Local Crime Analysis

Police Crime Detection &
Research Prevention Series

Group Paper 65
Local
Crime
Analysis
Tim Read
Dick Oldfield
LOCAL CRIME ANALYSIS
Tim Read
Dick Oldfield
POLICE RESEARCH GROUP

CRIME DETECTION AND PREVENTION SERIES: PAPER NO 65
LONDON: HOME OFFICE POLICE DEPARTMENT
Editor: Barry Webb

Home Office Police Research Group
50 Queen Anne’s Gate
London SW1H 9AT
© Crown Copyright 1995
First Published 1995
Police Research Group: Crime Detection and Prevention Series
The Home Office Police Research Group (PRG) was formed in 1992 to carry out
and manage research relevant to the work of the police service. The terms of
reference for the Group include the requirement to identify and disseminate good
policing practice.
The Crime Detection and Prevention Series follows on from the Crime Prevention
Unit papers, a series which has been published by the Home Office since 1983. The
recognition that effective crime strategies will often involve both crime prevention
and crime investigation, however, has led to the scope of this series being
broadened. This new series will present research material on both crime prevention
and crime detection in a way that will inform policy and practice throughout the
police service.
A parallel series of papers on resource management and organisational issues is also

published by PRG, as is a periodical on policing research called ‘Focus’.
ISBN 1-85893-431-1
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Foreword
‘Crime analysis’ is not a new concept. Police officers have always made their
own assessments about, for example, which areas or hours of the day are busier
in crime terms. Increasingly, however, police forces are being encouraged to
undertake crime analysis on a more organised and systematic basis.
The National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) which

outlines the principles that should guide the future development of police
information technology, identifies crime pattern analysis (CPA) as one of the
38 applications required to support the objectives and activities of the police
service. NSPIS does not, however, include the CPA application amongst its
top priority areas. It is seen as a medium-term priority, and linked to the
development of a national Crime and Incident Reporting System.
In the interim, there is a need to provide guidance to police forces on the

issues they need to address and the facilities required from a computer system
to undertake crime analysis. This report provides such guidance in relation
to a specific area of crime analysis: the analysis of high volume crime at a
divisional or sub-divisional level.
I M BURNS
Deputy Under Secretary of State
Home Office, Police Department
July 1995
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the following people for the assistance they
provided during this project:
Inspector Mike Barron (Merseyside Police Force)

Sergeant Marty Byrne (Northumbria Police)
Chief Inspector Bill Croft (Home Office Crime Prevention Centre)
Sergeant Paul Gibbon
Chief Inspector Brian Gresty (Merseyside Police)
Jane Hirst (Police Research Group)
George Houghton (Police Research Group)
Sergeant David Howe (Metropolitan Police)
Jim Ingram
Simon Jones (Home Office Crime Prevention Centre)
Constable John Kelly (West Midlands Police)
Chief Inspector Bob Lampard
Superintendent Ian Lynch (Northumbria Police)
Superintendent Gil Oxley (West Midlands Police)
Sergeant Martin Pearson (Metropolitan Police)
Detective Chief Superintendent Linsey Reynolds (PAG IT)
Constable Caroline Sunderland (West Yorkshire Police)
Sergeant Keith Taylor (Merseyside Police)
Mike Taylor (Police Research Group)
Barry Webb (Police Research Group)
We would also like to thank all those who attended the LCA workshop at
the Police Staff College, Bramshill in June 1994.
Lastly, we are indebted to Professor Ken Pease (Huddersfield University) for

his assistance during the course of the project and for agreeing to referee this
report.
The Authors
Tim Read and Dick Oldfield are members of the Home Office Police
Research Group.
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Executive summary
Recently both the Audit Commission and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of

Constabulary (HMIC) have been encouraging police forces to undertake
Crime Pattern analysis (CPA). However, currently there is a great deal of
confusion amongst police forces about precisely what is meant by CPA, and
little guidance exists for forces about how they should undertake this analysis.
This report aims to provide the police with guidance on one particular area
of CPA: Local Crime analysis (LCA). The term ‘Local Crime analysis’ has
been coined to describe the analysis at a local level (typically divisional or
sub-divisional) of high volume crime - including burglary, theft of/from
motor vehicles and criminal damage.
The term ‘crime analysis’ covers a broad range of different analytic

techniques. At a divisional or sub-divisional level police officers are going to
be interested in a variety of different types of analyses, and a variety of
different outputs from LCA. Therefore LCA is considered in relation to
specific areas of police work; crime prevention, repeat victimisation, problem
oriented policing, and proactive policing. Using the definition of crime
analysis developed by the Trevi working party, the report identifies the forms
of analysis which are relevant to the local analysis of high volume crime.
The report then describes the overall patterns that may be sought locally:
Crime patterns - the nature and distribution of crime within an area:

Crime trends - significant changes in an area’s crime pattern over time:
Crime clusters - groups of crimes linked through similar characteristics:
Crime series - crimes with common offenders.
This report also provides guidance to forces about the practical issues they
need to consider before undertaking LCA. These fall into two main areas -
issues relating to data, and analytical issues. The chapter dealing with the
former examines the type of data that may be used for analysis, possible
sources for this data (both inside and outside the police force), and problems
that may arise in ensuring its quality. This chapter also considers the
necessity of being able to exchange data between LCA systems at both an
intra- and inter-force level.
The section on analytical issues is split into two parts; temporal analysis, and
spatial analysis. The first examines the use of time as a variable in the
analysis of high volume crime, and some of the difficulties this poses. The
section on spatial analysis considers the role played by mapping and
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geographical information systems in LCA. Issues covered include the geo-
coding of data for analysis, the level of detail required for mapping, and how
this can be tailored to meet different analytic requirements. It also contains
a brief examination of the applicatiosn of expert systems and predictive
algorithms to LCA systems. This is followed by a section that looks at the
dissemination of output from LCA, and the training and support needed by
such systems.
Overall the report stresses that, in order to undertake LCA successfully,

police forces must first be clear about their aims and objectives in performing
the analysis. The development of a detailed and accurate user specification
for an LCA system is central to the success of the venture. At a strategic
level this involves questions such as why the analysis is being undertaken,
what form of analysis is required to support these aims, who the users of the
output are going to be, and what form of output they require. These
decisions will have an obvious ‘knock-on’ impact by determining the more
prosaic aspects of LCA; which data variables need to be collected, their
sources, who is to perform the analysis, where the facility should be sited,
whether there is a need to map the data, and so on. With this in mind, the
sections of the report which cover data, analysis, and general issues contain a
number of detailed questions designed to assist forces in the development of
a user specification, and of evaluating to what extent commercial LCA
systems meet their requirements.
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Contents
Page
Foreword iii
Acknowledgements iv
Executive Summary v
List of Tables ix
1. Local crime analysis: an introduction 1
2. The application of local crime analysis 7
Local crime analysis and problem-oriented policing 8

Local crime analysis and crime prevention 9
Local crime analysis and repeat victimisation 11
Local crime analysis and ‘proactive’ policing: resource allocation 11
Local crime analysis and ‘proactive’ policing: targeting offenders 13
3. Collecting the data 16
Data sources 16
Type of data 18
Data quality 19
Data compatibility 21
Database facilities 22
4. Analysing the data 23
Conducting searches 23
Creating tables 24
Statistical analysis 25
Temporal analysis 26
Spatial analysis 27
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Page
Mapping facilities 29
Level of geographical data required 29
Displaying and manipulating data 30
Costs 31
‘Hot Spot’ analysis and predictive facilities 31
Expert systems 33
5. General issues 35
Dissemination 35
Training 36
Support for local crime analysis systems 36
6. Conclusions and recommendations 39
Current use of local crime analysis by forces 39

Recommendations 40
References 42
Appendix A: The Trevi definition of crime analysis 45
Appendix B: Local crime analysis checklist 47
Appendix C: Local crime analysis contact list 59
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List of Tables
Table Number Caption Page
Table 1 Potential users of output from local crime analysis 4
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LOCAL CRIME ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION
1. Local Crime Analysis: an introduction
The 1993 Audit Commission report ‘Helping with enquiries: Tackling Crime
Effectively’ suggested that Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA) was a “key
technique which can be effective against prolific criminals”. This support
echoes the message that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has been
delivering to police forces during the course of its inspection process, that
police forces must be able to undertake CPA.
However, whilst, in general terms, there is consensus that the police should
be undertaking CPA, there has been little attempt to define the term, and
even less guidance available to the police about how they should set about
undertaking it. In part this confusion arises from the lack of precision
employed in discussions about CPA. The terms ‘crime pattern analysis’ and
‘crime analysis’ are often employed as if they have clearly understood
meanings; indeed they are often used interchangeably.
In reality they are best conceived as generic terms. To illustrate this point
more clearly, the definition of crime analysis produced by the TREVI sub-
committee (since superseded by a sub-committee of the K4 Co-ordinating
Committee), designed to provide a European standard, identifies eight
different forms of crime analysis. These eight components, shown in
appendix A, reflect the range of circumstances in, and purposes for which,
the police may wish to undertake ‘crime analysis’. For example, case analysis
(establishing the course of events immediately before, during, and after, a
serious offence) is clearly different than crime pattern analysis (identifying
the nature and scale of crime within a particular area), yet both are forms of
crime analysis.
This report is concerned with the application of crime analysis to one

specific area of police work: the analysis of high volume crime at a local,
either divisional or sub-divisional, level. The term Local Crime Analysis
(LCA) has been coined to describe this area of analysis. The focus of this
report reflects the fact that this type of crime accounts for the majority of
demand on the police, and that there is increasing interest in the ways that
the application of crime analysis techniques to high volume crime can assist
the police in managing this demand and in solving these offences.
In general terms, whatever the specific focus of the analysis, LCA is likely to
be concerned with the characteristics of the offence rather than the offender.
In addition the analysis usually involves looking at crime in aggregate rather
than in isolation. Where it focuses upon the offence, LCA can be divided
1
into three subgroups: analysis for management information, crime cluster

analysis, and crime trend analysis.
Analysis for management information
This is the most basic form of LCA. It involves the analysis of high volume
crime data locally in order to obtain an understanding of the pattern of crime
within a defined area. The purpose of the analysis is to facilitate general staff
and resource management by matching resources to the identified patterns.
Crime trend analysis
A crime trend is defined as a significant change in the nature of selected

crime types within a defined geographical area and time period. The analysis
is concerned with changes in the fundamental crime pattern, and involves
comparisons of aggregated crime data sets over time. Again this is most
likely to be useful for strategic planning and resource allocation.
Crime cluster analysis
This involves identifying a group of crimes with similar characteristics. To

be of maximum use to the police the area of commonality should
differentiate the identified crimes from the majority. The crime clusters can
be categorised into the type of crime committed, the way the crime was
committed, the time committed, type of items stolen, the location of the
crime, the type of victim and so on. Although this type of analysis is
described as being ‘criminal incident’ based, data may also be available on
the offender. Studies to identify repeat victimisation would fall within this
category.
Comparative case analysis
Comparative case analysis is the one type of analysis within LCA which is as
concerned with offender as offence details. Although similar in some
respects to crime cluster analysis, (both seek to identify a group of offences
with similar characteristics), comparative case analysis goes further in aiming
to identify whether these offences were committed by the same offender or
group of offenders. This type of analysis can be used to identify possible
suspects of a crime series by linking the output from crime recording systems
or command and control systems with intelligence data relating to modus
2
operandi (MO) and personal descriptions of known criminals. This is the

form of analysis that the Audit Commission have been encouraging police
forces to undertake in adopting a proactive approach to dealing with high
volume crime.
There are a number of uses for crime analysis at a local level; to plan resource
allocation, provide management information, identify crime series, design
and evaluate crime prevention schemes, or inform participants in
partnership approaches (neighbourhood watch schemes and local authorities
for example). It is important to emphasise that police officers’ and civilians’
particular requirements from crime analysis will be coloured by the type of
function that they perform within the service. Thus, a beat officer may use
crime analysis to obtain a better understanding of the distribution of crime
on his or her beat. Local management may require a similar type of analysis,
but at an area level, or over a longer time period, in order to assist with
resource allocation. By contrast, a Local Intelligence Officer may require
analysis of a different form, in order to establish series of crimes linked to a
common offender.
Table 1 provides a list of the potential users of crime analysis at a local level,
and the type of analysis they might undertake.
3
Table 1: Potential users of products from LCA

