a copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on October 30, 2006.42 They therefore had
15 days or until November 14, 2006 within which to file their Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. However, they filed
their Petition for Certiorari on December 29, 2006,43 after the period to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 had
expired. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal which is not allowed . (Ruben
C. Magtoto and Artemia Magtoto Vs. Court of Appeals and Leonila M. Dela CruzG.R. No. 175792. November 21, 2012)
An ordinary civil action is when a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. [Reyes v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008] A special civil action contains special features not found in
ordinary civil actions. It is also governed by ordinary rules but subject to specific rules prescribed. [ Rule 1, Sec. 3 (a), Paragraph 2]
3.19.3. Jurisdiction and venue
Unlike ordinary civil actions which is determined by either the residences of the parties if personal, or location of the property
if real, special civil actions need not be based on this. For instance for quo warranto, venue is fixed without regard to the residences of
the parties. [Riano, Civil Procedure II, 2012] Venue should still follow the rule on venue, except in instances where the special civil
action specifies.
Jurisdiction in ejectment
Petitioners contend that since the MTC acted without jurisdiction, the RTC can only decide the case on appeal if it has original
jurisdiction. The SC held that the MTC had jurisdiction over this ejectment case even if the question of possession could be resolved
without passing upon the issue of ownership. [Serrano v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 162366, November 10, 2006]
3.19.4. Interpleader
A remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants,
comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with
the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one
liability. [Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147382, April 6, 2005]
It is indispensable that there be conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-
interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants. [Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Metro Container Corp., G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001]
The requisites are: a.) There must be two or more claimants with adverse or conflicting interests upon a subject matter; b.)
The conflicting claims involve the same subject matter; c.) The conflicting claims are made against the same person; d.) The plaintiff
has no claim upon the subject matter of the adverse claims or if he has an interest at all, such interest is not disputed by the claimants.
[Riano, supra]
When to file?
Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest
whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. [ Rule 62, Sec. 1]
Interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person who is entitled to the payment of the rentals due because of
conflicting claims on the property. The remedy passes the legal problem to the court which will have to adjudicate upon the adverse
claims. [Pasrischa v. Don Luis Dizon Realty, Inc., 548 SCRA 273, 292]
It must be noted, however, that a stakeholder should use reasonable diligencethat is, by filing the interpleader suit within a
reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be
barred by laches or undue delay. [Wack-Wack Golf v. Won, 70 SCRA 165]
Instance when interpleader is no longer necessary
When the decision of a case has become final and executory, the party has no other alternative but to pay rentals. The move
for dismissal of interpleader was not an indication that it is no longer interested, rather there is no more need for it. [ Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation v. Metro Container Corp., supra]
In a case where petitioner’s father, aunt and uncles co-owned the land, and thereafter sold the land, petitioners aver that
there is a conflict among the heirs of the co-owner. Petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an
inchoate interest thereto as heirs, hence they have no personality to file such case. [ Ramos v. Ramos, 399 SCRA 43 (2005)]
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action
in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder. [Rule 63, Sec. 1]
In a case which interpreted R.A. 305, which converted the municipality of Naga to a city, in order to determine the rightful
possessor of Plaza Rizal. The court explained that the only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or
validity of provisions in an instrument or statute, hence it complies with requirement of the rules. [ Province of Camarines Sur v. Court
of Appeals, 600 SCRA 569]
Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6
and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. The court took cognizance on the case, despite the fact that a separate
action was pending in another court because in the instant case no breach was committed. [ Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Industries,
542 SCRA 470]
Declaratory relief not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Petitioner is a radio station which was granted to operate under R.A. 3001, subsequently, President Marcos issued P.D. 576-A
which restricted radio station ownership. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that a petition for declaratory relief is not
among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved. [Allied Broadcasting
Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 91500, October 18, 1990] Note that this rule is subject to the Supreme Court’s
discretion.
In one instance the court took cognizance of a case, wherein a 12 year old was raped by a foreigner, and in order to garnish
the foreign deposit of the accused, which was exempt by reason of a law. The Supreme Court treated the petition for declaratory relief
as mandamus to require the banks to honor the decision of the lower court, and added that, where the petition has far-reaching
implications and raises questions that should be resolved. [Salvacion v. Central Bank, G.R. No. 94723 August ,21, 1997]
All persons who have e claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties. [ Rule 63, Sec. 2]
In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other governmental regulation, the
Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same. [Rule 63, Sec. 3]
In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local
governmental unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard. [Rule 63, Sec. 4]
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an
actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe
for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. [ Jumamil
v. Café, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005]
Petitioner filed a case to clarify her status prior to their marriage, after the death of her Chinese husband. As a consequence,
her petition is, in effect, one for a declaratory relief, which this Court has repeatedly held to be inapplicable to the political status of
natural persons. [Lim v. Republic, G.R. No. L-29535. February 27, 1971]
Except in actions falling under the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may
refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and
proper under the circumstances. [Rule 63, Sec. 5]
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. [Rule 63, Sec. 1, Paragraph 2]
The petition for declaratory relief only included the administrator and trustees under the will, it failed to include the Roman
Catholic Church of Nueva Segovia. The non-joinder of necessary parties would deprive the declaration of that final and pacifying
function it is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the identical issue. [ Degala v. Reyes,
G.R. No. L-2402, November 29, 1950]
The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the Ordinance in question as party defendants in this case cannot defeat the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. The reason for the law requiring the joinder of all necessary parties is that failure to
do so would deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying function the action for declaratory relief is calculated to subserve, as they
would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the Identical issue. [Baguio Citizen’s Action v. City Council, G.R. No. L-27247, April
20, 1983]
If before the final termination of the case, a breach or violation of an instrument or a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary action, and
the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper. [Rule 63, Sec. 6]
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no
longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of
one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order. [ Tambunting, Jr. v.
Sumabat, G.R. No. 144101, September 16, 2005]
Petitioners filed a declaratory relief without stating the law which pertained to the case. The Supreme Court held that,
although Section 6, Rule 63 might allow such course of action, the respondents did not argue the point, and we note petitioners’ failure
to specify the ordinary action they desired. [Martelino v. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 160208, June 30,
2008]
Reformation of an instrument
When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the
instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of the parties may
ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.
If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper remedy is not
reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract. [Art. 1359, Civil Code of the Philippines]
Note that this remedy is governed by Art. 1359-1369 of the civil code.
In one case, Respondent Corporation filed an action for reformation 24 years after the issue arose, hence it is barred by
prescription. The Court added that the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights
and obligations of the parties for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising
from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the law or contract to which it refers.
[Bentir v. Leanda, G.R. No. 128991, April 12, 2000]
Consolidation of ownership
In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the
provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly
heard. [Art. 1607, Civil Code of the Philippines]i
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one
who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right
would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may
desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But “for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.” (Dionisio Manaquil, et al. Vs. Roberto
Moico, G.R. No. 80076, November 20, 2012)
Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. [ Art. 476,
Civil Code of the Philippines]
Procedure to be followed
The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of a cloud therefrom shall be governed by such rules of court as the
Supreme Court shall promulgated. [Art. 481, Civil Code of the Philippines]
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt or uncertainty affecting title to real property.
The plaintiffs must show not only that there is a cloud or contrary interest over the subject real property, but that they have a valid
title to it. [Spouses Santiago v. Villamor, G.R. No. 168499, November 26, 2012]
Requisites
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. [Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio, 651 SCRA 327]
3.19.6. Review of judgments and final orders or resolution of the Comelec and COA
This Rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit. [Rule 64, Sec. 1]
Decisions of the Civil Service Commission is now reviewable by the Court of Appeals. [R.A. No. 7902, Sec. 1]
Petition for review under Rule 43 an available remedy on the decision of the Civil Service Commission
Petitioner is a school principal and was charged of sexual harassment, the remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution
issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the
resolution. However, it admits exceptions, like the instant case, such as invalid writs, in this case Cuanan was denied of due process for
failure to serve him a copy of the pleadings. [Cuanan v. DepEd, G.R. No. 169013, December 16, 2008]
A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave
abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of
the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational
deliberation. [Aratuc v. COMELEC,621 SCRA 385]
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of
the COMELEC in approving the withdrawal of his nomination. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. [Lokin v. COMELEC, 621 SCA 385]
A complaint was filed against petitioners for violation of rules of COA and for violation of R.A. 3019. The office of the petition
for certiorari is not to correct simple errors of judgment; any resort to the said petition under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues. [Reyna v. COA, 642 SCRA 210]
Certiorari under Rule 65, as its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only
for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. [ Angara v. Fedman,
G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004]
Function of prohibition
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and
orderly administration of justice. It is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [ Vergara v.
Rugue, G.R. No. L-32984, August 25, 1977]
What is Mandamus?
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [Angchangco v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997]
Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when “any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court.” The main objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of
the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a
course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor.
Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v.
Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013
Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; compels performance of ministerial duties.
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only
when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its
Chairman, Roberti P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013
Certiorari distinguished from appeal by certiorari
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper
remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. [Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755]
It may issue only when the following requirements are alleged in and established by the petition: (1) that the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) that there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [ Tan v. Antazo, G.R. No. 187208, February 23,
2011]
For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a “tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions”; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.” [Ongsuko v. Malones, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009]
The pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is explicit in stating that “the petition shall not interrupt the court of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceedings. [ Juliano-Llave v. Republic, 646 SCRA
637]
Respondent’s contention that petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the remedy of
certiorari. The Supreme Court held that while the rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must first file a motion for
reconsideration with the lower court of the act or order complained of, however, such rule is not without exception. [Barrazona v. RTC
of Baguio-Branch 61, 486 SCRA 555]
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. [Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, G.R.
No. 162575, December 15, 2010]
If after such hearing or submission of memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof the court finds that the
allegations of the petition are true, it shall render judgment for the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled. [Rule 65, Sec.
8]
Other reliefs
The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. [Rule 65,
Sec. 7]
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively
with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. [A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC Dec. 12, 2007]
A petition for certiorari was filed questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest was within the
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision
of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. [Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011]
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It
may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. [Rule 65, Sec. 4]
The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for
delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. [Rule 64, Sec. 8]
To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. Here, while the RTC had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing
jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting Sps. Alindog’s prayer for injunctive relief. Spouses
Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog,G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC,
Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. [Tecson v. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277]
Petitioners argue that since their prayer involves the cancellation of the provisional authority and CPCs, and not the legislative
franchise, then quo warranto fails as a remedy. The Court explained that the special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by
which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise.
[Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009]
The Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding since they both deal with the
eligibility or qualification of a candidate. The distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" under Section 253 of the OEC, petition is
filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. [Fermin v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008]
An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his
office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act. [Rule 66, Sec. 1]
The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence
such action. [Rule 66, Sec. 2]
The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced,
bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person. [Rule 66, Sec. 3]
A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an
action therefor in his own name. [Rule 66, Sec. 5]
When the respondent is found guilty of usurping into, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or
franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or
relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the
public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. [Rule 66, Sec. 9]
If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public office he may, after taking
the oath of office and executing any official bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of the office, and may immediately
thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and papers in the respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office to
which the judgment relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to such demand, he may be
punished for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person adjudged entitled to the office may also bring
action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by such person by reason of the usurpation. [Rule 66, Sec. 10]
3.19.9. Expropriation
The power of eminent domain in particular has been described as a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the
state for public use or meet public exigency. It is also said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form, and
thus, inseparable from sovereignty. [Air Transportation Office v. Gopuco, Jr., 462 SCRA 544]
The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right
and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons
owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of
each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although
occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty
specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint. [Rule 67, Sec. 1]
The first stage is the determination of authority of the plaintiff to expropriate, which includes the propriety of the
expropriation, its necessity and public purpose. The second stage is the determination of just compensation through the court-
appointed commissioners. [National Power Corporation v. Joson, 206 SCRA 520] The first phase ends with either an order of dismissal
or a determination that the property is to be acquired for a public purpose. [City of Manila v. Alegar Corporation, G.R. No. 187604]
Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested
persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. [Rule 67,
Sec. 5]
When plaintiff can immediately enter into possession of the real property, in relation to R.A. No. 8974
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the
improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof;
(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated within
the period of sixty (60) days from the date of the expropriation case, to come up with a zonal valuation for said area; and
(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing
valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking
into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order
to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project. [Sec. 4, R.A. 8974]
Order of expropriation
If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no
party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal,
however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid. [Rule 67, Sec. 4]
The payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first. [Rule 67, Sec. 4]
Appointment of commissioner
Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested
persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. [ Rule 67,
Sec. 5]
Where no trial or hearing was conducted to afford parties the opportunity to present their own evidence, the court should
disregard the commissioner’s findings. The absence of such trial or h earing constitutes a violation of the right of due process. [National
Power Corporation v. De la Cruz, 514 SCRA 56]
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined
as of the date of filing of the complaint. [City of Iloilo v. Contreras Besana, 612 SCRA 458]
Meaning of just compensation
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the
fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. [Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., 664 SCRA 233]
Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriation must be fair and reasonable, compensation to be just, must
also be paid without delay if the property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land
and its fruits or income. [Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 632 SCRA 727]
Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots.
However, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within 5 years from the finality of judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their rights. [ Yujuico v. Atienza, Jr., 472
SCRA 463]
Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will
faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may
be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the
commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties, to attend, view and examine the
property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or
counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken,
the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But
in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the
actual value of his property so taken. [Rule 67, Sec. 6]
The court may order the commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon
by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to
subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property. The
commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual
until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. [ Rule 67, Sec. 7]
Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such
period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court
may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith, or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to
the commissioners for further report of facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the
report in part and reject it in part and it may make such order or render such judgment. [Rule 67, Sec.8]
Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from
the taking of the possession of the property, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall
have the right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in the judgment, or
to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the provisions of section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his
counsel absent themselves from the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered, the same shall be ordered to be deposited in
court and such deposit shall have the same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the person ultimately adjudged
entitled thereto. [Rule 67, Sec. 10]
When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in
which the property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use
or purpose. [Rule 67, Sec. 13]
Manner of foreclosure
Foreclosure of real estate mortgage may be made extra judicially under Act. 3135, or judicially, under Rule 68 of the revised rules
of court.
If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount
due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and other charges as approved by the court, and costs, and
shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to the court or to the judgment obligee within a
period of not less than ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of judgment, and that in default
of such payment the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment. [Rule 68, Sec. 2]
The period given in the rule is not merely a procedural requirement; it is a substantive right granted to the mortgage debtor as the last
opportunity to pay the debt and save his mortgaged property from final disposition at the foreclosure sale. [ De Leon v. Ibanez, 95 Phil.
119]
When the defendant, after being directed to do so as provided in the next preceding section, fails to pay the amount of the
judgment within the period specified therein, the court, upon motion, shall order the property to be sold in the manner and under the
provisions of Rule 39 and other regulations governing sales of real estate under execution. Such sale shall not affect the rights of
persons holding prior encumbrances upon the property or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court, also upon
motion, it shall operate to divest the rights in the property of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law. [Rule 68, Sec. 3]
Equity of redemption
This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-
day period ‘from the date of service of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order of
confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer. [Spouses Rosales v. Spouses
Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003]
Jurisprudence suggests that the motion for the sale of the mortgaged property is non-litigable and may be made ex parte
pursuant to the judgment of forclosure. [Government of P.I. v. De las Lajigas, 55 Phil. 668]
At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial
function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion. [Edralin v. Philippine Veteran Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011]
Motion for issuance of writ of possession an exception to three (3) day notice rule
The motion for issuance of a writ of possession is an exception to the general 3 day notice rule for motions. Nevertheless, the
ex parte nature of the proceedings does not deny due process to the petitioners because the issuance of the writ of possession does
not bar a separate case for annulment of the mortgage and foreclosure sale. [Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 537 SCRA 247]
The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid
to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the
same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such
encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the
person entitled to it. [Rule 68, Sec. 4]
Deficiency judgment
If upon the sale of any real property as provided in the next preceding section there be a balance due to the plaintiff after
applying the proceeds of the sale, the court, upon motion, shall render judgment against the defendant for any such balance for which,
by the record of the case, he may be personally liable to the plaintiff, upon which execution may issue immediately if the balance is all
due at the time of the rendition of the judgment; otherwise; the plaintiff shall be entitled to execution at such time as the balance
remaining becomes due under the terms of the original contract, which time shall be stated in the judgment. [ Rule 68, Sec. 6]
It has been suggested that the mortgagor, who is not the debtor and who merely executed the mortgage to secure the
principal debtor’s obligation, is not liable for the deficiency unless he assumed liability for the same in the contract. [ Philippine Trust
Company v. Echaus, 52 Phil. 852]
Judicial foreclosure versus extrajudicial foreclosure
There are two accepted modes of foreclosure: (a) Judicial foreclosure pursuant to Rule 68 of the rules of court; and (b)
Extrajudicial foreclosure pursuant to Act 3135. Extrajudicial foreclosure is the mode to be used if there is a special power inserted in or
attached to the real estate mortgage. [Riano, supra]
Equity of redemption
The period mentioned in the judgment of the court is the period within which the mortgagor may start exercising his equity
redemption, which is the right to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the debt. The payment may
be made even after the foreclosure saled provided it is made before the sale is confirmed by the court. [GSIS v. CFI, 175 SCRA 19]
Equity of redemption may be exercised even beyond the 90 day period or before conformation of sale
This is the mortgagor’s equity of redemption which may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period and even after
the foreclosure itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such confirmation, no redemption can be
effected any longer. [Limpin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 87]
There is no right of redemption in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage under Rule 68. This right exists only in extrajudicial
foreclosures where there is always a right of redemption within one year from the date of registration of the sale. [ Santos v. Register of
Deeds of Manila, 38 SCRA 42]
3.19.11. Partition
Partition, in general, is the separation, division, and assignment of a thing held in common by those to whom it may belong.
[Cano Vda. De Viray v. Spouses Usi, G.R. No. 192486, November 21, 2012]
Presumption on partition
Partition presupposes the existence of a co-ownership of a property by two or more persons. Thus, a division of property
cannot be ordered by the court unless the existence of ownership is first established, and that an action for partition will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest in the property. [Co Guik Lun v. Co, 655 SCRA 131]
Modes
Partition may be made in either of two ways: (a) By agreement of the parties; or (b) By judicial proceedings under the Rules
of Court. [Figuracion-Gerilla v. Vda. De Figuracion, 499 SCRA 484]
All the co-owners must be joined. Accordingly, an action will not lie without the joinder of all co-owners and other persons
having interest in the property. [Garcia de Lara v. Gonzales de Lara, 2 Phil. 294]
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition
will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between
him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint
for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his
lawful shares. [Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005]
Setting forth his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. [Rule 69, Sec. 1]
In an action for partition in accordance with this Rule, a party shall recover from another his just share of rents and profits
received by such other party from the real estate in question, and the judgment shall include an allowance for such rents and profit
[Rule 69, Sec. 8]
When the allegations in the complaint assert the exclusive ownership of the property to be partition, the nature of the action
is not of partition. It is an action for the recovery of property. [De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 412 SCRA 282]
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists,
and a partition is proper. The second phase commences when it appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon the partition”
directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. [Lacbayan v. Samoy, 645 SCRA 677]
If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate among all
the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such partition, together with
the order of the court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated.
[Rule 69, Sec. 2]
Partition by commissioners; appointment of commissioners, commissioner’s report; court action upon commissioner’s
report
Appointment of commissioners
If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest
such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct. [Rule 69, Sec. 3]
Before making such partition; the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties
as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. In making the partition, the commissioners
shall view and examine the real estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and examination, and shall hear the
parties as to their preference in the portion of the property to be set apart to them and the comparative value thereof, and shall set
apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements,
situation and quality of the different parts thereof. [Rule 69, Sec. 4]
The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings as to the partition, or the
assignment of real estate to one of the parties, or the sale of the same. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of court shall serve
copies thereof on all the interested parties with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings
of the report, if they so desire. No proceeding had before or conducted by the commissioners and rendered judgment thereon. [Rule
69, Sec. 6]
If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate description, the
particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in
severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him. If the whole property is assigned to one of the parties upon his paying to the
others the sum or sums ordered by the court, the judgment shall state the fact of such payment and of the assignment of the real
estate to the party making the payment, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in the party making the payment the whole of
the real estate free from any interest on the part of the other parties to the action. If the property is sold and the sale confirmed by the
court, the judgment shall state the name of the purchaser or purchasers and a definite description of the parcels of real estate sold to
each purchaser, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real estate in the purchaser or purchasers making the payment or
payments, free from the claims of any of the parties to the action. A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be recorded in
the registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, and the expenses of such recording shall be taxed as part of the
costs of the action. [Rule 69, Sec. 11]
The provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of both real and personal
property, in so far as the same may be applicable. [Rule 69, Sec. 13]
Prescription of action
Prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owner or co-heirs as long as there is a recognition of
the co-ownership, expressly or impliedly. [Art. 494, Civil Code]
Although the action to demand partition of a co-owned land does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by
prescription where there exist a clear repudiation of the co-ownership and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and
exclusive ownership. [Heirs of Restar v. Heirs of Cichon, 475 SCRA 731]
Exception
The exception to the non-prescription of the action to partition is where one of the interested parties openly and adversely
occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, in which case, acquisitive prescription may set it. [Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 2010]
In actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the
plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property. Second, they must also assert that they were deprived of
possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time
the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or building. [ Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix
Solutions, G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010]
Meaning of strategy
"Strategy" in this regard could only mean machination or artifice and considering that the parties tangled for weeks to reach
an agreement on the terms and conditions of a contract of lease. Stealth, on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or
clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission. [Sumulong v.
Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372]
Requisites
The essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the
expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or
building after expiration or termination of the right to possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with
the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received
by the defendant. [De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006]
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the property
in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession
of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or
building “after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. [Sarmiento v.
Manalite Home Owners Association, G.R. No. 182953, October 11, 2010]
There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real pro. property, namely, (1) the summary action for
forcible entry or detainer (denominated accion interdictalunder the former law of procedure, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks
the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion
publiciana which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First
Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the jus
fruendi also brought in the Court of First Instance. [Reyes v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. L-33213 June 29, 1979]
Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of real property which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC are: (1) the plenary
action for the recovery of the real right of possession (accion publiciana) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year or
when the action was filed more than one (1) year from date of the last demand received by the lessee or defendant; and (2) an action
for the recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria) which includes the recovery of possession.
Who may institute the action and when; against whom the action may be maintained
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person
or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. [Rule 70, Sec. 1]
An ejectment case is not abated by: Injunction, Accion Publicana, Writ of Possession where ownership is the principal issue,
Action for quieting of title of property, suits for specific performance and action for reformation of instrument. The said actions do not
involve physical or de facto possession. [Wilmon Auto Supply v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 108]
There is nothing in existing laws and procedural rules that obliges a plaintiff in an unlawful detainer or forcible entry case to pay
compensation or financial assistance to defendants whose occupation was either illegal from the beginning or had become such when
they refused to vacate the subject premises upon demand by the owner or person having better right to its possession. On the
contrary, our Rules of Court expressly recognizes the right of such plaintiff to claim for damages arising from the unlawful deprivation
of physical possession. (Antioquia Development Corporation And Jamaica Realty & Marketing Corporation Vs. Benjamin P. Rahacal,
Eulalia Cant Alejo, Teresita Cant Alejo, Rudy Ramos, Domingo Aguilar, Domingo Cantalejo, Vlrginia Cant Alejo, Dulce Aquino,
Rogelioredondo, Virgilio Cant Alejo, Francisco Lumbres And Rodolfo Dela Cerna, G.R. No. 148843 September 05, 2012)
Pleadings allowed
The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and
the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified. [Rule 70, Sec. 4]
The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto,
dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal
is found, it shall forthwith issue summons. [Rule 70, Sec. 5]
Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without
prejudice, and may be revived only after that requirement shall have been complied with. [ Rule 70, Sec. 12]
Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lesser shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on
the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five
(5) days in the case of buildings. [Rule 70, Sec. 2]
It is apparent from this provision that a demand is a pre-requisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is "for
failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease," and where the action is to terminate the lease because of the
expiration of its term. [Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672]
It has been ruled, however, that the demand upon a tenant may be oral. Sufficient evidence must be adduced to show that
there was indeed a demand like testimonies from disinterested and unbiased witnesses. [Jakihaca vs. Aquino, 181 SCRA 67]
The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action
must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession.
[Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes, G.R. No. 178096, 23 March 2011]
The action for unlawful detainer was based on the expiration of the contract of lease, a demand to vacate was not necessary
for judicial action after the expiration of the terms of the lease. There being no need for any demand or notice, there was likewise no
necessity to wait for five (5) days upon notice or demand before an action for unlawful detainer may be filed. [ Arquelada v. Philippine
Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 139137, March 31, 2000]
When the parties to an oral lease do not fix a specified period. Since the rentals were paid monthly, the lease, even if verbal,
may be deemed to be on a monthly basis, expiring at the end of every month. [Heirs of Suico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120615, January 21, 1997]
Demand is also not necessary when the action is filed for a sum of money, consisting of unpaid rents, liquidated damages,
attorney's fees, and costs. Intruders, not tenants of the owner, cannot use this remedy. [Guanson v. Ban, G.R. No. L-186, August 6,
1946]
The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant
from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. [Rule 70, Sec. 15]
When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. [Rule 70,
Sec. 16]
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and
shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building. [Rule 70, Sec. 18]
An adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary
consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material
possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. [Hilario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
121865, August 7, 1996]
The assertion by the defendant of ownership over the disputed property does not serve to divest the inferior court of its
jurisdiction. The defendant cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the property involved. [ Rural Bank
of Sta. Ignacia v. Dimatulac, G.R. No. 142015, April 29, 2003]
Ejectment; possession de facto; distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases.
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is:
who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does
not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the
issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to
possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas;
G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013
The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals (286 SCRA 437, 444-445 [1998]) is instructive on the means of staying the immediate
execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further
damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment
while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his
appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the
appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the
duty of the court in this respect being “ministerial and imperative.” Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to
file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a
supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond
should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal. In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond;
and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Herminia Acbang v. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr.,
et al.,G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014.
Defendant must take the following steps to stay the execution of the judgment:
1. Perfect an appeal;
2. File a supersedeas bond to pay for the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed
from; and
3. Deposit periodically with the RTC, during the pendency of the appeal, the adjudged amount of rent due under the contract
or if there be no contract, the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises. [ Rule 70, Sec. 19]
As a general rule, a judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him
arising from the loss of possession. To stay the immediate execution of the judgment while the appeal is pending, Sec. 19 of Rule 70
must be complied with. [Chua v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 437]
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply
with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints;
12. Interventions [Rule 70, Sec. 13]
3.19.13. Contempt
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is
a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a
body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. [Lorenzo
Shipping v. Distribution Association, 656 SCRA 331]
It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders but also conduct tending to bring the authority of
the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. [Siy v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158971, August 25, 2005]
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity, and
signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous,
an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for
disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that
there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Rivulet Agro-Industrial
Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B. Nieto, in their capacity as Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013
Kinds of contempt
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to
obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful
process or order of the court. [Narcida v. Bowen, 22 Phil. 365]
Purpose and nature of each
Function of contempt
Contempt proceedings has a dual function: (1) vindication of public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; and (2)
coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of
the parties to a suit awarded by the Court. [Regalado v. Go, 514 SCRA 616]
Direct Contempt
Direct contempt, or contempt in facie curiae, is misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge so as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, and can be punished summarily without
hearing. It is conduct directed against or assailing the authority and dignity of the court or a judge, or in the doing of a forbidden act.
[Encinas v. National Bookstore, G.R. No. 162704, July 28, 2005]
A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or
to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1)
day, or both, if it be a lower court. [Rule 71, Sec. 1]
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words in a pleading tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute. If a
pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge, it is direct contempt. [Re:
Letter dated 21 Feb. 2005 of Atty. Noel Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]
Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases of
contempt. “Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a
defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.” [Cruz v. Gigoyon, 658 SCRA 254]
Indirect Contempt
Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. [ Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority v. Rodriguez, 619 SCRA 176]
A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt;
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who,
after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or
in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt
under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a
court held by him. [Rule 71, Sec. 3]
1. The penalty for direct contempt depends upon the court which the act was committed.
2. If the act constituting direct contempt was committed against an RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank, the penalty is a
fine not exceeding P2,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 10 days, or both;
3. If the act constituting direct contempt was committed against a lower court, the penalty is a fine not exceeding P200 or
imprisonment not exceeding one day, or both; [Rule 71, Sec. 1] and
4. If the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet within the power of the respondent to perform, he
may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it.
5. A person adjudged in direct contempt may not appeal therefrom. His remedy is a petition for certiorari or prohibition directed
against the court which adjudged him in direct contempt. [Rule 71, Sec. 2] Pending the resolution of the petition for certiorari
or prohibition, the execution of the judgment for direct contempt shall be suspended. The suspension however shall take place
only if the person adjudged in contempt files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment. This bond is conditioned
upon his performance of the judgment should the petition be decided against him.
1) The punishment for indirect contempt depends upon the level of the court against which the act was committed;
2) Where the act was committed against an RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not
exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or both;
3) Where the act was committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding P5,000 or imprisonment
not exceeding one month, or both. Aside from the applicable penalties, if the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction,
TRO or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of the property
involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved; [Rule 71, Sec. 7] and
4) Where the act was committed against a person or entity exercising quasi-judicial functions, the penalty imposed shall
depend upon the provisions of the law which authorizes a penalty for contempt against such persons or entities.
5) The person adjudged in indirect contempt may appeal from the judgment or final order of the court in the same manner as
in criminal cases. The appeal will not however have the effect of suspending the judgment if the person adjudged in contempt does not
file a bond in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken. This bond is conditioned upon his performance of the
judgment or final order if the appeal is decided against. [Rule 71, Sec. 11]
Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu propio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in
the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the
court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. [ Rule 71,
Sec. 4]
Where to file?
Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such contempt has been committed against
a lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings
may also be instituted in such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner as provided in
section 11 of this Rule. [Rule 71, Sec. 5]
When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he
may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it. [Rule 71, Sec. 8]
It is only the judge, who orders the confinement of a person for contempt of court, who can issue the order of release
[Inoturan v. Limsiaco, Jr. 458 SCRA 48]
Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies
exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted
to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have
jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefor. [Rule 71, Sec. 12]
Labor arbiter and NLRC has power of contempt
As is clear under the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending
party or parties in direct or indirect contempt. The petitioners therefore, have not improperly filed the charge of indirect contempt in
the NLRC. [Robosa v. NLRC, G.R. No. 176085, February 8, 2012]
How commenced?
Indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of quasi-judicial bodies can only be done by initiating them in the proper RTC. It is not
within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. [Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, 408 SCRA 328]
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
DEFINITION:
“A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.” (Section (c),
Rule 1)
The term “special proceeding” may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides and the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.” (Natcher vs. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001)
A special proceeding, “by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,” has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. (Montañer vc CA, G.R. No.
174975, January 20, 2009)
The list under Section 1, Rule 72 is not exclusive. Any petition which has for its main purpose the establishment of a status,
right or a particular fact may be included as special proceeding. (Festin, Special Proceedings, A Foresight to the Bar Exam:
Question and Answer Noted, Bar Questions, Cases and Updated Laws, 2011)
What are some of the cases which are considered special proceeding?
No, by express provision of Sec. 5, Rule 2 which requires that the joinder of causes of action must not involve special civil
actions or actions governed by special rules, (which includes special proceedings)
We read with approval the CA’s use of statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogate generali, leading to the
conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section
11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed)
is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of
the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily. (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management
Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013)
A special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the entire estate of the deceased is obvious
and elementary ( Vda. De Reyes vs. CA, G.R. No. L-47027 January 27, 1989).
Probate of the will takes precedence over intestate proceedings: Effect if probate of the will is disapproved:
If in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it that the decedent had left a last
will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had
already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed but this is without prejudice to the fact that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as intestacy. (Uriarte vs CFI Of Negros, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970)
Insolvency proceedings end settlement of a decedent’s estate is both proceedings in rem which are binding the whole world.
Consequently, a liquidation of similar import or other equivalent general liquidation must also necessarily be a proceeding in rem so
that all interested persons whether known to the parties or not may be bound by such proceeding. (Philippine Savings Bank vs
Lantin, G.R. No. L-33929. September 2, 1983.)
The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person (probate
proceedings) where the gross value of the estate exceeds P300,000 and in Metro Manila where the gross value of the
estate exceeds P400,000. Where the gross value does not exceed P300,000 or P400,000 it would be the Municipal Trial
Court which would have jurisdiction. (BP 129 and RA 7691)
The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is
regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in
the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. (Uriarte vs CFI Of Negros, G.R. Nos.
L-21938-39 May 29, 1970)
The place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is
upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called
"venue". (Cuenco vs CA, G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973)
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does
not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. As it is merely constitutive of venue (Fule vs. CA, L-40502,
November 29, 1976).
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect. Moreover, it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in
a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. (Uriarte vs CA, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May
29, 1970)
Even assuming that there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts of the places where the decedent has
residences, the Regional Trial Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule 73). (Vda. De Chua vs CA. G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998)
Coverage on the extent of the power of the probate court: Issue of ownership not included:
The probate jurisdiction of the former court of first instance or the present regional trial court relates only to matters having to
do with the settlement of the estate and probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators,
executors, guardians and trustees and does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceeding. The parties concerned may choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience
in the preparation or presentation of evidence. (Ramos vs CA, G.R. No. 42108 December 29, 1989)
Jurisdiction of probate court to determine whether property belongs to conjugal partnership or exclusive ownership of
a party
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved —
whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to
be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings. (Leo C. Romero and David Amando C. Romero vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012)
It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and
dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action . (Vda. De Manalo vs. CA,
G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001)
The authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over the estate of deceased
individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective, cannot be treated with indifference nor
should it be ignored with impunity by the very parties invoking its authority. (Romero vs CA, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012)
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to (1) approve the sale of properties
of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; (2) to determine who are the heirs of the decedent; (3) the
recognition of a natural child; (4) the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of
an heir by the testator; and (5)to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights. (Romero vs CA, G.R. No. 188921, April
18, 2012)
While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said
complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding
precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of
Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs
must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, as in this case:
“Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must
take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot
make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.” (Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs.
Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. “Gaudioso E. Ypon,” and The Register of Deeds of Toledo City., G.R. No. 198680, July
8, 2013)
Nature of the determination of issue of ownership in probate not conclusive merely provisional:
The probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties. (Reyes vs Mosqueda, G.R. No. L-45262 July 23,
1990)
The jurisprudence and rule are both to the effect that the probate court "may" provisionally pass upon the question of
exclusion, not "should". The obvious reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result to inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. (Pio
Baretto vs. Aa, G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984)
It cannot but be conceded that the limited jurisdiction of a probate court prohibits it from determining rights to property left
by a decedent which depends on the contract (Goodin v. Casselman 200 N.W. 94, 51 N.D. 543).
However, actions of the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract entered
into by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of the latter's bid
to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate
(Rule 89, Revised Rules of Court).
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. "( De Leon vs. CA, G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002)
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. ( Romero vs CA,
G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012)
a) Orders the probate of the will of the decedent (Sec. 3, Rule 77);
b) Grants letters of administration of the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Sec. 5, Rule 79);
c) Supervises and control all acts of administration;
d) Hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Sec. 11, Rule 86);
e) Orders payment of lawful debts (Sec. 11, Rule 88);
f) Authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Sec. 2, Rule 89);
g) Directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Sec. 1, Rule 90);
h) Issue warrants and processes necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses or to carry into effect their orders and
judgments, and all other powers granted them by law (Sec. 3, Rule 73);
i) If a person defies a probate order, it may issue a warrant for the apprehension and imprisonment of such person until he
performs such order or judgment, or is released (Sec. 3, Rule 73).
"The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding
proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that
the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the
administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what properties,
rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. (De Leon vs CA, G.R. No. 128781, August
6, 2002)
The court acts as trustee and as such, should jealously guard the estate and see to it that it is wisely and economically
administered, not dissipated (Timbol vs. Cano, 111 Phil. 923, G.R. No. L-15445, April 29, 1961).
Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention to the fact that
certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear the observations, with
power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the
intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties. (De Leon vs CA, G.R.
No. 128781, August 6, 2002)
General rule:
When a person dies leaving property, the same should be JUDICIALLY ADMINISTERED and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one,
should he fail to name an executor therein. (Pereira vs CA, G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989)
Exceptions:
This court repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings (Fule vs CA, G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976)
If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other provisions
that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to
leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs. (Arcilla vs Montejo, G.R. No. L-21725, November 29, 1968)
It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs
have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should
not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. (Pereira vs CA, G.R. No. L-81147 June
20, 1989)
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all
the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then
minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity.
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. x x x (emphasis supplied). (Neri, at al. vs. Heirs
of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012)
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot
by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of
the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly
or by implication. (Sampilo vs CA, G.R. No. L-10474, February 28, 1958)
Two (2) year prescriptive period applies only persons who knew or participated in the extrajudicial settlement:
The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the
expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice
of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with. There is
nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third persons. (Sampilo vs CA,
G.R. No. L-10474, February 28, 1958)
If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for
partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a
condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the
register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as
certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4
of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2)
years after the death of the decedent. (Sec.1, Rule 74)
No bond is necessary when only real estate is involved because the lien as recorded is sufficient security for any claim which
may be filed under Sec 4, that is, when an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate.
An extrajudicial settlement despite the publication shall not be binding on any person who has not participated therein or who
had no notice of death of the decedent. this is because the procedure in section 1, rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding (Sampilo vs CA,
G.R. No. L-10474, February 28, 1958)
A SUMMARY SETTLEMENT is likewise NOT BINDING upon heirs or creditors who were not parties therein or had no knowledge
thereof.
a) The unpaid creditor MAY PROCEED against the bond by filing, WITHIN 2 YEARS, a motion for the payment of his credit in
the court wherein such summary settlement was had.
b) AFTER the lapse of the 2 year period, the creditor may NO LONGER proceed against the bond, BUT can institute an
ordinary action against the distributees within the statute of limitations.
3. Action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement on the ground of fraud should be filed within four years from the
discovery of fraud. (Regalado, 2008)
b) The 2-year lien upon the real property distributed by extrajudicial or summary settlement shall be annotated on the title
issued to the distributees and after 2 years will be cancelled by the register of deeds without need of court order (LRC Circular 143)
When does the prescriptive period of four (4) years begin to run?
Prescriptive period is 4 years. The period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of
the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said period had not
expired when the present action was commenced on November 4, 1958. (Gerona vs. De Guzman, Gr L-19060, 1964)
A judicial act whereby an instrument is adjudged valid and is ordered to be recorded. It is the statutory method of establishing
the proper execution of the instrument and giving notice of its contents. The probate of a will by the court having jurisdiction thereof is
considered as conclusive as to its due execution and testamentary capacity of the testator (Mercado vs. Santos, No. 45629, 22
September 1938).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-
42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86).
It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the
intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the two cases. (Roberts vs. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984)
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. (Maninang vs. CA, G.R.
No. L-57848 June 19, 1982)
Exceptions:
a) The heirs divide the estate according to the will; pay the creditors accordingly so that none of them may be prejudiced. By
permitting partition and division of estate without judicial proceedings would enable the heirs to take over their respective shares in the
inheritance without delay and thereby avoid expenses and waste (McMicking v. Sy Combieng, 21 Phil. 219)
b) No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court. We find, that the document may
be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 which reads as follows: Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by
an act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs . (Mang-Oy vs
CA, G.R. No. L-27421 September 12, 1986)
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribes by law. The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. (Nufable vs Nufable, G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999)
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e.,
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of
Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.)
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action to resolve title. (Pastor Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983)
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and
void and separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
(Nepomuceno vs CA, G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985)
An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari. And even assuming the existence
of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained,
particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang vs CA, G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982)
Doctrine of estoppels not applicable in probate proceedings:
Doctrine of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings as the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of
public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of
the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on
the pretext of estoppel. (Fernandez, Et Al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967)
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The
Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, Et Al., L-17091, September 30, 1963);
An INTERESTED PARTY is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate such as a creditor. (Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1398, G.R. No. L-23135 December 26, 1967)
a) Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo " are the death of the decedent, his
residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his
having left his estate in such province." (Cuenco vs CA, G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973)
e) Name of person having custody of will, if it has not yet been delivered to the court. (In The Matter Of The Petition To
Approve The Will Of Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011)
What are the grounds for the disallowance of a will? Nature? Issues to be resolved in the probate of a holographic will:
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to
probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary
acts of the decedent. (Ajero vs. CA, G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994)
Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding
the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established. (In The Matter Of The Petition
To Approve The Will Of Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011)
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code prescribes. (Art. 816 of the Civil Code)
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country
and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills . (De Perez vs. Tolete, G.R. No. 76714 June 2,
1994)
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled
by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin, 56 Scra
266 G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated
abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. (De Perez vs. Tolete,
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994)
When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is
had in both countries. (B.E. Johannes vs. Harvey, G.R. No. 18600, March 9, 1922)
That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal/ domiciliary administration,
while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person
dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable
for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs." (Testate Estate of Idonah Perkins vs Benguet Consolidated, G.R.
No. L-23145, November 29, 1968)
a) The will shall be treated as if originally proved and allowed in Philippine courts; (De Perez vs. Tolete, G.R. No. 76714
June 2, 1994)
b) Letters testamentary or administration with a will annexed shall extend to all estates of the Philippines;
c) After payment of just debts and expenses of administration, the residue of the estate shall be disposed of as provided by
law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country (Section 4, Rule 77).
1. Executor
2. Administrator
(a) Is a minor;
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
i.)drunkenness,
ii.) improvidence, or
Iii.)want of understanding or integrity, or
iv.) by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. (Section 1, Rule 78)
v.) Antagonistic Interest. "(I)n this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as
administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind of hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.". (Medina vs. CA,
G.R. No. L-34760, September 28, 1973)
The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty and discretion to determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to
serve as an executor. The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in
the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules of orders
of the court. (Matute vs. Court Of Appeals, No. L- 26751, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768, 784)
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to
dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. The curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to
dispose and as the rights granted by will take effect from the time of death, the management of his estate by the administrator of his
choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed any
longer. (RP vs. Marcos Ii, G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855, August 4, 2009)
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case
and it has been long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. (In The Matter Of The
Intestate Estate Of Cristina Aguinaldo- Suntay; Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, June
16, 2010)
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing
the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given
that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not
only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate . (Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay., G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012)
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the
interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly. (Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990)
When can the court appoint an administrator if the executor is disqualified, refused to assume the trust, etc.?
The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased who shall act as
representative not only of the court appointing him but also of the heirs and the creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its
discretion, the probate court may appoint one, two or more co-administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all
times to have different interests represented. (Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990)
Appointment of co-administrators:
Where the estate is large, to appoint two or more administrators of such estate to have different interests represented and
satisfied, and furthermore, to have such representatives work in harmony for the best interests of such estate. (Matute vs. CA, G.R.
No. 26751, January 31, 1969)
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate,
that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In
addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that “x x x [w]hen an executor or
administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x.”
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and
those interested therein. We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a
person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment.
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld
the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests
represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of
the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;(4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office. (Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs.
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay., G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012)
An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor ( Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 Off. Gaz. 1171).
The interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. In the case at bar, Petitioner’s interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed, through
a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally
adopted children — thus excluding petitioner who was the deceased’s sister, as an heir. (Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, G.R. No. L-
17759. December 17, 1962 )
Lack of interest is a ground for the dismissal of the action on the ground of lack legal capacity to sue:
Of course, since the opening sentence of the section requires that the petition must be filed by an interested person, it goes
without saying that a motion to dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, but rather on the
ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings. (Pilipinas Shell vs. Dumlao, G.R. No. 44888. February 7, 1992)
4.5. 4. POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; RESTRICTIONS ON THE POWERS:
1) To have access to, and examine and take copies of books and papers relating to the partnership in case of a deceased
partner;
2) To examine and make invoices of the property belonging to the partnership in case of a deceased partner;
3) To make improvements on the properties under administration with the necessary court approval except for necessary
repairs;
4) To possess and manage the estate when necessary:
5) To maintain in tenantable repairs houses and other structures and fences and to deliver the same in such repair to the
heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court.
The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which
can be waived or disregarded as it is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is
finally ordered closed and terminated, to the end that no part of the decedent's estate be left unaccounted for. The fact that the final
accounts had been approved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to require supplemental accounting. (Vda. De Chua vs. CA.
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998)
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an administrator
namely:
More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of
the decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator to:
(1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his
possession or knowledge;
(2) truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and
(3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be
authorized to receive them.
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether
regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him, therefore, it should not be
considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care,
management, and settlement of the estate. (Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010)
Order of preference in the appointment of regular administrator may be considered in the appointment of a special
administrator:
Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing
a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in
the estate of the decedent (Fule vs. CA, G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976)
The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of
a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
(Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010)
The Special Administrators that while they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to
the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth
administration, and its earliest settlement. (Corona vs. CA, G.R. No. L-59821 August 30, 1982)
The specific and limited powers of special administrators and that their appointment merely temporary and subsists only until
a regular administrator is duly appointed (since Rule 80, section 1 provides for the appointment of a special administrator as a
caretaker only "when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause") (Medina vs. Beda
Gonzales, G.R. No. L-34760 September 28, 1973)
The discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court but that is no authority for the judge to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment but such discretion must be
based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the
choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. (Fule vs. CA, G.R.
No. L-40502 November 29, 1976)
The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given
her by the testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1"), is entitled to the highest consideration.. (Corona vs CA, G.R. No. L-59821 August 30,
1982)
1.) neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or
2) neglects to perform an order or judgment of the court, or
3.) neglect to perfom a duty expressly provided by these rules, or
4.) absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or,
in its discretion, may permit him to resign. (Section 2, Rule 82)
Other grounds for the removal of the administrator discretionary upon the court:
The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules
at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. (Ocampo vs.
Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010)
Trial court’s action of removing administrator deserves respect by the appellate court except when there is an error or
grave abuse of discretion:
The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by said court, whose sensibilities are, in first place,
affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the
court. Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the matter of the
removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. (Matute vs. CA, No. L-
26751, January 31, 1969, 26 Scra 768, 784)
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it however must have
some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator
not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the
removal of the administrator. (Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990)
It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of administration is to terminate the authority of the
executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the revocation of the letters, will be
protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights acquired under a previous grant of administration. (Vda. De Bacaling
vs. Laguna, G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973)
The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010)
Upon the death of a person, all his property is burdened with all his debts, his death creating and equitable lien thereon for the
benefit of the creditors. Such lien continues until all debts are extinguished either by the payment, prescription, or satisfaction in one of
the modes recognized by law. (Sui Liong vs. Taysan, G.R. No. L-4777, November 11, 1908 )
Statute of non-claims:
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the
time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after
the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at anytime before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a
creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are
equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) months.
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the property to the person entitled to the same. (Heirs of
Pizarro vs. Consolacion, G.R. No. L-51278 May 9, 1988)
The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased
persons to enable the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate
court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion
in the due course of the administration. (Estate of Olave vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983)
1. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent;
2. All claims for funeral expenses;
3. All claims for expenses for the last sickness of the decedent; and
4. Judgment for money against the decedent. (Section 5, Rule 86)
The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is generally construed
to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have
been reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those founded upon contract. (Gutierrez vs. Baretto-Datu, G.R.
