G.R. No.

112346 March 29, 1996

EVELYN YONAHA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF HECTOR CAÑETE, respondents.

VITUG, J.:p

From the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing for lack of merit the petition for certiorari, with prayer for preliminary injunction, filed by
Evelyn Yonaha against an order, dated 29 May 1992, of the Regional Trial Court which had granted private respondent motion for the
1

issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution, the instant appeal was taken.

In Criminal Case No. 01106-L, Elmer Ouano was charged with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide" in an information
which averred —

That on April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M. in Basak, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw sporting Plate No. GCX-237 duly
registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously
maneuver and operate it in a negligent and reckless manner, without taking the necessary precaution to avoid injuries
to person and damage to property, as a result thereof the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector
Cañete, which caused the latter's instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of
his body. 2

When arraigned, the accused pleaded "guilty" and, on 09 March 1992, the trial court pronounced its judgment —

Finding therefore the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against him and taking into
account the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty which the prosecuting fiscal readily
accepted, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer and undergo an imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day to 1
year and 8 months and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim; P30,000.00 for
actual damages incurred in connection with the burial and the nightly prayer of the deceased victim and P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees.3

On 27 April 1992, a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary award. In his Return of Service, dated 07 May 1992, the
MTCC Deputy City Sheriff stated that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had manifested his inability to pay
the money obligation.

Forthwith, private respondents presented a "motion for subsidiary execution" with neither a notice of hearing nor notice to petitioner. Acting
on the motion, nevertheless, the trial court issued an order, dated 29 May 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution. The
sheriff went to petitioner's residence to enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was informed of Ouano's
conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her
and on the fact that the employer's liability had yet to be established. Private respondents opposed the motion.

On 24 August 1992, the trial court denied petitioner's motion. On 23 September 1992, petitioner's plea for reconsideration of the denial was
likewise rejected.

Petitioner promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP No. 29116) for review. The appellate court initially restrained the
implementation of the assailed orders and issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond. Ultimately, however,
the appellate court, in its decision of 28 September 1993, dismissed the petition for lack of merit and thereby lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated:

We are not unmindful of the ruling in the aforecited case of Lucia Pajarito vs. Señeris, supra. — that enforcement of the
secondary or subsidiary liability of employer maybe done by motion in the same criminal case, a recourse which
presupposes a hearing. But even assuming that issuance of writ of subsidiary execution requires notice and hearing,
we believe a hearing in the present case would be sheer rigmarole, an unnecessary formality, because, as employer,
petitioner became subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of her accused driver, Elmer Ouano, and proof of the latter's
insolvency. And if she had any defense to free herself from such subsidiary liability, she could have ventilated and
substantiated the same in connection with her (petitioner's) motion to stay and recall the writ of subsidiary execution in
question. But from her said motion, it can be gleaned that except for the protestation of violation of due process, and
absence of notice to her of the motion for issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution, petitioner intimated no defense
which could absolve her of subsidiary liability under the premises. Then, too, after the denial of her motion to stay and
recall subject writ, petitioner moved for reconsideration but in her motion for reconsideration, she averred no
exculpatory facts which could save her from subsidiary liability, as employer of the convicted Elmer Ouano. 4
In the instant appeal, petitioner additionally reminds the Court that Ouano's conviction was not the result of a finding of proof beyond
reasonable doubt but from his spontaneous plea of guilt.

We find merit in the petition.

The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned
5

the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it
6

really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as
just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a
hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employer's liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it
appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted
employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed
the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is
unsuccessful by reason of insolvency. 7

The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in her "motion to stay and recall," as well as in her
motion for reconsideration, which could save her from liability; a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The
employer must be given his full day in court.

To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires (a) the existence of an employer-
employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of
such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the employer and 8

the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide
that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law.
9

WHEREFORE, finding the order, dated 29 May 1992, as well as the order of 24 August 1992 to have been improvidently issued, said orders
are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner shall be given the right to a hearing on the motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution filed by
private respondents, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings conformably with our foregoing opinion. No costs.
G.R. No. 104658. April 7, 1993.

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CLARITA T. CAMACHO, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR LAWS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
EXISTENCE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — It is firmly settled that the existence or non-existence of the employer-employee relationship is
commonly to be determined by examination of certain factors or aspects of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of selection and
engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative
employee's conduct, although the latter is the most important element . . . As aptly held by the trial court, petitioner did not exercise control
and supervision over Feliciano with regard to the manner in which he conducted the hydro-pressure test. All that petitioner did, through its
Field Engineer, Roberto Mitra, was relay to Feliciano the request of private respondent for a hydro-pressure test, to determine any possible
leakages in the storage tanks in her gasoline station. The mere hiring of Feliciano by petitioner for that particular task is not the form of
control and supervision contemplated by law which may be the basis for establishing an employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and Feliciano. The fact that there was no such control is further amplified by the absence of any shell representative in the job site at the time
when the test was conducted. Roberto Mitra was never there. Only Feliciano and his men were. True, it was petitioner who sent Feliciano to
private respondent's gasoline station to conduct the hydro-pressure test as per the request of private respondent herself. But this single act
did not automatically make Feliciano an employee of petitioner. As discussed earlier, more than mere hiring is required. It must further be
established that petitioner is the one who is paying Feliciano's salary on a regular basis; that it has the power to dismiss said employee, and
more importantly, that petitioner has control and supervision over the work of Feliciano. The last requisite was sorely missing in the instant
case.

2. ID.; JOB CONTRACTING; REQUISITES; HALLMARKS OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. — Section 8 of Rule VIII, Book III of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides: "Sec. 8. Job contracting. — There is job contracting permissible under the Code if
the following conditions are met: (1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own
account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or
principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and (2) The contractor has substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of
his business." Feliciano is independently maintaining a business under a duly registered business name, "JFS Repair and Maintenance
Service," and is duly registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. He does not enjoy a fixed salary but instead charges a lump sum
consideration for every piece of work he accomplishes. If he is not able to finish his work, he does not get paid, as what happened in this
case. Further, Feliciano utilizes his own tools and equipment and has a complement of workers. Neither is he required to work on a regular
basis. Instead, he merely awaits calls from clients such as petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance services are requested. Moreover,
Feliciano does not exclusively service petitioner because he can accept other business but not from other oil companies. All these are the
hallmarks of an independent contractor.

3. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OWN ACTS AND OMISSIONS. — Being an
independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of how he was
to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence, if any, in the conduct of the same.

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J p:

Was the hydro-pressure test of the underground storage tank in private respondent Clarita T. Camacho's gasoline station conducted by an
independent contractor or not? A negative answer will make petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell, for brevity) liable for the
said independent contractor's acts or omissions; otherwise, no. This is the issue that this Court is called upon to resolve in this case.

The facts are as follows:

Private respondent Clarita T. Camacho (private respondent for short) was the operator of a gasoline station in Naguilian Road, Baguio City,
wherein she sells petitioner Shell's petroleum products. Sometime in April 1983, private respondent requested petitioner to conduct a hydro-
pressure test on the underground storage tanks of the said station in order to determine whether or not the sales losses she was incurring for
the past several months were due to leakages therein. Petitioner acceded to the said request and on April 27, 1983, one Jesus "Jessie"
Feliciano together with other workers, came to private respondent's station with a Job Order from petitioner to perform the hydro-pressure
test.
On the same day, Feliciano and his men drained the underground storage tank which was to be tested of its remaining gasoline. After which,
they filled the tank with water through a water hose from the deposit tank of private respondent. Then, after requesting one of private
respondent's gasoline boys to shut off the water when the tank was filled, Feliciano and his men left. At around 2:00 a.m. the following day,
private respondent saw that the water had reached the lip of the pipe of the underground storage tank and so, she shut off the water faucet.

At around 5:30 a.m., private respondent's husband opened the station and started selling gasoline. But at about 6:00 a.m., the customers
who had bought gasoline returned to the station complaining that their vehicles stalled because there was water in the gasoline that they
bought. On account of this, private respondent was constrained to replace the gasoline sold to the said customers. However, a certain
Eduardo Villanueva, one of the customers, filed a complaint with the police against private respondent for selling the adulterated gasoline. In
addition, he caused the incident to be published in two local newspapers.

Feliciano, who arrived later that morning, did not know what caused the water pollution of the gasoline in the adjacent storage tank. So he
called up Nick Manalo, Superintendent of Shell's Poro Point Installation at San Fernando, La Union, and referred the matter to the latter.
Manalo went up to Baguio in the afternoon to investigate. Thereafter, he and Feliciano again filled with water the underground storage tank
undergoing hydro-pressure test whereat they noticed that the water was transferring to the other tanks from whence came the gasoline being
sold. Manalo asked permission from Shell's Manila Office to excavate the underground pipes of the station. Upon being granted permission
to do so, Feliciano and his men began excavating the driveway of private respondent's station in order to expose the underground pipeline.
The task was continued by one Daniel "Danny" Pascua who replaced Feliciano, Pascua removed the corroded pipeline and installed new
independent vent pipe for each storage tank.

Meanwhile, petitioner undertook to settle the criminal complaint filed by Villanueva. Subsequently, Villanueva filed an Affidavit of Desistance,
1 declaring, inter alia —

"THAT, after careful evaluation of the surrounding circumstances, especially the explanation of the representatives of SHELL Phils., that the
gasoline tanks of Mrs. Camacho were subject to Hydro test, in such a way that water was used for the said test, I believe that she may not
have had anything to do with the filling of water in the tank of my car;

xxx xxx xxx

THAT, said representatives of SHELL Phils. have interceded for and in behalf of Mrs. Camacho and have fully satisfied my claim against her.

THAT, in view of all the foregoing I do not intend to prosecute the case and I am therefore asking for the dismissal of the case against Mrs.
Camacho."

Thereafter, private respondent demanded from petitioner the payment of damages in the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner, instead, offered
private respondent additional credit line and other beneficial terms, which offer was, however, rejected. cdrep

Subsequently, or on October 12, 1983, private respondent filed before the trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner due to the
latter's alleged negligence in the conduct of the hydro-pressure test in her gasoline station. For its part, petitioner denied liability because,
according to it, the hydro-pressure test on the underground storage tanks was conducted by an independent contractor.

The trial court dismissed private respondent's complaint for damages for the reason that:

"The hydro-pressure test which brought about the incident was conducted by Jesus Feliciano, who was neither an employee nor agent nor
representative of the defendant. Jesus Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. He alone was in control of the manner of how
he is to undertake the hydro-pressure test.

Considering that the conduct of said hydro-pressure test was under the sole and exclusive control and supervision of Jesus Feliciano, the
overflow with water causing the same to sip into the adjoining tank cannot be attributed to the fault or negligence of defendant. 2

From the adverse decision of the trial court, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which court reversed the decision of the
trial court. Thus,

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision being appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another rendered ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff:

1. P100,000.00 as moral damages;

2. P2,639.25 and P15,000.00 representing the actual losses suffered by plaintiff as a result of the water pollution of the gasoline.

No costs.

SO ORDERED." 3
Petitioner moved to have the above decision reconsidered but the same was denied in a Resolution dated March 9, 1992. Hence, this
recourse.

As stated at the very outset, the pivotal issue in this case is whether or not petitioner should be held accountable for the damage to private
respondent due to the hydro-pressure test conducted by Jesus Feliciano.

It is a well-entrenched rule that an employer-employee relationship must exist before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of
his employee. It is likewise firmly settled that the existence or non-existence of the employer-employee relationship is commonly to be
determined by examination of certain factors or aspects of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of
the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's
conduct, 4 although the latter is the most important element. 5

In this case, respondent Court of Appeals held petitioner liable for the damage caused to private respondent as a result of the hydro-pressure
test conducted by Jesus Feliciano due to the following circumstances: 6

1. Feliciano was hired by petitioner;

2. He received his instructions from the Field Engineer of petitioner, Mr. Roberto Mitra;

3. While he was at private respondent's service station, he also received instructions from Nick Manalo, petitioner's Poro Point Depot
Superintendent;

4. Instructions from petitioner's Manila Office were also relayed to him while he was at .the job site at Baguio City;

5. His work was under the constant supervision of petitioner's engineer;

6. Before he could complete the work, he was instructed by Mr. Manalo, petitioner's Superintendent, to discontinue the same and it was
turned over to Daniel Pascua, who was likewise hired by petitioner.

Based on the foregoing, respondent Court of Appeals concluded that Feliciano was not an independent contractor but was under the control
and supervision of petitioner in the performance of the hydro-pressure test, hence, it held petitioner liable for the former's acts and omissions.

We are not in accord with the above finding of respondent Court of Appeals. As aptly held by the trial court, petitioner did not exercise control
and supervision over Feliciano with regard to the manner in which he conducted the hydro-pressure test. All that petitioner did, through its
Field Engineer, Roberto Mitra, was relay to Feliciano the request of private respondent for a hydro-pressure test, to determine any possible
leakages in the storage tanks in her gasoline station. The mere hiring of Feliciano by petitioner for that particular task is not the form of
control and supervision contemplated by may be the basis for establishing an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
Feliciano. The fact that there was no such control is further amplified by the absence of any Shell representative in the job site time when the
test was conducted. Roberto Mitra was never there. Only Feliciano and his men were.

True, it was petitioner who sent Feliciano to private respondent's gasoline station in conduct the hydro-pressure test as per the request of
private respondent herself. But this single act did not automatically make Feliciano an employee of petitioner. As discussed earlier, more than
mere hiring is required. It must further be established that petitioner is the one who is paying Felicia's salary on a regular basis; that it has the
power to dismiss said employee, and more importantly, that petitioner has control and supervision over the work of Feliciano. The last
requisite was sorely missing in the instant case.

A careful perusal of the records will lead to the conclusion that Feliciano is an independent contractor. Section 8 of Rule VIII, Book III of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:

"Sec. 8. Job contracting. — There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the following conditions are met:

(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility
according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the
performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and

(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials
which are necessary in the conduct of his business."

Feliciano is independently maintaining a business under a duly registered business name, "JFS Repair and Maintenance Service," and is
duly registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. 7 He does not enjoy a fixed salary but instead charges a lump sum consideration for
every piece of work he accomplishes. 8 If he is not able to finish his work, he does not get paid, as what happened in this case. 9 Further,
Feliciano utilizes his own tools and equipment and has a complement of workers. Neither is he required to work on a regular basis. Instead,
he merely awaits calls from clients such as petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance services are requested. Moreover, Feliciano does
not exclusively service petitioner because he can accept other business but not from other oil companies. 10 All these are the hallmarks of
an independent contractor.

Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of how
he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence, if any, in the conduct of the same.

Anent the issue of damages, the same has been rendered moot by the failure of private respondent to establish an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and Feliciano. Absent said relationship, petitioner cannot be held liable for the acts and omissions of the
independent contractor, Feliciano.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the
trial court REINSTATED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution dated September 27, 1995
1

and the Decision dated April 10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533, and the Orders dated August 29,
2 3 4 5

1994 and February 2, 1995 that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.
6 7 8

The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the questioned Decision , are as follows:
9

On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. . . .

On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew
members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning
when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they
were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff.
Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the
Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.

When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta
incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In
Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the
immediate release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate.
She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to
understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local
dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.

Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities
agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by
defendant SAUDI (sic). In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.

On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors
requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw
him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the
Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the
case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed
her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.

One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of
her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to
Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA
office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her
that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice
to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on
June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila
manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.

In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing
happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was
about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight
Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told
her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
 On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her
astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with
Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition. 10

Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any
assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international
flights.
11

Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi
Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the
12

cause.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13

for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country
manager.

On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the
14

Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or
demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to try the case.

On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) . Saudia filed a reply
15 16
thereto on March 3, 1994.

On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994,
17

Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint . 18

The trial court issued an Order 19

dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.

From the Order of respondent Judge denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for
20

Reconsideration of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on
21

the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14,
1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration).
22

In the Reply filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of
23

jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on
appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant
case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's Motion for Reconsideration.
24

The pertinent portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on
September 20, 1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well
as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994,
considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral
and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject matter,
and there being nothing new of substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought
to be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 25

Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals.
26

Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining Order dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting
27

the respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.

In another Resolution promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA's Petition for the
28

Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:

 The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED, after considering the
Answer, with Prayer to Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it appearing
that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals,
et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).

SO ORDERED.

On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant Petition 29
for Review with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.

However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision dated April 10, 1996,
30

now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for
recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held
that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to
trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.

On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated April 30,
31

1996, given due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, the instant case is now deemed submitted
32

for decision.

Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:

The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New Civil
Code since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case involves
what is known in private international law as a "conflicts problem". Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines
will sit in judgment of the acts done by another sovereign state which is abhorred.

II

Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as
to absence of leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable Court required the respondents
to comment on petitioner's April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary
Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be
construed with liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.

III

Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled "Saudi
Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review
With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary
period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-
G.R. SP NO. 36533 has not yet become final and executory and this Honorable Court can take cognizance of
this case. 33

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge for our resolution:

I.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED "MILAGROS P.
MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES".

II.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW
SHOULD GOVERN.

Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. It maintains that private
respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign
element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti
commissi rule. 34
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 35
and 21 of the Civil
36

Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. 37

Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the interplay of events occurred in two states, the
Philippines and Saudi Arabia.

As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint 38

dated June 23, 1994:

2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation doing business in the
Philippines. It may be served with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales
(Phils.). Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities
agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by
defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.

7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her
superiors reauested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When
she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about
the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping
the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and
allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.

8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of
her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to
Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA
office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sigh a document written in Arabic. They told her
that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice
to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy
on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila
manger, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.

10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing
happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was
about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take that flight. At the Inflight
Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told
her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.

11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her
astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with
Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.

12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff sought the help of the Philippines
Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely
served the international flights.39

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem
herein could present a "conflicts" case.

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a
"foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and
associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. 40

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the
41

parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. 42
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and
that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as
a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.

We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here,
and the question of jurisdiction confronts the court a quo.
43

After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended Complaint, and the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly
44

predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.

On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.

On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.

Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, 45

this Court held that:

The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with private
respondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal
forum.

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction we find that the
46 47

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear
48

the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro
Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred
Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:

Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court]

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.

Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming
jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious.
Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex",
"harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 49

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take
cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental
unfairness to her.

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the
parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended
Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.

The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended Complaint.
50

SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions
filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the
trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.: 51

We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from disputing the lower court's
jurisdiction over defendant's person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause
of action has prescribed. By interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd.
availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve controversy in its favor.
For the court to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire
jurisdiction upon the latter's person, who, being the proponent of the affirmative defense, should be deemed to
have abandoned its special appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.

Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that;

When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person,
it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any
other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for
example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter. 52

Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal
system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent
should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. 53

Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all
choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum
is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed. 54

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This
process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts
relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the
55

proper law. 56

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. An essential element of
57

conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a
factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res,
the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 58

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable
law. These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the following:
59

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
 (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;

(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex
situs is decisive when real rights are involved;

(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made,
a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in
contracts and torts;

(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties,
or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;

(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, thelex loci
intentionis;

(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori — the law of the
forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to the
substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of
the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls
under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and

(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its
master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment. (Emphasis ours.)
60

After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of
the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that although she was
already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the
charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out,
she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.

There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the "handing over" or "turning over" of the person of private respondent
to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner's purported act contributed to and
amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby
allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner's authority as
employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah,
the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly
inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for
the wrongs done, once duly proven.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the
place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it
is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her,
she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice,
give her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts
of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the
over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the
situs of the alleged tort.

Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort
liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern
61

theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view
should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken
into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury
occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered. 62

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no
question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged
here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was centered here, although it
should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the
most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, 63
raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.

Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the most interest in
the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and
control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly
apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's insistence that "[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she
has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter." As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no
64

obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should
govern this case. And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the petitioner who was
65

invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of
Saudi Arabia is". 66

Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's (herein
petitioner's) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was
obviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state
intimately concerned with the ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the
vindication of the country's system of law and justice in a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must
proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or
elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the results of the case in any manner
whatsoever.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs.
Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.
 G.R. No. 3070 February 11, 1907

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JUAN

CABILING,Defendant-Appellant.

Jose Altavas Cortes for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

The defendant was charged in the court below with the murder of
Clarence T. Allen on the 22d of November, 1905. He was convicted
of that crime and sentenced to life imprisonment. From this
judgment he appealed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The evidence in the court below was contradictory. The substance of

the testimony of Levina F. Allen, widow of the deceased, and a
witness for the Government, as stated in the Attorney-General's
brief, is as follows:

The defendant, Juan Cabiling, was a student of the Government

school at Ormoc, and the deceased was the principal of said school.
On the morning of November 22, 1905, a normal school was opened
at Ormoc for the training of teachers from the various towns on the
western coast of Leyte. Mr. Allen was authorized to select from the
students those who were to be promoted to said school. The
defendant was one of those who desired to attend said school, and
on the morning in question as soon as the class under the direction
of Mrs. Allen assembled the defendant, who was one of the students
of said class, inquired of Mrs. Allen if he was not going to be in said
normal class, and upon being answered 'no' he stated that he was
not satisfied. Mrs. Allen went on with the recitation with which she
was then engaged, and while she was thus engaged the defendant
kept talking in a very rude manner, grumbled and refused to study,
wherefore she told him two or three times to stop because she must
hear the recitation; a little later, as soon as the recitation in class
four was over, and Mrs. Allen, desired to turn back to part second of
the book for review, because they had no other books, the
defendant told her that grammars must be available and that he
was not satisfied, as there arrived of supply of same, and upon
being answered that the grammars were for the normal school
teachers, the defendant got up and said to Mrs. Allen that she had
told a lie by telling him that he could go into the normal school and
now he was held back in the lower grade. In view of this behavior of
the defendant, Mrs. Allen said that she would go to talk with Mr.
Allen and have him settle the matter. Mrs. Allen left the room in the
direction of the library, where Mr. Allen was, and told him that it
would be better to send the defendant home and tell him to come
back at 2 p. m. The deceased gave his assent and followed Mrs.
Allen into the room, where the defendant was, and coming to the
place where the latter sat, Mr. Allen said to him: "What is the
matter with you this morning, Juan? If you are not satisfied here
you may go away." The defendant upon hearing these words,
rushed upon the deceased and stabbed him in the stomach; the
deceased pushed him back a distance of about 4 feet, and then the
defendant gave deceased a second blow in the same place,
whereupon the deceased caught the defendant by the right hand
wherein he had the knife, and by the neck. At this stage of the
struggle the lieutenant of the municipal police arrived and pointing
his revolver at the defendant separated them and took the knife
away from the defendant.

Her evidence is corroborated by that of Wilbur Chamberlain, another

eyewitness, and by that of James F. Godward, who witnessed the
termination of the struggle.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The fact which the evidence for the defense tended to establish are
stated in the brief of the Attorney-General as follows:

. . . That on the morning in question, after Mrs. Allen had

distributed some paper for the lesson in arithmetic, she left the
room and shortly afterwards the deceased came and, taking the
defendant by one ear, caused him to stand up and then kicked him,
took him by the arms with both hands and shook him against a
table, which fell down, and again advancing to where the defendant
was standing took him by the neck and tried to throw him upon the
floor; then the police arrived and took Cabiling to the municipal
building. All the witnesses for the defendant admitted that when the
deceased arrived the defendant had a knife in his hands and was
sharpening a pencil with it, but they stated positively that they had
not seen him assail the deceased nor strike him with said knife. The
defendant himself flatly denied this fact.

The substance of the evidence on both sides is correctly stated in

the quotations above made. Allen died as a result of these
wounds. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After a careful and somewhat lengthy analysis of the testimony of

the witnesses on both sides, the Attorney General says:

We find in the records sufficient data to lead us to the belief that the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is more reliable than
that of the witnesses for the defense. . . . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the apparent improbability of the testimony of the witnesses

for the defense, we have stated that there was a marked sign of
conspiracy between them. We need only to add, at this time, that
the testimony of the defendant lends strength to our belief in this
matter. He emphatically denied having inflicted, either designedly or
undesignedly any of the wounds shown in the body of the deceased,
and asserted that he could not possibly have inflicted such wounds,
nor did he know how they were inflicted. We can not believe the
truth of this testimony of the defendant, for to do so it would be
necessary to presume that he was unconscious at the time in
question. The absolute denial made by the defendant clearly shows
his well-planned and decided purpose of concealing everything that
might be damaging to him. . . . He and the deceased were the only
parties to the difficulty, the defendant alone carried a knife and no
one except the latter could have inflicted the wounds on the
deceased. If said wounds were caused as he alleged while he
defended himself against assault, there was no reason whatever for
attempting to conceal such fact, because the circumstance would be
a sufficient ground for finding him not guilty; but behind an absurd
and incredible denial, there arises in the mind the conviction that he
is in fact guilty of the crime in question, and that he perpetrated the
same in the manner testified to by the witnesses for the
prosecution. As against such a lack of veracity on the part of the
defendant and his witnesses, we have to admit as legal truth the
evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution given with evident
frankness and sincerity to the effect that said defendant assailed the
deceased in the manner recited by them, and inflicted the wounds
that caused his death.

Our examination of the evidence has lead us to the same conclusion

which the Attorney-General has reached, and we are satisfied
beyond any doubt that the testimony of the Government's witnesses
is true; that there was no aggression on the part of the deceased,
and that the first attack came from the defendant. He is accordingly
criminally liable for the death of Allen.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The next question to be considered is whether the crime committed

was that of homicide or murder. In order to raise the guilt of a
person to the grade of murder it is necessary that one of the
elements specified in article 403 of the Penal Code be proven. The
Attorney-General is of the opinion that no one of these requisites
was proven, and that the crime committed was homicide. With this
conclusion we can not agree. Among the circumstances which
qualify the act, there is mentioned in article 403 "treachery"
( alevosia). The killing was done with a pocketknife. It is very
apparent from the evidence that Allen had no suspicion that the
defendant intended to make any attack upon him, and there is
nothing to show that Allen knew that the defendant had this knife in
his possession; in fact, Mrs. Allen, who was standing near her
husband, testified that she did not see the knife until the second
blow was struck. It has been held in the supreme court of Spain
that a sudden and unexpected attack upon another is proof of
treachery, and we have repeatedly made the same ruling In the
case of the United States, vs. Babasa (2 Phil. Rep., 102) the
following statement is made in the syllabus:

One who kills another by suddenly and unexpectedly inflicting a

mortal wound with a knife is guilty of murder, as the means used in
the commission of the crime constitute alevosia.

The punishment for the crime of murder consists of three degrees.

The minimum degree, which is the maximum degree of the penalty
known as cadena temporal, is imprisonment from seventeen years
four months and one day to twenty years, the medium degree is life
imprisonment, and the maximum degree is death. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar it was proven that the defendant was born of the
12th day of September, 1888, and was, therefore, at the time of the
offense was committed 17 years and 2 months old. The penalty
above mentioned for the crime of murder is, by the terms of the
Penal Code, inflicted only upon those persons who are more than 18
years old. By the provisions of article 85 of the said code, if the
defendant is more that 15 years and less than 18 years of age, the
penalty provided in article 403 can not be inflicted, but in its place
there must be inflicted the penalty immediately inferior to the one
indicated by that article. The highest of the common crimes known
to our law are parricide and robbery with homicide, but if the person
who commits either one of these crimes is under 18 years of age,
the greatest punishment which can be inflicted upon him is
imprisonment for twenty years. In this case the punishment to be
imposed upon the defendant is the penalty immediately inferior to
that provided in article 403. That penalty consists of two indivisible
penalties, namely, death and life imprisonment; and the maximum
degree of a divisible penalty, namely, cadena temporal. By article
75, paragraph 3, of the Penal Code it is provided, that the penalty
immediately inferior to such penalty, as the one named in article
403 shall be the medium and minimum degrees of the divisible
penalty and the maximum degree of the penalty which follows the
divisible penalty in the general scale. Applying that article to the
case at bar, it results that the penalty applicable is the maximum
degree of presidio mayor to the medium degree of cadena
temporal; that is to say, imprisonment from ten years and one day
to seventeen years and four months. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If none of the extenuating circumstances mentioned in article 9 of

the Penal Code, nor any of the aggravating circumstances
mentioned in article 10 are proven, the penalty should be inflicted in
the medium degree, that is from twelve years and one day to
fourteen years and eight months. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The attorney-General is of the opinion that article 11 of the Penal
Code should be considered as an extenuating circumstance. That
article is as follows:

The circumstance of the culprit being a native, mestizo, or Chinese

shall be taken into consideration by the judges and courts for the
purpose of increasing or reducing the penalties according to the
degree of respective intention, the nature of the act, and the
conditions of the person offended, which shall be left to the
judgment of the former.

We can not agree with this conclusion. The evidence shows that the
defendant, so far from being an ignorant boy, was one of the most,
if not the most, intelligent in his class, and in such cases we have
never considered article 11 as an extenuating circumstance. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the aggravating circumstance, we agree with the Attorney-

General that of known premeditation was not proven, and that
circumstance 20 of article 10 was proven. That provision of article
10 is as follows:

When the act is committed with insult or in disregard for the respect
which may be due the aggrieved party on account of his rank, age,
or sex, or when it is committed in his dwelling, if he has not given
provocation.

It is applicable to this case because the person attacked was the

teacher and the person attacking was the pupil. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There being one aggravating circumstance and no extenuating

circumstance, the penalty must according to the law, be imposed in
the maximum degree and we fix it at fourteen years eight months
and one day of imprisonment ( cadena temporal). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment of the court below is modified by imposing instead of

life imprisonment the penalty of fourteen years eight months and
one day of cadena temporal, and the payment of 1,000 pesos,
Philippine currency, to the heirs of the deceased as indemnity. In all
other respects the judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of
ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten
days thereafter the case remanded to the lower court for proper
procedure. So ordered. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

G.R. No. L-33345 November 20, 1978

MARCELA M. BAGAJO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch 11, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Diosdado Bacolod for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General, for respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review, under Republic Act 5440, the decision of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental in Criminal Case No. OZ-95 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered against petitioner by the Municipal Court of Bonifacio,
Misamis Occidental and imposing upon her the penalty to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the
costs, for the crime of slight physical injuries.

The background facts as found by the trial court as follows:

In the afternoon of April 1, 1970, at about 2 o'clock, petitioner who was a teacher, left her classroom to go to the principal's office. While the
teacher was thus out of the room, complainant Wilma Alcantara, one of her pupils, left her desk and went to chat with Lilibeth Purlas, a
classmate, while leaning over the desk of Ponciano Navarro, another classmate. At that juncture, a fourth classmate, Benedicta Guirigay
passed near Wilma, who suddenly raised her leg causing the former to stumble on it and fall down, her head hitting the edge of the desk, her
stomach a sharp pointed umbrella and her knee a nail of the desk. She fainted. At that precise moment, petitioner was entering the room.
She asked Wilma what happened but the latter denied having anything to do with what had just taken place. Petitioner thereupon became
angry and, with a piece of "bamboo stick" which she was using as a pointer whipped Wilma behind her legs and her thigh, thereby causing
the following injuries, according to the medical certificate presented in evidence:

1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. it is about four inches in length and 1/4 centimeter
in width. There are three on the right leg and two on the left leg.

2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.

The above lessions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days. (Pages 26-27, Record.)

Upon the foregoing facts, petitioner claims in her appeal that respondent Judge erred in convicting her of the crime of slight physical injuries.
She maintains that as the teacher, she was just trying to discipline her pupil Wilma for tripping her classmate and for denying that she did so.
She contends she was not actuated by any criminal intent. And she is joined in this pose by the Solicitor General, who recommends her
acquittal, coupled with the observation that although "petitioner is not criminally liable for her conduct, she may still be held accountable for
her conduct administratively.

We agree with the Solicitor General.

In the school premises and during school activities and affairs, the teacher exercises substitute parental authority over the students. (Article
349, Civil Code.) More specifically, according to Article 352, "The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by
government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or
professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student." And pursuant to this provision, Section 150 of
the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual enjoins:

The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about), imposing manual work or
degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and unusual punishments of any nature, reducing scholarship rating for
bad conduct, holding up a pupil to unnecessary ridicule, the use of epithets and expressions tending to destroy the
pupil's self-respect, and the permanent confiscation of personal effects of pupils are forbidden.
In other words, under the foregoing Civil Code and administrative injunctions, no teacher may impose corporal punishment upon any student
in any case. But We are not concerned in this appeal with the possible administrative liability of petitioner. Neither are we called upon here to
pass on her civil liability other than what could be ex-delicto, arising from her conviction, if that should be the outcome hereof. The sole
question for Our resolution in this appeal relates exclusively to her criminal responsibility for the alleged crime of slight physical injuries as
defined in Article 266, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to which she was prosecuted and convicted in the courts below.

In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and so We Hold that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of
whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer, in the circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or
administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to have incurred by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that she did not do
what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but We
are convinced that the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. The
nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches long and ¼ cm. wide) and the fact that petitioner
whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to discipline her. And it cannot be said, that
Wilma did not deserve to be discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to commit any criminal offense. Actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions generally the use of corporal punishment by teachers on their pupils. All
that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the
evidence before the trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by complainant as a result of
her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil
in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the degree of
moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to
determine.

Absent any applicable precedent indicative of the concept of the disciplinary measures that may be employed by teachers under Section 150
of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted above, We feel it is wiser to leave such determination first to the administrative
authorities.

After several deliberations, the Court has remained divided, such that the necessary eight (8) votes necessary for conviction has not been
obtained. Accordingly, the petitioner -accused is entitled to acquittal. ,

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to her being dealt with administratively or in a civil case
for damages not resulting exdelicto.
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014

FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a violation of Republic Act No. 7610. The victim was
1

her own Grade 1 pupil whom she physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee while she was drowsing off on a bamboo
sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as duly certified by a physician.

Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this appeal must determine, in light of the Court's
pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the Philippines that:
2

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only
when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal
Code.

Antecedents

The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up the factual antecedents in its comment, as follows:
3

On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School located in the
Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina
Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to
apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to Michael and
pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a
result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.
Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).

After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella
Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his
Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza (TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised
them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr.
Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station
(TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).

The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part:

1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;

2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;

3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;

4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.

The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City (RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch
27 of that court. The information alleged as follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy
OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW

(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan Elementary School, with a Salary
Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven
year old child, by pinching him on different parts of his body, and thereafter slumping him to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan
Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has suffered injuries on different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child abuse, disposing as follows:
5

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the Court
sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.

No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.

SO ORDERED. 6

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, with a modification of
7

the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision rendered on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the
accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum thereof.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

In her petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner submits that:

9

The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and notunder the Revised Penal Code.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not violated when the essential elements of the crime charged were not
properly recited in the information.10

Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising are mainly factual and, therefore, not reviewable under
the mode of appeal chosen; that the affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law and jurisprudence, and
supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that the information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and
substance. 11

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law in her present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to questionsof law. The immediate implication of the limitation is to have the findings of fact by the CA,
which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court, conclude the Court by virtue of its not being a trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot
analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.

It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court, the following situations are the exceptions in which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts
went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact
of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts’ findings of fact. A further
exception is recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed bythe parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. Yet, none of the exceptions applies herein.
12

Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign him
in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as anact of discipline that she as a
school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco
parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.

Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was
unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she
13

acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which
has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishmentby a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:

Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents.

In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal
punishment upon the child. (n)

Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-
Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:

1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;

2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;

3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;

4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.

Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of Dr. Castigador, the trial judge observed in the
decision of June 26, 2003:

A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused by the extravasation of blood beneath it. She
opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and
tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during her examination of the victim the latter
felt pain when she put pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No.
3 is located on the victim’sleft inner thigh. According to her this could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4
is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.14

Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abusethusly:

xxxx

(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development
or in his permanent incapacity or death.

xxxx

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deedsor by wordsthat debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner
"went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and
when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose
consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down
on the floor." On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma
15

that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where
he had to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was guilty of child abuse by
16

deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or only maltreatment of a child.
Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also experienced the petitioner’s cruelty. The petitioner was
17

also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of another childnamed Dariel
Legayada. Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of
18

June 26, 2003. 19

Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form and substance, in that the essential
elements of the crime charged were not properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to due process of law was
consequently violated.

The petitioner’s submission deserves scant consideration.

Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

The information explicitly averred the offense of child abusecharged against the petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of child
abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and
substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the
ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in
her waiver of the challenge.

Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delictobecause no evidence had been adduced thereon. The CA saw
20

nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court. The explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was misplaced, however,
because even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victim’s feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define and
allow civil liability arising from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and
emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both
lower courts committed a plain error that demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People, it was
21

"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the
accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing
so in the following manner:

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto
have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused
and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether
as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused
by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an
appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct
at any time a matter of law and justice.1âwphi1

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity
under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of
the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of
administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases.
They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the
wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims
who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions
has been reserved or waived. 22

Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the victim, and in that respect the Court believes and
holds that ₱20,000.00 is reasonable. The victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of the Civil Code
authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the
petitioner was aggravated her being a public school teacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its maximum period pursuantto Section 31(e) of
Republic Act No. 7610. The amount of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the public good and
as a deterrent to other public school teachers who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code, supra, against the infliction of
corporal punishment on children under their substitute parental authority. The lack of proof of the actual expenses for the victim’s
treatmentshould not hinder the granting of a measure of compensation in the formof temperate damages, which, according to Article 2224 of
the Civil Code, may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered butits amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being
no question aboutthe injuries sustained requiring medical treatment, temperate damages ofat least ₱20,000.00 are warranted, for it would be
inequitable not to recognize the need for the treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of civil liability, to
be reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.

The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to
the child's development including those covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

xxxx

The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the
petitioner being a public schoolteacher. It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that the penalty provided in the Act
23

"shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the
information and established by evidence as well as admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are six
years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to seven years and four
months, for the medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day of
prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next
lower than prision mayor in its minimum period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the
1âwphi1

minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day
of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales ₱20,000.00
as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum
on each item of the civil liability reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013

GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. 1 Only
when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal
Code.

The Case

On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610.

Antecedents

On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child
abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, alleging as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,

Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his
palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family to wit:
"Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your father here), which
acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human
being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening
procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s
daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and
called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the
face;4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come
out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that
Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; 5 that the doctors who examined Jayson
issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and
(2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left. 6

On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan
after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about
Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.7

To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why
Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling
him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the petitioner as
a loving and protective father. 8

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit: 9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and
one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC
overlooked or disregarded material facts and circumstances in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He attacked
the lack of credibility of the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of the complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was
unnatural and contrary to human experience.

The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty, 10 viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the
maximum term.

Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount of ₱5,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 11

The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming that he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated
because he had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters.

Ruling of the Court

At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the CA’s affirmance of his conviction. His
proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on
certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v. Court of Appeals: 12

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of
the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the
issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the
same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in his petition. The allegation of grave
abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due course to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper and
adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors of
judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the crime that he claims were really
constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence
rather than his guilt for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in the petition concerned only the CA’s appreciation and
assessment of the evidence on record, which really are errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it would still be defective due to its being filed
beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires the filing of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to be
appealed. However, the petitioner received a copy of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005, 14 but filed the petition only on September 12,
2005,15 or well beyond the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.

The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly dismissing the petition, and instead set ourselves
upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the sentence
imposed on him not being commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of another long and hard look. If, on the other hand,
we were to outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed, the Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal of
last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium to the rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been
intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to every litigant. Indeed, its
announced objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." 16 This objective will be
beyond realization here unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application as the noble ends of justice demand. Thereby,
we give primacy to substance over form, which, to a temple of justice and equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the
dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting our consideration.

The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such birthright without due process of law unless we shunt aside
the rigidity of the rules of procedure and review his case. Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court. Consonant
with the basic rule in criminal procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should deem it our duty to correct errors in the
appealed judgment, whether assigned or not. 17

The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610,
which relevantly states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

xxxx

Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms. –

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development
or in his permanent incapacity or death.

xxxx

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand
and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted
provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the
"intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records
showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed
by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan.
With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused.
Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor. 18

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, 19 the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries
under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine
days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

xxxx

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment. 20 In imposing the correct
penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal
Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. 22 Passion or obfuscation
may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused. 23 It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation,
the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones
at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion.
Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.

The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in criminal cases resulting in physical injuries. 25 The
amount of ₱5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as moral damages is consistent with the current jurisprudence. 26

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a) finding petitioner George Bongalon
GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code;
(b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of ₱5,000.00
as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008

JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner,

vs.
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the June 29, 2007 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 87050, nullifying and setting aside the November 10, 2004 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil
Case No. 98-89483 and dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner; as well as its August 23, 2007 Resolution 4 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.5

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro
Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor
Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound he sustained. 6Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he
explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.

Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students
with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint 7 against
Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within
its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner,
if any; and to pay attorney's fees and cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP
General Insurance.8

On November 10, 2004, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:

1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his capacity as president of FEU to pay jointly and severally Joseph Saludaga the
amount of P35,298.25 for actual damages with 12% interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
moral damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of P500,000.00, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and cost of the
suit;

2. Galaxy Management and Development Corp. and its president, Col. Mariano Imperial to indemnify jointly and
severally 3rd party plaintiffs (FEU and Edilberto de Jesus in his capacity as President of FEU) for the above-mentioned
amounts;

3. And the 4th party complaint is dismissed for lack of cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.9

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which provides, viz:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint filed by Joseph Saludaga against appellant Far Eastern University and its President in Civil Case No. 98-89483 is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied; hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT:

5.1. THE SHOOTING INCIDENT IS A FORTUITOUS EVENT;

 5.2. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE INJURY RESULTING FROM A GUNSHOT WOUND
SUFFERED BY THE PETITIONER FROM THE HANDS OF NO LESS THAN THEIR OWN SECURITY GUARD IN VIOLATION
OF THEIR BUILT-IN CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO PETITIONER, BEING THEIR LAW STUDENT AT THAT TIME, TO
PROVIDE HIM WITH A SAFE AND SECURE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT;

5.3. SECURITY GAURD, ALEJANDRO ROSETE, WHO SHOT PETITIONER WHILE HE WAS WALKING ON HIS WAY TO THE
LAW LIBRARY OF RESPONDENT FEU IS NOT THEIR EMPLOYEE BY VIRTUE OF THE CONTRACT FOR SECURITY
SERVICES BETWEEN GALAXY AND FEU NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT PETITIONER, NOT BEING A PARTY TO IT,
IS NOT BOUND BY THE SAME UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY OF CONTRACTS; and

5.4. RESPONDENT EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN SELECTING GALAXY AS THE AGENCY WHICH WOULD PROVIDE
SECURITY SERVICES WITHIN THE PREMISES OF RESPONDENT FEU. 11

Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of student-school contract for a safe learning environment. The
pertinent portions of petitioner's Complaint read:

6.0. At the time of plaintiff's confinement, the defendants or any of their representative did not bother to visit and inquire about his
condition. This abject indifference on the part of the defendants continued even after plaintiff was discharged from the hospital
when not even a word of consolation was heard from them. Plaintiff waited for more than one (1) year for the defendants to
perform their moral obligation but the wait was fruitless. This indifference and total lack of concern of defendants served to
exacerbate plaintiff's miserable condition.

xxxx

11.0. Defendants are responsible for ensuring the safety of its students while the latter are within the University premises. And that
should anything untoward happens to any of its students while they are within the University's premises shall be the responsibility
of the defendants. In this case, defendants, despite being legally and morally bound, miserably failed to protect plaintiff from injury
and thereafter, to mitigate and compensate plaintiff for said injury;

12.0. When plaintiff enrolled with defendant FEU, a contract was entered into between them. Under this contract, defendants are
supposed to ensure that adequate steps are taken to provide an atmosphere conducive to study and ensure the safety of the
plaintiff while inside defendant FEU's premises. In the instant case, the latter breached this contract when defendant allowed harm
to befall upon the plaintiff when he was shot at by, of all people, their security guard who was tasked to maintain peace inside the
campus.12

In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that:

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in
the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure
that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. 14

It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual
obligation between the two parties. On petitioner's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other
hand, respondent FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the
campus.

It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.15 In the instant case, we find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who
was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to
provide a safe and secure environment to its students.

In order to avoid liability, however, respondents aver that the shooting incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have
reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as he was not their employee; 16and that they complied with their obligation
to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy.

After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in
providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met
the requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed, certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial;
however, no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the university was offered.

Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually
possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test
results, 201 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about these matters
or failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should
not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to
contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.

Consequently, respondents' defense of force majeure must fail. In order for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show that no
negligence or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has
failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God
in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation - whether by
active intervention, neglect or failure to act - the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. 17

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages.
Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for
damages. It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual
basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. 18

In the instant case, it was established that petitioner spent P35,298.25 for his hospitalization and other medical expenses. 19 While the trial
court correctly imposed interest on said amount, however, the case at bar involves an obligation arising from a contract and not a loan or
forbearance of money. As such, the proper rate of legal interest is six percent (6%) per annum of the amount demanded. Such interest shall
continue to run from the filing of the complaint until the finality of this Decision. 20 After this Decision becomes final and executory, the
applicable rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its satisfaction.

The other expenses being claimed by petitioner, such as transportation expenses and those incurred in hiring a personal assistant while
recuperating were however not duly supported by receipts. 21 In the absence thereof, no actual damages may be awarded. Nonetheless,
temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered where it has been shown that the claimant suffered some pecuniary
loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. Hence, the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded to
petitioner.

As regards the award of moral damages, there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages
since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. 22 The testimony of petitioner about his physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and moral shock resulting from the shooting incident 23 justify the award of moral damages. However, moral
damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the
limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard
against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was
due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court. 24 We deem it just and reasonable under the circumstances to award
petitioner moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.

Likewise, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P50,000.00 as part of damages is reasonable in view of Article 2208 of the
Civil Code.25 However, the award of exemplary damages is deleted considering the absence of proof that respondents acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

We note that the trial court held respondent De Jesus solidarily liable with respondent FEU. In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,26 we
held that:

[A] corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it, such that, save
for certain exceptions, corporate officers who entered into contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held personally liable
for the liabilities of the latter. Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not necessarily) with the
corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is
guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the
corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge
thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally
and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate
action.27

None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case; hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with
respondent FEU.

Incidentally, although the main cause of action in the instant case is the breach of the school-student contract, petitioner, in the alternative,
also holds respondents vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides:
 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security
Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered
into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of
Rosete.28

As held in Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao:29

In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,30 we held that where the security agency recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or
security guards to a client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency, and not the client, since the latter has no
hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be demanded
from the said client:

… [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its
watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful
acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of
security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the
client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards.

xxxx

The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render
the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. 31

We now come to respondents' Third Party Claim against Galaxy. In Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v.
Tempengko,32 we held that:

The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a 'third party' who is neither a party nor privy to the act or
deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party
plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect
of the plaintiff's claim. The third-party complaint is actually independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff's complaint.
Were it not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed independently and separately from the original
complaint by the defendant against the third-party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party defendant or so to
speak, to litigate his separate cause of action in respect of plaintiff's claim against a third-party in the original and principal case
with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one
litigation the entire subject matter arising from one particular set of facts. 33

Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and defenses in the course of the trial of petitioner's complaint.
Evidence duly supports the findings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in the selection of its employees but also in their
supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was even allowed
to go on leave of absence which led eventually to his disappearance. 34 Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner's condition or extend the
necessary assistance, other than the P5,000.00 initially given to petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their pledge to reimburse
petitioner's medical expenses.

For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach
of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts
awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the
security agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that his medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but said representations
were not fulfilled because they presumed that petitioner and his family were no longer interested in filing a formal complaint against them. 35

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87050 nullifying the
Decision of the trial court and dismissing the complaint as well as the August 23, 2007 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 98-89483 finding
respondent FEU liable for damages for breach of its obligation to provide students with a safe and secure learning atmosphere,
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

a. respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) is ORDERED to pay petitioner actual damages in the amount of P35,298.25, plus 6% interest
per annum from the filing of the complaint until the finality of this Decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the applicable
rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its satisfaction;

b. respondent FEU is also ORDERED to pay petitioner temperate damages in the amount of P20,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00; and attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P50,000.00;

c. the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

The Complaint against respondent Edilberto C. De Jesus is DISMISSED. The counterclaims of respondents are likewise DISMISSED.

Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy) and its president, Mariano D. Imperial are ORDEREDto jointly and severally
pay respondent FEU damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.
G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006

JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and ROSALITA CARDAÑA, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review assailing the Decision 1 dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412, declaring
petitioner liable for negligence that resulted in the death of Jasmin Cardaña, a school child aged 12, enrolled in Grade 6, of San Roque
Elementary School, where petitioner is the principal. Likewise assailed is the Resolution 2 dated March 20, 2003 denying reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of
a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and Rosalita
Cardaña - filed a case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.

The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on
the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principal’s office. The
Cardañas averred that petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.

Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was
dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers
during a meeting on December 15, 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.

In a Decision3 dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the
part of the petitioner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court found the appellee (herein petitioner) liable for
Jasmin’s death, as follows:

Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Appellee Joaquinita Capili is hereby declared liable for negligence
resulting to the death of Jasmin D. Cardaña. She is hereby ordered to indemnify appellants, parents of Jasmin, the following amounts:

1. For the life of Jasmin D. Cardaña P50,000.00;

2. For burial expenses 15,010.00;

3. For moral damages 50,000.00;

4. For attorney’s fees and litigation 10,000.00.

expenses

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now comes before us submitting the following issues for our resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIS-À-VIS THE SET OF FACTS STATED IN THE CHALLENGED DECISION,
ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2206 OF
THE CIVIL CODE AND IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS; AND

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 5
On the other hand, respondents posit the following issue:

Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Twelfth Division, in CA G.R. CV. No. 54412 promulgated on October 18,
2002 … should be affirmed and respected, thus remain undisturbed. 6

Primarily, the issue is whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaña.

Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had assigned her next-in-rank, Palaña, to see to its
disposal; that despite her physical inspection of the school grounds, she did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor
did any of her 15 teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten; 7 and that moral damages should not be granted against her since
there was no fraud nor bad faith on her part.

On the other hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same situation.

To begin, we have to point out that whether petitioner was negligent or not is a question of fact which is generally not proper in a petition for
review, and when this determination is supported by substantial evidence, it becomes conclusive and binding on this Court. 8 However, there
is an exception, that is, when the findings of the Court of Appeals are incongruent with the findings of the lower court. 9 In our view, the
exception finds application in the present case.

The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios
merely informed her that he was going to buy the tree for firewood. It ruled that petitioner exercised the degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances require and that there was an absence of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of care more than that
required by the attendant circumstances.10 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner should have known of the condition
of the tree by its mere sighting and that no matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree removed and not merely
delegated the task to Palaña. The appellate court ruled that the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that should have been removed soon after
petitioner had chanced upon it.11

A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a
situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of
nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or similar circumstances, would
foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner. 12

The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the
school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its
premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge
of the responsibility of her position.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered
by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. 13

The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that
the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 14

The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and
rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’ daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the school.

In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court held:

…As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to
an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally,
the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or
some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its
control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.

The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain.
The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. 16

Was petitioner’s explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed immediately sufficient to exculpate her?

As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school
and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree calls for an explanation on her part as to why she failed to be vigilant.

Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree because Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not
inform her of its condition. Neither did any of her teachers inform her that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she
could not see the immediate danger posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as she and the other teachers conducted ground
inspections. She further argues that, even if she should have been aware of the danger, she exercised her duty by assigning the disposition
of the tree to another teacher.

We find petitioner’s explanation wanting. As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the school’s premises. The fact
1âwphi1

that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by
her position.

Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee. 17 The record
shows that more than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaña on December 15, 1992, to the
time the incident occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been
removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of lack of negligence.

Lastly, petitioner questions the award of moral damages. Moral damages are awarded if the following elements exist in the case: (1) an injury
clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
of the Civil Code.18 However, the person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for
the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious anxiety as the
result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably, such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill
motive.19 Under the circumstances, we have to concede that petitioner was not motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis-à-vis respondents’
daughter’s death. The award of moral damages is therefore not proper.

In line with applicable jurisprudence, we sustain the award by the Court of Appeals of ₱50,000 as indemnity for the death of Jasmin, 20 and
₱15,010 as reimbursement of her burial expenses. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 18, 2002 and the Resolution dated March 20, 2003, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the award of moral damages is hereby deleted.
G.R. No. L-14342 May 30, 1960

CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., respondents.

Abad Santos and Pablo for petitioner.

Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, which condemned petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for
medical expenses, for a physical injury caused by the son of petitioner, Augusto Mercado, on a classmate, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., both
pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. The case had originated in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon.
Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding, which dismissed the complaint filed by Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and his father against petitioner, father of the
above-mentioned Mercado. The facts found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while
Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were
classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be
described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.

xxx xxx xxx

The facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started the aggression. Undeniably, the "pitogo" belonged to
Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the
"pitogo" belonged to Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball with which
they could play. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto. He thought it was the
"pitogo" of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so
because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the "pitogo". However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark
and he aggresively pushed the latter. The fight started then. After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and the latter
was clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto's anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut
him on the right check with a piece of razor.

xxx xxx xxx

Although the doctor who treated Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B. Past, testified for plaintiffs-appellants, he did not declare as to
the amount of fees he collected from plaintiff-appellants for the treatment of Manuel, Jr. the child was not even hospitalized for the
wound. We believe that the sum of P50.00 is a fair approximation of the medical expenses incurred by plaintiffs-appellants.

xxx xxx xxx

The damages specified in paragraphs C and D of the aforequoted portion of plaintiffs-appellant's complaint come under the class
of moral damages. The evidence of record shows that the child suffered moral damages by reason of the wound inflicted by
Augusto Mercado. Though such kind of damages cannot be fully appreciated in terms of money, we believe that the sum of
P2,000.00 would fully compensate the child.

As second cause of action, plaintiffs-appellants pray for P5,000.00 covering the moral damages they allegedly suffered due to
their son's being wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. The facts of record do not warrant the granting of moral
damages to plaintiffs-appellants Manuel Quisumbing and Ana Pineda. "In law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such
mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering
which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering of which arises from a contemplation of wrong
committed on the person of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by
his or her sympathy for the other's suffering. Nor can a parent recover for mental distress and anxiety on account of physical injury
sustained by a child or for anxiety for the safety of his child placed in peril by the negligence of another." (15 Am. Jur. 597).
Plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to attorney's fees, it not appearing that defendant-appellee had wantonly disregarded their
claim for damages.

In the first, second and third assignments of error, counsel for petitioner argues that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on
respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the
school should be held responsible instead of the latter. This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and
Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but we held, through Mr. Justice Bautista:
 We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of
arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th
Ed., p. 557)

The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should
be made liable, is as follows:

ART. 2180. . . .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for
the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back
to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor
does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim of
petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit.

