Miller 1

Abstract:

This extended essay explores the extent to which the clandestine activities of the

United States Office of Strategic Services in WWII were necessary in achieving the

agency’s objectives. The OSS was the American central intelligence agency during

WWII and conducted many operations behind enemy lines during the war. The agency

was created to answer the US’ need for a centralized intelligence office and had two

primary objectives; to conduct special operations behind enemy lines, and to collect and

analyze intelligence. The OSS, throughout their operations in Europe, Asia, and Africa,

completed these objectives through the use of a variety of tactics, some clandestine and

others not. In Burma the OSS conducted guerilla warfare, sabotage, and assassinations. In

the Balkans, more guerilla warfare, sabotage, and assassinations. In North Africa,

kidnapping, and infiltration. In Europe, the OSS infiltrated agents to both gather

intelligence and create subversion. This investigation comes to the final conclusion that

the clandestine activities of the OSS were necessary to a great extent in achieving the

aims of the OSS, but not entirely. Although the OSS conducted the majority of its

operations through the employment of clandestine and covert tactics, the OSS completed

its objectives through the use of overt and non-clandestine tactics as well.

Word Count: 206

 Miller 2

Table of Contents:

Title Page Number

Abstract 1

Contents 2

Chapter I: Introduction 3

Chapter II: Creation of the OSS

Chapter III: Purpose and Aims of the OSS 5

Chapter IV: The Operation of Special Services 6

Chapter V: The Collection and Analysis of Intelligence 12

Chapter VI: Conclusion 17

Bibliography 20
 Miller 3

Chapter I: Introduction

In September of 1939, German forces invaded Poland marking the beginning of

the Second World War. World War II changed the way wars are fought. By the end of the

War, every nation involved had a defensive intelligence agency as a part of its

government: Russia with the NKVD; the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs. The

French DST; the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance. The American Office of

Strategic Services (OSS); later the CIG1, then the CIA2. And the British with the SOE

(Special Operations Executive), and so on. From then on, espionage, subversion, and

covert operations became the way wars were fought and the American OSS was a key

player in that transformation. During its operations, the OSS used techniques of torture,

assassination, subversion, and other such covert and clandestine activities. The Office of

Strategic Services was the first government agency to openly employ such tactics. This

investigation explores the activities of the OSS in attempt to answer the following: To

what extent were the clandestine activities of the American OSS in WWII necessary

in achieving the objectives of the OSS?

1
Central Intelligence Group. This agency directly replaced the OSS in 1946 and was also
the immediate predecessor to the CIA.
2
Central Intelligence Agency. This is the current foreign intelligence agency of the
United States.
 Miller 4

Chapter II: Creation of the OSS

On the 13th of June 1942, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the military

order to establish the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which would become America’s

primary intelligence agency during WWII (Executive Order Designating a Coordinator

of Information, July 11, 1941). Until then, US intelligence duties had been divided among

several agencies (Stevenson 120-121). Procurement and analysis of intelligence was done

by branches of the departments of War, State, Treasury, and Navy, while code breaking

was covered by the Army (Stevenson 120-121). To top off the assortment, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation was interested in extending its duties from spy catching into

foreign intelligence (Brown 6). However, having so many agencies with such similar

functions created a redundancy problem, as was noted in 1941 by William Donovan, an

American intelligence agent who would later become the head of both the COI3 and the

OSS. In his “Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information.”

Donovan stated:

It is essential that we set up a central enemy intelligence organization which

would itself collect either directly or through existing departments of the
government, at home and abroad, pertinent information. [Such information and
data should be analyzed and interpreted by applying to it the experience of]
specialized trained research officials in [their] relative scientific fields (including
technological, economical, financial and political scholars (Brown 23).

It was with this in mind that President Roosevelt approved the creation of the COI

and later the OSS (Brown 10). Unfortunately, the COI was met with much political

hostility4 resulting in its replacement by the OSS in June of 1942 (Brown 12).
3
Coordinator of Information.
4
The political hostility that resulted from the creation of the COI was due primarily to the
nuance of the Office. As demonstrated, the COI was the first such agency of its kind and
 Miller 5

Chapter III: Purpose and Aims of the OSS

Donovan’s Memorandum also began to set the parameters for the tasks of the

OSS. Upon its creation, the OSS was responsible for two main objectives as established

in Roosevelt’s Military Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services of 1942. The

Order stated that the “Office of Strategic Services shall perform the following missions:

a) Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the United States

Joint Chiefs of Staff; and b) Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by

the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.” 5 The OSS, therefore, was formed around the two

main objectives of collecting and analyzing information, and planning and operating

special services.