No. L-17175, July 31, 1962)
Actions that does not survives the death of the party: Rationale:
This situation brings to the fore a consideration of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules. ( Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court)
The Philosophy behind the rule which provides for the dismissal of the civil case is that, upon the death of defendant, all
money claims should be filed in the testate or interstate proceedings "to avoid useless duplicity of procedure." (Ignacio vs.
Pambusco., G.R. No. L-18936, May 23, 1967)
Money claims arising from contract against the estate is an action that survives:
Generally, death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation and only obligations that are personal
or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor as these claims are not actually
extinguished. (Stronghold Insurance vs. Republic-Asahi, G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006)
Claims for taxes may be collected even after the distribution of the decedent's estate among his heirs who shall be liable
therefor in proportion of their share in the inheritance. (Government of the Philippines vs. Pamintuan, 55 Phil. 13)
The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from the
application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain
availability are imperious need. (Vera vs. Hon. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-31364 March 30, 1979)
Claims against a deceased surety on the performance bond is a claim which survive:
Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond.
Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond. (Stronghold
Insurance vs. Republic-Asahi, G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006)
In Maclan v. Garcia, Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessary expenses he spent as possessor of a
piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as an heir of its previous owner, he set up the defense that this claim should have been filed in
the special proceedings to settle the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his claim arises from law and
not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the settlement of the estate of Garcia’s predecessor, as mandated by
Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86).
The court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-
contract. Citing Leung Ben v O’Brien, it explained that the term “implied contracts,” as used in our remedial law, originated from the
common law where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term
quasi-contract is included in the concept “implied contracts” as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the liabilities of the deceased
arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim depends on the possibility that
Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the
complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court. (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013)
Remedies of a creditor:
The contract made between the administrator and the lawyer does not bind the estate to such an extent that the lawyer can
maintain an action against it and recover a judgment which is binding upon it. In such a case the creditor has two remedies:
(1)He can prosecute an action against the administrator as an individual. If judgment is rendered against the administrator
and it is paid by him, when he presents his final account to the Court of First Instance as such administrator he can include the amount
so paid as an expense of administration. The creditor can also
(2) Present a petition in the proceeding relating to the settlement of the estate, asking that the court, after notice to all
persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration. Whichever course is adopted
the heirs and other persons interested in the estate will have a right to inquire into the necessity for making the contract and the value
of the work performed by the attorney." (Ramos vs. Bidin, G.R. No. L-53650 May 28, 1988)
Causal relation between the monetary claims and the acts of administration:
The rule is that where the monetary claim against the administrator has a relation to his acts of administration in the ordinary
course thereof, such claims can be presented for payment with the court where a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is
pending, although said claims were not incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and collectible after his death. (Quirino vs.
Gorospe, G.R. No. L-58797, January 31, 1989)
The proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale of
mortgaged of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale
or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written notice to all
the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. ( Aldamiz vs. CFI,
G.R. No. L-2360, December 29, 1949)
Action against a distributee of the debtor’s assets by the creditor based on monetary claims:
The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action against a distributee of the debtor's asset is under Section 5, Rule 88 of
the Rules of Court. The contingent claims must first have been established and allowed in the probate court before the creditors can
file an action directly, against the distributes, such is not the situation in the case at bar. (De Bautista vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-
28298 November 25, 1983)
Instances when the probate court can issue writ of execution: Exclusive:
The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue execution
(1) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the
decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88),
(2) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and
(3) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142)
Under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, above cited instances are the only circumstances when probate court
can issue a writ of execution. (Pastor, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983)
The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or administrator independently of the testate or intestate
proceedings are:
1) Recovery of real or personal property or any interest therein from the estate;
2) Enforcement of a lien thereon;
3) Action to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal; and
4) Action to recover damages for breach of contract entered into by the decedent, but committed by the administrator, which is
personal to him (Gutierrez vs. Barreto-Datu, G.R. No. L-17175, July 31, 1962).
Claim by the administrator against third person is by way of an action not by motion:
"When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the
court's jurisdiction, the demand cannot be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third
person." Matters affecting property under judicial administration may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate
proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced". (Dela Cruz vs. Camon, G.R. No. L-21034, April 30, 1966)
That "the assessment is deemed made when the notice to this effect is released, mailed or sent to the taxpayer for the
purpose of giving effect to said assessment." It appearing that the person liable for the payment of the tax, in this case the
administrator, did not receive the assessment, the assessment could not become final and executory. (RP vs. Dela Rama, G.R. No.
L-21108, November 29, 1966)
It is apparent that actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant survive the death of the latter. Under Rule
87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are:
(1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent;
(2) judgments for money; and
(3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied".
It is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied",
and these words (also used by the Rules in connection with attachments and derived from the common law) were construed to include
all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. (Aguas v.s Llemos, G.R. No. L-18107,
August 30, 1962)
Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are:
(1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate;
(2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and
(3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property.
Section 2 of Rule 87 of the same Rules, which also deals with administrators, states: “Sec. 2. Executor or administrator may
bring or defend actions which survive. - For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or
administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for causes which survive.”
When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper
representatives of the deceased (Go Chan vs. Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001)
(3) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of [31] and he is made a party
defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is
no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one
of the guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency
of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
(Rioferio vs. CA, G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004 )
4.7.2. REQUISITES BEFORE CREDITOR MAY BRING AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF PROPERTY FRAUDULENTLY
CONVEYED BY THE DECEASED
1) There is DEFICIENCY of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator for the payment of debts and expenses of
administration;
2) The deceased in his lifetime had made or attempted to make a FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE of his property or had so
conveyed such property that by law the conveyance would be void as against his creditors;
3) The subject of the attempted conveyance would be liable to ATTACHMENT in his lifetime;
4) The executor or administrator has shown NO DESIRE TO FILE the action or failed to institute the same within a reasonable
time;
5) LEAVE is granted by the court to the creditor to file the action;
6) A BOND is filed by the creditor;
7) The action by the creditor is in the NAME of the executor or administrator. (Section 10, Rule 87)
Power of supervision and control of the probate court over properties of the decedent:
The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings has
supervision and control over these properties and in compliance with this duty, the court also has the inherent power to determine
what properties, rights and credits of the deceased the administrator should include or exclude in the inventory. (Chua vs. Absolute
Management Corp., G.R. No. 144881, October 16, 2003)
Power to recover properties against third person belongs to the administrator not the court:
The trial court has no authority to decide whether the properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If
after such examination there is good reason to believe that the person examined is keeping properties belonging to the estate, then
the administrator should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same. (Chua vs. Absolute Management Corp., G.R. No.
144881, October 16, 2003)
Issuance of a writ of attachment must be for the protection of the estate not of the creditor:
Any writ of attachment necessary to secure the judgment must be related to the protection of the estate. The writ may not issue if only
to protect the personal interests of the private respondent as a creditor of that estate. (Gruenberg vs. CA, G. R. No. L-45948
September 10, 1985)
Administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. And
liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. (Luzon Surety vs
Quebrar, G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984)
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs. (Estate Of Ruiz vs. CA, G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996)
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or
(2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon
the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
(Castillo v. Castillo, 124 Phil. 485 [1966])
The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance. (Estate Of Ruiz vs. CA, G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996)
Declaration of heirs can be made even before the satisfaction of the obligation chargeable to the estate:
What the court is enjoined from doing is the assignment or distribution of the residue of the deceased's estate before the above-
mentioned obligations chargeable to the estate are first paid. Nowhere from said section may it be inferred that the court cannot make
a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction of these obligations. (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, G.R. No. L-17091,
September 30, 1963)
Determination of charges against the estate necessary before the distribution of legal share:
Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased
at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it, form there, the legitime of the compulsory heir or
heirs can be established; and it is only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. (Natcher
vs. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001)
Claim of the creditor of the heirs of the deceased may be collected from the share of the heir:
The creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to said
heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate succession have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the
heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. (Litonjua vs. Montilla, G.R. No.
L-4170, January 31, 1952)
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the power to determine the proportion or parts to
which each distributee is entitled . A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the heredity estate which the court
may accept or reject. It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. (Vda. De
Kilayko vs. Tengco, G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992)
In the case of Montemayor vs. Gutierrez (114 Phil. 95), an estate may be partitioned even before the termination of the administration
proceedings. Hence, the approval of the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the administration proceedings. (Luzon
Surety vs. Quebrar, G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984)
In order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure:
(1) there should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those
entitled thereto by will or by law, but
(2) such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances,
taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper.
(3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and
not of the court. (Palicte vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987)
It is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to
the residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs.
Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) (Jimoga-On vs. Belmonte, 84 Phil. 545, G.R. No. L-1605, September 13, 1949)
Order of distribution and delivery of the residue of the estate closes the settlement proceeding:
What brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons
entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. (PCIB vs. Escolin, G.R. Nos. L-27860 And L-27896
March 29, 1974)
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent
action. (Vda. De Alberto vs. Ca, G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989)
After approval of partition and distribution and receipt of share of the distributee forecloses attack o its validity:
Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of
such partition had fully been carried out, and the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they are precluded from
subsequently attacking its validity or any part of it. (Ralla vs. Judge Untalan, G.R. Nos. L-63253-54, April 27, 1989)
We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just
and legal distribution of the estate. In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. (Solivio vs. CA, G.R. No.
83484, February 12, 1990)
4.8.3. REMEDY OF AN HEIR ENTITLED TO RESIDUE BUT NOT GIVEN HIS SHARE:
Non-compliance of the order of distribution of estate does not terminate probate proceedings:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain
his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137 March 19, 1949, G.R. No. L-
852).
As a general rule, the better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a
proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action. (Solivio vs. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February
12, 1990)
In Solivio case, the proceeding were still pending, thus, the movant had lost her right to have herself declared as a co-heir in said
proceedings. Because she failed to pursue the motion in the same action but instead erroneously chose to file a separate action. Unlike
the circumstances present in the Guilas case where the estate proceedings had already been closed and terminated for three years,
thus, the separate action filed by the movant for the annulment of the project partition was allowed to continue.
Probate court generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders
usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the necessity of
resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment enforceable by execution. (Pastor, Jr. vs.
CA, G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983)
The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue execution
(1) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the
decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88),
(2) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and
(3) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142)
Under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, the above cited instances are the only circumstances when probate
court can issue a writ of execution. Clearly, the provision authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of estate. A legacy is not a
debt of the estate.(Pastor, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983)
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration
of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular
person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of
letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
4.9. TRUSTEES
What is a trust?
A trust is a confidence reposed in one person, called the trustee, for the benefit of another, called the cestui que trust, with respect to
property held by the former to the latter. The person in whom the confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another
is known as trustee. (Special Proceedings by Gemilito Festin, Second Edition, 2011, Page 134)
Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words
evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the
transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently
of the particular intention of the parties. (O’laco vs. Co Cho Chit, G.R. No. 58010. March 31, 1993.)
A resulting trust is one that arises by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the
intention as to which can be found in the nature of their transaction although not expressed in a deed or instrument of
conveyance. Upon the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust not created by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly,
evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but one that arises in order to satisfy the demands of justice. (Yap vs. CA, G.R. No.
133047. August 17, 1999)
Implied Trust may be established by parol evidence, Express Trust cannot. Even then, in order to establish an implied trust in real
property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an
authentic document. An implied trust, in fine, cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof. (Yap vs. CA, G.R. No.
133047. August 17, 1999)
Requisites to bar action by beneficiary against trustee which acquired title to the property by acquisitive prescription:
It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription a property entrusted to him unless he
repudiates the trust. Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the
recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon
is clear and conclusive. (Torbela vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528 G.R. No. 140553, December 7, 2011 )
As a rule, however, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear
and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. The presence of the following elements must be proved: (1) a
trustor or settlor who executes the instrument creating the trust; (2) a trustee, who is the person expressly designated to carry out the
trust; (3) the trust res, consisting of duly identified and definite real properties; and (4) the cestui que trust, or beneficiaries whose
identity must be clear. (CANEZO VS ROJAS, G.R. NO. 148788, NOVEMBER 23, 2007)
Executor/Administrator Trustee
Accounts are NOT under oath and except for initial and final
submission of accounts; they shall be filed only at such times as
Accounts must be UNDER OATH and filed ANNUALLY.
may be REQUIRED by the court.
May sell, encumber or mortgage property if it is necessary for the May sell or encumber property of estate held in trust if necessary
purpose of paying debts, expenses of administration or legacies, or expedient upon ORDER of the court.
or for the preservation of property or if sale will be beneficial to
heirs, legatees or devisees. (Upon APPLICATION to the court with
written NOTICE to the heirs.)
Order of sale has NO TIME LIMIT. Order of sale has NO TIME LIMIT.
Services of executor or administrator are terminated UPON Trusteeship is terminated upon TURNING OVER THE PROPERTY
PAYMENT OF DEBTS of the estate and distribution of property to to beneficiary after expiration of trust (period may be provided for
heirs. in the will or trust contract).
MUST PAY the debts of the estate. NO OBLIGATION to pay debts of beneficiary or trustor.
The following conditions shall be deemed a part of the bond whether written therein or not
1) INVENTORY. The trustee shall submit to the court an inventory of the personal and real estate belonging to him as trustee who
shall have come to his possession or knowledge.
2) MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION. The trustee shall manage and dispose of such estate and faithfully discharge his trust in relation
thereto.
3) ACCOUNT. The trustee shall render under oath at least once a year until his trust is fulfilled an account of the property in his hands
and of the management and disposition thereof.
4) SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS. The trustee shall settle his accounts and deliver the remaining estate in his hands to those entitled
thereto (S6 R98; Manuel R. Riguera – Special Proceeding Notes).
2) Removal of a trustee who is insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or evidently unsuitable therefore:
3) Resignation:
(1) Administration revoked if will discovered. Proceedings thereupon. If after letters of administration have been granted on
the estate of a decedent as if he had died intestate, his will is proved and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be
revoked and all powers thereunder cease, and the administrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to the court, and render his
account within such time as the court directs. Proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will
shall be as hereinbefore provided (Sec. 1, Rule 82).
(2) Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or
removal. If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order
or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or
administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court
grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any
suitable person (Sec. 2, Rule 82).
A trustee appointed by the RTC shall have the same rights, powers, and duties, and in whom the estate shall vest, as if he had been
appointed by the testator. No person succeeding to a trust as executor or administrator of a former trustee shall be required to accept
such trust. (Section 2, Rule 98)
In case of vacancy where the RTC has appointed a new trustee, such new trustee shall have and exercise the same powers, rights, and
duties as if he had been originally appointed, and the trust estate shall vest in him in like manner as it had vested or would have
vested, in the trustee in whose place he is substituted; and the court may order such conveyance to be made by the former trustee or
his representatives, or by the other remaining trustees, as may be necessary or proper to vest the trust estate in the new trustee,
either alone or
Jointly with the others. (Sec. 3, Rule 98)
4.10. ESCHEAT
What is escheat?
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims
abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without there being an interested person having a legal claim thereto. (Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R. No. 192413, June 13,
2012)
Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims
the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the
state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. (RP vs.
CA & Solano, G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002)
Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon respondents was a
jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for
want of jurisdiction. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead
of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other
claimants . Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res.]Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and constructive notice to all persons interested. (Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R. No. 192413, June 13,
2012)
It is not the intent of the law to force depositors into unnecessary litigation and defense of their rights, as the state is only
interested in escheating balances that have been abandoned and left without an owner.
x x x We reiterate our pronouncement that the objective of escheat proceedings is state forfeiture of unclaimed balances. x x x Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R. No. 192413, June 13,
2012)
When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the
same, the Solicitor General or his representative in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may file a petition in the Court of First
Instance of the province where the deceased last resided or in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Philippines, setting forth
the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated. (Section 1, Rule 91)
In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the status, custody, and ownership of the unclaimed balance to
determine whether the inactivity was brought about by the fact of death or absence of or abandonment by the depositor. If after the
proceedings the property remains without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be reverted to the state “to forestall
an open invitation to self-service by the first comers.” However, if interested parties have come forward and lain claim to the property,
the courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state. We
emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a
proceeding whereby the state compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is substantial ground for a belief
that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or without an owner. (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri
Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012)
Rule 91 of the Revised rules of Court, which provides that ONLY the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, may
commence escheat proceedings, did not take effect until January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases brought after they take effect,
and also all further proceedings in cases pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be
feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply. (Tan vs. City of Davao, G.R. No. L-44347
September 29, 1988)
In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person
alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and
oppose the petition for escheat. (RP vs. CA & Solano, G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002)
A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party
entitled to avail of the suit. There can be no doubt that private respondent bank falls under this definition for the escheat of the
dormant deposits in favor of the government would necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such deposits. (RP vs. CFI of Manila,
G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988)
The jurisdiction acquired cannot be converted into one for the distribution of the properties of the said decedents. For such
proceedings (for the distribution of the estate of the decedents) to be instituted, the proper parties must be presented and the
proceedings should comply with the requirements of the Rule. (Mun. of Magallon, Negros Occ. vs. Bezore, G.R. No. L-14157,
October 26, 1960)
Hence, insofar as banks are concerned, service of processes is made by delivery of a copy of the complaint and summons
upon the president, cashier, or managing officer of the defendant bank. [8] On the other hand, as to depositors or other claimants
of the unclaimed balances, service is made by publication of a copy of the summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the
locality where the institution is situated. A notice about the forthcoming escheat proceedings must also be issued and published,
directing and requiring all persons who may claim any interest in the unclaimed balances to appear before the court and show cause
why the dormant accounts should not be deposited with the Treasurer. (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri
Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012)
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or
constructive notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any
dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having
been observed. (RP vs. CA & Solano, G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002)
The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed
to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment.
(RP vs. CA & Solano, G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002)
4.11. GUARDIANSHIP:
Rules 92-97 of the Revised Rules of Court originally governs the Guardianship of a minor and incompetent both as to their person and
property. However, by virtue of Administrative matter no. 03-02-05 SC (AM no. 03-02-05 SC) , the Supreme Court retained in the
meantime Rule 92-97 to be applied only to Guardianship of an Incompetent other than a minor. Effectively, guardianship would be
treated in two parts, one pursuant to Administrative matter no. 03-02-05 SC which deals with Guardianship of Minors and the other
refers to the Guardianship of Incompetents under Rules 92-97.
Also, in Guardianship of Minors, it is the Family Court of the place where the minor resides or if a non-resident, with the Family Court of
the place where the minor’s property or part thereof is situated, which has jurisdiction over the guardianship proceeding. (as can be
gleaned from the provisions of RA 8369) On the other hand, with regard to Guardianship of Incompetents, it is the RTC of the
place where the incompetent resides or if a non-resident, with the RTC of the place where the incompetent’s property or part thereof is
situated, which has jurisdiction over the guardianship proceeding for such incompetent. (Special Proceedings: Annotations by
Herrera, 2007 Edition, page 232)
Purpose of guardianship?
A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as
well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care
and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. (Oropesa vs. Oropesa,
G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012)
Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae which is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that
power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most
beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who
cannot protect themselves." (De Leon vs. Lorenzo, Gr L-23096 April 27, 1972)
NATURAL GUARDIAN VS. JUDICIAL GUARDIAN : POWER TO DISPOSE OR ENCUMBER THE PROPERTY OF WARD
Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose
or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then
only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court. (Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia
D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas D. Neri, Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos and
Victoria D. Illut-Piala vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012)
1) Have the care and custody of his ward and the management of his estate or the management of the estate only, as the
case may be.(Sec.1)
2) Must pay debts of ward. (Sec. 2)
3) To settle accounts, collect debts and appear in action for ward. (Sec. 3)
4) Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. (Sec.4)
5) May be authorized by court to join in partition proceedings after hearing. (Sec. 5)
6) The guardian may file a complaint against anyone whom is suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away
the any property of the ward. (Sec. 6)
7) Must render to the court an inventory of the estate of his ward within three months after his appointment and annually
after such appointment; such inventories and accounts shall be sworn to by the guardian. (Sec. 7)
8) Upon the expiration of a year from the time of his appointment, and as often thereafter as may be required, a guardian
must present his account to the court for settlement and allowance. (Sec. 8)
Power of the parent/legal guardian over the property of the minor requires judicial power:
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor
children, does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval. The powers and
duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court are only powers
of possession and management. (Lindain vs. Ila, G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation
amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting
their rights as heirs of the deceased. (Guy vs. CA, G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006)
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the
ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property
clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the
guardian. (Parco & Bautista vs. CA, G.R. No. L-33152 January 30, 1982)
Conflict of interest has been held sufficient ground for removal, the court may exercise discretion to render a guardian unsuitable for
the trust. To the extent that a court uses its discretion in appraising whether a person is unsuitable or incapable of discharging his
trust, it can be said that removal is discretionary but such discretion must be exercised within the law, and when the latter has laid
down the grounds for removal of a guardian, discretion is limited to inquiring as to the existence of any of those grounds. (In The
Matter of Guardianship of Carmen Vda. De Bengson vs. PNB, G.R. No. L-17066, December 28, 1961)
It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the
guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since
the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. (Eduardo T. Abad vs. Leonardo Biason and Gabriel Magno.,
G.R. No. 191993, December 5, 2012)
Before an appointed guardian enters upon the execution of his trust, he shall give a BOND.
Conditions:
1) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete INVENTORY of all the estate of his ward which shall
come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession or knowledge of any other person for him;
2) To FAITHFULLY execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the estate according to these rules for the best interests
of the ward, and to provide for the proper care, custody, and education of the ward;
3) To Render a true and just ACCOUNT of all the estate of the ward in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and
of the management and disposition of the same, at the time designated by these rules and such other times as the court directs; and
at the expiration of his trust to Settle his accounts with the court and Deliver and pay over all the estate, effects, and moneys
remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto;
4) To PERFORM all orders of the court by him to be performed. (Section 1, rule 94)
The purpose of the bond is for the protection of the property of the minor or incompetent to the end that he may be assured of an
honest administration of his funds during his minority. The bond served as security to those interested in the property settlement of the
estate, and the parties interested acquire a vested interest in the bond which cannot be divested without their consent, except in a
manner prescribed by law (Special Proceedings, Herrera, 2005 Edition P. 281).
When required by statutes to give a bond, no person can qualify and acts as guardian without complying with this condition precedent.
The court should not grant letters of guardianship without requiring a bond. (Special Proceedings, Herrera, 2005 Edition P. 282)
4.11.3. RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OVER MINOR
SALIENT PROVISIONS UNDER THE RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (AM NO. 03-02-05 SC):
Father and mother as legal guardian of minor; court appointment not required:
The father and mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the person and property of their unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. The Rule shall be suppletory to the provisions of the Family Code on guardianship (Sec.
1, AM NO. 03-02-05 SC).
On grounds authorized by law, any relative or other person on behalf of a minor, or the minor himself if 14 years of age or over, may
petition the Family Court for the appointment of a general guardian over the person or property, or both, of such minor. The petition
may also be filed by the Secretary of DSWD and of the DOH in the case of an insane minor who needs to be hospitalized (Sec. 1, AM
NO. 03-02-05 SC).
The grounds for the appointment of a guardian over the person or property or both, of a minor are the following:
III. Who may be appointed guardian of the person or property or both of a minor (Section 6, AM NO. 03-02-05 SC)
In default of parents or a court-appointed guardian, the court may appoint a guardian of the person or property or both of a minor,
observing as far as practicable, in the following order of preference:
1) The surviving grandparent in case several grandparent survive, the court shall select any of them taking into account all relevant
considerations;
2) The oldest brother or sister of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified;
3) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; or
4) Any other person, who in the sound discretion of the court, would serve the best interest of the minor.
a) Moral character;
b) Physical, mental and psychological condition;
c) Financial status;
d) Relationship of trust with the minor;
e) Availability to exercise the powers and duties of a guardian for the full period of the guardianship;
f) Lack of conflict of interest with the minor; and
g) Ability to manage the property of the minor.