We next come to the claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive. We note that the wound caused to
respondent was inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common fight between boys in a grade school. The Court of Appeals fixed the
medical expenses incurred in treating and curing the wound at P50. Said court stated that the wound did not even require hospitalization.
Neither was Mercado found guilty of any offense nor the scar in Quisumbing's face pronounced to have caused a deformity, unlike the case
of Araneta, et al. vs. Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil., 529; 55 Off. Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner's counsel argues that if death call for P3,000 to P6,000,
certainly the incised wound could cause mental pain and suffering to the tune of P2,000.

In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court pronounces that the child Quisumbing suffered moral damages "by reason of the wound
inflicted by Augusto Mercado." While moral damages included physical suffering, which must have been caused to the wounded boy
Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible circumstance in the
case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed.

It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it
does not appear that he had acted with discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.

It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical
injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict
when it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment, which motivated the assault, was
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." This
is, according to the decision appealed from, the reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who, in turn, also pushed
Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for
having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)

After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified.

For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the petitioner is declared exempt or free from the
payment of moral damages. The award of P50 for medical expenses, however, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known
under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-
appellees.

Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .

Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .

Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .

TEEHANKEE, J.:

An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. .

Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila
Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising from the death on March 10,
1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute. .

Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to his
action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the
1

defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow
student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly
incorporated."

The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with
another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio
Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the
effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave
Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist
blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face
downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a
hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone
witness to the incident."

The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as testified to by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of
the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor of any party" and
rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .

With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock
due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight
subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that these internal injuries of the deceased were caused "probably by strong fist
blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It held that "(T)he act, therefore,
3

of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and caused his death falls
within the purview of this article of the Code." 4

The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:

... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 2180. ... .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
 In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the
situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and
actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: — The clause "so long as
they remain in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code contemplated a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on
the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In those circumstances the control or influence over
the conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for their sort would pass from
the father and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco L. Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals,
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-14862, May 30, 1960). 5

There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the
school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.

Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:

1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a)
P6,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for
moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power, considering that the deceased was only between sixteen and
seventeen years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action. .

2. Absolving the other defendants. .

3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.

Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review, the trial
court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant
Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's death. The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious. .

1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold
"teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody," are not applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted
the fatal fistblows] lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be
6

made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."

The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, that "(I)t would seem that the
7

clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the
pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes
with their parents after school is over." This dictum had been made in rejecting therein petitioner father's contention that his minor son's
school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City [which was not a party to the case] should be held responsible, rather than him as
father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right
cheek with a piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral
damages award was after all set aside by the Court on the ground that none of the specific cases provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for
awarding moral damages had been established, petitioner's son being only nine years old and not having been shown to have "acted with
discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his classmate. .

The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs. Capuno, where the only issue involved as
8

expressly stated in the decision, was whether the therein defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages resulting from a death caused
in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor son, (which issue was resolved adversely against the father).
Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institution
of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .

2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools
under Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the
parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is
no question, either, that the school involved is a non-academic school, the Manila Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational
9

and industrial school. .

The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and
Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands
of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of
directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought
to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court found that it had been
incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant.
Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly
manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute"
which is now a corporation and is not owned by any individual person." 10

3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their
custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. In the law of torts,
11 12

the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole
time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in
their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict
willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. .

4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art.
1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority" and "where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the
13

one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction." The school itself, likewise,
has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article. 14

5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article
2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the
other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for
as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach
the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta
in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. .

6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for
the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The
unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied
with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm,
whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability,
in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from
liability. .

7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to P12,000.00 as
set by the Court in People vs. Pantoja, and observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The Court, in Pantoja, after noting
15

the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had expressed its "considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court thereby adjusted the minimum amount of
"compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old stated minimum of
P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which amount is to be awarded "even though there may have been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the
express provisions of said codal article. .

8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on
the total damages awarded, besides increasing the award of attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the discretion of the
trial court and the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial court. Decisive here
16

is the touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted
with gross negligence." No gross negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the imposition of exemplary
damages, as well as of interest and increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown in this appeal any compelling reason to
disturb such finding. .

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: .

1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severallyto pay plaintiffs as heirs
of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of
this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3. dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO
DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and
ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.

Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.

Padilla Law Office for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and
in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned
out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school,
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life
as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action
2

for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of
boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the
students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees . On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
3

completely absolved . 4

In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that
Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended,
that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing
the injury. 5

The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot
to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.

The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the
purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.

There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which they
claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April
7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without
making a report to the principal or taking any further action . As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun
6

that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not
have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same
firearm that killed Alfredo.

Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in
support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.

Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno Mercado v.
7

Court of Appeals, and Palisoc v. Brillantes. These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
8 9

In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned
turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate
civil action flied against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code
for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.

This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a
party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex
Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable Liability under this rule, he said, was
imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts
and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."

Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the
Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the
Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued that the school was not liable because it was not an
establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation where the
student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents." Justice
J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.

In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the
Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not boarding in the school, the head thereof and the
teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through Justice Teehankee:

The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" — means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as
they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously
held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to
have been set aside by the present decision.

This decision was concurred in by five other members, including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion,
10

that even students already of age were covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and subject to its
discipline. Dissenting with three others, Justice Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule
11

should apply only to torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco parentis.

In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved
at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have to await
another case wherein it may properly be raised."

This is the case.

Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under
Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein have also
directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades,
and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility
for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to
the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis"teachers" should
apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:

I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to
academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision and vice
over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that
his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority
and Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades"
used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments." The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the
Italian and French Civil Codes.

If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem
clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent,
should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not
 supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the
child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students
are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of
the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even
the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an
academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head
of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.

The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their
respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic in
nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and
not by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by any
student regardless of the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he
is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.

These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of
the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?

The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage
over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the
school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded
with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as
involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could
not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.

It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent
increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article
2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.

The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the
students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as
contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?

From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not
mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the control and under the
influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-
terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after
such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises. In
the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before
that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last
day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of
reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and
cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege,
the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing
in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the
parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate
and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such
influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was committed
within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or
even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had
exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.

Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained
of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also states that:

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the
teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.

The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be
unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting
injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the
school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as
principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its employ.

The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases
now, in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those
rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be
committed by its students.

A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused
by his students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed not to
expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree.
Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It
need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's influence,
besides being coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the students' desire to pass the course. The parent
can instill more las discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort
committed by the child.

And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor — then there should
all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in
preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority age and so is no
longer under the former's control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the
student.

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions:

1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed,
even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him
in the custody of the school authorities.

2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence
exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the
parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school
that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.

3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon
or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the
tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is
true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was
committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private
respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that
discipline.

4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions
from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol
was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.

5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it
be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with
the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic
circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law
they have invoked.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-54357 April 25, 1988

REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father PEDRO PASCO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA. MARIA and ARANETA UNIVERSITY, respondents.

Ponciano G. Hernandez for petitioner.

Marcelo C. Aniana for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The sole question of law raised by petitioner in this case is whether the provision of the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which states:

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

is equally applicable to academic institutions.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together with two companions, while walking inside the campus of the
private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led
by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed
by Abdul and as a consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save
his life.

On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein
private respondent Gregorio Araneta University which was docketed as Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as a party
defendant based on the aforementioned provision of the Civil Code.

On October 26, 1979, respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:

a. The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code under which it was sued applies only to vocational
schools and not to academic institutions;

b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the civil liability in this case arises from a criminal action which the defendant university has not committed;

c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by the plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring an
action for damages against defendant University. (Rollo, p. 96)

On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order * granting said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of Dismissal
but the motion was likewise denied on the ground that there is no sufficient justification to disturb its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition for
certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440, praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order of May 12, 1980 dismissing the
complaint as against respondent school and the order of July 17, 1980 denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal, with
costs against respondent school.

We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the
issue in this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school or the university itself (as distinguished from
the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads."

WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988

FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners,

vs.
EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Buenaventura C. Evangelista for petitioners.

Modesto V. Cabanela for respondent Edgardo Aquino.

Manuel P. Pastor for respondent Mauro Soriano.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 36390-R entitled "Federico
Ylarde, et al. vs. Edgardo Aquino, et al.," a case which originated from the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, We are again caned upon
determine the responsibility of the principals and teachers towards their students or pupils.

In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in
Tayug, Pangasinan-Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school was fittered with several concrete
blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards
to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one as early as 1962. In fact, he was able
to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.

Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class
dismissal on October 7, 1963. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole
wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The following day, also after classes, private respondent Aquino called four of
the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito
Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private respondent Aquino alone continued digging
while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole.
Then, said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty
meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. Before
leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."

A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then,
without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso
and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could
get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained the following injuries:

1. Contusion with hematoma, left inguinal region and suprapubic region.

2. Contusion with ecchymosis entire scrotal region.

3. Lacerated wound, left lateral aspect of penile skin with phimosis

4. Abrasion, gluteal region, bilateral.

5. Intraperitoneal and extrapertitoneal extravasation of blood and urine about 2 liters.

6. Fracture, simple, symphesis pubis

7. Ruptured (macerated) urinary bladder with body of bladder almost entirely separated from its neck.

REMARKS:

1. Above were incurred by crushing injury.

 2. Prognosis very poor.

(Sgd.) MELQUIADES A.
BRAVO

Physician
on Duty. 1

Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.

Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court
dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education;
(2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless
imprudence. 2

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the lower court.

Petitioners base their action against private respondent Aquino on Article 2176 of the Civil Code for his alleged negligence that caused their
son's death while the complaint against respondent Soriano as the head of school is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180 states:

Art. 2180. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. 3

The issue to be resolved is whether or not under the cited provisions, both private respondents can be held liable for damages.

As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic
school and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, wherein this Court thoroughly
4

discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the
school who can be held liable. In the same case, We explained:

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which
case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should
apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."

Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We rule that private respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that
the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino,
private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.

From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the
teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent
any injury on their persons. However, as earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private respondent Aquino on Article 2176
which is separate and distinct from that provided for in Article 2180.
With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this: Were there acts and omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino amounting
to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? Our answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for
damages.

From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1)
failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the
one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had
finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may
go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink
of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation,
an obviously attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of
the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to
amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing
three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the
digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by
its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless
to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives
of all the pupils concerned to real danger.

We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries which resulted in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his own
reckless imprudence, It should be remembered that he was only ten years old at the time of the incident, As such, he is expected to be
playful and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his age. Going back to the facts, it was not only him but the three of them who
jumped into the hole while the remaining boy jumped on the block. From this, it is clear that he only did what any other ten-year old child
would do in the same situation.

In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the
case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should
not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age
and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by
5

children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in mind,
6

We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.

The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as part of their Work Education. A single glance at the picture
showing the excavation and the huge concrete block would reveal a dangerous site requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers and
7

not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot comprehend why the lower court saw it otherwise when private respondent Aquino himself
admitted that there were no instructions from the principal requiring what the pupils were told to do. Nor was there any showing that it was
included in the lesson plan for their Work Education. Even the Court of Appeals made mention of the fact that respondent Aquino decided all
by himself to help his co-teacher Banez bury the concrete remnants of the old school shop. Furthermore, the excavation should not be
8

placed in the category of school gardening, planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that
could result in death or physical injuries.

The contention that private respondent Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person is certainly without cogent basis. A
reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by
themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is
sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a
teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.

We close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent
Aquino did. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be
alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered
great anguish all these years.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned judgment of the respondent court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ordering private respondent Edagardo Aquino to pay petitioners the
following:

(1) Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00

(2) Exemplary damages 10,000.00

(3) Moral damages 20,000.00

G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988

BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B.
CASTRO., respondents.

Edilberto B. Tenefrancia for petitioners.

Leonardo L. Cocjin Jr. for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the
decision of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 7 December 1984, in AC-G.R. No. CV 69876, in so far as it affirmed the
1

decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court), which held, among others, petitioners solidarily
2

hable with Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.

The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court and adopted by reference by the respondent Court, are:

... Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution ... [However], it is also an institution of arts and trade. It has so
advertised itself, as its own evidence shows. Its brochure (Exh. 2) shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offer
Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses... these
courses divest BCF of the nature or character of being purely or exclusively an academic institution. 3

Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is
under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the Armed Forces of the
4

Philippines (AFP), pursuant to Department Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department of Education and Culture, is provided by the
5

BCF an office and an armory located at the basement of its main building. 6

The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B.
7

Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as well as 8

orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other
ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
9 10

On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of
Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died
11

and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. 12

Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant
Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio
(Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants. After
hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation,
Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death of Napoleon Castro, (b)
P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, (c) P5,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P6,000.00 as actual
damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs; (2) absolving the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit. On appeal by petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial Court. The
13

modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of earning capacity of the deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of
temperate damages, and increasing the indemnity for the death of Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

The central issue in this case is whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for
"damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that
so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]
called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long as
14

(the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time." 15
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was stin in the protective and supervisory custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation when
he shot Napoleon Castro, the respondent Court ruled that:

it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident, which was at
about 8 o'clock in the evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the
BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about
dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of
and envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. (Emphasis supplied)
16

In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is
17

embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is
conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school
18

without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the
law.

Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the
custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity
liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon
"not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded." Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of
19

the school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was
supposed to be working in the armorywith definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.

Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, a school which offers both academic and technical/vocational courses
cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a student enrolled only in its academic program; however, considering that Jimmy B. Abon was
not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such other issue. 20

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his
tortious act in the killing of Napoleon Castro. No costs.
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN,
TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.

Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.

Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed, with the following modifications: (1) Exemplary damages in the
amount of P20,000.00 are hereby awarded to plaintiffs, in addition to the actual damages of P30,000.00, moral damages of
P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 awarded to plaintiffs in the decision under appeal; (2) St. Francis
High School, represented by the Spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and Benjamin Illumin, are hereby held jointly
and severally liable with defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment to plaintiffs of
the abovementioned actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, and for costs; and (3) Defendants
Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are hereby absolved from liability, and the case against them, together with their respective
counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)

The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo
Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers
for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand
went on with them to the beach.

During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some
of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered
but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General
Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena City,
against the St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal),
and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which
respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that the death of their son was due to
the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning, respondents
prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.

The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz,
ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages,
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The court a quo reasoned:

Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court believes that the defendant teachers namely: Connie Arquio, Luisito
Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria Cadiz had failed to exercise the diligence required of them by law
under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen. (pp. 2930, Rollo)

xxx xxx xxx

While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had already
occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were
remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. (p. 30, Rollo)

The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted to the sea without aforethought of the dangers it
offers. Yet, the precautions and reminders allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard
required by law under the circumstances. While the defendants-teachers admitted that some parts of the sea where the picnic
 was held are deep, the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even actually go to the water to test the depth of the particular
area where the children would swim. And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was confirmed by
the fact that three persons during the picnic got drowned at the same time. Had the defendant teachers made an actual and
physical observation of the water before they allowed the students to swim, they could have found out that the area where the
children were swimming was indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers who according to the female teachers were
there to supervise the children to ensure their safety were not even at the area where the children were swimming. They were
somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)

On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the
court a quo:

As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one.
Similarly no evidence has been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of
Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not
consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to
supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which
Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)

Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents-spouses assigned the following errors committed by the
trial court:

1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis High School and its administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as
equally liable not only for its approved co-curricular activities but also for those which they unreasonably failed to exercise control
and supervision like the holding of picnic in the dangerous water of Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.

2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High School and principal Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily liable
with their co-defendants-teachers Rosario Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at Talaan Beach,
Sariaya, Quezon, last March 20, 1982.

3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual and moral damages for the untimely and tragic death of
Ferdinand Castillo in favor of plaintiffs-appellants against all the defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)

The Court of Appeals ruled:

We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.

Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school-sponsored activity, nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the
same was held under the supervision of the teachers employed by the said school, particularly the teacher in charge of Class I-C
to whom the victim belonged, and those whom she invited to help her in supervising the class during the picnic. Considering that
the court a quo found negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers who, as such, were charged with the supervision of
the children during the picnic, the St. Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article 2176
taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. They cannot escape liability on the mere
excuse that the picnic was not an "extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High School." We find from the evidence that, as
claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even been
invited to attend the affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against undertaking the picnic, nor did he prescribe any
precautionary measures to be adopted during the picnic. At the least, We must find that the school and the responsible school
officials, particularly the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had acquiesced to the holding of the picnic.

Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal must be found jointly and severally liable with the
defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the rule that in cases
where the above-cited provisions find application, the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a
presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High
School and its principal); and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof
that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of
the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers). The record does not disclose
such evidence as would serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High School and its principal
from liability under the above-cited provisions.

As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants, while We cannot but commiserate with the plaintiffs for the
tragedy that befell them in the untimely death of their son Ferdinand Castillo and understand their suffering as parents, especially
the victim's mother who, according to appellants, suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of the tragedy, We find that the
amounts fixed by the court a quo as actual damages and moral damages (P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively) are
reasonable and are those which are sustained by the evidence and the law.

However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is hereby,
imposed in the present case by way of example of correction for the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code. (pp.
57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors committed by the trial court:

1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito Vinas, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria Cadiz guilty
of negligence and jointly and severally liable for damages such finding not being supported by facts and evidence.

2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)

On this score, respondent Court ruled:

The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the parents of the victim Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to
prove by their evidence that they did not give their son consent to join the picnic in question. However, We agree with the trial
court in its finding that whether or not the victim's parents had given such permission to their son was immaterial to the
determination of the existence of liability on the part of the defendants for the damage incurred by the plaintiffs-appellants as a
result of the death of their son. What is material to such a determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of
defendants vis-a-visthe supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the trial court, an affirmative
reply to this question has been satisfactorily established by the evidence, as already pointed out.

However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the defendants-teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, are
concerned. As to them, the trial court found:

While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident
had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by
coming late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students.

The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily explained why they were late in going to the picnic site, namely,
that they had to attend to the entrance examination being conducted by the school which is part of their duty as teachers thereof.
Since they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence in question, it cannot be said that they had any participation in the
negligence attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in the supervision of the children during
the picnic and which failure resulted in the drowning of plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or omission to the two
teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury caused to the plaintiffs because of the death of their
son resulting from his drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.

As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants, We agree with the court a quo that the counterclaim must be
dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)

Hence, this petition.

The issues presented by petitioners are:

A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs;

B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar;

C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar.
(pp. 81-82, Rollo)

In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The petition is impressed with merit.

If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. In the instant
case however, as will be shown hereunder, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under
them.

Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.

At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.

Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores

Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did you not ask him where he will bring this?
 A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to the picnic, and when I asked him where, he did not
answer, sir.

Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything more?

A No more, sir.

Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was drowned in the picnic came to you, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March 20, 1982, you did not know that your son join the
picnic?

A No, sir, I did not know.

Q Did you not look for your son during that time?

A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able, sir.

Q You did not ask your wife?

A I did not, sir.

Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic?

A Later on after 12:00, sir.

Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire whether your son have joined that picnic?

A Yes, sir.

(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo Castillo)

The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to
join the same. Furthermore.

Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:

Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?

A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She even felt guilty about the death of her son because
she cooked adobo for him so he could join the excursion where her son died of drowning.

Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the one who personally cooked the adobo for her
son?

A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient herself. She was very sorry had she not allowed her
son to join the excursion her son would have not drowned. I don't know if she actually permitted her son although
she said she cooked adobo so he could join. (Emphasis Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro —
witness).

Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death
of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.

In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the
school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is
clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at
Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned
activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.

As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their
teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article
2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score,
employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees
even if such act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.

Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses.

Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.

In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge
in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners
herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners
Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.

Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,

Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you approached the boy and claim also having applied first aid on
him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the children were covering you up or were surrounding you?

A Yes, sir.

Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?

A No, sir.

Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?

A Yes, sir.

Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your application of first aid?

A Yes, sir.

Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the process of your application of the first aid on the body of
Ferdinand Castillo?
 A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first aid that we were doing, sir.

Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you claimed the boy did not respond, were you not disturb
anyway?

A I was disturbed during that time, sir.

Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back pressure?

A From 9 to 11 times, sir.

Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to back pressure?

A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards, then the face was a little bit facing right and doing it by
massaging the back of the child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing of July 30, 1984)

Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination

ATTY. FLORES:

Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the child?

A Myself, sir.

Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?

A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I applied back to back pressure and took notice of the
condition of the child. We placed the feet in a higher position, that of the head of the child, sir.

Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position, where the feet were on a higher level than that of the head,
what did you do next?

A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after putting the child in that position, I applied the back to
back pressure and started to massage from the waistline up, but I noticed that the boy was not responding, sir.

Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy?

A About 10 seconds, sir.

Q What about Mr. Vinas?

A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.

Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did you do?

A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we changed the position of the boy by placing the child facing
upwards laying on the sand then we applied the mouth to mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-93, Rollo)

With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall
under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.

Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be
assessed against them.

While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were
already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the
case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages
becomes baseless.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for
the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein are
concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim, there being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

Balgos and Perez for petitioners.

Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47)
presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants
were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.

Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President),
Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security).
Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the
proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.

Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.

The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to
dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed the
trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's
orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
1

Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of
Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and
flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its
flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new challenges of progress.

Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as
held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; hence, the ruling in the Palisoc case
2 3 4

that it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or vocational.

At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such
liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent
damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case. 5

While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should
be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in
the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it had been
6

stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does
not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school
could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not
necessarily follow.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
7

presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or
assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there
looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-
delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression
has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124
Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It
is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage.
In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may
be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:

The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the
whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When
such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custom or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).

Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to
cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment
caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the
foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is
a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had
been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only
because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a
common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-
called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It
would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises
and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the
students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9

As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the
material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to
continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992

MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial guardian VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge of Branch LXI, Regional Trial Court of Region III, Angeles City, and the REPUBLIC
CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its President, respondents.

Mariano Y. Navarro for Republic Central Colleges.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against private respondent Republic Central Colleges
("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as defendants. The complaint alleged that:

. . . on 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and premises of the
defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular enrolled student of said school taking
his morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was on said date and hour in the premises of said
school performing his duties and obligations as a duly appointed security guard under the employment, supervision and
control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without any
provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill, attack, assault,
strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such
wound sustained would have caused plaintiff's death were it not for the timely medical assistance given to him. The
plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff
may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a
duration of from three to four months before his wounds would be completely healed. 1

Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. Private respondent
argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that private respondent school was not the
employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private
respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and
heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy
Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.

In an order dated 29 November 1983, respondent Judge granted private respondent school's motion to dismiss, holding that security guard
Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of the school which accordingly could not be held liable for his acts or omissions. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, without success.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended that respondent trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when he
refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352, of the Civil Code and granted the school's
motion to dismiss.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not
only for one's own act or omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons held
vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following:

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils, their
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

xxx xxx xxx

The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding the Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy B.
Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy
Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is settled that
where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of
such guards or watchmen. 2 Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to
the clients or customers of such agency. 3 As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among
the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property are
protected by the security guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does
not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions.
Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the
security agency. There being no employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot
impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.

Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of
the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing
liability upon the Republic Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.

The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:

Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Teachers and professors;

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices;

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
child.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student are fixed by government regulations and
those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor
shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student.

In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner, the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the "Manila
Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila, responsible in damages for the death of Dominador Palisoc, a student of Institute, which resulted
from fist blows delivered by Virgilio L. Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it
expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant
case.

Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject
to such substitute parental authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in
injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute parental authority
over Solomon.

Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the petitioner's claim as one based wholly and exclusively on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial judge was correct. Does it follow, however, that respondent Colleges could not be held liable
upon any other basis in law, for or in respect of the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle respondent school to dismissal of
petitioner's complaint in respect of itself?

The very recent case of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) v. Court of Appeals, 5 requires us to give a negative
answer to that question.

In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider
or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the Court stressed that an
implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students
who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in obligations for both parties:

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting
in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student
 with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements
and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere
that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb
the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are
flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and
limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. 6

In that case, the Court was careful to point out that:

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the
school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between
PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for
conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true
in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several
incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the
same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and
environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of
diligence which is required by the nature of obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person, time and
place. 7

In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the Court of Appeals and this
Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Colleges, upon the
assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA,
however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other
legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the
interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent
Colleges.

In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court, and in order to avoid a possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and
putting aside technical considerations, we consider that respondent trial judge committed serious error correctible by this Court in the instant
case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to TREAT the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer,
and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated 29 November 1983. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings
consistent with this Resolution.
G.R. No. 165565 July 14, 2008

SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or SR. CRISPINA A. TOLENTINO, S.Sp.S., Petitioners,
vs.
CORAZON P. TAGUIAM, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the Decision1 dated June 7, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81480, which reversed the
Resolution2 dated September 20, 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02. The NLRC
had affirmed the Decision3 dated March 26, 2002 of the Labor Arbiter dismissing respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal. This petition
likewise assails the Resolution4 dated September 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City. On
March 10, 2000, the class president, wrote a letter 5 to the grade school principal requesting permission to hold a year-end celebration at the
school grounds. The principal authorized the activity and allowed the pupils to use the swimming pool. In this connection, respondent
distributed the parent’s/guardian’s permit forms to the pupils.

Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federico’s permit form 6 was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by
her mother to join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.

Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils
were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going.

Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was already
administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital
where she was pronounced dead on arrival.

On May 23, 2000, petitioners issued a Notice of Administrative Charge 7 to respondent for alleged gross negligence and required her to
submit her written explanation. Thereafter, petitioners conducted a clarificatory hearing which respondent attended. Respondent also
submitted her Affidavit of Explanation.8

On July 31, 2000, petitioners dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence. 9 Meanwhile,
Chiara Mae’s parents filed a ₱7 Million damage suit against petitioners and respondent, among others. They also filed against respondent a
criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On July 25, 2001, respondent in turn filed a complaint 10 against the school and/or Sr. Crispina Tolentino for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for
reinstatement with full backwages and other money claims, damages and attorney’s fees.

In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter declared that respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. He opined that
Chiara Mae drowned because respondent had left the pupils without any adult supervision. He also noted that the absence of adequate
facilities should have alerted respondent before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool. The Labor Arbiter further concluded that
although respondent’s negligence was not habitual, the same warranted her dismissal since death resulted therefrom.

Respondent appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

Aggrieved, respondent instituted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which ruled in her favor. The appellate court observed
that there was insufficient proof that respondent’s negligence was both gross and habitual. The Court of Appeals disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, … the Court hereby GRANTS the petition. The assailed September 20, 2002
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission entitled Corazon Taguiam vs. School of
the Holy Spirit and/or Sister Crispina Tolentino[,] NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-03877-01[,]
NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
hereby ENTERED directing the private respondent the School of the Holy Spirit to:
 (1) Pay the petitioner full backwages, plus all other benefits, bonuses and general increases to which she would have been
normally entitled, had she not been dismissed and had she not been forced to stop working computed up to the finality of this
decision;

(2) Pay the petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service in addition to full backwages;

(3) Pay the petitioner an amount equivalent to 10% of the judgment award as attorney’s fees;

(4) Pay the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.11

In this petition, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in:

… REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF MERIT. 12

Simply stated, the sole issue presented for our resolution is whether respondent’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to
loss of trust and confidence was valid.

The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater
force in labor cases.13 However, where the issue is shrouded by a conflict of factual perception, we are constrained to review the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. In this case, the findings of facts of the appellate court contradict those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. 14

Under Article 28215 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee.
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. 16 Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one’s
duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. 17

Our perusal of the records leads us to conclude that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Mae’s permit
form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae’s mother has allowed her to join it
by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.

The purpose of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the parents have allowed their child to join the school activity involved. Respondent
cannot simply ignore this by resorting to assumptions. Respondent admitted that she was around when Chiara Mae and her mother arrived.
She could have requested the mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least called her up to obtain her conformity.

Second, it was respondent’s responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. 18 Thus, she
should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were
present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her
by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.

As it turned out, since respondent was the only adult present, majority of the pupils were left unsupervised when she followed the two pupils
who sneaked out. In the light of the odds involved, respondent should have considered that those who sneaked out could not have left the
school premises since there were guards manning the gates. The guards would not have allowed them to go out in their swimsuits and
without any adult accompanying them. But those who stayed at the pool were put at greater risk, when she left them unattended by an
adult.
1avvphi1

Notably, respondent’s negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however, we are in
agreement that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent. This is not the first time that we have departed from the requirements laid down
by the law that neglect of duties must be both gross and habitual. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, 19 we ruled that Philippine Airlines (PAL)
cannot be legally compelled to continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his
duties although it was his first offense. In that case, we noted that a mere delay on PAL’s flight schedule due to aircraft damage entails
problems like hotel accommodations for its passengers, re-booking, the possibility of law suits, and payment of special landing fees not to
mention the soaring costs of replacing aircraft parts. 20 In another case, Fuentes v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 we held that it
would be unfair to compel Philippine Banking Corporation to continue employing its bank teller. In that case, we observed that although the
teller’s infraction was not habitual, a substantial amount of money was lost. The deposit slip had already been validated prior to its loss and
the amount reflected thereon is already considered as current liabilities in the bank’s balance sheet. 22 Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence
as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee. In this case, the damage went as far
as claiming the life of a child.

As a result of gross negligence in the present case, petitioners lost its trust and confidence in respondent. Loss of trust and confidence to be
a valid ground for dismissal must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.23 Otherwise stated, it must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion;
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be genuine and not simulated; nor should it appear
as a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. It has
never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature. There must, therefore, be an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee which must be established by substantial evidence. 24

As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have made sure that the children were protected from all harm
while in her company.25 Respondent should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an
accident. A simple reminder "not to go to the deepest part of the pool" 26 was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation
presented to the children, especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. 27 Dismally, respondent created an unsafe
situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence
reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.

Finally, we note that based on the criminal complaint filed by Chiara Mae’s parents, the Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause to
indict respondent for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The Assistant City Prosecutor held that respondent "should
have foreseen the danger lurking in the waters." By leaving her pupils in the swimming pool, respondent displayed an "inexcusable lack of
foresight and precaution."28 While this finding is not controlling for purposes of the instant case, this only supports our conclusion that
respondent has indeed been grossly negligent.

All told, there being a clear showing that respondent was culpable for gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence, her
dismissal was valid and legal. It was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse and set aside the resolution of the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 7, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81480 is
SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated September 20, 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02 is
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010

ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGO, Petitioners,
vs.
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed
in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-95-22889.

The facts, as found by the CA, follow:

On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph College’s [SJC’s] premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson
Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner]
Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jayson’s] class is x x x Estefania Abdan.

Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In
the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by
looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the
eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit [Jayson’s] eye and the different
parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which
he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, [Jayson’s] wound had not
completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.

Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for
which she spent ₱36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least ₱40,000.00.

Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to
[petitioners’] fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable
for moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter to [petitioners] for the payment of his medical expenses as well as other expenses
incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for damages. [Petitioners], therefore,
should likewise compensate [Jayson] for litigation expenses, including attorney’s fees.

On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the
school year 1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, the class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was conducting a
science experiment under the guidance and supervision of Tabugo, the class science teacher, about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings
by combining these elements in a test tube and heating the same. Before the science experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his
classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated
compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of understanding the English
language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the
experiment and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked at the compound,
which at that moment spurted out of the test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson’s] eyes.

Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center for treatment. At the
hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to his teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube
until the compound had cooled off.

After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected.
In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in [Jayson’s] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson’s] father, requested SJC to
advance the amount of ₱26,176.35 representing [Jayson’s] hospital bill until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC
acceded to the request.

On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the
medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science experiment.
In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot
accede to the demand because "the accident occurred by reason of [Jayson’s] failure to comply with the written procedure for the experiment
and his teacher’s repeated warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less look into, the opening of the test tube until the
heated compound has cooled.3

Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson’s father, on Jayson’s behalf, sued petitioners for damages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Jayson] and against [petitioners]. This Court orders and holds
the [petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay [Jayson] the following amount:

1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of ₱77,338.25 as actual damages; However, [Jayson] is ordered to reimburse [petitioner] St.
Joseph College the amount of ₱26,176.36 representing the advances given to pay [Jayson’s] initial hospital expenses or in the
alternative to deduct said amount of ₱26,176.36 from the ₱77,338.25 actual damages herein awarded by way of legal
compensation;

2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of ₱50,000.00 as mitigated moral damages;

3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of ₱30,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees;

4. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.4

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously adverted to, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 221 dated September 6, 2000 is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against [petitioners].5 1avvphi1

Undaunted, petitioners appealed` by certiorari to this Court, adamant that the CA grievously erred, thus:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF JAYSON’S INJURY WAS HIS
OWN ACT OF LOOKING AT THE HEATED TEST TUBE BEFORE THE COMPOUND HAD COOLED IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR TO THE EXPERIMENT.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ST. MARY’S COLLEGE V.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS, x x x JAYSON’S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING INTO THE TEST TUBE WAS IN FACT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FOR WHICH THE PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
PROOF TO SUPPORT THE SAME.

IV. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO [JAYSON].

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES TO [JAYSON].

VI. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS’ COUNTERCLAIM. 6

We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts that petitioners were "negligent since they all failed to exercise the
required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students."

Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree
of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. 7 A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted except for highly
meritorious circumstances when: (1) the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) a lower
court’s inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of fact are conclusions without
mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record.8 None of the foregoing exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance.

Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was his own negligence in disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo
prior to the experiment and peeking into the test tube. Petitioners invoke our ruling in St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos 9 which absolved St.
Mary’s Academy from liability for the untimely death of its student during a school sanctioned activity, declaring that "the negligence of
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident."

We are not convinced.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the lower courts’ conclusions are borne out by the records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded
that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the
chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The assailed Decision of the CA quotes with favor the RTC decision, thus:

In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was the proximate cause of the latter’s injury. We find that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into the test tube when the chemicals
suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of any intervening
cause. [Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The court a quo
correctly ruled that:

"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence because all of them are responsible for exercising the required
reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged
with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts presented
before this Court, these [petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them. [Petitioner]
subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the science experiment although [Jayson] insisted
that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No evidence, however, was presented to establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was inside the classroom
for the whole duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the school clinic for
immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe that
[petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time the accident happened. The Court is also perplexed why none of
the other students (who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court to corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The Court, however,
understands that these other students cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in said school and testifying for
[Jayson] would incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge because she
exercised control and supervision over [petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing would go
wrong and that the science experiment would be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students. [Petitioner] Sr. Josephini
Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the other individual [petitioners] were under her direct
control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual [petitioners] were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.

xxxx

"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it
has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for
hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner]
school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. The fact that there has never been any accident in the
past during the conduct of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo and do away with
creative foresight to install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety
instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and
anticipated dangers.

"Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university itself, although an educational institution may be held liable
under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence
of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the
negligent employee."10

Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the findings of the RTC, which the CA affirmed.

Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her students, including Jayson, at the start of the
experiment, not to look into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled off. Petitioners would allocate all liability and place all
blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student, herein respondent Jayson.

We disagree.

As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of
care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.

Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the following persons with
the corresponding obligation, thus:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.

Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution is demonstrated by the following:

1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its students although it had full information on the
nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the students during class;

2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who conduct experiments in class;

3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and
dangers; and

4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the
accident involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the class—fifty (50) students— conducting the experiment is difficult
to monitor.

Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her
science class not to look directly into the heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St. Mary’s preclude their liability in this case.

Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Mary’s is not in point. In that case, respondents thereat admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that
the cause of the accident was a mechanical defect and not the recklessness of the minor, James Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We held, thus:

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. x x x.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It
was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle
and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.11

In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which happened during the science experiment was
foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in
exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of
the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary’s, "for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident."12

As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we see no need to disturb the lower courts’ identical rulings thereon:

As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of [Jayson’s] injury was the explosion of the heated compound independent of any efficient
intervening cause. The negligence on the part of [petitioner] Tabugo in not making sure that the science experiment was correctly conducted
was the proximate cause or reason why the heated compound exploded and injured not only [Jayson] but his classmates as well. However,
[Jayson] is partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise bear the
consequences of his own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be held liable only for the damages actually caused by their
negligence.13

Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts’ award of actual and moral damages, and grant of attorney’s fees. The
denial of petitioners’ counterclaim is also in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011

AQUINAS SCHOOL, Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA S. INTON, on their behalf and on behalf of their minor child, JOSE LUIS S. INTON, and SR.
MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the private school’s liability for the outside catechist’s act of shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he
disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the classroom.

The Facts and the Case

In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita
Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade three religion
class.

On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a
joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the
same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the child’s behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several
times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room
and finish copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor.

As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis
against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal
action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.

With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the
hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis’ favor, holding
Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of ₱25,000.00, exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of ₱10,000.00 plus the
costs of suit.1

Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). 2 They asked the CA to increase the award of damages and hold
Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA found
them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined to increase the award of damages. 3 Jose Luis moved for partial reconsideration
but this was denied. Aquinas, for its part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision through a petition for review on certiorari.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the
damages awarded to Jose Luis.

