The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism

Author(s): Michael Walzer

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 6-23
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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 THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE
OF LIBERALISM

MICHAEL WALZER
forAdvancedStudy
Institute

1.

Intellectualfashions arenotoriouslyshort-lived,verymuchlikefashions
in popularmusic,art,or dress.But thereare certainfashionsthatseem
regularlytoreappear. Likepleatedtrousers orshortskirts,theyareinconstant
featuresofa largerandmoresteadilyprevailing phenomenon - inthiscase,
a certainwayofdressing. Theyhavebriefbutrecurrent lives;we knowtheir
transience and excepttheirreturn. Needlessto say,thereis no afterlife in
whichtrousers will be permanently pleatedor skirtsforever short.Recur-
renceis all.
Although itoperatesat a muchhigherlevel(an infinitely higherlevel?)
ofcultural significance, thecommunitarian critiqueofliberalismis likethe
pleatingof trousers:transient but certainto return.It is a consistently
intermittent featureof liberalpoliticsand social organization. No liberal
successwillmakeitpermanently unattractive. Atthesametime,nocommu-
nitariancritique,howeverpenetrating, will everbe anything morethanan
inconstant featureof liberalism. Someday,perhaps,therewill be a larger
transformation, like the shiftfromaristocratic knee-breeches to plebian
pants,rendering liberalism anditscriticsalikeirrelevant.
ButI see nopresent
signsof anything likethat,noram I surethatwe shouldlookforward to it.
Fornow,thereis muchtobe saidfora recurrent critique,
whoseprotagonists
hope onlyforsmallvictories, partialincorporations, and whentheyare
rebuffed ordismissedorcoopted,fadeawayfora timeonlyto return.
Communitarianism is usefullycontrasted withsocial democracy, which
hassucceededinestablishing a permanent presencealongsideofandsome-

A UTHOR'SNOTE: Thisessaywasfirstgiven
as theJohn
Deweylecture
atHarvardLawSchool
int
September
1989.

POLITICAL THEORY,Vol. 18 No. 1, February

19906-23
?c 1990Sage Publications,
Inc.
6

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 Walzer/COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE 7

timesconjoinedwithliberalpolitics.Socialdemocracy hasitsownintermit-
tently fashionable critics,largelyanarchistandlibertarian incharacter.Since
it sponsorscertainsortsof communalidentification, it is less subjectto
communitarian criticism thanliberalismis. But it can neverescape such
criticism entirely,forliberalsandsocialdemocrats alikesharea commitment
to economicgrowthandcope (althoughin different ways)withthederaci-
natedsocial formsthatgrowthproduces.Community itselfis largelyan
ideologicalpresenceinmodern society;ithasno recurrent criticsofitsown.
It is intermittently fashionable onlybecauseitno longerexistsin anything
likefullstrength, anditis criticized onlywhenitis fashionable.
The communitarian critiqueis nonethelessa powerful one; itwouldnot
recurifitwerenotcapableofengaging ourmindsandfeelings. In thisessay,
I wanttoinvestigate thepowerofitscurrent American versions andthenoffer
a versionof myown-less powerful, perhaps,thantheones withwhichI
shallbegin,butmoreavailableforincorporation withinliberal(or social
democratic)politics.I do not mean (I hardlyhave the capacity)to lay
communitarianism to rest,although I wouldwillingly waitforitsreappear-
in
ance a formmorecoherent and incisivethanthatin whichit currently
appears.Theproblem withcommunitarian criticismtoday- I amnotthefirst
to noticethis is thatit suggeststwodifferent,
- and deeplycontradictory,
arguments againstliberalism. One ofthesearguments is aimedprimarily at
liberalpractice, theotherprimarily atliberaltheory,buttheycannotbothbe
right. It is possiblethateachone is partly right-indeed, I shallinsistonjust
thispartialvalidity -but each of the arguments is rightin a way that
undercuts thevalueoftheother.

[I.

Thefirst argument holdsthatliberalpoliticaltheory accurately represents

liberalsocialpractice.As iftheMarxist accountofideologicalreflectionwere
literally
true,andexemplified here,contemporary Westernsocieties(Amer-
ican societyespecially)are takento be the home of radicallyisolated
individuals, rationalegotists,and existential agents,menand womenpro-
tectedanddividedbytheirinalienable rights.Liberalismtellsthetruthabout
theasocialsocietythatliberalscreate-not, infact,exnihiloas theirtheory
suggests,butina struggle againsttraditions andcommunities andauthorities
thatareforgotten as soonas theyareescaped,so thatliberalpracticesseem
tohavenohistory. Thestruggle itselfis ritually
celebrated
butrarely reflected
on.The members ofliberalsocietysharenopoliticalorreligioustraditions;

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8 POLITICAL THEORY /FEBRUARY 1990

theycantellonlyonestoryaboutthemselves andthatis thestoryofexnihilo

whichbeginsin thestateof natureor theoriginalposition.Each
creation,
individualimagineshimselfabsolutelyfree,unencumbered, and on his
own- andenters society, itsobligations,
accepting onlyinordertominimize
andsecurity
hisrisks.His goal is security, is,as Marxwrote,"theassurance
ofhisegoism."Andas he imagineshimself, so he reallyis,

thatis, an individualseparatedfromthecommunity, withdrawnintohimself,

wholly
preoccupiedwithhis privateinterest and actingin accordancewithhis privateca-
price.... Theonlybondbetweenmenis natural need,andprivateinterest.1
necessity,

