LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA TIRONA, respondent.

Actions; Lease; Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful
detainer cases are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms.—Unlawful detainer cases are
summary in nature. The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases are the fact of
lease and expiration or violation of its terms.

Same; Same; Same; Sales; The sale of a leased property places the vendee into the shoes of the original
lessor to whom the lessee bound himself to pay.—In Mirasol v. Magsuci, et al., we ruled that the sale of
a leased property places the vendee into the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee bound
himself to pay. The vendee acquires the right to evict the lessee from the premises and to recover the
unpaid rentals after the vendee had notified the lessee that he had bought the leased property and that
the rentals on it should be paid to him, and the lessee refused to comply with the demand.

Same; Same; Same; The issue of ownership is not essential to an action for unlawful detainer.—Contrary
to Tirona’s position, the issue of ownership is not essential to an action for unlawful detainer. The fact of
the lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements of the action. The defense of ownership
does not change the summary nature of the action. The affected party should raise the issue of
ownership in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack. Although a wrongful possessor may at times be upheld by the courts, this is merely temporary
and solely for the maintenance of public order. The question of ownership is to be settled in the proper
court and in a proper action.

Same; Same; Same; Co-Ownership; It was error for the Court of Appeals to include the issue of
ownership—in ruling that the case of unlawful detainer had to wait for the results of the partition
proceedings, it effectively put ownership as the main issue in the case.— Unlawful detainer being a
summary proceeding, it was error for the appellate court to include the issue of ownership. Had the
appellate court limited its ruling to the elements to be proved in a case of unlawful detainer, Ocampo
need not even prove his ownership. When the appellate court ruled that the case of unlawful detainer
had to wait for the results of the partition proceedings, it effectively put ownership as the main issue in
the case. The issue of ownership opens a virtual Pandora’s Box for Tirona and her supposed intervenor,
Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.

Same; Same; Interpleader; An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the
person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.—The good faith of Tirona is
put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should
have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have
awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action
for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to
conflicting claims on the property. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has
property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,
without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who
consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in
respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises
in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which
initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and
BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees.

Interpleader; Interpleader under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Purpose of.—The action of
interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has
personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any
right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who
consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is
afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one
liability.

Same; Same; Difference between interpleader under the Code of Civil Procedure and under the Rules of
Court.—The procedure under the Rules of Court is the same as that under the Code of Civil Procedure
except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the
subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the
subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation.

Same; Stakeholder should file action of interpleader within reasonable time after dispute has arisen
without waiting to be sued by claimants; Reason.—A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to
hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against
him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time
after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise,
he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the
environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

Same; Where stakeholder files action of interpleader after judgment has been rendered against him in
favor of one of claimants, action deemed too late; Reason.—A stakeholder’s action of interpleader is too
late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending
claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment
and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was
entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes
liable to the latter.
Same; Party who files action of interpleader should show that he has not been made independently
liable to any of the claimants.—Before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order of
interpleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become
independently liable to any of the claimants.

Same; Where stakeholder defends a suit by one claimant and allows it to proceed to judgment against
him, action of interpleader deemed too late.—If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse
claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that
part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.

Same; A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in action of interpleader
and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants.—A successful litigant cannot
later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim
anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.

MAKATI AKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and

CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., defendants-appellees.

Courts; Jurisdiction; Governed by Rep. Act 296, as amended.—The jurisdiction of courts over the subject
matter of justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which
municipal courts shall have exlusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases “in which the demand, exclusive
of interest, or the value of the property in controversy” amounts to more than “ten thousand pesos.”

Same; Same; Congress; Its power concerning court’s jurisdiction; Supreme Court; Its duty.—"The power
to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts” belongs to Congress (Sec. 2,
Art. VIII, Constitution), and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to
matters “concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law/' (Sec. 13, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Same; Rules of Court; Implication of failure of section 19 of Rule 5 to make Rule 63 applicable to inferior
courts.—The failure of section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on
interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that ,the same are not bound to follow Rule
63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure
applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.

URSULA MAGLENTE, CONSOLACION BERJA, MERCEDITA FERRER, THELMA ABELLA and ANTONIO NGO,
petitioners, vs. HON. PRISCILLA BALTAZAR-PADILLA, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Manila Branch 38, VISITACION GABELO, ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA PEREZ, ERLINDA TRAQUENA, BEN
CARDINAL, EDUARDO TRAQUENA, LEOPOLDO TRAQUENA, MARIFE TUBALAS, ULYSIS MATEO, JOCELYN
FERNANDEZ, ALFONSO PLACIDO, LEONARDO TRAQUENA, SUSAN RENDON and MATEO TRINIDAD,
respondents.

Actions; Certiorari; The remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any tribunal or board exercising
functions without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.—The remedy of
certiorari is limited to acts of any tribunal or board exercising judicial functions without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. It must be based on jurisdictional grounds like want of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion; otherwise, any error committed by it will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment which may be questioned only on ordinary appeal.

Possession; Writs of Possession; A writ of possession does not lie as a consequence of a decision
ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell.—A writ of possession shall issue only in the
following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real
property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third
party has intervened, and (4) execution sales. Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the
trial court’s decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ
does not lie in such a case.

Same; Same; A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession
or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either.—Petitioners’ argument
that the trial court’s writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with it the corollary right to a writ
of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the
right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either. The
interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.

Rule 63

HONESTO V. FERRER, JR., and ROMEO E. ESPERA, petitioners, vs. MAYOR SULPICIO S. ROCO, JR., in his
capacity as Mayor of Naga City, Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Naga, and PEÑAFRANCIA
MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, respondents.

Actions; Declaratory Relief; Requisites.—Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person

interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to
determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may
be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of the provisions in an instrument
or statute. It is settled that the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: 1] the subject matter of
the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; 2] the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; 3] there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4] there
must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; 5] the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6] adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

Administrative Law; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Criminal Procedure; If a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body,
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if
the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.—Under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In other
words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge
of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to
the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, represented by SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI,

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, represented by POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO L. LOMIBAO,
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by CHAIRMAN ANGELO T. REYES, AND CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, represented by CHAIRPERSON KARINA C. DAVID, petitioners, vs. MANILA’S FINEST
RETIREES ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by P/COL. FELICISIMO G. LAZARO (RET.), AND ALL THE
OTHER INP RETIREES, respondents.