Local users of LCA Uses for LCA
Crime Prevention Officer Identification of patterns of crime, evaluation of

crime prevention initiatives, supporting analysis for
crime prevention proposals.
Local Intelligence Officer Knowledge of activity in area, identification of series

of crime, matching of MO details with known
offenders, identification of repeat victimisation.
Uniformed Officers Knowledge of activity in and around beat,

identification of crime hot-spots’ on beat.
Duty Sergeant Material for shift briefings and to assist in

deployment of resources.
CID/Specialist Squads Targeting of crime series, occasional identification of

suspects, assistance during interviews of suspects,
identification of stolen property, collated details of
crimes under investigation.
Basic Command Unit Knowledge of activity in and around sub-

Management division, identification of emerging problems for
focused policing, management information for BCU
resources, dissemination of good practice (crime
prevention).
Other Agencies Planning, monitoring & management of activities.
(adapted from Oldfield 1992)
4
The type of analysis that is performed, and the data that are collected, will
vary depending on the task undertaken. As a result there is a need for
flexible, low-cost LCA systems which the police can tailor to reflect local
demands. While these systems may only offer a short-term solution to forces’
overall crime analysis requirements, particularly bearing in mind the
development of the national CPA application, there is still the need to
provide guidance on the issues surrounding the local analysis of high volume
offences. In addition it is important that the dialogue that attends the
development of the national CPA facility is informed by local experience
with low-cost LCA systems and awareness of the potential benefits of crime
analysis.
The next section of this report, ‘the application of local crime analysis’,
identifies a number of broad areas where LCA is likely to be of benefit to the
police. It covers areas such as problem oriented policing, proactive policing,
the identification of repeat victimisation, -and the support of crime
prevention initiatives, and examines the role for LCA in these areas.
Sections three, four and five of this report consider the factors that forces
need to consider in seeking to undertake LCA in detail, and which are
pulled together in the LCA ‘checklist’ in appendix B. These sections cover
issues such as the type and quality of data required for LCA, sources for this
data, the type of analysis to be undertaken, the mapping of data, and the
training and support required for LCA.
In order to undertake LCA successfully it is important that police forces

have access to a computer system that meets their analytic requirements.
To this end, sections three, four and five contain a number of questions
aimed directly at LCA systems. These questions reflect the Police Research
Group’s perception of what the police service should require from an LCA
system. They provide the police with a means of developing a LCA user
specification that reflects their local needs, and thus the ability to evaluate
commercially available software. This section concludes with the box below
which prompts forces to consider the uses to which they wish to apply LCA.
5
Which of the following is LCA to be used for:-
Identification of patterns of crime?

Management information/crime accounting?
Identification of emerging problems for focused policing?
Identification of crime/incident ‘hot-spots’?
Identification of repeat victimisation?
Identification of crime series/repeat offenders?
Evaluation of police activities/initiatives?
6
THE APPLICATION OF LOCAL CRIME ANSLYSIS
2. The application of local crime analysis
Research has shown that crime is seldom randomly distributed across an

area, rather there are marked geographical and temporal skews in the
patterning of offence locations, often varying according to the type of crime.
For example Sherman found, in a study of telephone calls from the public to
the police in Minneapolis, “substantial concentrations of all police calls, and
especially calls for predatory crime, in relatively few ‘hot spots’. Just over
half (50.4%) of all calls to the police for which cars were dispatched went to
a mere 3.3 percent of all addresses and intersections” (Sherman, 1989).
Similarly the temporal distribution of crime is likely to be skewed, whether

this be by time of day, day of the week or across seasons. Poyner and Webb
(1992) found, in a study of street theft in Birmingham that offences tended
to occur on specific days (Tuesday, Friday and Saturday), and on these days,
within narrow time bands. In addition, the offences took place mainly in
the summer months. A study of telephone calls to Merseyside Police over a
three year period indicated that burglary tended to peak in February and
March, and to be at its lowest level in July and August (Farrell and Pease,
1994).
The analysis of crime and incident data, and the identification of ‘crime
patterns’ is clearly of importance to the police. Research into offence and
offender profiling in South Tyneside had the effect of reducing house
burglaries by as much as fifty percent. By combining computerised analysis
of crime recorded data with offender profiling techniques it was feasible for
the local intelligence officer to identify potential suspects and to use
statistical information to target investigations and covert operations. The
collection of more detailed information on the characteristics of crimes (type
of property attacked, architectural features, point and method of entry,
weapons or tools used, and property stolen) also allowed the evaluation of
target-hardening initiatives and better direction of crime prevention officers
as a result (Dale and Lynch, 1994).
The remainder of this section illustrates the central role of LCA in four key,
and developing, areas of policing activity:- problem oriented policing, crime
prevention, repeat victimisation, and proactive policing.
7
Local crime analysis and problem-oriented policing
In general terms LCA aims to address the following issues, regardless of the
specific context in which the analysis is undertaken:-
– to identify an area’s crime problems through the analysis of data;
– to raise the level of awareness and understanding of the crime problems

within an area; and
– to assist in the development of appropriate responses to those problems
that are of concern.
The use of LCA to identify crime problems locally, and to develop

appropriate responses is influenced by the concept of ‘problem-oriented
policing’, advanced by Herman Goldstein. This approach argues that police
work should “begin with an analysis of each of the varied problems police
handle and only then proceed to establish the most effective response”
(Goldstein, 1990). Problem oriented policing suggests that the police should
attempt to define and address these problems, to “group incidents as
problems” by identifying the relationships that exist between these
incidents, including similarities of behaviour, location, and people involved.
This approach is a response to the traditional reactive model of policing

which measures the success of police officers in terms of the speed and
efficiency with ‘which they deal with the incidents assigned to them. As a
result, it is claimed, incidents are usually handled as isolated events, and
connections seldom made between them.
The definition of ‘problem’ is left deliberately open by Goldstein;- “a cluster

of similar, related, or recurring incidents rather than a single incident, a
substantive community concern, or a unit of police business”. This reflects
the variety of circumstances in which the approach can be employed (cited
examples range from addressing problems of domestic violence or drink-
driving to robberies on a specific street to disorder in a particular car park).
Incidents may be grouped according to a number of characteristics:-
behaviour (usually the type of offence), territory (concentration of the
problem in a given area), persons (either offender or victim) and the time of
the problem (time of day, day of week or season).
8
Crime analysis plays a central role within problem oriented policing. “In a
police agency in which individual officers may not know what has occurred
outside the areas in which they work or during periods when they are not on
duty, crime analysis has been the primary means for pooling information that
may help solve crimes”. In order to deal with the identified problem, its
characteristics and contributing factors should be examined in detail. This
may entail collecting information about offenders and/or victims; the time of
occurrence, location and other details of the physical environment; the
history of the current problem; the motivations, gains and losses of involved
parties; the apparent (and hidden) causes and competing interests; and the
results of current responses. It is only once this information has been
collected and analysed that an effective response to the problem can be
devised and implemented.
Local crime analysis and crime prevention
The ‘problem oriented’ approach has had a marked impact in the crime
prevention field. In his paper ‘Getting the best out of Crime Analysis’ Paul
Ekblom advocates a problem oriented approach to identify and determine
solutions to specific, often local, crime problems. He describes the
‘preventive process’ as a five-stage sequence of activities, within the overall,
continuous monitoring of crime:
1. Obtaining data on crime problems
2. Analysis and interpretation of data
3. Devising preventive strategies
4. Implementation
5. Evaluation
Clearly crime analysis plays a central role in this process. Indeed the study
provides a comprehensive account of the utility of crime analysis throughout
the course of a crime prevention initiative. The process begins with the
collection of data likely to be of use in crime analysis, which may be
extracted from existing information systems, or generated specifically for the
9
analysis. The data then has to be structured for analysis. Analysis involves
the identification of the patterns, clusters and trends identified above.
Ekblom identifies a number of patterns that may emerge:
One way patterns where one variable carries information for guiding
(main effects) preventive strategies, ie the occurrence of an
offence over time.
Two way patterns where an association is established between two

(associations) variables, normally found by cross-tabulation.
Three way patterns which occur when an association between two

(interactions) variables varies with the stage of a third variable.
Ekblom cites the example of street attacks, where
the likelihood of the victim being injured depends
on the age of the assailant (association), and is also
influenced by a third variable, the age of the
victim.
The analysis concludes when a clear and consistent picture of the crime
problem is generated. The final part of the process involves placing the
identified problem in a wider context, taking into account criminological,
social and demographic factors that may help to explain it. The information
that emerges can then be disseminated to he relevant parties within the
police force to allow the development and implementation of appropriate
responses to the problem. It should be stressed that while Ekblom’s report
focuses upon the role of crime analysis in the crime prevention field, the
problem-solving process he describes is applicable to other forms of local
crime analysis.
Subsequent work in the crime prevention field has built upon the ‘problem
oriented’ approach. For example, Berry and Carter have described a
methodology for the evaluation of crime prevention initiatives which
conforms closely to the problem-oriented model. They stress the importance
of analysis in determining the nature and extent of the problem, in defining
the objectives of the initiative, and evaluating its effectiveness (Berry and
Carter, 1992).
10
Local crime analysis and repeat victimisation
Recent interest in the field of repeat victimisation has indicated a further

area for crime analysis. One study found that once a house had been
burgled, its chance of repeat victimisation was four times the rate of houses
that had not been burgled before (Forrester et al, 1988). Similarly the 1992
British Crime Survey found that 8% of the victims of motor vehicle theft
accounted for 22% of incidents surveyed. This pattern of repeat
victimisation has been shown to apply across a range of offences; racial
attacks, domestic violence, crime against small businesses, crime on
industrial estates, bullying, school burglary and property crime (Bridgeman
and Sampson, 1994).
The realisation that “victimisation is a good predictor of victimisation”

across a range of crimes has obvious ramifications for local crime analysis.
Farrell and Pease (1994) suggest that the first step in developing a crime
prevention perspective for repeat victimisation “is locally to establish the
patterns of repeat victimisation prevailing in as much detail as the current
police command and control system will permit”. Once instances of repeat
victimisation have been identified by crime analysis then strategies to
prevent subsequent victimisation can be developed.
The application of crime analysis to repeat victimisation indicates that the

distinction between the reactive (ie identification of crime trends, the spatial
distribution of crime, or repeat victimisation) and proactive use of crime
pattern analysis (comparative case analysis in the Audit Commission’s
assessment) is of limited practical use. The identification of incidents of
repeat victimisation through reactive analysis allows police forces to predict
where future victimisation is likely to take place, and to develop proactive
strategies.
Local crime analysis and proactive policing: resource allocation
Demand from the public for police services has increased at a faster rate than
have police resources (Audit Commission, 1993). As a result, police forces
have begun to introduce methods of prioritising and managing their response
to this demand. For example, call-grading schemes have been introduced,
where the form of the initial police response is determined by the nature of
the call. A typical scheme will grade calls as requiring an immediate
response, a delayed response, a response by appointment, and no response.
11
Forces have also begun to introduce mechanisms to manage demand and its
subsequent investigation, such as crime desks, dedicated crime lines and help
desks. A common assumption behind these schemes is that, where police
resources are limited, it is not feasible to deploy police officers to visit every
crime scene and complete a crime report.
In these circumstances there has been much emphasis, not least from the
Audit Commission and HMIC, on the need for the development of
proactive strategies by the police, utilising crime analysis to identify suitable
targets for police action. It is suggested that, through crime analysis, the
minor crimes that the police are unable to investigate in person are still
included in the development of proactive policing strategies. In the absence
of police deployment, and with the increased use of the telephone to report
and record certain types of crime, crime analysis, often termed ‘static
investigation’, may provide the sole means of investigating and combating
certain types of crime.
Local crime analysis therefore offers an alternative to the stark dichotomy of

screening crimes ‘in’ and ‘out’ of investigation. If police forces are able to use
LCA to ‘investigate’ high volume crime this may also allay public concerns
that have arisen as a result of decreasing levels of deployment of police
officers for these offences. The supposition here is that if crime analysis were
to be routinely undertaken on these offences then the screening decision
could more accurately be depicted as a filter in the investigative process,
rather than marking its end for the vast majority of cases.
Research on crime screening, however, suggests that it is often the quality of

the information collected on the crime report that determines whether or
not the case will be allocated for further investigation (Gill et al,
forthcoming). Clearly, if data deficiencies determine whether the case has
been screened ‘in’ or ‘out’ they are also going to have an impact upon the
type of analysis that can be subsequently undertaken, and the value of the
output from this analysis. Similarly the research discovered that there was a
great deal of confusion, and little guidance as to precisely how the ‘static
investigation’ of this, typically high volume, crime was carried out. It is
important that crime analysis is not viewed solely as a palliative to public
concerns about decreased deployment of police officers to investigate certain
categories of high volume crime. Should this be the case, and LCA be
12
employed on crimes where there is insufficient data to enable comprehensive

analysis, or in circumstances where the purpose of the analysis is unclear,
then the value of LCA is likely to be undermined.
A recent paper evaluating anti-burglary strategies in three forces states that

crime pattern analysis can “yield information about the likely location and
times of high volume crime” and can therefore be used to guide the
deployment of resources (Stockdale and Gresham, 1995). The authors
suggest, however, that ‘”its potential value has not been fully exploited;
staffing levels and distribution of resources sometimes fail to reflect patterns
and amount of criminal activity”. The report indicates that, while there is a
role for LCA in the identification of local crime patterns and crime trends,
and the consequent allocation of resources to match these patterns better,
the process needs planning, and resources, for successful implementation.
Local crime analysis and proactive policing: targeting offenders
In the past, the analysis of high volume criminal incident data tended to be
offence rather than offender focused, reactive rather than proactive, and
aimed at the development of strategies to counter the incidence of the
offence, rather than the identification of possible offenders. By contrast, the
approach advocated by the Audit Commission is to detect similarities
between crimes that point to the same perpetrator or group of perpetrators
(comparative case analysis). The method is simple. “Every offence involved
in the comparison is carefully scrutinized. The individual characteristics of
different crime are described in columns. These columns may cover, for
example, any disguise used, vehicles used for escape, clothing, descriptions
etc. When the characteristics of different crimes are compared, any
similarities will immediately become apparent” (Minnebo, 1992 (1)).
The training provided by the National Criminal Intelligence Service