(I haveusedmasculinepronouns inordertofitmysentences toMarx's.But

itis an interestingquestion, notaddressed here,whether this
firstcommuni-
tariancritique speakstotheexperience of women: Are and
necessity private
interest theironlybondswithone another?)
Thewritings oftheyoungMarxrepresent oneoftheearlyappearances of
communitarian criticism,and his argument, firstmade in the 1840s, is
powerfully presenttoday.AlastairMaclntyre's descriptionof theincoher-
enceofmodemintellectual andcultural lifeandthelossofnarrative capacity
makesa similarpointinupdated, theoretical
state-of-the-art, language.2 But
theonlytheory thatis necessary tothecommunitarian critiqueofliberalism
is liberalism All thatthecriticshavetodo,so theysay,is totakeliberal
itself.
theory seriously.The self-portraitof theindividual constitutedonlyby his
willfulness, liberatedfromall connection, withoutcommonvalues,binding
ties,customs,or traditions - sans eyes,sans teeth, sans taste,sans every-
thing - needonlybe evokedinorder tobe devalued:Itisalreadytheconcrete
absenceofvalue.Whatcan thereallifeof sucha personbe like?Imagine
himmaximizing andsocietyis turned
hisutilities, intoa warofall against
all,thefamiliar ratrace,inwhich,as Hobbeswrote,thereis "no othergoal,
norothergarland, butbeingforemost."3 Imaginehimenjoying hisrights,and
societyis reducedto thecoexistenceof isolatedselves,forliberalrights,
according tothisfirst
critique,havemoretodowith"exit"thanwith"voice."4
Theyareconcretely expressedin separation, divorce,withdrawal, solitude,
privacy, andpoliticalapathy.And finally, theveryfactthatindividual life
can be describedin thesetwo philosophical languages,the languageof
utilitiesandthelanguageofrights, mark,saysMaclntyre,
is a further ofits
incoherence: Men andwomenin liberalsocietyno longerhaveaccess to a
singlemoralculturewithinwhichtheycan learnhow theyoughtto live.'
Thereis noconsensus, nopublicmeeting-of-minds, onthenature ofthegood
life,hencethetriumph ofprivatecaprice,revealed,forexample,inSartrean
existentialism, theideologicalreflection ofeveryday capriciousness.

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 Walzer/COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE 9

We liberalsarefreetochoose,andwe havea right tochose,butwe have

no criteriatogovernourchoicesexceptourownwaywardunderstanding of
ourwaywardinterests anddesires.Andso ourchoiceslackthequalitiesof
cohesionandconsecutiveness. We canhardly remember whatwe didyester-
day;we cannotwithanyassurancepredictwhatwe willdo tomorrow. We
cannotgive a properaccountof ourselves.We cannotsittogether and tell
comprehensible stories,andwe recognizeourselvesin thestorieswe read
onlywhenthesearefragmented narratives,without plots,theliterary equiv-
alentofatonalmusicandnonrepresentational art.
Liberalsociety,seen in thelightof thisfirstcommunitarian is
critique,
fragmentation inpractice;andcommunity is theexactopposite,thehomeof
coherence, connection, andnarrative capacity.ButI am lessconcerned here
withthedifferent accountsthatmight be provided ofthislostEdenthanI am
withtherepeated insistenceonthereality offragmentation aftertheloss.This
is thecommonthemeofall contemporary communitarianisms: neoconserva-
tive lamentation, neo-Marxist indictment, and neoclassicalor republican
hand-wringing. (Theneedfortheprefix "neo"suggests againtheintermittent
or recurrent character of communitarian criticism.) I shouldthinkitwould
be an awkwardtheme,forifthesociologicalargument of liberaltheoryis
right,ifsocietyis actuallydecomposed, without residue, intotheproblematic
coexistence ofindividuals,thenwe might wellassumethatliberalpoliticsis
thebestwaytodealwiththeproblems ofdecomposition. Ifwe havetocreate
an artificialandahistorical unionoutofa multitude ofisolatedselves,why
nottakethestateofnatureortheoriginalpositionas ourconceptual starting
point?Whynotaccept,instandard liberalfashion, thepriority ofprocedural
justiceoversubstantive conceptions ofthegood,sincewe canhardly expect,
givenour fragmentation, to agreeaboutthegood? MichaelSandel asks
whether a community ofthosewhoputjusticefirst caneverbe morethana
community ofstrangers.6 The questionis a goodone,butitsreverseformis
moreimmediately relevant: Ifwe reallyarea community ofstrangers,how
can we do anything else butputjusticefirst?

Ill.

We aresavedfromthisentirely plausiblelineofargument bythesecond

communitarian critiqueof liberalism.The secondcritiqueholdsthatliberal
theory radicallymisrepresents reallife.The worldis notlikethatnorcould
itbe. Menandwomencutloosefromall socialties,literally unencumbered,
eachonetheoneandonlyinventor ofhisorherownlife,withnocriteria, no

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10 POLITICAL THEORY /FEBRUARY 1990

commonstandards, toguidetheinvention -these aremythical figures. How

can anygroupofpeoplebe strangers to one another wheneachmember of
thegroupis bornwithparents, and whentheseparentshave friends, rel-
atives,neighbors, comradesat work,coreligionists, and fellowcitizens-
connections, in fact,whichare not so muchchosenas passed on and
inherited? Liberalismmaywellenhancethesignificance ofpurelycontrac-
tualties,butitis obviouslyfalsetosuggest, as Hobbessometimes seemedto
do, thatall ourconnections aremere"market friendships,"voluntarist and
self-interestedincharacter, whichcannotoutlasttheadvantages theybring.7
Itis intheverynatureofa humansocietythatindividuals bredwithinitwill
findthemselves caughtupinpatterns ofrelationship, networks ofpower,and
communities ofmeaning. Thatqualityofbeingcaughtupiswhatmakesthem
personsof a certainsort.Andonlythencan theymakethemselves persons
ofa (marginally) differentsortbyreflecting on whattheyareandbyacting
in moreorless distinctive wayswithinthepatterns, networks, andcommu-
nitiesthatarewilly-nilly theirs.
Theburdenofthesecondcritique is thatthedeepstructure evenofliberal
societyis in factcommunitarian. Liberaltheorydistorts thisrealityand,
insofaras we adoptthetheory, deprivesus ofanyreadyaccessto ourown
experience ofcommunal embeddedness. Therhetoric ofliberalism -this is
theargument oftheauthors ofHabitsoftheHeart- limitsourunderstanding
ofourownheart'shabits,andgivesus no waytoformulate theconvictions
thathold us togetheras personsand thatbind personstogether intoa
community. The assumption hereis thatwe arein factpersonsandthatwe
are in factboundtogether. The liberalideologyof separatism cannottake
personhood and bondednessawayfromus. Whatit does takeawayis the
sense of our personhoodand bondedness,and thisdeprivation is then
reflectedinliberalpolitics.Itexplainsourinability toformcohesivesolidar-
ities,stablemovements andparties, thatmightmakeourdeepconvictions
visibleand effective in theworld.It also explainsourradicaldependence
(brilliantly
foreshadowed inHobbes'sLeviathan)onthecentralstate.
But how are we to understand thisextraordinary disjunction between
communal experience andliberalideology, betweenpersonalconviction and
publicrhetoric, andbetweensocialbondedness andpoliticalisolation? That
questionis notaddressed bycommunitarian criticsofthesecondsort.Ifthe
firstcritiquedependson a vulgarMarxisttheoryof reflection, thesecond
critiquerequiresan equallyvulgaridealism.Liberaltheorynow seemsto
havea poweroverandagainstreallifethathasbeengranted tofewtheories
in humanhistory. Plainly,ithas notbeengranted to communitarian theory,
whichcannot,on thefirst argument, overcomethereality ofliberalseparat-