Retirement; Philippine National Police; The Integrated National Police (INP) was never, as posited by the
petitioners, abolished or terminated out of existence by R.A. No. 6975.—It appears clear to us that the
INP was never, as posited by the petitioners, abolished or terminated out of existence by R.A. No. 6975.
For sure, nowhere in R.A. No. 6975 does the words “abolish” or “terminate” appear in reference to the
INP. Instead, what the law provides is for the “absorption,” “transfer,” and/or “merger” of the INP, as
well as the other offices comprising the PC-INP, with the PNP. To “abolish” is to do away with, to annul,
abrogate or destroy completely; to “absorb” is to assimilate, incorporate or to take in. “Merge” means
to cause to combine or unite to become legally absorbed or extinguished by merger while “transfer”
denotes movement from one position to another. Clearly, “abolition” cannot be equated with
“absorption.”

Same; Same; Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) which include the herein respondents are,
therefore, not excluded from availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to Philippine
National Police (PNP) retirees under Sections 74 and 75 of R.A. No. 6975 as amended by R.A. No.
8551.—With the conclusion herein reached that the INP was not in fact abolished but was merely
transformed to become the PNP, members of the INP which include the herein respondents are,
therefore, not excluded from availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees
under Sections 74 and 75 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551. It may be that respondents
were no longer in the government service at the time of the enactment of R.A. No. 6975. This fact,
however, without more, would not pose as an impediment to the respondents’ entitlement to the new
retirement scheme set forth under the aforecited sections.
Same; Same; Under the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8551), the application of rationalized retirement
benefits to Philippine National Police (PNP) members who have meanwhile retired before its enactment
was not prohibited.—Under the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8551), the application of rationalized
retirement benefits to PNP members who have meanwhile retired before its (R.A. No. 8551) enactment
was not prohibited. In fact, its Section 38 explicitly states that the rationalized retirement benefits
schedule and program “shall have retroactive effect in favor of PNP members and officers retired or
separated from the time specified in the law.” To us, the aforesaid provision should be made applicable
to INP members who had retired prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975. For, as aforeheld, the INP was,
in effect, merely absorbed by the PNP and not abolished.

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC.,
respondent.

Actions; Declaratory Relief; Words and Phrases; “Declaratory Relief,” Defined; The only issue that may
be raised in a petition for declaratory relief is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute—corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other
adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.—Declaratory relief is defined as an
action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or
resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive
order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue
that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other
adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.

Same; Same; Requisites.—Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as
follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the
documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

Same; Same; When Dismissible; A petition for declaratory relief may not be dismissed despite the filing
of an action for rescission, ejectment and damages where the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition.—It is true that in
Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, 395 SCRA 624 (2003), we held that the petition for
declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful
detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful
detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief
case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred
over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet
resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact,
the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the
proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief. We are not unmindful of the
doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956), where the declaratory relief action
was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again,
in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief
petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief
action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before
the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties’ dispute, as it would
settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations
subject of this controversy.

Contracts; Interpretation of Contracts; Essential to contract construction is the ascertainment of the

intention of the contracting parties, and such determination must take into account the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.—Essential to contract construction is the
ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties, and such determination must take into
account the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. This intention, once ascertained, is
deemed an integral part of the contract.

Obligations and Contracts; Extraordinary Inflation or Deflation; Words and Phrases; Inflation, Defined;
Extraordinary Inflation, Defined.—Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit, or
both, without a corresponding increase in business transaction. There is inflation when there is an
increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods, resulting in a substantial and
continuing rise in the general price level. In a number of cases, this Court had provided a discourse on
what constitutes extraordinary inflation, thus: [E]xtraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease
or increase in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common
fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such increase or decrease could not have been reasonably
foreseen or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of
the obligation.

Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four
decades, starting in the midsixties, is characteristic of most currencies—while the Supreme Court may
take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that span of
time, such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered as the extraordinary phenomenon
contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code; Absent an official pronouncement or declaration by
competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation during a given period, the effects of
extraordinary inflation are not to be applied.—The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case
do not make out a case of extraordinary inflation or devaluation as would justify the application of
Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We would like to stress that the erosion of the value of the Philippine
peso in the past three or four decades, starting in the mid-sixties, is characteristic of most currencies.
And while the Court may take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine
currency in that span of time, such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered as the
extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an
official pronouncement or declaration by competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary
inflation during a given period, the effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied.

THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD and GAIL U. FULE, Director, Supervision and Examination
Department II, and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK,
respondent.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Declaratory Relief; Words and Phrases; Declaratory relief is defined
as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive
order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument,
executive order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.—
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity
arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights
and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC), in CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal
Revenue, 575 SCRA 467 (2008), held that in the same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper
subjects of a petition for declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a
petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on
questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court.—Ergo,
the Court, in CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 575 SCRA 467 (2008), held
that in the same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory
relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the
simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may
avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court. In view of the foregoing, the decision of the
BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for declaratory relief since it was
issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions.

Rule 64

Chavez v Comelec

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed judgment,
order or resolution.17

A petition filed under Rule 65, like a Rule 64 petition, requires the inclusion as a party respondent the tribunal
which issued the assailed judgment, order or resolution.18

Even if the Court treats the instant petition as one filed under Rule 64 or under Rule 65, the same should still
be denied for failure to show that the COMELEC committed errors of fact and/or law, or that it acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
declaring that petitioner is a nuisance candidate and in ordering his disqualification to run as senator in the
forthcoming national elections in May, and the cancellation of his COC.

Section 6919 of the Omnibus Election Code authorizes the COMELEC, motu proprio, or upon a verified petition
of an interested party, to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate and to refuse to give due course to his
or her COC or to cancel one already filed if it is shown that: (1) the candidate's COC has been filed to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute, (2) the COC has been filed to cause confusion among the voters by
the similarity of names of the registered candidates, and (3) where other circumstances show that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for office.

COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 also specifies the instances where the COMELEC
may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a COC:

SEC. 6. Motu Proprio Cases. - The Commission may, at any time before the
election, motuproprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy of any
candidate for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senator and Party-list:

I. The grounds:

a. Candidates who, on the face of their certificate of candidacy, do not possess the constitutional and legal
qualifications of the office to which they aspire to be elected;

b. Candidate who, on the face of said certificate, filed their certificate of candidacy to put the election process
in mockery or disrepute;

c. Candidates whose certificate of candidacy could cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of names and surnames with other candidates; and

d. Candidates who have no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy had been filed or acts that clearly demonstrate the lack of such bona fide intention, such
as:

d. 1 Candidates who do not belong to or are not nominated by any registered political party of national
constituency;

d.2 Presidential, Vice-Presidential [candidates] who do not present running mates for vice-president,
respectively, nor senatorial candidates;

d.3 Candidates who do not have a platform of government and are not capable of waging a nationwide
campaign. (Emphasis supplied.)

The COMELEC's ruling is based on facts which lead to no other conclusion but that petitioner is indeed a
nuisance candidate:

TEODORO M. JUMAMIL, GRACIANO CENTINO, ANICETO CASTILLO, ORLANO MILLANO, and FAUSTINO
FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NICOLAS PUROG, JR., DOLORES
ORQUINVERDE, ARTURO ALILUYAH, JOHN A. MEDICE, RUFINO A. SUBIAGA and FELIX G. AUCENTE, JR.,
respondents.

Election Law; Commission on Elections; “Final order or resolution” interpreted to mean final orders,
rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasijudicial
powers; The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, not of a division.—
An examination of the records of the subject Petitions undeniably demonstrates that the assailed Order
of public respondent COMELEC is not the kind contemplated by the aforequoted rule. In the case of
Ambil v. COMELEC, 344 SCRA 358 (2000), this Court took great pains to elucidate the meaning of “final
order or resolution” contemplated by the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court. We said: To begin
with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the
Constitution, as follows: ‘SECTION7.Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.’ (Citation omitted.) We have interpreted this provision to mean final
orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers. (Citation omitted.) This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en
banc, (citation omitted) not of a division, (citation omitted) certainly not an interlocutory order of a
division. (Citation omitted.) The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. (Citation omitted.) The
mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme
Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now
expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. (Citation omitted.)

Same; Same; Consolidated Petitions for Certiorari dismissed for utter lack of merit over and above the
fact that they have already become moot.—Now, therefore, be it resolved, as it is hereby Resolved, in
accordance with the foregoing discussion, to DISMISS herein consolidated Petitions for Certiorari for
utter lack of merit, over and above the fact that they have already become moot.

NOEL Y. REPOL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VIOLETO CERACAS, respondents.

Remedial Law; Appeals; Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental issue and do not terminate or
finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the
merits.—The 12 January 2004 Order did not dispose of the case completely as there is something more
to be done. Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental issue and do not terminate or finally
dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits. Since
the COMELEC First Division issued the interlocutory Order of 12 January 2004, the same COMELEC First
Division should resolve Repol’s motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved
party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC en banc nor to
elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Same; Same; Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Only final orders of the COMELEC in
Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc.—Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may
be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that
only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.
Same; Same; Same; The Comelec en banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of
a Division, meaning those acts having a final character.—Under this constitutional provision, the
COMELEC en banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of a Division, meaning
those acts having a final character. Clearly, the assailed status quo ante Order, being interlocutory,
should first be resolved by the COMELEC First Division via a motion for reconsideration.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE
BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the
ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a
grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.—Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for
all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of
discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil action, there must also be a showing
that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.

Election Contests; Appeals; Conditions in Order for the Supreme Court (SC) to Review Orders and
Decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Electoral Contests Despite Not Being Reviewed
by the COMELEC En Banc.—Based on ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811
(2000), this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral contests — despite not
being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if: 1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice; 2) The issue
involves a principle of social justice; 3) The issue involves the protection of labor; 4) The decision or
resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; or 5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is
the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

Supreme Court; Jurisdictions; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court (SC) over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition. Subject
matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority “to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and defines its powers.”—The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from
the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority “to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by
the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.” Definitely, the subject matter
in this case is different from the cases cited by respondents. Nothing less than the electorate’s political
speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the
desire to be heard and understood, to move people to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to
change the contours of power whether through the election of representatives in a republican
government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this kind
of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message. Neither do we assess
whether we should protect speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on
freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium because the quality of
this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.

Same; Same; During elections, the Supreme Court (SC) has the power and the duty to correct any grave
abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.—During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of
discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional
mandate to protect the people against government’s infringement of their fundamental rights. This
constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.

Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created
by the Supreme Court (SC) to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an
effective and efficient manner.—The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an
effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the
evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may
include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and
then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically
presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such
action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where
resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed
before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

Same; Court of Appeals; The Court of Appeals (CA) is primarily designed as an appellate court that
reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature.—The Court
of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law
made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of
the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil
actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts
and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are
factual questions to determine.

Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.—The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has “full discretionary power to take cognizance
and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the
petition.”

ELSIE S. CAUSING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERNAN D. BIRON, SR.,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The Rules of Court (1997) contains a separate rule (Rule
64) on the review of the decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Commission on
Audit (COA). Rule 64 is generally identical with certiorari under Rule 65, except as to the period of the
filing of the petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the period is thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution assailed.—Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution states that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30
days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court (1997) contains a separate rule
(Rule 64) on the review of the decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 is
generally identical with certiorari under Rule 65, except as to the period of the filing of the petition for
certiorari, that is, in the former, the period is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution assailed.

Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; The well-established rule is that the motion for
reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; Exceptions.—The well-established rule is that
the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public respondent the
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of reexamination of the legal
and factual aspects of the case. The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has
laid down exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a
motion for reconsideration, namely: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has
no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where
the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
Election Law; Prohibited Personnel Movement; Transfers; Detail; The only personnel movements
prohibited by Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail;
Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the
contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old
location to the Office of the Mayor “some little steps” away.—The only personnel movements
prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the
Resolution as “any personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one
department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or
without the issuance of an appointment”; while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is
the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment.
Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer and detail must be construed as such. Obviously,
the movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation
of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old location to the
Office of the Mayor “some little steps” away. We cannot accept the petitioner’s argument, therefore,
that the phrase “any transfer or detail whatsoever” encompassed “any and all kinds and manner of
personnel movement,” including the mere change in office location.

