1. G.R. No.

92573, June 03, 1991

ALEX A. ABILA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND FLORENTINA E. ELERIA,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:

Abila, was appointed to succeed the position left by Villafuerte. In respect of his appointment, Eleria
protested the same to the Board. It was indorsed to the officer-in-charge of Quezon City, who rendered a
decision dismissing the protest. On appeal, the found that both Abila and Eleria met the minimum
eligibility and education requirements for Administrative Officer IV, but ruled that Eleria had the edge in
terms of rank and experience as an Administrative Officer. The Board also held that Eleria was holding a
position next in rank to that of the vacancy, which circumstance, according to the Board, under Section 4
of the Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 83-343, gave her "promotional priority" over Abila. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Commission has authority to substitute its own judgment for that of the official
authorized by law to make an appointment to the government service.

HELD:
The Commission has no such authority, the power of appointment, which is essentially discretionary,
being vested by law in the head of the office concerned. The head of the office is the person on the spot.
He occupies the ideal vantage point from which to identify and designate the individual who can best fill
the post and discharge its functions in the government agency he heads. The choice of an appointee from
among those who possess the required qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for
considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of service which can best be made by the
head of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the organizational structure and
environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function. The next-in-rank rule invoked
by Commission to justify its choice of Eleria over Abila, applies only where a vacancy is filled by
promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another position higher either in rank
or salary. A promotion involves a situation quite different from the situation in the case at bar where the
appointment of Abila was effected through lateral transfer from a position in one department of the city
government to a position of greater responsibility in another department of the same government.

2. HON. ALMA G. DE LEON VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND JACOB F. MONTESA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Montesa, who is not a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career Executive
Service, was appointed as "Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV in the Ministry of Local Government.
Secretary Alunan, citing as reasons the interest of public service and the smooth flow of operations in the
concerned offices, issued Department Order No. 94-370, relieving Montesa of his current duties and
responsibilities and reassigning him as Director III. Montesa, however, did not report to his new assigned
position. Instead, he filed a 90-day sick leave, and upon expiration, he submitted a memorandum to then
the Acting Secretary, signifying his intention to re-assume his position as Department Legal
Counsel/Chief, Legal Services. The Department directed Montesa to report to his new assigned post,
stressing that his continued non-compliance with order is prejudicial to the interest of public service. As
a consequence, drop him from the rolls of public service.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the Montesa is permanent.

RULING:
The appointment of the respondent did not attain permanency. Not having taken the necessary Career
Executive Service examination to obtain the requisite eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment
and up to the present, possess the needed eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service.
 Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and/or
Director III, was merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.

3. G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
PETITIONERS, VS. RAFAEL M. SALAS, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to
the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. However, his employment was terminated by the Board of
Directors of PAGCOR, allegedly for loss of confidence, after a covert investigation conducted by the
Intelligence Division of PAGCOR. Salas submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman and the Board of
Directors of PAGCOR, requesting reinvestigation of the case since he was not given an opportunity to be
heard, but the same was denied. He appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which
denied the appeal on the ground that, as a confidential employee, he was not dismissed from the service
but his term of office merely expired. On appeal, the CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283 which affirmed
the decision of the MSPB. The Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision with the finding that
Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence.
In so ruling, the appellate court applied the "proximity rule"

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee.

RULING:
Salas is not a confidential, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the proximity rules. It can thus be safely
determined therefrom that the occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential
employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was, to repeat, the
latter's belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of
discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Withal, where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing
authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. Based on the nature of such
functions of Salas and as found by Court of Appeals, while it may be said that honesty and integrity are
primary considerations in his appointment as a member of the ISS, his position does not involve "such
close intimacy" between him and the appointing authority, that is, the Chairman of PAGCOR, as would
ensure "freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust"

4. G.R. No. 96266, July 18, 1991

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, PETITIONER, VS. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC.,
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict, oil companies filed with the ERB their respective
applications on oil price increases. It issued then an order granting a provisional increase. Maceda filed a
petition for Prohibition, seeking to nullify the provisional increase, in spite of, ERB’s authority to grant
provisional increase was reaffirmed even without prior hearing. Then, the ERB set the applications for
hearing with due notice to all interested parties including Maceda but he failed to appear at said hearing
as well as on the second hearing. Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief commenced with
ERB ruling that testimonies of witnesses were to be in the form of Affidavits. Consequently, Maceda
points out that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maceda was denied due process out of the relaxed procedure of ERB.
 RULING:
No, since ERB is an administrative body exercising quasi-legislative function. The Solicitor General has
also pointed out that the order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular
witness and to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this
discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper. And
such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB, which in matters of
rate or price fixing, is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function. As such
administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court
proceedings. Thus, ERB’s authority to grant provisional increase is within the bounds of law.

5. G.R. No. 134990, April 27, 2000

MANUEL M. LEYSON JR., PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO ANTIPORDA,
CHAIRMAN, UCPB AND CIIF OIL MILLS, AND OSCAR A. TORRALBA, PRESIDENT, CIIF OIL MILLS,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Leyson of ITTC, filed with Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against Torralba of Coconut
Industry Investment Fund on the grounds of committed irregularities and corrupt practices.
Subsequently, Leyson charged Antiporda of UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and again Torralba with
violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the Ombudsman anchored on the
aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt practices. However, the Ombudsman dismissed
the complaints based on the findings that the case is a simple breach of contract with damages
and should have been filed with regular courts.

ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:
No. The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in 1976 and on that year P. D.
No. 961 was promulgated. It was amended by P. D. No. 1468 by inserting a new provision
authorizing the use of the balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the acquisition
of "shares of stocks in corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in the establishment
and operation of industries x x x commercial activities and other allied business undertakings
relating to coconut and other palm oil industry. From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of
stock in what have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were purchased. Thus,
corporations comprising the CIIF were organized as stocks corporations and therefore not within
the scope of Ombudsman jurisdiction.

6. MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA

FACTS:
Garcia, in his capacity as mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city.
News reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt through the contract signed
by Garcia. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an inquiry into the matter. After the
investigation, it was recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative
cases against Garcia and the other city officials involved. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman, approved this
recommendation. Thereafter, preventive suspension of Garcia and others was ordered.

ISSUE:
 1) WON Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting an inquiry on complaints
against petitioner, and ordering their investigation pursuant to respondents’ mandate under the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Law.
2) WON Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion concerning the preventive suspension
imposed on petitioner.
RULING:

1) No, the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is mandated by no less
than the Constitution. Under Article XI, Section 13, the Ombudsman has the power to “investigate on
its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Still, R.A.
6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the Ombudsman the statutory power to
conduct administrative investigations.
2) The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy
Ombudsman. This is the clear import of Section 24 of R.A. 6770. There can be no question in this case
as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive
suspension against an official like the petitioner, to prevent that official from using his office to
intimidate or influence witnesses or to tamper with records that might be vital to the prosecution of
the case against him.

7. G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999

HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO A. ABAD,

FACTS:
Teachers went on strike on various dates on which, they did not report for work. For this reason,
they were administratively charged and were placed under preventive suspension. The
investigation was concluded before the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private respondents
were found guilty as charged. These teachers filed their respective appeal on the Board but were
later dismissed because of their failure to file their appeal memorandum on time.

ISSUE: WON administrative investigation of teacher was concluded within period of preventive
suspension, and thus the government should not be held answerable for payment of their salaries.

RULING:
No. Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only a
means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the
other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect
subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision
finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the
suspension. Thus, §47(4) states that respondent "shall be considered as under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins." On the other hand, if his
conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of
the final penalty of suspension or dismissal.

8. FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of on the part of
the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges. Another charge sheet
which consisted of six (6) different specifications of administrative offenses including fraud was
filed against Beja. He was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to Sec. 41 of P.D. No.
807. The PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB for "appropriate action." At the scheduled
hearing, Beja asked for continuance on the ground that he needed time to study the charges
against him. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present
evidence. However, Beja filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:
WON the PPA General Manager has power to issue a preventive suspension order without the
necessary approval of the PPA board of directors.

RULING:
Yes, the PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. Preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of
removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No. 857; the General Manager
shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager". His disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No.
857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies the "jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees" in
the PPA.