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 Walzer/COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE 11

ismandcannot, onthesecondargument, evokethealreadyexisting structures

of social connection.In anycase, thetwocriticalarguments are mutually
inconsistent;theycannotbothbe true.Liberalseparatism eitherrepresents
ormisrepresents theconditionsofeveryday ofcourse,do a little
life.Itmight,
ofeach- theusualmuddle- butthatis nota satisfactory conclusionfroma
communitarian standpoint.Foriftheaccountofdissociation andseparatism
is evenpartlyright,thenwe haveto raisequestionsaboutthedepth,so to
speak,ofthedeepstructure. Andifwe arealltosomedegreecommunitarians
undertheskin,thentheportrait ofsocialincoherence losesitscriticalforce.

IV

Buteachofthetwocriticalarguments is partly I willtrytosaywhat

right.
is rightabouteach,andthenask ifsomething plausiblecan be madeofthe
parts.First,then,therecannotbe muchdoubtthatwe (intheUnitedStates)
live in a societywhereindividuals arerelatively dissociatedandseparated
fromone another, orbetter,
wheretheyarecontinually separating fromone
another-continually in motion,oftenin solitaryand apparently random
motion, as ifinimitationofwhatphysicistscallBrownian movement. Hence
we live in a profoundly unsettled
society.We can bestsee theformsof
unsettlement ifwe trackthemostimportant moves.So, consider(imitating
theChinesestyle)theFourMobilities:

1. Geographic mobility.Americans apparentlychangetheir residence moreoftenthanany

peopleinhistory, atleastsincethebarbarianmigrations, excluding onlynomadictribes
andfamiliescaughtup in civilor foreign wars.Movingpeopleand theirpossessions
fromone cityor towntoanother is a majorindustry in theUnitedStates,eventhough
manypeople manageto movethemselves. In anothersense,of course,we are all
self-moved, notrefugees butvoluntarymigrants. The senseof place mustbe greatly
weakenedbythisextensive geographicmobility, although I findithardtosaywhether
it is superseded
by mereinsensitivity or by a newsenseof manyplaces.Eitherway,
communitarian feelingseemslikelyto declinein importance. Communities are more
thanjust locations,buttheyare mostoftensuccessfulwhentheyare permanently
located.
2. Social mobility.
Thisarticlewillnotaddressthearguments abouthowbesttodescribe
social standingor how to measurechanges,whetherby income,education,class
membership, orrankin thestatushierarchy. It is enoughto saythatfewerAmericans
standexactlywheretheir parents
stoodordo whattheydidthaninanysocietyforwhich
wehavecomparable knowledge. Americans mayinherit manythings fromtheir
parents,
buttheextenttowhichtheymakea different life,ifonlybymakinga different living,
meansthattheinheritance ofcommunity, thatis,thepassingonofbeliefsandcustomary

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12 POLITICAL THEORY /FEBRUARY 1990

ways,is uncertain at best.Whether or notchildrenare thereby robbedof narrative

capacity,theyseemlikelytotelldifferent storiesthantheirparents told.
3. Maritalmobility.Ratesofseparation, divorce,andremarriage arehighertodaythanthey
haveeverbeeninourownsocietyandprobably higherthantheyhaveeverbeeninany
other(exceptperhapsamongRomanaristocrats, although I knowofno statistics from
thattime,onlyanecdotes).Thefirst twomobilities, geographic andsocial,also disrupt
familylife,so thatsiblings,forexample,oftenliveatgreatdistancesfromoneanother,
andlateras unclesandaunts,theyarefarremovedfromnephewsandnieces.Butwhat
we call"brokenhomes"aretheproduct ofmarital breaks,ofhusbands orwivesmoving
out- and then,commonly, movingon to new partners. Insofaras homeis thefirst
community andthefirst schoolofethnicidentity andreligiousconviction, thiskindof
breakagemusthavecountercommunitarian consequences. It meansthatchildren often
do nothearcontinuous or identicalstoriesfromtheadultswithwhomtheylive.(Did
thegreaternumber ofchildren everhearsuchstories?Thedeathofonespouseandthe
remarriage oftheothermayoncehavebeenas commonas divorceandremarriage are
today.But,then,othersortsofmobility havetobe considered: Bothmenandwomen
aremorelikelytodaytomarry acrossclass,ethnic, andreligiouslines;remarriage will
thereforeoftenproduceextraordinarily complexandsociallydiversefamilies -which
probably arewithout historical
precedent.)
4. Politicalmobility.Loyaltyto leaders,movements, parties,clubs,andurbanmachines
seemsto declinerapidlyas placeandsocialstanding andfamilymembership become
lesscentralintheshapingofpersonalidentity. Liberalcitizensstandoutsideallpolitical
organizationsandthenchoosetheonethatbestservestheiridealsorinterests. Theyare,
ideally,
independent voters,thatis,peoplewhomovearound;theychooseforthemselves
ratherthanvotingas theirparentsdid,andtheychoosefreshly each timerather than
repeatingthemselves. As theirnumbers increase,theymakefora volatileelectorate and
henceforinstitutional instability,
particularly
at thelocal levelwherepoliticalorgani-
zationonceservedtoreinforce communal ties.