The Court’s Ruling

The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose Luis based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon the CA’s belief that the school was Yamyamin’s
employer. Aquinas contests this.

The Court has consistently applied the "four-fold test" to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a)
selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the most
crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the
employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same. 4

In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its
ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the
school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the way
bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did
not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress’ testimony in this regard.
Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. 1âwphi1
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young
students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by
their religion teacher.

First, Yamyamin’s transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach religion.

Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters and
that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the students.

Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the school’s Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for handling
students. It also required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998. 5

Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach 6 to ensure that she was really catechizing the
students.

And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom evaluation. 7 Unfortunately, since she was new and it
was just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted
promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident. 8 It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty
of outright neglect.

Regarding the Intons’ plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the Court finds no justification for this since they did not appeal from
the decision of the CA. The Intons prayed for the increase only in their comment to the petition. They thus cannot obtain from this Court any
affirmative relief other than those that the CA already granted them in its decision. 9

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4,
2008, and HOLDS petitioner Aquinas School not liable in damages to respondent Jose Luis Inton.
 G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016

ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, DR. BRIGIDO L. CARANDANG, AND DR. ALEJANDRO P.
ORTIGAS Petitioners, v. SPOUSES MANUEL AND ESMERALDA PEREZ AND SPOUSES ERIC AND JURISITA QUINTOS, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated September 30, 2015 and the Resolution2 dated February 2, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 103529, which rulings reversed the Decision dated July 7, 2014 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 84,
Malolos City, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 145-M-2012 and remanded the case to the trial court for reception of evidence on the amount of damages to be
awarded.

As a backgrounder, in 2006, the Commission on Higher Education issued Memorandum Order No. 10, series of 2006 which required medical students to
undergo rotating clinical clerkship in their fourth year. As such, petitioner St. Luke's College of Medicine (St. Luke's) entered into a Memorandum of Intent
with the Municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija for the construction of a community clinic. The said facility consisted of a six-bed medical facility in the
ground floor, and a residential space for the medical staff in the second floor.

The undisputed facts, as amply summarized by the CA, are as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4th year medical students to the clinic, namely: plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa,
plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Quintos' daughter Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They were tasked to complete a
four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic and like the previous batches, they were housed in the second floor of the clinic.

According to Ramos, he and his groupmates reported for duty at the Cabiao clinic at approximately 10 o'clock in the morning of February 8, 2010. When
their shift ended at 5 o'clock that afternoon, the group went for a jog and returned to the clinic at around 7 o'clock in the evening. They again went out at
9 o'clock in the evening to buy beverages, cooking oil and other items needed for their breakfast the next day and went to sleep sometime after
midnight. Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they bought was an alcoholic beverage called The Bar, which consisted of either vodka or gin. He
also admitted that only he and Cecille drank the alcoholic beverage which they mixed with the soda and that they did not consume the whole bottle.

Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and 3:30 in the morning of February 9, 2010 when he heard Murillo shouting from the other side of
the room that there was a fire. Ramos immediately ran to the door which led to the living room and when he opened the same, he saw thick smoke
coming from the left portion of the living room where there was a glow. He also felt extreme heat, prompting him to run to the bathroom to get a pail of
water with which he tried to extinguish the fire. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind. When Ramos' attempt to put out the fire
proved to be futile, he went back to the bathroom and poured water on the girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire.

According to Ramos, the smoke started to seep through the bathroom door and the group had started shouting for help. After a considerable amount of
time, he heard somebody outside instructing him to get back from the window. When he did so, somebody broke the window and started to dismantle the
iron grills barring the same. By that time, Ramos had started losing consciousness due to smoke inhalation and only remembered that he was being
pulled out of the building through the window.

Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical students, including the daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation
resulting" to asphyxia.

As a result of the deaths, defendant-appellee St. Luke's compensated the parents of the three deceased students in the amount of PhP300,000.00 each
from insurance proceeds. (Citations omitted)

The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an investigation on the incident, and in a Certification dated April 18, 2011, it certified that the fire was
"purely accidental in nature due to unattended cooking," to wit:4
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT as appearing on The Blotter Book No. 0304-0287, pages 17 and 18, the two storey Institutional building owned by Local
Government Unit (LGU) Cabiao, Nueva Ecija was partially razed by fire including all the contents of the second floor that transpired on or about 090245H
February 2010. The estimated cost of damage is two Million pesos (P2,000,000.00) more or less.

Result of investigation conducted by the Investigator on Case of this station, Bureau of Fire Protection, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, disclosed that the fire was
purely ACCIDENTAL IN NATURE due to UNATTENDED COOKING that occurred at the kitchen of said floor and no evidence were gathered to show that the
fire was intentionally, deliberately or maliciously set.
Respondents had their doubts. Thus:5
xxx. xxx, plaintiffs-appellants, requested for a meeting with defendant-appellee Dr. Alejandro Ortigas, Associate Dean for Faculty and Student Affairs of
St. Luke's. During the meeting, plaintiffs-appellants were surprised by the presence of defendants-appellees Dr. Brigido Carandang, St. Luke's Dean of
Medicine, the Municipal Health Officer of Cabiao Dr. De Leon, as well as Municipal Fire Marshall of Cabiao Baby Boy Esquivel, a Cabiao police officer and
its barangay captain.

The officials informed plaintiffs-appellants that the fire was caused by the gas burner left open by the victims which greatly disturbed plaintiffs-appellants.
In a subsequent meeting, they were informed that there was also evidence that the victims were drinking alcoholic beverages on the night of the fire
which plaintiffs-appellants refused to accept.

Convinced that there was a cover-up, plaintiffs-appellants continued to question individual defendants-appellees. Exasperated, defendant-appellee Dr.
Carandang allegedly asked "Ano pa bang gusto ninyo sa amin? Nakiramay na kami."
Offended and still unconvinced, respondent Spouses Manuel and Esmeralda Perez, the parents of Jessa, and respondent Spouses Eric and Jurisita
Quintos, the parents of Cecille, sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In its Resolution dated August 3, 2010, the existence of
which is expressly admitted by petitioners, having quoted the contents 6 and having attached a copy thereof to the present petition, 7 the NBI declared that
the construction of the Cabiao Community Clinic building was in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9514 (R.A. No. 9514) or the Revised Fire
Code of the Philippines, that the cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical wiring, and that St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature. The pertinent
parts of the said Resolution reads:8
xxxx

2. The building structure of Cabiao Community Center

The Cabiao Community Clinic/Center is a two-storey concrete building. The ground floor is used as the municipality's lie-in clinic or hospital during day
time. The students and in particular the victims use this facility together with the. medical complement of the municipality for their community medical
service.
On the 2nd floor was the office of Dr. LEON DE LEON, Cabiao Municipal Health Officer, adjacent was a storage room for office and medical supplies and
documents, the bedrooms for the medical students rendering community service, a dining area, a kitchen, and the living-room. The second floor, it may
be said, is virtually dedicated for the board and lodging of the students while on mission. These rooms and areas are separated from each other by wood
panels made of plywood including the wall in which the gas stove was located. All the windows at the second floor are also covered by permanent
iron grills. There are no fire exits, fire alarms, fire extinguishers, sprinklers, emergency lights.

The community center is a virtual fire/death trap. During night time, medical students were left alone inside the 2nd floor with the main
gate locked from the outside and with no apparent signs of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, fire exit plan, emergency lights, provisions of
confining the fire to its source, among others, for the occupants fire safety and protection system. They were on their own at the second floor,
without anyone (maid or security guard) to attend to their needs while the ground floors and the adjoining building were uninhabited.

3. The electrical system of Cabiao Community Clinic;

Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN, Chief Electrical Section of the (sic) and member of the NBI investigating team observed that the facility has a main circuit
breaker and the two distribution panels, located at the ground floor, just above the comfort room of the 2 ndfloor. The main breaker has a 500 amp
capacity while the two distribution panels serving the 1st floor and the 2nd floor has 200 amp capacity, each, as against the main electrical service wire
with the size 14 mm.

The ratio between the capacity of the circuit breaker and the electrical service wire is out of proportion and became electrically
insensitive to overload and wire short circuits; thereby negating the very purpose the circuit breaker was designed.

The size of service wire is Small, suitable only for lighting purposes and not to supply two buildings, dedicated for public use. Six years of use in
overload capacity would have worn out the wire and its strength and vitality, hence it will readily overheat, notwithstanding at the time
short circuits, only few bulbs were in use.

The electrical meter used is appropriate only to residential units and not to service the two buildings intended for public which are [equipped] with
modern medical equipment; the old NFA and the [Cabiao] Community Clinic.

Both live service wire and secondary electrical wires were bundled together inside the same tube. At the 2nd floor, visible signs of cut wires were
found inside a tube, including the service wire as it pass through going down to the main panel board and several cut wires of the
secondary breaker going to the second floor for power distribution.

The main and secondary panel boards were wrongly situated at the ground floor, above which is the location of a comfort room, where
water could easily slip to the panel boards.

The installation of the secondary panel board at the ground floor distributing power to the 2 nd floor defeats its purpose, considering that if
electrical trouble happens at the 2nd floor one has to go to the 1st floor to shut off the power.

4. The construction of the Cabiao Community Center building was in violation of the provision of Republic Act No. 9514 (Revised Fire Code of the
Philippines)

Owners, occupants or administrator of buildings or structures are required to incorporate and provide fire safety construction, protective and warning
systems. Investigation shows that a) there were no fire protection features such as sprinkler systems, hose boxes, hose reels or standpipe systems and
other firefighting equipment; fire alarm systems; b) no fire exit, fire exit plan for each floor of the building showing the routes from each other [sic] room
to appropriate exits, displayed prominently on the door of such room; c) no properly marked and lighted exits with provision for emergency light to
adequately illuminate exit ways in case of power failure, and d) no provisions for confining the fire at its source such as fire resistive floors and walls.

5. The Cabiao Bureau of Fire Protection failed to perform its mandate pursuant to RA 9514.

Under the Fire Code, the Bureau of Fire Protection is required to conduct fire safety inspections as pre-requisite to the grant of licenses and permits for
the use and occupancy of buildings, structures, facilities and their premises including the installation of fire protections and fire safety equipment and
electrical systems in any building structure or facility; and the storage of explosives or combustible, flammable, toxic and other hazardous materials.

The BFP is likewise responsible for designating fire inspectors who shall inspect every building at least once a year, and every time the owner,
administrator or occupant [renews] its business permit or permit to occupy; to issue a business permit or permit to operate only after securing a Fire
Safety Inspection Certification (FSIC); require the building owner occupant to submit plans and specifications and other pertinent documents of
building/structure in order to ensure compliance of applicable codes and standards and issue a written notice to the owner and/or contractor to stop work
on portion of any work due to absence or in violation of approved plans and specifications; to inspect at reasonable time, any building, structure or
premises and order the owner/occupant to remove hazardous materials and/or stop operation if the standards are not met; to declare and summarily
abate hazardous conditions of the buildings or structures and/or declare the same as fire hazards.

It is worthy to note that despite the long period of time from the occurrence of the fire until the termination of this investigation, the Cabiao BFP headed
by FO3 ESQUIVEL has yet to submit its report and findings. However, inasmuch as FO3 ESQUIVEL has bungled the investigation of the fire by
removing items from the scene of the fire and his failure to explain the disappearance of other electrical debris, the opening and
enlargement of the iron grill where the sole survivor passed, the back door broken, and the non-recording of the investigations, FO3
Esquivel's action and behaviors are highly suspect of a massive cover up of the real cause of the fire.

xxxx

7. St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature.

St. Luke's College of Medicine - William H. Quasha Memorial, Inc., being the owner and operator of the Cabiao Community Clinic is not without liability for
the fate of the fire victims. As a learning institution, which sends out its students to rural areas to comply with its curriculum requirement,
St. Luke's has the duty and responsibility to see to it that the premises to where it sends its students are safe. It is significant to stress that
the Cabiao Community Clinic was established by the Municipality of Cabiao and the St. Luke's College of Medicine in line with the latter's expansion of its
Community Medicine undertaking to the rural areas in order to train its students in health promotion and disease prevention as well as to provide medical
service to deserving population and to undertake clinical research on various health practices.

The victims were sent there as part of their community medicine module in the curriculum and their assignments were determined by the officials of the
College of Medicine.

8. The origin of fire.

The Cabiao BFP has manifested its prejudice and bias and thus, cannot be an independent, reliable and credible investigator of this fire
incident. They could not even entertain any theory, other than the gas burner, because in doing so would place themselves in jeopardy. They even
resorted to tampering of premises by removing all electrical wire debris, thinking that in its absence, fire caused by short circuits cannot
be proven.
It is highly probable that the origin of fire is electrical based on the Electrical Report No. 04-10-001 submitted by Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN, Chief,
Electrical Section, NBI because of the following.

i. Presence of thick black smoke that indicates heat caused by short-circuit

ii. Explosion or tripping off of the transformer, then a black out - showing therefore that the circuit breaker did not trip off

iii. Inspection of the main circuit breaker and the secondary breakers show that these did not trip off

iv. Presence of short circuited wires located at the 2nd floor, where buddle wires were found

v. Presence of numerous spliced wires or jumped wires in three different convenient outlets

vi. Mainboard panel is mismatched with the service wire

vii. Other defective wirings

It is a well done theory that the cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical wiring with two reasons to support it, first is the physical
manifestation as mentioned by Engr. DAVE AOANAN who conducted evaluation/investigation on what is left on the building of the Cabiao
Community Clinic; second is the personal experience of MIGUEL RAFAEL RAMOS y DAVID the lone survivor of the incident [who] narrated
what he perceived during last hour before he was rescued. MIGUEL['s] narration contradict the theories laid down by Fire Marshall BABY BOY
ESQUIVEL that the fire was by the negligence of the victims [whom] he suspect[s] to have left [burning a] gas stove. MIGUEL'S narration specifically
pointed out that the fire was primarily coming from the living room and not at the kitchen which is directly in front of their door way. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Respondents then filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners St. Luke's College of Medicine-William H. Quasha Memorial Foundation, Dean of
Medicine Brigido L. Carandang, and Associate Dean for Faculty and Student Affairs Alejandro P. Ortigas, claiming that their negligence caused the deaths
of respondents' daughters. Respondents maintained that, as a learning institution which sends out its medical students to rural areas to comply with its
curriculum requirement, St. Luke's has the contractual duty and legal responsibility to see to it that the premises to where it sends its students are safe
and that, in the case at bar, St. Luke's refused to recognize its obligations/liabilities. 9 Respondents thus prayed as follows:10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs -
1. Finding the defendants negligent and liable under their contractual and legal obligations to Jessa and Cecille;

2. Directing defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages; and cralawlawlibrary

3. Ordering defendants to pay the cost of suits and attorney's fees.

Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs as the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the premises.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.11 It held that the Cabiao Community Clinic was not a fire trap as there were two (2) fire exits, and that
respondents failed to present any report or finding by a competent authority that the said Clinic was not a safe and secure place for the conduct of St.
Luke's clerkship program. The RTC did not take into consideration the NBI Report as it was allegedly not presented. 12 chanrobleslaw

The RTC further held that the Clinic is owned by the Municipality of Cabiao, and that the latter and/or its responsible officials should have been impleaded
as indispensable parties.13chanrobleslaw

The RTC summarized its findings in this manner:14

Albeit the Court is saddened by what happened with the untimely death of Perez and Quintos who are both very bright with promising future in the field
of medicine, it cannot however close its eyes on the evidence submitted before it by placing the blame on the cause of their death[s] to the defendants
just to put the fault on anybody in order to appease their grieving love[d] ones. For in the mind of the Court, the omission of the defendants to secure a
copy of the fire safety license of the Clinic or verify if it has one prior to its construction before allowing their senior medical students to occupy and reside
therein is not per se a negligent act. Neither is the failure of the defendants to orient their senior medical students, who obviously are of legal ages
already such as the deceased, on how to take the necessary measures for their safety and security before retiring to sleep in the night considered
negligent. Likewise, the failure of the dialogue between the parties is not a legitimate ground to declare the defendants negligent. Put differently, the
Court is not persuaded that there is basis or justification to adjudge the defendants negligent for the accidental death of Perez and Quintos.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and remanded the case to the RTC for reception of evidence on the amount of damages to be
awarded.15 Addressing the .preliminary issues, the CA held that the Municipality of Cabiao was not an indispensable party as the Complaint was one for
damages based on the allegations in the enrollment contract. It explained that: 16
While there was indeed an allegation of St. Luke's ownership of the clinic, bulk of the arguments in the complaint were based on St. Luke's duty to ensure
its students' safety based on its obligation as a school. Not being contractually obligated to keep plaintiffs-appellants' children safe from any risk as a
result of school-sanctioned activities, the Municipality of Cabiao cannot be considered an indispensable party to the action as it was not a participant in
the contract of enrollment.
Moreover, the CA held that although schools cannot be insurers of its students against all risks, in the case at bar, the safety of the victims was within the
reach of petitioners and the hazard of a fire was not unforeseeable. 17 Also, while the fire was beyond the control of petitioners, their decision to house
their students in a place where there are no means of escape in case of such an emergency shows a blatant disregard for the students' welfare. 18 chanrobleslaw

The CA elucidated as follows:19

The testimonies of Dr. Ortigas, Dr. Carandang and Dr. Macabulos all show a lack of effort on their part to thoroughly inspect the conditions of the building
in relation to the safety of their enrolled medical student-clerks.

According to Dr. Ortigas and Dr. Macabulos,20 they considered the doors leading out from the pantry and the bedrooms as fire exits. However, as doctors
who presumably have a wider degree of foresight than most, they failed to consider that a fire might break out in areas which would block these doors
that are merely ordinary exits. Further, Dr. Ortigas himself testified that permits are not part of their consideration for safety and that they do not
specifically look for the same [xxx.]

xxxx

Dr. Ortigas admitted that, as a doctor, he was not concerned with the permits issued regarding the construction and safety of the building. However, at
the time he conducted the inspections of the clinic, he was also the Associate Dean of St. Luke's College of Medicine with the duty to ensure that the
building was safe for the security of the enrolled students of St. Luke's College of Medicine who would be assigned to the clinic during their clerkship and
he admittedly did not consider the same.

As Associate Dean for Student Affairs, it would be reasonable to expect Dr. Ortigas to show concern for the safety and security of the students
enrolled in the institution thus, ensure that the premises they were to reside in would be properly equipped in case of fires and other calamities. He
himself stated that his position as such put him "in charge of student and student affairs, xxx and in general, the non-academic matters involving
students and the faculty." Consequently, it is safe to conclude that his task included the safety and welfare of the students enrolled at St. Luke's College
of Medicine, one which he miserably failed to discharge.

