130.

DE LEON vs DELA LLANA

G.R. No. 212277, February 11, 2015

Facts

This case stemmed from an unlawful detainer complaint filed by respondent Gilbert
dela Llana against petitioner Robert de Leon and a certain Gil de Leon. In the said
complaint, Gilbert averred that sometime in 1999, he, through an undated contract of
lease, leased a portion of a 541 square-meter property situated in Poblacion,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley Province, registered in his name, to Robert, which
the latter intended to use as a lottery outlet. The lease contract had a term of five (5)
years and contained a stipulation that any case arising from the same shall be filed
in the courts of Davao City only. Gilbert claimed that Robert and Gil failed to pay
their rental arrears to him and refused to vacate the subject property, despite
repeated demands, thus, the first ejectment complaint. In their defense, Robert and
Gil posited that the aforementioned lease contract was simulated and, hence, not
binding on the parties.

Issue

Whether the undated lease contract was a relatively simulated contract and, as such,
non-binding.

Held

If the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the
contract is only relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real
agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the
simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is
absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in
interest.

In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the

parties have no intention to be bound by it. “The main characteristic of an absolute
simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce
legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties.” “As a result, an
absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from
each other what they may have given under the contract.
131. ALMEDA vs HEIRS OF PONCIANO ALMEDA
G.R. No. 194189, September 14, 2017

Facts

A Power of Attorney was executed by Venancio and Leonila granting Ponciano,

among others, the authority to sell the parcels of land. Venancio and Leonila died
happily. A Complaint for Nullity of Contracts, Partition of Properties and
Reconveyance of Titles was filed by the petitioners against Ponciano and his wife
Eufemia Perez Almeda. Petitioners claimed that Ponciano, taking advantage of his
being the eldest child and his close relationship with their parents, caused the
simulation and forgery of the deed of absolute sale.

Issue

Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated.

Held

Simulation has been defined as the declaration of a fictitious will, made deliberately
by mutual agreement of the parties, in order to produce the appearances of a
juridical act which does not exist or is different from that which was really executed,
for the purpose of deceiving third persons. Accordingly, simulation exists when:

(a) there is an outward declaration of will different from the will of the parties;
(b) the false appearance was intended by mutual agreement of the parties;
and
(c) their purpose is to deceive third persons.

None of the foregoing requisites have been shown to exist in this case.
132. DEE HWA LIONG FOUNDATION MEDICAL CENTER AND ANTHONY DEE
vs ASIAMED SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 205638, August 23, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center and respondent Asiamed
Supplies and Equipment Corporation entered into a Contract of Sale. This Contract
of Sale stated that DHLFMC agreed to purchase from Asiamed a machine. The
machine was delivered. A Sales Invoice and two (2) Delivery Invoices were signed
by petitioner Anthony Dee and DHLFMC Vice President for Administration, Mr.
Alejandro Mateo. During the appeal, Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court erred in finding them liable for interest, penalty charges, and
attorney's fees based on Delivery Invoices. Petitioners claim that these are in the
nature of contracts of adhesion. The delivery invoices were unilaterally prepared by
respondent, without petitioners' conformity. These stipulations attempted to modify
the Contract of Sale. However, petitioners insist that the delivery invoices cannot be
deemed to have modified the Contract of Sale, considering that they lacked the
informed consent of petitioner DHLFMC. In any case, the penalty stipulated in the
delivery invoices was unconscionably high and should be reduced.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the interest rate and attorney's fees stipulated in the delivery invoices
are binding on the parties.

HELD:

This Court denies the petition.

A contract need not be contained in a single writing. It may be collected from several
different writings which do not conflict with each other and which, when connected,
show the parties, subject matter, terms and consideration, as in contracts entered
into by correspondence. A contract may be encompassed in several instruments
even though every instrument is not signed by the parties, since it is sufficient if the
unsigned instruments are clearly identified or referred to and made part of the signed
instrument or instruments. Similarly, a written agreement of which there are two
copies, one signed by each of the parties, is binding on both to the same extent as
though there had been only one copy of the agreement and both had signed it.

