Consociationalism and Minority Protection in Ethiopia

1. Introduction
In this paper I explored the way Ethiopia is protecting minorities in light of consociationalism as
expounded by Arend Lijphart. I want to make it clear from the outset that, I am not with the
position that the four elements of consociationalism exist in Ethiopia. And according to some
literatures it is not mandatory for the four elements of consociationalism to be fulfilled in order
for a country to be said it is of consociational democracy. Consociationalism as developed by
Lijphart is mainly designed to counterweight the negative implications of majoritarian
democracy. Majoritarian democracy proves to be detrimental to the interests of minorities
because the majority in a multi-ethnic or multi-religious country is to overwhelm the decisions of
government taking advantage of their numerical majority. And hence for a country of diverse
societies an arrangement that transcend the conventional understanding of democracy must be
instituted.

Just to outline what is included in this paper the theoretical frame work of consociationalism is
dealt in the first part. The four elements of consociationalism i.e. grand coalition, mutual veto,
proportionality and segmental autonomy are briefly reiterated from different literatures. Then it
follows the situation of consociationalism in the Ethiopian context. For the purpose of
comparison I commenced from the transitional charter, although it is no longer in force, and then
I attempted to analyze relevant provisions from the FDRE constitution. And finally a conclusion
to this paper is drawn in the last part of it.

2. What is Consociationalism and the Need for it?

“Consociationalism literally means “association between equals”. Despite having distinct
cultures, institutions and identities, ethnic groups in consociations evolve a system in which they
interact politically equally. They feel autonomous in their respective ethnic groups and have
feelings that they are enjoying equal partnership in the system. They are politically organized,
and a mechanism for their proportional representation is set up.”1 In his work of “Evaluating the

1
.Chapter No. 2, Consociationalism: a Review and Critique prr.hec.gov.pk/Chapters/1232S-2.pdf, accessed on
09/04/2016, at 15.
System of Power Sharing Ethiopia in Light of Arend Lijphart’s Model of Power Sharing”Alefe
encapsulates the four elements of Consociationalism2 in the following way;

1. Grand executive coalition representing different societal segments: elites come

together in the interests of the whole society. 2. Mutual veto, which allows groups to
reject decisions detrimental to their interests. 3. Proportionality: proportionality rules
as a governing principle in political representation, civil service appointments, and
allocation of public funds. 4. Segmented autonomy: segmented autonomy in education,
linguistic, cultural and legal affairs.

In consociational theory, the adoption of the four principles of a grand coalition, proportionality,
mutual veto, and segmental autonomy is the outcome of a deliberate decision by elites to change
their style of behaviour from competition to collusion.3 The need for consociationalism is clearly
stipulated by Liphart in the following way: the leaders of the rival subcultures may engage in
competitive behavior and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they
may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of
cultural fragmentation.4

The elements of consociationalism are briefly discussed below.

2.1. Grand Coalition

Grand coalition is a device that provides “executive power-sharing” to various segments of a
society.5 The simplest form of grand coalition is the, ‘cabinet of all significant ethnic, linguistic
or religious groups in a parliamentary system’.6 A presidential regime, because it entails the
predominance of a single leader, is less suitable to consociational government than a
parliamentary regime with a collegial cabinet in which the various segments can be represented.7

2
.Alefe Abeje Belay, Evaluating the System of Power Sharing Ethiopia in Light of Arend Lijphart’s Model of Power
Sharing, European Scientific Journal November 2013 edition vol.9, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN
1857- 7431, at 260.
3
.Matthijs Bogaards, Consociationalism after Civil War: What is Different?IPSA 22nd World Congress of Political
Science, 8-12 July 2012, Madrid (a presentation paper), at 11.
4
.Arend Leijphart, Consociational democracy, world politics, Vol.21, No.2 (Jan. 1969), 207-225, at 211-212.
5
.Cited above, note 1, at 20.
6
.Cited above, at 21.
7
.Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, Andreas Wenger, Solutions for a better world? Consociational Democracy in
Iraq, Regional Conflict Summer Term 2006, Research Seminar, at 9.
 2.2. Segmental Autonomy
This otherwise known as group autonomy refers to the “group’s authority to run its own internal
affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture”.8 Segmental or group autonomy can take
two forms: territorial and non-territorial form. According to Lijphart, for divided societies with
geographically concentrated communal groups, a federal system is undoubtedly an excellent way
to provide autonomy for these groups. Nevertheless, where the communal groups are not
geographically concentrated autonomy can also be arranged on a non-territorial basis.9