The effects oftheFourMobilitiesareintensified in a variety

ofwaysby
othersocialdevelopments whichwe arelikelytotalkaboutinthecommon
metaphor ofmovement: theadvanceofknowledge, technologicalprogress,
and so on. But I am concernedhereonlywiththeactualmovement of
individuals.Liberalismis, mostsimply,thetheoretical endorsement and
justificationofthismovement.9 In theliberalview,then,theFourMobilities
represent theenactment of liberty,and thepursuitof (privateor personal)
happiness.Andithas tobe said that,conceivedin thisway,liberalism is a
genuinelypopularcreed.Anyeffort to curtailmobilityin thefourareas
described herewouldrequirea massiveandharshapplication ofstatepower.
Nevertheless, thispopularityhasanunderside ofsadnessanddiscontent that
are intermittentlyarticulated,and communitarianism is, mostsimply,the
intermittent articulation
ofthesefeelings. It reflects
a senseofloss,andthe
loss is real.Peopledo notalwaysleave theirold neighborhoods or home-
townswillinglyor happily.Movingmaybe a personaladventure in our
standard culturalmythologies, butitis as oftena familytraumain reallife.

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 WalzerI COMMUNITARIANCRITIQUE 13

The samethingis trueofsocialmobility, whichcarriespeopledownas well

as up andrequires adjustments thatarenevereasytomanage.Maritalbreaks
maysometimes giveriseto newand stronger unions,buttheyalso pile up
whatwe mightthinkof as familyfragments: single-parent households,
separatedandlonelymenandwomen,andabandonedchildren. Andinde-
pendencein politicsis oftena not-so-splendid isolation:Individualswith
opinionsarecutloose fromgroupswithprograms. The resultis a declinein
"the sense of efficacy," withaccompanying effectson commitment and
morale.
All inall,we liberalsprobably knowone another lesswell,andwithless
assurance,thanpeopleoncedid,although we maysee moreaspectsofthe
otherthantheysaw,andrecognizeinhimorhera widerrangeofpossibilities
(including thepossibilityofmovingon).Wearemoreoftenalonethanpeople
once were,beingwithoutneighbors we can counton, relativeswho live
nearbyorwithwhomwe areclose,orcomradesatworkorinthemovement.
Thisis thetruth ofthefirstcommunitarian argument. We mustnowfixthe
limitsofthistruth byseekingwhatis truein thesecondargument.
In itseasiestversion,thesecondargument - that we arereally, atbottom,
creatures ofcommunity - is certainly
truebutofuncertain significance.The
ties of place, class or status,family,and even politicssurvivetheFour
Mobilitiestoa remarkable extent.To takejustoneexample,fromthelastof
theFour: It remainstrue,even todayin thismostliberaland mobileof
societies,thatthebestpredictor ofhowpeoplewillvoteis ourknowledge of
how theirparentsvoted."0 All thosedutifullyimitative youngRepublicans
and Democratstestify to thefailureof liberalism to makeindependence or
waywardness of mindthedistinctive markof itsadherents. The predictive
value of parentalbehaviorholdseven forindependent voters:They are
simply the heirs of independence. But we do not knowto whatextent
inheritances ofthissortarea dwindling communal resource;itmaybe that
eachgeneration passeson lessthanitreceived.Thefullliberalization ofthe
social order,theproduction andreproduction ofself-inventing individuals,
maytakea longtime,muchlonger, indeed,thanliberalsthemselves expected.
Thereis notmuchcomfort hereforcommunitarian critics,
however;while
theycan recognizeandvaluethesurvivalofolderwaysoflife,theycannot
counton,andtheymusthaveanxietiesabout,thevitality ofthoseways.
Butthereis another approachtothetruth ofthesecondcriticalargument.
Whatever theextentoftheFourMobilities, theydo notseemtomoveus so
farapartthatwe can no longertalkwithone another. We oftendisagree,of
course,butwe disagreein mutually comprehensible ways.I shouldthinkit
fairlyobviousthatthephilosophical controversies thatMaclntyre laments

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14 POLITICAL THEORY /FEBRUARY 1990

are notin facta markofsocial incoherence. Wheretherearephilosophers,

therewill be controversies, just as wherethereare knights, therewill be
tournaments. Butthesearehighly ritualized whichbearwitnessto
activities,
theconnection, notthedisconnection, of theirprotagonists. Evenpolitical
conflictin liberalsocietiesrarelytakesformsso extremeas to set its
protagonists beyondnegotiation andcompromise, procedural justice,andthe
verypossibility of speech.The Americancivil rightsstruggleis a nice
exampleof a conflictforwhichour moral/political languagewas and is
entirelyadequate.Thefactthatthestruggle hashadonlypartialsuccessdoes
notreflect linguisticinadequacybutrather politicalfailuresanddefeats.
MartinLutherKing's speechesevokeda palpabletradition, a set of
commonvaluessuchthatpublicdisagreement couldfocusonlyon how(or
how quickly)theymightbestbe realized.1But thisis not,so to speak,a
traditionalist a Gemeinschaft
tradition, tradition, a survivalofthepreliberal
past.Itis a liberaltraditionmodified, nodoubt,bysurvivals ofdifferent sorts.
Themodifications aremostobviously Protestant andrepublican incharacter,
thoughby no meansexclusivelyso: The yearsof massimmigration have
brought a greatvariety ofethnicandreligious memories tobearonAmerican
politics.Whatall of thembearon,however, is liberalism.The languageof
individualrights-voluntary association,pluralism, toleration, separation,
privacy,freespeech,the careeropen to talents,and so on-is simply
inescapable.Who amongus seriouslyattempts to escape?If we reallyare
situatedselves,as thesecondcommunitarian critiqueholds,thenoursitua-
tionis largelycapturedby thatvocabulary. This is thetruth of thesecond
critique.Does it makeanysensethento arguethatliberalism preventsus
fromunderstanding ormaintaining thetiesthatbindus together?
Itmakessomesense,becauseliberalism isa strange doctrine, whichseems
continually toundercut itself,
todisdainitsowntraditions, andtoproducein
each generation renewedhopesfora moreabsolutefreedom fromhistory
andsocietyalike.Muchof liberalpoliticaltheory, fromLocketo Rawls,is
an effort to fixand stabilizethedoctrine in ordertoendtheendlessness of
liberalliberation. Butbeyondeverycurrent versionof liberalism, thereis
alwaysa superliberalism, which,as RobertoUngersaysofhisowndoctrine,
"pushestheliberalpremisesaboutstateand society,aboutfreedomfrom
dependenceand govemanceof social relations by thewill,to thepointat
whichtheymergeintoa largeambition: thebuildingof a socialworldless
aliento a selfthatcan alwaysviolatethegenerative rulesofitsownmental
or socialconstructs."'2 Although Ungerwas once identified as a communi-
tarian,thisambition - largeindeed!- seemsdesignedto prevent notonly
any stabilization of liberaldoctrinebut also any recovery or creationof