The court shall order a social worker to conduct a case study of the minor and all the prospective guardians and submit his report and
recommendation to the court for its guidance before the scheduled hearing. The social worker may intervene on behalf of the minor if
he finds that the petition for guardianship should be denied.
VI. When and How a Guardian of the Property for Nonresident Minor is Appointed; Notice
(Section 12, AM NO. 03-02-05 SC)
When minor resides outside the Philippines but has property in the Philippines:
1) Any relative or friend of such minor or anyone interested in his property, in expectancy or otherwise, may petition to the Family
Court for the appointment of a guardian over his property.
2) Notice of hearing shall be given to the minor by publication or any other means as the court may deem proper. The court may
dispense with the presence of the non-resident minor.
VII. Bond of Parents as Guardians of Property of Minor (Sec. 16, AM NO. 03-02-05 SC)
If the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, the parent concern shall furnish a bond in
such amount as the court may determine, but in no case less than 10% of the value of such property or annual income, to guarantee
the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
NOTE: A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the Family Court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the Family Court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding, in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the
obligations of general guardian shall be heard and resolved.
1. If upon petition by the person declared incompetent, or his guardian, relative, or friend, and after trial, it is judicially determined that
the person is no longer incompetent, his competency shall be adjudged and the guardianship shall cease. (Section1, Rule 97).
2. The guardianship may also be terminated when it appears that the guardianship is no longer necessary. (Section 3, Rule 97)
When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or is found thereafter to be unsuitable, or has wasted
or mismanaged the property of the ward, or has failed to render an account or make a return for thirty days after it is due, the court
may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him as such and require him to surrender the property of the ward to the person
found to be lawfully entitled thereto.
The court may allow the guardian to resign for justifiable causes.
Upon the removal or resignation of the guardian, the court shall appoint a new one.
No motion for removal or resignation shall be granted unless the guardian has submitted the proper accounting of the property of the
ward and the court has approved the same.
Upon termination of the trust, it is the duty of the guardian to render a true and Just account of all the property of the ward in his
hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same, at the time designated
by this rule and such other times as the court directs; and at the expiration of his trust, to settle his accounts with the court and deliver
and pay over all the property, effects, and monies remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person lawfully
entitled thereto, as provided for in Section 14, par. C of AM No. 03-02-05 SC.
4.12. ADOPTION:
What is adoption?
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to
a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation. (IN RE: Stephanie Garcia, GR 148311, March 31, 2005)
Formerly, Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor and was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the
consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood
relationship. The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement
of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. (Daoang vs. CA, G.R.
No. L-34568 March 28, 1988)
at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a (b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the
position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the adoption;
means of the family. (Waived when adopter is a biological parent of
the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent) (c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and
responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and
has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited
ALIEN: counselor in his/her country;
Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: (d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, (e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) (f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption to give the necessary moral values and example to all his
and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, children, including the child to be adopted;
that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular (g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied
office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to
implement the provisions of this Act;
his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: (h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has
diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly
authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed
Exception to the Requirements on residency:: under his/her national laws; and
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the (i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable
Philippine laws.
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
GUARDIAN:
The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Trial custody is IN THE PHILIPPINES for 6 months (but court may Trial custody is IN THE COUNTRY OF ADOPTER for 6 months
reduce period or exempt parties from trial custody). and is mandatory before a decree of adoption is issued.
ADOPTEE: Legitimate or illegitimate CHILD of a spouse or even a ADOPTEE: Only a CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE for domestic
person who is OF LEGAL AGE may be adopted. adoption may be the subject of inter-country adoption.
ANNEXES: Income tax returns, police clearance, character ANNEXES: Income tax returns, police clearance, character
reference, family picture, birth certificate of adopter are NOT reference, family picture, birth certificate of adopter are
REQUIRED to be annexed in the petition. REQUIRED to be annexed in the petition.
Decree of adoption issued by FC which has jurisdiction over case. Decree of adoption issued by a FOREIGN COURT.
1.) Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
2.) The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled
to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this
end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
3.) In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern. (Section 16-18 of RA 8552)
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This
is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. (IN RE: Stephanie
Garcia, GR 148311, March 31, 2005)
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a
grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. (RP vs.
Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996)
The adoptee may use the surname of the adopter. The minor cannot bear adopter's surname as a married woman, for her husband
has not joined in the petition for adoption and cannot join it, because he has children by a previous marriage and to allow the minor to
adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter (where the husband had not), would mislead the public into believing that she
(adoptee) has also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. (Suarez vs.. Republic, L-20914 December 24, 1965).
As provided in Section 19 of RA 8552 or the Domestic Adoption act, upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded
on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s):
(a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
(c) sexual assault or violence; or
(d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Adopter cannot rescind the adoption, but he can forfeit some benefits of the adoptee:
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases
where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. It is noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons
cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child e.g. valid disinheritance (Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R.
No. 143989, July 14, 2003)
Inter-Country Adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreign national or a Filipino citizen
permanently residing abroad. (Section 3 (a) RA 8043)
When allowed?
1) Inter-country adoptions are allowed when the same shall prove beneficial to the child’s best interests, and shall serve and protect
his/her fundamental rights (Sec. 2).
2) It is allowed when all the requirements and standards set forth under RA 8043 are complied with.
3) Maximum number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years.
1) Filing of petition with the Family Court of the place where the prospective adoptive parents reside – The petition may
also pray for a change of name of the child.
2) Order of Hearing – No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social worker has made a CASE STUDY of
the adoptee, adopter and the biological parents (Sec. 11).
A copy of the order of hearing shall be published at least once a week for 3 successive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation.
At the discretion of the court, copies of the order shall also be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General. If a
change of name of the adoptee is prayed for in the petition, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
3) Child and Home Study Report – The social worker shall verify with the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the
adoptee.
4) Hearing – It shall be held within 6 months from the date of issuance of the order.
In case of application for change of name, hearing shall be held within 4 months after the last publication of notice
nor within 30 days prior to an election.
5) Supervised Trial Custody – No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the adopters have been given by the court a
supervised trial custody period for at least six (6) months (Sec. 12).
6) Decree of Adoption – After the publication of the order of hearing and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, a decree
of adoption shall be entered stating the name by which the child is to be known which shall take effect as of the date the original
petition was filed EVEN if petitioners die before its issuance.
An amended birth certificate shall be issued. The original birth certificate shall be stamped "cancelled" and shall be sealed in
the Civil Registry records.
The new birth certificate to be issued to the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue (Sec. 14). (A.M. No. 02-
6-02-SC)
IN CASE OF RESCISSION/REVOCATION
Venue:
The petition shall be filed with the Family Court of the city or province where the adoptee resides.
The adoptee, if incapacitated, must file the petition for recission or revocation of adoption within five (5) years after he reaches the age
of majority, or if he was imcompetent at the time of the adoption, within five (5) years after recovery from such incompetency.
(Section 20 and 21 of RA A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC)
The best interests of the minor and shall give paramount consideration to his material and moral welfare. The best interests of the
minor refer to the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security
of the minor encouraging to his physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the minor (Sec. 14[[A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC 2003-04-22]].
It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to
deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in
adoption. ( Landingin vs. Republic, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006)
Writ of habeas corpus is an order issued by the court commanding a person in custody of another to produce the body of the
person on the place, date and time specified therein.
The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. The
restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ must be more than a mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical.
(Felipe Gonzales vs.. Viola, G.R. No. L-43195, August 23, 1935)
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding,
(a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person,
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. (Feria vs. CA, G.R. No. 122954, February
15, 2000)
Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on
his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;
(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or
person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the
remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear. ( Section 3, Rule 102)
* In paragraph b, or, if both persons are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation,
and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended.
* In paragraph d, a copy of the commitment or cause of detention should set forth, if it can be procured without impairing the
efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear. (FEU bar reviewer,
remedial law 2014, page 153-154)
When the person to be produced is imprisoned or restrained by an officer, the person who makes the return shall state therein, and in
other cases the person in whose custody the prisoner is found shall state, in writing to the court or judge before whom the writ is
returnable, plainly and unequivocably:
a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or under restraint;
b) If he has the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, the authority and the true and whole cause thereof, set forth at
large, with a copy of the writ, order, execution, or other process, if any, upon which the party is held;
c) If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and is not produced, particularly the nature and gravity of the sickness
or infirmity of such party by reason of which he cannot, without danger, be brought before the court or judge;
d) If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, and has transferred such custody or restraint to another,
particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer was made (Sec. 10).
Peremptory writ of habeas corpus, is one which unconditionally commands the respondent to have the body of the detained
person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary
citation or one which merely requires the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted.
(Lee Yick Hon vs. Insular Collector Of Customs, G.R. No. L-16779, March 30, 1921)
Ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of
certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be considered subservient to procedural
limitations which glorify form over substance. (39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 13, 486-488)
It must be kept in mind that in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction,
the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but not the record," while the latter assails directly the
judgment and "reaches the record but not the body." (Velasco vs. CA G.R. No. 118644 July 7, 1995)
Section 4, Rule 102 provides: If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record , and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. (In Re Ashraf Kunting,
G.R. No. 167193, April 19, 2006)
4.13.6. DISTINGUISH FROM WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA (See matrix of distinctions between Habeas Corpus,
Amparo and Habeas Data)
4.13.7. RULES ON CUSTODY OF MINORS AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN RELATION TO CUSTODY OF MINORS (A.M.
NO. 03-04-04-SC)
CUSTODY OF MINORS
Petition for custody of minor falls within the jurisdiction of the Family Court:
A petition for the custody of minors is also provided in Rule 99, Section 1 which provides for a petition for adoption. The petition for
custody of children is now within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Family Courts, as provided in Republic Act No. 8369, Section 5(b)
[Family Courts Act of 1997].
Under Article 213, second paragraph of the Family Code, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. This rule, however, is not absolute. (Espiritu vs. Court Of Appeals, G.R. No.
115640, March 15, 1995; Orda vs. Court Of Appeals, G.R. No. 92625, December 26, 1990; Luna vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, No. L-68374, June 18, 1985)
Right to the custody required in a petition for writ of habeas corpus of minors:
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. (Tijing vs. CA,
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001)
Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom
they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners
cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor. (Tijing vs. CA, G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001)
Sec. 10 of the DNA Evidence Rule (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, October 15, 2007) provides for the rule on the post-
conviction DNA Testing results and the remedy if favorable. It states that:
“SEC. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict.— The convict or the
prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction
DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In case the court, after due hearing, finds the petition to be meritorious, it
shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is
justified for a lawful cause. A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with
any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and
issue the appropriate orders.”
4.14.1. COVERAGE
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of (1) "EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS" and (2) "ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCES," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are
"killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." (Secretary of Defense vs.
Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008)
Confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enfroced disappearances
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats
thereof.Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and
security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no
longer imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character
of the writ, thus:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of
and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure Amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.(Emphasis supplied.) (RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA
and ARTURO LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL
ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012)
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life,
liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme
Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such
as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
xxx
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this
rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to
certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
is seriously misplaced. (Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O.
Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013)
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rulemaking powers in response to the alarming rise in the
number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation of
impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent
punishment of the perpetrators. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Court has previously held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary
remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary
character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Hence, every petition for the
issuance of the writ is required to be supported by justifying allegations of fact on the following matters:
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name
is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs. (In the Matter
of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Lilibeth Ladaga Vs. Major General Reynaldo
Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al./In the Matter of the
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Angela A. Librado-Trinidad Vs. Major General
Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al.In the
Matter fo the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Carlos Isagani T. Zarate Vs. Major
General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al.
G.R. No. 189689/G.R. No. 189690/G.R. No. 189691, November 13, 2012)
Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter action can more
adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of amparo as a curative
remedy is to facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators. (RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and
ARTURO LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL
ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012)
It is PREVENTIVE in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is CURATIVE in that it facilitates
the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the
goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
(Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008)
4.14.2. DISTINGUISH FROM HABEAS CORPUS AND HABEAS DATA (See matrix of distinctions between Habeas Corpus,
Amparo and Habeas Data)
Procedures
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It
is initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. The
judge or justice then makes an “immediate” evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted “with the
attendant circumstances detailed”. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss
the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner’s right to lie liberty or security
is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive
judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds
for more permanent protection and interim relies are necessary.
The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the
responsive pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside form identifying the issues in the case,
Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity
of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition;
(iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and
time of death or disappearance as well as any patter or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (v)
bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the
means and methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.
There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are
warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within
ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper
ans appropriate. The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough o that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions
taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures
have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and
security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through
consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary
remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights. (Secretary Leila M. De Lima,
Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528.
February 19, 2013)
4.14.4. WHO MAY FILE
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Writ of amparo not available in case of demolition of dwelling of squatters by final judgment:
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality, is not
included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made
available. (Canlas vs. Napico, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008)
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or
relative of the aggrieved party.
The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without
reason—"to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for Amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party." (Boac, Et.Al. vs. Cadapan & Empeno, G.R. Nos. 184461-62 , May 31, 2011)
Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands
- requires that every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the
supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Tapuz vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008)
Allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough
x x x for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation. x x x (Egardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising vs. Virginia Pardico,
for and in behalf in representation of Benhur Pardico., G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012)
In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in
an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.[ Thus, this Court held in its Resolution in Razon v. Tagitis:
Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer a problem in
that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when they
escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains missing more than two years after his
reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the continuing threat to the
brothers’ right to security; the brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for their enforced disappearance were still at
large and had not been held accountable, the former were still under the threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even
killed, which threat constituted a direct violation of their right to security of person. (Emphasis supplied.) (RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA,
JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA,
AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012)
Issuance of writ cannot be justified in the absence of continuing restraint on a person’s liberty
As previously discussed, there is no basis to grant Lozada the privilege of the writ of amparo, considering that the illegal restraint
alleged in this case had already ceased and there is no imminent or continuing restriction on his liberty . In Castillo v. Cruz, this Court
held as follows:
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any
evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that
there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot
be justified. (Emphasis supplied.) (RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO, *
G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012)
Actual threat from all the facts and circumstances of the case can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under
the rule on the writ of amparo
The alleged threat to herein petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security must be actual, and not merely one of supposition or with the
likelihood of happening. And, when the evidence adduced establishes the threat to be existent, as opposed to a potential one, then, it
goes without saying that the threshold requirement of substantial evidence in Amparo proceedings has also been met. Thus, in the
words of Justice Brion, in the context of the Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and
circumstances of the case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. (In the Matter of
the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Lilibeth Ladaga Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu,
Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al./In the Matter of the Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Angela A. Librado-Trinidad Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding
General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al.In the Matter fo the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in Favor of Carlos Isagani T. Zarate Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the
Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al. G.R. No. 189689/G.R. No. 189690/G.R. No. 189691, November 13,
2012)
Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting
affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:
a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or
persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party;
and
d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken:
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. (Section 9, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte (Section 12, A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC )
First the insistence on filing an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to
those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
xxx
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the
hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually
required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions
in facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the writ of Amparo. (Secretary Leila M. De Lima,
Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528.
February 19, 2013
The respondent must plead all his defenses in the return. Failure to do so shall operate as a waiver of such defense not therein
pleaded. (Section 10, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
SUMMARY HEARING (Sec. 13) - The hearing on the petition shall be summary in nature. However, the court, justice or judge may
call for a preliminary conference. It shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions for habeas corpus.
This Rule on Writ of Amparo shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. (Section 21, A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC)
When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be
available by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the
writ of Amparo. (Section 22, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
4.14.11. CONSOLIDATION:
When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be
consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. (Section 23
of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
Interim Reliefs for Petitioner: Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant
any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private
institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in
Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or
judge.
(b) Inspection Order. — The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession
or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses
having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge
may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or
violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of
making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five
(5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession,
custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in
digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their
inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court,
justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions
capable of keeping and securing their safety.
Interim Reliefs to Respondent: Upon verified motion of the respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue
an inspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section.
A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge
of the defenses of the respondent. (Section 14-15 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
The “Decision” dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is appealable under
Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. x x x
This “Decision” pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not
the judgment under Section 18. The “Decision” is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection,
production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders
are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.( Secretary
Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B.
Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013)
Difference between the privilege of the writ of amparo and the actual order called the writ of amparo.
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The
privilege includes the availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the rule on the Writ of Amparo. After
examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
detail the required acts from the respondent that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or threat to the petitioner’s life,
liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants “the privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to
intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real
and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as “granting the privilege of the Writ
ofAmparo.” (Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013)
Section 17 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides that the parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent
who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee
cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
Requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to petitioner
x x x The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or even administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of the writ was correctly applied by
this Court. x x x (IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA,
LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS,
COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name
"HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN,respondents G.R. No. 191805)
Substantial evidence required to warrant a finding that the state has violated amparo
The Court may be more yielding to the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence and logical inferences, but substantial
evidence is still the rule to warrant a finding that the State has violated, is violating, or is threatening to violate, amparo petitioners'
right to life, liberty or security. (In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Lilibeth
Ladaga Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et
al./In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Angela A. Librado-Trinidad Vs. Major
General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al.In the Matter fo
the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Carlos Isagani T. Zarate Vs. Major General Reynaldo
Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al. G.R. No. 189689/G.R. No.
189690/G.R. No. 189691, November 13, 2012)
Thus, in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable Amparo
petitioners to meet the required amount of proof showing the State's direct or indirect involvement in the purported violations and
found it a fair and proper rule in amparo cases “to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality” and “to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced.” Put simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the rules for as
long as it satisfies “the most basic test of reason – i.e., relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other
pieces of adduced evidence. (In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Lilibeth Ladaga
Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al./In the
Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Angela A. Librado-Trinidad Vs. Major General
Reynaldo Mapagu, Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al.In the Matter fo the
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Carlos Isagani T. Zarate Vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu,
Commanding General of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division, et al. G.R. No. 189689/G.R. No. 189690/G.R. No.
189691, November 13, 2012)
Writ of Amparo is swift, it is resolved through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs
under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine
experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The
remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence (Secretary of
Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008)
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be
granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
(MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos
Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte., G.R.
No. 19636, July 24, 2012)
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy,
thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology. (Meralco vs Lim, G.R. No. 18476, October 5, 2010)
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules. (Meralco vs
Lim, G.R. No. 18476, October 5, 2010)
1) Find out the information collated about him, particularly by law enforcement agencies, and
4.15.3. DISTINGUISHED FROM HABEAS CORPUS AND AMPARO (See matrix of distinctions between Habeas Corpus,
Amparo and Habeas Data)
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable. (Section 6, A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
It must be stressed, however, that such “threat” must find rational basis on the surrounding circumstances of the case. In this
case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the
military’s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him
to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and habeas data,
in the petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent
and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds. (In the matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and the writ
of Habeas Data in favor of Francis Saez, petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22Nn MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ,
CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN
CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A
CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, respondents, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012)
In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data
is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner made specific allegations relative to his personal circumstances and those of the
respondents. The petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which are allegedly violative of his rights and the participation of some of
the respondents in their commission. As to the prerequisite conduct and result of an investigation prior to the filing of the petition, it
was explained that the petitioner expected no relief from the military, which he perceived as his oppressors, hence, his request for
assistance from a human rights organization, then a direct resort to the court.
Anent the documents sought to be the subject of the writ of habeas data prayed for, the Court finds the requirement of
specificity to have been satisfied. The documents subject of the petition include the order of battle, those linking the petitioner to the
CPP and those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence reports making references to him. Although the exact locations and the
custodians of the documents were not identified, this does not render the petition insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data is clear that the requirement of specificity arises only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known.
The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. Thus, despite the
lack of certain contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under
exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to outright dismissal.
From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations stated in the petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data filed conform to the rules. However, they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept “hook, line and sinker”, so
to speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a different matter altogether. (In the
matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and the writ of Habeas Data in favor of Francis Saez, petitioner vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22Nn MICO, CAPT.
LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT
ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT.
ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY
GOMEZ, respondents, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012)
The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the
writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the
following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of information
of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of the petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its
collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information; and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. (Section 10, A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in
question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to
its nature or privileged character. (Section 12, A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
4.15.7. CONSOLIDATION
When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be
consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. (Section 21, A.
M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available
to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data. (Section 22, A. M.
No. 08-1-16-SC)
The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
(Section 20, A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
As to the Writ of Habeas Data, it is indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the
case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. (Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010)
Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore,
cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus
of proving his case. “Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence. (In the matter of
the petition for the writ of Amparo and the writ of Habeas Data in favor of Francis Saez, petitioner vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22Nn MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE
BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT.
JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY
OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ,
respondents, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012)
Compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be accorded primacy
Among the grounds cited by the CA in denying the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data was the
defective verification which was attached to the petition. In Tagitis, supporting affidavits required under Section 5(c) of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo were not submitted together with the petition and it was ruled that the defect was fully cured when the petitioner and
the witness personally testified to prove the truth of their allegations in the hearings held before the CA. In the instant case, the
defective verification was not the sole reason for the CA’s denial of the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas
data. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that although rules of procedure play an important rule in effectively administering justice,
primacy should not be accorded to them especially in the instant case where there was at least substantial compliance with the
requirements and where petitioner himself testified in the hearings to attest to the veracity of the claims which he stated in his petition.
To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be accorded primacy. In the proceedings
before the CA, the petitioner himself testified to prove the veracity of his allegations which he stated in the petition. Hence, the defect
in the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to the petition was deemed cured. (In the
matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and the writ of Habeas Data in favor of Francis Saez, petitioner vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22Nn MICO, CAPT.
LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT
ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT.
ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY
GOMEZ, respondents, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012)
WRIT OF HABEAS
WRIT OF AMPARO WRIT OF HEAS DATA
CORPUS
DATE OF
July 1, 1997 October 24, 2007 February 2, 2008
EFFECTIVITY
4.16.1. DIFFERENCES UNDER RULE 103, R.A. NO. 9048 AND RULE 108
Cancellation or Correction of
Name of Law Change of Name Clerical Error Law
Entries in the Civil Registry
What to File A signed and verified petition. File a verified petition for the File an affidavit.
cancellation or correction of
any entry.
Sources and Legal Basis: RULE 103, RULE 108 AND RA 9048, Special Proceedings 2011 by Gemilito Festin
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname . – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion. (Section 4, Rule 108)
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status . RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. (Silverio vs. CA G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007)
The reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and
recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security; and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees
to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading". Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name.
(RP vs. Hon. Marcos & Pang Cha Quen, G.R. No. L-31065, February 15, 1990)
An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother’ surname, and does not
have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such and it is only when the
illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or
private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname.
(RP vs. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007)
4.17. ABSENTEES
The law (see Articles 381, 382 and 383) requires the judge to appoint a representative for the absentee precisely to safeguard the
property or interest of the latter. It is thus imperative that the declaration of absence be for a specific purpose, and that purpose can
be no other than the protection of the interest or property of the absentee. (In Re Petition for Declaration Of Absence Of
Roberto Reyes vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. L-32026 January 16, 1986)
There must be an immediate necessity for the representation of the absentee in some specific urgent matters. (Castan
Commentary)
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered
by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code) The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to
place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings.
(Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80)
A perusal of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court on absentees reveals that it is based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on
absence. And the reason and purpose of the provisions of the New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to 396) are:
a) Spouse present;
b) Heirs instituted in a will;
c) Relatives who would succeed intestate;
d) Those who have over the absentee’s property some right subordinated to the condition of his death.
a) After the lapse of two (2) years from his disappearance or since the receipt of the last news about the absentee; or
b) After the lapse of five (5) years from such disappearance, if the absentee has left a person to administer his property. (Section 2,
Rule 107)
Title XI of the Family Code is entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW contains the following provision, inter
alia:
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Art.
238, Title XI of the Family Code)
There is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a
special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary
ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s order sufficed. ( RP vs CA, G.R. No. 163604. May 6,
2005)
Article 412 of the New Civil Code is the only substantial law covering the alteration or correction of entries in the civil register
which alteration or correction can only be effected through a judicial order.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a
strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be
corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected
by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy., G.R. No. 198010, August 12,
2013)
Changes in the citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate or from married to not married are substantial as
well as controversial, which can only be established in an appropriate adversary proceeding. (Rosales vs Castillo-Rosales, G.R. No.