(NCIS) for crime analysts follows this model. A comparison schedule is
created (a list of characteristics associated with the crimes being examined)
which is then used to identify links between cases (either general or specific
matches). In an exercise on armed robbery these links cover variables such
as the date, time and location of the offence, characteristics of the offender
(height, accent, clothing, facial features, hair and belongings), and type of
security vehicle. Matches (and non-matches) across cases are then
considered cumulatively to provide an eventual probability weighting of the
likelihood of the same offender(s) being involved in the cases.
13
The Audit Commission suggest that comparative case analysis should be

applied to high volume crime and that, in the case of burglary for example,
crimes could be linked on the basis of common characteristics such as the
means of entry, time of day that the crime occurred, types of items stolen and
so on. However, care needs to be exercised when seeking to establish points
of similarity for high volume crimes which might indicate a criminal
hallmark. Data which is collected during the course of an investigation into
a serious crime is likely to be far more detailed than the data available to the
police in relation to high volume crimes, unless the information held on the
crime recording system is supplemented by criminal intelligence or forensic
details. With high volume crime, white there may be some MOs that are
sufficiently uncommon to provide an obvious link between offences and
known offenders, in many cases the MO, or at least the way the MO is
recorded, is likely to be so common as to make case linking through this
variable alone impossible.
There is an assumption in the Audit Commission’s report ‘Helping with

Enquiries..’ that an offender who commits offences such as burglary or theft
from motor vehicles will always offend in a similar manner. Some support
for this view has emerged from research undertaken by Northumbria Police
looking at the MOs employed by house-burglars arrested since January 1993.
Their findings indicated that 95% of these offenders retained the same MO,
and that three quarters of them carried house-breaking instruments. These
results could, however, have arisen as a result of bias in the sample. Those
who retained the same MO would be more likely to be identified, and
arrested, than those whose MO evolved. A self-reporting study on car-theft
provides evidence to support this hypothesis. A third of those interviewed
altered the means by which they broke into and stole the vehicle as they
became more experienced. “Back then, we used to smash a quarterlight
using a scaffy bar ... but now I like to do the door locks with a screwdriver
and rip the alarms off... use a wrench. One time if there was an alarm I used
to leave it, now it’s no problem” (Light et al, 1993).
The above is not to suggest that comparative case analysis should not be
applied locally, but rather to suggest that the technique has to be applied
with care. A number of LCA packages have already begun to address the
issue of comparative case analysis. These systems collect details of convicted
or suspected offenders (where known) for offences in the crime analysis
database. As a result, crimes can be mapped not only by offence
characteristics, but by offender characteristics. In short, the system
14
endeavours to provide the analyst with a short-cut to the ‘most likely’

offenders based on their past criminal behaviour. Indeed one of the LCA
systems has a menu selection that will produce a list of the number of times
an offender has been convicted of an offence using a specific MO.
While there is an obvious appeal to these developments, there is a danger

that comparative case analysis becomes little more than the unquestioning
linking of offenders to offences through MO. Such developments, and
particularly the reliance on a database of known/suspected offenders, could
be problematic bearing in mind research studies that indicate the mobility of
offenders (Farrington and Lambert, 1992) and the relatively transitory
nature of persistent offending by juveniles. A recent report found that
‘persistent offenders’ (those who committed 10 or more offences in a given 3
month period), seldom appeared as persistent offenders in subsequent periods
(Hagell and Newburn, 1994).
15
COLLECTING THE DATA
3. Collecting the data
This section, and the subsequent two sections of the report examine some of
the issues that influence the development and operation of an LCA system,
and which forces should consider before they begin to evaluate LCA systems
in any detail. The shaded boxes contain detailed questions which the police
should use in the appraisal of a system to undertake LCA.
Data sources
There are a variety of different data sources available to the police for
analytic purposes. The use of the term ‘Crime Pattern Analysis’ tends to
obscure the potential usefulness of non-crime data to the police. Data
already available to the police can be supplemented by information that has
been collected by external organisations. This could include data from local
authorities, retail organisations, crime prevention programmes, or other
public sector organisations. The form of the data may also vary. It may be
raw data that can be imported into the LCA system and provide more
variables for analysis. Alternatively it may be the results of surveys or
previous research that serve to refine or amend the type of analysis
undertaken. An example of the latter might be details of offending or
motivation to offend obtained from research undertaken by the Probation
Service with offenders.
Demographic and census data may also be used by the police to interpret
crime patterns in the light of social or economic features (ie levels of
unemployment or the proportion of young people within the area). The
linking of census data with postcodes has allowed researchers to develop
‘small-area’ typologies, “classifications of people according to the types of
areas in which they live” (ie ‘Blue Collar Workers with High
Unemployment’, ‘Young Professionals in Bedsitters’ or ‘Affluent Farming
Communities’). Geographical Information System (GIS) technology has
allowed the analysis of “the degree of variation among socio-economic
groups in the incidence of various conditions”. Within the health field, for
example, the technique (termed ‘geodemographic analysis’) has been used to
examine the incidence of food-poisoning amongst, and the take-up of drug
clinics by, various sectors of the population (Brown et al 1991).
While there is the potential for the police to link crime data, and the
incidence of specific crime types, with information about the socio/economic
status of the local population, there are problems inherent in such data.
Census data is typically grouped by enumeration districts at a local level, and
16
COLLECTING THE DATA
these may not coincide with the boundaries employed by the police (beats or
divisions). This lack of congruence may cause difficulties in any subsequent
analysis (see Brunsdon 1989).
One of the major problems that has beset LCA systems in the past has been
the inability of systems to down-load data from other sources, and
consequently the requirement to enter the data for analysis onto the
computer manually. Clearly this is not an efficient use of police resources,
particularly as most police forces are already collecting the data that will
provide the basis for LCA analysis (normally the crime recording system).
Therefore it is a prerequisite that an LCA system should be able to down-
load data from existing computer systems within the police force
A number of police data sources can be used as the basis for analysis;
criminal intelligence, traffic information, property details, nominal
databases, incidence data, as well as data taken from the crime recording
system. In some cases (domestic violence, for example) police incident logs
give a more accurate indicator of the extent of repeat victimisation than
does data taken from the crime recording system because most domestic
violence does not get recorded as a criminal offence. Although there are
limitations to incident log data, its use may allow the identification of a
problem sooner than would be the case with reliance on data from the crime
recording system.
Researchers in Chicago have attempted to take this work one step further in
developing an ‘Early Warning System’ for gang-related homicides using a
geographical crime analysis computer system. The project aims to identify
patterns of nonlethal violence that precede lethal violence in
neighbourhoods. In short, based on the assumption that there is a
relationship (spatial and temporal) between specific types of gang-related
crime and incivilities and subsequent gang homicides, the research uses the
incidence of the former to predict where the latter will occur. In order to do
this the project has collected information on lethal and non-lethal crimes
from Chicago Police, together with data from other agencies about the
locations of parks, schools, public housing, train stations, taverns and
dilapidated or abandoned buildings (STAC 1993).
17
COLLECTING THE DATA
Can data be captured through an on-line link or by transfer via a magnetic

medium?
Can a data link be set up and operated without specialist support?
Are facilities available to design structured data entry forms for manual input?
Can the structured forms support mandatory fields, look up tables, dates/times
and shorthand coded entries?
Are shorthand coded entries automatically expanded into full field entries on
input?
Can the facility retrieve for editing an individual record by its unique crime
number?
Type of data
Too often in the past the assumption has been made that, in order to
undertake effective crime analysis, it is necessary merely to tap into data
already held on the force’s crime recording system. As a result the analysis
has been driven by what was already available, rather than by what was best
suited to the task in-hand. It is important that, before any analysis is
undertaken, careful consideration be given to the type of data required to
support this analysis.
The type of data that should be collected will depend on the type of analysis
that the police wish to undertake. This relates both to the variables that are
collected, and their format and detail. If the sole purpose of the analysis is to
provide management information about the distribution of crime within the
area then the level of detail already available on the crime recording system
may suffice. However, the crime recording system may fail to provide
sufficient detail about the MO employed in an offence to allow comparative
case analysis to be undertaken. As a result the data collected routinely may
have to be supplemented by additional/more detailed variables. Equally, if
the analysis is being undertaken as part of a specific project, particularly in
conjunction with other agencies, then it may be necessary to tailor the
variables being collected accordingly. An example of the latter is provided
by a burglary project in Newton-Ie-Willows, Merseyside where, due to the
joint sponsorship of a burglary project by the local authority, details of
18
COLLECTING THE DATA
number of people living in the property and type of property were collected
and analysed by the police (Merseyside Police, 1993). The following
questions indicate the likely data requirements for an LCA system.
Does the system record the date and time the crime/incident took place?
(If the exact time of the crime/incident is not known, can the system display
the range of possible times, earliest/latest time/date?)
Does the system record the location of the crime/incident?
(‘Location’ may comprise a number of variables, ranging in detail, ie property
number/name, street, beat etc. However, it should include a geographical
reference for the crime/incident)
Does the system record details of the crime/incident?
(This should include the characteristics of the offence/incident, the MO,
whether the crime was detected, and details of stolen property).
Does the system contain data on offender characteristics
(where known/applicable)?
Does the system provide, where relevant, information on the victim?
Does the system allow a unique victim identifier to be allocated?
Does the system provide/allow access to non-crime data (ie demographic data)?
Data quality
One police force has recently begun comparative case analysis on ‘serial’
burglars (individuals convicted of more than four burglaries). When the
force began the analysis it discovered that most of the data it took from the
crime recording system was unsuitable for the analysis; being either
inaccurate, missing, or of insufficient detail to allow comparison across cases.
Similarly, in the anti-burglary project in Newton-le-Willows the officers
concerned found that the data the force routinely collected on burglaries did
not provide the level of detail they required for analysis. As a result a
separate form had to be designed to collect this data. The latter example
also demonstrates the importance of having an LCA system flexible enough
to take data from outside routine police data sources, if necessary.
19
COLLECTING THE DATA
A number of researchers have commented on problems that arise when the

data required for LCA analysis, particularly the address of the offence, is
input in a variable form. Johnston et al (1993) cite the example of
‘Reservoir BR Car Park’ which may be recorded at different times as ‘BR Car
Par’, ‘Reservoir Car Park’, and so on. The recording of the same address in a
variety of different forms will limit the analysis that can be subsequently
undertaken. Attempts to identify instances of repeat victimisation at an
address, for example, using a frequencies count, will be compromised because
the LCA system is likely to treat all these addresses as discrete values and
consequently as different addresses. Similarly, if an LCA system employs a
gazetteer to generate a reference for mapping purposes, the spelling of an
address differently from the way it has been recorded in the gazetteer may
prevent the automatic allocation of a geographic reference. In order to
minimise these problems police forces should develop rules and conventions
to govern the recording of data subsequently used for LCA (ie rules on the
order of words, permitted abbreviations).
The degree of ‘ownership’ police officers exercise over an LCA system can
play a crucial part in ensuring the quality of the data put into the system.
Where officers are persuaded of the benefit of an LCA system, and are able
to use its output operationally, they are more likely to ensure that the data is
collected accurately and in comprehensive detail.
In the project to combat drug-related burglaries at Newton-Ie-Willows the