Defendants-appellees also made a big deal out of the procedure of asking feedback from students which led to the assumption that the clinic was safe
and habitable. However, it must be remembered that the students that gave the feedback were more concerned with passing their course and
presumably trusted that the school would not send them to a location which it has independently determined to be unsafe.

xxxx

In relation, defendants-appellees defend their judgment to send plaintiffs-appellants' daughters to the community clinic by contending that there has
been no untoward incident since the program began in 2004. xxx.

xxxx

The same argument also runs contrary to defendants-appellees' acceptance of the construction of iron grills on the second floor windows of the clinic.
According to Dr. Ortigas, the same were constructed in order to prevent people from using the same to enter the building and not designed to prevent
egress therefrom. Dr. Ortigas was specificallly questioned if there were prior incidents of intrusion into the clinic to which he replied in the negative. If
defendants-appellees' logic of "no untoward incident has happened" is to be applied then, the presence of the grills was unnecessary in the same way
that they found the inspection of fire safety permits to be unnecessary. It baffles the Court, therefore, that defendants-appellees would accept the
precaution against an admittedly unlikely intrusion but ignore any safety measures against a fire which was a great possibility given that the clinic had
flammable equipment such as a gas burner for cooking. (Citations omitted)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed reversible error when it: (a) held that the Municipality of Cabiao was
not an indispensable party,21 (b) disregarded the findings of the BFP that the fire was purely accidental and caused by unattended cooking, 22 and (c) ruled
that petitioners were negligent.23chanrobleslaw

We deny the petition.

A perusal of the Complaint readily shows that respondents base their cause of action on petitioners' breach of the contractual obligation, as an
educational institution, of ensuring that their students, in the performance of a required school activity, would be safe and secure. The Municipality of
Cabiao, not being a party to said enrollment contract, is not an indispensable party to the case.

An indispensable party is defined by the Rules of Court as a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. 24 In the
present case, respondents premise petitioners' liability on their contractual obligation to their students and, certainly, complete relief and a final judgment
can be arrived at by weighing the claims and defenses of petitioners and respondents, without need of evaluating the claims and defenses of the
Municipality of Cabiao. If at all, the Municipality of Cabiao is a necessary party 25 whose non-inclusion in the case at bar shall not prevent the court from
cralawre d

proceeding with the action.

Indeed, the present case is one between a school and its students, with their relationship being based on the enrollment contracts. In the illuminating
case of PSBA, et al. v. CA, et al.,26 the Court had the opportunity to lay down the principle that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in
attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the
realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.
Indubitably, institutions of learning have the "built-in" obligation of providing a conducive atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where there are no
constant threats to life and limb, and one where peace and order are maintained.

In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered as part of the campus premises of St. Luke's. In the course description of the
clerkship program in preventive and community medicine, it is stated that the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the base operation of the clerkship
program.27 As such, petitioner had the same obligation to their students, even though they were stationed in the Cabiao Community Clinic, and it was
incumbent upon petitioners to ensure that said Clinic was conducive for learning, that it had no constant threats to life and limb, and that peace and
order was maintained thereat. After all, although away from the main campus of St. Luke's, the students were still under the same protective and
supervisory custody of petitioners as the ones detailed in the main campus.

In the performance of its contractual and inherent obligations, the Court is mindful of the attendant difficulties on the part of institutions of learning, and
the Court recognizes that the latter cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. Thus, as also laid out in the PSBA case, "the school may still
avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the
'omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and
place."28
chanrobleslaw

Our next query, then, is, in relation to the fire incident, did petitioners commit a breach of contract through negligence?

A review of the records compels the Court to answer in the affirmative.

In Mendoza, et al. v. Sps. Gomez,29 we defined negligence as "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."

In Gaid v. People,30 we enumerated the elements of simple negligence as follows: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender, and (2)
that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. We explained that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is
this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against
its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of
this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. 31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case at bar, it is well to remember that the victims were in the Cabiao Community Clinic because it was a requirement of petitioners. The students
were complying with an obligation under the enrollment contract — they were rendering medical services in a community center as required by
petitioners. It was thus incumbent upon petitioners to comply with their own obligations under the enrollment contract - to ensure that the community
center where they would designate their students is safe and secure, among others.

Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions to guard their students against foreseeable harm. As correctly found by the CA, petitioners were
remiss in inspecting the premises of the Cabiao Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in order. These precautions could have
minimized the risk to the safety of the victims. Indeed, the CA had basis in making the following pronouncement: 32
In the instant case, as previously emphasized, defendants-appellees were aware that its medical students were residing at the second floor of the clinic.
At the very least, during inspection, they should have thoroughly inspected the building's physical appearance and the documents pertinent to the
premises to make sure that the same minimized the risk to the safety of the students. There is no record that any inquiry on the condition of the
premises was even made by defendants-appellees prior to the implementation of the program. In addition to such failure, defendants-appellees would
have this Court believe that their participation in the clinic was limited to providing the same with medical personnel without considering that such
personnel also included its students which St. Luke's was obliged to protect from unnecessary danger.
The petitioners were obviously negligent in detailing their students to a virtual fire trap. As found by the NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was constructed
in violation of numerous provisions of the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines. It had no emergency facilities, no fire exits, and had no permits or
clearances from the appropriate government offices.

Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was built under the direction, supervision, management and control of the Municipality of Cabiao, 33 and that it
ensured that there was an agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to provide 24-hour security to the Clinic. 34 chanrobleslaw

Petitioners, however, cannot escape liability based on these arguments. As held in Saludaga v. FEU, et al.,35 a learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate matters of safety and security to a third party as to do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation of
ensuring a safe learning environment for its students.

In Saludaga, the Court chastised therein respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) for its total reliance on a security agency as to the qualifications of its
security guards, viz:36
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the
qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and
other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers
stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or
abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe
learning environment for its students.
Similarly, we cannot turn; a blind eye on petitioners' total reliance on the Municipality of Cabiao in ensuring the safety and security of their students. The
enrollment contract is between petitioners and the victims, and petitioners cannot abdicate' on their contractual obligation to provide their students a safe
learning environment, nor can it pass or contract away such obligation to a third party.

Moreover, as to the stipulation of 24-hour security in the Clinic, petitioners failed to present evidence that this stipulation was actually enforced or that
they took measures to ensure that it was enforced. This, once more, shows petitioners' propensity of relying on third parties in carrying out its obligations
to its students.

It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure, of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.37 In Gilat Satellite Networks, Ltd. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.,38 the Court expounded: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

xxx. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the
contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering
that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include his "expectation interest,"
which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, or
his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action.
The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make RECOMPENSE to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe
his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous
event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability. xxx. (Emphasis omitted)
In the case at bar, it was amply shown that petitioners and the victims were bound by the enrollment contracts, and that petitioners were negligent in
complying with their obligation under the said contracts to ensure the safety and security of their students. For this contractual breach, petitioners should
be held liable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorariand AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' Decision and
Resolution.
G.R. No. 186732 June 13, 2013

ALPS TRANSPORTATION and/or ALFREDO E. PEREZ, Petitioners,

vs.
ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before this Court is a Rule 45 Petition for Review1 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
100163.

THE FACTS

Respondent Elpidio Rodriguez (Rodriguez) was previously employed as a bus conductor. 4 He entered into an employment contract with
Contract Tours Manpower5 (Contact Tours) and was assigned to work with petitioner bus company, ALPS Transportation. 6

During the course of his employment, Rodriguez was found to have committed irregularities on 26 April 2003, 7 12 October 2003,8 and 26
January 2005.9 The latest irregularity report dated 26 January 2005 stated that he had collected bus fares without issuing corresponding
tickets to passengers. The report was annotated with the word "Terminate." 10

Rodriguez alleged that he was dismissed from his employment on 27 January 2005, or the day after the issuance of the last irregularity
report. However, he did not receive any written notice of termination. 11 He went back to the bus company a number of times, but it refused to
readmit him.12

On 11 August 2005, Rodriguez filed before the labor arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of 13th month pay, and damages
against ALPS Transportation and Alfredo Perez, the proprietor of petitioner bus company. 13

In response to the complaint, petitioners stated that they did not have any prerogative to dismiss Rodriguez, as he was not their employee,
but that of Contact Tours.14 In fact, based on their agreement with Contact Tours, it was supposedly the latter that had the obligation to inform
respondent of the contents of the reports and to decide on the appropriate sanctions. 15 Petitioners further explained that due to the issuance
of the three irregularity reports against Rodriguez, they wrote to Contact Tours and recommended the termination of respondent’s
assignment to them.16

During the pendency of the illegal dismissal case before the labor arbiter, ALPS Transportation charged Rodriguez with theft before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tanauan, Batangas. 17 However, petitioners eventually filed an Affidavit of Desistance and withdrew the criminal
charges against respondent.18

On 12 January 2006, the labor arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint for lack of merit. 19 He explained that no evidence had been
adduced to support the contention of Rodriguez that the latter had been terminated on 27 January 2005. 20 Moreover, during the mandatory
conference, the representative of Contact Tours manifested that the company had not dismissed Rodriguez, and that it was in fact willing to
reinstate him to his former position.21Thus, the labor arbiter concluded that Rodriguez had not been illegally dismissed, and was actually an
employee of Contact Tours, and not of ALPS Transportation. 22

Rodriguez appealed the dismissal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On 28 February 2007, the NLRC set aside the
decision of the labor arbiter and entered a new one, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated January 12, 2006 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is being entered, directing the
respondents to reinstate the complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges but without backwages.

SO ORDERED.23

In so concluding, the NLRC ruled that Contact Tours was a labor-only contractor. 24 Thus, Rodriguez should be considered as a regular
employee of ALPS Transportation.25

As regards the claim of illegal dismissal, the NLRC found that Rodriguez failed to prove that his services were illegally terminated by
petitioners, and that he was prevented from returning to work. 26 However, the bus company likewise failed to prove that he had abandoned
his work.27 Thus, citing previous rulings of this Court, the NLRC held that in case the parties fail to prove either abandonment or termination,
the employer should order the employee to report back for work, accept the latter, and reinstate the employee to the latter’s former position.
However, an award for backwages is not warranted, as the parties must bear the burden of their own loss. 28
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the NLRC, Rodriguez filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the CA.

After a review of the records, the CA concluded that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decision. The
appellate court ruled that, in termination cases, it is the employer who bears the burden of proving that the employee was not illegally
dismissed.29 Here, the CA found that ALPS Transportation failed to present convincing evidence that Rodriguez had indeed collected bus
fares without issuing corresponding tickets to passengers. The appellate court held that the irregularity reports were mere allegations, the
truth of which had not been established by evidence. 30

Moreover, the CA gave no credence to ALPS Transportation’s argument that Rodriguez had not yet been terminated when he filed the illegal
dismissal complaint, as he had not yet received any notice of termination. 31 The appellate court explained that, before the illegal dismissal
complaint was filed, more than six months had lapsed since respondent was last given a bus assignment by ALPS Transportation. 32 Thus, the
CA concluded that the argument of the bus company was only an excuse to cover up the latter’s mistake in terminating him without due
process of law.33

The CA then ordered ALPS Transportation to reinstate Rodriguez and to pay him full backwages, viz:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Alfredo Perez is declared guilty of having committed illegal dismissal. Accordingly, only the portions
of the assailed dispositions ordering the reinstatement of Elpidio Rodriguez to his former position without loss of seniority rights is AFFIRMED
and the phrase, "but without backwages" is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, Alfredo Perez is ORDERED to pay Elpidio
Rodriguez backwages computed from the time he was illegally dismissed until his actual reinstatement. No costs.

SO ORDERED.34

Aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision, petitioners filed the instant Rule 45 Petition before this Court.

THE ISSUES

As culled from the records and the submissions of the parties, the issues in this case are as follows:

1. Whether respondent Rodriguez was validly dismissed; and

2. Assuming that respondent was illegally dismissed, whether ALPS Transportation and/or Alfredo E. Perez is liable for the dismissal.

THE COURT’S RULING

We uphold the assailed Decision and Resolution and rule that respondent Rodriguez has been illegally dismissed.

For a dismissal to be valid, the rule is that the employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due process
requirements.35 Substantive due process requires that the dismissal must be pursuant to either a just or an authorized cause under Articles
282, 283 or 284 of the Labor Code.36 Procedural due process, on the other hand, mandates that the employer must observe the twin
requirements of notice and hearing before a dismissal can be effected. 37

Thus, to determine the validity of Rodriguez’s dismissal, we first discuss whether his employment was terminated for a just cause.

Petitioners argue that the dismissal of Rodriguez was brought about by his act of collecting fare from a passenger without issuing the
corresponding ticket.38 This was not the first irregularity report issued against respondent, as similar reports had been issued against him on
26 April 200339 and 12 October 2003.40 Thus, the company had lost trust and confidence in him, as he had committed serious misconduct by
stealing company revenue.41 Petitioners therefore submit that the dismissal was valid under Article 282 of the Labor Code. 42

For his part, Rodriguez denies the contents of the irregularity report. 43 He states that the report consists of a mere charge, but is bereft of the
necessary proof.44 Moreover, he submits that while the bus company filed a criminal complaint against him for the same act, the complaint
was dismissed pursuant to an Affidavit of Desistance, in which the bus company stated that "the incident arose out of a misunderstanding
between them."45 Finally, he contends that the company’s invocation of the 2003 irregularity reports to support his dismissal effected in 2005
was a mere afterthought.46 In any event, he maintains that even those alleged infractions were not duly supported by evidence. 47

We find for respondent and rule that the employer failed to prove that the dismissal was due to a just cause.

The Labor Code provides that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized cause lies with the
employer.48 If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. 49

Here, we agree with Rodriguez’s position that the 26 January 2005 irregularity report, which served as the basis of his dismissal, may only be
considered as an uncorroborated allegation if unsupported by substantial evidence. On this matter, we quote with favor the ruling of the
1âwphi1

appellate court:
The nature of work of a bus conductor involves inherent or normal occupational risks of incurring money shortages and uncollected fares. A
conductor’s job is to collect exact fares from the passengers and remit his collections to the company. Evidence must, therefore, be
substantial and not based on mere surmises or conjectures for to allow an employer to terminate the employment of a worker based on mere
allegations places the latter in an uncertain situation and at the sole mercy of the employer. An accusation that is not substantiated will not
ripen into a holding that there is just cause for dismissal. A mere accusation of wrongdoing or a mere pronouncement of lack of confidence is
not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an employee. Thus, the failure of the petitioners to convincingly show that the respondent
misappropriated the bus fares renders the dismissal to be without a valid cause. To add, jurisprudence dictates that if doubt exists between
the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. 50 (Citations omitted)

Thus, we rule that petitioners have failed to prove that the termination of Rodriguez’s employment was due to a just cause.

Turning to the issue of procedural due process, both parties are in agreement that Rodriguez was not given a written notice specifying the
grounds for his termination and giving him a reasonable opportunity to explain his side; a hearing which would have given him the
opportunity to respond to the charge and present evidence in his favor; and a written notice of termination indicating that after considering all
the circumstances, management has concluded that his dismissal is warranted. Clearly, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that
procedural due process is wanting in the case at bar.

Having found that Rodriguez was illegally dismissed, we now rule on petitioners’ liabilities and respondent’s entitlements under the law.

An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of full backwages. In Santos v. National Labor
Relations Commission,51 we explained:

The normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and, secondly, the payment of backwages corresponding to the period
from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The statutory intent on this matter is clearly discernible. Reinstatement restores the
employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he was removed, that is, to his status quo ante dismissal, while the grant of
backwages allows the same employee to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal.
These twin remedies — reinstatement and payment of backwages — make the dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to
continued employment. Thus, do these two remedies give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of labor to security of tenure.
(Citations omitted)

Thus, the CA committed no reversible error in upholding the NLRC’s order to reinstate Rodriguez and in directing the payment of his full
backwages, from the time he was illegally dismissed until his actual reinstatement.

As to who should bear the burden of satisfying respondent’s lawful claims, petitioners submit that since Rodriguez was an employee of
Contact Tours, the latter is liable for the settlement of his claims.

We do not agree.

"The presumption is that a contractor is a labor-only contractor unless he overcomes the burden of proving that it has substantial capital,
investment, tools, and the like."52 While ALPS Transportation is not the contractor itself, since it is invoking Contact Tours status as a
legitimate job contractor in order to avoid liability, it bears the burden of proving that Contact Tours is an independent contractor. 53

It is thus incumbent upon ALPS Transportation to present sufficient proof that Contact Tours has substantial capital, investment and tools in
order to successfully impute liability to the latter. However, aside from making bare assertions and offering the Kasunduan between
Rodriguez and Contact Tours in evidence,54 ALPS Transportation has failed to present any proof to substantiate the former's status as a
legitimate job contractor. Hence, the legal presumption that Contact Tours is a labor-only contractor has not been overcome.

As a labor-only contractor, therefore, Contact Tours is deemed to be an agent of ALPS Transportation. 55 Thus, the latter is responsible to
Contact Tours' employees in the same manner and to the same extent as if they were directly employed by the bus company. 56

Finally, the CA correctly ruled that since ALPS Transportation is a sole proprietorship owned by petitioner Alfredo Perez, it is he who must be
held liable for the payment of backwages to Rodriguez. 57 A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of the owner of the enterprise. 58 Thus, the owner has unlimited personal liability for all the debts and obligations of the business,
and it is against him that a decision for illegal dismissal is to be enforced. 59

WHEREFORE, the instant Rule 45 Petition for Review is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 100163 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 175773 June 17, 2013

MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION (MMPSEU), Petitioner,

vs.
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of the parties in this case provides that the company shoulder the hospitalization expenses of
the dependents of covered employees subject to certain limitations and restrictions. Accordingly, covered employees pay part of the
hospitalization insurance premium through monthly salary deduction while the company, upon hospitalization of the covered employees'
dependents, shall pay the hospitalization expenses incurred for the same. The conflict arose when a portion of the hospitalization expenses
of the covered employees' dependents were paid/shouldered by the dependent's own health insurance. While the company refused to pay
the portion of the hospital expenses already shouldered by the dependents' own health insurance, the union insists that the covered
employees are entitled to the whole and undiminished amount of said hospital expenses.

