G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000.
* Courts; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Preliminary investigation is
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
International Law; Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Immunity;Courts; Due Process; Courts
cannot blindly adhere and take on its face a communication from the Department of Foreign
Affairs that a particular person is covered by any immunity; Due process is a right of the
accused as much as it is of the prosecution.—Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its
face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The
DFA’s determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which
has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte(In ex parte judicial proceeding is
conducted for the benefit of only one party.y or for one party' or 'by one side.Refers to
situations in which only one party (and not the adversary) appears before a judge. Such
meetings are often forbidden.') the DFA’s advice and in motu proprio(ON HIS OWN
IMPULSE) dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter’s
right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused
as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting
at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to
be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the
immunity claus(a provision that will limit the responsibility of a trustee to liability for
negligence or misconduct.)e does not ipso facto(by that very fact or act : as an inevitable
result) result in the dropping of the charges.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Slander; Slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement between the Asian Development Bank and the Republic
of the Philippines because our laws do not allow the ccmmission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.—Slandering a person could not possibly be covered
by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such
as defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation(SAY THAT SOMEONE IS
GUILTY OF THEFT) of theft is ultra vires(WITHOUT AUTHORITY/ BEYOND
POWERS) and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction. It appears that even the government’s chief legal counsel, the Solicitor
General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC—being purely a statutory right, it may
be invoked only when specifically granted by law.—On the contention that there was no
preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a
matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a
statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by
law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective.
PETITION for review on certiorari (review of a loower court’s decision)of a decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 160.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two
counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171.
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s
bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security
Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from
legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorariand mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner
elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA
that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In
receiving ex-parte the DFA’s advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases
without notice to the prosecution, the latter’s right to due process was violated. It should be
noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The
needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time.1 At
any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the dropping of the charges.2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
“Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
. a.)immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.”
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was
done in “official capacity.” It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner’s case falls
within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to
rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.3 The imputation of theft is ultra viresand cannot be part of official functions. It
is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4 It appears that even the government’s
chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and
that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state
except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised
by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.5As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it
to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC
such as the one at bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be
invoked only when specifically granted by law.7 The rule on criminal procedure is clear that
no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.8 Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.(C.J.), Puno, Kapunanand Pardo, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the
state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the
United States, the procedure followed is the process of “suggestion,” where the foreign state
or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to
make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds
that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the
court a “suggestion” that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In the Philippines, the
practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an
executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. (Holy See, The vs.
Rosario,Jr., 238 SCRA 524[1994])
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse
to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the
plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General or other officer acting under his direction. (Lasco vs. United Nations
Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration,241 SCRA 681 [1995])