L-31712 September 28, 1984)
Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and
by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. What is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and
corrections in entries of the civil register. (Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001)
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon
the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in
the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but
to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if
he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be
cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested
parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is
no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out. (Republic of
the Philippines vs. Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy., G.R. No. 198010, August 12, 2013)
4.18.1. ENTRIES SUBJECT TO CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION UNDER RULE 108, IN RELATION TO R.A. NO. 9048
1. Births
2. Marriages
3. Deaths
4. Legal separations
5. Judgments of annulments of marriage
6. Judgments of declaration of nullity of marriage
7. Legitimations
8. Adoptions
9. Acknowledgments of natural children
10. Naturalization
11. Election, loss or recovery of citizenship
12. Civil interdiction
13. Judicial determination of filiation
14. Voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
15. Changes of names (Section 2, Rule 108)
The civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by such correction or cancellation shall be
made parties (Section 3, Rule 108).
1) Correction of clerical or typographical errors in any entry in civil registry documents, EXCEPT corrections involving the change in sex,
age, nationality and status of a person.
2) Change of a person's first name in his/her civil registry document under certain grounds specified under the law through
administrative process. (Civil Registration - Primer for RA 9048).
“A clerical or typographical error” refers to an obvious mistake committed in clerical work, either in writing, copying, transcribing,
or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as a misspelled name or misspelled place of birth and the
like, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records. (Section 2, RA 9048)
A person’s first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. No law allows the change of an entry in the birth
certificate of petitioner as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment of the applicant. Also, all entries in the birth certificate of petitioner
were correct since the sex of a person is determined at birth (Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, Oct. 22, 2007).
a) Birth date;
b) month
c) gender except sexual reassignment;
4.18.3 CONSTITUTION OF FAMILY HOME: RULES ON CONSTITUTION OF FAMILY HOMES, FOR PURPOSES OF
EXEMPTION FROM EXECUTION
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family
home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be
family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same was
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a
family home. (SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and
MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS., G.R. No. 185064,
January 16, 2012)
Generally, in the absence of statutory provisions directing otherwise, any order, judgment or decree of the probate court
capable of being enforced, or taking effect without further order, may be appealed from; and that no action of the probate court can
be appealed from which requires a subsequent order or judgment to give it effect. (Woerner, The American Law of
Administration, Vol. 3, pp. 1860-61.)
An order directing one to appear and submit to an examination touching any property in his possession belonging to an intestate,
otherwise, he shall be committed to prison, is APPEALABLE. (Intestate of the deceased Kaw Singco (alias Co Chi Seng) vs.
Quirico Abeto G.R. No. L-47631 April 25, 1941)
An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
While under the concept in ordinary civil actions some of the orders stated in Sec. 1 may be considered interlocutory, the nature of
special proceedings declares them as appealable orders, as exceptions to the provisions of Sec.2, Rule 41. Thus:
a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or the Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
b) Petition for review. The appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
c) Petition for review on certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the SC by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may permit the part of
the estate not affected by the controversy or appeal to be distributed among the heirs or legatees, in accordance with the Rule 90.
(Section 2, Rule 109)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART III
Criminal Procedure
Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. (Isip vs People)
Criminal Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts as Special Agrarian Courts; jurisdiction in criminal offenses for violation
of RA No. 6657 is excluded from the power of DAR
Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of
cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving
the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power
conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted
jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. (LBP vs. Belista)
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level
courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that "hold- departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." (Mondejar vs. Buban)
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneous or separately with the
Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the libellous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. (Mary Rose A. Boto vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena, A.C. No.
9684, September 18, 2013)
Venue in estafa
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed
outside its limited territory. The prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the
identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, the
prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under sec. 1(b) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code (“RPC”) was committed
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The Affidavit of
Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed, and there is nothing in the
documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. Although
the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the
offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the
Regional Trial Court of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. ( Hector Trenas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195002, January
25, 2012)
5.1.1. Distinguish jurisdiction over subject matter from jurisdiction over person of the
Accused
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Foz vs. Fajardo)
Requisites:
1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter – is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong (Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil 484); by virtue of the imposable penalty or its nature, is one which the court is
by law authorized to take cognizance of; conferred by law.
2. Jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed – the offense must have been committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court; jurisdiction over the territory; cannot be waived
3. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused – the person charged with the offense must have been brought to its presence
for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court
In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others,
officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. (People vs. Sandiganbayan)
The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its
investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the
determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case,
given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call. (Jesse Philip B. Eijan Santos vs. Special
Presidential Task Force 156, represented by Atty. Allan U. Ventura, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014)
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the Office of the Ombudsman has “primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the Government, the investigation of such cases.” This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other
investigative bodies. This means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-
equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal
power. (DOJ vs. Liwag)
The Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the court not to interfere with
the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are supported by substantial evidence.
(Presidential Fact Finding vs. Desierto)
General rule: Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction
Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate otherwise (Antonino vs. Ombudsman)
General rule:
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is
confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
Exceptions
There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka vs. Enrile, 74 as
follows:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-
19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
(Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104
SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-2579S, October 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
The careless inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives flesh to the bone of contention of
petitioners that the instant case in a matter of persecution rather than prosecution (Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr. Et Al. Vs. Magdaleno M.
Peña, Et Al. G.R. No. 143591, May 5, 2010)
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J.
[1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984,
128 SCRA 577); and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953, cited in REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In these exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by
examining the records of the preliminary investigation, as it did in Salonga vs. Paño (187 SCRA 788), Allado and Webb; Paul G. Roberts
et al., vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996)
With respect to offenses penalized by special laws, the filing of the complaint or information in court is the one that interrupts
the prescriptive period and not the filing of the complaint in the proper office for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation
(Zaldivar v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277).
5.2.2. Who may file them, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de officio
Who may prosecute cases for abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness
Sec. 5, paragraph 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the rule that criminal cases for
seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall be prosecuted by the private offended party, her parents, grandparents or
guardian or in the absence of any relative the State may prosecute under the principle of parens patriae. It states that:
“The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents of guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by
any of them. If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents,
grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.”
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power
and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. Thus, all
criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the
prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from
different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor having
control and supervision over the case. (Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011.)
For complaint or information to be sufficient, one of the requirements is that it must allege the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of
the specified crimes. (People vs. Dimaano)
A complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s
affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined
the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. (Sasot vs. People)
An error in the name of the accused is not reversible as long as his identity is sufficiently established. This defect is curable at
any stage of the proceedings as insertion of the real name of the accused is merely a matter of form (People v. Padica, 221 SCRA 362)
Rule in case some of the witnesses are not included in the information
The non-inclusion of some of the names of the eyewitnesses in the information does not preclude the prosecutor from
presenting them during trial. (People v. Dela Cruz)
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to
state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the
prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all
the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al, G.R.
No. 196735, May 5, 2014)
An information filed in court shall be supported by affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, other
supporting documents and the resolution of the case. The reason for this rule is because the law aims not only to acquit the innocent
but to like insulate the clearly innocent from false charges and from the strong arm of the law. (OKABE VS. GUTIERREZ)
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against
him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding
surprises during the trial. (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014)
Appellants aver that the information filed before the trial court was substantially defective considering that it accuses Abdul
and Ampuan as one and the same person when in fact they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to
comprehend the information read to him. However, appellants failed to raise the issue of the defective Information before the trial
court through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the information. Their failure to object to the alleged defect before
entering their pleas of not guilty amounted to a waiver of the defect in the Information. Records even show that the information was
accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect but appellants did not comment thereon. Moreover, objections as to
matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. ( People of the Philippines v. Renandang
Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012)
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not
necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by
law. (Lasoy vs. Zenarosa)
Variance doctrine
In case of variance between the complaint filed by the offended party and the information in crimes against chastity, the
complaint controls (People v. Oso, 62 Phil 271)
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal knowledge, Pareja
cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences and
substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa.
Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would
be to violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance doctrine embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between the offense charged
in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014)
A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that
the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. While the information clearly states that the crime was
committed by appellant's insertion of his penis inside AAA's vagina, the latter solemnly testified on the witness stand that appellant
merely put his penis in her mouth. Nevertheless, appellant failed to register any objection that the Information alleged a different mode
of the commission of the crime of rape. Thus, appellant's conviction for rape by sexual assault must be sustained, the variance
notwithstanding. (PEOPLE vs. GULLERMO LOMAQUE, GR 189297, June 5, 2013)
Even when a complaint is defective for being signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the complainant, the court may
still acquire jurisdiction over the case. The complaint required in Art. 344 of the RPC is but a condition precedent to the exercise by the
proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. The complaint simply starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not
confer jurisdiction in the court to try the case. Art. 344 is not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over private offenses because
the same is governed by the Judiciary Law and not the RPC. (People v. Yparraguire)
In rape cases, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender is a special qualifying
circumstance which should be both alleged (People v. Cantos) and proved (People v. Manggasin) with certainty in order to warrant the
imposition of the [maximum] penalty.
It is not the designation of the offense in the complaint or information that is controlling (People v. Samillano, 56 SCRA 573);
the facts alleged therein and not its title determine the nature of the crime
(People v. Magdowa, 73 Phil 512).
The accused may be convicted of a crime more serious than that named in the title or preliminary part if such crime is covered
by the facts alleged in the body of the information and its commission is established by evidence (Buhat v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA
701).
An accused could not be convicted under one act when he is charged with a violation of another if the change from one statue
to the other involves:
PURPOSE:
General rule:
An information or complaint must charge only one offense, unless the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses
1. continuing crimes
2. complex crimes
3. special complex crimes
4. crimes susceptible of being committed in various modes
5. crimes of which another offense is an ingredient
A defectively crafted information, such as that alleging multiple offenses in a single complaint or information transgresses Rule
110, 13. A. However, failure to make a timely objection to such a defect is deemed to be a waiver of the said objection. (People v.
Santiago)
Under Sec. 3, Rule 120, failure on the part of the accused to object on the duplicity of offense as charged in the information,
he may be convicted as many crimes as charged in the information or complaint.
There are also no substantial amendments in the information warranting a new preliminary investigation. A new preliminary
investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same
offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new
criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must
be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. (Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan)
Where the complainant is a private individual, the venue of libel cases is limited to only either of the 2 places, namely: (1)
where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or (2) where the alleged defamatory article was
printed and first published. (Bonifacio vs. RTC of Manila)
Purpose of venue:
Not to compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the territory where the crime was
committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.
GENERAL RULE:
Penal laws are territorial; hence Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the Philippines.
GENERAL RULE:
Offended party has the right to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the criminal action where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Where from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of the offended
party;
2. Where the offended party has waived the right to civil indemnity; or
3. Where the offended party has already instituted an action.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter him and others from committing the same or
similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile,
of the civil action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained
by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. (Buntiong vs. Balboa)
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that, “[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.”
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil
action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the
criminal action. (Lee Pue Liong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, 703 SCRA 240)
Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the rule that in case a criminal
action is instituted, the civil liability resulting therefrom shall be deemed impliedly instituted in the said criminal action unless there is
waiver or a reservation to institute a separate civil action before the institution of the said criminal case. It states that:
“Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.”
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Article
33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This was precisely
the Court's thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question of the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, iun the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. xxx In the instant case, Civil Case
No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the
disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question
that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar. (Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161075, July
15, 2013)
Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the rule on the suspension of civil action
after the commencement of the criminal action. It states that:
“Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal action has been commenced, the
separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered
in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.”
In Gandiongco vs. Penaranda [155 SCRA 725], it was held that suspension is allowable only if the civil action
arises from the criminal act subject of the criminal case. The civil action must be intended to enforce civil liability arising from the
offense charged.
Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals did not rule on the effect of the death of Eddie Malogsi during the pendency of this case.
Considering that no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death, whether or not he was guilty of the crime
charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that he did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally
extinguished by his death, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and, by analogy, our ruling in People v.
Bayotas. Therefore, the present criminal case should be dismissed with respect only to the deceased Eddie Malogsi. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO DADAO, et al., G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014)
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal
case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. (San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. SEC. Hernando B. Perez, et al., GR No.
166836, September 4, 2013)
The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. SEC.
Hernando B. Perez, et al., GR No. 166836, September 4, 2013)
BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be
determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of the PD No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime
have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on
the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is
in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. (San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. SEC. Hernando B.
Perez, et al., GR No. 166836, September 4, 2013)
To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions, reference is made to
the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements,
namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer,
or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. The issue in the criminal
actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing
them to be without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach
in the fulfillment of Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the
civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such
result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks
because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had
issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make
arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the
contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the
offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite
the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the conditional sale. (Teodoro A. Reyes vs. Ettore Rossi, GR No. 159823, February 18,
2013)
5.3.6. Rule on filing fees in civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action
Payment of filing fees in case civil aspect is deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action
The amendments were deliberated on and adopted by this Court after the Manchester doctrine has been enunciated.
Yet, observe that the last two (2) paragraphs prescribe a rule different from that in Manchester, and in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under the 1985 Rule, the filing fees for the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal had to be paid first to the Clerk
of Court where the criminal action was commenced, without regard to whether the claim for such damages was set out in the
information or not. Under the 1988 Rules however, it is only when the amount of damages, other than the actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information that the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
In any other case — i.e., when the amount of damages other than actual is NOT alleged in the information — the filing fees for the civil
action “to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages x x x shall merely
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.’’ This Court’s plain intent — to make the Manchester
doctrine, requiring payment of filing fees at the time of the commencement of an action applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions
under Section 1, Rule 111 only when the amount of damages other than actual is alleged in the complaint or information — has thus
been made manifest by the language of the amendatory provisions.
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interest of clarity and certainty, categorically
declares for the guidance of all concerned that when the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court — because the offended party has not waived the civil action, or reserved the right to
institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action — the rule is as follows: (1) when the amount of the
damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, then the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by
the offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial; and (2) in any other case, however — i.e., when the amount of damages is not
so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply constitute a first
lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages. (Honesto General vs. Hon. Graduacion Reyes Claravall, et al., 195 SCRA
623)
5.3.7 Extinguishment/Maintenance of civil liability despite acquittal
The civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him. (Lee Pue Liong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, 703 SCRA 240)
An accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts
so warrants. (People of the Philippines vs. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, GR NO. 157943, September 4, 2013)
A preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except to determine whether a crime has been committed, and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of
that crime. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence, which needs to be
presented only to engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
(Community Rural Bank vs. Judge Telavera)
We rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused’s motion for review of the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution
reversing the investigating prosecutor’s finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already
final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice. (Serag vs. CA)
It is not part of the trial of the criminal action in court. Nor is its record part of the record of the case in the RTC. The dismissal
of the case by the investigator will not constitute double jeopardy and will not bar the filing of another complaint for the
same offense, but if re-filed, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation (U.S. v. Marfori, 35 Phil 666).
Reply is not mandatory in preliminary investigation; hence, no deprivation of due process if denied
There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file
a Reply to the accused’s counter-affidavit. To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary investigations, Section
3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz: “(d)
If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the
investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.” On the other hand, petitioner
was entitled to receive a copy of the Counter-affidavit filed by Aguillon. (P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R.
No. 190569, April 25, 2012)
The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public
officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts as well. § 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) does not make any distinction. “Any illegal act or omission of any public
official” is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. Such grant of primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees cognizable by the other courts (Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70(2001)
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The prosecution evidence
fails to establish probable cause against petitioner HPG officers. (P/C Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C Insp. Joell. Mendoza, P/C Insp.
Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr., P03 Fernando Reys. Gapuz, Po2 Eduardo G. Blanco, Po2 Edwin Santos And Po1 Josil
Rey I. Lucena, G.R. No. 203605, April 23, 2014)
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is
enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt. The term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. (Cruz v. Hon. Gonzales, et al, G.R. No. 173844, April 11, 2012)
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits.28 As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or
even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are
those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. (Century Chinese Medicine Co., et
al. vs. People of the Philippines and Ling Na Lau, GR No. 188526, November 22, 2013)
The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first
instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. As a rule, in the absence of any grave abuse of
discretion, courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch; the public prosecutor alone
determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere with
his findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown. In this case, the Supreme Court found no error in the public prosecutor’s
determination that no probable cause existed to justify the filing of a criminal complaint. (Manila Electric Company, represented by
Manolo C. Fernando v. Vicente Atilano, et al., G.R. No. 166758, June 27, 2012)
The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving public
officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II vs. The Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of DOJ, and affirmed in subsequent cases: The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of
the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public
officers and employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent
with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors, however, the Ombudsman, in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of
the government, the investigation of such cases. (Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 196842, October
9, 2013)
Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides for the duties of the investigating officer in resolving the case
under preliminary investigation in which he may either dismiss the case or file it in court together with the proper information. It states:
“Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for
trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the
dismissal of the complaint.”
5.4.5. Review
In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in line with the principle of non-interference with the
prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in the determination of the existence of
probable cause. The Secretary of Justice found sufficient evidence to indict petitioner. It was adequately established by DBP and found
by the Secretary of Justice that the funds would not have been released pursuant to the subsidiary loan agreement if HSLBI had no
sub-borrowers/Investment Enterprises to speak of. As it turned out, not only were the collaterals submitted inexistent, all the
purported sub-borrowers/Investment Enterprises were also fictitious and inexistent. In fact, the signatures of the sub-borrowers and
the supporting documents submitted to DBP by petitioner and her co-respondents were all forged. The findings of probable cause
against petitioner was based on the document showing that petitioner’s opinion was instrumental in the deceit committed against DBP.
(Cruz v. Hon. Gonzales, et al, G.R. No. 173844, April 11, 2012)
Non-interference of the court in finding probable cause by prosecutor; Exceptions; Remedy of certiorari under Rule 65
Courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal information, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the
determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while the exception hinges on
the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by
the present Constitution “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” (Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, GR No. 182130, June
19, 2013)
The rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to
establish probable cause unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion, thus “means
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” The party seeking the writ of certiorari must
establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. (Rosalinda Punzalan vs. Michael Plata, GR No. 160316, September 2, 2013)
We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a factual question is best left to the sound judgment of the trial
court, and that, absent any misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, the findings of the trial court shall not be dismissed.
(People of the Philippines vs. Marcelino Dadao, et al., GR No. 201860, January 22, 2014)
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the DOJ Secretary since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case. In other words, the dismissal of the case was based upon considerations other than the judge’s own personal
individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. (SAMUEL LEE AND MAYBELLE LIM VS. KBC BANK)
Remedy to assail determination of DOJ Secretary pertaining to existence or non-existence of probable cause
Contrary to respondents’ claim, Rule 65 provides the proper remedy to assail the DOJ’s determination of the presence or absence of
probable cause instead of a petition for review under Rule 43. By weighing the evidence submitted by the parties in a preliminary
investigation and by making an independent assessment thereof, an investigating prosecutor is, to that extent, performing functions of
a quasi-judicial nature in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, since he does not make a determination of the rights of
any party in the proceeding, or pronounce the respondent’s guilt or innocence (thus limiting his action to the determination of probable
cause to file an information in court), an investigating prosecutor’s function still lacks the element of adjudication essential to an appeal
under Rule 43. Additionally, there is a “compelling reason” to conclude that the DOJ’s exclusion from the enumeration of quasi-judicial
agencies in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is deliberate. However, the petitioner must allege and show that the DOJ acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting or denying the petition for review. ( PCGG Chairman Magdangal B. Elma and Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Reiner Jacobi, Crispin T. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 155996, June 27, 2012)
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information:
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;
(3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable
cause. (People vs. Hon. Dela Torre-Yadao, G.R.
Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for a situation where preliminary investigation is not required. It
states that:
“Section 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. —
(a) If filed with the prosecutor. — If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable by imprisonment
of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant within ten
(10) days from its filing.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. — If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after
the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after
personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he
shall dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine
further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten
(10) days from its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that
there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest.”
5.4.8. Remedies of accused if there was no preliminary investigation
A person lawfully arrested may post bail before the filing of the information or even after the filing without waiving his right to PI,
provided that he asks for a PI by the proper officer within the period fixed in the said rule. (People v. Court of Appeals, May 29, 1995).
Remedies of the accused in case of denial of his right to preliminary investigation: Waiver
a) The accused who is denied the mandatory preliminary investigation may refuse to enter a plea upon arraignment and to object to
the continuation of further proceedings based on lack of preliminary investigation. If he pleads without objection, he cannot raise the
issue on appeal. (People vs. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532; People vs. Lazo; 198 SCRA 274)
b) Although it is entirely possible that the investigating fiscal may erroneously exercise the discretion and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction . (Hegerty vs.
Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 285 [2003])
Habeas Corpus not proper remedy in case of denial of preliminary investigation: Remedies available
a) A petition for habeas corpus is not a proper remedy if the accused was not accorded preliminary investigation which he did not
waive. The remedy is a motion to quash the warrant of arrest and/or information or to ask for an investigation/re-investigation of the
case. (Ilagan vs. Enrile 139 SCRA; Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464)
5.4.9. Inquest
A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A “preliminary investigation” is an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. “An inquest” is a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of
determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person was based on probable cause.” (Imelda S. Enriquez vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento,
Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7, 2006)
5.5. Arrest
Arrest is defined under Sec. 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as:
“Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.”
Section 2, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the manner, time and conduct of arresting a
person who committed a crime. It states that:
“Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention.”
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (People vs.
Laguio)
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
Warrantless search
The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view
(3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to
wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.” (Valdez vs. People)
A person may be arrested lawfully even without a warrant of arrest, under any of the circumstances provided under Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
“Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.”
An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and
valid under Rule 113, section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’
contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and
surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing
shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya,
Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-
appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting police officers had
probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being
accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants –
who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA
6425, as amended – is valid. (People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al, G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010.)
Warrantless arrest by private person: Citizen arrest
Moreover, Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizes a warrantless arrest, otherwise called a
“citizen’s arrest’’ when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an
offense.” Thus, although officially assigned in Baguio City, Lt. Ancheta’s act of arresting accused-appellant (after the latter offered to
sell him marijuana in San Fernando, La Union) is justified, not only because it is his duty as a law enforcer but also by Section 5 of Rule
113, which authorizes instances of warrantless arrest or citizens’ arrests. (People of the Philippines vs. Jose Rayray Areola, 241 SCRA 1)
A private person may effect an arrest under any of the circumstances provided under Section 9,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. It states that:
“Section. 9. Method of arrest by private person. — When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to be arrested of
the intention to arrest him and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued
immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so
inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.” (Emphasis supplied)
“Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.” (Emphasis supplied)
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether a particular affidavit/deposition or testimony of the affiant/deponent
establishes probable cause. However, great deference is to be accorded to the Judge’s determination . (Spinelli vs. US, 393 US 410, 89
S.Ct. 584 [1969]; US vs. Leon, supra, note 61) The affidavit/deposition supporting an application for a search warrant is presumed to
be valid. (Eliza T. Abuan vs. People, G.R. No. 168773, October 27, 2006)
The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court. The second is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. (De Los Santos-Dio vs. CA, GR No. 178947, June 26, 2013)
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario
would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. (People of the
Philippines vs. Roberto Velasco, G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013)
We cannot uphold the contention of petitioner that his warrantless arrest was illegal. The CA correctly ruled that his failure to question
the legality of his arrest before entering his plea during arraignment operated as a waiver of that defense. “It has been ruled time and
again that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for
the quashal of the information against him on this ground before his arraignment.” In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner
never raised any issue and instead “freely and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged”. Thus, he was estopped from
raising the issue of the legality of his arrest before the trial court, more so on appeal before the CA or this Court. (RODRIGO RONTOS
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR 188024, June 5, 2013)
5.6. Bail
The definition of bail is clearly spelled out under Sec. 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure , as amended by
S.C. A.M. 05-8-26 dated August 26, 2005. It states that:
“Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of
corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.”