As the war progressed, these aims began to expand (Brown 112, 234-240, 274).

Within almost a year of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the objective of collecting

and analyzing information had grown to include strategic planning as well as preparations

for the end of the war (Dunlop 39). The planning and operation of special services also

expanded to include research and development of weapons and of psychological warfare

(Brown 111). Although the original functions of the OSS expanded, the objectives of the

agency remained the same throughout the war: to collect and analyze intelligence, and to

conduct covert operations on enemy soil.

many politicians and members of the military simply did not know how to handle the
agency. This combined with the COI’s control over many of the smaller intelligence
agencies created the atmosphere of hostility that lead to its replacement (Smith 17).
5
These operations were frequently of a covert nature and were conducted on enemy soil.
Throughout the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff used the OSS as a go-to, do-anything
agency (War Report of the OSS 42)
 Miller 6

Chapter IV: The Operation of Special Services

“Throw all you normal law abiding concepts out the window. There’s a chance to raise

merry hell.”

- Dr. Stanley Lovell, OSS Department of Research and Development

Of the two functions of the OSS, the conducting of covert operations was by far

the most diverse, consisting of guerilla tactics, sabotage, assassinations, etc...

Immediately following the United States’ entry into WWII, the OSS began to conduct

campaigns of guerilla warfare in South East Asia (Dunlop 69). During the summer of

1942, OSS Detachment 101 lead by Carl Eifler began operations behind Japanese lines in

an area mostly comprised of the country of Burma (Dunlop 71). The unit was one of the

first American forces to be present in what would become the China Burma India Theater

(Dunlop 63). The goal was to establish an American foothold in Asia, however, poor

political relations with the Chinese put an end to these desires and instead, Eifler began

the first American campaign of Guerilla Warfare in WWII (Dunlop 68). Beginning with

several paratroop jumps into the occupied jungles, DET 101 soon established several air-

supplied bases (Smith 23). Once a headquarters had been created, Eifler began to train

natives of the Kaichin ethnicity in the art of guerilla warfare (Dunlop 112). Within

months, the OSS had a large American-Kaichin army that began to wreak havoc upon the

Japanese forces (Dunlop 113-116). It soon became apparent that having the Kaichin as

their allies was a great advantage. The Kaichin were skilled in both moving through the

forest undetected as well as having a specific knowledge of the area. This provided for an

exceptional guerilla force, which was all the more beneficial as traditional warfare tactics
 Miller 7

would be useless against the superior Japanese (Dunlop 114). Due to the superior force of

the Japanese, the forces of DET 101 were significantly out-gunned (Smith 26). The OSS

men knew that this would give Japanese a significant strategic advantage if engaged in a

traditional battle scenario (Dunlop 74). By the use of guerilla tactics though, DET 101

and the Kaichin guerillas were able to increase their strategic advantage (Dunlop 74). The

guerillas avoided direct combat, instead resorting to ambushes and assassinations

(Dunlop 76). This demonstrates a necessity to resort to clandestine, or covert tactics in

achieving the objectives of the OSS. While not only formidable in their tactical skill, the

guerillas were also exceptionally ruthless and had a general disregard for the standards of

warfare (Smith 213).

The mixed Kaichin-American force would frequently assassinate tribal leaders

who were unwilling to cooperate with the Eifler and DET 101 as Tom Moon describes in

his book The Grim and Savage Game. Moon was himself a member of DET 101 and

recalls there being frequent interrogation of Japanese prisoners at the Detachment’s

headquarters in Northern Burma. Although these tactics are arguably unnecessary in

achieving the objectives of the OSS, they were very effective. By governing with such a

violent hand, DET 101 established a level of control that would be hard to match with

less clandestine techniques. This being in part due to the limited resources of DET 101 as

well as the general dislike of Westerners by the natives.

