respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share
in her estate.
HEIRS OF URIARTE
FACTS:
The heirs of Uriarte claimed that they have a successional right
over a 2.7 hectare piece of land in Surigao del Sur left by Justa
Arnaldo Sering upon her death on March 31, 1989.
Half of this land (0.5 hectares), formerly was conjugal
property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The rest,
consisting of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death
of her parents. Accordingly, the division of Justas property should
be as follows as private respondent contends:
A - The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the
share of Juan Arnaldo which will accrue to petitioners and the
second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to
private respondent.
B - As to the second portion of the area of the land in question
which as already stated was consolidated with the 1/2 hectare
originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo
and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to private respondent,
who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and who is only three degrees
from Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners who are the children of
Primitiva Arnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees
removed from Justa Arnaldo
ISSUE:
Who among the petitioners and the private respondent
is entitled to Justa’s estate as her nearest relatives within the
meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
The nephew who is the son of Justa’s half sister is
entitled to the property
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and
then descent is made to the person with whom the computation
is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his
brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father,
four from his first cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of
Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and
daughters of Justas cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of
Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then
plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only
a half-sister of Justa is of no moment. Nevertheless, petitioners
make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo,
his mother being Ursulas daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by
Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case, private
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa
and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is
the son of Justas half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa’s
nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may
inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the
decedent.[23] That private respondent is only a half-blood relative
is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his
aunt’s heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, The
determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half
blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of
the survivors.
[G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998]
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and
RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.
CHARACTERS:
PETITIONER LAURO G. VIZCONDE and his wife
ESTRELLITA NICOLAS-VIZCONDE had two
children, viz., CARMELA AND JENNIFER.
SPOUSES RAFAEL NICOLAS AND SALUD
GONZALES-NICOLAS (parents of Estrellita).
The other children of Rafael and Salud are:
o Antonio Nicolas;
o Ramon Nicolas;
o Teresita Nicolas de Leon;
o Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent; and
o Antonio predeceased his parents and
is now survived by his widow,
Zenaida, and their four children.
FACTS:
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel
of land located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela
property) for P135,000.00, evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng
Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734. On
March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property for
P3,405,612.00. In June of the same year, Estrellita bought a
parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF
Homes, Paranaque (hereafter Paranaque property) using a
portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the
balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner’s life
occurred. Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer,
1
were killed on June 30, 1991. Petitioner entered into an Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde With Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud . The
extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the
properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner
and spouses Rafael and Salud. The settlement gave 50% of the
total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters
to Rafael, except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the
name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other 50%
was allotted to petitioner. The Paranaque property and the car
were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all
their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs in the
said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate,
Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding listing as heirs
Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife (Zenaida) and children of
Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix
of Rafaels estate and sought to be appointed as guardian ad
litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother.
Private respondent Ramon filed an opposition praying to be
appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Ramon filed
another opposition alleging, among others, that Estrellita
was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold
for not less P6,000,000.00 before her gruesome murder. On
May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition entitled In Matter Of
The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and
averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all
the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his
lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels
children by right of representation as the widower of
deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita.
The RTC appointed Ramon as the Guardian of Salud and
Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special
Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not include
petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs. Neither was the Paranaque
property listed in its list of properties to be included in the
estate. Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994,
removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his
wards property without the courts knowledge and permission.
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order
giving petitioner ten (10) days to file any appropriate petition or
motion related to the pending petition. In response, petitioner
filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing that he
was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and
he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. Despite the
Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion moved to include
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the
Paranaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
collated. Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10,
1994 granted the same.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision respondent Court of
Appeals denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly
adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela property
as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers
in handling the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the
Order of the Probate Court. (NO!)
Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the
intestate estate proceeding regarding Rafael’s estate is proper.
(NO!)
RULING:
No. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation.
The probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals,
committed reversible errors
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-
law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of
the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by
those in Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
With respect to Rafael’s estate, therefore, petitioner who was not
even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person
or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the
intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or
allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said
proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and
determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may
not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is
provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a
separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench, however, we
note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the
sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and
ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the
concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed
and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the
presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside the
probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in
an appropriate action
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the
Paranaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate
that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory
stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of
any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is
appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a
reversible error in ordering collation of the Paranaque
property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way
2
of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paranaque
property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the
sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable
simply by reason thereof. Indeed collation of the Paranaque
property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court
presupposes that the Paranaque property was gratuitously
conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that
the Paranaque property was conveyed for and in consideration
of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael,
the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who
inherited and is now the present owner of the Paranaque
property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts
order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the
obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to
herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels
estate. As it stands, collation of the Paranaque property is
improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties
gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his
compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the
transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a
public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heir[38] in the Paranaque
property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain
whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to
collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In
fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more
than the value of the Valenzuela property.[39] Hence, even
assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation
may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has
long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any
determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid
and binding purpose.
The content of the Order: (ARON MAKA RELATE TAS
PANGHITABO….)
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses
Vizconde were then financially incapable of having purchased or
acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela
from the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses
Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the
latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said
spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-
facto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to
the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of
Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were
financially incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael
Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in
business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and
garment manufacturing.However, no competent evidence has
been submitted to indubitably support the business undertakings
adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition
of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable
consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of
Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in
Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said
transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of
Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997]
Facts:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are
the niece and nephew of the deceased Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father
Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March
5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived
only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.
Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence
they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as
sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private
respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued in
the latter’s name. Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they
are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by
right of representation. Teodoro Domingo however, attacks the
legitimacy of Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison
was presented as the lone witness, with documentary evidences
offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their father and
their aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted
a written offer of the exhibits. Subsequently, private respondent
filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground
that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the
deceased Teodora Guerrero. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appeals upheld
the dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal
certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the
father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half
of the property in question by right of representation.
Ruling:
1. NO. The private respondent is not the proper party to
impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. There is no
presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
3
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And
well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with
the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces;
and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only
in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can
impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made
in any other way is void.’ This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because
they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action
can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the
periods fixed by law. Upon the expiration of the periods provided
in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can
no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption,
therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The
obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child
born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long
time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the
paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the
matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the
period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
2. YES. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide
for the manner by which the estate of
the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:"
"“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of
the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.”
“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall
inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any,
under Article 1001.”
“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.”
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half
of the subject property was automatically reserved to the
surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal
partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the
remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and
herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own
right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total
undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to
herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by
the Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided
one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively."
PAVIA VS UGARTE
FAMILY TREE
Manual Iturralde and Josefa Gonzalez.
|
|
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez (+)--------------Maria Juana Iturralde y
Gonzalez-----------------Maria Josefa Iturralde y Gonzalez(++
|
|
Pablo Linart (+)
|
|
Carmen Libart (herein petitioner)
FACTS:
 Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the
28th of December, 1900, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde
asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir
of the deceased.
 The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the
only claimant to the estate, having been heard in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings
were instituted, and she was declared, in an order made
on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice to third
parties, to be the heir of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde
y Gonzalez.
 In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen
Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed
one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon
Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that
Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared
the lawful heir of the deceased — a fact which this new
relative did notdeny — be required to render an
account of the property of the estate.
 PETITIONER'S CONTENTION:
What she claims is that, although she is one degree
lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana
Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the
estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by
representation — that is to say, that even though a grandniece,
she is entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct
niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde.
COURT'S DECISION:
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the
same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to.
ISSUE:
4
WON herein petitioner is entitled to represent his father Pablo
Linart and is entitled to half of the estate of the deceased.
RULING:
NO.
the error which the appellant claims was committed in the court
below is very clearly shown.
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the
same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to, when, as a
matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can
only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of
the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one
of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the
daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been
quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart,
had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded
to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by
representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the
portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an
error to consider that the word "children" in this connection does
not include "grandchildren." There is no precedent in our
jurisprudence to warrant such a conclusion.