coordinating officer found that “the quality of the information on the form
52 (a form designed to supplement the existing crime reporting sheet) was
not adequate (for analysis). Distinct briefings of all sections took place but
the best method of education was found to be a ‘hands on’ process. Officers
were encouraged to interrogate the system and see for themselves the
inadequacies of their own documentation. Those officers who have
undergone this process have markedly improved their information on form
52”. In short, as a result of using the system, officers became aware that its
quality and utility depended on the quality of the data they collected.
20
COLLECTING THE DATA
Can data capture/input facilities be easily amended in response to changing

requirements?
Can data be validated against a table of allowable field entries during manual
input?
Can data be validated retrospectively after transfer from another system?
How is the table of valid field entries built and maintained?
Data compatibility
It is important to recognise that crime patterns do not mirror police

boundaries, either locally, or at a force level. Patterns of offending may fall
across divisions, or across forces, and may be lost if there is not the potential
to exchange data between LCA facilities, within and across forces.
Currently the interchange of data between, and within, forces is difficult
because of the variety of different ways crime is recorded, and the lack of
compatibility between the systems employed.
The ‘local’ remit of this report should not obscure the fact that, with the
development of force-wide facilities aimed at providing a variety of crime
analysis functions, including the analysis of more serious crime and criminal
intelligence data, police forces may need to share data across the force, or
obtain data from other forces or national systems. The National Strategy for
Police Information Systems (NSPIS) envisages the eventual creation of a
national CPA application with the ability to perform crime analysis at local,
force, regional and national levels. This will obviously require the
interchange of data. Thus, in the interim it is important that in developing
specifications for LCA police forces conform to national data standards as
they emerge, and that the LCA systems themselves adhere to NSPIS, where
applicable, and support the export and import of data.
21
COLLECTING THE DATA
Does the LCA system comply with:-

– the national IS/IT strategy
– the force IT strategy?
– crime data standards (eg ACPO CCCIS)?
– general system standards (eg CCTA CC88)?
– the Data Protection Act?
Database facilities
Central to an LCA system is its ability to capture, hold and manipulate the
data required for subsequent analysis. This will be achieved through a
database facility. The database will need to be flexible as it may need to hold
not only the core set of data identified as necessary to support routine LCA,
but also additional data required to assist ad-hoc forms of analysis.
Is an easy-to-use facility provided to set up the database?

Can the database be changed subsequently to include new data fields and field
entries?
What are the limits of the database facility (maximum number of records, field
size, etc.)?
22
ANALYSING THE DATA
4. Analysing the data
Conducting searches
Once the LCA database has been set up it will be used by the analyst to
search the data in order to retrieve individual records or assemble sets of
records that correspond to specified criteria (eg crimes that have occurred
within a certain time-scale, or offences with the same characteristic(s)).
This searching through the database is the fundamental component of LCA,
allowing the analyst to create sub-sets of data for more detailed subsequent
analysis and to develop hypotheses about patterns of crime, and identify
crime series and crime clusters. It is important that the analyst is not
constrained by the limitations of the LCA database, but is able to develop
queries as complex as required, across all variables. For example, if the data
available for analysis is un-coded then it is essential that the database has the
ability to support free-text searches. Similarly the LCA database should
facilitate the creation of complex, multi-layered queries in order to allow the
analyst to ‘drill down’ into the data.
Can the facility search on all coded data fields?

Does the system support range matching (eg match ranges of dates or times)?
Can the facility search text fields for non-coded (free text) entries?
Does the system support synonym matching (eg red jumper matches red
pullover)?
Can search factors be combined using the Boolean operators (and/or/not/nor)?
Can search criteria be saved and edited?
Can the facility retrieve all records that have been created or amended since a
specified date?
Does the searching facility support inexperienced users (eg through pre-defined
options menu or simple form filling)?
Does the facility support expert users (eg by providing shortcuts through menus)?
Can the results of searches be displayed as a series of complete records, a list of
summary details from the records, and within structured report formats?
23
ANALYSING THE DATA
Creating tables
It is likely that the analyst will wish to go further than simply identifying
sub-sets of the data that conform to search criteria. Cross-tabulation is seen
as an essential technique for LCA, allowing the identification of patterns
and relationships between variables. It is essential that an LCA system
possesses the ability to break down and compare crime variables in a tabular
form.
Can the facility automatically produce a table showing bow many crimes exist for
each category of a single variable? (eg the system automatically identifies all the
MO codes that have been used and lists them showing the number of crimes
using them).
Can the facility automatically produce a table showing how many crimes exist for
each combination of categories for two or more variables? (eg automatically
tabulating MO codes against beats).
Can the facility handle ranges for dates/times etc.? (eg a crime is included if it
occurred between the dates specified)
Can a user specify the categories to be tabulated? (eg produce a table with a
user-nominated restricted set of MOs.)
Can the facility convert the crime numbers into row percentages. column
percentages and table percentages?
Can summary tables be easily exported to other software applications (business
graphics/statistical package/spreadsheet)?
What are the limits of the facility (size of table, number of categories, etc.)?
Can suitable print outs be produced by the facility?
Are special printing facilities required for the production of large tables?
Are there any other special computer system requirements
(eg maths co-processor)?
Are there any additional costs associated with this element of the system?
24
ANALYSING THE DATA
Statistical analysis
In addition to cross-tabulation, statistical tools may be required by the crime

analyst to interpret the significance of the data being examined. This is
particularly the case where the analyst is seeking to identify crime trends, or
is involved in the production of management information statistics.
Analysts are unlikely to be experienced statisticians, so such tools must be
easy to use and interpret.
Does the facility support the production of general management information

statistics? (eg averages and standard deviations).
Does the facility support the analysis of variation of crime between two specified
periods?
Does the facility support the analysis of trends of crime over a specified period?
Can the results of this analysis be easily exported into other software
applications?
Can suitable hard copy be produced by the facility?
Are there any special system requirements for this element of the system?
Analysts may spend a number of hours interacting with a LCA system before
a pattern, cluster or trend is clearly identified. They will not wish to repeat
that amount of effort every time they wish to re-examine the pattern or show
it to somebody else. As a result it is important that the LCA system has the
ability to ‘record’ the analytic processes that the analyst has followed. This is
particularly important if the analyst is responsible for the production of
similar output (ie area crime profiles) on a regular basis.
Are there facilities to record the steps used to carry out the analysis so that it can
be repeated at a later date (eg store the details of a series of cross tabulations for
regular use)?
Temporal analysis
The time and date of an offence are key variables for LCA. They are likely
to play a part in most analyses undertaken, whether as a parameter in
identifying crime series or clusters, generating information about crime
25
ANALYSING THE DATA
trends (short or long term), or providing an analytic variable for case-

linking. Equally it is important, if comparative analysis is to be undertaken,
that data is collected over a sufficient time scale to allow these analyses to be
made. Work in the repeat victimisation field has demonstrated the
importance of the time ‘window’ chosen for analysis. For example, if one is
attempting to identify repeat crimes, a study of crime in a one week period
will show virtually no repeat victimisation. “This is because crimes which
are noted during the observed week may be repeats of crime the week before,
or may be precursors of crimes in the subsequent week. Even though some of
the crimes are in fact repeat crimes or linked to future repeat crimes, by
research of this kind they are observed as ‘single incident’ crimes” (Farrell
and Pease, 1993).
If the period of study is increased, or data is collected over a sufficiently long

period of time, the problem of the time-window will be minimised. In the
LCA field the likely requirement to undertake comparative analysis over
long time periods (ie levels of burglary in the first six months of the year,
compared to a similar period the previous year) should allay concerns about
this problem.
The accuracy of the data collected on the time at which certain high volume
crimes were committed also has an impact on the type of analysis that can be
undertaken. While it is relatively easy to record the time an assault took
place, this is not necessarily the case for a burglary or motor-vehicle crime.
When an offence has been committed overnight, or during a period when
the house was unoccupied, then there will be a range, covering the earliest
and latest times possible for the offence to have occurred, rather than a
single definite time. If the offence has taken place while the vehicle owner
or occupier was absent for some time (on holiday, for example) the result
may be a range that covers a period of weeks. This may pose problems for
some types of analyses. If the analyst is looking at the distribution of crimes
across days of the week, or examining whether certain types of offence are
occurring during the day, or at night, the inability to state precisely when a
crime took place presents obvious difficulties. In order to compensate for
this some LCA systems have introduced weightings where those crimes
where the time of commission can be accurately estimated are weighted
more heavily than those where the time of commission is more vague (see
Brunsdon, 1989).
26
ANALYSING THE DATA
Does the system allow crimes where the time of the offence is known to be
weighted for analytical purposes?.
Spatial analysis
The mapping of crime data is not new to the police. Prior to the
introduction of GIS software police forces were using (and some continue to
use) manual ‘pin-maps’ to visually display the distribution of crime, and to
identify crime clusters (see, for example, an account of analysis by
Hampshire police by Neyroud, 1985). The emergence of GIS systems has
provided the police with the ability to map and manipulate data sets, or
subsets from data sets, faster, and to link crime data with other data.
Crime data can be mapped in several ways. It can be represented as points or

dots on a map. Alternatively data can be represented for areas by shadings or
colours (referred to as choropleth maps, with dark areas usually indicating
areas of low incidence, and light areas indicating high incidence). Finally,
data can be indicated as contours, where points of equal value are connected
by lines (contours), and the area between the contour lines are considered of
equal value.
In order to map data for LCA it is necessary to provide it with a geographical

reference (usually a northing and easting). Some forces already geocode
their crime data, when put onto the crime recording system for example, but
if this is not the case, then forces wilt have to consider how, by whom, and to
what level of detail, this referencing is undertaken. In some forces the police
officers completing the crime report, or the staff inputting the crime data,
generate the geographical reference by looking up the location of the crime
on a map and ascribing it a reference point. However, not only is this time
consuming, but it can also be prone to inaccuracies.
A far better solution is the introduction of a gazetteer which will

automatically assign a grid reference to the crime when the address is
entered. Basically, gazetteers operate as ‘look-up’ tables, containing a list of
addresses with their corresponding reference (geocode). Yet even this
solution has flaws. For example, if the address details on the crime report are
different from the address on the gazetteer (ie misspelt, or in a different
order) it will not be possible to generate a reference for the crime, and
manual intervention will be required.
27
ANALYSING THE DATA
There are also problems that arise as a result of the particular nature of police
work. Most gazetteers contain details of specific addresses within an area.
Difficulties arise when offences occur-at a location other than the specific
location identified in the gazetteer. For example, a vehicle may be stolen in
the street rather from a house, and may be recovered on waste-ground. In
these circumstances a gazetteer may not be able to provide a reference for the
offence.
Ordnance Survey (OS) are currently developing a product called

ADDRESS-POINT which will eventually provide every postal address
nationally with a grid reference accurate to one metre, together with a
unique property reference identifier (to distinguish between those addresses
with a common grid reference, blocks of flats for example). However, the
annual cost of ADDRESS-POINT, based on the non-discounted rate of 12p
per address (applicable for the first 400,000 addresses) is likely to be well
1 Ordnance Survey 1995 Price List. outside the budget of most divisions!1
Is there a facility to assist with geographical referencing?

What address features can be uniquely referenced using the facility (e.g.
postcode, street, house number)?
How accurate is the unique reference?
How is the referencing facility set up and kept up to date?
How does the facility react to an address that it does not have a reference for
(a new address in the area, an address outside the area or a misspelling)?
How does the facility react to an address that it has more than one reference for
(eg more than one ‘12 High Street’ in area)?
How does the system deal with a non-addressable incident?
Police forces need to consider the level of accuracy acceptable when

geocoding crime, and again, this level should be determined by the type of
analysis that is going to be undertaken. Some police forces are content to
geocode their crimes by postcode (accurate to 100 metres). If the primary
focus of LCA is the provision of managment information, and the aim of
the analysis is to see the general distribution of crime across the division,
then this may be sufficient. However, if the intention is to analyse repeat
victimisation then clearly it will be necessary to identify individual addresses
on the map, and to geocode the data more precisely.
28
ANALYSING THE DATA
Mapping facilities
In the past there has been a tendency for police forces to become seduced by
the appeal of GIS. Currently there are innumerable commercial concerns
offering GIS systems to the police for the purpose of ‘crime pattern analysis’.
Often these systems have been developed in a non-police environment, but
are offered on the basis that they can be ‘tweaked’ to meet police
requirements. Bearing in mind the likely cost of a GIS system it is important
that police forces plan how the GIS component will be used in analysis, and
what its benefits are likely to be, before investing in such a system.2 2 See Gunston (1993) for a detailed
Openshaw suggests that one of the primary reasons for the failure of a GIS account of issues involved in the
application is the quality of the product specification. “Many users are purchase of GIS
simply too vague and either ask the vendor to provide the system
specification for them or else they do it themselves without any clear idea of
what GIS can do and how precisely the final system will perform”
(Openshaw et al).
Level of geographical data required
In order to set the location of crimes in context when displayed through the
mapping facility there needs to be some digitised geographical data (ie
computer based maps) as a background. Digitised geographical data is
commercially available at great levels of detail (eg showing fences and bay
windows of houses) - and at great expense. Alternatively maps can be
digitised specifically for the LCA system. Police forces need to consider
what level of detail they require when mapping crimes; are they content with
an outline of the division showing beat boundaries and major roads, or do
they require a map that shows individual house and garden boundaries?
Once again, the decision about the level of map to use should be determined
by the analytic task being undertaken, and the type of data that has been
collected. There is little point in obtaining high resolution maps if the data
is geocoded to a lower level. The result will be crimes which, although they
appear to be precisely attached to an individual address, in reality could have
been located anywhere on a relatively broad area of the map.
29
ANALYSING THE DATA
Where is the digitised map data obtained from?

What is the availability of this data?
Are special facilities required to capture the map data (eg digitising tablet or
compact disk drive)?
Is there a facility to digitise local boundaries and points of police interest
(eg beats, neighbourhood watch areas and local crime generators)?
Can different geographical data sets be captured as different layers?
What are the physical limits of the system (maximum number of layers, cells,
icons, etc.)?
Displaying and manipulating data
At their most basic, all mapping facilities should be able to represent the
location of individual crimes as a symbol (icon) on the computer based map.
However, it is likely that the crime analyst will require a range of additional
facilities from the mapping application to assist in the display of the data,
and to facilitate the investigation and interpretation of patterns, trends and
clusters.
Can the mapping facility display crimes as icons overlaid on the map
background?
Can the shape/size/colour of the icon be linked to specified crime feature(s) (eg a
red cross for burglaries through rear doors)?
Can the shape/size/colour of the icon be linked to the number of crimes
occurring at a single geographic reference (eg larger dots for multiple crimes at a
single location)?
What are the limits associated with customising icons in this way?
Can the analyst zoom in/out and pan across the map image?
Can the crime record be displayed through interaction with the map (ie point
and click at the icon to access the associated crime record)?
Can crimes be selected and summary details displayed by specifying an area of
interest on the map (within a user defined radius of a selected point, within a
user defined polygon or a pre-defined digitised area)?
Can the mapping facility easily combine and display geographically referenced
non-crime data sets? Are there any restrictions?
30
ANALYSING THE DATA
Can the mapping facility manipulate and display aggregated crime data over
specified areas (eg colour or shade beats according to crime rates)?
Are any automatic pattern/trend/cluster identification facilities offered?
Can they be shown to work?
Are they likely to be of use?
Costs
There ate now GIS systems on the market that offer the police a variety of
different scaled maps within the same package. This means that the level of
the mapped display can be tailored to fit the specific task being undertaken.
In the past the cost of detailed OS maps often proved prohibitive to police
forces, particularly at a divisional or sub-divisional level, and meant that
forces could only afford cheaper maps that did not offer the same detailed
resolution. While these costs are now decreasing, and forces may be able to
obtain copies of OS digitised maps (with some restrictions) from local
authorities for minimal cost, it is important to recognise that the costs of GIS
are still high, and GIS technology may need to be thought about as a
resource for the whole force rather than the division. Unless considered
carefully this element of the system can easily put the cost of LCA way
beyond the available budget.
What are the costs for the digitised map data?

What are the additional hardware, operating system and software requirements?
What additional peripheral equipment is required (eg digitiser, colour printer)?
What are their costs for purchase, maintenance and support?
What are the training requirements and costs?
‘Hot Spot’ analysis and predictive facilities
The identification and analysis of crime ‘hot-spots’ is not a new area of

analysis for the police. In an article that describes the failure of a police GIS,
Openshaw et al suggest that one of the inherent weaknesses of the system
was that it was only capable of mapping crime data; the analysis and
interpretation of the data was left entirely to the operator. In these
circumstances Openshaw suggests that “there is too much data for the
31
ANALYSING THE DATA
human being to cope with and the incorporation of appropriate statistical

and geographical analysis procedures is needed to simplify the data analysis
task” (Openshaw et al). What is required is a system which would identify
interesting patterns automatically, which could be subsequently interrogated
in greater detail by the crime analyst.
As Sherman’s 1989 study demonstrated, there are areas where, for a variety
of reasons, the incidence of crime is higher (or lower) than probability would
lead one to expect. An LCA system which could automatically identify
crime ‘hot spots’ with the crime analyst having to perform the barest
minimum of functions (typing in the date or offence criteria, for example)
has an obvious appeal to police forces. Such a tool could be used to pinpoint
police resources where they were most, or least, needed, to target patrols, or
to assist in the placing of closed circuit television cameras.
A number of LCA systems claim to be able to identify these relationships

within crime data automatically, and to present these patterns to the analyst
for further examination. As well as ‘hot-spot’ analysis these systems may also
offer predictive facilities (where the future location of crime is predicted on
the basis of previous occurrences).
Brunsdon (1989) suggests that “it is essential that the computer system ...
‘hides’ the internal statistical analyses, and presents results in terms of output
more meaningful to police managers or crime pattern analysts” who,
“although experts in the analysis of crime patterns, may not have the
training to directly apply these statistical methods, or interpret their output”.
While the latter is probably true, police officers are likely to remain wary of a
predictive system whose logic is ‘hidden’ from them unless, and until, the
accuracy of the algorithms that generate these patterns is proved
operationally. On a rather more fundamental level there remain concerns
about the flexibility of these algorithms, and their ability to take account of
ephemeral, localised factors that may impact on crime levels, but which may
not be collected by the LCA database.
Can the algorithms be shown to work reliably with live data?

Are any relationships identified by the algorithms likely to be of use
or are the vast majority spurious, trivial or false alarms?
What are the associated costs for this clement of the system?
What is the training requirement for this element of the system?
32
ANALYSING THE DATA
Expert systems
Similar reservations would seem to apply to the development of ‘expert

systems’ for use in the analysis of high volume crime. An expert system may
be defined as a “computer program which attempts to simulate the way in
which human experts solve problems. It also seeks to enhance that
performance, by utilizing the computer’s capacity to carry out many and
complex operations, simultaneously and rapidly, over a large database”
(Gallagher, 1990). The appeal of the expert system to the police is readily
apparent, with its ability to utilise the experience of specialists in
investigating high volume crimes to generate analytical ‘rules’ that can be
subsequently applied to similar types of offences in the absence of these
specialists.
However, there are a number of problems inherent in the development and

application of these systems. The American REBES project (REsidential
Burglary Expert System) was launched in the belief that it might be possible
“to establish a ‘behavioural fingerprint’ ie a number of discrete actions which
when taken together, would point to an individual, or small group of
criminals, thus making further investigation viable”. These ‘behavioural
fingerprints’ were established by asking experienced burglary detectives to
link, in the form of ‘if - then’ statements, the characteristics of burglaries. As
a result, a number of ‘rules’ were devised that were then used to query a
burglary database. At the end of the query the system produced a profile of
the offender, details of the rules activated during the search, and a list of
suspects, based upon a comparison of the rules and profiles used (Gallagher,
1990).
Once again, the types of analysis claimed for this system rely on the
offending behaviour of an individual remaining constant; identifying ‘likely
offenders’ for an offence by comparison of an unsolved case with solved cases
(or, conversely, indicating cases that a convicted offender may have
committed), or identifying serial offenders by identifying open cases with
similar characteristics. The limitations of this approach would appear to be
recognised by the designers of REBES in their suggestion that an additional
benefit of the system is its “ability to compare behaviour of a particular
offender over a number of separate arrests or admissions, and establish the
consistency of his/her criminal behaviour” (Gallagher, 1990). It is not clear,
however, how information about possible fluctuations in offending behaviour
over time is fed back to REBES and used to amend the analytic rules,
33
ANALYSING THE DATA
particularly as the system appears to assume that offending behaviour is

consistent.
A more fundamental concern about the REBES system is the validity of the
rules upon which the ‘offender profile’ and list of suspects are based. In
Baltimore, 397 rules for burglaries were generated by detectives. The rules
3 The criteria for the opinion scale were validated by asking other detectives within the force to indicate the
were ‘Strongly Agree’, ‘Agree’, extent to which they agreed with the statement using a five point scale.3 Any
‘No Opinion’, ‘Disagree’, and statement that engendered 60% or more disagreement was rejected.
‘Strongly Disagree’ (Gallagher p12)
There are obvious concerns that in using one group of detectives to validate
the opinions of others the system does little more than reinforce the
prevalent stereotypes that exist within the police about the characteristics of
burglars. Although the system may successfully lead to the apprehension of
an offender it will be biased towards those who conform to those criteria
advanced by the police, and there is little evidence of the accuracy of these
criteria. For example, while a rule that proclaims “entry by scam or
deception is the work of gypsies” (one of the original 397 statements
produced in Baltimore) may lead to the conviction of a number of gypsy
burglars, it may say little about the majority of those who commit burglary by
artifice. Clearly this raises questions as to how accurate detectives’
perceptions about the behaviour of an offender at the scene of a crime are,
and on what these perceptions are based.
On what basis are the ‘experts’ who inform the system selected?
How are the rules within the expert system generated?
Once generated, how are the rules validated?
How reliable are the rules that result?
How is the system up-dated in the light of subsequent analysis?
34
GENERAL ISSUES
5. General issues
Dissemination
Output from LCA is likely to be required for a wide variety of purposes, in a

variety of different forms. The use of business graphics (ie pie charts, bar
charts and graphs etc) to display the results from LCA can assist in their
interpretation and enhance their impact. Similarly, it may be necessary to
incorporate the output from LCA into word-processed text, for example as
reports or as briefing documents.
Does the LCA facility have an integral business graphics facility?

Can sub-sets of crime data be easily exported and interpreted into a business
graphics facility?
Are there facilities to integrate the products of the analysis (eg lists, tables, charts,
graphs and maps) with word processed text?
Can suitable print out be produced by the facility (including draft and high
quality)?
What are the costs associated with this element of the system?
It is particularly important to be able to disseminate good quality hard-copy

from the mapping facility of an LCA application. The impact and value of
detailed digitised maps is diminished if it proves impossible to print quality
paper copies of what is shown on the computer screen.
Can the facility produce hard copy of maps including clear representation of icons
or shading?
Can an operator specify which layers/sets of data are to be printed?
Are explanatory details of the output (eg key to icons scale of map, operator
identity and date of production) automatically included on the hard copy?
Are both draft and good quality hard copy available?
Are both monochrome and colour printing options available?
How long does it take to produce a print-out?
Can the size of the print-out be controlled?
35
GENERAL ISSUES
Training
The development of menu-driven LCA systems, and the ability to save and
recall frequently repeated data queries, has led to a decrease in the level of
computing expertise required of police officers in order to analyse data.
Nevertheless, the importance of training in the LCA field should not be
under-estimated. At present, little training is offered to crime analysts; in
the main they are expected to learn ‘on the job’. As a result it is important
that LCA systems are designed to be easy to use and require little training.
What is the overall training requirement for the system?