However, as effective as DET 101 was, a small portion of the US and British

militaries began to dislike the commando tactics of the unit. General Stilwell (the

commander of American forces in the China Burma India Theater) disparaged the unit’s

tactics of guerilla warfare as “irregular”, “illegal actions”, and “shadow boxing” (Smith
 Miller 8

311). While DET 101 carried on with their “shadow boxing” in the Burmese jungles,

guerilla warfare was also being implemented in the Balkans.

Operations in the Balkans had begun in September of 1942, when British SOE

(Special Operating Executive) agents airdropped into the mountains of Greece (Smith

180). At that time, the OSS had been busy establishing a base in Cairo, Egypt, from

which the majority of future airdrops departed (Smith 180). By August of 1943,

American OSS agents were being airdropped into Greece as well as Yugoslavia, forming

the SBS or Strategic Balkan Services (Moon 231). Throughout the Balkans, OSS agents

operated against the German and Pro-Axis forces with the aide of local Partisans (Moon

242). A large portion of these operations consisted of searching and rescuing downed

pilots from behind enemy lines, a duty the OSS had first taken up in Burma (Moon 239).

This duty was also one of the least covert or clandestine of all those assigned to different

OSS Operational Groups. The completion of this duty demonstrated the ability of the

OSS to achieve their objectives without resorting to clandestine or covert tactics.

The OSS also conducted more aggressive and clandestine acts of guerilla warfare

and sabotage as well (Smith 181-183). With the help of the Greek Resistance, the SBS

began to carry out numerous sabotage missions against the German railroads in order to

limit the Wehrmacht’s6 mobility (Moon 232). These sabotage missions were necessary to

slow German defensive capabilities while both the British and the Americans were

considering the possibility of a Southern invasion of Europe (War Report of the OSS

144). In the beginning of 1943, the Allies began discussion on how to move the

significant allied force in Northern Africa to the European theatre (Stevenson 84).

However, expecting such an invasion, the Germans maintained a significant defensive

6
The German Army
 Miller 9

force throughout the Balkans and Italy (Stevenson 85). Therefore these sabotage attempts

were necessary in aiding the possibility of an Allied invasion of Southern Europe (Smith

185). Unfortunately, these missions were only slightly effective because both the

mountainous terrain of the Balkans, and the feuding between resistance groups, proved

large obstacles to overcome (War Report of the OSS 139).

Besides the sabotage mission and the frequent ambushes, assassinations were also

present in the Balkans, primarily in Greece. In their invasion of Greece, the Germans had

been particularly ruthless, so when the Greeks had the opportunity to retaliate they did so

with a vengeance (Moon 247). The Greek mutilated and tortured the German prisoners

and several Greek-American OSS agents allegedly were involved in killing captured SS

agents (Moon 248). However, the Greeks were not the only agents retaliating against the

SS.

To the West in Italy, violence had increased as well with the new OSS presence.

Infuriated by the sabotage conducted by the OSS in Northern Italy, the German SS began

to act with an intense savagery against the American and Italian resistance movements

(Smith 192). In December of 1943, Captain Howard Chappell of the OSS lead a large

sabotage mission in Northern Italy known as Mission Aztec (Moon 251). The mission

was in response to an increasing number of Italian informants who were leaking

information to the Germans. Chappell’s mission left a long trail of German blood behind

it as the OSS and Italian resistance conducted numerous assassinations and sabotaged

many German targets (War Report of the OSS 150). When the Germans finally began

their retreat from Italy, Italian Partisans and OSS agents rallied up weapons and killed as

many SS troops as they could (Moon 253). In This Grim and Savage Game Moon
 Miller 10

reported that, on one occasion, forty SS soldiers were killed and ninety were captured.

Among those captured were several infamous SS agents notorious for their savagery.

Chappell later reported that all had been shot trying to escape (Moon 254). Again, the

heavy use of clandestine and covert tactics by the OSS was effective in the achievement

of an objective, however the violence of Mission Aztec can be questioned as to its

necessity. On one hand, the objectives of silencing the German informants and

conducting sabotage against the German military were achieved. However, on the other

hand, the killing of POWs is unnecessarily violent and yielded no benefit to the

completion of the mission’s objectives. This is also true in the killing of POWs in Greece.

Shortly before Mission Aztec, one of the more unorthodox departments of the

OSS was being formed, the Department of Subversive Operations or SO (War Report of

the OSS 36). The SO was responsible for enlarging anti-Fascist movements in both Italy

and Germany (War Report of the OSS 37). Through this task, the Department of

Subversive Operations attempted to cause economic and political problems in Germany

and Italy through the spread of rumors and other such methods (War Report of the OSS

41). This was achieved through the use of agents infiltrated throughout Europe. In

September of 1944, Josef “Jupp” Kappius became the first OSS agent in Germany, after

parachuting from a British bomber (Smith 138). Kappius assumed the German identity of

Willhelme Leineweber and began to fulfill his orders (Moon 280). Kappius had been

tasked with promoting the anti-Nazi movement, sabotaging the German war effort, and to

cause subversion (Moon 280). As to his last task, Kappius was charged with not only

spreading subversion among the Wehrmacht (German Army), but also causing economic

panic, as well the possible surrender of the Third Reich7 (Moon 280). Operations of
7
The Department of Subversive Operations hoped that if Germany was subverted to a
 Miller 11

subversion were frequently tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (War Report of the OSS

17), creating a necessity for such clandestine activities as subversion and infiltration in

the completion of the objectives of the OSS.

Chapter V: The Collection and Analysis of Intelligence

Although the OSS was heavily involved in conducting covert operations during

great-enough extent, the German government would simply surrender the war to attend to
the domestic unrest (Moon 281).
 Miller 12

the War, the agency’s other major focus was the collection and analysis of intelligence. A

large part of the many clandestine tactics used by OSS, therefore, were specifically

designed for this task. This objective can be broken down into two parts, the first being

the gathering of information. The second is not only the analysis of the information but

also the strategic planning that resulted from the analysis.

During the War, the OSS used several techniques for gathering information. The

primary technique was a direct result of the many covert guerilla operations operating in

both Europe and Asia. With so many operatives behind enemy lines, reconnaissance8 was

responsible for a significant amount of the intelligence that made it back to the military

(Moon 83-84). In Southeast Asia, for example, DET 101 built airfields from which they

could spot Japanese airfields (Moon 84). These locations were then relayed to Northern

Combat Area Command who would bomb the locations, effectively decreasing Japanese

air control (Moon 84). During the war, DET 101 was responsible for 90% of Northern

Combat Area Command’s intelligence (Moon 84). The use of reconnaissance was very

necessary in the completion of the objectives of the OSS. Other more covert techniques

such as infiltration were beneficial to some extent, but lacked the simplicity of

reconnaissance. For instance, to infiltrate Germany, an agent would need to have

extensive training and documentation. However, to conduct a reconnaissance operation in

the Balkans, an agent would only need standard military field equipment and radio.

Reconnaissance operations could also be carried out in locations that would be pointless

to infiltrate such as the Jungles of Burma.

8
Reconnaissance is the military practice of conducting covert surveys, or scouting
operations, for the purpose of gathering information. Typical OSS reconnaissance
missions involved sending agents equipped with radios across enemy line to report on
enemy movement (Moon 83)
 Miller 13

The guerilla forces of the OSS also provided information through local informants

(Smith 154). A fair amount of the information provided by the OSS groups working in

Italy, the Balkans, and Egypt was procured through the locals who cooperated with the

OSS (Moon). However, at times this cooperation was hard to attain, and on occasion,

drastic measures were taken to solve this problem (as demonstrated by DET 101’s

assassination of Japanese sympathetic Kaichin and Major Chappell’s killing of German

informants in Italy). In Egypt and Northern Africa, the OSS found it necessary to deal

with uncooperative by the use of kidnapping (Moon 210). A group of OSS agents would

capture the oldest child of the most important man in the village. When the man came

pleading for his son’s return, the agents would task him with gathering intelligence on the

Germans and Italians. If the man procured useful information, his son would be returned

(Moon 211). Other informants were more willing to aide the Allies, many even becoming

active agents in their own countries. Several members of the Catholic Church, for

example, informed on German spies present in Liberia after the Allies took the country

from the Axis (Smith 163). As in Burma, the use of clandestine tactics was exceptionally

effective, if not necessary in dealing with uncooperative locals as well as gathering

information, one of the two main objectives of the OSS.