The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899,
and December 31, 1895, relied upon, are not applicable to this
case. Those decisions were rendered in cases relating to testate
and not to intestate successions. In both cases, and in many
others decided by the supreme court of Spain, prior to the
operation of the Civil Code, where a testator had named certain
persons as heirs and, they failing, that the property should pass
to their children, it was held that "Grandchildren" were
necessarily included in the word "children," and that in such a
case the grandchild does not, properly speaking, inherit by
representation, "for the reason that he must in any event succeed
the child in the natural and regular order," and pointed out in the
last decision referred to. And, as is also pointed out in the first
decision, "the fact that it was stated with more or less correctness
in the prayer of the complaint that the action was based upon the
right of representation, is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a
right which he had under the terms of the will." The difference is
this, that in the case of a testamentary succession, we must take
into consideration and give force to the intention of the testator
when he substitutes the children for the heirs first named by him.
The descendants are ordinarily considered as included in the
term "children," unless they are expressly excluded, whereas in
intestate successions, reference should only be had to the
provisions of the law under which it is evident that the rights of
representation in the collateral line do not obtain beyond the
sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.
We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of
the deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance,
because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance
grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of
representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the
brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo
Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
The court ordered the record be remanded to the court of First
Instance from whence it came for execution of the said judgment.
G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976
BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO
MARCELO; ALMARIO ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR
ALCURIZA and ANITA ALCURIZA, the latter two being minors
are represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO ALCURIZA,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO,
Administrator of the Intestate of JUAN S. SALAO; now
MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA
SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO
DE SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as successors-in-interest
of the late JUAN S. SALAO, together with PABLO P. SALAO,
Administrator, defendants-appellants.
Facts:
[Pls. see attached family tree]
Upon the death of Valentina Ignacio, her heirs, their
three children and 1 grandson partitioned her property. (pls. see
table below) Prior to Valentina’s death, her children Ambrosia
and Juan Sr. secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry
of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare
fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran and they exercised dominical
rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.
Later, Ambrosia and Juan Sr., acquired that Pinanganacan or
Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the
Hermosa cadastre which adjoins the Calunuran fishpond. Said
Calunaran and Lewa fish ponds are the bone of contention in this
case.
On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese
occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's death on
September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five
years old when she died), she donated her one-half proindiviso
share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S.
Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family.
He was already the owner of the the other half of the said
fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr.
(Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces of real
property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the
usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime.
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina
Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr.
that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and
that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to
give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of the
net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951
categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest
in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father
Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles
issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of
Ambrosia's one-half share.
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their
original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in
the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended
their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the
annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the
reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin
Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond
registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and aunt.
He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As
counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting to
5
P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than
P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has been
paying on his bond for the lifting of the receivership Juan S. Salao,
Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by
his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six children and by the
administrator of his estate.
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the
two fishponds in question were adjudicated to his seven legal
heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties
would remain under administration during the pendency of this
case.
The trial court found that there was no community of
property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin
Salao when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands were
acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of
Valentina Ignacio existed among her heir after her death in 1914;
that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and
that it subsisted up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned
among her three children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.
Issues:
Whether or not plaintiffs (Benita and heirs of Victorina) have
successional rights over Ambrosia’s share.
Ruling:
Succession: Even if the donation were declared void, the
plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's
share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr.,
her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if
living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her
legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita
Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the
succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line,
representation takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art
972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita
Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs.
Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).
Table 1. Properties of Valentina Ignacio upon her death on 1914.