2.3. Proportionality
The desire to avoid political competition may be strong that the cartel of elites may decide to
extend the consociational principle to the electoral level in order to prevent the passions aroused
by elections from upsetting the carefully constructed, and possibly fragile, system of
cooperation.10 Consociationalism democracy violates the principle of majority rule, but it does
not deviate very much from normative democratic theory. Most democratic constitutions
prescribe majority rule for the normal transaction of business when the stakes are not too high,
but extraordinary majorities or several successive majorities for the most important decisions,
such as changes in the constitution. In fragmented systems, many other decisions in addition to
constituent ones are perceived as involving high stakes, and therefore require more than simple
majority rule.11

Proportionality involves allocation of representation in political institutions and the distribution

of resources and jobs. The rationale behind proportional representation is to ensure the “just
representation” and “inclusion‟ of all segments of society in the power structure of state. 12 PR is
beautiful, according to Lijphart because “in addition to producing proportionality and minority
representation, it treats all groups – ethnic, racial, religious, or even non-communal groups – in a
completely equal and evenhanded fashion”.13 As a whole, proportionality applies to both

8
.Lijphart (2002 p. 39) cited in note 6 above, at 23.
9
.Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Journal of Democracy Volume 15, Number 2 April
2004, at 104-105.
10
.Cited above note 4, at 214.
11
.Cited above, at 214.
12
.Cited above, note 8, at 25.
13
.Cited above, note 9, at 100.
proportional electoral representation and proportional distribution of government powers and
jobs.

2.4. Mutual Veto

Consociationalists believe that the mutual or minority veto provides shelter to minorities and
guarantees that “it will not be out-voted by the majority when its vital interests are at stake.14 A
grand coalition offers important political protection for minority segments in consociational
arrangements but it does not provide reliable protection. Decisions, in the grand coalitions, are
normally, reached by majority vote; though the minority’s presence in the coalition does give it a
chance to present its case as forcefully as possible to its coalition partners, it may, nevertheless,
be out-voted by the majority.15

3. Consociationalism In Ethiopia
In line with consociationalism as developed by Lijphart and other literatures that I have already
hinted out above now it is time to explore the Ethiopian situation.

In Ethiopia every Nation, Nationality and People has an unconditional right to self-
determination, including the right to secession, the right to speak, to write and to develop its own
language; to express, to develop and promote its culture; and to preserve its history, the right to
full measure of self government which includes the right to establish institutions of government
in the territory that it inhabits and to equal representation in state and Federal governments.16
Article 47(2) of the constitution is also explicit in entitling the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
that do not have ‘their’ states to establish same. Further provisions for the protection of
minorities are Articles 54(3) in which at least 20 seats is reserved for minority Nationalities and
peoples in the House of Peoples’ Representatives, and 61(1) in which each Nation, Nationality
and People is to be represented in the House of Federation.