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 Walzer/COMMUNITARIANCRITIQUE 15

community. Forthereis no imaginable community thatwouldnotbe alien

totheetemally transgressiveself.Ifthetiesthatbindus together do notbind
us, therecan be no such thingas a community. If it is anything at all,
communitarianism is antithetical And
totransgression. thetransgressive self
is antithetical
eventotheliberalcommunity whichisitscreator andsponsor.'3
Liberalismis a self-subverting doctrine;forthatreason,it reallydoes
require periodiccommunitarian correction. Butitis nota particularly helpful
formofcorrection to suggestthatliberalism is literally
incoherent orthatit
can be replacedbysomepreliberal or antiliberalcommunity waitingsome-
howjustbeneaththesurfaceorjustbeyondthehorizon.Nothing is waiting;
Americancommunitarians haveto recognizethatthereis no one outthere
butseparated, rights-bearing,
voluntarily associating, freelyspeaking, liberal
selves.It wouldbe a good thing, though, ifwe couldteachthoseselvesto
knowthemselves as socialbeings,thehistorical products of,andinpartthe
embodiments of,liberalvalues.Forthecommunitarian correction ofliberal-
ismcannotbe anything otherthana selectivereinforcement of thosesame
values or,to appropriate thewell-known phraseof MichaelOakeshott, a
pursuit oftheintimations ofcommunity withinthem.

The place to begin the pursuitis withthe liberalidea of voluntary

association,whichis notwell-understood, it seemsto me, eitheramong
liberalsor amongtheircommunitarian critics.In bothits theoryand its
practice,liberalismexpressesstrongassociativetendenciesalongsideits
dissociative tendencies:Itsprotagonistsformgroupsas wellas splitofffrom
thegroupstheyform;theyjoinup andresign, marry anddivorce.Neverthe-
less,it is a mistake, and a characterically
liberalmistake, to thinkthatthe
existingpatterns of associationare entirely
or evenlargelyvoluntary and
contractual, thatis,theproduct ofwillalone.In a liberalsociety,as inevery
othersociety, peoplearebomintoveryimportant sortsofgroups,bornwith
identities, maleor female,forexample,working class,Catholicor Jewish,
black,democrat, andso on.Manyoftheirsubsequent associations
(liketheir
subsequent careers)merely expresstheseunderlying identities,
which,again,
arenotso muchchosenas enacted."4 Liberalismis distinguishedless bythe
freedom to formgroupson thebasisoftheseidentities thanthefreedom to
leave thegroupsandsometimes eventheidentities behind.Associationis
alwaysatriskina liberalsociety. Theboundaries ofthegrouparenotpoliced;
peoplecomeand go, or theyjustfadeintothedistancewithout everquite

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16 POLITICAL THEORY /FEBRUARY 1990

acknowledging thattheyhave left.That is whyliberalismis plaguedby

free-rider problems - bypeoplewhocontinue toenjoythebenefits ofmem-
bershipand identity while no longerparticipating in the activitiesthat
producethosebenefits."Communitarianism, bycontrast, is thedreamofa
perfect free-riderlessness.
Atitsbest,theliberalsocietyis thesocialunionofsocialunionsthatJohn
Rawlsdescribed: a pluralism ofgroupsbondedbysharedideasoftoleration
anddemocracy.'6 Butifallthegroupsareprecarious, continually onthebrink
ofdissolution or abandonment, thenthelargerunionmustalso be weakand
vulnerable.Or, alternatively, its leadersand officialswill be drivento
compensate forthefailuresofassociationelsewherebystrengthening their
own union,thatis, thecentralstate,beyondthelimitsthatliberalism has
established. Theselimitsarebestexpressedintermsofindividual rights and
civilliberties, buttheyalso includea prescription forstateneutrality. The
goodlifeis pursuedbyindividuals, sponsored bygroups;thestatepresides
over the pursuitand the sponsorship but does notparticipate in either.
Presiding is singular incharacter; pursuing andsponsoring areplural.Hence
itis a criticalquestionforliberaltheory andpracticewhether theassociative
passionsand energiesof ordinary people are likelyoverthelonghaul to
survivetheFourMobilitiesandprovethemselves sufficientto therequire-
mentsofpluralism. Thereis at leastsomeevidencethattheywillnotprove
sufficient-without a littlehelp. But,to repeatan old question,whence
comethourhelp?A fewoftheexisting socialunionsliveintheexpectation
of divineassistance.For therest,we can onlyhelpone another, and the
agencythrough whichhelpofthatsortcomesmostexpeditiously is thestate.
Butwhatkindofa stateis itthatfosters associativeactivities?Whatkindof
a socialunionis itthatincludeswithout incorporatinga greatanddiscordant
variety ofsocialunions?
Obviously,it is a liberalstateand social union;anyotherkindis too
dangerous forcommunities andindividuals alike.Itwouldbe an oddenter-
priseto arguein thenameofcommunitarianism foran alternative state,for
thatwouldbe to argueagainstourownpoliticaltraditions andto repudiate
whatevercommunity we alreadyhave. But thecommunitarian correction
does requirea liberalstateofa certainsort,conceptually thoughnothistori-
cally unusual:a statethatis, at least over some partof the terrainof
sovereignty, deliberately nonneutral. The standardliberalargument forneu-
trality is an induction fromsocialfragmentation. Sincedissociatedindivid-
uals will neveragreeon thegood life,thestatemustallowthemto live as
theythinkbest,subjectonlyto JohnStuartMill's harmprinciple, without
endorsing orsponsoring anyparticular understanding ofwhat"best"means.