(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her
parents, Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza, and the other half
of which was owned by her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,700
(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,418
(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,989
(VALENTIN)
(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,469
(VALENTIN)
(5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare, 12 ares and 5 centares
purchased from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by Valentina Ignacio
on November 9, 1895 with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,205
(6) Fishpond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000
(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10,424 square
meters, the other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 5,217
(8) Riceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,454
(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on
January 27, 1890 with a house and two camarins thereon . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 8,065
(10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia Salao, with an area of 11,678
square meters, of which 2,173 square meters were sold to Justa
Yongco . . . . . . . . . .9,505 (VALENTIN)
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 179,022 square
DIAZ VS IAC
The respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the
Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In
The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding
letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be
appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Facts:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana
were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti
and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and
out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who
died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the
widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4)
that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that
Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona
Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death
was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor
natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz
and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and
December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the
properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the
Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Issue:
Whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda.
De Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo
Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de
Santero.
who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her
niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural
children of Pablo Santero)?
6
Ruling:
Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of
Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of
the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child.
On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and
the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that
the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or
ISSUE:
mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The
record shows that from the commencement of this case the only
parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six
minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since
RULING:
petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any
error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate
heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
- Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942
was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra
Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her
daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her.
- Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles
died in 1949 without any issue.
- On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo,
claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed
a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money
and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful
heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-
half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with
defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2)
to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes,
described in the complaint, partitioned between him
and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an
accounting of all the income derived from said
properties from the time defendants took possession
thereof until said accounting shall have been made,
delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.
- Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria
Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject
properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate
child who cannot succeed by right of representation.
- For his part, the other defendant, private respondent
James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now
his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which
Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor.
These properties were allegedly mortgaged to
respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in
September 1963.
- the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner finding the evidence of the private
respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the
properties in suit.
- From said judgment, private respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
trial court. Hence. This petition.
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT
GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL
RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.
1. NO. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero
Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation,
claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca
Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the
fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his
alleged putative father and mother were not yet
married, and what is more, his alleged father's first
marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would
be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article
992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
7

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.
ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET AL
Principle:
A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-in-law by right
of representation. Article 971 explicitly declares that the
representative is called to succession by law because of blood
relationship. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would
have succeeded. A widow of the person represented cannot
assert the same right of representation as there is no filiation by
blood.
Facts:
Petra Rosales is the decedent. She is survived by her husband,
their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving
behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued
an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in
individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes
(daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales
son, 1/4.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting
a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the
late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a
compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.
Petitioner contends that she is a compulsory heir as enumerated
in Art. 887 being the widow or widower of the son of the
decedent and that at the time of the death of her husband
Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the
properties of Petra Rosales as her compulsory heir by right of
representation together with her son.
Issue:
Can a widow inherit from the mother-in-law?
Held:
NO
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to
inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the
right of representation.
The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate
succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous
exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the
final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which
makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the
more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law,
it would have so provided in the Code.
Article 887 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as
regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code
aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful
examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The
estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales,
the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra
V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article
981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained
by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz—
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is
called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He
does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales,
but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner
cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no
filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her
husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right
to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as
8
it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death
that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded
from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed
from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
RODRIGUEZ VS. RAVILAN
Facts:
Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their son,
Nicolas Mendoza, filed a written amended complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu against Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of
their daughters Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, all
surnamed Barte. The complaint recites, among other things, that
many years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the pueblo
of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs, Espiridion, Feliciana,
Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro,
surnamed Barte, and that, although five of them divided among
themselves the said property, consisting of lands situated in the
said pueblo and several carabaos, the legal portions which
pertained to four of them, Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro,
remained undivided, and these latter continued to possess, in
common, the property that fell to their shares, and were also
associated in business separately from their other coheirs.
The said property, as aforesaid, was administered by Espiridion
Barte, in common accord with the others, and, he having died
without leaving heirs, by force of law the part that pertained to
him passed to his brother Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and Matea,
as the heirs nearest of kin of the said Espiridion, and, by common
agreement, the said brother and sisters continued their
partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro as
administrator; that during the latter's administration, Matea
Barte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented
by his father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of
Pedro Barte, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in the name of
their son Nicolas decided upon the distribution of the property
mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the
guardian of the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would not
agree to the partition, on the pretext that, as the administratix of
that property, she had to pay debts of the deceased.