The elements of consociationalism, although not all, exist in Ethiopia. Taking the argument of
Adeney, I submit all the elements proposed by Lijphart are not mandatory to exist to say

14
.Lijphart(1977 p. 119) cited in note 12 above, at 26.
15
.Cited above, at 26.
16
.Art 39(1-3) of the FDRE Constitution.
consociationalism exists in a given country. What Adeney observed is “though Lijphart has
argued elsewhere that a consociation conform to above mentioned four features, it has been
asserted that a ‘government can have consociational elements even if it does not conform to all
Lijphart’s stipulations’’.17

According to Alefe, the Ethiopian federal arrangement could be described as federal

consociational one. He stresses the institutionalization of a parliamentary form of government
both at federal and state levels where it was selected because there was a desire to make power a
sharable good, which the presidential system does not and hence, parliamentary form of
government which is coalition requiring and coalition sustaining was consciously selected to
make sure that political power and resources are shared among the diverse nations and
nationalities of Ethiopia.18 In a sharp contrast to what Alefe holds Berhanu argues, the
parliamentarian form of government envisaged in Article 45 of the FDRE constitution upholds a
‘winner takes all’ approach and this may be a very unsuitable political system for a multiethnic
society that requires a coalition or power-sharing arrangement. As a result, a concentration of
power on a single winner could not satisfy the various interests and needs of the numerous and
diverse communities of multiethnic Ethiopia.19 Nevertheless, literatures show that the application
consociationalism is not limited to parliamentary form of government but also to presidential
one20, although parliamentary system of government more suitable to it. I argue, however, what
type of a government a country adopts is not an end by itself but the readiness of the elites and
the political forces to accommodate diversities and to act accordingly. This being so the general
situation of consociationalism in Ethiopia the following section evaluates the elements in some
detail.

3.1. Grand Coalition in Ethiopia

Before the coming into force of the 1995 constitution the transitional period chapter had served
as an interim constitution from 1991 to 1995. So in order to have a clear picture of the grand
coalition or the power sharing arrangement in Ethiopia it would be fair to start from this charter.

17
.Adeney( 2009), cited in note 15 above, at 27.
18
.Cited above, note 2, at 263.
19
.Berhanu Gutema Balcha, Restructuring State and Society: Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia, Spirit PhD
Series,Thesis no. 8, 2007, at 120.
20
.For example, see the article cited above note 17, at 21.
The Transitional Charter in its Article two affirms the right of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
the right to self-determination which includes the right to effectively participate in the central
government on the on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation. In addition,
Article seven of the charter stipulates the Council of Representatives shall be composed of
representatives of national liberation movements, other political organizations and prominent
individuals, to make-up a total of no more than 87 members. According to the charter the
Council of Representatives is vested with the powers of legislation and oversight of the Council
of Ministers.21 The charter dictates the head of state, the Prime Minister, the Vice-Chairperson
and the Secretary of the Council of representatives shall be from different nations/nationalities
(Article nine (b)). The Council of Representatives has also the function of approving the Prime
Minister’s nomination of members of the Council of Ministers drawn-up on considerations of
ascertaining a broad national representation, technical competence and unswerving adherence to
the charter (Article nine (c). So it is fair to conclude that the transitional period charter had
envisaged power sharing arrangements that can represent the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
of Ethiopia. Hence this was a well devised mechanism for minority representation in the central
government organs thereby protecting the rights of minorities.

Having highlighted the situation of grand coalition in the transitional period charter what the
situation seems in the FDRE constitution is evaluated subsequently. The constitution provides
members of the House, on the basis of population and special representation of minority
Nationalities and Peoples’ shall not exceed 550; of these, minority Nationalities and Peoples
shall have at least 20 seats and particulars are to be determined by law.22 The Amended Electoral
Law of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 532/2007 has the particulars for the representation of
minorities as is envisaged by the constitution. Article 20(1) (c) and (d) of the proclamation
underscores for the existence of constituencies, where in accordance with Article 54 of the
Constitution minority nationalities and peoples whose number is not less than 20 and are
believed to require special representation, shall be represented and the task of determining the
minority nationalities believed to require special representation is to be determined in advance by
the House of Federation based on clear criteria. These constitutional provisions and the

21
. Article nine, Transitional Period Chapter of Ethiopia, No.1, Addis Ababa, 22nd July 1991
22
. Art. 54(3), of the FDRE Constitution
provisions of the subsequent proclamation are a kind of panacea for minorities that cannot be
represented in the first past the post electoral system of Ethiopia.

Furthermore, the second chamber in the Ethiopian federation, the House of Federation, is
envisaged in a way to represent the different identities (Nations, Nationalities and Peoples) of the
country. This House is composed of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples and
each Nation, Nationality and People shall be represented in it by at least one member.23 From
this it follows that the two Houses are designed in a way to reflect the interests of minorities and
this is an element of consociationalism.

The better manifestation of consociationalism as developed by Lijphart is, however, on executive

power sharing and when the situation in Ethiopia is evaluated in reference to this the FDRE
constitution is far from clear as compared to the transitional period charter. A power-sharing
arrangement requires the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political
decision-making, especially at the executive level in order to construct a genuine power-sharing
device that can mitigate the danger of destructive ethnic rivalry and antagonism that could be
generated due to ethnic cleavages and dissimilarity.24 Elsewhere in the constitution it is provided
that, every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-
government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it
inhabits and to equitable representation in state and Federal governments.25 This is the
constitutional provision that grants every Nation, Nationality and People equitable representation
…in Federal governments. By far the constitution gives more emphasis on the self rule aspect
than the shared rule aspect. As hinted out above the Transitional period charter was more
courageous, clear and inclusive in the composition of ethnic groups in the executive than the
FDRE constitution. Similarly, Assefa observes, this constitutional provision is far from clear as
to how the executive grand coalition is to be apportioned in the different ethnic groups of the
country. He added, there is, of course, the legal framework of Article 39 (3) of the Constitution,
which provides for the equitable representation of the states at federal and state level as well as
the composition of the ruling party (that is a coalition of parties from different nationalities)
which looks like typical of consociational ethnic accommodation, that is, the principle of power

23
.Art., 61(1) and (2) of the FDRE Constitution.
24
.Lijphart (1994 p. 856), cited in note 19 above, at 84.
25
.Art. 39 (3) of the FDRE Constitution.
sharing among ethnic leaders at federal level. However, not only is its application limited in
practice but it also fails to include all of those concerned in the process of policy-making.26

Nevertheless, I argue, it is not mandatory to have hard and fast rule that determines the
representation of the different segments of the society in an arithmetic manner. General guideline
for the apportioning of government power is sufficient as what is provided in Article 39(3) of the
FDRE constitution, the flesh and blood to be filled by administrative actions. In a similar fashion
Lijphart argues assigning religious or ethnic quotas in divided societies to positions in the civil
service, judiciary, police and military are often unnecessary and it is sufficient to have explicit
constitutional provision in favor of the general objective of broad representation and to rely on
the power-sharing cabinet and the proportionality constituted parliament for the practical
implementation of this goal.27

3.2. Proportionality in Ethiopia

As the foregoing discussions reveal proportionality assumes representation in political
institutions and the distribution of resources and jobs. And this is mainly achieved through an
electoral system of proportional representation. This proportional electoral system of
representation is friendly for minorities because it counterpoises the overwhelming of the
majority. Noticing the unfriendliness of majoritarian democracy to minorities Bogaards noted
“Majoritarian democracy is judged unsuitable for plural societies, because the winner-takes-all
character and concentration of power allow a dominant group or coalition of groups to capture
state power, relegating the minority into permanent opposition. The breakdown of democracy in
many postcolonial states in Africa and Asia was attributed to the adoption of Westminster style
democracy, inherited from the (British) colonial powers.28

In Ethiopia the FDRE constitution unequivocally states members of the House shall be elected
from candidates in each electoral district by a plurality of the votes cast and provisions shall be
made by law for special representation for minority Nationalities and Peoples (Art 54(2)). And

26
.Assefa Fisha(PhD), Federalism Teaching Material, Prepared under the Sponsorship of the Justice and Legal
System Research Institute, 2009, at 483.
27
.Cited above, note 13, at 105-106.
28
.Matthijs Bogaards, Democracy and Power-Sharing in Multinational States: Thematic Introduction, in
Democracy and Power-Sharing in Multi-National States, International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS),
Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006, at 119.
the subsequent legislation, as mentioned above, is the Amended Electoral Law of Ethiopia
Proclamation No. 532/2007 in which in its Article 20(1) (c) and (d) it deals for the representation
of minorities. One can observe that the first past the post electoral system in Ethiopia is antithesis
to proportional representation as outlined by Lijphart. But also the constitution and the electoral
proclamation are vigilant in mitigating this scenario for both have provisions for representation
of minorities that may not dominate a given constituency.

The critique against proportional representation is it may result in overrepresentation of

minorities. But in Ethiopia this is far from happening in the House of Peoples Representatives
because the FDRE constitution has explicitly stipulated the quota that may be given to
minorities. It cannot also happen in the House of Federation because the way of representation
for Nations, Nationalities and Peoples is delimited, and rather the criticism is the other way
round for the House under represents the minority ethnic groups.

3.3. Minority (Mutual) Veto in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia the amendment of all rights and freedoms specified in chapter three, Article 104 and
105 of the federal constitution requires, among others, the approval of the proposed amendment
by a majority vote of all state councils.29 So if a given state considers the constitutional
amendment is detrimental to its interests it can challenge it or it can fail to approve the proposed
amendment. This is one expression of mutual veto in the Ethiopian context. Here worth noting is
it is not the identities but the states that can exercise the mutual veto of the proposed amendment.
As a result, the question to follow is whether the interest of the Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples is expressed in the mutual veto? Whether the mutual veto is serving the interest of the
minorities? This is because the regional arrangement in Ethiopia has created majority-minority
relations in the states and the majorities can outdo the minorities in their respective state council.
In this regard I argue that the minorities are not protected although they may think that the
constitutional amendment is detrimental to their interests. Just to elaborate, if I take the example
of the Tigray regional state where the Tigreans are the majority and the Irobs and Kunamas are
minorities and if the latter nationalities are against the proposed amendment, they cannot
materialize their opposition for the reason that they are to be outvoted by the Tigrean majority
composed state council of the region. Nevertheless, in the homogenous regions (at least for

29
. Art 105(1)(a) of the FDRE constitution.
those that have empowered certain ethnic groups as indigenous by exclusion of the ethnic
minorities) one can say that these regions (empowered ethnic groups) can exercise their mutual
veto because there is overlap between the state council and the ethnic group.

On the other hand, Alefe argues when it comes to minority veto, the Ethiopian model of power-
sharing betrays the principle of consociationalism, federal policy making process didn’t provide
for minority veto but he pointed in the Ethiopian federation, the right of secession is guaranteed
as a right of minority veto.”30 But I argue the right to minority veto as developed by Lijphart is to
be exercised within a given polity without looking for going out from a country and as a matter
of fact in Ethiopia the right to secede does not take as precondition a detrimental effects to
happen to an ethnic minority.

As a final remark, the missed opportunity in Ethiopia for the minorities to protect themselves if a
law is detrimental to their interests was through the second chamber.

3.4. Segmental Autonomy in Ethiopia

This aspect of consociationalism allows segmental groups to administer own affairs and it is all
about self rule. Segmental autonomy can be expressed in terms of territorial autonomy and non-
territorial autonomy.

3.4.1. Territorial Autonomy

In Ethiopia every Nation, Nationality and People has an unconditional right to self-
determination, including the right to secession and the right to full measure of self government
which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits.31
In Ethiopia in addition to the 9 member states of the federation, Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples within the States already established have the right to establish, at any time, their own
States.32 This constitutional provision is a kind of internal secession recognized for ethnic groups
in Ethiopia, although it has never been practiced in reality. Since the self-rule aspect of
federalism is given much emphasis in the Ethiopian context territorial autonomy is

30
.Cited above, note 18, at 264.
31
.Art. 39(1) and (3) of the FDRE Constitution.
32
.Art., 47(2) of the FDRE Constitution.
constitutionalized and hence we have ethnic based regional states and within some of the regions
we have ethnic based zones and special weredas.

