Prosecution

War crime of torture; command responsibility (art. 28a)

NEED to PROVE:

Elements: the perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more
persons; perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for obtaining info or confession, punishment ,
intimidation or coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; protected persons;
aware of factual circumstances that established that protected status; the conduct took place in the
context and was associated with an international armed conflict ; perpetrator was aware of factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict (elements of crimes page 14)

7 Common requirements for all war crimes: armed conflict; protected persons; nexus between accused
acts and armed conflict; existing IHL; gravity; individual criminal responsibility; awareness (module 8
page 17)

Support each charge with sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person
commited the crime charged. May rely on documentary or summary evidence and need not call the
witnesses expected to testify at the trial. (elements of crimes page 29)

May draw reasonable inferences from the facts (instructions for moot)

Take note of arts. 66-69 of ICC statute: (instructions for moot)

Presumption of innocence: guilty beyond reasonable doubt dapat (art. 66 of Icc statute)

When deciding on the relevance or admissibility of evidence collected by a state, the court shall not rule
on the application of the state’s national law. (art. 69 of icc statute)

Expected to establish the following points:

- They type of armed conflict or other situation of violence and the law that is applicable to the
present case
- The elements of crimes for each of the three counts
- Applicable law, policy and supporting authorities

Art. 28(a) of Rome statute: A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under
his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:

- That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time.,
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
 - That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

Take note of table in module 8 page 31

Case summary:

Par 1: Donka and Page as part of ZU

Par 2: territorial dispute on Bonham; defense spending competition

Par 3: nuclear test by page; failure to reach consensus in ZU on nuclear test prohibition; another reso to
impose sanction on Page successful

Par 4: Blues religion ang majority sa Bonham. Blues religion is Page not Donka. Same language as Page.
Discrimination in employment etc; formation of Bonham Liberation Organization (BLO)

Par 5: BLO presscon in Mewani; action plan: achieve independence; gathering of people almost 2k;
march to city hall; deployment of riot police by chief of police; AFTER SEVERAL WARNINGS water
cannons; battons; 20 arrested; Donka president call to maintain peace; 3 wounded

Par 6: Statement from Page Foreing Affairs Spokesperson supporting Bonham; “extend moral and
OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT to BLO as needed”

Par 7: Joe Hill elected as head of BLO; call for week long protest; riot control measures; 100 arrested

Par 8: dialogue; province wide blockade; arrested again; BLO went ahead; violent clashes;

Par 9: Donka times report: BLO acquiring weapons from Page; using forest to smuggle weapons; group
of people w/ weapons attacked a security post in Mewani; 21 killed; suspected done by BLO; BLO NEVER
officially claimed responsibility; BUT security personnel identified sme wore blues religion tattoos; BLO
leaders returning from Page to Bonham after meeting with Ministries of Foreing affairs and defense of
Page;

Par 10: direct confrontation with weapon wielding group sabini chief of police; all those killed BLO daw;
weapons manufacturers in Page;

Par 11: President Donka televised statement; announcement of deployment of military forces;
announcement na under the command of colonel nazir

Par 12: Prime minister of page rejecting allegations;

Par 13: Zepelan observer newspaper: BLO activities detained; 69 killed BLO supporters; 4 security
personnel killed; demonstrationby people ulit; turned violent after military presence spotted; Molotov
cocktails; dozen military trucks; 50 killed; 100 seriously arrested and injured
Par 14: local media report in Bonham: major clash military vs bloactivitiest; 150 people in mewani
missing as claimed by family;

Par 15: colonel nazir presscon; intelligence of meeting in community hall; deployment ng military dun
nearby; 23 surrendered; labanan;

Par 16: BLO statement condemning community hall attack; meeting for festival daw; 1000 civilians
killed; 153 deaths from community hall attack;

Par 17: BHRF presscon; introduced 6 individuals who escaped from community hall attack; 10 family
members of killed people; NOTICE calling for meeting by welfare association; no weapons mgatao; NO
INJURY TO MILITARY PERSONNEL;