That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint,
and the debts having been settled, as admitted by the defendant
herself, the latter was requested to present the accounts, which
she absolutely refused to do, and that she continued in the
possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the said property, without
the consent or intervention of the plaintiffs; that Jorgia Barte,
Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of Matea Barte, and the heirs of Pedro
Barte, named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte,
were then entitled to the property in question, which should be
divided among them in three equal parts, one to be allotted to
Jorgia Barte, another to Nicolas Mendoza, and the other to the
heirs of Pedro Barte.
Issue:
Whether or not partition should be granted.
Ruling:
No. Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person
having or holding real estate with others, in any form of joint
tenancy or tenancy in common, may compel partition thereof in
the manner hereinafter prescribed."
Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in
an action for partition shall set forth the nature and extent of the
plaintiff's title and contain an adequate description of the real
estate of which partition is demanded, and name each tenant in
common, coparcener, or other person interested therein, as
defendants."
So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property
must have the status of a coproprietor or coowner of the
property the partition of which is asked for; and notwithstanding
the fact that Jorgia Barte and the son of Matea Barte, through his
representative, aver that they are the coowners of the said
Mandaue lands of others situated in the municipalities of Bogo
and Tabogon, they have not proved their averment by titles
which establish the common ownership alleged. A mere
affirmation without proofs is insufficient, since the defendant
party, representing the four daughters of the deceased Pedro
Barte, absolutely denied all the allegations of the complaint.
In actions for the partition of property held in common it is
assumed that the parties are all coowners or coproprietors of the
undivided property to be partitioned. The question of common
ownership need not be gone into at the time of the trial, but only
how, in what manner, and in what proportion the said property
of common ownership shall be distributed among the interested
parties by order of court.
Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be
remembered that the hereditary succession of the deceased
Espiridion Barte, who it is said left no legitimate descendants at
his death, should be divided among his eight brothers and sisters
who may have survived him, and in case any of these have died,
the children of his deceased brother or sister, that is, his nephews
and nieces per stirpes, are entitled to share in his inheritance,
according to the provisions of articles 946, 947, and 948 of the
Civil Code, the last cited of which prescribes: "Should brothers
survive with nephews, children of brothers of the whole blood,
the former shall inherit per capita and the latter per stirpes,"
representing their respective fathers or mothers, brothers or
sisters of the deceased.
The record does not show whether Jorgia Barte left any
legitimate heir at her death, and if she did not, her collateral
relatives succeed her in the manner provided by law.
9
 It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the
four brothers and sisters can not affect the hereditary rights
which belong to the relatives of the deceased predecessor in
interest successions.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a
reversal of the judgment appealed from, to declare and we do
hereby declare, that the partition prayed for be denied
Vda de la Rosa v Vda Damian
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-
ampunan) of the decedents.
Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa
and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa
Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in
Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12with whom
Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with
Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of
marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s
union is in dispute. The question of whether Felisa Delgado and
Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because
the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall
within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE ISSUE:

DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
Who are the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and
BAR Q: Suppose that A begets X with B, and Y with another Josefa Delgado.
woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters,
but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other RULING:
reciprocally?
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO- all her half and full
FACTS: blood sibs, nephews and nieces may represent but not the
grandnephews and nieces. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO
RUSTIA- his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.
Lucio
Felisa Ramon
Campo
Delgado Osorio 1. THE LAWFUL
HEIRS OF JOSEFA
Sisters: Guillerm Josefa DELGADO- Luis all her half and full blood
Roman Marciana Nazario Edilberta Jose Jacoba Gorgoniosibs, nephews
Delgado and nieces may
o Rustia Delgado
Rustia Damian & Half- blood but
represent not the
(deceased) Hortencia sibling of
nephews grandnephews
Josefa and
Cruz Illegitima
and nieces.
te child
nieces,
nephews Luisa
children and To determine
Delgado who the lawful heirs
de facto
nieces of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned
grandneph status of the cohabitation
Adopted ews and with petitione
of her mother Felisa Delgado Ramon Osorio must first be
child grandniece r
addressed. We hold that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
s
never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado
out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta,
Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed
Delgado,51 were her natural children.52

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate

Plaintiffs are the Delgados, half- blood sibling and decendants of
Josefa Delgado while Respondents are the siblings of Guillermo.