Statutory Construction; It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally
construed in favor of the accused.—Causing’s too literal understanding of transfer should not hold sway
because the provisions involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be charged
with an election offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a basic rule of
statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Every
reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the accused. This means that the courts must not
bring cases within the provision of a law that are not clearly embraced by it. In short, no act can be
pronounced criminal unless it is clearly made so by statute prior to its commission (nullum crimen, nulla
poena, sine lege). So, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought
within them.

RULE 65

Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board,
an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or
with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the
petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law
or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further
proceeding with the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a
petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.

Sec. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. – After the comment or other pleadings required by the
court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require
the parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or upon the expiration
of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.

However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the
petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139
and 139-B of the Rules of Court.

The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or
measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.

ALFREDO TAGLE, petitioner, vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK (Formerly Philippine Commercial International
Bank) and the HONORABLE HERMINIA V. PASAMBA, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-
Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.

Certiorari; Requisites; The principal office of a special civil action for certiorari is only to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a
Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is intended for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its
principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A writ of
certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is
limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. For a petition for certiorari to
prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Same; Words and Phrases; “Without Jurisdiction,” “Excess of Jurisdiction,” “Grave Abuse of Discretion,”
Explained.—The phrase “without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority
or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in
general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority. “Excess of
jurisdiction” occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority; or
results when an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not
authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone
authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. While that of “grave abuse of
discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

Same; Appeals; Decisions (judgments), final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case,
i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by
filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case.—From the words of Rule 45, it is crystal that decisions (judgments), final orders or resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may
be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case. In the case at bar, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 were final orders. They were
not interlocutory because the proceedings were terminated; and left nothing more to be done by the
appellate court. There were no remaining issues to be resolved in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461. Consequently,
the proper remedy available to petitioner Alfredo then was to file before this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, and not a special civil action for certiorari.

Same; Same; Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is
available to an aggrieved party; A remedy is considered “plain, speedy and adequate” if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or
agency.—It is fairly obvious that the third requisite for a petition for certiorari is wanting, that is, there
must be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
availability to petitioner Alfredo of the remedy of a petition for review on certiorari from the assailed
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals effectively barred his right to resort to a petition for certiorari. Basic
is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved
party. A remedy is considered “plain, speedy and adequate” if it will promptly relieve the petitioner
from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal
was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy. Moreover, petitioner Alfredo failed to
show circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule as to make available to him a
petition for certiorari in lieu of making an appeal.
Same; Same; “Petition for Review” and “Petition for Certiorari,” Compared.—To be sure, once again, we
take this opportunity to distinguish between a Petition for Review on Certiorari (an appeal by certiorari)
and a Petition for Certiorari (a special civil action/an original action for Certiorari), under Rules 45 and
65, respectively, of the Revised Rules of Court. Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings
Corporation, 436 SCRA 123 (2004), summarizes the distinctions between these two remedies, to wit: As
to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, 283 SCRA 133 (1997), we explained the simple reason for
the rule in this light: ‘When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule.
Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.’ The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over
the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court—on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or
of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long
as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where
the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact—a mistake of judgment—appeal is the
remedy. As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power
of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of
control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the
original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the
trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal
are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved
party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the
prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively). As to the Subject Matter. Only
judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower
court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy. As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of
judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the
notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days
from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion. As to the Need for a Motion
for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for
certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this
motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required
before appealing a judgment or final order.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed
only when there are exceptional circumstances to justify the same.—The relaxation of procedural rules
may be allowed only when there are exceptional circumstances to justify the same. Try as we might,
however, we fail to find the existence of such exceptional circumstances in this case, and neither did
petitioner Alfredo endeavour to prove the existence of any. In fact, there is total lack of effort on
petitioner Alfredo’s part to at least explain his inability to comply with the clear requisites of the Revised
Rules of Court.

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO and OFELIA R. DACUDAO, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, respondent.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Hierarchy of Courts; Every litigant who brings the petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65,
Rules of Court.—Every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which
to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a
court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts,
the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 4. When and where petition filed.—The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of the said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts
or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal
or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Certiorari; Requisites for the Special Civil Action for Certiorari to Prosper.—For a special
civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must
be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The burden of proof lies on petitioners to
demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Department of Justice (DOJ); The fact that the Department of Justice is the primary prosecution arm of
the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency.—The fact that the DOJ is the primary
prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary
investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.
Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 618 (2001), the Supreme Court has held that a
preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating: x x x [t]he prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot
be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused,
not the fiscal.

Quasi-Judicial Agencies; A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a
legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it
performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties
coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law.—For sure, a
quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory
functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its
decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect
whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order
to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the
Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; The main objective of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent.—The petition could not be one for
mandamus, which is a remedy available only when “any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court.”
The main objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the
respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would
have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and
where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.
Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; Although the Constitution guarantees the right
to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept.—In The Ombudsman v.
Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008), the Court has clarified that although the Constitution guarantees the right
to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that
concept, the facts and circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken into account.
There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are sought and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of the concept.

Prospectivity of Laws; As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist,
and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature.—As a general rule, laws shall have
no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is
procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the
remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally
attaches to or arises from procedural laws.

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; “Errors of Judgment” and “Errors of Jurisdiction,” Compared;
Words and Phrases; An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal, while an error of jurisdiction is one where
the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
and which error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.—Anent the first issue, in
order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line
between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the
other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer
or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable where the petition contains
an allegation that the challenged resolution is “patently illegal” and was issued with “grave abuse of
discretion” and “beyond the public respondent’s jurisdiction” when said resolution substantially
modified the earlier decision which had long become final and executory.—It is true that under Rule 43,
appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising
quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals by
filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order
or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable
considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is “patently
illegal” and was issued with “grave abuse of discretion” and “beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato
C. Corona’s) jurisdiction” when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March
29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here
involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule
43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. x x x The office of a writ
of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases—cases in which the act of the lower court or
quasijudicial body is wholly void.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition
for certiorari filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant.—The Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has
been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy
vs. Contreras, et al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we
have further stated in Cuaresma: “x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.”
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be
discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.

Same; Same; Same; Suspension of the Rules; That the Supreme Court has the power to set aside its own
rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.—That the Court has the
power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.
We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: “Be it remembered that rules of procedure are
but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a
lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case.”

Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; A motion for reconsideration is not necessary when
the questioned resolution is a patent nullity.—As to the second issue of whether the petitioners
committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when
the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, as will be taken up later.