Par 18: spontaneous province wide protests; BLO extraordinary meeting; announcement of BLO as
legitimate govt and him as president; according to Zepalan observer: HIGH RANKING PAGIAN officials
and members of PAGIAN armed forces were spotted in meeting;

Par 19: Page recognition of Bonham as state; Donka President denouncing declaration; BDS agreement;
BDS immunity; special brigade

Par 20: BDS description; Donkangovt restrictions on movement of people in Bonham to regions in
Donka;

Par 21: Blues festival;

Par 22: butterfly café meeting intelligence received by Colonel Nazir; nadamay butterfly temple;

Par 23: press statement by Colonel Nazir; lahatdaw ng dead bodies ay BLO; BDS: may entry pass
sapagian military base; USB flash drive w/ HP initials’

Par 24: BHRF website update: 150 bonhamian taken in custody while attending procession; taken to
undisclosed location; BHRF demand for their release

Par 25: Chief of Police: for peace and order lang; carried out by BDS; info received na BLO received BLO
weapons from Page; persons arrested on suspicion of involvement; serving as liaisons daw; high security
detention; through investigation yet to be conducted;

Par 26: ICRC invitation to check detainees

Par 27: BCA presscon; 22 individuals arrested on while participating on dec 28 procession; old building
dawdinla; no electricity water etc; terrible conditions;

Par 28: BLO rescued the 22 individual; recalled colonel nazir’s visit to building; talking to personnel si
colonel; no medical assistance to people being brought to old building;

Par 29: Chief of police: arrest in accordance to peace; no torture; Donkan preventive detention law;
Par 30: release of ICRC report;

Par 31: did not proceed on investigation on the matter ang donkan authorities; immune daw BDS

Par 32: BHRF appeal to ZU; ZU established Independent Enquiry commission (IEC); declared ceasefire;
IEC report of gross violations of human rights international humanitarian law in its first report;

Par 33: referendum; new state of Bonham; donkan authorities did not initiate prosecutions;

START

FOR PROSECUTION

There is an international armed conflict

PRINCIPLE:

Test for international armed conflict (page 21 module 8)

An armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more states. However, an internal
armed conflict may become international (or depending on the circumstances, be international in
character alongside an internal armed conflict) if:

- Another state intervenes in the conflict with troops; or

- Some of the participants in the internal conflict act on behalf of another state.

International armed conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed forces between two or more
states

The existence of an armed conflict within the meaning of article 2 common to the Geneva conventions
can always be assumed when parts of the armed forces of two States clash with each other. Any kind of
use of arms between two States brings the Conventions into effect (ICRC opinion paper 2008
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf)

Any use of armed force by one State against the territory of another, triggers the applicability of the
Geneva Conventions between two States. It is also of no concern whether or not the party attacked
resists. As soon as the armed forces of one State find themselves wounded or surrendering members of
the armed forces or civilians of another State on their hands, as soon as they detain priosoners or have
actual control over a party the territory of the enemy state, then they must comply with the relevant
convention. (same source^)

In situations of internal disturbance, the relevant considerations for determining whether armed
violence amounts to an armed conflict include:

- The protracted nature of the armed violence

 - Its intensity
- The extent of organization of the parties involved. (module 8 page 19)

These elements have been interpreted as follows:

Protracted nature = the hostilities must be extended over time and include events that occur because of
the conflict. This is analyzed by looking at the entire period of the conflict, from its initiation to
cessation.

Intensity: relevant factors to assess the intensity of armed violence include the:

- Number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations

- Type of weapons and other military equipment used etc.
- Number and calibre of munitions fired
- Number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting
- Number of casualties
- Extent of material destruction;
- Number of civilians fleeing the combat zones;

Organization of parties: parties must be sufficiently organized to confront each other with military
means. Relevant factors to assess the organization of parties include the:

- Existence of headquarters
- Existence of designated operation zones
- Ability to procure, transport and distribute arms
- Existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanism within the group.
- Ability to obtain access to military equipment recruits and military training
- Ability to plan, coordinate, and carry out operations
- Ability of armed group to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements.

Lack of organization cannot be inferred from frequent violations of IHL. It depends on whether the
attacks were primarily due to a military strategy by a group’s leaders or individual members of the group
acting alone. (module 8 page 20)

THE CASE:

Here, there is an internal disturbance. The activities of the Bonham Liberation Organization (BLO)
created the internal disturbance amounting to armed conflict.

Element 1: Protracted nature of armed violence:

- Started with week-long protests in par. 7. Towards the goal of achieving independence
(mentioned in par. 5)
- Use of water canons, battons( par5)
- Province wide blockade of public transport (par 8)
 - Par 9: Donka times report: BLO acquiring weapons from Page; using forest to smuggle weapons;
group of people w/ weapons attacked a security post in Mewani; 21 killed; suspected done by
BLO; BLO NEVER officially claimed responsibility; BUT security personnel identified sme wore
blues religion tattoos
- Par 13: Zepelan observer newspaper: BLO activities detained; 69 killed BLO supporters; 4
security personnel killed; demonstrationby people ulit; turned violent after military presence
spotted; Molotov cocktails; dozen military trucks; 50 killed; 100 seriously arrested and injured
- Par 14: local media report in Bonham: major clash military vs bloactivitiest; 150 people in
mewani missing as claimed by family;
- Par 15: colonel nazir presscon; intelligence of meeting in community hall; deployment ng
military dun nearby; 23 surrendered; labanan;
- Par 18: spontaneous province wide protests;
- Par 22: attack on butterfly café nanadamay temple
- Par 24: BHRF website update: 150 bonhamian taken in custody while attending procession;
taken to undisclosed location; BHRF demand for their release
- Par 25: Chief of Police: for peace and order lang; carried out by BDS; info received na BLO
received BLO weapons from Page; persons arrested on suspicion of involvement

Notably, lahat in connection with support to BLO and independence of Bonham. Clearly, protracted. All
the events = Same purpose.

Element 2: Intensity:

There is intensity of individual confrontations

- Par 9: Donka times report: BLO acquiring weapons from Page; using forest to smuggle weapons;
group of people w/ weapons attacked a security post in Mewani; 21 killed; suspected done by
BLO; BLO NEVER officially claimed responsibility; BUT security personnel identified sme wore
blues religion tattoos; BLO leaders returning from Page to Bonham after meeting with Ministries
of Foreing affairs and defense of Page;
- Par 10: direct confrontation with weapon wielding group sabini chief of police; all those killed
BLO daw; weapons manufacturers in Page;
- Par 13: Zepelan observer newspaper: BLO activities detained; 69 killed BLO supporters; 4
security personnel killed; demonstrationby people ulit; turned violent after military presence
spotted; Molotov cocktails; dozen military trucks; 50 killed; 100 seriously arrested and injured
- Par 14: local media report in Bonham: major clash military vs bloactivitiest; 150 people in
mewani missing as claimed by family;
- Par 15: colonel nazir presscon; intelligence of meeting in community hall; deployment ng
military dun nearby; 23 surrendered; labanan;
- Par 16: BLO statement condemning community hall attack; meeting for festival daw; 1000
civilians killed; 153 deaths from community hall attack;
 - Par 17: BHRF presscon; introduced 6 individuals who escaped from community hall attack; 10
family members of killed people; NOTICE calling for meeting by welfare association; no weapons
mgatao; NO INJURY TO MILITARY PERSONNEL;
- Par 22: butterfly café meeting intelligence received by Colonel Nazir; nadamay butterfly temple;

Element 3: Organization of parties:

On the part of Donka,the factors on organization of parties is implied because of it being a State. Donka,
being a state, necessarily is capable of/possesses the factors.

On the part of the BLO:

There is existence of a command structure within the group/ ability to plan, coordinate, and carry out
operations/ ability of armed group to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements as
apparent from the following facts:

- Par 5: BLO presscon in Mewani; action plan: achieve independence; gathering of people almost
2k; march to city hall;
- Par 6: Statement from Page Foreing Affairs Spokesperson supporting Bonham; “extend moral
and OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT to BLO as needed”
- Par 7: Joe Hill elected as head of BLO; call for week long protest
- Par 9: Donka times report: BLO acquiring weapons from Page; using forest to smuggle weapons;
group of people w/ weapons attacked a security post in Mewani; 21 killed; suspected done by
BLO; BLO NEVER officially claimed responsibility; BUT security personnel identified sme wore
blues religion tattoos; BLO leaders returning from Page to Bonham after meeting with Ministries
of Foreing affairs and defense of Page;
- Par 15: colonel nazir presscon; intelligence of meeting in community hall
- Par 18: spontaneous province wide protests; BLO extraordinary meeting; announcement of BLO
as legitimate govt and him as president; according to Zepalan observer: HIGH RANKING PAGIAN
officials and members of PAGIAN armed forces were spotted in meeting;
- Par 19: Page recognition of Bonham as state
- Par 22: butterfly café meeting intelligence received by Colonel Nazir

Factor that made this an international armed conflict:

Support of Page to Bonham particularly to the BLO is evident in the facts. The involvement or
intervention of another country supporting the BLO makes this an international armed conflict.

- They have all the motivation to help BLO. They have a claim to Bonham. (par 2) May defense
spending pa nga to show their force. Isama pa mga nuclear tests. (par 2). May have a motivation
to gantiDonka because of ZU reso imposing sanctions on them (par 3).
- Par 6: Statement from Page Foreing Affairs Spokesperson supporting Bonham; “extend moral
and OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT to BLO as needed” .
 - Par 9: Donka times report: BLO acquiring weapons from Page; using forest to smuggle weapons
- Par 9: Donka times report: BLO leaders returning from Page to Bonham after meeting with
Ministries of Foreing affairs and defense of Page;
- Par 10: direct confrontation with weapon wielding group sabini chief of police; all those killed
BLO daw; weapons manufacturers in Page;
- Par 11: President Donka televised statement; report of page’s military support to BLO.
- Par 18: BLO extraordinary meeting; announcement of BLO as legitimate govt and him as
president; according to Zepalan observer: HIGH RANKING PAGIAN officials and members of
PAGIAN armed forces were spotted in meeting;
- Par 19: Page recognition of Bonham as state
- Par 23: press statement by Colonel Nazir; BDS: may entry pass sapagian military base; USB flash
drive w/ HP initials’
- Par 25: Chief of Police: for peace and order lang; carried out by BDS; info received na BLO
received BLO weapons from Page

The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons;

Clear in the following facts:

PAR 27 – 22 Individuals introduced in a presscon who were arrested on December 28 and taken to the
old building. No electricity, running water or even toilets. Isolation. Contact not allowed either with
other inmates or family. Only 2 glasses of water and 4 slices of bread every day. Could not sleep and fell
sick due to suffocation. No medical facility. 6 detainees commited suicide. – the fact na may
nagpakamatay.. emphasizes severeness.

Par 28- they saw new people being brought to the building. Many who came were injured but to their
knowledge no medical assistance was provided.

Par 30 – ICRC report: conditions of detention not approved. Lack of healthcare services and the
psychological impact of isolation on the detainees.

Par 32: IEC report of gross violations of human rights international humanitarian law in its first report;

Perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for obtaining info or confession, punishment , intimidation or
coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind

Reasonable inference from following facts:

For punishment:
Par 25 – persons arrested were on suspicion of their involvement; thorough investigation then charges
against them will be filed; high security detention centre;

May be said to be because of discrimination as well: the Bonham people are different:

Par 4: Blues religion ang majority sa Bonham. Blues religion is Page not Donka. Same language as Page.
Discrimination in employment etc.

Par 20: govt restrictions on movement of people in Bonham to regions in Donka

Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventionsof 1949

Generally, protected persons include:

- Civilians; prisoners of war; and combatants no longer able to fight because they are sick,
wounded or shipwrecked;

Persons not entitled to protection under GC I, II, III necessarily fall within the ambit of GC IV, which
applies to civilians. In case of doubt as to the status of the person, that person is considered to be a
civilian. (Source: Module 8 page 23)

Even assuming that they were really directly involved in helping BLO or may in fact be combatants pasok
pa rinsilasa protected persons. Torture happened when they “ceased” from doing whatever they were
doing. Nakakulongna eh so hindinanilaginagawa o nagagawayungginagawanila.