Does the system have any interactive training facilities?.
Can menu structures, screen designs and other interface features be customised to
meet the local requirement?
Does the system have an on-line help facility?
Does the system support both new users and advanced users?
How easy is it to navigate through the elements of the system?
Can each of the analysis facilities support a library of regularly used operations?
Are the system response times adequate for interactive use?
Support for LCA systems
At present it is unlikely that a police force will be able to purchase an system

‘off the shelf’ and install it without tailoring it to suit local requirements.
The system will requite adaptation to link it to existing computer systems
within the force, database structures will require amending, and the analytic
output may need to be developed to meet local requirements. Indeed,
Openshaw has suggested that customisation is crucial to the success of a GIS
system.
In addition, once the LCA system is in operation there will be a requirement

to support the system, in case of any breakdown. Computerised crime
analysis is still a relatively new discipline within the police service, and most
police forces are currently still deciding on the potential use of, and
requirements from an LCA system. As a result, existing LCA systems are
likely still to be developmental and to evolve further in the future.
36
GENERAL ISSUES
For all the reasons outlined above, it is essential that forces ensure that the
LCA supplier offers comprehensive and reliable support for the system. If
this is not the case, police forces may find themselves saddled with a system
that is inflexible, where they cannot obtain prompt support in the event of
breakdown, and where the supplier has little interest in the continued
development of the system. Too often in the past individual police forces
have developed LCA facilities with local software houses or academic
institutions. These LCA facilities have subsequently withered on the vine
when the individuals responsible for the development have moved on.
Commercial suppliers will specify a minimum configuration for the computer

hardware required to support the LCA system (eg in terms of speed of
computer or size of disk storage). It is important that police forces ensure
that system limitations in terms of the volume of data that can be handled,
processing speeds and so on do not fall short of local requirements.
What are the hardware, operating system and software requirements for the LCA
facility?
What are the associated purchase, set up, maintenance and support costs?
Are all elements available and supported in the UK?
Are facilities available to assist with data back up, weeding and archiving?
What are the other resource costs for the system (eg manpower for data capture,
geo-referencing, housekeeping)?
Overall police forces should ask the following basic quest ions of an LCA
application:-
Is the system sufficiently robust to operate at sub-divisional level?

Is the system sufficiently cheap to be implemented at sub-divisional level?
Is the system sufficiently supported to be implemented at sub-divisional level?
Can the system provide a high level of availability for all routine operations?
37
GENERAL ISSUES
Finally forces must assess the security requirements for their implementation
of LCA systems.
Can password security be set up?

Can the system limit functionality according to user type (analyst, system
manager, data inputter, read-only enquiries)?
38
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6. Conclusions and recommendations
Current use of LCA by forces
Currently there are a number of police forces using LCA systems. The
functionality, sophistication and cost of these systems varies enormously.
Similarly the extent to which they undertake the various functions that
comprise ‘crime analysis’ differs; some forces utilise systems that provide only
tabular output for crime trend or management information purposes, other
forces (admittedly the minority) have adopted high-cost, networked GIS
applications. The genesis of these systems also varies widely. While some
forces have adapted commercially available packages, other forces have
developed systems internally, or in partnership with academic institutions.
In the past it was probably true to say that, with a few exceptions, the
provision of crime analysis within a force tended to arise as a result of local
initiative or interest, often on the part of divisional or sub-divisional
management. As a result there are a number of forces who currently have a
range of different LCA systems operating within the force (one metropolitan
force has at least six separate crime analysis systems within force).
While such a situation smacks of duplication, it has to be remembered that

these systems developed in the absence of force or national guidance on
crime analysis. In addition it has been the systems developed from local
initiatives that have demonstrated the operational effectiveness of high
volume crime analysis. The predominantly local impetus behind the
development of LCA systems has ensured that the systems tend to be low-
cost, and personal-computer based.
A number of police forces, however, are now undertaking force-wide reviews

of their crime analysis requirements encouraged by the focus of the Audit
Commission and HMIC on crime analysis. Currently several forces are
developing user specifications to meet these requirements. The all-
encompassing scope of these reviews, and the likely cost of their
procurement, mean that they go some way beyond the remit of this piece of
work.
Nevertheless, these reviews are in their early stages at present, and only a
minority of forces are undertaking them, which suggests that there will be a
role for open, low-cost, flexible LCA systems in the short term at least.
Appendix B of this report provides a list of manufacturers and police forces
contacted during the course of this research. The list is neither definitive
39
nor comprehensive, and should not be construed as constituting a Police

Research Group ‘seal of approval’, but gives some idea of the range of systems
that have been developed to undertake ‘crime analysis’.
Recommendations
This report has not attempted to produce a user specification for an LCA
system, or provide a detailed appraisal of existing systems because it was felt
that this approach was too prescriptive. Such a specification could not take
into account the different requirements for LCA that police forces might
have locally, or the current uses of technology within the force. What it has
done is to identify the decisions and issues that forces will need to tackle in
deciding which LCA systems are right for them. The questions found in
sections three, four and five of this report, and brought together in appendix
B, should be used by the police to inform the development of their user
specification, and thus as a means of evaluating the extent to which
commercially available LCA packages meet their specific requirements. The
following are some of the key issues which need to be addressed in achieving
this:
☞ In order to produce a robust user specification for LCA the force or

(sub)division needs a clear perception of the type of crime analysis it
wishes to undertake, the purpose of the analysis, who the users of the
output will be, and what their output requirements are. All these
decisions need to be clarified long before they approach the
manufacturers of LCA systems.
☞ The type of data collected for LCA should always be dictated by the
type of analysis required, rather than the reverse. Too often in the past
the form of analysis done by the police has been determined by the
form of data held on existing IT systems.
☞ Data taken from crime recording systems may not be sufficient to allow
the force to undertake LCA. Links to alternative data sources, both
within and outside the police force, should be established where
necessary.
☞ LCA systems must have the potential to down-load data from existing
data sources. The manual input of LCA data should be avoided
wherever possible.
40
☞ Police forces should seek to develop conventions to govern the

recording of data used for crime analysis to minimise problems in its
inputting and subsequent analysis.
☞ It is essential that data can be interchanged between LCA applications,

at an inter- and intra-force level. As a result the police, even at a local
level, must take account of data standards and the emergent national
IS/IT strategy in the procurement of LCA systems.
☞ Prior to the purchase of a GIS application, police forces need to

identify their purpose in mapping crime data, and the level of
resolution required as a result. These considerations will have
repercussions in terms of the costs of the system. Where resources for
mapping are limited links with local authorities, who may already have
access to high-resolution digitised maps, may provide a solution.
☞ In purchasing an LCA system police forces should recognise that the

area is relatively new and is still developing. Requirements from LCA
systems are likely to evolve. In these circumstances it is crucial that
the LCA suppliers are able to provide a high level of support for the
package, to ensure its continued operation and development.
☞ It is important that police forces identify the training requirements

needed to undertake LCA. This training should go beyond
instructions on how to operate the LCA system, and must include
training on the type and purpose of analysis required.
41
REFERENCES
References
Audit Commission (1993) Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively,

Audit Commission: Police Paper No 12. London: HMSO.
Audit Commission (1994) Tackling Crime Effectively: Management

Handbook.
Berry, G. and Carter, M. (1992) Assessing Crime Prevention Initiatives: The

First Steps: Crime Prevention Unit Paper No.31. London: Home Office.
Block, C. R. (1992) Automated Spatial Analysis as a Tool in Violence

Reduction. Unpublished paper presented to Problem-Oriented Policing
Conference, Police Executive Research Forum, San Diego,
October 16, 1992.
Bridgeman, C. and Sampson, A. (1994) Wise After the Event: Tackling

Repeat Victimisation. A Report by the National Board for Crime Prevention.
London: Home Office.
Brown, P. J. B., Hirschfield, A. and Batey, P. W. J. (1991) ‘Applications of

Geodemographic Methods in the Analysis of Health Condition Incidence
Data’ in Papers in Regional Science: The Journal of the RSAI 70, 3.
Brunsdon, C. F. M. (1989) Spatial Analysis Techniques Applied to Local Crime

Patterns. Unpublished, PhD thesis, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.
Dale, A. and Lynch, I. ‘Profiling the burglars’ in Police Review, 3 June 1994.
Ekblom, P. (1987) Getting the Best out of Crime Analysis. Crime Prevention
Unit Paper No 10. London: Home Office.
Farrell, G. and Pease, K. (1993) Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: Repeat

Victimisation and its Implications for Crime Prevention. Crime Prevention Unit
Paper 46, London: Home Office.
Farrell, G. and Pease, K. (1994) ‘Crime Seasonality: Domestic Disputes and

Residential Burglary in Merseyside 1988-90’ in British Journal of Criminology
Vol 34 No4 Autumn 1994.
Farrington, D. P. and Lambert, S. D. (1992) The Feasibility of a Statistical

Approach to Offender Profiling: Burglary and Violence in Nottinghamshire.
Unpublished.
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Forrester, D., Chatterton, M. and Pease, K. (1988) The Kirkholt Burglary

Prevention Project, Rochdale. Crime Prevention Unit Paper 13. London:
Home Office.
Gallagher, K. P. (1990) Expert Systems In The U.S.A. Unpublished, Thames

Valley Police.
Gill, M., Hart, J., Livingstone, K. and Stevens, J. (forthcoming) Case

allocation and police investigations into burglary and auto crime. Police Research
Series. London: Home Office.
Goldstein, H. (1990) Problem-Oriented Policing. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Gunston, M. (1993) Geographic Information Systems: A Buyer’s Guide.

London: HMSO.
Hagell, A. and Newburn, T. (1994) Persistent Young Offenders. London:

Policy Studies Institute.
Home Office (1994) The National Strategy for Police Information Systems.
Johnston, V., Shapland, J. and Wiles, P. (1993) Developing Police Crime

Prevention: Crime Analysis. Unpublished.
Light, R., Nee, C. and Ingham, H. (1993) Car Theft: The Offenders
Perspective. Home Office Research Study 130. London: HMSO.
Merseyside Police. (1993) Evaluation of the Newton-Ie-Willows Joint

Community Safety Initiative, Operation Newburg. Unpublished.
Minnebo, P. (1) (1992) ‘Talking About Crime Analysis’ in van der Heijden, T.
and Kolthoff, E. (eds) Crime Analysis: a tool for crime control. Den Haag: Ben
Baruch.
Minnebo, P. (2) ‘Talking About Crime Analysis’ in Recherche

Informatiebulletin. CRI July 1992.
Neyroud, P. W. (1985) Incident Pattern Analysis: the Management of Police

Resources in Preventing Crime. Hampshire Constabulary.
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National Criminal Intelligence Service Training Package, Session 19,

Comparative Case Analysis.
Oldfield, R. (1992) A Review of Crime Pattern Analysis in the UK Police

Service. Police Research Group, unpublished.
Openshaw, S., Cross, A., Charlton, M. and Brunsdon, C. (undated)

Lessons learnt from a Post Mortem of a failed GIS.
Poyner, B. and Webb, B. (1992) ‘Reducing theft from shopping bags in city
center markets’ in R. V. Clarke (ed) Situational Crime Prevention, Successful
Case Studies. New York: Harrow and Heston.
Ratledge, E. C. and Jacoby, J. E. (1989) Handbook on Artificial Intelligence

and Expert Systems in Law Enforcement. New York: Greenwood Press.
Reinier, G. H., Greenlee, M. R., Gibbens, M. H. and Marshall, S. (1977)

Crime Analysis in Support of Patrol. National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United
States Department of Justice.
Sherman, L. W., Gartin, P. R. and Buerger, M. E. (1989) ‘Hot Spots Of