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 Walzer/COMMUNITARIANCRITIQUE 17

Butthereisa problem here:Themoredissociated individuals are,thestronger

thestateis likelytobe,sinceitwillbe theonlyorthemostimportant social
union.Andthenmembership inthestate,theonlygoodthatis sharedbyall
individuals, maywellcometoseemthegoodthatis "best."
This is onlyto repeatthefirstcommunitarian critique,and it invitesa
responselikethesecondcritique: thatthestateis notinfacttheonlyoreven,
forordinary peopleintheireveryday lives,themostimportant socialunion.
All sortsofothergroupscontinue toexistandtogiveshapeandpurposeto
thelives of theirmembers,despitethetriumph of individualrights,the
FourMobilitiesinwhichthattriumph is manifest,andthefree-riding thatit
makespossible.Butthesegroupsarecontinually atrisk.Andso thestate,if
itis toremain a liberalstate,mustendorseandsponsorsomeofthem, namely,
thosethatseemmostlikelytoprovideshapesandpurposescongenialtothe
sharedvaluesof a liberalsociety.'7 No doubt,thereareproblemsheretoo,
andI do notmeanto denytheirdifficulty. ButI see no wayto avoidsome
suchformulation - andnotonlyfortheoretical reasons.Theactualhistory of
thebestliberalstates,as ofthebestsocialdemocratic states(andthesetend
increasingly to be thesamestates),suggestthattheybehaveinexactlythis
way,although oftenveryinadequately.
Let me givethreerelatively familiar examplesof statebehaviorof this
kind.First,theWagnerActofthe1930s:Thiswas nota standard liberallaw,
hindering thehindrances tounionorganization, foritactively fosteredunion
organization, and it did so preciselyby solvingthefree-rider problem.By
requiringcollectivebargaining whenever there
wasmajority support (butnot
necessarily unanimous support)fortheunion,andthenby allowingunion
shops,theWagnerAct sponsoredthecreationof strongunionscapable,at
leastto somedegree,of determining theshapeof industrial relations."8Of
course,therecouldnotbe strongunionswithout workingclass solidarity;
unionization is parasiticon underlying communities of feelingand belief.
But thoseunderlying communities werealreadybeingerodedby theFour
Mobilities whentheWagnerActwaspassed,andso theActservedtocounter
thedissociative tendencies ofliberalsociety.Itwasnevertheless a liberallaw,
fortheunionsthatithelpedcreateenhancedthelivesofindividual workers
andweresubjecttodissolution andabandonment inaccordancewithliberal
principlesshouldtheyevercease to do that.
The secondexampleis theuseoftaxexemptions andmatching grantsof
taxmoneyto enabledifferent religiousgroupsto runextensivesystemsof
day-carecenters,nursinghomes,hospitals,and so on-welfare societies
insidethewelfarestate.I do notpretendthattheseprivateand pluralist
societiescompensate fortheshoddiness oftheAmerican welfarestate.But

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18 POLITICAL THEORY /FEBRUARY 1990

theydo improvethedeliveryof servicesby makingit a moreimmediate

function of communalsolidarity. The state'srolehere,besideestablishing
minimalstandards, is to abate,sincein thiscase itcannotentirely solvethe
free-riderproblem. Ifsomenumber ofmenandwomenendup ina Catholic
nursing home,eventhough theynevercontributed toa Catholiccharity,they
willatleasthavepaidtheirtaxes.Butwhynotnationalize theentire welfare
systemandendfree-ridership? The liberalresponseis thatthesocialunion
of social unionsmustalwaysoperateat twolevels:A welfaresystemrun
entirelybyprivate, nonprofit associations wouldbe dangerously inadequate
andinequitable initscoverage;anda totally nationalizedsystem woulddeny
expression tolocal andparticularist solidarities.'9
The third exampleis thepassageofplant-closing lawsdesignedtoafford
someprotection tolocalcommunities ofworkandresidence. Inhabitantsare
insulated, although onlyfora time,againstmarket pressureto moveoutof
theiroldneighborhoods andsearchforworkelsewhere. Although themarket
"needs"a highly mobileworkforce,thestatetakesotherneedsintoaccount,
not only in a welfarist way (throughunemployment insuranceand job
retraining programs) butalso in a communitarian way.Butthestateis not
similarlycommitted to thepreservation ofeveryneighborhood community.
Itis entirelyneutral towardcommunities ofethnicity andresidence, offering
no protection againststrangers who wantto move in. Here,geographic
mobility remainsa positivevalue,one oftherights ofcitizens.
Unions,religious organizations, andneighborhoods eachdrawonfeelings
andbeliefsthat,in principle ifnotalwaysin history, predatetheemergence
oftheliberalstate.How strong thesefeelings andbeliefsare,andwhattheir
survivalvalueis,I cannotsay.Havetheunionsestablished sucha griponthe
imaginations oftheirmembers as to makeforgoodstories?Therearesome
goodstories, firsttold,thenretold, andsometimes evenre-enacted. Butthe
narrativelinedoes notseemsufficiently compelling toyounger workers to
sustainanything liketheold working class solidarity.Noris itsufficient
for
a religiousorganization toprovidelifecycleservicesforitsmembers ifthey
arenolongerinterested initsreligiousservices.Norareneighborhoods proof
forlongagainstmarketpressure.Still,communalfeelingand beliefseem
considerably morestablethanwe once thought theywouldbe, and the
proliferation of secondaryassociationsin liberalsocietyis remarkable -
evenifmanyofthemhaveshortlivesandtransient memberships. One hasa
senseof peopleworkingtogether and trying to cope,and not,as thefirst
communitarian critique suggests,
justgetting byontheirown,bythemselves,
one byone.

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 Walzer/COMMUNITARIANCRITIQUE 19

Vl.