Par 24: BHRF website update: 150 bonhamian taken in custody while attending procession; taken to
undisclosed location;

Pars 27-30 while they were detained tortured sila dun physically and mentally

so maybe prisoners of war din?

Aware of factual circumstances that established that protected status

Col. Nazir was aware.

Par 24: BHRF website update: 150 bonhamian taken in custody while attending procession; taken to
undisclosed location;

- Hello eh mgabonhamiannasumalilangsa procession hinuli.

Par 28: BLO rescued the 22 individual; recalled colonel nazir’s visit to building; talking to personnel si
colonel;
 - Pumuntasiya so alamniya. Even had a talk with personnel there. Necessarily knows the people
that are detained.

The conduct took place in the context and was associated with an international armed conflict

We have already established earlier the existence of an international armed conflict.

The armed conflict must have played a substantial part in the accused’s decision and ability to commit
the crime, and the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed.

It is enough that the accused acted in furtherance of or under the guise of that conflict.

Factors relevant to an assessment a nexus to armed conflict include:

- The status of the perpetrator (e.g. were they a combatant?);

- The status of the victim (e.g. were they a non-combatant or a member of opposing party?)
- Whether the act advanced a military purpose;
- Whether the act was commiitted in the context of the perpetrator’s official duties;
- Whether the crime was committed with assistance of other combatants; and
- Whether the crime was committed under the guide of military authority. (module 8 page 27)

THE CASE:

Everything happened in the context of the conflict of the government of Donka with the BLO.

This can be highlighted by the fact of the televised statement of the DOnkan President in par. 11. They
were deploying military forces under Colonel Nazir to address the situation in Bonham. Everything
happened to restrain the BLO in their supposed attempt to destroy peace in that part of the country.

The perpetrator were definitely combatant.

It is clear from paragraph 25 that the persons were arrested because of suspicion on their involvement
with activities of the BLO. Authorities arrested them in the context of the fight of the Donkan govt

- Par 25: Chief of Police: for peace and order lang; carried out by BDS; info received na BLO
received BLO weapons from Page; persons arrested on suspicion of involvement; serving as
liaisons daw; high security detention; through investigation yet to be conducted;

Sa kanilanamismonananggalingnadahilsa suspicions sa involvement sa BLO kaya

inarestoyungmgainaresto.

Perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict
by order of the president, colonel nazir was specifically tasked to suppress the forces of the BLO. This is
evident in the televised statement in par. 11. The military support of Page to BLO was mentioned.

Colonel Nazir was specifically heard saying (par 28)

Par 15: colonel nazir presscon; intelligence of meeting in community hall; deployment ng military dun
nearby; 23 surrendered; labanan;

Command Responsibility

PRINCIPLE:

Art. 28(a) of Rome statute: A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under
his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:

- That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time.,
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
- That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

In order to prove superior responsibility of a military commander, the prosecution must establish:

- The accused was either a military commander or a person effectively acting as such and had
effective command and control (or effective authority and control) over the subordinates who
committed the crimes.
- The accused either knew or under the circumstances, should have known, that the subordinates
were committing or were about to commit crimes.
- The accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent
or repress (stop and punish) the commission of the crimes or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
- The crime resulted because of the accused’s failure to properly control the forces under his or
her command.

THE CASE:

Col Nazir knew of the circumstances of the torture

- Par 28: BLO rescued the 22 individual; recalled colonel nazir’s visit to building
- Release of report of ICRC to govt and later to the public (par 30)
- Presscon of BCA (par 27)
He failed to take measures to either prevent/punish

- Wala namanginawakahitano. Nothing mentioned. Even with the release of the reports in public
na terrible conditions nga. Wala pa rinnangyari.