5.6.1. Nature
In MTC/MCTC
In RTC
Before conviction
Except:
The right to bail is not available to military personnel or officer charged with a violation of the Articles of War. (Aswat v. Galido, 204
SCRA 205)
“Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed
and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during
the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;
b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his
bail without valid justification;
c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.”
In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong pursuant to § 8 Rule 114.
In bail proceedings, the prosecution must be given ample opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. While the proceeding
is conducted as a regular trial, it must be limited to the determination of the bailability of the accused. It should be brief and speedy,
lest the purpose for which it is available is rendered nugatory. (People v. Singh, et. al., G.R. No. 129782 (2001)
Regardless of quantity, the sale, trade, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of shabu is punishable by
life imprisonment to death. Being a capital offense, it is incumbent upon respondent Judge to hold a hearing on the petitions/motions
for bail filed by the accused therein to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong. To grant an application for bail and fix the
amount thereof without a hearing duly called for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong constitutes gross
ignorance or incompetence whose grossness cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence. (MABUTAS vs.
JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO)
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. However, if the appellate court determines the existence of
any of the circumstances, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants
bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed (LEVISTE V. CA)
The manifestation of the prosecutor that he is not ready to present any witness to prove that the prosecution’s evidence against the
accused is strong, is never a basis for the outright grant of bail without a preliminary hearing on the matter. A hearing is required even
when the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail (Domingo vs. Pagayatan)
It is undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone, respondent is already
administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail
bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized
to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in his office. (TRINIDAD LACHICA V JUDGE ROSABELLATORMIS)
The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a
hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the SB of
its discretion (SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN)
The following are cases where the court may order the release on recognizance of any person under detention
a. when the offense charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light, or a criminal offense, the imposable penalty of which does not
exceed 6 months imprisonment and/or P2000 fine, under the circumstances provided in RA No. 6036
b. where a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the imposable principal penalty, without
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, in which case the court, in its discretion, may allow his
release on his own recognizance
c. where the accused has applied for probation, pending resolution of the case but no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing
one d. in case of a youthful offender held for physical and mental examination, trial, or appeal, if he is unable to furnish bail and under
circumstances envisaged in PD No. 603 as amended. (Espiritu v. Jovellanos, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1139 (1997)
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious rationale is that imposing bail in an
excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. The court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears
that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include
increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of
his movements. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the SC found that the
setting of the amount at P5.5M is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of A’s right to bail (Yap v. CA and the
People, G.R. No. 141529 (2001)
“Section 21. Forfeiture of bail. — When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be
notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be
declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment
should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of
the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is
acquitted. (Erlinda P. Varcas vs. Judge Rafael P. Orola, Jr., et al. A.M. MTJ-05-1615 February 22, 2006)
Bail may be cancelled upon application of the bondsmen in accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114 based on the following grounds:
5.6.9. Application not a bar to objections in illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation
Sec. 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure gives us the rule that application for bail by the accused shall not
be a bar to question the validity of arrest, or the legality of the warrant, or the absence of preliminary investigation. It provides that:
“Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack or irregular preliminary investigation. — An application for or admission to
bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or from assailing
the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before
entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.”
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level
courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that "hold- departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." (Mondejar vs. Buban)
The legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved, they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of guilt of the
accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed
so that the inference of the one from proof of the other is not unreasonable and arbitrary experience. People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil 856
(1953)
An accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right. People v. Ortega, 276 SCRA
166 (2003)
The accused may waive his right to be present during the trial. However, his presence may be compelled when he is to be identified.
Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546 (1975)
It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the accused's right to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit
kindred, guarantees, the most obvious difference being that a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the
Constitution, obtains regardless of the nature of the case:
Section 16 “All persons shall have the right to speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.”
In fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a
speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by stage agencies. (Danilo Ursua vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012)
An escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-
examine witnesses that have testified against him. Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988)
Non-appearance of the accused on the hearing constitute a waiver
Non appearance of an accused on a day set for hearing would result to the waiver of his right to present evidence only for the
particular day or until he has appeared for hearing. There is no reason for the Sandiganbayan to totally foreclose Crisostomo’s
right to present evidence merely on an absence of 1 day in view of (1) the provision just cited and (2) the fact that Crisostomo may
possibly face a death sentence. Given the gravity of the penalty, it behooved the Sandiganbayan to have given Crisostomo the
opportunity to present evidence. Besides, this was the only time Crisostomo absented himself as he was always faithful present during
the prior hearings. (Crisostomo vs. Sandiganbayan)
Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be
excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original
declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied
because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party's witness, being the
only means of testing the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice. (Anna Lerima
Patula vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012)
If during the investigation the assisting lawyer leaves, comes and goes, the statement signed by the accused is still inadmissible
because the lawyer should assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer
until the signing of the extrajudicial confession People v. Morial, 363 SCRA 96 (2001)
Appellant claims that his silence should not be used againts him as he was just exercising his constitutional right to remain silent. We
agree with the appellant. It should be borne in mind that when appellant was brought to the police station, he was already a suspect to
the crime of rape. As such, he was already under custodial investigation. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides,
viz: “Any person under investigation for the comission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.” Clearly, when appellant
remained silent when confronted by the accusation of “AAA” at the police station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to
remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that
appellant's silence should be deemed implied admission of guilt. (People of the Philippines vs. Jonas Guillen, G.R. No. 191756,
November 25, 2013)
When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the
same. Arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of the grounds for its
dismissal (BERNADETTE ADASA VS. CECILLE ABALOS)
Purpose of Arraignment
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even
of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the
State is mobilized against him. As an indispensable requirement of due process, and arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed
aside peremptorily. Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial court. (Estrella Taglay
vs. Judge Marivic Daray, G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012)
The following rules shall be observed in the conduct of arraignment and plea of the accused in criminal proceedings:
a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial.
The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall
be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of
not guilty shall be entered for him.
e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to
whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within
ten (10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10) days after arraignment.
f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of plea bargaining,
determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of failure of the offended party to appear despite due
notice, the court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged
with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone.
g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to
quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.”
The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is not a matter of right to the accused but of sound discretion to the trial court. People vs Lambino,
103 Phil 504 (1958)
During the arraignment, the court may allow the accused to make a plea to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged, subject to the following rules:
a) The plea to a lesser offense must be to be made by the accused with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor; and
b) After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of
not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.”
5.8.4. Accused pleads guilty to capital offense, what the court should do
Duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense
This Court, in People v. Oden, laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense.
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
Rationale
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form,
namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible.
Primordial purpose
The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might
be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance
and consequence of his plea.
Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or
impropriety of the plea.
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed judgement. The
inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no
cogent reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence and thus, adopts the same.
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a “searching inquiry,” we have held that the
following guidelines should be observed:
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the
meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background,
which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises
of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the
accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship
of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis
of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature
of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the
tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if
such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused,
as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence
proving the commission of the offense charged.
The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be
based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL
GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIEKARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL, NORA EVAD y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN y
RAFON a.k.a LARINA PERPENIAN and JOHNDOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013)
Searching inquiry
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed judgement. The
inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no
cogent reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence and thus, adopts the same.
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a “searching inquiry,” we have held that the
following guidelines should be observed:
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that
the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL,
EDDIEKARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING,
JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL, NORA EVAD y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON a.k.a LARINA
PERPENIAN and JOHNDOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013)
Accused may at anytime before the judgment of conviction becomes final may be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty and be
changed to a plea of not guilty. Sec. 5, Rule 116 provides that:
“Section 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. — At any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may
permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.”
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court
shall order his mental examination and, if necessary his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c)
A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office
(Section 11, Rule 116 OF THE Rules of Court). x x x In Samson v. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 612, the
Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision
limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned form the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to
defer arraignment. (Spouses Alexander Trinidad Vs. Victor Ang, G.R. No. 192898, January 31, 2011)
A motion to quash the information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed
against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information. It is the
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence alliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. To
be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its face. (People of the Philippines vs.
Edgardo V. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013)
5.9.1. Grounds
The grounds for the quashal of the information are clearly spelled out under Sec. 3, Rule 117. It states that:
“Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court
may order that another complaint or information be filed except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of
criminal liability or double jeopardy. (People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo V. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013)
The denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal
case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special
defenses invoked in their motion to quash. The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined in law. (Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan)
An order denying a MTQ is not appealable because such order is merely interlocutory. However, if the court, in denying the MTQ, acts
with grave abuse of discretion, the certiorari or prohibition will lie. Newsweek Inc. vs IAC, 142 SCRA 443 (1986)
If a single act is punished by two different laws, but each requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not require,
conviction or acquittal in one will not bar a prosecution for the other. Perez vs. CA, 163 SCRA 236 (1988)
Requisites
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for double jeopardy to set in: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case be dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. (Philippine National Bank vs. Lilian S. Soriano, G.R. No. 164051, October 3, 2012)
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur: 1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or
the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its
provisional dismissal; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3) the court issues an order
granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and 4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case. (LOS BAÑOS V. PEDRO)
5.10. Pre-trial
What is pre-trial?
It is a procedural device used prior to trial to narrow issues to be tried, to secure stipulations as to matters and
evidence to be heard, and to take all other steps necessary to aid in the disposition of the case. Such conferences between
opposing attorney’s may be called at the discretion of the court. The actions taken at the conference are made the subject of an order
which controls are the future course of the action.
5.10.2. What the court should do when prosecution and offended party agree to the plea offered by the accused
During the pre-trial, except for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the trial judge shall consider plea-
bargaining arrangements. Where the prosecution and the offended party agree to the plea offered by the accused, the court shall.
a. Issue and order which contains the plea bargaining arrived at;
c. Render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil liability or damages duly
established by the evidence. (Sec. 5, B)
“Section 2. Pre-trial agreement. — All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the
matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.”
The court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following concur : (1) counsel does not appear at the pre-trial
conference AND (2) counsel does not offer an acceptable excuse. (Atty.Emelita Garayblas & Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruz, Vs. Hon.
Gregory Ong. Et Al,M G.R. Nos. 174507-30, August 3, 2011)
The trial judge shall issue a Pre-trial Order within ten (10) days after the termination of the pre-trial setting forth the actions taken
during the pre-trial conference, the facts stipulated, the admissions made, evidence marked, the number of witnesses to be presented
and the schedule of trial. Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of the action
during the trial. (As amended. A.M. No. 03-1-09 SC) [Sec. 10, B]
5.10.6. Referral of some cases for court annexed mediation and judicial dispute resolution
Criminal cases which are mediation-able under the court annexed mediation
To overcome the problem, the Supreme Court in 2001 authorized the use of court-annexed mediation (CAM) as a form of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for the following in criminal cases:
The civil aspect or claim for damages for violation of B.P. 22 (bouncing checks)
Simple theft
Libel
Estafa
However, (a) acts of violence against women and their children; (b) criminal violation of tax laws; and (c) civil forfeiture under the Anti
Money Laundering Law (R.A. No. 9160) cannot be referred to mediation. The prohibition for compromise extends to (d) civil status of
persons; (e) validity of marriage; (f) legal separation (counselling is more appropriate), (g) ground for legal separation; (h) future
support; (i) legitime; and (j) jurisdiction.
5.11. Trial
A hearing does not necessarily imply the presentation of oral or documentary evidence in open court but that the parties are afforded
an opportunity to be heard. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 133 (2003)
“The time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be… 80 days.” SC ruled that 111 days have elapsed from the
time the accused were arraigned on June 15, 2001 up to the filing of their Motion to Dismiss on October 4, 2001.
The right is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. SC held here that the
cancellation of hearings by the prosecution w/o any valid ground is certainly vexatious, capricious and oppressive. A dismissal by the
court based on this ground is not tantamount to GADLEJ. (PEOPLE vs. JUDGE HERNANDEZ (Pasig RTC), ATTY. SALAYON and ATTY.
LLORENTE (2006)_
The purpose of trial in absentia is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases. People v. Agbulos, G.R. No. 73907 (1993)
5.11.4. Remedy when accused is not brought to trial within the prescribed period
Sec. 9 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the remedy of dismissal of the action in
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial in case he is not brought to trial within the time prescribed. It provides that:
“Section 9: Remedy where the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit . — If the accused is not
brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this Rule, the
information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the
burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion
of time under Section 3 of this Rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under
this section.”
The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG
Application of subpoena
Even if the witness has been cited to appear before a court sitting outside of the province in which he resides and the distance is more
than 50km (now 100km) from his place of residence by the usual course of travel, he is still bound by the subpoena. Rule 23 applies
only in civil cases. People v Montejo, 21 SCRA 722 (1967)
The trial judge gravely erred in rendering a judgment of conviction against both accused. Since the trial of B did not take place, the trial
court should have rendered a decision only against A. People v. Ellasos and Obillo, G.R. No. 139323(2001)
Sec. 18, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that the discharge of the accused as a state witness is
tantamount to his acquittal. It provides that:
“Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. — The order indicated in the proceding section shall amount to an acquittal of
the discharged accused and shall be bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify
against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.”
A grant of a demurrer to evidence is tantamount to an acquittal and cannot be reviewed on appeal otherwise, the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy is offended. A demurrer must be filed after the prosecution rests its case. It entails and appreciation
of the evidence of the prosecution and when the same if found insufficient to support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, the
demurrer is proper. DAYAP v SENDIONG
Once granted, the court must enter a partial judgment of conviction but must continue with the trial for the reception of the
defense’ evidence on the civil aspect. This is because at the moment the demurrer is granted, only prosecution’s evidence (both as to
the criminal and civil aspect) is on record. However, the grant of a demurrer may still be reviewed by the courts but only on grounds of
GADLEJ under rule 65. In this case, there being not finding of GADLEJ on the part of the MTC, the demurrer stands DAYAP v
SENDIONG
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Lee Pue
Liong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, 703 SCRA 240)
5.12. Judgment
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
either the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony. In fact, such minor flaws may even enhance
the worth of a testimony for they guard against memorized falsities.
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the
witnesses’ honesty. The test is whether the testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and
substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE
(2007)
Effect of acquittal
As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused.
Section 2(b) of the same Rule, also quoted earlier, provided in part: (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. NICDAO VS CHING
What is judgment?
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines and sets forth the requirements for a valid judgment:
Section 1. Judgment; definition and form. — Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and
law upon which it is based.
Thus, a judgment, to be valid, must have been personally and directly prepared by the judge, and duly signed by him. Corollarily, a
decision or resolution of the court becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only from the moment of its promulgation.
Promulgation of judgment, in turn, signifies that on the date it was made, the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to
support it. If at the time of the promulgation, a judge or member of a collegiate court has already vacated his office, his vote is
automatically withdrawn. In criminal cases, promulgation of judgment is made by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered. Judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court only when the judge is absent or
outside the province or city.
It is clear then, that a judge who takes over the sala of another judge who died during office cannot validly promulgate a decision
penned by the latter. In fact, decisions promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been appointed to and qualified in
another office are null and void. To be binding, a judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge
whose signature appears thereon. In single courts like the regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts, a decision may no longer
be promulgated after the ponente has vacated his office.
The respondent judge cannot, likewise, claim that his only participation in the promulgation of the questioned decision was “merely an
exercise of a ministerial duty to enforce the said decision which was already long rendered by the judge who actually and completely
heard the above-mentioned criminal cases on the merits.” It must be stressed that the respondent judge had earlier inhibited himself
from the cases in question, and that Judge Calderon was designated to hear and try the cases in his stead. The mere fact that the
respondent judge was designated as Presiding Judge of Branch 26 following the death of Judge Calderon does not necessarily mean
that his previous inhibition in relation to the criminal cases in question has been lifted. That would be an absurdity, as a valid
designation presupposes that the judge so designated has not inhibited himself from the cases assigned/raffled to the said branch.
(Peter Bejarasco, Jr. and Isabelita Bejarasco, complainants vs. Judge Alfredo D. Buenconsejo, Municipal Trial Court, Dalaguete, Cebu,
Secundino Piedad, Clerk of Court, and Leonisa Gonzales, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu, respondents)
It is well settled that acquittal, in a criminal case is immediately final and executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the
State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy Barbers vs Laguio, Jr., 351 SCRA 606 (2001)
Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the
judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner not then being assisted by his
counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with court processes and procedure. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provides: “The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the
court in which it was rendered.However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his
counsel or representative.” There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of
judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by
such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced. (Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 185960, January
25, 2012)
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when
the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation. (7a)”
Thus, it was held that the finality of the judgment was entirely distinct from its entry and the delay in the latter does not affect the
effectivity of the former which is counted from the expiration of the period to appeal. (Munnez, et al., vs. CA, et al., L-46040, July 23,
1987)
It is a proceeding whereby errors of law or irregularities are expunged from the record, or new evidence is introduced, or both steps
are taken. (People vs. Tamayo, 86 Phil. 213)
A new invention to temper the severality of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. (Jose vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 257)
When available?
Sec. 1, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the remedy of new trial which may be availed of by the
aggrieved party within the period to appeal. It provides that:
“Section 1. New trial or reconsideration. — At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the
accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.”
There are two requisites for a Motion for New Trial to be granted.
It is filed on time
It is based on either of two grounds under Sec 2, Rule 121
Assailing the final judgment with a motion for new trial are reliefs far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. (Writ of Habeas
Corpus of Reynaldo De Villa GR 158802)
Fresh period to appeal after denial of the Motion for new trial or reconsideration
In Neypes vs CA., the court allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. SUMIRAN VS SPOUSES DAMASO
The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event
that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the “fresh period
rule” should be applied to pending actions. SUMIRAN VS SPOUSES DAMASO
Sec. 3, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure sets forth the grounds for the reconsideration of the judgment in a
criminal proceedings. It provides that:
“Sec. 3. Ground for reconsideration. — The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of errors of law or fact in the judgment
which requires no further proceedings.
5.14. Appeal
What is Appeal?
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. It is not a right but a
mere statutory privilege to be exercised only and in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. PEOPLE v. ABON
However, the escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction, considering
that what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but a duty to
review all death penalty cases. PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO TARUC
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the period when an appeal from a judgment or final order
in a criminal case should be taken, viz:
Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or
from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has been served upon the accused or his counsel at
which time the balance of the period begins
to run.
In this case, the judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of Estafa was promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a
notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of judgment, the petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to lift
warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond three (3) months later. It was only in November 2010 or more than a year later since the
RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with the CA her motion to admit notice of appeal. At that point, her judgment of
conviction has already attained finality and cannot be modified or set aside anymore in accordance with Section 7, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Court has already stressed that “the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.”
In exceptional cases, the Court has in fact relaxed the period for perfecting an appeal on grounds of substantial justice or when
there are other special and meritorious circumstances and issues.
Thus, in Remulla v. Manlongat, the Court considered the one-day late filing of the prosecution’s notice of appeal as excusable given the
diligent efforts exerted by the private prosecutor in following up its filing with the public prosecutor. (ANITA RAMIREZ vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 197832, October 2, 2013)
Applying these legal concepts to this case, the Supreme Court found that, while the People was procedurally correct in filing its petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does not raise any jurisdictional error committed by the Sandiganbayan. On the contrary, what
is clear is the obvious attempt by the People to have the evidence in the case reviewed by the Court under the guise of a Rule 65
petition. This much can be deduced by examining the petition itself which does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith committed by
the Sandiganbayan in its proceedings. The petition does not also raise any denial of the People’s due process in the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan. It was also observed by the Supreme Court that the grounds relied in the petition relate to factual errors of
judgment which are more appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather than in a Rule 65 petition. The grounds cited in the petition call for
the Court’s own appreciation of the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the People’s evidence in proving the
element of bad faith, and the sufficiency of the evidence denying productivity bonus to Doller. ( Arnold James M. Ysidoro v. Hon.
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al, G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012.)
At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the RTC's imposition of the death
penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision. However, with the Court's pronouncement in the 2004 case of People vs. Mateo,
providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by the CA of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate
review. (People of the Philippines vs. Val Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 130714 & 139634, October 16, 2012)
Sec. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the
same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court. The same shall
be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this Rule.
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioner likewise erred in contending that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court prohibits the dismissal of the certiorari petition
when appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. First, said provision only refers to dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure
to prosecute. Second, the dismissal of the appeal is conditioned on the appellant's failure to file a brief. An appellant's brief is a
pleading filed in an ordinary appeal. Clearly, Section 8 contemplates an ordinary appeal filed before the Court of Appeals. DEUS V.
PEOPLE
Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in
another court, a motion to quash the warrant/to retrieve things thereunder seized may be filed for the first time in either the issuing
court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. Garaygay v. People, G.R. No.
138758 (2000)
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited”
and “regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or
species. Accordingly, one search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. People v. Ko,
G.R. No. 133254-55 (2001)
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. CHAN VS. HONDA
MOTORS
In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution, the
following are authorized to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and
illegal possession of firearms. SPOUSES MARIMLA V. PEOPLE
Venue for the filing of the application for the issuance of search warrant
The above-cited rule provides for the venue where the application for the issuance of a search warrant shall
be filed, to wit:
A search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on
the basis of the applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. Tan cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of
the search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated
from the same incident. SY TAN VS SY TIONG
“Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
In Burgos vs. Chief of Staff [133 SCRA 319], the ownership of personal property is unessential. The
said rule [Sec. 2, Rule 126] does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. As provided, under sub-section (b) of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the
properties that may be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of search and seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and
property seized under the warrants.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (Ambre vs. People, G.R. No. 191532,
August 15, 2012)
b) Consented search
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is
given:
Airport Frisking
Persons may lose the protection if the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern about airplane high jacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated
with airline travel. (People of the Philippines vs. Hadji Socor Cadidia, GR No. 191263, October 16, 2013)
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view,
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b)
the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent. (Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines., G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011)
It is not correct to say that only the parties to the application for search warrant can question its issuance or seek suppression of
evidence seized under it – the proceeding for the issuance of search warrant does not partake of an action where a party complains of
a violation of his right by another. (Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Rizza G. Mendoza, G.R. No. 170425, April 23, 2012)
5.16.1. Nature
No notice to the adverse party or hearing on the application is necessary before a writ of preliminary attachment may issue. Mindanao
Savings, etc. vs CA, 172 SCRA 480 (1989)
Section 1. Availability of provisional remedies. – The provisional remedies in civil actions, insofar as they are applicable, may
be availed of in connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action.
Sec. 2. Attachment. – When the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal action as provided in Rule 111, the offended party may
have the property of the accused attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused in
the following cases:
(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;
(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of
the accused who is a public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the course of his employment as
such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about to do so; and
(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines.
EVIDENCE
Evidence
General principles
Concept of evidence
Evidence in its broadest sense, refers to “any matter of fact, the effect, tendency or design of which is to produce in the mind a
persuasive affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence of some other matter of fact. [Jones on Evidence, Vol. 1, 4th ed.]
Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. [Rule
128, Sec. 1]
The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules.
[Rule 128, Sec. 2]
It does not apply to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings as administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of the
rules obtaining in the court of law. [El Greco Ship Maning and Management Corporation vs Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 177188,
December 4, 2008]
In civil cases, the concept of presumption of innocence does not apply and generally there is no presumption for or against a
party except in certain cases provided for by law. [Riano, supra]
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must prove his claim by a preponderance of evidence. [Rule 133, Sec. 1] In criminal
cases, the guilt of the accused has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. [Rule 133, Sec. 2]
In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. In
criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. [Rule 130, Sec. 27]
There is proof only because of evidence. It is merely the probative effect of evidence and is the conviction or persuasion of the mind
resulting from a consideration of the evidence. [29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, Sec. 2]
Evidence is the "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact
in dispute in judicial proceedings." [Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948]
FACTUM PROBANS – the probative or evidentiary fact tending to prove the fact in issue or the
Factum Probandum does not include matters of judicial notice, conclusive presumptions and judicial admissions as these matters
need not be established or proven.
