HERBERT HOOVER DIKE – WHAT’S THE BIG DAM DEAL, A CASE STUDY

OF BACKWARD EROSION PIPING AND THE PLAN TO REAIR THE DAM

John Kendall, P.E.1

ABSTRACT

Herbert Hoover Dike, a 150 mile long embankment dam in South Florida, has received a
tremendous amount of attention and federal funding over the past ten years to address
performance problems related to seepage. This paper documents some of the past poor
performance that has occurred at Herbert Hoover Dike (HHD) and explores the causes of
these issues, focusing on the construction methods and embankment soils that have
created conditions that are ideal for backward erosion piping at low gradient.
Additionally, this paper discusses the dam modifications that are being completed to
reduce risk of failure from internal erosion. Over the past 10 years, approximately 22
miles of cutoff wall have been constructed at HHD and plans are currently in place to
extend the cutoff wall an additional length of 35 miles, putting in place a cutoff wall
completely around the southern perimeter of Lake Okeechobee. This paper discusses the
past performance history of the project related to piping, and describes how the hanging
cutoff wall provides the needed risk reduction for the dam.

INTRODUCTION

Lake Okeechobee is one of the largest lakes in the United States, with surface area of
approximately 724 square miles. Located in South Florida, the lake is approximately 30
miles west of the Atlantic Ocean and 60 miles east of the Gulf of Mexico. The lake and
surrounding drainage basin encompass an area of approximately 5,600 square miles.
Historically, Lake Okeechobee was the headwaters to the everglades, with water
naturally flowing into the lake from the north and then overflowing the southern banks of
the lake during the wet season and during times of strong southerly wind. Water would
then sheet flow across the landscape south of the lake, eventually exiting into the ocean
around the southern tip of Florida. This environment resulted in extremely fertile soil
deposits south of the lake, which attracted the farming community during the dry parts of
the year. In the 1920’s, local interest began constructing a series of levees to protect farm
lands from being inundated during the wet season. This era came to a disastrous
conclusion in 1926 and again 1928 when hurricane storm surges overwhelmed parts the
levees and caused massive human life loss in the adjacent communities. These events
ultimately lead to congressional approval of the 1930 River and Harbor Act which gave
USACE authority to construct levees around parts of the lake; specifically, 68 miles
along the southern shore and 16 miles of levee along the northern shore. In the 1960s,
additional authorities through the rivers and harbors act resulted in a second phase of
construction that raised and widened the existing levees and constructed additional levee
that fully encircled the lake. The completed dike, approximately 150 miles in length, was

1
Geotechnical Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, FL 32207,
john.r.kendall@usace.army.mil

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 1

given its name to honor President Herbert Hoover, an engineer who personally inspected
the area after the devastating hurricanes of the 1920s.

Although constructed as a series of levees, it has since been reclassified as a dam, as it

holds a low head, permanent pool across most of the southern side of the alignment and
holds prolonged loading around its entire perimeter during abnormally wet years.
Outflows from Lake Okeechobee occur primarily at the southwest side of the lake
through the Caloosahatchee River and east side of the lake through the St. Lucie Canal.
The St. Lucie Canal and Caloosahatchee River flow east to the Atlantic Ocean and west
to the Gulf of Mexico, respectively. Additional minor releases from Lake Okeechobee
are made through canals, culverts, and other water control structures located around the
lake. During extreme rainfall events, the lake has about 6 times more inflow capacity
than outflow capacity. The dam has no emergency overflow spillway; therefore, during
periods of prolonged rainfall, the lake level will rise with only limited ability to control.

Since its final construction in the 1960’s excessive seepage has been observed during
periods of high reservoir levels, especially around the south and southeast perimeter of
the dam. This has typically resulted in sand boils and clear seepage exiting into drainage
ditches that parallel the landside toe, as well as to a lesser frequency areas where seepage
has been observed exiting the face of the dam. During a few isolated events when the
reservoir approached pool of record (retaining about 10 feet of water) backward erosion
piping has initiated. Fortunately, inspection of the dam identified the developing
problems and intervention was able to prevent progression to failure. As a result of these
events, approximately 22 miles of cutoff wall have been constructed along the
southeastern perimeter of HHD. A recently completed comprehensive risk assessment
and dam safety modification study identified the need to extend the cutoff wall an
additional 35 miles, completely encircling the southern perimeter of the dam. The
following sections discuss how the construction methods resulted in ideal conditions for
piping and how the hanging cutoff wall prevents piping from progressing to failure.