A goodliberal(or socialdemocratic) stateenhancesthepossibilities for

cooperativecoping. John Dewey provided a usefulaccount ofsuch a state in
ThePublicandItsProblems.Publishedin 1927,thebookis a commentary
onanda partialendorsement ofanearlierroundofcommunitarian criticism.
Deweysharedwiththecritics ofhistime,whocalledthemselves "pluralists,"
anuneasiness withthesovereign state,buthewas notquiteas uneasyas most
of themwere.He also shared an admiration forwhathe called "primary
groupings" withinthe state,
but he was more inclinedthanthepluralistswere
to qualifyhisadmiration.Primary groupings, he wrote,are"good, bad, and
andtheycannot
indifferent," by theirmere existencefix thelimits of state
The stateis not"onlyan umpireto avertandremedytrespasses
activity. of
one groupuponanother." It has a largerfunction:"It rendersthedesirable
associationsoliderandmorecoherent....Itplacesa discount uponinjurious
groupingsand renderstheirtenureof life precarious. . . [and] it gives the
individualmembersof valuedassociationsgreaterliberty and security;it
relievesthemofhampering conditions....Itenablesindividual members to
countwithreasonable certaintyuponwhatothers willdo."20Thesemayseem
liketaskstoo extensivefora liberalstate,buttheyare constrained bythe
constitutional establishmentofindividual -which arethemselves
rights (on
thepragmatic understanding)notso muchrecognitions ofwhatindividuals
bynatureareorhaveas expressions ofhopeaboutwhattheywillbe anddo.
Unlessindividuals acttogetherin certainways,stateactionof thesortthat
Deweyrecommended cannotgetstarted. Whenwe recognizethe"rightof
thecitizenspeacefully toassemble,"forexample,we arehopingforassem-
bliesof citizens.Ifwe thendiscriminate amongsuchassemblies, we do so
on limitedgrounds, onlythosethatreallydo expresscommunities
fostering
offeelingandbeliefanddo notviolateliberalprinciples ofassociation.
It is oftenarguedthesedaysthatthenonneutral state,whoseactivities I
havemadesomeattempt is bestunderstood
tojustify, inrepublicanterms. A
revivalof neoclassicalrepublicanism providesmuchof thesubstanceof
contemporary communitarian politics.The revival,I haveto say,is largely
academic;unlikeotherversionsofcommunitarianism in Dewey'stimeand
ours,it has no externalreference. Therereallyare unions,churches, and
neighborhoods in Americansociety,buttherearevirtually no examplesof
republican associationandno movement orpartyaimedat promoting such
association.Deweywouldprobablynotrecognizehis"public,"norRawls
his"socialunion,"as versions ofrepublicanism, ifonlybecauseinboththese

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20 POLITICAL THEORY /FEBRUARY 1990

cases, energyand commitment have been drainedfromthesingularand

narrowly politicalassociationto the morevariousassociationsof civil
society.Republicanism by contrast is an integrated and unitary doctrinein
whichenergy andcommitment arefocusedprimarily on thepoliticalrealm.
It is a doctrineadapted(in bothitsclassicaland neoclassicalforms)to the
needsofsmall,homogeneous communities, wherecivilsocietyis radically
undifferentiated. Perhapsthe doctrinecan be extendedto accountfora
"republicofrepublics," a decentralized andparticipatory revisionofliberal
democracy. A considerable strengthening oflocal governments wouldthen
be required inthehopeofencouraging thedevelopment anddisplayofcivic
virtueina pluralist varietyofsocialsettings. Thisindeedis a pursuitofthe
intimations ofcommunity within liberalism, forithasmoretodo withJohn
StuartMillthanwithRousseau.Nowwe aretoimaginethenonneutral state
empowering cities,towns,andboroughs;fostering neighborhood commit-
teesandreviewboards;andalwaysonthelook-out forbandsofcitizensready
totakeresponsibility forlocal affairs.2'
None of thisis any guaranteeagainstthe erosionof the underlying
communities or thedeathof local loyalties.It is a matter of principlethat
communities mustalwaysbeatrisk.Andthegreatparadoxofa liberalsociety
is thatonecannotsetoneselfagainstthisprinciple withoutalsosettingoneself
againstthetraditional practicesand sharedunderstandings of thesociety.
Here,respectfortradition requirestheprecariousness of traditionalism.
If
thefirstcommunitarian critiqueweretruein itsentirety, iftherewereno
communities and no traditions, thenwe couldjust proceedto inventnew
ones. Insofaras thesecondcritiqueis even partlytrue,and theworkof
communal invention is wellbegunandcontinually inprogress,we mustrest
content withthekindsofcorrections andenhancements - theywouldbe, in
fact,moreradicalthanthesetermssuggest -that Deweydescribed.

VI.

I haveavoideduntilnowwhatis often takentobethecentral issuebetween

liberalsandtheircommunitarian critics
-the constitution
oftheself.22Lib-
eralism,it is commonly said,is foundedon theidea of a presocialself,a
solitaryand sometimes heroicindividualconfrontingsociety, who is fully
formed beforetheconfrontation begins.Communitarian criticsthenargue,
first,thatinstability and dissociationare the actual and disheartening
achievement of individualsofthissortand,second,thattherereallycannot
be individuals ofthissort.The criticsarecommonly said in turntobelieve

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 Walzer/COMMUNITARTANCRITIQUE 21

in a radicallysocializedselfthatcan never"confront" societybecauseitis,

fromthebeginning, entangledin society,itselftheembodiment of social
values.The disagreement seemssharpenough,butin fact,in practice, itis
notsharpat all -for neitherof theseviewscan be sustainedforlongby
anyonewho goes beyondstakingout a positionand triesto elaboratean
argument.23 Nordoes liberalorcommunitarian theory requireviewsofthis
sort.Contemporary liberalsarenotcommitted toa presocialself,butonlyto
a selfcapableof reflecting criticallyon thevaluesthathavegovernedits
socialization;and communitarian critics,who are doingexactlythat,can
hardlygo ontoclaimthatsocialization is everything.Thephilosophical and
psychological issuesherego verydeep,butso faras politicsis concerned,
thereis littleto be wonon thisbattlefield; concessionsfromtheotherside
cometooeasilytocountas victories.
Thecentralissueforpoliticaltheory is nottheconstitution oftheselfbut
theconnection ofconstituted selves,thepattern ofsocialrelations.Liberal-
ism is best understood as a theoryof relationship, whichhas voluntary
associationat itscenterandwhichunderstands voluntarinessas theright of
rupture or withdrawal. Whatmakesa marriage voluntaryis thepermanent
possibility ofdivorce.Whatmakesanyidentity oraffiliation
voluntary is the
easyavailability ofalternative identitiesandaffiliations.Buttheeasierthis
easinessis,thelessstableall ourrelationships arelikelytobecome.TheFour
Mobilitiestakeholdandsocietyseemstobe inperpetual motion, so thatthe
actualsubjectof liberalpractice,it mightbe said,is nota presocialbuta
postsocialself,freeat last fromall but themosttemporary and limited
alliances.Now,theliberalselfreflects thefragmentation of liberalsociety:
It is radicallyunderdetermined anddivided,forcedto inventitselfanewfor
everypublicoccasion.Someliberalscelebratethisfreedom andself-inven-
tion;all communitarians lamentitsarrival, evenwhileinsisting thatitis not
a possiblehumancondition.
I have arguedthatinsofaras liberalismtendstowardinstability and
dissociation, itrequiresperiodiccommunitarian correction.
Rawls's"social
unionof social unions"reflects and buildson an earliercorrection of this
kind,theworkof Americanwriterslike Dewey,RandolphBourne,and
HoraceKallen.Rawlshas givenus a generalized versionof Kallen'sargu-
mentthatAmerica,afterthegreatimmigration, was and shouldremaina
"nationofnationalities."24 In fact,however, theerosionofnationality seems
to be a feature of liberalsociallife,despiteintermittent ethnicrevivalslike
thatofthelate1960sand 1970s.Wecangeneralizefromthistothemoreor
less steadyattenuation of all theunderlying bondsthatmakesocialunions
possible.Thereis no strong orpermanent remedy forcommunal attenuation