Petitioners claim that the delivery invoice receipts are contracts of adhesion and that
they were unwittingly signed, without informed consent. However, it is not disputed
that the delivery invoices provided for the interest and attorney's fees or that
petitioner Anthony and Mateo signed these invoices. Thus, the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals ruled that the parties mutually agreed to the interest and
attorney's fees as a factual matter. Although petitioners allege that these invoices
lacked petitioner DHLFMC's informed consent, there is no attempt to prove this. It is
also not proven that the stipulations were somehow hidden or obscured such that
DHLFMC could not have read them, making it impossible for DHLFMC to agree to
the terms.
133. ESTRELLADO vs PRESIDING JUDGE OF MTCC
G.R. No. 164482, November 8, 2017

Facts

This is a case where a consolidated appeals originated from special civil actions for
forcible entry involving three adjacent parcels of land filed by by J.S. Francisco &
Sons, Inc. against the Estrellados.

Spouses Eugenio and Lourdes Estrellado, Spouses and Nicolas and Narcisa
Estrellado, and the late Spouses Alipio and Vivina Barredo. The landowners herein
mentioned were related to one another either by consanguinity or by affinity. The
petitioners are the successors-in-interest and heirs of the named landowners and the
respondents are the heirs of the late Spouses Alipio and Vivina Barredo. The
Spouses Eugene and Lourdes Estrellado sold a parcel of lot to Dr. Jovito S.
Francisco. The sale was evidenced by a deed of absolute.

The Franciscos could not produce the deeds of sale between them and the
Estrellados. Nonetheless, they presented the certification signed by the late Spouses
Alipio and Vivina Barredo. The Franciscos also presented the receipt signed by the
late Spouses Alipio and Vivina Barredo to the effect that they had received from Dr.
Francisco the balance as the "final instalment and full payment of the sale.

Issue

Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale is enforceable.

Held

It is required under Article 1403(2) of the Civil Code that the sale of real property, to
be enforceable, should be in a writing subscribed by the party charged for it. This
requirement was met herein by the Franciscos even in the absence of any formal
deed of sale. Considering that the agreement between the parties on the sale was
reduced in writing and signed by the late Spouses Alipio and Vivina Barredo as the
sellers, the sale was enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Despite the document
embodying the agreement on the sale not being acknowledged before a notary
public, the nonobservance of the form prescribed by Article 1358(1) of the Civil Code
did not render the sale invalid. Indeed, the form required by Article 1358 was only for
convenience of the parties, and was not essential to the validity or enforceability of
the sale.
134. DIAMPOC vs BUENAVENTURA
GR. No. 200383, March 19, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioner Norma M. Diampoc and her husband Wilbur L. Diampoc filed a Complaint
for annulment of deed of sale and recovery of duplicate original copy of title, with
damages, against respondent Jessie Buenaventura and the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Rizal.

The Diampocs alleged in their Complaint that they owned a parcel of land; that
Buenaventura became their friend; that Buenaventura asked to borrow the owner's
copy of TCT 25044 to be used as security for a loan she wished to secure; that they
acceded, on the condition that Buenaventura should not sell the subject property;
that Buenaventura promised to give them ₱300,000.00 out of the ₱1 million loan
proceeds; that on July 2, 2000, Buenaventura cause them to sign a folded document
without giving them the opportunity to read its contents; that Buenaventura filed to
give them a copy of the document which they signed; that they discovered later on
that Buenaventura became the owner of a one· half portion of the subject property
by virtue of a supposed deed of sale in her favor; that they immediately proceeded to
the notary public who notarized the said purported deed of sales and discovered that
the said portion of land was purportedly sold to Buenaventura; that barangay
conciliation proceedings were commenced, but proved futile; that the purported deed
of sale is spurious; and that the deed was secured through fraud and deceit, and
thus null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject Deed of Sale is illegal and spurious.

HELD:

As aptly declared by the court a quo, notarized documents, like the deed in question,
enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence. Miserably, appellants
failed to discharge this burden.

The rule that one who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents has been
applied even to contracts of illiterate persons on the ground that if such persons are
unable to read, they are negligent if they fail to have the contract read to them. If a
person cannot read the instrument, it is as much his duty to procure some reliable
persons to read and explain it to him, before he signs it, as it would be to read it
before he signed it if he were able to do so and his failure to obtain a reading and
explanation of it is such gross negligence as will estop him from avoiding it on the
ground that he was ignorant of its contents.