SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 1 of 22

VII. CHANGE OF NAME & CORRECTION / CANCELLATION OF corrections in the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but
ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY interposed no objections to the other amendments.

Case #1: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARLITO On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the
I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY counsel for respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor
MOIRA KHO- SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and General (OSG) had yet to enter its appearance for the city civil
KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents. [G.R. No. 170340. registrar. The trial court thus reset the hearing to October 9, 2001. 6 On
June 29, 2007.]
September 14, 2001,the OSG entered its appearance with an
authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the
FACTS: On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy case and render assistance to it (the OSG).

Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified
petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence
effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition.
the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the They also presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies
correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
of Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an
additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito's children was
Carlito’s request for correction= citizenship of his mother (Chinese to requested to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified
Filipino). Carlito's second name of "John" be deleted from his record of from "Maribel" to "Marivel".

birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito's father in his
(Carlito's) marriage certi cate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan RTC RULING: Directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct
Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese", respectively.
the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the
citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John"
Carlito, Michael, Mercy, Nona and Heddy Moira’s request for from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of
correction= deletion of the word “married” since their parents are not marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected
legally married.
likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira. Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of
Carlito’s children corrections = date of Carlito and his wife's marriage the birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to re ect the date of
be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000,
appearing in their marriage certificate. 
instead of April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as “Marivel”. With
respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as
corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlito's
respondent. As required, the petition was published for three
father from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the latter's citizenship from
consecutive weeks in Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of
"Filipino" to "Chinese”.

general circulation, after which it was set for hearing on August 9,

2001. In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city CA RULING: Denied the Republic's appeal and affirmed the decision
civil registrar stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed of the trial court. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS
outlines the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry, was observed in the case. Regarding Carlito's
minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held that the
correction of their mother's first name from "Maribel" to "Marivel" was
made to rectify an innocuous error. As for the change in the date of the
marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit the CA conceded that it is a
substantial alteration, it held that the date would not affect the minors'
liation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" considering that at the time of
their respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father Carlito's first
marriage was still subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999. In
light of Carlito's legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they
were born, their children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed,
the CA went on to state, that Marivel was not an indispensable party to
the case, the minors having been represented by their father as
required under Section 5 of Rule 3 9 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the
requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied
nonetheless with the jurisdictional requirements for correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
petition for correction of entry in Carlito's birth record, it noted, falls
under letter "o" of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Since the changes sought by
respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted
through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such
as Marivel and respondents' parents, should have been notified or
impleaded. The Republic further contends that the jurisdictional
requirements to change Carlito's name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court were not satis ed because the Amended Petition
failed to allege Carlito's prior three-year bona de residence in Butuan
City, and that the title of the petition did not state Carlito's aliases and
his true name as "Carlito John I. Kho". Petitioner concludes that the
same jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlito's
father. DEIHAa
Page 2 of 22
ISSUE: Whether the changes or corrections in the respective birth
certificates should be allowed?
RULING: YES, the changes or corrections in the respective birth
certificates should be allowed. While there is a need for an
adversary proceeding, since the changes are all substantial in
nature. The Court here ruled that when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate
adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections
to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. 
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether
Marivel or respondents' parents should have been impleaded as
parties to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however,
that during the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who
was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to
the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito's parents as parties to the
proceeding. Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel
was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children's
birth certificates, especially since the notices, orders and decision of
the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and
the children. It is also well to remember that the role of the court in
hearing a petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to
ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein.
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their
certificate of marriage shows that indeed they were married on January
21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared
that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper, adding that
he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were born because
his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999. Given the evidence
presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors were
illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change
at all in the nature of their filiation. With respect to Carlito's mother, it
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 3 of 22
bears noting that she declared at the witness stand that she was not Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito's siblings
married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, that testimony was not uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino". To disallow the
challenged by the city prosecutor. 
correction in Carlito's birth record of his mother's citizenship would
perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito's and who are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.

his siblings' birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date
of marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the
issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest correction of the name of Carlito's wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel".
Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible
together as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding considering that
marriage legally. 
the name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is
"Marivel".

A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended
to respondents' Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record Meanwhile, with respect to the correction in Carlito's marriage
of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the circumstances, certificate of his father's name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho”, except
the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date of marriage of in said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was uniformly
parents" is warranted.
entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings. Following
jurisprudence, the change amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which error and it was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration, which can
governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with, be granted through a summary proceeding.

observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the

correction sought for.
 