3.4.2. Non-territorial autonomy

In divided societies, where the communal groups are not geographically concentrated, autonomy
can also be arranged on a non-territorial basis.33 The concept of non-territorial autonomy is an
adequate device to enable ethnic minorities that are living scattered over a territory to exercise
their language and cultural rights.34 The non-territorial autonomy is mainly expressed in allowing
the segments to education right in their language or in their religion and to preserve their culture.

Non-territorial or (national) cultural autonomy is usually advocated in cases where claimant

groups are territorially not sufficiently concentrated. Such personal autonomy applies to all
members of a certain group within the state, irrespective of their place of residence. 35 But in
Ethiopia, non-territorial autonomy is non-existent for the regional constitutions have already
established indigenous-non-indigenous distinction, and hence the indigenous are empowered to
the exclusion of the non-indigenous. Beken points, not-territorial autonomy is not included in the
Ethiopian constitutional documents, but he detected such an arrangement in Benishangul-Gumuz
regional state. Citing proclamation No. 73/2008 Articles 2(11) and 3(4) he deducted the
Administration of Nationalities is competent to protect the language rights and cultural rights of
the nominal nationality/ethnic minority outside its territory and by this the proclamation has
introduced the concept of non-territorial autonomy for indigenous minorities in the Benishangul-
Gumuz state structure.36 In a nutshell, the notion of non-territorial autonomy is not introduced in
the Ethiopian constitutional frame work although an element of it exist in the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state, which of course it being confined to the indigenous people of the region.

33
.Cited above, note 27, at 105.
34
.Christophe Van der Beken, Federalism, Local Government and Minority Protection in Ethiopia: Opportunities
and Challenges, Journal of African Law, Available on CJO 2014 doi:10.1017/S0021855314000205, at 23.
35
.Stefan Wolff, a Consociational Theory of Conflict Management, at 5.
36
. Christophe Van der Beken, Federalism at the Regional level? Unity in Diversity in Ethiopia's Multi-Ethnic
Regions, at 142-145.
 4. Conclusion
In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country where divergent interests are prevalent the formal
democracy, majority rule, aspect, is not sufficient and hence must be corroborated by its
substantial form to protect the interest of the minority. One of the mechanisms to protect the
interests of different groups and minorities is the one that is developed by Arend Lijphart- the
concept of consociationalism. Consociationalism requires elites and political forces to work in
concert, despite having distinct cultures, institutions and identities. It presupposes the
representatives of the different ethnic groups or religious groups as the case may be, administer
the nation together, without the exclusion of the other, to have proportional representation in the
affairs of their country, to have an autonomous existence within the given polity in order to
preserve their distinctiveness and if their fundamental interests are at stake to boycott.

In Ethiopia the demise of the Dergue regime and the subsequent, promulgation of the
Transitional Period Charter and the FDRE constitution are the building bricks to the
transformation of the country from the alleged “nation state’’ to country of nationalities. This
deviation from the past history recognizes the existence of dozens of ethnic groups and inscribes
constitutional provisions to forge unity out of diversity. The Transitional Period Charter
introduced the notion of grand coalition by explicitly guaranteeing nations, nationalities and
peoples the right to effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and
fair and proper representation and it underscores the top executive to be represented from
different nations/nationalities. Although, no much weight is given in the FDRE constitution as
the Transitional Period Charter was the former has provisions for the equitable representation of
the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples in the federal government. Representation of Nations,
Nationalities and peoples in the Federal Houses is also engrained constitutionally. Taking into
account Ethiopia’s first-past-the post electoral system the constitution and the revised electoral
proclamation have arranged mechanisms for minority representation in the Lower House. In the
upper House the representation of minorities is guaranteed as well. The minority veto element of
consociationalism is weak in Ethiopia though; there are manifestations of it like in the
amendment of the federal constitution. Segmental autonomy particularly the territorial aspect of
it is the main manifestation of Ethiopian federalism. Nations, Nationalities and people are
presumed to have ‘their’ own territory in at least in one part of the country and they are given the
name indigenous in the regional constitutions. And this is the reason why it is repeatedly said
Ethiopian federalism gives more emphasis to the self-rule aspect than the shared one. On the
other hand the non-territorial autonomy is almost non-existent in Ethiopia. From this I conclude
that consociational arrangement in Ethiopia exists although each and every part of it as
developed by Lijphart is not founded in the constitution.