Admissibility of evidence
Reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to
convict. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. [ People vs. Turco, 337
SCRA 714]
RTC ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA testing. DNA Testing can now be ordered in a proceeding for support as it is now
admissible as evidence. [Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005]
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. [Rule 128, Sec. 3]
Relevancy of evidence
Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral
matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in
issue. [Rule 128, Sec. 4]
Under the Rules of Court, a collateral matter may be admitted if it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue. [Rule 128, Sec. 4]
Heesen presented testimony regarding the general reputation of the other firearms company using the same safety mechanism as that
of the shotgun used in defense for his alleged shooting of Lopez. The conduct of others evidences the tendency of the thing in
question; and such conduct is receivable with other evidence showing the tendency of the thing as dangerous, defective, or the
reverse. [Lopez vs. Heesen, 365 P.2d 448 (1961)]
The amount of $258.02 seized from Ball and was presented as evidence against him. The money is not relevant to prove the robbery
because it was not identified by the jewelry store as the money coming from the store; further, there was no proof that it was taken
from the jewelry store. [State vs. Ball, 339 S.W2d 783 (1960)]
Multiple admissibility
There are times when a proffered evidence is admissible for two or more purposes. [Riano, supra]
When the victim was asked who his assailant was, he said that it was Salafranca, he expired after such utterance. The Court considered
the utterance of Bolanon (victim)as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae. [People v. Salafranca, 666 SCRA 501]
Conditional admissibility
The proponent of the evidence may ask the court that the evidence be conditionally admitted in the meantime, subject to the condition
that he is going to establish its relevancy and competency at a later time. [Riano, supra]
Curative admissibility
The doctrine of curative admissibility allows a party to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to answer the opposing party’s
previous introduction of inadmissible evidence if it would remove any unfair prejudice caused by the admission of the earlier
inadmissible evidence. [Adams v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 865 S.W.2d 748]
Direct evidence proves a fact without the need to make an inference from another fact. [ Riano, supra]
Circumstantial evidence or indirect evidence is that evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which
the fact finder draws from the evidence established. [People v. Matito, 423 SCRA 617]
Evidence is positive when the witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur. Evidence is negative when the witness states that he did
not see or now the occurrence of a fact. [Francisco, Evidence Rules, 3rd Ed.]
Evidence is competent when it is not excluded by law in a particular case. [ Francisco, supra] The term “credibility” refers to
worthiness of belief, that quality which renders a witness worthy of belief. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.]
Competence:
The forwarder, who discovered “leaves” from a box sent to it by Marti, sent a request to the NBI to subject the leaves to a laboratory
testing which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. The Court held that there was no violation of constitutional rights because the
rights granted by the Constitution are protection from arbitrary exercise of power by the government, and not by third parties, in this
case, the forwarder. [People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57)]
Privacy of correspondence
An anonymous letter was filed alleging therein that Pollo was engaged in unlawful lawyering activities. The Court held that there was
no violation of petitioner's right to privacy because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files
and the copying of the contents was done by a government agency in its capacity as employer for an alleged work-related misconduct.
[Pollo vs. David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011]
Laconico requested Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. The Court held that an extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
“tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. [Ganaan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 112]
Ortanez presented three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between his wife and unidentified persons. The Court
held that the cassette tapes are not admissible since absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed
the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. [ Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of
Appeals, 235 SCRA 111]
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law. [Rule 131, Sec. 1]
It means that the obligation is imposed upon a party who alleges the existence if a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action to establish it by proof. [Francisco, supra]
The burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a counterclaim, the burden of proving the existence of the claim
lies with the defendant. [Ogawa v. Menigishi, 676 SCRA 14, 21, July 9, 2012]
Presumptions
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts.
[In the Matter of the Intestate Estates of Delgado and Rustia, 480 SCRA 334]
Conclusive presumptions
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them. [Rule 131, Sec. 2]
Disputable presumptions
A presumption is disputable or rebuttable if it may be contradicted or overcome by other evidence. [Riano, supra] (See Rule 131, Sec. 3
for enumeration)
These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. [Rule 1, Sec. 6]
Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and applied so as not to frustrate substantial justice. [Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, 454
SCRA 17]
To justify relaxation of the rules, a satisfactory explanation and subsequent fulfillment of the requirements have always been required.
[Barcenas v. Tomas, 454 SCRA 593]
The Rules on Electronic Evidence shall likewise be construed liberally. [Rule 2, Sec. 2, Rules on Electronic Evidence]
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. [Rule 133, Sec. 2]
In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the guilt of the accused lies with the prosecution because of the presumption that the
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. [Sec. 14(2), Art. Ill, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution]
A conviction for estafa requires a clear showing that the offended party parted with his money or property upon the offender’s false
pretenses, and suffered damage thereby. It is imperative, therefore, that damage as an element of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph
2(a) be proved as conclusively as the offense itself. [People v. Chua, G.R. No. 187052, September 13, 2012]
The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence. In this case, the
prosecution failed to show that petitioners committed the acts prohibited by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. [ Boac v. People,
G.R. No. 180597, November 7, 2008]
Preponderance of evidence
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of
the other. [Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 454 SCRA 653]
Substantial evidence
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence,
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [Rule 133, Sec. 5]
In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings like those conducted before the NLRC, the standard of proof is substantial evidence
which is understood to be more than just a scintilla or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. [Morales v. Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc., 664 SCRA 110]
Evidence is clear and convincing if it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to allegations sought to be
established. It is intermediate, being more than preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed]
Fraud is never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being
adequate. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. [Tankeh v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171428, November 11,
2013]
Bad faith has to be established by the claimant with clear and convincing evidence, and this necessitates an examination of the
evidence of all the parties. This is best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. [Belle Corporation v. De Leon- Banks, G.R.
No. 174669, September 19, 2012]
Judicial Notice:
The proof of the public need for the expropriation case was an ordinance setting aside the land for the school expansion purpose. The
Court held that the judge was duty bound to take cognizance of the Ordinance since the Charter of the City of Manila provides that
judges should take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. [ City of Manila vs. Garcia, 19 SCRA 413]
A motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. The Court held that the lower
court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it.
[Baguio vs. Vda. De Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337]
Appellant points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his first petition for annulment because no "parole" evidence need
be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged being parts of the records, which were well within the judicial notice and cognizance
of the said court. Court said that they are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of
the contents of other cases. [Prieto vs. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549]
In an action for recovery of ownership of property, the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony of Tabuena in another case it had
previously heard. The Court held that generally, a court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even if
it is the same court which heard it, notwithstanding the fact that the parties and issues are similar. [ Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, 196
SCRA 650]
Exception
Court of Appeals ignored the existence of the tax return extant on the record. As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of records in other cases tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were heard or are
actually pending before the same judge. However, an exception is when reference to such records is sufficiently made without
objection from the opposing parties. [Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 151857, April 28,
2005]
Petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. Well-established in this
jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any
other fact. [Yao-Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA736]
Taha claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a manner
that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. SC takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in
rural areas, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. [People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676]
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s admission. As required by Section 3 of
Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. [ People vs.
Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000]
Basis:
Judicial notice is based on the maxim, “what is known need not be proved,” hence, when the rule is invoked, the court may dispense
with the presentation of evidence on judicially cognizable facts. [Jones, supra]
The object of judicial notice is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily
capable of dispute and are not actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can safely be assumed from the tribunal’s general
knowledge or from a slight search on its part. Judicial notice, is therefore, based upon convenience and expediency. [ Francisco, supra]
When mandatory?
A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. [Rule 129, Sec. 1]
Under Sec. 1 of Rule 129, a court shall take judicial notice, among others, of the official acts not only of the legislative and executive
departments but also of the judicial department. [Siena Realty Corporation v. Gal-lang, 428 SCRA 422]
Judicial notice on ordinance as mandated by charter
The trial judge was duty bound to take — judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all
courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. [ City of Manila v. Garcia, G.R. No.
L-26053, February 21, 1967]
It ought to be clear even to Baguio that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a
judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in
decreeing the dismissal. [Baguio v. Teofila L. Vda. De Jalagat, G.R. No. L-28100, November 29, 1971]
Brushing aside the contention, the Court held that it had no alternative but to take judicial notice of the declaration of the President as
an official act and thus, is a matter of mandatory judicial notice under Sec. 1 of Rule 129. [Suplico v. NEDA, 558 SCRA 329]
A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. [Rule 129, Sec. 2]
Requisites for judicial notice
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. [Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009 ]
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable. [Expertravel and Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 459 SCRA 147]
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge." [BPI-Savings v. Court of Tax Appeal, G.R. No. 122480, April 12, 2000]
As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters
of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge” [Expertravel and Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra]
Foreign laws must be alleged and proved. In the absence of proof, the foreign law will be presumed to be the same as the laws of the
jurisdiction hearing the case under the doctrine of processual presumption. [Northwest Orient Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA
192]
Exceptions
Where the foreign law is within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when the law is generally well-known, had been ruled upon
in previous cases before it and none of the parties claim otherwise, the court may take judicial notice of the foreign law. [ PCIB v.
Escolin, 56 SCRA 266]
Judicial Admissions:
Calupitan later on withdrew the original pleading he filed. The Court held that where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in
the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally offered in
evidence. [Lucido vs. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48]
CIR and Petron jointly stipulated before the CTA that Petron did not participate in the procurement and issuance of the Tax Credit
Certificates. This stipulation of fact by the CIR amounts to an admission and, having been made by the parties in a stipulation of facts
at pretrial, is treated as a judicial admission. [CIR vs. Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 185568, 21 March 2012]
An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. [ Rule
129, Sec. 4]
According to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the determination of her participation in the disputed
property. The Amended Complaint takes the place of the original, the latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any
further function as a pleading. [Torres v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-37420, July 31, 1984]
It is an established principle that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself and binds the
person who makes the same, absent any showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset
it. [Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. Central Colleges of the Philippines, 666 SCRA 540]
The trial court may reject evidence that a party adduces to contradict a judicial admission he made in his pleading since such admission
is conclusive as to him. [Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. v. Capistrano, 665 SCRA 454]
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. [Rule 129, Sec. 4]
A party may also argue that he made “no such admission.” This argument may be invoked when the statement of a party is taken out
of context or that his statement was made not in the sense it is made to appear by the other party. [Philippine Health-Care Providers,
Inc. v. Estrada, G.R. No. 171052, January 28, 2008]
Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be
exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. [Rule 130, Sec. 1]
An object evidence, when offered in accordance with the requisites for its admissibility, becomes evidence of the highest order and
speaks more eloquently than witnesses put together. The presence of the victim’s ravished body in a deep ravine with handcuffs on her
wrist is a physical evidence that bolsters the testimony of the witness. [People v. Larrahaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21, 2005]
Demonstrative evidence
Demonstrative evidence is not the actual thing but it is referred to as “demonstrative” because it represents or demonstrates the
real thing. It is not strictly “real” evidence because it is not the very thing involved in the case. [ Riano, supra]
One who has familiarity with the scene presented may testify
Some courts insist on requiring the photographer to testify but this view has been eroded by the tendency of modern courts to admit
as a witness one who has familiarity with the scene portrayed. [Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58]
When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. [Rule 130, Sec. 1]
Chain of custody, in relation to Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. [ United States v. Howard-Arias, 679
F.2d 363, 366]
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. [Malillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, 30
April 2008]
It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. [Zafra v. People, 671 SCRA 396]
It is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the
identity of the evidence are removed. [People v. Langcua, G.R. No. 190343, February 6, 2013]
Meaning of DNA
DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
[Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 460 SCRA 315]
A rape-slay case of a 9-year old girl, admitted in evidence the DNA samples of the victim which were found in the bloodstained
garments of the accused. Vaginal swabs taken from the victim were also admitted and were found to show the DNA profile of the
accused who was subsequently convicted. [People v. Vallejo, 382 SCRA 192]
Documentary evidence
Documents as evidence consist of writing or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of
written expression offered as proof of their contents. [Rule 130, Sec. 2]
The trial court gave credence to Marcelina’s testimony, ruled in her favor with Adelino guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape with the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and aid of armed men, and sentenced him to death. The Court held that such testimony was not
enough to convict Adelino since the offended party's testimony must be subjected to thorough scrutiny for a determination of its
veracity beyond reasonable doubt. [People vs. Bardaje, 1999 SCRA 388 (1980)]
The photographer who took the photographs presented as evidence was not present to identify it. The Court held that the photographs
are admissible as evidence because Photographs can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can
testify to its exactness and accuracy. [Sison vs. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995)]
Trial court ruled that the photographs are inadmissible. The Court held that the photographs are inadmissible because the map or
photograph must first to be admissible, be made a part of some qualified person's testimony. Someone must stand forth as its
testimonial sponsor; in other words, it must be verified. [Adamczuk v. Halloway, 13 A.2d 2 (1940)]
The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the dangerous drug itself. The chain of custody over the
dangerous drugs was broken and the integrity of the evidence submitted to the trial court was not preserved. [ People vs. Climaco, G.R.
No. 199403. June 13, 2012]
Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing
of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. What
is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. [People vs. Cardenas, G.R. No. 190342. March 21, 2012]
To be admissible, documentary evidence, like any other evidence, must be relevant and competent. It is also subject to general
exclusionary rules such as the rule on hearsay, best evidence rule, and parol evidence rule. [ Riano, supra]
Purser was able to note in his notebook the incident that happened during the flight. The Court held that the subject of inquiry is not
the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible as part of the res gestae for they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the
declarant". [Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)]
Best evidence rule applicable only if the subject of inquiry is the content of the document
On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court made an error in judgment based on the fact that a certain Mr. Rogers was called
to the stand to testify as to the testimonies made by Lamarre and that it is sufficient that the transcript of stenographic notes be
presented based on the best evidence rule. The Court held that the best evidence rule does not apply because the rule is limited to
cases where the contents of a writing are to be proved and in this case there was no attempt to prove the contents of the transcript
but the issue was whether Lamarre made such statements and not what is contained in the transcript. [ Meyers v. United States, 171
F.2d 800 (1948)]
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet,
including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus
reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded
as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the
others. [People vs. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959)]
The best evidence rule applied in copyright infringement case, where plaintiff possessed no originals of any work he contended was
copied, accordingly before subsequent reconstructions were admissible plaintiff had to establish that the originals were lost or
destroyed through no fault of his own. Thus, copyrighted drawings offered as evidence are considered as documentary evidence and
when subject of inquiry is the content of the creation the original must be presented. [Seiler v. Lucas Film, Ltd., 797 F.2d 1504 (1986)]
Best evidence rule not applicable if the issue is the existence of the document
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the documents are the subject of inquiry. Since in this case the prosecution
presented the marked money solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents presented the marked money,
other substitutionary evidence like a Xerox copy is admissible without the need of accounting for the original. [People vs. Tandoy, 192
SCRA 98 (1990)]
In criminal cases where the document is used as evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, the best evidence applies. In the absence
of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a copy of the said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a
document which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence of such original document may be
doubted. [U.S. vs. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 (1910)]
Exception to the best evidence rule –when the original is with the adverse party
Only a photocopy of the Employee Clearance was presented in evidence. The Court held that the photocopy is admissible as evidence
since an exception to the best evidence rule is when the document sought to be presented is in the possession of the person against
whom it is to be offered and such party fails to present it even after reasonable notice. [ Pacasum vs. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16,
2009]
The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. When such libel or slander was
committed through a published article, copies of such article constitute the best evidence. [ Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Reyes, 55 Phil. 522
(1910)]
Company is suing for damages and presented as evidence are computations made by private accountants. The Court held that the
amount claimed does not comply with the best evidence rule. Sec.2e Rule130 is inapplicable because (1) the voluminous character of
the records, on which the accountant's reports were based, was not established, and (2) a requisite for the application of the rule is
that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the latter may test it on cross-examination.
[Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free Workers, 77 SCRA 24 (1977)]
Exhibits included photocopies of ledgers and vouchers. The Court held that it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce
secondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that the circumstances are such
as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his control. [Villa Rey Transit vs. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845 (1968)]
The document conveying the land was lost so the petitioner tried to present oral, secondary evidence. The Court held that the
secondary evidence is admissible. The loss or destruction of the instrument, meanwhile, may be proved by any person aware of the
fact, or by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or
papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document was kept, and has been unable to find it; or
who has made any other investigation sufficient to satisfy the Court that the document was indeed lost. [ Michael & Co. vs. Enriquez, 33
Phil. 87 (1915)]
The material error made by petitioners is that they failed to account for all the originals prior to presenting the photocopy deed of sale.
The court in order to admit photocopy, the party must prove its existence of the original, its execution, subsequent loss and contents in
this order unless otherwise allowed by the court in some other manner. [De Vera vs. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 (1983)]
The evidence offered by NAPOCOR were photocopies. The Court held that the photocopies were not equivalent to the original
documents based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The information contained in the photocopies submitted by NAPOCOR will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. [National Power Corporation vs. Codilla, G.R. No. 170491. April 3, 2007]
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. In
doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other
useful purpose will be served by requiring production. [Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]
The Court held that the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are not electronic evidence. Thus, it is consequential
that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. [ MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633. October 17, 2007]
Secondary Evidence:
Considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and
inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in evidence the original. In the
absence of the said document, the exhortations of petitioners regarding the existence of said deed of sale must fail. [ Ebreo v. Ebreo,
483 SCRA 583]
Parol evidence
Exceptions
Canuto claimed that two days before the expiration of the original redemption period, she asked Mariano for an extension of time for
the repurchase of the land and Mariano agreed. The Court held that the rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to
alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parole of an agreement between the
parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed. [ Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil 840]
While parole evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has
been fraud or mistake. In the case at bar, it is sought to show that the sugar was to be obtained exclusively from the crop raised by the
defendant; however, there is no clause in the written contract which even remotely suggests such a condition. [Yu Yek vs. Gonzales, 29
Phil 384]
The second paragraph contained in the letter is a condition precedent, which states: “This matter has been the subject of agreement
between your husband and this office.” When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which,
for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parole evidence. [ Land Settlement vs. Garcia Plantation, 7 SCRA
750]
Serrano introduced parole evidence to prove that he was merely acting as an agent without any consideration. The Court held that
Serrano can introduce such parole evidence because the case at bar is not one where the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies, or
contradicts the terms of indorsement admittedly existing. [Maulini vs. Serrano, 28 Phil 640]
The verbal assurance given by Seeto is a collateral agreement, separate and distinct from the indorsement, by virtue of which PNB was
induced to cash the check, and therefore, admissible as an exception to the parol evidence rule. An extrinsic agreement between
indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodies in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parol. [ PNB vs. Seeto, 91
Phil 756]
Statement presented not intended to change the agreement, parol evidence will not apply
The act or statement of Woodhouse was not sought to be introduced to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove how
he induced the Halili to enter into it — to prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the
other party's consent thereto. These are expressly excluded from the parol evidence rule. [ Woodhouse vs. Halili, 93 Phil 526]
The only proof of the payment was Robles' testimony regarding it. The Court held that The rule against the admission of parole
evidence does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parole
agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any
reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity. [Robles vs. Lizarraga, 50 Phil 387]
The parole evidence rule is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement. A receipt is not such a
document as it merely attests to the receipt of money and it is not and could have not been intended by the parties to be the sole
memorial of their agreement. [Cruz vs. CA, 192 SCRA 209]
If a party to the action is not a party to the written agreement, parol evidence cannot be invoked
The parole evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at
least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on
the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. [ Lechugas vs. CA, 143 SCRA 335]
For the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. What is
required is that the agreement be in writing since written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in
fleeting memory only. [Inchiong vs. CA, 257 SCRA 578]
Although parole evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.
[Ortanez vs. CA, 266 SCRA 561]
Under the Rule on parole evidence, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is not
admissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document. We have carefully examined the
Suretyship Agreement signed by Yujuico and found no ambiguity therein. [Rosario Textile Mills vs. Home Bankers, G.R. No. 137232,
June 29, 2005]
Even if the document appears to be a sale, parol evidence may be resorted to if the same does not express the true intent of the
parties. The true understanding in this case is that the portion of the property will not be disposed of. [ Madrigal vs. CA, G.R. No.
142944, April 15, 2005]
Ancient Document Rule
Requisites
The ancient document rule applies to the two Spanish documents and should thus be admitted without the need for evidence on its
authenticity and execution. They meet the 3 requisites of the ancient document rule, namely: (1) be at least thirty (30) years old (2)
found in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion and (3) that it is produced from a
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine. [Heirs of Lacsa vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 234 (1991)]
Exhibit 4 was presented into the Court claiming to be an ancient document. However, it had a missing page which allegedly contained
the signature of the vendor of the lot in question.. Without that signature, the document is incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document
is akin to, if not worse than, a document with altered contents. [Bartolome vs. IAC, 183 SCRA 102 (1990)]
Respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the
decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation
must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, signed by Mohd
Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the
authentication envisaged by Section 25. [Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)]
The trial court erred in admitting that affidavit over the objection of appellant's counsel because section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides that documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English, Spanish or the national language. [ People vs. Monleon, 74 SCRA 263 (1976)]
While Rule 132, Sec. 33 renders documents unaccompanied by the official translation as inadmissible, in the interest of justice, the
prohibition should not apply in this case since Salison failed to object to the document’s admissibility. [ Salison vs. People, 253 SCRA 758
(1966)]
The Order disallowing the printing of the material encoded in the diskettes is void. There was neither testimonial evidence nor any
physical evidence on the diskettes that might indicate they had actually been tampered or their contents altered in order to secure the
conviction of the accused. The mere fact that the diskettes had been in the possession of the prosecution does not necessarily imply
that it had tampered with the evidence to suit its prosecutorial objectives. [People vs. Burgos, 200 SCRA 67 (1991)]
The Court held that the printouts must be signed in order to be admissible. Because they are not signed, they are not properly
authenticated and are thus of no probative value. [IBM Phils., Inc. vs. NLRC, 305 SCRA 592 (1999)]
The Philippine Supreme Court has defined a document as a “deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which something is
proved, evidenced or set forth” [Bermejo v. Barrios, 31 SCRA 764]
When the document is not being offered as authentic as implied from Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires
authentication only when the document is offered as ‘authentic.’ [Patula v. People, 669 SCRA 135]
Testimonial evidence
Qualifications of a witness
All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make their known perception to others, may be witnesses. [Rule 130, Sec. 20]
Competency pertains to the legal fitness or ability of a witness to be heard on a trial of a cause. [ Francisco supra] Credibility of a
witness refers to the believability of a witness and has nothing to do with the law or the rules. It refers to the weight and
trustworthiness or reliability of the testimony. [Riano, supra]
Disqualifications of witnesses
The victim’s feeble-mindedness was an undisputed fact. However, there is no showing that she could not convey her ideas by words or
signs. It appears in the records that Clara gave sufficiently intelligent answers to the questions propounded by the court and the
counsels. The court is satisfied that the complainant can perceive and transmit in her own way her own perceptions to others. [People
vs. De Jesus, 129 SCRA 4]
The acceptance of a witness depends on the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. The
testimony of Soria was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible despite her slurred speech and the use of leading questions. [People
vs. Solomon, 229 SCRA 402]
Paul, a five-year-old boy, testified that Rolando boxed his wife then burned her. The testimony of Paul shows that he is of above
average intelligence, that he is capable of giving responsive answers, of recalling events, and of relating his recollections. For a child
witness to be competent, it must be shown that he has the capacity of (1) observation, (2) of recollection, and (3) of communication.
[People vs. Mendoza, 254 SCRA 18]
The straightforward narration of the victim of what transpired and the categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed
the case for the prosecution. Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. [People vs. Macapagal, July 14, 2005]
By reason of marriage
When an offense directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that
one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other. Using
the criterion, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime
committed by him against his wife (the victim's mother). [Ordono vs. Saquigan, 62 SCRA 270]
It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale,
been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's
breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. When a spouse commits an offense against the other spouse
which vitally and directly impairs the conjugal relation, the two are no longer covered by the Marital Disqualification Rule. [People vs.