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION METHODS

The design and construction methods used at HHD have resulted in conditions that are
ideal for Backward Erosion Piping (BEP), particularly in the areas around the southern
side of the dam that was constructed in the 1930’s. Construction of the dam was by
methods that are considered unacceptable by today’s standards. First, no foundation
preparation was completed prior to embankment construction. Photographs 1 and 2 show
a before and after image of the lake shore, illustrating the conditions on which the
embankment was built.

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 2

Photograph 1 – Shows a portion of the southern bank of Lake Okeechobee prior to the
1930’s construction. Other than excavation of a fire trench through the peat, construction
documents do not indicate that any foundation preparation was performed prior to
construction. The Structure circled in red is the same structure referenced in Photograph
2, which shows the embankment shortly after completion.

Photograph 2 - Shows the HHD embankment immediately after construction. The

Structure circled in red is for reference when comparing Photographs 1 and 2.

In addition to a lack of foundation preparation, the construction methods themselves are

now known to be poor practice. Two primary construction methods are known to have
been used; hydraulic dredge and fill and dragline excavation and placement.

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 3

Hydraulic Dredge and Fill

This method was considered by many to be state of the art in the 1930’s, allowing levees
to be constructed at a bargain price. In practice, small containment dikes, wider than the
embankment footprint, were constructed and then soil from the interior of the lake was
dredged and pumped into the containment dikes. After the dredged material fell out of
suspension and water drained off, the fill was then reshaped to the levee template. There
were two primary problems that resulted from this filling method. First, the dredged
material segregates during placement, with gravels and cobbles falling out of suspension
immediately, followed shortly after by sands and finally clay and silt size particle settling
out of suspension further downstream or not at all. This problem is illustrated in
Photograph 3. In additional to segregation, the materials were not compacted prior to or
during shaping into the final embankment prism.

Photograph 3 – Showing segregation of cobbles and gravels at previous point of

discharge.

Dragline Excavation and Placement

Dragline excavation and placement was also used to construct a significant length of the
1930’s alignment. By this method, dragline excavated material from the interior borrow
canal was placed in bulk along the levee alignment. This method also failed to use any
compaction efforts during placement. This method also resulted in some segregation of
particle sizes, as cobbles and gravels tended to accumulate around the base of the end
dumped stockpiles. This construction method is illustrated in Photograph 4.

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 4

 Photograph 4 – Showing bulk fill placement from dragline.

Photograph 5 is a newer image that was captured in 2016 on the southern side of the dam.
This photo was taken at a construction site just east of Lake Harbor. As seen in this
image, open work gravel and cobbles have been found in pockets in the embankment.
This is suspected to have occurred as a result of segregation from stockpiling during
dragline placement. The interconnectivity of these pockets will be random along the
length of the dam, depending on the width of the stockpiles built during construction.

Photograph 5 – Open work gravel/cobble pockets discovered during a rehabilitation

project on the south side of HHD.

Cross Section

The embankment cross section also creates conditions that increase likelihood of
initiation of BEP. Lack of land ownership beyond the toe of the dam has allowed local

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 5

interest to construct shallow drainage ditches immediately along the landside toe
(typically drainage ditches for agriculture and roadways). This practice has given a
horizontal exit location for seepage and allows sands to begin eroding at much lower
gradient. Additionally, the borrow source for the embankment was excavated
immediately adjacent to the lakeside toe of the dam, giving direct connection of the
reservoir to the foundation soils. A typical cross section of the embankment is shown as
Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 – typical 1930’s cross section on the southern side of HHD

PERFORMANCE

The ground surface gently slopes to the southeast across the footprint area of HHD,
resulting in a low but permanent head across the southern side of the dam and reverse
head condition on the northern side of the dam (higher water surface elevation in the
landside canal that parallels the toe on the north side of the dam). At normal lake levels,
the head difference across the southern side of the dam is only about 3 to 4 feet.
However, during excessively wet years, the embankment has retained up to about 10 feet
of water. These higher reservoir levels are typically retained for several months as the
pool is slowly lowered back to normal levels. Once reservoir levels exceed about 7 to 8
feet of head, clear seepage and sand boils begin to appear in the landside toe ditch.
Under these head conditions, erosion of soil has not been documented; however, as the
pool reaches 9 to 10 feet of head differential (effectively pool of record) erosion has
initiated and required intervention to prevent progression of backward erosion piping.
The following Figure 2 shows the location of past inspection points around the lake. On
this figure, orange triangles labeled with a 3 represent areas of concentrated seepage and
red triangles labeled with a 4 mark areas where piping has initiated. Smaller orange
triangles with no labeling represent areas were the toe was observed to be saturated. Also
shown on this figure are the limits of the various construction methods and construction
eras. Note, there appears to be a correlation between hydraulic fill and inspection points;
however, hydraulic filling techniques cannot be concluded as the cause because landside
elevations are also lowest in this region. On the north side of the dam, the landside

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 6

elevations are higher than the lake at normal pool, and head difference across the dam is
generally less than 5 feet at pool of record.

Figure 2 - Shows construction methods in relation to performance history. (Note,

the inspection points marked on the on the northwest side of the lake appear to be
false readings based on technical review of field inspection notes).

The worst BEP occurred on the south side of the lake in 1995, as such, the most thorough
documentation is available for this area. The remainder of this paper will focus on this
area given the significance of the BEP that initiated at this location and the more
abundant availability of data from this area. During this high water event, piping initiated
at 4 locations in Lake Harbor, located due south on the lake (see Figure 6). Under a
differential head of approximately 9 feet, across an approximate 250-foot wide
embankment (iavg = 0.04), piping initiated into the downstream toe ditch and began to
progress horizontally toward the lake. These locations were identified and reported by a
studious inspector and the progression was able to be stopped. Check-dams were built in
the toe ditch, raising the water in the ditch by about two feet. This small rise in tailwater
was sufficient to stop progression. Photographs and as-built plans were studied in detail
as part of the 2015 comprehensive risk assessment of the HHD and several conclusions
were documented during that review. Photograph 6 shows one of the pipes and the delta
of sand that eroded from the embankment.

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 7

Photograph 6 – Showing pipe exiting horizontally from the sidewall of the landside toe
ditch; photo looking north (toward the lake) at the near vertical side wall of the toe ditch.

It had been previously suspected that foundation soils were eroding, given that the piping
initiated in a ditch cut below the toe of the embankment; however, close review of
Photograph 7 shows that it was more likely fill materials that were eroding. As shown in
Photograph 7, the left bank of the ditch is composed of Peat (the native surficial soil
south of the lake). Nearly black in color, areas where the peat has fallen on the erosion
delta can be seen laying on top of the eroded sands. The right bank of the ditch is light
gray in color and is thinly stratified with darker colored soil, giving the appearance of
hydraulic fill. The fact that Peat exists on one side of the ditch and not the other,
indicates that the natural peat deposit in this area has been displaced or removed during
embankment construction. Photograph 7 shows these features. Also visible in this
photograph are several initiation points were BEP was progressing, and one location
where roof support had collapsed and choked off further progression. Other areas that
piped along the east side of the dam and during subsequent high water events were found
to have similar circumstances, and all locations stopped moving materials after tailwater
in the adjacent ditch was raised through construction of check dams. Only one grain size
analysis was performed on the materials that piped. This test classified the piped material
as poorly graded fine sands (SP) with a uniformity coefficient Cu of only 1.4. Similar SP
soils have been found in borings and excavations at the foundation/embankment interface
all around the southern perimeter of the dam, typically with Cu less than 2. These
extremely uniform fine sands contribute the initiation of piping at average gradients of
0.05 and less.

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 8

 Collapsed Pipe

Peat that has fallen

onto the lighter Thinly stratified
colored sands sands

Peat

Photograph 7 – Shows internal erosion that occurred during the 1995 high water event.

In addition to review of video and photographic evidence of past occurrences of BEP,

preconstruction survey of the dam was also reviewed to get an idea of predevelopment
ground surface conditions in the areas of past poor performance. Figure 3 shows a
transparent overlay of the preconstruction survey on top of the HHD alignment (these pre
1930’s surveys could only be located for a small fraction of the embankment alignment).
As shown on this figure, the areas where BEP occurred are in direct alignment with a
canal that crossed transverse and then longitudinally to the embankment alignment. It is
suspected that the channel became filled with uniform sands during the hydraulic filling
process and the channel was the cause of the displaced peat seen in Photograph 6 above.
Figure 3 also shows another crossing southeast of the location where BEP occurred.
Unfortunately, review of other preconstruction surveys, where available, indicates that
these canal crossings were common and occurred over and over again through the
southern side of the HHD alignment.

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 9

Figure 3 – transparent overly of predevelopment survey and aerial alignment of HHD,
showing preconstruction channel crossings at the BEP locations.