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The claimants to the
estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided
into two groups:
children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though
there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that
to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from)
another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from
that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater
rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we
submit that, succession should be allowed, even when the
illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The
reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the
case under consideration.

(1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her
half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his
sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate
That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category
between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the
same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all
10
stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation.
We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full
blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double
the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are
either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share
equally.53
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the
nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa
Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are
her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the
time of her death on September 8, 1972.
They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The
records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court
to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or
their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new
Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other one-half.
2. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA- his
sisters,69 nieces and nephews.
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an
illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia
only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which
time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first,
compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second,
voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of
an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative
father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual
limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28,
1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground)
must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of
the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). The report card in UST
of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo
Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s
parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in
its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was
Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa
Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September
10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing
contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an
authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not
the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the
original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law.
Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo
Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the
latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased
spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab
intestato. We quote:
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the
estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia
and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not
lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil
Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful
heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting
of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
ADOPTION
G.R. NO. L-6294 JUNE 28, 1954
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR MARCIAL
ELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS SANTOS-YÑIGO AND LIGIA MIGUEL
DE SANTOS-YÑIGO, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES,
VS.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
PRINCIPLES:
ADOPTION; PURPOSE - The purpose of adoption is to afford to
persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having
one by creating, through legal fiction, the relation of paternity
and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. This
purpose reject the idea of adoption by persons who have children
of their own, for, otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences
may arise resulting from the infiltration of foreign element into a
family which already counts with children upon whom the
parents can shower their paternal love and affection
11
ADOPTION; PERSONS WHO HAVE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
CANNOT ADOPT - There is merit in the contention that the
petition should not be granted in view of the prohibition
contained in article 335, paragraph 1, of the new Civil Code.
This article provides that persons who have legitimate children
cannot adopt, and there is no doubt about its application because
the petition was filed on June 24, 1952 and at that time
petitioners had two legitimate children, one a boy born on
November 12, 1950 and the other, a girl born on April 13, 1952.
FACTS:
a. June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in CFI of Zamboanga
by Santos and his wife for the adoption of a minor
named Marcial Eleuterio Resaba. It is alleged that the
legitimate parents of said minor have given their
consent to the adoption.
b. It was also alleged that petitioners had reared and cared
for the minor as if he were their own.
c. OSG filed a written opposition on the ground that
petitioners have 2 legitimate children who are still
minors, and as such they are disqualified to adopt under
the provisions of the new civil code
d. Petitioners argue that their 2 LCs were born after the
agreement for adoption was executed by petitioners
and the parents of the minor. Also the old code at the
time of agreement contains no such prohibition.
ISSUE:
Is the adoption valid even if the agreement to adopt was made
before the spouses had legitimate children.
HELD:
No.
While the adoption agreement was executed at the time when the
law applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and
that rule does not prohibit persons who have legitimate children
from adopting, we cannot agree to the proposition that such
agreement has the effect of establishing the relation of paternity
and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court.
Now, said rule expressly provides that a person desiring to adopt
a minor shall present a petition to the court of first instance of the
province where he resides (section 1). This means that the only
valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one made through court,
or in pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule, which
shows that the agreement under consideration can not have the
effect of adoption as now pretended by petitioners.
2. Baruel--- Manuel
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs.IAC, VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and
ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
Principle:
Preterition applies to adopted children but not to spouses. (A
spouse is not a relative in the direct line of the other spouse.
Adoption makes the adopted child the legitimate child of the
adopter).