Castaneda, 88 SCRA 562]
By his testimony imputing the commission of the crime against his wife, the husband is considered to have waived all his objections to
the testimony of his wife. It is to be expected that after giving such a testimony, it is but normal for his wife to rebut the allegation.
[People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694]
The basis for the disqualification is the relationship of the spouses and not their pecuniary interest. In the cases wherein a spouse is
allowed to be examined by the adverse party as a hostile witness when the spouses are parties to the action, the interests of the
spouses are separate. The spouse offered as a witness is merely a nominal party and is allowed to do so only as a concession from t
the marital disqualification rule for the sake of discovery. [Lezama vs. Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166]
No claim or demand is being made against the estate of Manuel Guerrero. The Dead Man’s Statute only applies in cases e there is a
claim or demand against the estate of the deceased or against the person of an unsound mind. [ Guerrero vs. St. Claire Realty, 124
SCRA 553]
There was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratix extensively cross-examined the witness on the matters
subject of the prohibition. [Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298]
A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-
examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. [Goni vs. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 222]
The Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties; officers and/or stockholders of a corporation, therefore, are not
disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a
deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such person. [ Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330]
The statute does NOT apply when the actions were not brought "against" the estate or not brought upon claims "against" the estate.
In this case, the action is one by the administratrix to enforce demand "BY" the estate. Hence, the statute is inapplicable and the
widow can testify. [Tongco vs. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698]
The dead man's statute is applied to cases filed AGAINST the administrator for claims AGAINST the estate of the deceased. In this
case, it the administrator who filed the case for delivery of the stocks and it was not a claim against the estate so the dead man's
statute does not apply. [Razon vs. IAC, 207 SCRA]
Marital Disqualification:
Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without
collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if
otherwise competent, becomes admissible. [ People vs. Carlos 47 Phil. 626 (1925)]
Attorney-Client Privilege:
It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. A communication
made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the
confidential relation. Such communication is between the third person and the client, the attorney being merely an agent. [ Uy Chico vs.
Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915)]
Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would
furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is
privileged. [Regala vs. Sandiganbatan, 262 SCRA 124 (1996)]
The privilege which protects communications between attorney and client does not extend to a copy of a letter written by the client to
his attorney which comes to the hands of the adverse party. Where the authenticity of such documents is admitted, the court will take
no notice of the manner in which it was obtained. [Barton vs. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924)]
Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and private matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and
contracts relating to fees are essentially not of a privileged nature. In other words, the terms of employment between attorney and
client are not of a privileged nature. [Orient Insurance vs. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 (1930)]
The period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either
a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. in other words, If the client seeks his
lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional
seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s consent. [ People vs.
Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)]
The protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client
in anticipation of litigation. However, there is no necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda, and
personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. [ Hickman vs. Taylor, 329 SCRA
495 (1947)]
The communications by Upjohn's employees to counsel are covered by the attorney-client privilege insofar as the responses to the
questionnaires and any notes reflecting responses to interview questions are concerned. The communications concerned matters within
the scope of the employees' corporate duties, and the employees themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned
in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice. [Upjohn Co. vs. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 (1981)]
The receipt of fees from a client is not usually within the privilege because the payment of a fee is not normally a matter of confidence
or a communication. The ministerial or clerical services of an attorney in transferring funds to or from a client is not a matter of
confidence that is protected by the privilege. [In re Grand Jury Investigation, 732 F.2d 447 (1983)]
McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, because his statements were made in confidence to an attorney
for a co-defendant for a common purpose related to both defenses. [U.S. Vs. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979)]
The court held that a communication divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential communication
between attorney and client. [U.S. Vs. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975)]
The fact that a defense investigator on respondent’s behalf elicited statements of third parties does not convert them into respondent’s
personal communications. Also, the work-product privilege may be waived when the defense presents its investigator as a witness thus
opening the investigator, along with the product of his work, to cross-examination. [U.S. Vs. Nobles, 422 U.S. (1975)]
Physician-Patient Privilege
Requisites
In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be successfully claimed, the following requisites should concur:
(1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5) the information was confidential and if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation of the patient. [Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273 (1992)]
Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is the patient’s husband who testifies on a document executed by medical
practitioners, his testimony does not have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and
executed the report. Plainly, this does not fall within the prohibition. [Krohn vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 (1994)]
State Secrets
When the ground for asserting the privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the
generalized interest in confidentiality, unsupported by a claim of the need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security
secrets, it cannot prevail against a demonstrated, specific need for the documents/recordings needed and over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of the privilege must yield to the
demonstrated need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. [ U.S. vs. Nixon 418 U.S. 683 (1974)]
The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest.
Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this rule will not be applicable. The rule that a public officer cannot be
examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public
interest would suffer by the disclosure question. [Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986)]
There is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege - it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary
Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China,
which was the subject of the three. [Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008]
Examination of a witness
The mere fact that the witness died after giving his direct testimony is no ground in itself for excluding his testimony from the record so
long as the adverse party was afforded an adequate opportunity for cross- examination but through fault of his own failed to cross-
examine the witness. The right to cross-examine Loreto was waived by Petitioners through their repeated absence and motions to
postpone the cross- examination. [Dela Paz vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 65 (1987)]
Supreme Court held that although the right to cross-examine is a vital part of due process, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. The principle requiring a
testing of testimonial statements by cross-examination has always been understood as requiring, not necessarily an actual cross-
examination, but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. [Fulgado vs. CA, 182 SCRA 81 (1982)]
Purpose of cross-examination
The CFI disallowed the cross- examination of a witness presented by Capitol since he was the witness of Capitol. The Supreme Court
held that the adverse party may cross-examine a witness for the purpose among others, of eliciting all important facts bearing upon
the issue. From this provision it may clearly be inferred that a party may cross- examine a witness on matters not embraced in his
direct examination. But this does not mean that a party by doing so is making the witness his own. [Capital Subdivision vs. Negros
Occidental, 4672 (1956)]
Continuing objections
Marshall did not waive his continuing objection to testimony within the scope of the district court's ruling of admissibility by cross-
examining Ms. Stanlin with regard to some of the documents she relied upon in testifying as a fact that the records showed that three
lawn mowers were missing, or by introducing these documents in connection with this cross- examination- in order to show how
unreliable was her estimate that any lawn mowers at all were missing from the store. [U.S. vs. Marshall, 762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)]
Section 14, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its
discretion, as the interests of justice may require; and We believe that it was the better part of discretion and caution on the part of the
trial court to have denied as it did, the request of the defense to recall Ceribo. The record is loaded with circumstances tending to show
insidious attempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to tamper with the witnesses for the prosecution.
Under the circumstances, to allow such a procedure would only encourage the perversion of truth and make a mockery of court
proceedings. [People vs. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA]
Once a witness has been subjected to extensive cross-examination, the motion to recall him as rebuttal witness may be denied.
[Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Ong Su, 79 SCRA 207 (1977)]
The Supreme Court held that it was improper for the trial court to grant the motion to recall witness because the discretion to recall a
witness may not be exercised on whimsical grounds, but must come out of a clear showing that particularly identified material points
were not covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital documents were not presented to the witness whose
recall is prayed for, or that the cross- examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Here,
the counsel averred that some questions had not been asked but did not even specify what they were. [ People vs. Rivera, 200 SCRA
786 (1991)]
Leading Questions:
The alternative form of question (‘State whether or not you said that you refused,’ ‘Did you or did you not refuse?’) is free from this
defect of form, because both affirmative and negative answers are presented for the witness' choice. Nevertheless, such a question
may become leading, in so far as it rehearses lengthy details which the witness might not otherwise have mentioned, and thus supplies
him with full suggestions which he incorporates without any effort by the simple answer, ‘I did,’ or ‘I did not.’ Accordingly, the sound
view is that such a question may or may not be improper, according to the amount of palpably suggestive detail which it embodies.
[State vs. Scott, 149 P2d 152 (1944)]
The testimony and the public document are declarations adverse to the interest of the Costelos which is admissible in evidence. The
previous recognition by a party in physical possession of the property in dispute of the ownership in another constitutes a declaration
against the interest of the former and ay be received in evidence not only against such party who made the declaration or his
successors in interest but also against 3rd persons. [Viacrusis vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCRA 176(1972)]
The admissions of the president of a company are binding on the company under the rule that admissions of liability by a party may be
given against it. [Keller & Co. vs. COB, 141 SCRA 86 (1986)]
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is
applicable in criminal cases. [People vs. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105 (1978)]
The silence of an accused (or in this case, the three appellants) under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating
him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be
considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. [ People vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)]
Comment to the jury by a prosecutor in a state criminal trial upon a defendant's failure to testify as to the matters which he can
reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge or by the court that the defendant's silence under
those circumstances evidences guilt violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. [ Griffin
vs. California, 380 U.S. 853 (1965)]
The rights of an accused cannot be prejudiced by the extra-judicial declarations of another person. [People vs. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248
(1996)]
As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have
probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. [ People vs. Alegre, 94
Phil. 109 (1979)]
Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
Statements made by an employee against his employer are admissible against the latter, where the statements while in employ and
where they concerned a matter within the scope of his employment. [ Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, 588 F.2d 626
(8th Cir. 198)]
Co-conspirator's Statements
In the absence of any other evidence to prove the existence of an alleged conspiracy, extra-judicial statements and admissions of an
individual cannot be taken as evidence against an alleged co-conspirator. An extrajudicial statement made by a co-accused is, by itself,
insufficient to convict an accused of a crime charged because said statement is inadmissible since they were made not during the
existence of the conspiracy but after the said conspiracy had already ceased and when the co-accused was already in the custody of
the police. [People vs. Cabrera, 57 SCRA 715 (1974)]
The rule regarding statements made by a co-conspirator refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the
unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had been brought to an
end. Under the rule on multiple admissibility of evidence, the confession of a co-accused may be inadmissible against his co-accused
for being hearsay but may nevertheless be admissible against the declarant’s own guilt. [People vs. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (1955)]
The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to statements made by one
conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a
confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. [ People vs. Chaw Yaw Shun, 23 SCRA 127
(1968)]
The rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial
acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. [People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531 (1959)]
The testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages
therein. It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to
other facts, as there is hardly a witness who can perfectly remember the details of a crime. [ People vs. Bulan, G.R. No. 143404, 8 June
2005]
Admission By Privies
Coverage of privies
The word “privies does not only denote testate or intestate succession but also succession by virtue of acts inter vivos, as by
assignment, subrogation or purchase and in fact any act whereby the successor is substituted in the place of the predecessor in
interest. The purchaser at an execution sale is a privy of the execution debtor. [Alpuerto vs. Pastor, 38 Phil. 785 (1918)]
The act of a predecessor to a land is not binding on the successor if the acts/declarations made by the predecessor acknowledging
ownership or offering to purchase the property from a third party were made before the predecessor held title to the land. [ City of
Manila vs. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 (1905)]
Confessions:
Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are flawed under the Constitution and as such cannot be admitted in Court. Here, it is evident that Compil was
immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas. [ People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135
(1995)]
The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the “exclusionary rule” because the constitutional
guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The accused cannot be made to
affix their signatures on evidence without complying with the Bill of Rights. By affixing their signatures on the evidence, the accused
are in effect made to tacitly admit the crime charged for, in this case, mere possession of prohibited drugs is a crime. These signatures
amount to uncounseled extra-judicial confession prohibited by the Bill of Rights and therefore inadmissible as evidence. [ People vs.
Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)]
Silence of the accused during custodial investigation may not be taken against him
While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent^ his silence
when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. [ People vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA
109 (1979)]
Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the
accused is inadmissible in evidence. [People vs. Yip Wai Ming, 264 SCRA 224 (1996)]
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. On the other hand, the term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense charged. The rights of an accused are not confined to the period prior to the filing of an information but are available at that
stage when a person is under investigation for the commission of an offense. These rights are available to a person at any time before
arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense. [ People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995)]
The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying declarant
simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's
extrajudicial statement only against its source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant's confrontation right.
The court may admit into evidence interlocking confessions of co-defenants/accused even without giving the accused an opportunity to
cross-examine his co-defendant. The rule however is different when a co-defendant does not confess. In such cases, the co-defendant
must be given an opportunity to cross- examine the confessant if and when such person takes the witness stand. [ Parker vs. Randolph,
442 U.S. 62 (1979)]
The Supreme Court held that the testimonies of the two chemists were admissible as their purpose is to ascertain defendant's
knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. The general rule is that evidence of other offenses committed by the defendant is
inadmissible. However, such evidence may be admitted where its purpose is to ascertain the knowledge and intent of the defendant to
fix his negligence. [U.S. vs. Pineda, 37 Phil. 457 (1918)]
Evidence of another crime for Identification and presence of the perpetrator admissible
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant,
as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the
vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime. [ People vs. Irang, 64 Phil.
285 (1937)]
Character as evidence
Purpose
While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of
an offense, such is not necessary in the crime of murder through TREACHERY or EVIDENT PREMEDITATION (remember that the
character of the wounds show that the deceased was killed in a lying position). The proof of such character may only be allowed in
homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary. [ People vs. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)]
General reputation
The accused failed to prove that Severino's quarrelsome nature was a general reputation, and not an isolated or specific act. While it is
true that, to support a defense of self-defense, the accused may prove that the deceased was of a quarrelsome, provoking, irascible
disposition, such proof must be of his general reputation in the community, and NOT of specific or isolated acts. [ People vs. Babiera, 52
Phil. 97 (1928)]
Impeachment of witness
Generally, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing: 1. that he has made
contradictory statements; or
2. by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. The question to which the
defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for
truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. [U.S. Vs. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)]
Even the testimony adduced by the defense portraying Cheril as a disrespectful and wayward child does not detract from her credibility
as a witness narrating her ordeal in the hands of her father. Moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of persons
accused of rape, as even prostitutes can be the victims of rape. [People vs. Umbana, 402 SCRA 415]
6.5.6. Hearsay Rule
Testimonial knowledge:
The purpose of the prosecuting officer is nothing more than to establish the fact that Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of
those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged. The Supreme Court believe that the question propounded to the witness
was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to
be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named REALLY AND ACTUALLY conspired with Puesca and later took part in
the commission of the offense. [People vs. Cusi, 14 SCRA 944 (1965)]
The statement of Guzman relating that the accused had told him that he had killed the deceased is not hearsay. The witness Guzman
related the accused’s confession for the purpose of establishing the fact that such a statement was made, thus excluding the same
from the coverage of the hearsay rule. [People vs. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (1989)]
The field notes of investigator Gross consisted of the testimony of Leake’s son who was not presented nor cross-examined during the
trial. The Federal Court held that was error for the trial court to admit into evidence the testimony concerning what Leake's son said to
Edward Gross, because the person who gave the statement does not testify in open court, pursuant to the Hearsay Rule. [ Leake vs.
Hagert, 175 N.W. 2d 675 (1970)]
A statement is not prohibited by the hearsay rule if it is merely offered for proving the fact that the statement was made, and not as a
means of proving the truth of the fact asserted therein. Implied assertions, which are inferences that can be drawn from the conduct of
persons, are not covered by the hearsay rule unless they are intended to be an assertion concerning the matter in inquiry. (Ex.
Testimony that a person pointed to a person in a police line up) [U.S. Vs. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)]
The ban on hearsay does not cover independently relevant statements, which consist of statements that are independently relevant of
the truth asserted therein. They belong to two classes: 1. Those statements which are the very facts in issue, 2. Those statements
which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following: Statement of a person showing his
state of mind; Statement of a person showing his physical condition; Statement of a person to infer a state of mind of another person;
Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; Statements to show a lack of credibility of a witness. [Estrada
vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA (2001)]
Dying Declaration:
The declaration of the deceased is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he
would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope
of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule." It may be
admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased had no
sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused. [ People vs. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (1985)]
The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of death. That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not
the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible. [ People vs. Sabio, 2 SCRA 218 (1981)]
The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the testimony of Mercy Beriña, that she heard Rodolfo “Ompong” Chavez say
“tinambangan kami na Ador” (We were ambushed by the Adors). Sad to say, no specific name was ever mentioned by the witness.
Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) “Adors” were involved. The prosecution therefore was not able to establish with moral
certainty as to who of the Adors were perpetrators of the offense. [ People vs. Ador, G.R. Nos. 140538-39, 14 June 2—4]
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was a confirmation
of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage". [People vs. Majuri, 96 SCRA 472 (1980)]
Previous out of court statements admissible as admission against the declarant’s interest
Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds,
are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, - something else is
necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because
no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. [People vs. Toledo, 51 Phil. 825 (1928)]
Requisites
To admit declarations against interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule: (a) the declarant must not be able to testify due to death,
mental incapacity or physical incompetence rather than mere absence from the courts;; (b) the declaration must concern a matter of
fact cognizable by the declarant;; (c) the circumstances render it improbable that a motive to falsify exists. [ Fuentes vs. CA, 253 SCRA
430 (1996)]
Court held that Miguel’s claim of ownership to half of the subject property is belied by his statement in the Verified Petition for issuance
of letters administration. While he explicitly declared that the subject property belonged to Quintin, at the same time he was
remarkably silent about his claim that he acquired one- half thereof during the lifetime of Quintin. Thus, the statement and the
accompanying silence may be appreciated in more than one context. It is a declaration against interest and a judicial admission
combined. [Heirs of Miguel Franco vs. CA, G.R. No. 123924, 11 December 2003.]
Pedigree
While a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may nevertheless testify as to his age which he learned
from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. In his application for back pay filed
with the Department of Finance and when he asked the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth, he
repeatedly asserted that his birthday was on December 11, 1901. [Gravador vs. Mamingo, 20 SCRA 742 (1967)]
Requisites
“Pedigree” under Section 39 has three requisites: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any member of the family;
(2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the
witness testifying to the reputation or tradition must be a member of the family of the said person. [People vs. Alegado, 201 SCRA 582]
Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant, the declaration of the latter that the former is her niece is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence
thereof, the reason that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure
of justice. [Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)]
Requisites
Requisites for admissibility of acts or declarations about pedigree, family reputation or tradition: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable
to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject to inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration be made ante litem moam. [ Ferrer vs. de Ynchausti, 38 Phil. 905
(1918)]
Common reputation
Testimony does not constitute common reputation unless such is equivalent to universal reputation. [City of Manila vs. Del Rosario]
For a statement to be part of the res gestae, it must not only be spontaneous but also be made at a time when there was no
opportunity to concoct or develop a story. [People vs. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100 (1988)]
Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a certain and impending death,
and for this reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, such declaration can fall squarely in the rule on res gestae. [People vs.
Putian, 74 SCRA 133 (1993)]
Requisites
For the res gestae rule to apply, the following must be present: That the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;; that
the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;; and that the statements made must concern the
occurrence in question and their immediately attending circumstances. [ People vs. Tolentino, 218 SCRA 337 (1993)]
The act which allows the admission of business entries refers only to records kept in the regular course of business and not those kept
in the regular course of conduct related to business. [Palmer vs. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109]
Sec. 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court may not be invoked in order to justify the admission of a statement of account identified by a
witness whose office made the entries thereof but who has no personal knowledge about how the account had arisen or of the
transactions to which the entries refer. [Philam Life vs. Capital Assurance Corporation, (CA) 72 O.G. 3941]
The report submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties, on the basis of his own personal observation of the facts
reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. [Caltex vs. Africa, 16 SCRA 448 (1966)]
A medical certificate prepared by a government hospital doctor, even if he/she was not presented as witness, is admissible as prima
facie of the facts therein stated and is an exception to the hearsay rule. [People vs. Leones, 117 SCRA 382 (1982)]
A sheriff’s return is an official statement by a public official in the performance of his duty specially enjoined by law and forming part of
official records and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the
facts stated in his entry. [Manalo vs. Robles Trans. Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729 (1956)]
Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of
such entries. They are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated since they would be incomplete or inaccurate. [ People vs.
Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993)]
Requisites
For entries in official record to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or
by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;; and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. [People vs.
Gabriel, G.R. No. L-107735, February 1, 1996]
Notarial documents
Court ruled in favor of the spouses Sison, applying the rule that documents acknowledged before notaries public are public documents
which are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to their authenticity and due execution. Furthermore, the
series of official acts and processes leading to the transfer of the tax declaration in the name of Eduardo lend credence to the due
execution of the questioned deed of sale. [Dela Cruz vs. Sison, G.R. No. 163770, February 17, 2005]
To satisfy the threshold the judge must be convinced that the compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
and is generally considered useful and reliable. If these conditions are met, statements from the compilation are admissible to prove
the truth of the relevant matter stated. The business record exception is predicated not only on the circumstance that the record itself
is kept in the usual course of the business but also on the circumstance that the recorded information is obtained by the recorder from
a declarant having a "business" duty to communicate it truthfully. [State vs. Lungsford, 400 A.2d 843 (1979)]
Requisites
A document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement
is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation. [PNOC Shipping vs. Court
of Appeals, 299 SCRA 402 (1999)]
Subsequent failure or refusal to appear at the second trial or hostility since testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to
testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power
of speech. [Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 54 (1967)]
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause exception to the confrontation
requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. [Ohio vs. Roberts, 448
SCRA 56 (1980)]
Opinion rule
Generally speaking, any person who by study or experience has acquired particular knowledge or experience may be allowed to give in
evidence his opinion upon matters of technical knowledge and skill relating to such business or employment. [Dilag & Co. vs. Merced,
45 O.G. 5536 (1949)]
Expert testimony
Expert testimony constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on questions of a professional
character. Courts, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they
can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of
conviction which may have been adduced during the trial. [U.S. vs. Trono, 3 Phil. 213 (1904)]
As with other jurisdictions, the Philippines also rejects the results of polygraph tests as evidence of establish the guilty or innocence of
a person for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or deception.
Visibility is a vital factor in determining whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is
settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity
of the malefactor should normally be accepted. [People vs. Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1 (1999)]
Whether a witness is shown to be qualified or not as an expert is a preliminary question to be determined in the first place by the
court; and the rule is, that if the court admits the testimony, then it is for the jury to decide whether any, and if any what, weight is to
be given to the testimony, Reports and articles are present to the effect that the process has gained general acceptance. But even if a
showing of general acceptance had not been established here, neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty in a test suffices to
render it inadmissible in court. [U.S. vs. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)]
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically applies to expert testimony. Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes "general
acceptance" as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as
a whole were intended to incorporate a "general acceptance" standard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid
"general acceptance" requirement would be at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules and their "general approach of
relaxing the traditional barriers to `opinion' testimony." [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1933)]
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to posses, may be
received in evidence. [Rule 130, Sec. 49]
Opinion of ordinary witness
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. [ Rule 130, Sec. 50]
Character evidence
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence
relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or
reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits
of the case. [People v. Lee, 382 SCRA 596]
In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged. [Rule 130, Sec. 51 (a)]
In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.
[Rule 130, Sec. 51 (b)]
A perusal of the entire records of the case shows that the defense did not formally offer in evidence such sworn statements and
evidence not formally offered cannot be considered by the court. The Court held that evidence not formally offered cannot be
considered by the court. [People vs. Carino, 165 SCRA 664 (1988)]
Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it was formally offered, and not when the particular document is marked
is identified and marked as an exhibit. [Interpacific Transit vs. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) ]
Formal offer of evidence is hardly applicable in summary proceedings where no full-blown trial is held in the interest of a speedy
administration of justice. [Delos Reyes vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 394 (1989)]
Nature of objection
The right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive;; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably
made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence. [ Peolple vs. Yatco,
97 Phil. 940 (1992)]
When the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a
specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
[PHILAMGEN vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194 (1992)]
Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right
to object. But such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity,
lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections. [ Catuira vs. CA, G.R. No. 105813, September 12,
1994]
Requirements for an evidence not formally offered may still be admitted
Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, first,
the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the
records of the case. [Vda. de Onate vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 283 (1995)]