5. References
Books

1. Alefe Abeje Belay, Evaluating the System of Power Sharing Ethiopia in Light of Arend
Lijphart’s Model of Power Sharing, European Scientific Journal November 2013
edition vol.9, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431.
2. Arend Leijphart, Consociational democracy, world politics, Vol.2, No.2 (Jan., 1969),
207-225.
3. Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Journal of Democracy
Volume 15, Number 2 April 2004.
4. Assefa Fisha(PhD), Federalism Teaching Material, Prepared under the Sponsorship of
the Justice and Legal System Research Institute, 2009
5. Berhanu Gutema Balcha, Restructuring State and Society: Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia,
SPIRIT PhD Series, Thesis no. 8, 2007.
 6. Christophe Van der Beken, Federalism, Local Government and Minority Protection in
Ethiopia: Opportunities and Challenges, Journal of African Law, University of London
2014.
7. Christophe Van der Beken, Federalism at the Regional level? Unity in Diversity in
Ethiopia's Multi-Ethnic Regions.
8. Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, Andreas Wenger, Solutions for a better world?
Consociational democracy in Iraq, Regional Conflict Summer Term 2006, Research
Seminar.
9. Matthijs Bogaards, Consociationalism after Civil War: What is Different? IPSA 22nd
World Congress of Political Science, 8-12 July 2012, Madrid (a presentation paper).
10. Matthijs Bogaards, Democracy and Power-Sharing in Multinational States: Thematic
Introduction, in Democracy and Power-Sharing in Multi-National States, International
Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006.
11. Stefan Wolff, a Consociational Theory of Conflict Management.
Laws

1. Transitional Period Chapter of Ethiopia, No.1, Addis Ababa, 22nd July 1991.
2. Proclamation No. 1/1995, Proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, 1st Year No.1 Addis Ababa – 21st August, 1995.
3. Proclamation No. 532/2007 the Amended Electoral Law of Ethiopia Proclamation, 13th
Year No. 54 Addis Ababa 25th June, 2007.
Website

1. Chapter No. 2, Consociationalism: a Review and Critique

prr.hec.gov.pk/Chapters/1232S-2.pdf, accessed on 09/04/2016.

Table of Contents
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1
2. What is Consociationalism and the Need for it? ................................................................................... 1
2.1. Grand Coalition ............................................................................................................................. 2
2.2. Segmental Autonomy.................................................................................................................... 3
2.3. Proportionality .............................................................................................................................. 3
2.4. Mutual Veto .................................................................................................................................. 4
3. Consociationalism In Ethiopia .............................................................................................................. 4
3.1. Grand Coalition in Ethiopia .......................................................................................................... 5
3.2. Proportionality in Ethiopia ............................................................................................................ 8
3.3. Minority (Mutual) Veto in Ethiopia .............................................................................................. 9
3.4. Segmental Autonomy in Ethiopia ............................................................................................... 10
3.4.1. Territorial Autonomy .......................................................................................................... 10
3.4.2. Non-territorial autonomy .................................................................................................... 11
4. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 12
5. References ........................................................................................................................................... 13
Institute of Federalism and Legal Studies

Department of Comparative Public Law and Good

Governance

Course: Federalism and Human Rights

Individual Assignment

Title: Consociationalism and Minority Protection in Ethiopia

By: Id. No.

Wendim Miesho ECSU 1500173

Submitted to: Christophe Van der Beken (PhD, Assoc. Prof)

May, 2016

Addis Ababa