Predatory Crime: Routine Activities And The Criminology Of Place’.
Criminology, Vol 27, Number 1, Feb 1989.
STAC (1993) ‘An Early Warning System for Violence’ in STAC News,
Volume 1, No 1, Winter 1993.
Stockdale, J. E. and Gresham, P. J. (1995) Combating Burglary: An

evaluation of three strategies. Crime Detection and Prevention Series No59.
44
APPENDIX
Appendix A. The Trevi definition of crime analysis
The Trevi definition of crime analysis differentiates between two basis types
of analysis; ‘strategic’ and ‘operational’. Types of analysis designed to aid the
formation of policy are termed ‘strategic’, while those designed to support the
investigation of a particular case are termed ‘operational’.
Strategic analysis aims to provide information which can provide a picture of

a phenomenon, and which can identify trends in criminality on which
management can base their decisions. This allows for the initiation of plans
of action against emerging crime on a long-term basis, rather than merely
reacting to a single criminal act.
Operational analysis aims to provide an understanding of the information

collected during a specific investigation. It may involve the identification of
links between individuals and/or events, an indication of where further work
needs to be undertaken, or an indication of conflicting information.
Eight specific forms of crime analysis are identified.
Strategic forms of analysis
1. Crime Pattern Analysis which attempts to form a picture of the nature

and scale of crime in a particular area. The size of the area, or the type and
number of crimes examined, may vary. Descriptive, or inferential statistics
are used for analysis, which may be supplemented by qualitative material.
2. General Profile Analysis which aims to identify typical characteristics of

perpetrators of certain crimes. There is no set method for general profile
analysis, which tends to involve the combination of judicial information
with information from “human sciences, experience, and common sense, in
order to arrive at useful principles for police practice”. (The quoted example
of this technique is its use, by Dutch Customs, to spot suspected drug couriers
on the basis of factors such as passport, clothing, behaviour, nervousness etc).
General profile analyses may focus not only on the offender, but also on the
likely victim of crime.
3. Crime Control Methods Analysis aims to learn from the experience

gained with techniques and tactics used during previous police actions. In
other words, it involves the evaluation of methods and techniques
introduced with the aim of establishing their future usefulness.
45
APPENDIX A
Operational forms of analysis
4. Case Analysis attempts to establish the course of events immediately

before, during, and after, a serious offence. This involves charting a relevant
(offender, victim or witness) individuals’ activities chronologically. The
evolution of the chart, particularly the existence of any areas of confusion or
uncertainty, indicates areas for further analysis.
5. Comparative Case Analysis seeks to detect similarities between crimes -

that point to the same perpetrator or groups of perpetrators.
6. Offender Group Analysis aims to provide all available information on

contacts between certain individuals contained on police records, and
connect this to their possible involvement in criminal activities. In this type
of analysis a number of diagrammatic techniques will be used; relational
diagrams, event charts, activity charts and flow charts for money and goods.
7. Specific Profile Analysis which involves constructing a hypothetical

picture of the perpetrator of a crime on the basis of data from the scene of
the crime, witnesses’ statements and other available information. (This type
of analysis is perhaps more commonly known by the term Offender
Profiling’).
8. Investigations Analysis involves the study and evaluation of activities

that are undertaken within the context of an investigation, with the aim of
rounding off that investigation and of identifying courses of action that have
not been pursued (Minnebo, 1992 [1]).
46
APPENDIX B
Appendix B. Local crime analysis checklist
What follows is a ‘checklist’ for LCA systems designed to provide guidance

to police forces (and inform software manufacturers) on the functionality
required from an LCA system. It is not a technical specification, as it was
felt that this would be too prescriptive to be of general use to the police, but
deals with the various components that constitute an LCA system; database
facilities, analytic facilities, mapping facilities, as well as a section covering
general requirements.
The checklist provides a framework to assist with the evaluation of systems

offered to support the LCA process. For each element a number of questions
are asked to establish how well the system under evaluation will support
LCA and what the accompanying resource commitments are likely to be.
While the checklist is designed to be comprehensive, there may be specific

local considerations that are not covered in it. These should be added to the
checklist. Equally, any factors that are super-nummary to local requirements
should be disregarded.
Uses for LCA
Prior to any detailed decisions being taken about the specification of an LCA
system, it is important that the police identify the purpose(s) for which the
system will be used.
Which of the following is LCA to be used for:-

Identification of patterns of crime?
Management information/crime accounting?
Identification of emerging problems for focused policing?
Identification of crime/incident ‘hot-spots’?
Identification of repeat victimisation?
Identification of crime series/repeat offenders?
Evaluation of police activities/initiatives?
Type of data required for LCA
The type of data collected for LCA will depend on the type of analysis that
the police wish to undertake. This relates both to the variables that are
collected, and their format and detail. However, the following questions
indicate the likely core data requirements for an LCA system.
47
APPENDIX B
Does the system record the date and time the crime/incident took place?
(If the exact time of the crime/incident is not known, can the system
display the range of possible times, earliest/latest time/date?,)
Does the system record the location of the crime/incident?
(‘Location’ may comprise a number of variables, ranging in detail, ie
property number/name, street, beat etc, However, it should include a
geographical reference for the crime/incident)
Does the system record details of the crime/incident?
(This should include the characteristics of the offence/incident, the MO,
whether the crime was detected, and details of stolen property).
Does the system contain data on offender characteristics (where
known/applicable)?
Does the system provide, where relevant, information on the victim?
Does the system allow a unique victim identifier to be allocated?
Does the system provide/allow access to non-crime data (ie demographic data)?
Database facilities
Central to an LCA system is its ability to capture, hold and manipulate

crime data. This will be achieved through a database facility.
i) How easy is it to set the database up?
There will be some variation in the way that databases are set up to take
account of local requirements. The database will need to hold a core set of
data required for LCA together with any other information required locally.
If no facilities are provided for in-force personnel to set the database up then
expensive specialist support may be required.
Is an easy-to-use facility provided to set up the database?

Can the database be changed subsequently to include new data fields and field
entries?
ii) How easy is it to capture/input data?
There will be a daily requirement to capture crime data and there may be an
occasional requirement to capture supplementary crime data and non-crime
data (e.g. census data). Often some or all of this data will be held already on
another computer system. It is not desirable to duplicate the manual entry of
this data onto the LCA system, but this may be the only practical method
when the system is first installed.
48
APPENDIX B
Can data be captured through an on-line link or by transfer via a magnetic

medium?
Can a data link be set up and operated without specialist support?
Are facilities available to design structured data entry forms for manual input?
Can the structured forms support mandatory fields, look up tables, dates/times
and shorthand coded entries?
Are shorthand coded entries automatically expanded into full field entries on
input?
Can the facility retrieve for editing an individual record by its unique crime
number?
Can data capture/input facilities be easily amended in response to changing
requirements?
Can data be validated against a table of allowable field entries during manual
input?
Can data be validated retrospectively after transfer from another system? How
is the table of valid field entries built and maintained?
iii) Does the facility assist with geographical referencing?
Many LCA techniques require crimes to be geographically referenced (ie

allocated a northing and easting). In a few forces crimes may be already
geographically referenced when captured. For the remaining users, an
automated referencing system will provide advantages over the manual
referencing of every crime from a paper map. Gazetteers are viewed as good
solutions to this problem, whereby a user enters the address of die crime and
the system automatically allocates the appropriate grid reference.
Is there a facility to assist with geographical referencing?

What address features can be uniquely referenced using the facility (e.g.
postcode, street, house number)?
How accurate is the unique reference?
How is the referencing facility set up and kept up to date?
How does the facility react to an address that it does not have a reference for
(a new address in the area, an address outside the area or a misspelling)?
How does the facility react to an address that it has more than one reference
for (eg more than one 12 High Street’ in area)?
How does the system deal with a non-addressable incident?
49
APPENDIX B
iv) Is adequate functionality for searching the database provided?
The database facility will be used to search the data to retrieve individual
records or assemble sets of records satisfying some criteria.
Can the facility search on all coded data fields?

Does the system support range matching (eg to match ranges of dates or
times)?
Can the facility search text fields for non-coded (free text) entries?
Does the system support synonym matching (eg red jumper matches red
pullover)?
Can search factors be combined using the Boolean operators (and/or/not/nor)?
Can search criteria be saved and edited?
Can the facility retrieve all records that have been created or amended since a
specified date?
Does the searching facility support inexperienced users (eg through pre-defined
options menu or simple form filling)?
Does the facility support expert users (eg by providing shortcuts through
menus)?
Can the results of searches be displayed as a series of complete records, a list of
summary details from the records and within structured reports?
vi) Can the database facility produce the required outputs?
Analysts will use the database facility to select a sub-set of the crime data
which they will then wish to export to another analytical facility. (Whether
any real ‘output’ will be required to achieve this export will be dependent on
the architecture of the system.) Output is also required from the database
facility for print outs.
Can sub-sets of crime data be made avail-able immediately for further analysis
(e.g. cross tabulation or mapping)?
What standard file transfer formats can be produced by the facility? (eg ASCII
or DBF)
What other facilities are available to assist the transfer of data between the
database facility and other applications/systems?
Can the facility produce print outs of records, lists and structured reports?
Are explanatory details of the output (eg summary search criteria, operator
identity and date of production) automatically included on the print outs?
50
APPENDIX B
vi) What are the resource commitments for the database facility?
Suppliers will specify a minimum configuration for the system required to

support the database element of an LCA system (eg in terms of speed of
computer or size of disk storage). The assumptions made concerning the
volume of data, processing levels and response times must be compared
against the local requirement.
What are the hardware, operating system and software requirements for the
database facility?
What are the associated purchase, set up, maintenance and support costs?
Are all elements available and supported in the UK?
What are the limits of the database facility (maximum number of records, field
size, etc.)?
Are facilities available to assist with data back up, weeding and archiving?
What are the other resource costs for the database element (eg manpower for
data capture, geo- referencing, housekeeping)?
Analysis facilities
The ease with which sub-sets of crime data can be moved between analytical
applications will have a significant effect on the usability of the system.
i) Can crime data be displayed, manipulated and disseminated in tabulated form?
Cross-tabulation is seen as a ‘bread and butter’ technique for LCA. A facility

is required to break down and compare crime variables in a table to assist in
the identification of patterns and relationships between variables.
Can the facility automatically produce a table showing how many crimes exist
for each category of a single variable? (eg the system automatically identifies all
the MO codes that have been used and lists them showing the number of
crimes using them).
Can the facility automatically produce a table showing how many crimes exist
for each combination of categories for two or more variables? (eg automatically
tabulating MO codes against beats).
Can the facility handle ranges for dates/times etc.? (eg a crime is included if it
occurred between the dates specified).
51
APPENDIX B
Can a user specify the categories to be tabulated? (eg produce a table with a
user-nominated restricted set of MOs).
Can the facility convert the crime numbers into row percentages, column
percentages and table percentages?
Can summary tables be easily exported to other software applications (business
graphics/statistical package/spreadsheet)?
What are the limits of the facility (size of table, number of categories, etc.)?
Can suitable print outs be produced by the facility?
Ate special printing facilities requited for the production of large tables?
Are there any other special computer system requirements (eg maths
coprocessor)?
ii) Can crime data be displayed, manipulated and disseminated using simple
statistical techniques?
Statistical tools are required to help analysts interpret the significance of

patterns, trends and clusters in crime data. Analysts are unlikely to be
experienced statisticians, so such tools must be easy to use and interpret.
Does the facility support the production of general management information

statistics? (eg averages and standard deviations).
Does the facility support the analysis of variation of crime between two
specified periods?
Does the system allow crimes where the time of the offence is known to be
weighted for analytical purposes?
Does the facility support the analysis of trends of crime over a specified period?
Can the results of this analysis be easily exported into other software
applications?
Can suitable hard copy be produced by the facility?
iii) Can the results of crime data tabulations and the statistical analysis of crime
data be displayed and disseminated using business graphics tools?
52
APPENDIX B
Business graphics (pie charts, bar charts, graphs etc.) assist with the
interpretation and dissemination of the analysis.
Does the facility have an integral business graphics facility?

Can sub-sets of crime data be easily exported and interpreted into a business
graphics facility?
Can suitable print out be produced by the facility (including draft and high
quality)?
What are the costs associated with this element of the system?
iv) Can the results of analysis be integrated with word processed reports for
dissemination?
In many cases the results of an analysis will need to be supported by a written

report.
Are the facilities to integrate the products of the analysis (eg lists, tables,
charts, graphs and maps) with the word processed text?
Are there additional costs associated with this element of the system?
v) Are any automatic pattern/trend/cluster identification algorithms offered?
Most analysts use their knowledge of the crime data together with the
analytical tools already mentioned to develop and test hypotheses about
patterns, trends and clusters within their data. Some LCA systems claim to
be able to identify these relationships within crime data automatically. The
analysts are then presented with these apparent patterns to explore further.
Can the algorithms be shown to work reliably with live data?

Are any relationships identified by the algorithms likely to be of use or are the
vast majority spurious, trivial or false alarms?
What are the associated costs for this element of the system?
If an ‘expert system’ is required to undertake LCA, the following questions

should be asked.
53
APPENDIX B
On what basis are the ‘experts’ who inform the system selected?
How are the rules within the expert system generated?
Once generated, how are the rules validated?.
How reliable are the rules that result?
How is the system up-dated in the tight of subsequent analysis?
vi) Can the results of an analysis be saved for future reference?
Analysts may spend a number of hours interacting with a LCA system before
a pattern, cluster or trend is clearly identified. They will not wish to repeat
that amount of effort every time they wish to re-examine the pattern or show
it to somebody else.
Are there facilities to record the steps used to carry out the analysis so that it
can be repeated at a later date (eg store the details of a series of cross
tabulations for regular use)?
Mapping Facilities
Although computerised mapping facilities are viewed as another analytical

technique for LCA, they deserve particular consideration due to their
potential resource implications. Indeed the costs are such that GIS
technology may need to be thought about as a corporate resource for the
whole force, rather than trying to justify the investment through LCA alone.
i) How does the mapping facility capture digitised geographical data?
In order to set the location of crimes in context when displayed through the
mapping facility there needs to be some digitised geographical data (ie
computer based maps) as a background. Digitised geographical data is
commercially available at great levels of detail (eg showing fences and bay
windows of houses) - and at great expense. Alternatively maps can be
digitised specifically for the LCA system. The level of detail required will
depend on the type of analysis undertaken.
Where is the digitised map data obtained from?