More importantly, Carlito's official transcript of record from the Urious

College in Butuan City, certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service
Commission, 32 and voter registration record 33 satisfactorily show
that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus
likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.

The correction of the mother's citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as

appearing in Carlito's birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact
that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he
did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the
correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents' fault, does
not in any way change the adversarial nature of the proceedings. 

SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 4 of 22

Case #2: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ISSUE: Whether Giovanni, the ward, availed of the right remedy which
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, respondent. [G.R. No. 157043. February is under Rule 103 and thus, there is a need a need to comply with an
2, 2007.]
adversarial proceeding?

FACTS: Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change
of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores
on September 9, 1998. Capote prayed for an order directing the local
civil registrar to effect the change of name on Giovanni's birth
certificate. Since the trial court found that Capote’s petition was
sufficient in form and substance, it gave due course to the petition. It
was published in a newspaper of of general circulation in the province
of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks was
likewise ordered. Likewise, the local civil registrar was notified and a
copy of the petition and order was sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General.
natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
Since there was no opposition to the petition, Capote moved for leave
RULING: YES, Giovanni, the ward, availed of the right remedy
which is under Rule 103 and thus, there is a need a need to
comply with an adversarial proceeding which was complied by
posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of
the petition. There was no opposition on the part of the OSG, even
a copy of the petition and order was sent to it.
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity
of the Family Code of the Philippines),  the pertinent provision of the
Civil Code then as regards his use of a surname, read: Art. 366. A
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a
natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. 

of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed

commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother's
not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. 
surname from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on
the part of Giovanni's putative father to actually recognize him.
RTC RULING: After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among
a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to others, Article 366 of the Civil Code: Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall
Giovanni Nadores.
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.

CA RULING: Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial

in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni's petition. Giovanni
change of name. 
availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: the Republic contends that the CA requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate
erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. Giovanni's petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the
Republic cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador and claims that Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him
affected by the child's change of name should have been made as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was
respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 5 of 22
facilitate his mother's intended petition to have him join her in the opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte
United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the
of mother and son.
proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough. (emphasis
supplied)

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner in support

of its position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, a proceeding separate and distinct from the special
proceedings for change of name. Those cases deal with the
application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while
this case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by
petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on respondent's case.
While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change
of name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings
in the trial court on account of its own failure to participate therein. As
the CA correctly ruled: The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given
legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity
to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through
publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties
were deemed noti ed and the whole world considered bound by the
judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the
OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements
to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested
parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded
the opportunity to contest the petition.

change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike

petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in  

the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a
summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall
under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry
suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly
goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although
by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding
change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name.In
this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for an
adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general
circulation notice of the ling of the petition. The lower court also
furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came
forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one
opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear
the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.
The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine
whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true
the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS
Case #3: IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN
WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG. JULIAN
LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG,
petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by
the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent. [G.R. No. 159966.
March 30, 2005.]
FACTS: On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang,
a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, led a petition
dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/
cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Julian sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The
petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB
and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry. The OSG also
RTC RULING: Denied the petition when it found that the reason given
for the change of name sought in the petition — that is, that petitioner
Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore
because of his middle name — did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is
merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest
in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father
and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be
taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial
court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he
could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his
middle name.
considered a reasonable cause or a compelling one?
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: It is argued that convenience of the
child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not
prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle
Page 6 of 22
name "Carulasan" will cause him undue embarrassment and the
difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social
acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner
also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition
for change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to
decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases 9 decided by this
Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.  
OSG’S CONTENTION: The OSG filed its Comment positing that the
trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG
argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children
have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and
such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the
same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the
dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best interest of
petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a
adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify
the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that
matter. Petitioner's allegation that the continued use of the middle
name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary
than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court
that the dropping of the child's middle name could only trigger much
deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence,
while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is
no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even
assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it
has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually
proscribed by Singaporean law.
ISSUE: Whether the reason for Julian’s change of name may be
RULING: NO, the reason for Julian’s change of name may not be
considered a reasonable cause or a compelling one, since the only
reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 7 of 22
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name name would prejudice public interest.

would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper

and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name. In addition, Julian is only a minor. Considering the nebulous
foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is
best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment
and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of
the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may
just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court
and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere
matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the su ciency and propriety of the justi cations advanced
in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its
being lodged in the courts.