A typical geologic cross section is shown on Figure 4 below. This figure also illustrates
the probable BEP failure path that was developing in the sands at the embankment
foundation interface in 1995. As shown on the geologic cross section below, the
foundation under the dam is composed primarily of limestone and calcareous silty and
clayey sands and occasional layers of calcareous silt. The borrow pit for the embankment
is just off of the lakeside toe. Borrow from this source resulted in an embankment that is
a nonhomogeneous mix of these calcareous materials found at shallow depth under the
foundation. The calcareous nature of these materials has allowed some cementation of
the embankment fill which is likely sufficient for roof support over a developing BEP
failure path. During the 1995 event documented above, one of the progressing pipes
collapsed and several were progressing with roof support. In addition, one sink hole
developed midway up the landside slope on the north end of the area that piped in 1995.
This sink hole may have been due to upward stoping of the pipe or possibly due to
suffusion of embankment fill into open work gravels in the 1960s widening of the
embankment (which was constructed by dragline excavation and placement, also without
significant compaction effort). The sink hole is shown on Photograph 8.

Also shown on this cross section is the Phase I/Phase II construction interface; the
interface between the 1930’s original construction and the 1960’s widening. The two
phases of construction somewhat reduce the likelihood of a continuous defect through the
full width of the embankment.

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 10

Figure 4 – Typical geologic section under the southern perimeter of HHD and most
probable BEP failure path.

Photograph 8 - Sink hole on landside slope that developed during 1995 high-water event.

CUTOFF WALL

Given the higher head across the embankment and the more favorable conditions for BEP
on the southern side of the dam, the recently completed Potential Failure Mode
Analysis/Risk Assessment and Dam Safety Modification Study conclude that risk
reduction for BEP potential failure modes was warranted around the southern perimeter
of HHD. Many different alternatives were developed as part of the Dam Safety
Modification Study (DSMS), including the addition of toe drain to the embankment,
purchasing land on which the toe ditch is located and backfilling the problematic area, as
well as a variety of nonstructural alternatives in populated areas where risk exceeded the

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 11

societal risk limits. Comparison of the array of alternatives found that cutoff wall
construction was the most efficient risk reduction measure.

Although there is no impervious boundary within a reasonable depth below the dam in
which to tie a cutoff wall into, the cutoff wall still mitigates the risk of BEP by cutting off
the highly erodible sand layers and forcing a developing BEP failure path to progress
through layers in the foundation that are not erodible. It also cuts off the complete
horizontal nature of the failure path and adds a vertical component to the failure path that
cannot continue to progress at the low gradients that can develop in this system. The
cutoff wall ties into a permeable limestone layer; therefore, seepage analysis conducted
for this project only predicts modest reductions in exit gradient. However, piezometers
around the Reach 1 cutoff wall show much more head reduction than is predicted by
seepage analysis, thought to be an effect of the anisotropy of the foundation and presence
of thin layers of lower permeability silts and silty sands that are penetrated by the cutoff
wall. Figure 5 shows the most probable failure path with a cutoff wall in place in the
embankment. Note, the limestone layers around the lake are not found to be vuggy, and
the layer in which the wall ties into has been tested to be up to 13,000psi in unconfined
compressive strength.

Figure 5 – Typical geologic section under the southern perimeter of HHD and most
probable BEP failure path for the with cutoff wall condition.

The following Figure 6 shows the proposed and completed locations of the cutoff walls.
Note, cutoff wall construction in Reach 1 is substantially completed in 2010.

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 12

Figure 6 – Cutoff wall location plan at HHD

SUMMARY

Design and construction methods at HHD have created ideal conditions for initiation and
progression of BEP. Poor or absent foundation treatment and poor construction
techniques have resulted in discontinuities of highly erodible, poorly graded fine sands at
the embankment/foundation interface. These poorly graded sands have been observed to
initiate erosion at extremely low average gradients, less than 0.05. Other methods have
resulted in pockets of open work gravels and cobbles in the embankment fill.
Disproportionate inflow to outflow capacity prevents the pool from being controlled at
levels low enough to ensure that BEP does not occur. Progression of BEP was confirmed
in 1995 and prevention of dam failure can likely be attributed to the efforts of an astute
inspector that observed the erosion and notified the appropriate team members. Cutoff
wall is currently planned around the entire southern perimeter of the dam to reduce risk
of failure from BEP failure modes. The cutoff wall is somewhat unconventional in that it
does not tie into an impervious boundary, rather it prevents progression of BEP by 1)
reducing exit gradients on the downstream face of the dam and by 2) should BEP initiate
under an extreme loading event, the failure path would be forced vertical and through
limestones in the foundation that are not erodible.

REFERENCES

Photos from USACE South Atlantic Jacksonville Archives

2016 Dam Safety Modification Study
2015 PFMA RA

Copyright © 2018 U.S. Society on Dams. All Rights Reserved. 13