FACTS: (FYI: This happened in Cebu. They live in Sanciangko
Street. The disputed properties are in Cebu City and Bantayan)
Petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the
late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of
letters testamentary on the premise that Nemesio Acain died
leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores
and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura
were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio
Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya with a
translation in English submitted by petitioner without objection
raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on
burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain
Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
Part of the will:
“THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our
properties. house, lands and money which I earned
jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by
me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower,
of legal age and presently residing…. In case my brother
Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money
properties, lands, houses…. which constitute my share
shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita,
Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio
and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus the children of Segundo
who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner.
The oppositors respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a
legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow
Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited.
Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
Respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and
ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of
the will of Nemesio Acain.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
filed this present petition for the review of respondent Court's
decision.
ISSUE:
12
Whether or not private respondents have been preterited.
SC RULING:
Yes, on the part of the adopted child but NO on the part of the
wife.
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall he effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply
as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she
is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has
not been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No.
603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives
to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a
legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The
only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies
and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers
and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in
totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will
be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except that proper
legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
REMEDIAL LAW; PROBATE MATTERS:
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will,
or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would
be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor. Petitioner is not the appointed
executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in
the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of
personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir,
defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to
the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of
law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of
respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal
standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the
deceased and Special Proceedings must be dismissed.
As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity
of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is
not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to
do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no
legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a
universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have
been preterited. It was denied by the trial court in an order dated
January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion
to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on
the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
court.
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will
and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will
appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and
sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the
obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have
meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The
trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved
Petition is hereby DENIED.
Guys dli ni xa adoption na kaso
SUAREZ VS CA
Principle:
13
The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of
each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied
and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of
their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not
because of their mother but through their own right as children
of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in
any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to
protect their own interests.
FACTS:
Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955
and since then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of
land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned.
In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty
Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of
contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of
Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the
aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. 1
The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty
Corporation having become final and executory, five (5) valuable
parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then)
were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of
the private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of
P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate
of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.
On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period,
petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action 2 against private
respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter
docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the
auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied
pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that
being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they
cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land,
of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on
execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the
five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in
the name of petitioner’s deceased father?
RULING:
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law
applicable at the time of the institution of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides:
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists
of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the
rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the
surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the
legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is
equal to the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and
auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their
mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not
because of their mother but through their own right as children
of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in
any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to
protect their own interests.
TEOTICO VS ANA DEL VAL
Facts:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre made a will
giving a legacy to Dr. Rene Teotico of P20,000. Dr. Rene Teotico is
the husband of Josefina Mortera, the testatrix's niece. The
testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal
heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed of in the will. The testatrix died on July 14, 1955.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother
of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to
the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said
will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time
of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress,
threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the
opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to
intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the
oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera,
and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by
alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to
the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician
who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the
probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960,
admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made
in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the
14
portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the
testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied. Both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the
decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy
in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as
subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter
from that portion which admits the will to probate.
Issue:
Whether or not an adopted child of the testatrix’s
deceased sister (Ana del Val Chan) has the right to intervene in
the probate proceeding in this case.
Ruling:
NO.
The Supreme Court held that the oppositor (Ana del Val
Chan) cannot derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted
child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of
the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as
expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents.
As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of
the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however,
is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to
his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law.
Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a
relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which
they may have after the adoption, except that the law
imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of
adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted
considered as descendants of the adopter. The
relationship created is exclusively between the adopter
and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of
either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p.
652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and
adopted, and does not extend to other members of the
family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry
the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline
of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and
Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa,
Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-
313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol.
1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either
as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding
contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
Questions sa assignment
1.
Under Art. 189, par. 3 of the Family Code, The adopted shall
remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
B. Yes.
Under Article 39, par. 4 of The Child and Youth Welfare Code, the
adoption shall have the following effects:
XXXX
4. Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter: Provided,
That if the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or
ascendants and by an adopted person, the latter shall not have
more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child:
Provided, further, That any property received gratuitously by the
adopted from the adopter shall revert to the adopter should the
former predecease the latter without legitimate issue unless the
adopted has, during his lifetime, alienated such property:
Provided, finally, That in the last case, should the adopted leave
no property other than that received from the adopter, and he is
survived by illegitimate issue or a spouse, such illegitimate issue
collectively or the spouse shall receive one-fourth of such
property; if the adopted is survived by illegitimate issue and a
spouse, then the former collectively shall receive one-fourth and
the latter also one-fourth, the rest in any case reverting to the
adopter, observing in the case of the illegitimate issue the
proportion provided for in Article 895 of the Civil Code.
2. Jigo
3.
Question No. 3: Are the parents by nature & blood relatives an
intestate heir to the estate of the adopted child?
Ans.: No.
Article 984 of the Civil Code provides that in case of the death of
an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents
and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his
legal heirs.
4. Compacion
1. A) (Family Code) Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following
effects:
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his
parents and other blood relatives.
15
Section 16 of RA 8552 provides that except in cases where the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
It is by this severance that an adopted child is not an intestate of
either his biological parents or his blood relatives. Adoption
relieves the birth parents of the adopted person of all parental
rights and responsibilities and terminates all legal relationships
between the adopted person and the birth parents and other
relatives of the adopted person. Thereafter, the adopted person is
a stranger to the former relatives for all purposes, including
inheritance.
B) RA 8552 Section 18 provides that in legal and intestate
succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal
rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
In other words, after adoption, the adopted person shall be
treated as if he or she was born to the adopting parents and shall
have all rights and be subject to all of the duties arising from that
relation, including the right of inheritance. Thus, an adopted child
is an intestate heir of the adopters.
As regards to the adopter’s blood relatives, he is not an
intestate heir. The relationship established by the adoption,
however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend
to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus,
the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the
legitimate children which they may have after the adoption,
except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by
reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted
considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship
created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and
does not extend to the relatives of either.
2. No. RA 8552 Section 18 provides that in legal and intestate
succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal
rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child does,
the latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the
parents or ascendants of the adopter.
In other words, the law does not create any relationship between
the adopted child and the relatives of the adopting parents, not
even to the biological or legitimate children of the adopting
parents.
3. Article 39 (2) PD 603 provides that adoption dissolves the
authority vested in the natural parent or parents, except where
the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent.
Article 342 NCC provides that parents by nature shall inherit
from the adopted child and the adopter shall not be a legal heir of
the adopted person.
However, they were repealed by RA 8552 which states that in
legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction
from legitimate filiation.
Thus, an adopted child shall not inherit real or personal
property from his or her birth parents or their relatives
when the relationship between them has been terminated by
final order of adoption, nor shall the birth parents or their
relatives inherit from the adopted child. This means that the
adopter and adopted shall become intestate heirs as to each
other.
4. Article 39 PD 603 provides that: The adopter shall not be a
legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall
inherit from him, except that if the latter are both dead, the
adopting parent or parents take the place of the natural parents
in the line of succession, whether testate or interstate.
Article 342 CC provides: The adopter shall not be a legal heir of
the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall inherit from
him.
However, Article 190(2) CC provides that when the parents,
legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire
estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and
the other half, by the adopters.
But by the enactment of RA 8552, the birth parents of an adopted
person are relieved of all parental duties and responsibilities
toward the adopted person, including the right of inheritance
unless specifically provided by will. Thus, adoptive parent is an
intestate heir of the estate of the adopted child.
 The adopter’s blood relatives shall not be entitled to
inherit from and through the adopted individual under
the laws of intestacy in the absence of a will, unless
expressly excluded. The rationale for this is the relationship
established by the adoption is restricted to the adopting
parents, and does not extend to his other relatives.
5. Both shall inherit.
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the
adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the
legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half,
by the adopters
5. Manuales
16