The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identi cation, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right,
so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given
him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may
justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be

'proper and reasonable cause' for which the change is sought. To
justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds
for  change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name
is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 8 of 22
Case #4: MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, RTC RULING: Denied Marcelo’s two motion to dismiss. On the other
PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA hand, it granted Rita’s petition for cancellation and/or correction of
LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and entries in Marcelo and his siblings’ birth certificates.  

HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in

their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial
Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in
their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY
K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY
K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-
Marcelo and his siblings elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
reiterating their allegations in their motions to dismiss with the
additional ground of forum-shopping asseverating that Rita and her
siblings had filed complaints for falsification against them and their
father, a petition to cancel their father's naturalization certificate and a
petition for partition of their mother Keh Shiok Cheng's estate.

MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE,

respondents.  [G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001.]
CA RULING: Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of
Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated October 28, 1994.
FACTS: Private respondents, Rita Lee et al, legitimate children of Lee 14 Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was
Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng, filed in 1992 and in 1993 two (2) also denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December
separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in 19, 1994.

the records of birth of petitioners Marcelo Lee et al praying that the

entry of the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother be substituted ISSUE: Whether Rita and her siblings availed of the appropriate
with the name "Tiu Chuan," their true birth mother and mistress of their adversary proceeding - Rule 108?

father, Lee Tek Sheng. 

Rita et al alleged that after the death of their mother, Tiu Chuan, on RULING: YES, Rita and her siblings availed of the appropriate
May 9, 1989, their father insisted that all his children, including Marcelo adversary proceeding - Rule 108. The proceedings taken in both
et al, be included in the obituary notice of Tiu's death. Investigation petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) disclosed that records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate
Lee Tek Sheng falsified all the entries in the birth certificate of Marcelo adversary proceedings. The Court held that substantial errors may
et al and made it appear that Keh Shiok Cheng, instead of Tiu Chuan, be corrected in a petition for correction of entries in the civil
delivered Marcelo and his siblings. 
registry where the aggrieved parties avail of the appropriate
adversary proceedings; that the petitions filed in the case at bar is
With this allegation, Marcelo moved to dismiss on the ground that the not a collateral attack on the legitimacy of private respondents but
petitions under Rule 108 cannot assail legitimacy and filiation, that to establish that private respondents are not the children of Lee
these were essentially an action to impugn legitimacy that cannot be Tek Sheng; that where there is no specific law or rule specifically
filed before the death of the father and that the same has already prescribing the period for filing of an action or petition the same
prescribed. 
must be brought within 5 years from the time the right of action
accrues pursuant to Article 1149 of the Civil Code. In the case at
bar, the cause of action of private respondents accrued in 1989
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 9 of 22
when they discovered the falsified entries in petitioners' birth action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth
certificates and that they filed the petitions in 1992 and 1993, both records.

within the five (5) year prescriptive period; and that there is no
forum-shopping where there is no identity of parties, rights or
causes of action and reliefs among the cases filed.
respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one
outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. 18 The petitions filed by
private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners'
records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or
biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth
records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private
case, petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply because
they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their
common father at a much later date. This is especially true in the case
of private respondents who, as their father's legitimate children, did
not have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception
against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their
mother's (Keh Shiok Cheng's) estate. It was only sometime in 1989
that private respondents' suspicions were aroused and con rmed.
From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.

the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer

therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh
Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's
children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all
between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.
respondents in their various cases against petitioners would reveal that
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b)
an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c)
an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place
that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.
crime as de ned and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The
last element of their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in
falsifying the entries in petitioners' birth records, occurred more than
thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that
private respondents' right of action or right to sue accrued. However,
we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.
59 Even a cursory examination of the pleadings led by private
at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of action and
reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions led
under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel
certain entries in petitioners' birth records. Su ce it to state, the cause
of action in these Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are
very different from those in the criminal complaint against petitioners
and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a
which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the
cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng's naturalization certi cate which has for
its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral
act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter, the
action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate which has for its cause
of action the private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to
inherit from their mother's estate.

that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of

 

SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 10 of 22

Case #5: MILAGROS M. BARCO, as the Natural Guardian and Registrar of Makati be directed to correct the birth certificate of June
Guardian Ad Litem of MARY JOY ANN GUSTILO, petitioner, vs. to the effect that the latter's full name be made "June Salvacion C.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SIXTEENTH DIVISION), REGIONAL Gustilo," and that the name of her father be changed from "Francisco
TRIAL COURT (BR. 133- MAKATI), NCJR; THE LOCAL CIVIL Maravilla" to "Armando Gustilo. Notably, Francisco affixed his
REGISTRAR OF MAKATI; and NADINA G. MARAVILLA, signature to the Petition signifying his conformity thereto. Three days
respondents. [G.R. No. 120587. January 20, 2004.]
later, Gustilo filed a "Constancia," wherein he acknowledged June
as his daughter with Nadina, and that he was posing no objection to
FACTS: On 24 December 1970, private respondent Nadina Maravilla Nadina's petition. The Petition was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-130.
("Nadina") married Francisco Maravilla ("Francisco"). By February of On 26 July 1983, the RTC, in accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of
1977, Nadina and Francisco opted to live separately and the year after, Court, issued an Order setting the case for hearing and directing that a
they obtained an ecclesiastical annulment of marriage from the copy of the order be published once a week for three consecutive
Catholic Diocese of Bacolod City.
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. On 7 September 1983,
Nadina led an Amended Petition, 12 this time impleading Francisco
On the same year by June, Nadina gave birth to a daughter named and Gustilo as respondents. Correspondingly, the RTC amended the
June Salvacion ("June") in Makati, Metro Manila. June's birth Order on 22 September 1983 to reflect the additional impleaded
certificate listed Francisco Maravilla as the father, and Maravilla as the parties. To which the OSG filed a motion to dismiss, citing various
child's surname. 3 Nadina signed the birth certificate shortly after it jurisprudence holding that only innocuous or clerical errors may be
was accomplished. 
corrected under a Rule 108 petition for correction of entries, and that
the Petition seeks changes "are substantial and controversial in
Subsequently, Nadina claimed that the real father of June is Armando
character which directly affect the filiation and legitimacy of petitioner's
Gustilo who is married to a Consuelo Caraycong (perished in the MV
daughter.”

Don Juan naval accident of 1981). On 21 August 1982, Nadina and

Gustilo were married in the United States. This marriage took place RTC RULING: Dismissed OSG’s motion to dismiss and granting
two and a half years before Nadina's marriage to Francisco was Nadina's petition and ordering the requested corrections to be
alleged to have been annulled in the Philippines. On 12 March 1985, effected. The RTC considered the claim of Nadina that she had relied
Nadina apparently was able to obtain a judicial declaration annulling completely on her uncle William R. Veto to facilitate the preparation of
her marriage to Francisco.
June's birth certificate, that it was through his inadvertence that the
mistaken entries were made, and that she was in intense physical
On 17 March 1983, Nadina filed in her own name a Petition for
discomfort when she had affixed her signature to the birth certificate
Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Birth of her daughter June
containing the incorrect entries. The RTC also noted that Francisco
with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Makati. Therein, she alleged
had signified his conformity to the action by signing the original
that she had been living separately from her lawful spouse Francisco
petition, and that Gustilo had manifested through a Constancia dated
since February of 1977, and that Gustilo was the real father of
20 March 1983 that he was acknowledging June as his daughter and
June. Nadina claimed that she did not allow Francisco to have any
expressing no objection to the petition.

sexual congress with her within the first 20 days of the three hundred
days preceding the birth of June. She prayed that the Local Civil
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS
While the proceeding is on-going, Gustilo died in 1986. It was found
out that Gustilo had two other children: a Jose Vicente Gustilo III and
Mary Joy Ann Gustilo (Gustilo had a relationship with petitioner
Milagros Barco from 1967-1983). Jose seeks to annul the RTC order
which had effected changes in the civil status of June. Barco in her
capacity as the natural guardian and/or guardian ad litem of her
daughter, Mary Joy filed a Motion for Intervention with a Complaint-in-
Intervention.
all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction. Even
CA RULING: Dismissing both Jose’s petition and Barco’s Complaint-
in- Intervention. The appellate court held that neither Jose Vicente nor
Barco were able to establish the existence of lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, the two grounds that would justify the annulment of a
final judgment. It ruled that while Jose Vicente and Barco had not been
made parties in the Petition for Correction, the subsequent notice and
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing served as
constructive notice to all parties who might have an interest to
participate in the case. The publication of the Order conferred upon the
RTC the jurisdiction to try and decide the case. It also found no merit
in Jose Vicente's claim that he learned of the RTC Order only in
November of 1992, pointing out that as early as 1987, he led a
pleading with the intestate court alleging that June's birth certificate
had been amended to record the name of her true father.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Barco assails this holding and claims
that the failure to implead her as a party to the petition for correction
deprived the RTC of jurisdiction. THe general rule still is that the
jurisdiction of the court in the correction of entries in the civil register is
limited to innocuous or clerical mistakes, as what she insinuates as the
apparent contrary holding in Republic v. Valencia 54 applies only to
citizenship cases. Next, Barco argues that the petition for correction
had prescribed under the Civil Code; and that the petition for
correction should be treated as a petition for change of name which
can only be led by the person whose name is sought to be
changed. Barco correctly notes, however, that the RTC erred in
Page 11 of 22
directing that the name of Nadina's daughter be changed from "June
Salvacion Maravilla" "June Salvacion Gustilo."
ISSUE: Whether the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over Barco and all
other indispensable parties to the petition for correction.
RULING: YES, the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over Barco and
if Nadina failed to implead Barco, this was cured by Nadina’s
compliance with Section 4, Rule 108 (notice of publication). 
The Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction over the parties was
properly acquired through the notice by publication effected in
conformity with Section 4 of Rule 108. Barco assails this holding and
claims that the failure to implead her as a party to the petition for
correction deprived the RTC of jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, Barco is
among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was
affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination
that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward's share
in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina
knew of Mary joy's existence at the time she led the petition for
correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a
petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests
may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner
cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate
offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina
amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates
earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted
above. Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the
Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by
compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by
publication. 
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS


Case #6: ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 174689.
October 19, 2007.]
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru
Silverio alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to
the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April
4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio"
in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male.” Silverio further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he
had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure. From then on, Silverio lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of rst
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
People's Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent
Page 12 of 22
to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of
Manila. On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements
were established. No opposition to the petition was made. During trial,
petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr.
and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
RTC RULING: In favor of Silverio. Ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila
to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of Silverio -
specifically for Silverio's first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY
and gender from "Male" to FEMALE.
the OSG, led a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged
that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.
CA RULING: Reversed RTC’s decision and rendered a decision in
favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court's decision lacked legal
basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic's petition, set aside
the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No.
02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Silverio essentially claims that the
change of his name and sex in his birth certi cate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048. Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his
rst name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his rst name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one's legal
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner's rst name for his declared purpose
may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.

SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 13 of 22

ISSUE: Whether Silverio’s reliance on the ground of sex reassignment petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
for the change of name and sex on his birth certificate is correct?
 through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus,
there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
RULING: NO, Silverio’s reliance on the ground of sex reassignment the entries in his birth certificate.

for the change of name and sex on his birth certificate is incorrect.
Neither may entries in the birth certificates as to first name and The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
sex may be changed on the ground of equity.  legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself
found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the union between a man and a woman.  One of its essential requisites is
use of his true and official name.  In this case, he failed to show, or the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
true and official name.
recon gure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).

change of petitioner's first name was not within that court's primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been led with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that
is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as
the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit
since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certi cate is a historical record of
the facts as they existed at the time of birth. 29 Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of
first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry,
where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might
be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or
on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It
can only apply or interpret the written word of its co- equal branch of
government, Congress.

physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.

Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, 

the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. For these reasons, while
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS
Case #7: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent. [G.R. No. 166676.
September 12, 2008.]
FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan
filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate 2 before the
RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
In Cagandahan's petition, she alleged that she was born on January
13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth
but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
which is a condition where persons thus a icted possess both male
and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed
to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small
ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such
that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for
three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by
the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance
and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his
behalf. To prove her claim, Cagandahan testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines- Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon
issued a medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is
known as CAH.
RTC RULING: Granted Cagandahan’s petition. The Civil Register of
Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in
Page 14 of 22
the birth certificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the
prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and
It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's registry,
baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended
to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking
a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The OSG contends that the petition
below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent's petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar. 5 The
OSG further contends respondent's petition is fatally defective since it
failed to state that respondent is a bona de resident of the province
where the petition was led for at least three (3) years prior to the date
of such filing as mandated under Section 2 (b), Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court. 6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of
sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's claimed medical
condition known as CAH does not make her a male.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Cagandahan counters that although
the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a
party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the
Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to
publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes
in the course of the proceedings, Cagandahan is actually a male
person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 15 of 22
true sex/gender, change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the
108, and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the
entries in the birth certificate of Cagandahan to change her sex or absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" 27 and in
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male
known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff", under Rules will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court?
protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male.