GERVACIO DAUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. FELIPE T. ELEOSIDA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

Criminal procedure; Motion to quash; Appeal; Certiorari; When appeal is the rentedy.—In case a motion
to quash is denied, the defendant's remedy is to appeal from the judgment of conviction, after trial on
the merit. Certiorari against the order denying the motion to quash is not proper.

Justice of the peace court; Jurisdiction.—A violation of an ordinance is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN,
represented by HIS HEIRS: ROSALIA, ELEUTERIO, JOE, ERNESTO, HARRISON, ALL SURNAMED DE
GUZMAN; and GINA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Litigants should not be allowed to file identical motions repeatedly,
speculating on the possible change of opinion of the court or of its judges.—Litigants should not be
allowed to file identical motions repeatedly, speculating on the possible change of opinion of the court
or of its judges. We emphasize this principle in the present case and warn the parties to desist from the
practice of filing several motions to dismiss which allege the same ground.

Same; Same; Interlocutory Orders; While there is actually no rule prohibiting the filing of a pro forma
motion against an interlocutory order as the prohibition applies only to a final resolution or order of the
court, a second motion nonetheless can be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere
reiteration of the grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court.—This is not
the first time that the Court disallowed the repetitive filing of identical motions against an interlocutory
order. In a parallel case, San Juan, Jr. v. Cruz, 497 SCRA 410 (2006), the Court acknowledged that there is
actually no rule prohibiting the filing of a pro forma motion against an interlocutory order as the
prohibition applies only to a final resolution or order of the court. The Court held, nonetheless, that a
second motion can be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of the
grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court.
Same; Same; The 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned from the trial court’s
denial of the first motion for reconsideration.—In San Juan, the Court was also confronted with the
question of when the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned. Petitioner
therein filed second and third motions for reconsideration from the interlocutory order and when he
filed the petition for certiorari with the CA, he counted the 60-day reglementary period from the notice
of denial of his third motion for reconsideration. He argued that, since there is no rule prohibiting the
filing of a second or third motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order, the 60-day period should
be counted from the notice of denial of the last motion for reconsideration. Having declared that the
filing of a second motion for reconsideration that merely reiterates the arguments in the first motion is
subject to denial, the Court held that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be
reckoned from the trial court’s denial of the first motion for reconsideration, otherwise, indefinite
delays will ensue. Applying the ruling in San Juan, the petition for certiorari was evidently filed out of
time, as its filing was reckoned from the denial of the last motion. The subject Motion to Dismiss was
filed in an attempt to resurrect the remedy of a petition for certiorari, which had been lost long before
its filing.

Judgments; Res Judicata; A ruling on motion to dismiss, issued without trial on the merits or formal
presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment on the merits—Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court is explicit that a dismissal for failure to comply with an order of the court shall have the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits; Unless the court states that the dismissal is without prejudice, the
dismissal should be understood as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice.—In any case, we
agree with the CA’s conclusion that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. However, we do not agree that the judgment of dismissal in the first case
was not on the merits. A ruling on a motion to dismiss, issued without trial on the merits or formal
presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment on the merits. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court is explicit that a dismissal for failure to comply with an order of the court shall have the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits. In other words, unless the court states that the dismissal is without
prejudice, the dismissal should be understood as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice.

Same; Same; Res judicata is to be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice of justice
to technicality, particularly in this case where there was actually no determination of the substantive
issues in the first case and what is at stake is respondents’ home.—Bearing in mind the circumstances
obtaining in this case, we hold that res judicata should not be applied as it would not serve the interest
of substantial justice. Proceedings on the case had already been delayed by petitioner, and it is only fair
that the case be allowed to proceed and be resolved on the merits. Indeed, we have held that res
judicata is to be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality,
particularly in this case where there was actually no determination of the substantive issues in the first
case and what is at stake is respondents’ home.

ISMAEL V. SANTOS, ALFREDO G. ARCE and HILARIO M. PASTRANA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC., LUIS P. LORENZO, JR. and FREDERICK DAEL,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practices; Verification; There is substantial compliance if the verification is
executed by an attorney, it being presumed that facts alleged by him are true to his knowledge and
belief.—It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, we have held that there is substantial
compliance if the same is executed by an attorney, it being presumed that facts alleged by him are true
to his knowledge and belief. However, the same does not apply as regards the requirement of a
certification against forum shopping.

Same; Same; Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; The certification must be made by petitioner himself
and not by counsel.—It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the certification must be made by
petitioner himself and not by counsel since it is petitioner who is in the best position to know whether
he has previously commenced any similar action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or
agency.

Same; Certiorari; There are three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari
brought under Rule 65.—Moreover, the petition failed to indicate the material dates that would show
the timeliness of the filing thereof with the Court of Appeals. There are three (3) essential dates that
must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the
judgment or final order or Resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. Petitioners failed
to show the first and second dates, namely, the date of receipt of the impugned NLRC Decision as well
as the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration.

Same; Same; Same; Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction.—Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice.
These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the
clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the
policy of liberal construction.

JOAQUIN GA, JR., JUDITH GA GADNANAN and JESUSA GA ESMAÑA, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
ANTONIO TUBUNGAN AND ROSALINDA TUBUNGAN and NORBERTO GA, respondents.

Civil Procedure; Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP); The Court held that all
appeals from orders, resolutions or decisions of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.—In Sy v.
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 365 SCRA 49 (2001), the Court held that all appeals
from orders, resolutions or decisions of the COSLAP should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. If a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy due to grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, the same should also be brought to the Court of Appeals, as
the said court cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this
case, respondents did not timely appeal the COSLAP decision to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43, and
instead filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, although with the Regional Trial Court, a body that is
co-equal with the COSLAP. Only later did they file a petition for certiorari with the appellate court
assailing the trial court’s dismissal of their petition.

Judgments; In National Housing Authority v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 505 SCRA
38 (2006), we held that a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case is no judgment at all.—In National Housing Authority v. Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems, 505 SCRA 38 (2006), we held that a judgment rendered by a body or
tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is no judgment at all. Thus, it cannot
be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. The void judgment can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is likewise void.

Same; A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void.—We also declared in the
same case that such a nullity is correctible only through a petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari
that seeks the nullification of a void judgment cannot be dismissed for timeliness as the same does not
prescribe. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It can never become
final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question.