What is the availability of this data?
Are special facilities required to capture the map data (eg digitising tablet or
54
APPENDIX B
compact disk drive)?

Is there a facility to digitise local boundaries and points of police interest (eg
beats, neighbourhood watch areas and local crime generators)?
Can different geographical data sets be captured as different layers?
What are the physical limits of the system (maximum number of layers, cells,
icons, etc.)?
ii) Is adequate functionality provided by the mapping facility?
All mapping facilities should be able to represent the location of individual

crimes as an icon positioned on the background digitised map information.
A range of other facilities may be required by the analyst to assist in the
investigation and interpretation of patterns, trends and clusters.
Can the mapping facility display crimes as icons overlaid on the map
background?
Can the shape/size/colour of the icon be linked to specified crime feature(s) (eg
a red cross for burglaries through rear doors)?
Can the shape/size/colour of the icon be linked to the number of crimes
occurring at a single geographic reference (eg larger dots for multiple crimes at
a single location)?
What are the limits associated with customising icons in this way?
Can the analyst zoom in/out and pan across the map image?
Can the crime record be displayed through interaction with the map (ie point
and click at the icon to access the associated crime record)?
Can crimes be selected and summary details displayed by specifying an area of
interest on the map (within a user defined radius of a selected point, within a
user defined polygon or an pre-defined digitised area)?
Can the mapping facility manipulate and display aggregated crime data over
specified areas (eg colour or shade beats according to crime rates)?
Are any automatic pattern/trend/cluster identification facilities offered?
Can they be shown to work?
Are they likely to be of use?
iii) Can the mapping facility provide access to other geographically referenced
data sets?
55
APPENDIX B
Occasionally an analyst will want to-combine crime data and other

geographically referenced data (eg local authority boundaries or census data)
over a map background
Can the mapping facility easily combine and display geographically referenced
non-crime data sets? Are there any restrictions?
iv) Can the mapping facility produce the required Output?

Whereas multi-coloured maps look good on computer screens, good quality
hard copy is required to assist with dissemination.
Can the facility produce hard copy of maps including clear representation of
icons or shading?
Can an operator specify which layers/sets of data are to be printed?
Are explanatory details of the output (eg key to icons, scale of map, operator
identity and date of production) automatically included on the hard copy?
Are both draft and good quality hard copy available?
Are both monochrome and colour printing options available?
How long does it take to produce a print-out?
Can the size of the print-out be controlled?
v) What are the resource commitments for this element of the system?
Being a relatively new technology, the costs of GIS are high. Unless
considered carefully this element of the system can easily put the cost of
LCA way beyond the available budget.
What are the costs for the digitised map data

(purchase/license/updates/support/cost per print)?
What are the additional hardware, operating system and software
requirements?
What additional peripheral equipment is required (eg digitiser, colour printer)?
What ace their costs for purchase, maintenance and support?
Other requirements
Other general system requirements are included in this final part of the
checklist.
56
APPENDIX B
i) Is the overall system easy to use
Users of LCA systems are unlikely to be trained computer specialists nor

experienced statisticians. LCA systems must be designed to be easy to use
with little training.
What is the overall training requirement for the system?

Does the system have any interactive training facilities?
Can menu structures, screen designs and other interface features be customised
to meet the local requirement?
Does the system have an on-line help facility?
Does the system support both new users and advanced users?
How easy is it to navigate through the elements of the system?
Can each of the analysis facilities support a library of regularly used operations?
Are the system response times adequate for interactive use?
ii) Is the system appropriate for sub-divisional use?
LCA systems tend to be used at the sub-divisional (or equivalent) level,

where there is the knowledge of local crime problems and control of the
resources to respond to the problems.
Is the system sufficiently robust to operate at sub-divisional level?

Is the system sufficiently cheap to be implemented at sub-divisional level?
Is the system sufficiently supported to be implemented at sub-divisional level?
Can the system provide a high level of availability for all routine operations?
iii) Does the system meet relevant standards?
Any investment in LCA systems must be seen as a contribution to the

overall development of computer support for the police.
Does the system comply with:

- the national IS/IT strategy
- the force IT strategy?
- crime data standards (eg ACPO CCCIS)?
- general system standards (eg CCTA CC88)?
- the Data Protection Act?
57
APPENDIX B
iv) Does the system provide adequate security functions?
Forces must assess the security requirements for their implementation 0 LCA
Systems.
Can password security be set up?

Can the system limit functionality according to user type (analyst, system
manager, data inputter, read-only enquiries)?
58
APPENDIX C
Appendix C LCA contact list
In the preparation of this report a number of police forces and commercial

organisations offering LCA systems were contacted. Details of these are
provided below. The list is not designed to be comprehensive, nor is it likely
to remain up-to-date:-
System and Contact Name Address and Telephone Number
Active Software - Paul Smith Active Software, Datum House, Roentgen

Road, Basingstoke. Tel (01256) 56629
Claris - Phil Atkinson Claris International, 1 Roundwood Avenue,

Stockley Park, Uxbridge UB11 1BG.
Tel (0181) 756 0101
CPAS - Vic Way Sanderson Insight Ltd, Bedford Road,

Wootton, Bedford, MK43 9JB.
Tel (01234) 768557
Crime - Superintendent Gil Oxley Police Station, West Midlands Police,

Homer Rd, Solihull, West Midlands B91
3QL. Tel (0121) 712 6000
EPIC - David McCaddon ICL Government & Major Companies Law

& Order Branch, ICL (UK) Ltd, Arndale
House, Arndale Centre, Manchester M4
3AR.Tel (0161) 8339 111
Famous - John Griffiths Griffiths Associates Ltd, Penylan House,

Pencoed, Mid Glamorgan CF35 6LT Tel
(01656) 862653
FastCad - Joe Stelzer FastCad GIS ltd, 26 Greenhill Crescent,

Watford Business Park, Watford WD1 8XG.
Tel (01923) 240272
Greater Manchester Police - Greater Manchester Police, P0 Box 22,

(system developed in house - Chester House, Boyer St,
Paradox based) Manchester M16 ORE.
Tel (0161) 872 5050
59
APPENDIX C
System and Contact Name Address and Telephone Number
JOCA - Arthur Jordan Clapham Police Station, Metropolitan

(system developed in house) Police, 51 Union Grove, SW8 2QU.
Tel (0171) 326 1212
Enfield Police Station DIIU, Metropolitan Police, Enfield Police

(System developed in house - Station, 41 Baker Street, Enfield, Middlesex
MapInfo based) EN1 3EU. Tel 0181-366-1212
Memex Memex Information Systems ltd, 16 Albion

Way, East Kilbride, Scotland G75 0YN.
Tel (013552) 33804
Merseyside Police - Inspector Wavertree Road Police Station, Merseyside

Mike Barron (System developed Police, Liverpool L71RJ. Tel (0151) 709 6010
in house - ArcInfo/Paradox based)
Pafec Pafec Ltd, Strelley Hall, Nottingham, NG8

6PE. Tel (0115) 9357055
Plan Chest - David Hunt Graphical Data Capture Ltd, 262 Regents
Park Road, London N3.
Tel (0181) 3494095
Proquest - Dr Bruce Hattersley Lenken Europe, Tower Factory, Well Street,

Finedon, Northants NN9 5JP.
Tel (01933) 682020
STAC - Peg Dabdoub Illinois Criminal Justice Authority, 120

South Riverside Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
60606-3997.
Trilogy - John Upson Trilogy Computers, Sovereign Court, Milton

Keynes. Tel (01908) 690509
Watson - Richard Mills Harlequin Ltd, Barrington Hall, Barrington,

Cambridge CB2 5RG. Tel 01223 873800
West Yorkshire Police - Information Technology Department, West

Graham Dawson Yorkshire Police, Bayheath House,
Wakefield. Tel 01924 293400
60
CRIME DETECTION AND PREVENTION SERIES PAPERS
Recent Police Research Group Crime Detection

and Prevention Series Papers:
55. Witness Intimidation: Strategies for prevention.
Warwick Maynard 1994.
56. Preventing Vandalism: What Works? Mary Barker and

Cressida Bridgeman. 1994.
57. Thinking About Crime Prevention Performance Indicators.

Nick Tilley. 1995.
58. Biting Back: Tackling Repeat Burglary and Car Crime. David
Anderson, Sylvia Chenery and Ken Pease. 1995.
59. Combating Burglary: An Evaluation of Three Strategies.

Janet Stockdale and Peter Gresham. 1995.
60. Policing and Neighbourhood Watch: Strategic Issues.

Gloria Laycock and Nick Tilley. 1995.
61. Investigating, seizing and confiscating the proceeds of crime.

Michael Levi and Lisa Osofsky. 1995.
62. Performance Indicators for Local Anti-Drugs Strategies – A

Preliminary Analysis. Mike Chatterton, Christine Godfrey, Gwendy
Gibson, Mark Gilman, Matthew Sutton and Alan Wright. 1995.
63. Preventing School Bullying. John Pitts and Philip Smith. 1995.
64. Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: Integrated

Approaches. Mike Maguire and Timothy John. 1995.
61
Paper 65: Local Crime Analysis Tim Read
Police Department
Home Office

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Police Crime Detection &

Research Prevention Series

POLICE RESEARCH GROUP

Editor: Barry Webb

Police Research Group: Crime Detection and Prevention Series

A parallel series of papers on resource management and organisational issues is also

The National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) which

In the interim, there is a need to provide guidance to police forces on the

Inspector Mike Barron (Merseyside Police Force)

Lastly, we are indebted to Professor Ken Pease (Huddersfield University) for

Recently both the Audit Commission and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of

The term ‘crime analysis’ covers a broad range of different analytic

Crime patterns - the nature and distribution of crime within an area:

Overall the report stresses that, in order to undertake LCA successfully,

1. Local crime analysis: an introduction 1

2. The application of local crime analysis 7

Local crime analysis and problem-oriented policing 8

3. Collecting the data 16

4. Analysing the data 23

6. Conclusions and recommendations 39

Current use of local crime analysis by forces 39

Appendix A: The Trevi definition of crime analysis 45

Appendix B: Local crime analysis checklist 47

Appendix C: Local crime analysis contact list 59

Table Number Caption Page

Table 1 Potential users of output from local crime analysis 4

1. Local Crime Analysis: an introduction

This report is concerned with the application of crime analysis to one

into three subgroups: analysis for management information, crime cluster

Analysis for management information

Crime trend analysis

A crime trend is defined as a significant change in the nature of selected

Crime cluster analysis

This involves identifying a group of crimes with similar characteristics. To

Comparative case analysis

operandi (MO) and personal descriptions of known criminals. This is the

Table 1: Potential users of products from LCA

Crime Prevention Officer Identification of patterns of crime, evaluation of

Local Intelligence Officer Knowledge of activity in area, identification of series

Uniformed Officers Knowledge of activity in and around beat,

Duty Sergeant Material for shift briefings and to assist in

CID/Specialist Squads Targeting of crime series, occasional identification of

Basic Command Unit Knowledge of activity in and around sub-

Other Agencies Planning, monitoring & management of activities.

(adapted from Oldfield 1992)

In order to undertake LCA successfully it is important that police forces

Which of the following is LCA to be used for:-

Identification of patterns of crime?

2. The application of local crime analysis

Research has shown that crime is seldom randomly distributed across an

Similarly the temporal distribution of crime is likely to be skewed, whether

Local crime analysis and problem-oriented policing

– to identify an area’s crime problems through the analysis of data;

– to raise the level of awareness and understanding of the crime problems

The use of LCA to identify crime problems locally, and to develop

This approach is a response to the traditional reactive model of policing

The definition of ‘problem’ is left deliberately open by Goldstein;- “a cluster

Local crime analysis and crime prevention

1. Obtaining data on crime problems

2. Analysis and interpretation of data

3. Devising preventive strategies

Two way patterns where an association is established between two

Three way patterns which occur when an association between two

Local crime analysis and repeat victimisation