RULING: NO, the trial court have not erred in ordering the

correction of entries in the birth certificate of Cagandahan to In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of
change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed
her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and
"Jennifer" to "Jeff", under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of his mature decision to be a male. Life is already di cult for the ordinary
Court. 
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his
unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court unique circumstances in this case. 

has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of

judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons  

adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's

grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we  find merit in
respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with
the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality
and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 16 of 22
Case #8: ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and such a way that the entry under the name of the child, the surname
natural guardian, Armi A. Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as
capacity, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. ROSENDO ALBA; and that the entry under the date and place of
HERRERA, respondents. [G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005.]
marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise
ordered deleted or cancelled. Also, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
FACTS: On October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera Revised Rules of Court, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in the birth correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba
certificate of "Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.", to wit: (1) the surname Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entries under the name of the child,
"Herrera" as appended to the name of said child; (2) the reference to the surname Herrera, Jr., and the name of the father Rosendo Caparas
private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) Herrera are ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as
the alleged marriage of private respondent to the child's mother, Armi ROSENDO ALBA; and the entry under the date and place of marriage,
A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered
the challenged entries are false and that it was only sometime in deleted or cancelled.

September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said birth

certificate.
CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC decision and dismissed Armi’s petition
holding, among others, that petitioner failed to prove that private
Rosendo Herrera alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day
1965 with Ezperanza C. Santos and never contracted marriage with in court. It further held that as an illegitimate child, petitioner minor
Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he should bear the surname of his mother. 

presented certifications from the Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City

and the National Statistics Office, both stating that they have no record ISSUE: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over Armi and Rosendo
of marriage between Herrera and Armi.
Alba even if they failed to attend during the hearing?

On November 12, 1996, Herrera filed an amended petition, impleading RULING: YES, the court acquired jurisdiction over Armi and
Armi and "all the persons who have or claim any interest in th[e] Rosendo Alba even if they failed to attend during the hearing since
petition." 
the petition for cancellation filed is considered an action in rem. It is
enough that the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
On November 27, 1996, the trial court issued an Order setting the There is also substantial compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108
petition for hearing on January 24, 1997, and directed the publication since there is a notice by publication. 

and service of said order to Armi at her address appearing in the birth
certificate which is No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, and to the Civil In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for
Registrar of the City of Manila and the Solicitor General. The hearing cancellation vested the latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial
was rescheduled on February 26, 1997. However, Armi failed to attend.
corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting
the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the
RTC RULING: In favour of Herrera. Ordering the correction of the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in with the proper Regional Trial Court. Being a proceeding in rem,
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 17 of 22
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not
required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested
with jurisdiction over the subject matter. aSTHDc

The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the
publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila,
sufficiently complied with the requirement of due process, the essence
of which is an opportunity to be heard. Said address appeared in the
birth certificate of petitioner minor as the residence of Armi.
Considering that the Certi cate of Birth bears her signature, the entries
appearing therein are presumed to have been entered with her
approval. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all
indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, which binds
the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition.
An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. The
absence of personal service of the order to Armi was therefore cured
by the trial court's compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires
notice by publication. Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was private
respondent's alleged concealment of Armi's present address, was not
proven. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed
by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case
by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.

Furthermore in the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi

that Rosendo Alba is an illegitimate child because she was never
married to private respondent. Considering that the latter strongly
asserts that he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is
therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the
surname of his mother. In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects
of the instant controversy do not warrant the annulment of the trial
court's decision.

SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS
VIII. PROCEEDINGS FOR THE HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE
PERSONS
Case #1: CHIN AH FOO (alias CHAN FOO WOO) and YEE SHEE
(alias YEE SUI YENG), widow of Chin Ah Kim, petitioners, vs.
PEDRO CONCEPCION, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LEE
VOO, respondents.  [G.R. No. 33281. March 31, 1930.]
Chan Sam from San Lazaro Hospital. Article 8 of the Penal Code
FACTS: On November 15, 1927, one Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo),
was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the murder of
Chin Ah Kim. Thereafter, the trial judge rendered judgment declaring
the accused not responsible for the crime, and dismissing the case,
but requiring the reclusion of the accused for treatment in San Lazaro
Hospital, in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code, with the
admonition that the accused by not permitted to leave the said
institution without first obtaining the permission of the court. In
compliance with this order, Chan Sam was con ned for approximately
two years in San Lazaro Hospital. During this period, efforts to obtain
his release were made induced by the desire of his wife and father-in-
law to have him proceed to Hongkong. Opposition to the allowance of
the motions came from the wife and children of the murdered man,
who contended that Chan Sam was still insane, and that he had made
threats that if he ever obtained his liberty he would kill the wife and the
children of the deceased and probably other members of his own
family who were living in Hongkong. These various legal proceedings
culminated in Doctors Domingo and De los Angeles being delegated to
examine and certify the mental condition of Chan Sam, which they did.
After the report had been submitted, counsel for the oppositors
challenged the jurisdiction of the court. However, the respondent judge
sustained the court's right to make an order in the premises and
allowed Chan Sam to leave the San Lazaro Hospital to be turned over
to the attorney-in-fact of his wife so that he might be taken to
Hongkong to join his wife in that city.
Director of Health.
Page 18 of 22
ISSUE: Whether the trial court judge erred when it did not ask for the
opinion of Director of Health before issuing the order releasing Chan
Sam from San Lazaro Hospital?
RULING: YES, the trial court judge erred when it did not ask for
the opinion of Director of Health before issuing the order releasing
and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so
that both can stand together. Considering article 8 of the Penal
Code as in force and construing this article and section 1048 of
the Administrative Code, we think that the Attorney-General was
right in expressing the opinion that the Director of Health was
without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any
person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the
provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code. We think also that the
converse proposition is equally tenable, and is that any person
confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with
article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody in
an insane asylum until the views of the Director of Health have
been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or
permanently cured or may be released without danger. In other
words, the powers of the courts and of the Director of Health are
complementary each with the other. As a practical observation, it
may further be said that it is well to adopt all reasonable
precautions to ascertain if a person con ned in an asylum as
insane should be permitted to leave the asylum, and this can best
be accomplished through the joint efforts of the courts and the
Director of Health in proper cases. After thorough discussion, our
view is that while the respondent Judge acted patiently and
cautiously in the matters which came before him, yet he exceeded
his authority when he issued his orders of December 26, 1929, and
March 17, 1930, without first having before him the opinion of the

SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 19 of 22

Article 8 of the Penal Code, pursuant to which the trial judge purported Contrasting the two provisions of Philippine law which have been
to act in issuing his order of release, provides that among those mentioned, it is self-evident that for section 1948 of the Administrative
exempt from criminal liability are:
Code to prevail exclusively it would be necessary to nd an implied
repeal of a portion of article 8 of the Penal Code. But it is a well-known
"1. An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid rule of statutory construction that when there is no express repeal
interval.
none is presumed to be intended. The most reasonable supposition is
that when the Legislature placed the provision, from which section
"When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law de 1048 of the Administrative Code was derived, on the statute books, it
nes as a grave felony, the court shall order his con nement in one of did so without any consideration as to the effect of the new law on
the asylums established for persons thus a icted, which he shall not be article 8 of the Penal Code. It is likewise a canon of statutory
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same construction that when two portions of the law can be construed so
court."
that both can stand together, this should be done. In this respect, we
believe that the authority of the courts can be sustained in cases
Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, which, it is argued, has
where the courts take action, while the authority of the Director of
superseded or supplemented article 8 of the Penal Code, provides as
Health can be sustained in other cases not falling within the jurisdiction
to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital for the
of the courts. This latter construction is reinforced by that portion of
insane the following:

section 1048 of the Administrative Code which requires the Director of

Health to notify the Judge of First Instance who ordered the
"When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any
commitment, in case the patient is con ned by order of the
Government hospital or other place for the insane is temporarily or
court. Various defenses were interposed by the respondents to the
permanently cured, or may be releases without danger, he may
petition, but we have not been impressed with any of them except the
discharge such patient, and shall notify the Judge of First Instance
ones which go to the merits. 

who ordered the commitment, in case the patient is confined by order

of the court."



An examination of article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses
that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one
accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for
obtaining release from the institution. The respondent judge has based
his action in this case on this provision of the law. On the other hand,
section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants to the Director of
Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an
insane asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of Health has
exercised his authority in this case, or that the head of the Philippine
Health Service has been asked to express his opinion.

SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS
Case #2: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ANDRES MAGALLANO, defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-32978.
October 30, 1980.]
arraign him. With the assistance of his counsel de oficio, the accused
FACTS: The accused was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Davao City with parricide for having killed his lawful wife, Exequiela
Costa, on September 29, 1968.
legally insane at the commission of the crime?
Upon motion by the counsel de oficio for the accused asserting the
accused's insanity, the latter was referred to the Chief of the Davao
General Hospital for examination. The Director was ordered to file the
necessary petition for hospitalization of the accused if in his opinion it
served the public welfare or the welfare of the person concerned.
eccentricities which do not mean complete deprivation of
Pursuant thereto, after psychiatric examination of the accused
conducted by Dr. Corazon San Pedro as attending physician, the
officer-in-charge of the Davao Regional Mental Hospital submitted a
report to the effect that the accused "was quiet, no bizarre behavior
noted. He was in good contact with his environment, recognized his
companions and was aware of the place where he was being
examined. He answered questions coherently and was relevant." She
recommended however that the subject be further examined in the
Regional Mental Hospital at least once a week for further evaluation.
Hence, the office of the City Fiscal moved that the regional hospital be
given more time to complete its examination and to submit a medical
report on the accused's state of mind. Subsequently, the officer-in-
charge of the Regional Mental Hospital on May 15, 1969 furnished the
Court with a resume of the psychiatric examination conducted on the
accused, to wit:"In the three interviews done, 1 subject was observed
to be in good contact with his environment. No odd behavior was
observed. He answered questions coherently and relevantly. No
hallucinations or delusions elicited. He is well oriented to the date,
place and person. He can give his personal data and other
circumstances in his life. He can relate the event that led to his
confinement in jail."
Page 20 of 22
Having been satisfied that the accused was fit and ready for trial on
the basis of the two medical reports, the trial court proceeded to
entered a plea of not guilty.
ISSUE: Whether the defense failed to prove that the accused was
RULING: YES, the defense failed to prove that the accused was
legally insane at the commission of the crime. While there is
evidence tending to show that the accused in some instances had
displayed some unusual behavior, at most these could only be
intelligence or discernment. The presumption of sanity is not
overcome by mere abnormality of behavior.
Indeed, the evidence presented by the defense does not outweigh the
certifications submitted by government psychiatric doctors who had
closely observed the accused for a month and a half, 15 and found
that the accused was in good contact with his environment; that he did
not manifest any odd behavior for in fact he could even relate the
circumstances that led to his confinement.
Apart from these certifications, statements in court by witnesses for
both the prosecution and the defense have pictured a mental condition
on the part of the accused that is not inconsistent with sanity. The fact
that a few days after the killing incident the accused was seen
sweating with his face covered with blood, as testified to by his own
father and Crispin Orais, for the reason according to accused himself
that he struck his head against a tree to end his life in atonement for
his guilt in killing his wife is a manifestation of remorse or self-reproach
which is but a rational feeling experienced by normal persons. As
correctly observed by the prosecution, it revealed an awareness of a
wrongdoing.Cdpr

SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS
Coupled with this manifestation or remorse is the appellant's voluntary
surrender to the police headquarters where he executed a statement
confessing his misdeed, The police officer and the City Fiscal who
separately conducted investigations of the accused observed that he
was normal for he could answer their questions coherently and
intelligently and that there was no indication of abnormality on his part.
The observation of these public officials is entitled to full credence, for
they have not been shown nor alleged to have any improper or ulterior
motive to misrepresent or not tell the truth about the mental condition
and behavior of the accused.
entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in
Again from accused's own evidence is the testimony of his son, that
before the killing for which he stands charged, he was working for a
living through fishing three times a week and that he himself prescribed
the prices for his catch which his son brought to the market for sale. 
metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his


Page 21 of 22
Case #3: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant. [G.R. No.
54135. November 21, 1991.]
FACTS: Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of
rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of
moral damages, and to pay the costs. At arraignment, appellant
due course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the
appellant.
The principal submission of Rafanan is that he was suffering from a
violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial
court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the
National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and
treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was
admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until
26 June 1978.
During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports
on the mental and physical condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr.
Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and
chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic
mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between
fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most
common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages 15
and 30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the
symptoms of schizophrenia in the following manner: "Eugen Bleuler
later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a
disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance
SPECIAL PROCEEDING APRIL 3 DIGESTS Page 22 of 22
of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude of the into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period
schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and his immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. 18
consequent autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2)
uncertain affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not
schizophrenia is often referred to as the four A's: association, affect, purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical
autism, and ambivalence.
period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances
occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their
ISSUE: Whether the defense was able to prove that Rafanan was testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general
suffering from schizophrenia during the commission of rape upon behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.
Estelita’s person?
Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and
examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental
RULING: NO, the defense was not able to prove that Rafanan was Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr. Nerit. Accordingly, we
suffering from schizophrenia during the commission of rape upon must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.

Estelita’s person. Further, Rafanan was conscious of the things he

did and say during the commission of the crime. Dr Jovellano’s
testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of
intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged which, in
the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of
insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan
threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she
had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the
Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality
of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr.
Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that a person suffering
from schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of the mental
faculties but also deprivation of the power of self-control. We do
not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently
demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already
pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be
shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a
crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of
insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing
evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and
during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry