Professional Documents
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Labor Law Digest
Labor Law Digest
Labor Law Digest
WILLIAMS
Facts: The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas
St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am
to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic.
It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of
police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality.
Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works
infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice
Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither
communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Chavez vs Bonto-Perez
on June 23, 2011
The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement entered into by Chavez with
her Japanese employer superseded the Standard Employment Contract; that POEA had no
knowledge of such side agreement being entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for
sleeping on her right for two years.
Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this case, Chavez filed her claim well within the
three-year prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor
Code. For this reason, laches is not applicable.
Labor Standards – Standard Employment Contract – POEA – Mutual Consent – Migrant Workers
Act
Marsaman Manning was the local agency of Diamantides Maritime. In June 1995, Marsaman
contracted Cajeras to be a cook in one of the ships operated by Diamantides (MV Prigipos). The
contract was for 10 months. But less than 2 months later, Cajeras was sent back home. The
captain of the shop, in his entry to the Deck Log, said that the dismissal of Cajeras was of mutual
consent; that a certain Dr. Hoed diagnosed Cajeras to be having some sort of a mental disorder.
Cajeras subsequently sued Marsaman for illegal dismissal. NLRC ruled in favor of Cajeras.
Marsaman assailed the NLRC decision. Marsaman further alleged that in awarding backpays to
workers, the law applicable should be Sec. 10 or RA 8042 (or 3 months salary for every year of
service).
Section 10 of RA 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) is indeed applicable but the assertion of Marsaman
to pay only 3 months of Cajeras’s salary is untenable. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals
that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e.,
whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three months salary
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the
employment contract concerned has a term of at least one year or more (Cajeras was contracted
for 10 months only). This is evident from the words for every year of the unexpired term which
follows the words salaries x x x for three months. To follow Marsaman’s thinking that Cajeras is
entitled to three months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely
disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is
contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care
should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is
presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used them
advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months,
as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay,
and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief
Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines,
serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and
twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared
illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-
impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with
the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package
he will receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on
the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the
State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and
deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-
being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
On the second issue.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent
against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of
the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since
1998. She admitted that she’s been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of
marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the
religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years
of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has
the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Ruling: Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must
then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of
the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a
feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor
General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct
circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.
The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal
laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on
the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.
THE DISMISSAL IS FOR A JUST OR AUTHORIZED CAUSE BUT DUE PROCESS WAS NOT
OBSERVED.
Due Process to be Observed by The Employer - For termination of the employment based
on the any of the just causes for termination, the requirements of due process that an employer
must comply with are: (TWIN NOTICES)
1. Written notice should be served to the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination and giving the said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain;
2. A hearing or conference should be held during which the employee concerned, with
the assistance of counsel, if the employee so desires, is given the opportunity to respond
to the charge, present his evidence and present the evidence presented against him;
NOTE:
Under the so-called WENPHIL DOCTRINE if the services of the employee was
terminated due to a just or authorized cause but the affected employee’s right to due
process has been violated, the dismissal is legal but the employee is entitled to damages
by way of indemnification for the violation of the right.
SERRANO vs. ISETANN et. al. abandoned the WENPHIL DOCTRINE and ruled that if
the employee is dismissed under just or authorized cause but the affected employee’s
right to due process has been violated, his dismissal becomes ineffectual. Therefore, the
employee is entitled to backwages from the time he was dismissed until the
determination of the justness of the cause of the dismissal.
AGABON vs. NLRC (Nov. 17, 2004) abandoned the Serrano doctrine and
REINSTATED THE WENPHIL DOCTRINE. The sanctions, however must be stiffer than
that imposed in Wenphil.
In the last couple of decades, the Supreme Court has grappled with the legal effect and the
corresponding sanction in cases where there exists a just and valid ground to justify the dismissal
but the employer fails to comply with the due process requirement of the law. Prior to the
promulgation in 1989 of Wenphil v. NLRC, [170 SCRA 69, February 8, 1989], the prevailing
doctrine held that dismissing employees without giving them proper notices and an opportunity
to be heard was illegal and that, as a consequence thereof, they were entitled to reinstatement
plus full backwages. Wenphil abandoned this jurisprudence and ruled that if the dismissal was for
a just or an authorized cause but done without due process, the termination was valid but the
employer should be sanctioned with the payment of indemnity ranging from P1,000.00 to
P10,000.00.
In 2000, the Supreme Court promulgated Serrano v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 117040, January 27,
2000], which modified Wenphil. It considered such termination “ineffectual” (not illegal) and
sanctioned the employer with payment of full backwages plus nominal and moral damages, if
warranted by the evidence. In case the dismissal was for an authorized cause, separation pay in
accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code should be awarded.
In 2004, the Supreme Court in Agabon v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004],
abandoned Serrano and effectively reverted to Wenphil (known also as the “Belated Due Process
Rule”) and held that a dismissal due to abandonment - a just cause - was not illegal or
ineffectual, even if done without due process; but the employer should indemnify the employee
with “nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.” (Glaxo Wellcome Phils.,
Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Empleyado ng Wellcome-DFA, G.R. No. 149349, March 11, 2005).