By this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 petitioner Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Salaried Employees Union (MMPSEU) assails the March
31, 2006 Decision2 and December 5, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75630, which reversed and set aside
the Voluntary Arbitrator’s December 3, 2002 Decision 4 and declared respondent Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) to be
under no legal obligation to pay its covered employees’ dependents’ hospitalization expenses which were already shouldered by other health
insurance companies.

Factual Antecedents

The parties’ CBA5 covering the period August 1, 1996 to July 31, 1999 provides for the hospitalization insurance benefits for the covered
dependents, thus:

SECTION 4. DEPENDENTS’ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE – The COMPANY shall obtain group hospitalization insurance
coverage or assume under a self-insurance basis hospitalization for the dependents of regular employees up to a maximum amount of forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000.00) per confinement subject to the following:

a. The room and board must not exceed three hundred pesos (₱300.00) per day up to a maximum of thirty-one (31) days.
Similarly, Doctor’s Call fees must not exceed three hundred pesos (₱300.00) per day for a maximum of thirty-one (31) days. Any
excess of this amount shall be borne by the employee.

b. Confinement must be in a hospital designated by the COMPANY. For this purpose, the COMPANY shall designate hospitals in
different convenient places to be availed of by the dependents of employees. In cases of emergency where the dependent is
confined without the recommendation of the company doctor or in a hospital not designated by the COMPANY, the COMPANY
shall look into the circumstances of such confinement and arrange for the payment of the amount to the extent of the
hospitalization benefit.

c. The limitations and restrictions listed in Annex "B" must be observed.

d. Payment shall be direct to the hospital and doctor and must be covered by actual billings.

Each employee shall pay one hundred pesos (₱100.00) per month through salary deduction as his share in the payment of the insurance
premium for the above coverage with the balance of the premium to be paid by the COMPANY. If the COMPANY is self-insured the one
hundred pesos (₱100.00) per employee monthly contribution shall be given to the COMPANY which shall shoulder the expenses subject to
the above level of benefits and subject to the same limitations and restrictions provided for in Annex "B" hereof.

The hospitalization expenses must be covered by actual hospital and doctor’s bills and any amount in excess of the above mentioned level
of benefits will be for the account of the employee.

For purposes of this provision, eligible dependents are the covered employees’ natural parents, legal spouse and legitimate or legally
adopted or step children who are unmarried, unemployed who have not attained twenty-one (21) years of age and wholly dependent upon
the employee for support.

This provision applies only in cases of actual confinement in the hospital for at least six (6) hours.

Maternity cases are not covered by this section but will be under the next succeeding section on maternity benefits. 6
When the CBA expired on July 31, 1999, the parties executed another CBA 7 effective August 1, 1999 to July 31, 2002 incorporating the same
provisions on dependents’ hospitalization insurance benefits but in the increased amount of ₱50,000.00. The room and board expenses, as
well as the doctor’s call fees, were also increased to ₱375.00.

On separate occasions, three members of MMPSEU, namely, Ernesto Calida (Calida), Hermie Juan Oabel (Oabel) and Jocelyn Martin
(Martin), filed claims for reimbursement of hospitalization expenses of their dependents.

MMPC paid only a portion of their hospitalization insurance claims, not the full amount. In the case of Calida, his wife, Lanie, was confined at
Sto. Tomas University Hospital from September 4 to 9, 1998 due to Thyroidectomy. The medical expenses incurred totalled ₱29,967.10. Of
this amount, ₱9,000.00 representing professional fees was paid by MEDICard Philippines, Inc. (MEDICard) which provides health
maintenance to Lanie.8 MMPC only paid ₱12,148.63.9 It did not pay the ₱9,000.00 already paid by MEDICard and the ₱6,278.47 not covered
by official receipts. It refused to give to Calida the difference between the amount of medical expenses of ₱27,427.10 10 which he claimed to
be entitled to under the CBA and the ₱12,148.63 which MMPC directly paid to the hospital.

In the case of Martin, his father, Jose, was admitted at The Medical City from March 26 to 27, 2000 due to Acid Peptic Disease and incurred
medical expenses amounting to ₱9,101.30.14 MEDICard paid ₱8,496.00.15Consequently, MMPC only paid ₱288.40,16 after deducting from the
total medical expenses the amount paid by MEDICard and the ₱316.90 discount given by the hospital.

Claiming that under the CBA, they are entitled to hospital benefits amounting to ₱27,427.10, ₱6,769.35 and ₱8,123.80, respectively, which
should not be reduced by the amounts paid by MEDICard and by Prosper, Calida, Oabel and Martin asked for reimbursement from MMPC.
However, MMPC denied the claims contending that double insurance would result if the said employees would receive from the company the
full amount of hospitalization expenses despite having already received payment of portions thereof from other health insurance providers.

This prompted the MMPSEU President to write the MMPC President 17 demanding full payment of the hospitalization benefits. Alleging
discrimination against MMPSEU union members, she pointed out that full reimbursement was given in a similar claim filed by Luisito Cruz
(Cruz), a member of the Hourly Union. In a letter-reply, 18 MMPC, through its Vice-President for Industrial Relations Division, clarified that the
claims of the said MMPSEU members have already been paid on the basis of official receipts submitted. It also denied the charge of
discrimination and explained that the case of Cruz involved an entirely different matter since it concerned the admissibility of certified true
copies of documents for reimbursement purposes, which case had been settled through voluntary arbitration.

On August 28, 2000, MMPSEU referred the dispute to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and requested for preventive
mediation.19

Proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator

On October 3, 2000, the case was referred to Voluntary Arbitrator Rolando Capocyan for resolution of the issue involving the interpretation of
the subject CBA provision.20

MMPSEU alleged that there is nothing in the CBA which prohibits an employee from obtaining other insurance or declares that medical
expenses can be reimbursed only upon presentation of original official receipts. It stressed that the hospitalization benefits should be
computed based on the formula indicated in the CBA without deducting the benefits derived from other insurance providers. Besides, if
reduction is permitted, MMPC would be unjustly benefited from the monthly premium contributed by the employees through salary deduction.
MMPSEU added that its members had legitimate claims under the CBA and that any doubt as to any of its provisions should be resolved in
favor of its members. Moreover, any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of labor. 21

On the other hand, MMPC argued that the reimbursement of the entire amounts being claimed by the covered employees, including those
already paid by other insurance companies, would constitute double indemnity or double insurance, which is circumscribed under the
Insurance Code. Moreover, a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity and the employees cannot be allowed to profit from their
dependents’ loss.22

Meanwhile, the parties separately sought for a legal opinion from the Insurance Commission relative to the issue at hand. In its letter 23 to the
Insurance Commission, MMPC requested for confirmation of its position that the covered employees cannot claim insurance benefits for a
loss that had already been covered or paid by another insurance company. However, the Office of the Insurance Commission opted not to
render an opinion on the matter as the same may become the subject of a formal complaint before it. 24 On the other hand, when queried by
MMPSEU,25the Insurance Commission, through Atty. Richard David C. Funk II (Atty. Funk) of the Claims Adjudication Division, rendered an
opinion contained in a letter,26 viz:

Ms. Cecilia L. ParasPresident

Mitsubishi Motors Phils.

[Salaried] Employees Union

Ortigas Avenue Extension,
Cainta, Rizal

Madam:
We acknowledge receipt of your letter which, to our impression, basically poses the question of whether or not recovery of medical expenses
from a Health Maintenance Organization bars recovery of the same reimbursable amount of medical expenses under a contract of health or
medical insurance.

We wish to opine that in cases of claims for reimbursement of medical expenses where there are two contracts providing benefits to that
effect, recovery may be had on both simultaneously. In the absence of an Other Insurance provision in these coverages, the courts have
uniformly held that an insured is entitled to receive the insurance benefits without regard to the amount of total benefits provided by other
insurance. (INSURANCE LAW, A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices; Robert E. Keeton, Alau I.
Widiss, p. 261). The result is consistent with the public policy underlying the collateral source rule – that is, x x x the courts have usually
concluded that the liability of a health or accident insurer is not reduced by other possible sources of indemnification or compensation. (ibid).

Very truly yours,

RICHARD DAVID C. FUNK II

Officer-in-Charge
Claims Adjudication Division

(SGD.)
Attorney IV

On December 3, 2002, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision 27 finding MMPC liable to pay or reimburse the amount of hospitalization
expenses already paid by other health insurance companies. The Voluntary Arbitrator held that the employees may demand simultaneous
payment from both the CBA and their dependents’ separate health insurance without resulting to double insurance, since separate premiums
were paid for each contract. He also noted that the CBA does not prohibit reimbursement in case there are other health insurers.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

MMPC filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 28 before
the CA. It claimed that the Voluntary Arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding that recovery under both insurance policies
constitutes double insurance as both had the same subject matter, interest insured and risk or peril insured against; in relying solely on the
unauthorized legal opinion of Atty. Funk; and in not finding that the employees will be benefited twice for the same loss. In its
Comment,29 MMPSEU countered that MMPC will unjustly enrich itself and profit from the monthly premiums paid if full reimbursement is not
made.

On March 31, 2006, the CA found merit in MMPC’s Petition. It ruled that despite the lack of a provision which bars recovery in case of
payment by other insurers, the wordings of the subject provision of the CBA showed that the parties intended to make MMPC liable only for
expenses actually incurred by an employee’s qualified dependent. In particular, the provision stipulates that payment should be made directly
to the hospital and that the claim should be supported by actual hospital and doctor’s bills. These mean that the employees shall only be paid
amounts not covered by other health insurance and is more in keeping with the principle of indemnity in insurance contracts. Besides, a
contrary interpretation would "allow unscrupulous employees to unduly profit from the x x x benefits" and shall "open the floodgates to
questionable claims x x x."30

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision 31 reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the voluntary arbitrator dated December 3, 2002 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and judgment is rendered declaring that under Art. XI, Sec. 4 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and
respondent effective August 1, 1999 to July 31, 2002, the former’s obligation to reimburse the Union members for the hospitalization
expenses incurred by their dependents is exclusive of those paid by the Union members to the hospital.

SO ORDERED.32

In its Motion for Reconsideration,33 MMPSEU pointed out that the alleged oppression that may be committed by abusive employees is a mere
possibility whereas the resulting losses to the employees are real. MMPSEU cited Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co., 34 wherein the Arizona
Supreme Court explicitly ruled that an insured may recover from separate health insurance providers, regardless of whether one of them has
already paid the medical expenses incurred. On the other hand, MMPC argued in its Comment 35 that the cited foreign case involves a
different set of facts.

The CA, in its Resolution36 dated December 5, 2006, denied MMPSEU’s motion.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues

MMPSEU presented the following grounds in support of its Petition:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION DATED 03 [DECEMBER] 2002 OF THE
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BELOW WHEN THE SAME WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE OPINION
OF THE INSURANCE COMMISSION THAT RECOVERY FROM BOTH THE CBA AND SEPARATE HEALTH CARDS IS NOT PROHIBITED
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC PROVISION IN THE CBA.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERTURNING THE DECISION OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
WITHOUT EVEN GIVING ANY LEGAL OR JUSTIFIABLE BASIS FOR SUCH REVERSAL.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER OR EVEN MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT THE
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES CITED IN THE RECORDS THAT DO NOT PROHIBIT, BUT IN FACT ALLOW, RECOVERY FROM TWO
SEPARATE HEALTH PLANS.

D.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MORE IMPORTANCE TO A POSSIBLE, HENCE MERELY SPECULATIVE,
ABUSE BY EMPLOYEES OF THE BENEFITS IF DOUBLE RECOVERY WERE ALLOWED INSTEAD OF THE REAL INJURY TO THE
EMPLOYEES WHO ARE PAYING FOR THE CBA HOSPITALIZATION BENEFITS THROUGH MONTHLY SALARY DEDUCTIONS BUT
WHO MAY NOT BE ABLE TO AVAIL OF THE SAME IF THEY OR THEIR DEPENDENTS HAVE OTHER HEALTH INSURANCE. 37

MMPSEU avers that the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator deserves utmost respect and finality because it is supported by substantial
evidence and is in accordance with the opinion rendered by the Insurance Commission, an agency equipped with vast knowledge
concerning insurance contracts. It maintains that under the CBA, member-employees are entitled to full reimbursement of medical expenses
incurred by their dependents regardless of any amounts paid by the latter’s health insurance provider. Otherwise, non-recovery will constitute
unjust enrichment on the part of MMPC. It avers that recovery from both the CBA and other insurance companies is allowed under their CBA
and not prohibited by law nor by jurisprudence.

Our Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Atty. Funk erred in applying the

collateral source rule.

The Voluntary Arbitrator based his ruling on the opinion of Atty. Funk that the employees may recover benefits from different insurance
providers without regard to the amount of benefits paid by each. According to him, this view is consistent with the theory of the collateral
source rule.

As part of American personal injury law, the collateral source rule was originally applied to tort cases wherein the defendant is prevented from
benefiting from the plaintiff’s receipt of money from other sources. 38 Under this rule, if an injured person receives compensation for his injuries
from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the damages which he would otherwise collect
from the tortfeasor.39 In a recent Decision40 by the Illinois Supreme Court, the rule has been described as "an established exception to the
general rule that damages in negligence actions must be compensatory." The Court went on to explain that although the rule appears to
allow a double recovery, the collateral source will have a lien or subrogation right to prevent such a double recovery. 41 In Mitchell v.
Haldar,42 the collateral source rule was rationalized by the Supreme Court of Delaware:

The collateral source rule is ‘predicated on the theory that a tortfeasor has no interest in, and therefore no right to benefit from monies
received by the injured person from sources unconnected with the defendant’. According to the collateral source rule, ‘a tortfeasor has no
right to any mitigation of damages because of payments or compensation received by the injured person from an independent source.’ The
rationale for the collateral source rule is based upon the quasi-punitive nature of tort law liability. It has been explained as follows:

The collateral source rule is designed to strike a balance between two competing principles of tort law: (1) a plaintiff is entitled to
compensation sufficient to make him whole, but no more; and (2) a defendant is liable for all damages that proximately result from his wrong.
A plaintiff who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys a windfall; a defendant who escapes, in whole or in part, liability for his
wrong enjoys a windfall. Because the law must sanction one windfall and deny the other, it favors the victim of the wrong rather than the
wrongdoer.

Thus, the tortfeasor is required to bear the cost for the full value of his or her negligent conduct even if it results in a windfall for the innocent
plaintiff. (Citations omitted)
As seen, the collateral source rule applies in order to place the responsibility for losses on the party causing them. 43Its application is justified
so that "'the wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take advantage of contracts or other relations
that may exist between the injured party and third persons." 44Thus, it finds no application to cases involving no-fault insurances under which
the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies, regardless of who was at fault in the incident generating the losses. 45 Here, it is
clear that MMPC is a no-fault insurer. Hence, it cannot be obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of its employees
which had already been paid by separate health insurance providers of said dependents.

The Voluntary Arbitrator therefore erred in adopting Atty. Funk’s view that the covered employees are entitled to full payment of the hospital
expenses incurred by their dependents, including the amounts already paid by other health insurance companies based on the theory of
collateral source rule.

The conditions set forth in the CBA provision indicate an intention to limit MMPC’s liability only to actual expenses incurred by the employees’
dependents, that is, excluding the amounts paid by dependents’ other health insurance providers.

The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the CBA has no express provision barring claims for hospitalization expenses already paid by other
insurers. Hence, the covered employees can recover from both. The CA did not agree, saying that the conditions set forth in the CBA implied
an intention of the parties to limit MMPC’s liability only to the extent of the expenses actually incurred by their dependents which excludes the
amounts shouldered by other health insurance companies.

We agree with the CA. The condition that payment should be direct to the hospital and doctor implies that MMPC is only liable to pay medical
expenses actually shouldered by the employees’ dependents. It follows that MMPC’s liability is limited, that is, it does not include the
amounts paid by other health insurance providers. This condition is obviously intended to thwart not only fraudulent claims but also double
claims for the same loss of the dependents of covered employees.

It is well to note at this point that the CBA constitutes a contract between the parties and as such, it should be strictly construed for the
purpose of limiting the amount of the employer’s liability. 46 The terms of the subject provision are clear and provide no room for any other
interpretation. As there is no ambiguity, the terms must be taken in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. 47 Consequently, MMPSEU cannot
rely on the rule that a contract of insurance is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured. Neither can it rely on the theory that any doubt
must be resolved in favor of labor.

Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co. is not

on all fours with the case at bar.

MMPSEU cannot rely on Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co. where the Supreme Court of Arizona allowed the insured to enjoy medical benefits
under an automobile policy insurance despite being able to also recover from a separate health insurer. In that case, the Allstate automobile
policy does not contain any clause restricting medical payment coverage to expenses actually paid by the insured nor does it specifically
provide for reduction of medical payments benefits by a coordination of benefits. 48 However, in the case before us, the dependents’ group
hospitalization insurance provision in the CBA specifically contains a condition which limits MMPC’s liability only up to the extent of the
expenses that should be paid by the covered employee’s dependent to the hospital and doctor. This is evident from the portion which states
that "payment by MMPC shall be direct to the hospital and doctor." 49 In contrast, the Allstate automobile policy expressly gives Allstate the
authority to pay directly to the insured person or on the latter’s behalf all reasonable expenses actually incurred. Therefore, reliance on
Samsel is unavailing because the facts therein are different and not decisive of the issues in the present case.

To allow reimbursement of amounts paid

under other insurance policies shall
constitute double recovery which is not
sanctioned by law.

MMPSEU insists that MMPC is also liable for the amounts covered under other insurance policies; otherwise, MMPC will unjustly profit from
the premiums the employees contribute through monthly salary deductions.

This contention is unmeritorious.

To constitute unjust enrichment, it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or
unlawfully.50 A claim for unjust enrichment fails when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit. 51

The CBA has provided for MMPC’s limited liability which extends only up to the amount to be paid to the hospital and doctor by the
employees’ dependents, excluding those paid by other insurers. Consequently, the covered employees will not receive more than what is
due them; neither is MMPC under any obligation to give more than what is due under the CBA.

Moreover, since the subject CBA provision is an insurance contract, the rights and obligations of the parties must be determined in
accordance with the general principles of insurance law. 52 Being in the nature of a non-life insurance contract and essentially a contract of
indemnity, the CBA provision obligates MMPC to indemnify the covered employees’ medical expenses incurred by their dependents but only
up to the extent of the expenses actually incurred. 53 This is consistent with the principle of indemnity which proscribes the insured from
recovering greater than the loss.54 Indeed, to profit from a loss will lead to unjust enrichment and therefore should not be countenanced. As
aptly ruled by the CA, to grant the claims of MMPSEU will permit possible abuse by employees.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 31, 2006 and Resolution dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 75630, are AFFIRMED.