The other main way for gathering intelligence was through both infiltration and

espionage, both of which are clandestine in nature. Although there were few OSS agents

in Japan9, both Europe and the Middle East had a large number of active agents
9
The OSS found it exceptionally difficult to infiltrate Japan for a variety of reasons. Soon
after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the country went into a state of ethnic lockdown similar
to the reaction in the US. Just as America had locked away many Asian-American
citizens, Japan scrutinized all foreigners and non-Japanese. This public scrutiny made it
impossible for the OSS to successfully infiltrate an agent, instead forcing the agency to
rely on informants from within the country. These informants were typically Red Cross
workers, or missionaries who had been deemed unthreatening by the Japanese Empire.
 Miller 14

throughout the war (Smith 131-134). Due to the variety of ethnicities present in 1940s

America, OSS agents were often of foreign descent and therefore well-adapted to the

infiltration of their native country (Brown 97). One example of this tactic was the

infiltration of Josef Kappius. As discussed earlier, Kappius, in addition to renewing the

anti-Nazi movement in Germany and attempting to creation widespread subversion,

provided simple information on German life that was highly valuable to the OSS (Moon

282). Among his reports, Kappius informed his OSS supervisors on the quality of life in

Germany, as well as the ineffectiveness of recent bombing raids (Moon 281).

Another influential set of spies used to covertly infiltrate the enemy were the five

members of Operation GREENUP (Smith 245). The team members were all either

German anti-Nazis, or German or Dutch-born American immigrants (Smith 245). The

team was based in Innsbruck and also focused on strengthening the anti-Nazi movement,

however several of their reports provided insight into the German Industrial

Infrastructure, as well (Smith 246).

Yet another example of the use of infiltration as a clandestine tactic, was

Operation SUSSEX, which was developed to provide information on Axis defensive

positions prior to the Allied invasion of Normandy (Smith 252). The operation was

comprised of a hundred French-speaking agents being air-dropped into the area

surrounding Normandy. The agents then provided all locations of German defenses

(Smith 252-253). This type of operation was carried out frequently by the OSS, and the

agency was frequently involved in the strategic planning of military operations because

of it (War Report of the OSS 189). Operations of this kind were frequently covert, or

However due to the non-military nature of these informants, as well as their scarcity, the
information they provided typically lacked strategic value to the OSS (War Report of the
OSS 198).
 Miller 15

clandestine nature but were also necessary in achieving the objectives of the OSS.

Without conducting such clandestine operations as infiltration, the OSS would be unable

to effectively gather reliable information as less-clandestine tactics were frequently

ineffective.10

In addition to gathering intelligence, the OSS was frequently involved in the

information’s analysis as well as strategic planning based off that analysis. This was a

duty of the OSS since Operation TORCH, the American invasion of Morocco in 1942

(War Report of the OSS 56). Prior to the invasion, Donovan had dispatched several agents

to analyze the best possible landing spots for the Allied Troops. The agents reconnoitered

the coast, and assessed German weak points throughout Northern Africa with the purpose

of determining the best strategic location for the landing of the Allied invasion (War

Report of the OSS 56). However, strategic planning also included preparation for the end

of the War (Brown 13).

When the OSS trained its first few agents, each agent was given a standing order

to start an American resistance should the United States be occupied by Germany or

Japan (Moon 23). The OSS even developed specific strategies to fight off both German

and Japanese forces from US soil (Moon 24). The OSS also developed end of war plans

for a US occupation of Germany, identifying anti-Nazi politicians who could be

implemented in a new government (Brown 13-14). Although these plans did call for the

future use of sabotage, assassination, guerilla warfare, and other such covert activities,
10
Besides on the ground intelligence gathering, several attempts had been made to
effectively observe German military targets through the use of modified planes. The
British used several modified Spitfire and Mosquito aircraft for this use to some effect.
Although the aircraft did manage to capture an extensive quantity of photographs, the
images were infrequently of any value. That combined with the risk of getting shot down
by the ever-patrolling Luftwaffe (German Air Force) resulted in the risks greatly
outweighing the benefits (Stevenson 140).
 Miller 16

they did not employ such tactics at that time, therefore demonstrating another occasion in

which the OSS did not use clandestine tactics in the completion of its goals.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

Throughout its operations in World War II, the Office of Strategic Services used a

variety of clandestine and covert tactics in the completion of its objectives. In completing

it’s first objective, the conducting of special services behind enemy lines, the OSS used

many clandestine tactics, some of which were necessary in achieving the objective, some

of which were not, and some of which were not clandestine but still as effective. In

Burma, the OSS Operational Group, DET 101, found it necessary to employ guerilla
 Miller 17

warfare in order to successfully engage with the superior Japanese military. This was also

true for the OSS operatives in the Balkans who faced a similar situation with the German

Army. By using clandestine tactics, the OSS was able to engage and defeat superior

enemy forces. DET 101 also used ruthless and clandestine tactics when dealing with the

locals in order to compensate for the small size and power of the operational group.

Without such violent tactics, the unit would have been unable to control the local people.

However, some of the clandestine activities were not so necessary. For example in

both Greece and Italy, OSS agents murdered prisoner German SS officers. These murders

were undoubtedly clandestine in nature, however they were hardly beneficial to the

achievement of the goals of the OSS.

Other tactics and activities were not-clandestine in nature, but just as necessary in

achieving the objectives of the OSS. For instance, in both Burma and the Balkans the

OSS was responsible for rescuing downed fighter pilots from behind enemy lines, an

activity necessary to the goal of conducting special operations behind enemy lines, while

also not being clandestine.

As for the completion of the second goal, the gathering and analyzing of

intelligence, the OSS also employed a variety of clandestine tactics. In Burma, North

Africa, the Balkans, and almost all other operational theaters of the OSS, agents

employed both clandestine, and more respectful tactics. The OSS used the clandestine

tactic of infiltration to gather information throughout the European theater. Infiltration

was necessary as a means of gathering first-hand11 intelligence form heavily occupied,

and often times urban, territories where other more respectful tactics could otherwise be

employed.
11
As in agent-gathered information as opposed to informant-gathered.
 Miller 18

In Burma and North Africa OSS operatives forced locals into being informants.

DET 101 assassinated non-compliant local as examples to the other potential informants.

In North Africa, agents persuaded informants by the use of kidnapping. Both of these

clandestine tactics were only employed once deemed necessary after the failure of less-

clandestine tactics. However, the OSS did have some success with volunteer informants.

The OSS did employ one non-clandestine tactic to great use and effect, though.

Reconnaissance, although somewhat of a covert activity, was successfully employed

throughout the course of the war. In several theaters, reconnaissance was necessary in

achieving the collection and analysis of information, often times being more effective and

versatile than the clandestine tactic of infiltration.

In conclusion, due to the over-whelming presence of the clandestine tactics used

by the OSS, this investigation concludes that these tactics were necessary to a great

extent, but not entirely. Although these tactics were used to great effect to accomplish

these goals, other tactics of a more open and overt nature were also used in the

achievement of the objectives of the OSS.

 Miller 19

Bibliography:

Brown, Anthony Cave. The Secret War Report of the OSS. New York, NY: Berkley

Publishing Corporation, 1976. Print.

Donovan, William. Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information. ,

1941. Print.

Dunlop, Richard Harris. Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma. USA: Rand

McNally & Company, 1979. Print.

Moon,Tom. The Grim and Savage Game: The OSS and U.S. Covert Operations in World

War II. LaVergne, TN: Da Capo Press, 2000. Print.

 Miller 20

Roosevelt, Franklin D. The White House. Executive Order Designating a Coordinator of

Information, July 11, 1941. Washington D.C.: , 1941. Print.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. White House. Military Order Establishing the Office of Strategic

Services, June 13, 1942. Washington D.C.: , 1942. Print.

Roosevelt, Kermit. U.S. Department of War. War Report of the OSS. New York: Walker,

1976. Print.

Smith, Richard Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence

Agency. Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1972. Print.

Stevenson, William. A Man Called Intrepid . Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 1976. Print.

U.S. Office of Strategic Services, Psychological Assessment Staff. Assessment of Men.

New York: Rinehart, 1948. Print.