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22 POLITICAL THEORY /FEBRUARY 1990

shortof an antiliberal of theFourMobilitiesand therightsof

curtailment
rupture anddivorceon whichtheyrest.Communitarians sometimes dream
ofsucha curtailment, buttheyrarelyadvocateit.The onlycommunity that
mostof themactuallyknow,afterall, is just thisliberalunionof unions,
alwaysprecarious andalwaysatrisk.Theycannottriumph overthisliberal-
ism;theycan only,sometimes, reinforceitsinternal
associativecapacities.
The reinforcement is onlytemporary,becausethecapacityfordissociation
is also strongly andhighly
internalized valued.Thatis whycommunitarian-
ism criticismis doomed- it probablyis not a terriblefate- to eternal
recurrence.

NOTES

1. Karl Marx,"On theJewishQuestion,"in Early Writings, ed. by T. B. Bottomore

(London:C. A. Watts,1963),p. 26.
2. AlasdairMacintyre, After Virtue (NotreDame: University ofNotreDame Press,1981).
3. ThomasHobbes,TheElementsofLaw, Part1,ch. 9, para.21. 1 havenoticedthatthe
twofavorite writers ofcommunitarian ofthisfirst
critics kindareHobbesandSartre. Is itpossible
thattheessenceofliberalism is bestrevealedbythesetwo,whowerenot,intheusualsenseof
theterm, liberalsatall?
4. See AlbertHirschman's Exit,Voice,andLoyalty(Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity
Press,1970).
5. Maclntyre, AfterVirtue, chs.2, 17.
6. Thisis RichardRorty'ssummary ofSandel'sargument: "ThePriority ofDemocracyto
Philosophy," inTheVirginiaStatue forReligiousFreedom, ed.byMerrillD. Peterson andRobert
C. Vaughan(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1988),p. 273; see Sandel,Liberalism
and theLimitsofJustice(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1982).
7. ThomasHobbes,De Cive,ed.byHowardWarrender (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,
1983),PartI, ch. l.
8. RobertBellah et al., Habitsof theHeart (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,
1985),pp.21, 290; see Rorty'scomment, "Priority,"
p. 275,n. 12.
9. And also its practicalworkingout,in thecareeropen to talents,therightof free
movement, legaldivorce,andso on.
10. See A. Campbelletal., TheAmericanVoter(New York:Wiley,1960),pp. 147-148.
11. See theevocationofKinginHabitsoftheHeart,pp. 249,252.
12. RobertoMangabeiraUnger,TheCriticalLegal StudiesMovement (Cambridge, MA:
HarvardUniversity Press,1986),p. 41.
13. Cf. Buff-Coat (RobertEverard)in thePutneydebates:"Whatsoever ... obligations I
shouldbe boundunto,ifafterwards God shouldrevealhimself, I wouldbreakitspeedily, ifit
werean hundred a day."In Puritanism and Liberty,ed. byA.S.P.Woodhouse(London:J.M.
Dent,1938),p. 34. Is Buff-Coat thefirst superliberal
orUngera latterday Puritan saint?
14. I do notintenda determinist argument here.We mostlymovearoundwithininherited
worldsbecausewe findsuchworldscomfortable andevenlife-enhancing; butwe also moveout

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 Walzer/COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE 23

whenwe findthemcramped-andliberalismmakestheescape mucheasierthanit was in

preliberalsocieties.
15. 1describehowfree-ridership worksinethnicgroupsin"Pluralism: A PoliticalPerspec-
tive,"in theHarvardEncyclopediaofAmericanEthnicGroups,ed. by StephanThernstrom
(Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1980),pp.781-787.
16. JohnRawls,A TheoryofJustice(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1971),
pp.527ff.
17. See theargument fora modest"perfectionism" (ratherthanneutrality) inJosephRaz,
TheMorality ofFreedom(Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986),chs.5 and6.
18. IrvingBernstein, Turbulent Years:A Historyof theAmericanWorker, 1933-1941
(Boston:Houghton Mifflin,
1970),ch. 7.
19. See myessayon "SocializingtheWelfareState"inDemocracyand theWelfare State,
ed. byAmyGutmann (Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press,1988),pp. 13-26.
20. Dewey,ThePublicandItsProblems(Athens,OH: SwallowPress,1985),pp. 71-72.
21. This kindof pluralistrepublicanismis also likelyto advancetheprospects of whatI
called"complexequality"inSpheresofJustice (NewYork:Basic Books,1983).1cannotpursue
thisquestionhere,butit is worthnotingthatbothliberalism andcommunitarianism can take
egalitarianandnon-orantiegalitarian forms.Similarly, thecommunitarian correctionofliber-
alismcan strengthen theold inequalities
oftraditionalistwaysof lifeor it can counteractthe
newinequalities oftheliberalmarket andthebureaucratic state.The "republicofrepublics"is
likely,though byno meanscertain, tohaveeffects ofthesecondsort.
posedinSandel,Liberalismand theLimitsofJustice;muchofthe
22. The issueis starkly
recentdiscussionis a commentary on orargument withSandel'sbook.
23. See Will Kymlicka,"Liberalismand Communitarianism," in CanadianJournalof
Philosophy (June,1988),pp. 181-204.
24. Kallen,Cultureand Democracyin theUnitedStates(New York:Boni & Liveright,
1924).

at the nstituteforAdvanced
MichaelWalzeris Professor NewJersey.
StudyinPrinceton,
He is theauthorofnumerous booksand articlesonpoliticaltheory.

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