Administrative Agencies; Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP); Administrative

agencies like Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) are tribunals of limited
jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute.—
Administrative agencies like COSLAP are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers
which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, COSLAP has
two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the
agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter
is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in
nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume
jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to
consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons
and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land
dispute or problem.

Same; Same; The Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) may resolve land disputes
that involve only public land or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license from
the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant.—The
COSLAP may resolve land disputes that involve only public lands or lands of the public domain or those
covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber
concession, or a reservation grant. However, the lot subject of the instant petition was not shown to fall
under any of these categories of land and appears to be a private unregistered land. Neither is the
dispute between petitioners and respondents critical and explosive in nature nor does it involve a large
number of parties that could result to social tension and unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as
involving a critical situation that requires immediate action.

Judgments; A void judgment can never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time.—A void
judgment can never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time. It is thus clear that the
Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of respondents’ petition for certiorari as the judgment
of the COSLAP could not have attained finality. In other words, the failure of respondents to properly
appeal from the COSLAP decision before the appropriate court was not fatal to the petition for certiorari
that they eventually filed with the Court of Appeals. The latter remedy remained available despite the
lapse of the period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision.

BANK OF COMMERCE, petitioner, vs. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC., INTERCONTINENTAL

BROADCASTING CORPORATION, and BANAHAW BROADCASTING CORPORATION, THRU BOARD OF
ADMINISTRATOR, and SHERIFF BIENVENIDO S. REYES, JR., Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 98, respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; Since a motion for
reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the failure to first take
recourse to is usually regarded as fatal omission.—Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that
a petition for certiorari may only be filed when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
course of law. Since a motion for reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy, the failure to first take recourse to is usually regarded as fatal omission.

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Mergers; Words and Phrases; Merger is a reorganization of two or more
corporations that results in their consolidating into a single corporation, which is one of the constituent
corporations, one disappearing or dissolving and the other surviving.—Merger is a reorganization of two
or more corporations that results in their consolidating into a single corporation, which is one of the
constituent corporations, one disappearing or dissolving and the other surviving. To put it another way,
merger is the absorption of one or more corporations by another existing corporation, which retains its
identity and takes over the rights, privileges, franchises, properties, claims, liabilities and obligations of
the absorbed corporation(s). The absorbing corporation continues its existence while the life or lives of
the other corporation(s) is or are terminated.

Same; Same; Same; A merger does not become effective upon the mere agreement of the constituent
corporations; Section 79 of the Corporation Code further provides that the merger shall be effective
only upon the issuance by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of a certificate of merger.—
Indubitably, it is clear that no merger took place between Bancommerce and TRB as the requirements
and procedures for a merger were absent. A merger does not become effective upon the mere
agreement of the constituent corporations. All the requirements specified in the law must be complied
with in order for merger to take effect. Section 79 of the Corporation Code further provides that the
merger shall be effective only upon the issuance by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of a
certificate of merger.

Same; Same; Same; De Facto Merger; Words and Phrases; The idea of a de facto merger came about
because, prior to the present Corporation Code, no law authorized the merger or consolidation of
Philippine Corporations, except insurance companies, railway corporations, and public utilities.—The
idea of a de facto merger came about because, prior to the present Corporation Code, no law authorized
the merger or consolidation of Philippine Corporations, except insurance companies, railway
corporations, and public utilities. And, except in the case of insurance corporations, no procedure
existed for bringing about a merger. Still, the Supreme Court held in Reyes v. Blouse, 91 Phil. 305 (1952),
that authority to merge or consolidate can be derived from Section 28½ (now Section 40) of the former
Corporation Law which provides, among others, that a corporation may “sell, exchange, lease or
otherwise dispose of all or substantially all of its property and assets” if the board of directors is so
authorized by the affirmative vote of the stockholders holding at least two-thirds of the voting power.
The words “or otherwise dispose of,” according to the Supreme Court, is very broad and in a sense,
covers a merger or consolidation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A de facto merger can be pursued by one corporation acquiring all or
substantially all of the properties of another corporation in exchange of shares of stock of the acquiring
corporation.—In his book, Philippine Corporate Law, Dean Cesar Villanueva explained that under the
Corporation Code, “a de facto merger can be pursued by one corporation acquiring all or substantially
all of the properties of another corporation in exchange of shares of stock of the acquiring corporation.
The acquiring corporation would end up with the business enterprise of the target corporation;
whereas, the target corporation would end up with basically its only remaining assets being the shares
of stock of the acquiring corporation.” (Emphasis supplied) No de facto merger took place in the present
case simply because the TRB owners did not get in exchange for the bank’s assets and liabilities an
equivalent value in Bancommerce shares of stock. Bancommerce and TRB agreed with BSP approval to
exclude from the sale the TRB’s contingent judicial liabilities, including those owing to RPN, et al.

Prohibition

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY
COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, respondents.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Requisites for Certiorari to Prosper.—For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the
petitioner must allege and establish the concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) The writ is
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) Such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Same; Same; A petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in jurisdiction.—It is further
emphasized that a petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, and does not
correct just any error or mistake committed by a court, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions unless such court, board, or officer thereby acts without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Words and Phrases; “Judicial Functions”; Meaning of Judicial Functions.—The first requisite is that the
respondent tribunal, board, or officer must be exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial
function, according to Bouvier, is the exercise of the judicial faculty or office; it also means the capacity
to act in a specific way which appertains to the judicial power, as one of the powers of government.
“The term,” Bouvier continues, “is used to describe generally those modes of action which appertain to
the judiciary as a department of organized government, and through and by means of which it
accomplishes its purpose and exercises its peculiar powers.”

Same; Prohibition; The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal
authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice.—The function of prohibition is
to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice. The writ of prohibition is directed against proceedings that are done without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For grave abuse of discretion to be a ground
for prohibition, the petitioner must first demonstrate that the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has exercised its or his power
in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent
and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. On the other hand, the term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board,
or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such jurisdiction or acted without any
authority.

Same; Same; Petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that any other
existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.—The petitioner must further allege in the petition and
establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A remedy is plain,
speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment
and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.

Judicial Review; Eminent Domain; Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the
power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the
appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners; Only when the
landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has
been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become
available.—Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession
of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made
to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. This bar against
prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of
private land intended for public use, and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made
subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain,
the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the
appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners. Only when the
landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has
been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become
available.

FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR., petitioner, vs. NOEL RABI, and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 9,
Tacloban City, respondents.

Criminal Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Generally, an aggrieved party is mandated

to first exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a judicial action for redress from acts of
administrative bodies or offices in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions, exceptions.—The
general rule is that an aggrieved party is mandated to first exhaust all administrative remedies before
filing a judicial action for redress from acts of administrative bodies or offices in the performance of
their quasi-judicial functions; otherwise, said action may be dismissed for prematurity. However, the
principle is not without exceptions. The aggrieved party may validly resort to immediate judicial action
where the (a) question raised is purely legal; (b) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (c) when
there is an urgent need for judicial intervention; (d) when the disputed act is performed without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (e) the administrative remedy does not provide for a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; and (f) when due process is disregarded.

Administrative Law; Scope of Administrative Supervision.—The “administrative supervision” which shall

govern the equivalent and an agency under its jurisdiction is limited to the authority of such department
to generally oversee the operation of the agency under it to insure that the same is managed effectively
and economically, without interfering with its day-to-day activities; and to take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including the rectification of violations,
abuses or other forms of maladministration.

Same; Same; Distinction Between Administrative Supervision and Control.—It bears stressing that in
administrative law, administrative supervision is not synonymous with control. The Court distinguished
supervision from control in Jose Mondano vs. Francisco Silvosa, thus: “x x x In administrative law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. x x x.”
“Supervision and control,” on the other hand, includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to
approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.

Same; Same; The office of the regional state prosecutor does not conduct any preliminary investigation
or prosecute any criminal case in court at all.—As a practical matter, however, criminal complaints are
filed in a proper case for preliminary investigation with the municipal trial court or with the office of the
city or provincial prosecutor which has territorial jurisdiction over the offense complained of and not
with the office of the regional state prosecutor. Hence, the office of the regional state prosecutor does
not conduct any preliminary investigation or prosecute any criminal case in court at all. The bulk of the
work of the office of the regional state prosecutor consists of administrative supervision over city or
provincial or city fiscals and their assistants.

THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, petitioner, vs. FELIX ANGELO BAUTISTA, Solicitor General of the
Philippines, respondent.

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; POWERS TO SUSPEND AND ANNUL

ELECTIONS.—The Commission on Elections cannot vote to suspend an election but may vote to
recommend or may recommend only to the President the suspension of an election "when for any
serious cause the holding of an election should become impossible in any political division or
subdivision," pursuant to section 8 of Republic Act No. 180, and the Commission Cannot "vote to annul
said elections" because it has no power to annul an election. What at most it may do is to express its
views in the report to be submitted to the President and the Congress on the manner in which such
election was conducted, pursuant to section 4, Article X, of the Constitution.

2.ID.; ID.; TENURE OF OFFICE OF ITS MEMBERS.—The membership of the Commission is for a fixed
period of nine years, except as to the first members appointed who were to hold office for nine, six and
three years. With these periods, it was the intention to have one position vacant every three years, so
that no President can appoint more than one Commissioner, thereby preserving and safeguarding the
independence and impartiality of the Commission.

3.ID.; ID.; WHEN THE PRESIDENT MAY APPOINT COMMISSIONER FOR UNEXPIRED TERM.—By death,
resignation, retirement, or removal by impeachment, a vacancy in the Commission is created. In these
cases the President may appoint a Commissioner for the unexpired term. When such an event should
come to pass the limitation to one appointment by a President would be ineffectual.

4.PUBLIC OFFICERS; APPOINTMENT; POWER TO APPOINT IMPLIES AUTHORITY TO DESIGNATE,

LIMITATION OF.—The principle or rule that the power to appoint implies or includes the authority to
designate, in the same way that that power carries with it the authority to remove, under the theory
that the whole includes and is greater than the part, is not absolute but subject to certain limitations.

5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MEMBERS MUST BE INDEPENDENT, SECURED

AND SAFEGUARDED; TEMPORARY DESIGNATION OF A PERSON OR OFFICER TO THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ILLEGAL.—By the very nature of their functions, the members of the Commission on
Elections must be independent. They must be made to feel that they are secured in the tenure of their
office and entitled to fixed emoluments during their incumbency (economic security), so as to make
them impartial in the performance of their functions—their powers and duties. They are not allowed to
do certain things, such as to engage in the practice of a profession; to intervene, directly or indirectly, in
the management or control of any private enterprise; or to be financially interested in any contract with
the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof (sec. 3, Article X, of the Constitution).
Those safeguards are all conducive or tend to create or bring about a condition or state of mind that will
lead the members of the Commission to perform with impartiality their great and important task and
functions. That independence and impartiality may be shaken and destroyed by a designation of a
person or officer to act temporarily in the Commission on Elections. And, although Commonwealth Act
No. 588 provides that such temporary designation "shall in no case continue beyond the date of the
adjournment of the regular session of the National Assembly (Congress) following such designation," still
such limit to the designation does not remove the cause for the impairment of the independence of one
designated in a temporary capacity to the Commission on Elections. It would be more in keeping with
intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than
to designate one to act temporarily.

6.PROHIBITION; IT WILL NOT LIE TO DETERMINE TITLE TO OFFICE.—The authorities and decisions of
courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial
officer, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court (High's
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3d ed., p. 715; Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil., 866, 871).

7.ID.; ABSENCE OF REMEDY TO REDRESS CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSGRESSION; CASE AT BAR.—The

remedy of prohibition may lie in this case as no one is entitled to the office, there is no party who in his
name may institute quo warranto proceedings, and the respondent, the only other party who may
institute the proceedings in the name of the Republic of the Philippines would not proceed against
himself. Were it not for this anomalous situation where there would be no remedy to redress a
constitutional transgression, the time-honored rule that to test the right to an office quo warranto
proceedings is the proper remedy, would have been strictly adhered to.

MARCELO ENRIQUEZ, petitioner, vs. HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, MELITON YBURAN, and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.

1.VENUE; WHEN ACTION INVOLVES TITLE TO OR RECOVERY OP PosSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY.—When

the action affects title to or recovery of possession of real property it should be commenced and tried in
the province where the property lies. (Sec. 3 of Rule 5 of the Eules of Court.)

