NAME: Nicholas Gavalas

DATE:4/18/2019
COURSE: BUL2241
ASSIGNMENT: chapter 4/ intro to constitutional law
PURPOSE OF THE ASSIGNMENT: to learn about every part of an offer.

Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.:

Facts: 1989 (FMVSS208), requires that auto manufacturers install seatbelts on rear seats, next to the
vehicle’s doors and frames. Manufacturers must install lap-and-shoulder belts on seats next to the
vehicle’s doors and frames, but have the choice of whether or not to install such belts on rear middle
seats. The Williamson family was in a collision resulting in the death of Williamson, while wearing a lap
belt. Delbert and Alexa Williamson survived while wearing lap-and-shoulder belts, and alongside with
Thanh’s estate, brought California tort suit against Mazda. Claiming that Thanh died because Mazda
equipped her seat with a lap belt. The Williamsons sought certiorari, which was then granted.
Courts Response: The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed.
Legal concept: Supremacy Clause, in which federal law takes precedence over conflicting state laws.
How Is It Applied: Under ordinary conflict preemption principles, state laws that “stand as obstacles to
accomplishing and the execution of full purposes and objections” of federal laws are preempted. Similar
to the regulation in the Geier case, the regulation in this case leaves the manufacturer with a choice in
which the tort suit then restricts.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) rejected a regulation requiring lap-and-shoulder belts
in rear seats in 1989, but in the same year, later required manufacturers to install lap-and-shoulder belts
for rear outer seats due to changed circumstances. Manufacturers retained their choice for rear inner
seats as a result. DOT was not concerned about consumer acceptance regarding this regulation, as they
believed lap-and-shoulder belts would increase safety, nor posed additional safety risks, therefore was
not seeking use of regulation to spur development of alternative safety devices.
More importantly, DOT didn’t require lap-and-shoulder belts for rear inner seats due to that
requirement would not be cost-effective. This fact of their negative judgement about the cost-
effectiveness cannot by itself show that they were seeking to forbid common-law tort suits, in which a
judge and jury might reach a different conclusion. DOT didn’t believe costs would remain frozen, which
emphasized the falling costs from manufacturers “voluntarily equipping more of their vehicles with rear
seat lap-and-shoulder belts”.
Reason: Many federal safety regulations embody some form of cost-effectiveness judgement. An agency
could base its decision to preempt on its cost-effectiveness judgement, yet the rulemaking record at
issue with this is that it discloses no such preemptive intent. With this, to infer the mere existence of
such judgement that a federal agency intends to bar states from imposing stricter standards would
result in treating all such federal standards as if they were maximized. This would then eliminate the
possibility that federal agencies seek only to set forth the minimal standard, potentially being
supplemented through state tort law.
This consequence cannot be reconciled with the statutory saving clause, because it foresees the
likelihood of continued, meaningful roles for state law. Regarding the Williamson case, the regulation’s
history, the agency’s contemporaneous explanation, and the consistently held interpretive views
indicated that the regulation didn’t seek to maintain manufacturer’s choice in order to further
significant regulation objectives. Providing manufacturers with the choice of belts for rear inner seats is
not a significant objective of federal regulations, and therefore doesn’t preempt state tort suit.

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association:

Facts: no other authority in state of Tennessee regulating interscholastic athletics other than TSSAA,
constitution/bylaws/rules of association set standards of membership and eligibility of students to play,
(1997) regulation enforcement proceeding against Brentwood Academy (private parochial high school
member), TSSAA board of control found Brentwood violated rule prohibiting “under influence” in
recruiting athletes, Brentwood sued association claiming enforcement of rule was state action and a
violation of 1 st and 14 th Amendments
Courts Response: district court entered summary judgement for Brentwood and enjoined TSSAA from
enforcing, U.S. Court of Appeals judgement for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Legal concept: Judicial Review, power of the courts to determine the constitutionality of any legislative
or executive act
How Is It Applied: Entwinement of public school officials with TSSAA from bottom-up is
complimented
by state of TN providing entwinement from top down.
Reason: TSSAA not organization of natural persons acting on their own: 84% of schools in state are
members, no express conclusion of law that public school officials act w/scope of duties when
representing institutions yet no other rational view, interscholastic athletics play integral part in public
education of TN requiring some mechanism to produce rules and regulate competition: TSSAA provides
integral element of secondary public schooling.

Department of Revenue of Kentucky, et al. v. Davis:

Facts: Kentucky exempts from state income taxes interest on bonds issued within state but not other
states, differential tax scheme in Kentucky benefits residents buying bonds by effectively lowering
interest rates, plaintiffs sued state for refund after paying state income tax on out-of-state municipal
bonds, claimed differential tax impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce
Courts Response: Trial court ruled for Kentucky, State Court of Appeals reversed that judgement after
ruling state’s scheme violated Commerce Clause, U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Case was
remanded.
Legal concept: State regulation of commerce, the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution restricts the
states’ power to regulate activities if the result obstructs interstate commerce
How Is It Applied: Municipal bonds currently finance about two-thirds of capital expenditures by
state/local governments, “dormant” Commerce Clause, Kentucky treats income from municipal bonds of
other states with no preference given to any local issuer/holder, differential tax scheme critical to
operation of identifiable part of municipal financial market: unanimous desire of states to preserve tax
feature is opposing private protectionism that has driven development of dormant Commerce Clause
Reason: Suggests that no state perceives any local advantage/disadvantage beyond permissible ones
open to a government/those dealing with it when that government itself enters market, state law
exempting from state income taxes interests on bonds issued within state does not impermissibly
discriminate against interstate commerce
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association:

Facts: California statute (the Act) prohibits sale/rental of violent video games to minors/requires
packaging labels of “18”, the Act includes games that lack prosocial/educational substance//possess
potential of appealing to deviant/morbid interest of minors//patently offensive to prevailing standards
in community ideology of what is appropriate for minors, plaintiffs in video game/software industry
brought challenge to the Act
Courts Response: U.S. District Court of Northern District of California ruled that the Act violated 1 st
Amendment’s freedom of speech clause//permanently enjoined its enforcement, Court of Appeals
affirmed this judgement, U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Judgement of Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
Legal concept: Free speech, 1 st Amendment protects most speech by using a strict scrutiny standard
How Is It Applied: Federal Constitution protects from a state law that impairs a preexisting contract,
Free Speech Clause protects discourse on public matters and California correctly recognizes video games
qualifying for 1 st Amendment protection, video games communicate ideas: suffices to confer such
protection
Reason: The Act imposes restriction on content of protected speech which is invalid unless state can
demonstrate it passes strict scrutiny unless compelling government interest and serves said interest,
California cannot meet standard of specifically identifying an “actual problem” in need of solving/free
speech must be actually necessary to solution, California cannot show direct causal link between violent
video games and harm to minors.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka:

Facts: Black minors sought court orders to obtain admission to public schools on non-segregated basis,
denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring/permitting segregation by
race, Supreme Court previously upheld laws under “separate but equal” doctrine, black minors
contended: equality in segregated public schools was impossible and that they had been deprived of
equal protection of laws guaranteed by 14 th Amendment
Courts Response: judgement for plaintiffs
Legal concept: Equal protection, requirement that similarly situated persons be treated similarly by
government action
How Is It Applied: segregation of races within sanction of law retards educational/mental development
of black children/deprives them of equal educational opportunities, separate educational facilities
inherently unequal: “separate but equal” doctrine has no grounds in public education
Reason: governmentally imposed classification involves fundamental rights or suspect classification,
equal protection requires classification to be necessary to promote compelling/overruling government
interest