Col Nazir has effective control

- Par 11: President Donka televised statement; announcement of deployment of military forces;
announcement na under the command of colonel nazir . - This shows that the operations
against the BLO is under his command.
- Par 15: colonel nazir presscon; intelligence of meeting in community hall; deployment ng
military dun nearby; 23 surrendered; labanan; - Shows control in the actions of the forces
- Examples of effective control at the ICC include the ability to require people to engage in or
withdraw from hostilities (module 10 page 17)
- Same with community hall attack. Siya din order nun.
- Par 22: butterfly café meeting intelligence received by Colonel Nazir; nadamay butterfly temple;
- shows control again. May control din sa BDS. Kasama BDS dito sa operation.
- Par 19: BDS was to be integrated into the DOnkan armed forces as a special brigade. May
control si Col. Nazir being the one designated to be the one with command.

FOR DEFENSE

No Command responsibility

PRINCIPLE:

The material ability to punish and its corresponding duty to punish can only amount to effective control
over the perpetrators if they are premised upon a pre-existing superior-subordinate relationship
between the accused and the perpetrators.

A showing that an accused is in overall control of combat operations is not an express requirement of
this mode of liability. However, if such a fact is pleaded it will be considered as a way of showing or
disproving that a superior-subordinate relationship existed. (module 10 page 8 footnote 33)

(Knew or had reason to know) Two forms of knowledge in superior responsibility cases:

- Actual knowledge, established through either direct or circumstantial evidence, that

subordinates were about to commit or had committed crimes
- Constructive knowledge or imputed knowledge, meaning that the superior possessed
information that would at least put him on notice of the present and real risk of such offences
and alert him to the need for additional investigation to determine whether such crimes were
about to be committed or had been committed by his subordinates. (module 10 page 10)
The superior’s actual knowledge, in terms of awareness that his subordinates were about to commit or
have committed crimes, cannot be presumed. (module 10 page 10) Absent direct evidence, however,
actual knowledge may still be established by way of circumstantial evidence.

A showing that a superior had “some general information in his possession, which would put him on
notice of possible unlawful acts by his subordinates would be sufficient to prove that he “had reason to
know.” (module 10 page 11)

This reason to know determination does not require the superior to have actually acquainted himself
with the information in his possession, nor that the information would compel the conclusion of the
existence of crimes. It is sufficient that the information was available to him and that it indicated a need
for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether offences were being committed or about to be
committed by subordinates. (module page 11)

A superior cannot be presumed to have knowledge by virtue of his position alone (module 10 page 12
footnote 51)

As a general rule, the circulation of rumors or general reports are insufficient to establish the required
knowledge. (module 10 page 12)

THE CASE:

No effective control:

- Hindi ba dapat subordinate lang? eh BDS yung gumawa nung paghuli. Black uniformed
personnel daw according to par. 28. The BDS ang black uniformed personnel clearly mentioned
in par. 20. BDS din ang bantay dun sa building. We can infer that sila may gawa ng torture.
- Par 25 – BDS din ang nanghuli; per request of Donka govt; part of work;
- Par 19 – BDS is a PRIVATE military company. Wala naman talaga control si col. Nazir. BDS is not
obligated to follow his orders. They can opt to not follow his orders being not directly under the
military although they are involved in the conflict. It was mentioned here that they are “to
REINFORCE” so ibig sabihin additional support lang sila dun sa force ni col. Nazir. They are a
SEPARATE group.

No knowledge si col. Nazir of torture

- A superior cannot be presumed to have knowledge by virtue of his position alone (module 10
page 12 footnote 51)
- As a general rule, the circulation of rumors or general reports are insufficient to establish the
required knowledge. (module 10 page 12)
- The superior’s actual knowledge, in terms of awareness that his subordinates were about to
commit or have committed crimes, cannot be presumed. (module 10 page 10)
- Puro reports lang naman
- Paano natin depensahan yung may nakakita daw sa kanya dun sa old building???
No international armed conflict

- Test for international armed conflict (page 21 module 8) An armed conflict is international if it
takes place between two or more states. However, an internal armed conflict may become
international (or depending on the circumstances, be international in character alongside an
internal armed conflict) if: Another state intervenes in the conflict with troops. Eh wala naman
troops. Puro support lang sa equipment etc. military training as mentioned earlier in the
arguments for prosecution. But no actual bringing in of troops by Page. Hence, it could not be an
international armed conflict.
- At most, only internal armed conflict. Cannot be international.