2.PLEADING AND PRACTICE; IMPROPER VENUE; MOTION TO DISMISS; COURT'S DENIAL OF MOTION;
MANDAMUS is NOT PROPER REMEDY BUT PROHIBITION.—When a motion to dismiss on the ground' of
improper venue is erroneously denied, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting the error. It
being a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Eules of Court by refusing to dismiss an
action which should not be maintained' in his court, the remedy is prohibition.

Mandamus

NEMESIO M. CALIM, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JESUS F. GUERRERO, THE HONORABLE EMILIO A.
GONZALEZ III, THE HONORABLE ADORACION A. AGBADA, in their respective capacities as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, Director and Graft Investigation Officer II, THE HONORABLE ROBERTO J. ACOBA,
Vice-Mayor, Siniloan, Laguna, PAUL SIMON Z. GO, HOMER R. SERRANO, FELIPE A. EM, ELIGIO R. DE
LEON, FELIPE V. CASTRO, GAUDENCIO C. SALAY, ANDRES V. QUINTERO, HECTOR A. MANEJA, SEDFREY B.
REALEZA, all members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Siniloan, Laguna, respondents.**

Mandamus; It is elementary that mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is
founded clearly on law and not when it is doubtful.—It is elementary that mandamus applies as a
remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly on law and not when it is doubtful. In varying
language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if
those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. A writ of mandamus can be issued only when
petitioner’s legal right to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear
and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law. Mandamus, therefore, is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty.

Ombudsman; The Supreme Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.—Essentially, what
petitioner attacks in the instant Petition for Mandamus is the order of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, in admonishing the private respondents. The case partakes of an administrative
disciplinary nature. Herein, petitioner was not able to establish his entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to compel the public respondents to file a
criminal information against the private respondents. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not
interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional
mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. Courts have upheld the wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutorial powers that the Ombudsman enjoys; and such powers are virtually free
from executive, legislative or judicial intervention. The rationale of this rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers that the Office of the Ombudsman is granted
under the present Constitution, but upon practicality as well; otherwise, the functions of the courts
would be perilously bound by numerous petitions assailing the result of the investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office, in much the same way that the courts would be saturated if compelled to
review the prosecutors’ exercise of discretion each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a
complaint. The discretion to prosecute or dismiss a complaint filed before it is lodged in the Office of the
Ombudsman itself. To compel the Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal case against the private
respondents, as petitioner would have it, is outside the ambit of the courts.

Same; Appeals; Appeals, if availing, from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court.—A graver reason that impels this court to reject petitioner’s plea is the mode taken by
petitioner in elevating the case to this court. In the case of Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 (1998), this
court ruled that appeals, if availing, from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. In Lanting v. Ombudsman, 458 SCRA 93 (2005), we underscored the catena of cases
subsequent to the Fabian ruling, thus: In Fabian v. Desierto, supra, we held that only “appeals from the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 (of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).” We
reiterated this ruling in Namuhe vs. Ombudsman, and recently in Barata vs. Abalos, Jr. and Coronel vs.
Aniano Desierto, as Ombudsman, and Pedro Sausal, Jr. Calim vs. Guerrero, 517 SCRA 412, G.R. No.
156527 March 5, 2007

ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, GENER C. ENDONA, and RHANDOLFO B. AMANSEC, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, respondent.

Speedy Disposition of Cases; Mandamus; It is inaccurate to say that the writ of mandamus will never
issue to control a public official’s discretion—mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to
enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated
by the Constitution.—Ordinarily, a petition for a writ of mandamus is proper to compel the public official
concerned to perform a ministerial act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. However, it is inaccurate to say that the writ will never issue to control the public
official’s discretion. Our jurisprudence is replete with exceptions to that rule. Thus, this Court held that if
the questioned act was done with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority, the writ will be issued to control the exercise of such discretion. Likewise, mandamus is a
proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a
public duty, most especially when mandated by the Constitution. Thus, a party to a case may demand
expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. Under the
undisputed facts before us, we hold that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by failing to resolve the administrative and criminal cases against
petitioners even to this day, or a period of almost eight (8) years from the filing of their complaints-
affidavits.

Same; In the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the aggrieved party’s assertion or
failure to assert such right, and the prejudice caused by the delay.—“All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies,” so the
Constitution declares in no uncertain terms. This right, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In a number of
cases, this Court ruled that the right to a speedy disposition of a case is a relative or flexible concept. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination
of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length
of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the aggrieved party’s assertion or failure to assert such right, and
the prejudice caused by the delay.
Same; Ombudsman; When the Constitution enjoins respondent to “act promptly” on any complaint
against any public officer or employee, it has the concomitant duty to speedily resolve the same.—These
powers, functions and duties are aimed to enable respondent to be “a more active and effective agent
of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.” Unfortunately, respondent has transgressed its
constitutional and statutory duties. When the Constitution enjoins respondent to “act promptly” on any
complaint against any public officer or employee, it has the concomitant duty to speedily resolve the
same. But respondent did not act promptly or resolve speedily petitioners’ cases. The Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman requires that the hearing officer is given a definite period of
“not later than thirty (30) days” to resolve the case after the formal investigation shall have been
concluded. Definitely, respondent did not observe this 30-day rule. Here, respondent did not resolve the
administrative and criminal cases against petitioners although the investigation of the said cases had
long been terminated when the latter formally offered their evidence way back on January 29, 2002. In
fact, due to respondent’s inaction, petitioners, on March 24, 2006 or more than four (4) years from
January 29, 2002, filed a motion praying the immediate dismissal of all the cases against them,
contending that respondent’s “inordinate delay” in resolving them constitutes a violation of their
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases. Significantly, this motion was never resisted by
complainant FFIB. Nonetheless, respondent did not even bother to act on the motion. Likewise, it did
not inform petitioners why the cases remain unresolved.

Same; Same; Adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the
established rules of procedure, but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice;
The people’s respect and confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman are measured not only by its
impartiality, fairness, and correctness of its acts, but also by its capacity to resolve cases speedily.—
These are only some of the cases showing respondent’s disregard of the person’s constitutional right to
a speedy disposition of his case. Sadly, the list of cases is growing. This is alarming. Here, respondent,
the very protector of the people, became the perpetrator of the dictum that “justice delayed is justice
denied.” Indeed, the said dictum is not a meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those
who are tasked with the dispensation of justice. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in
the administration of justice by our judicial and quasijudicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must
not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure, but
must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of
cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.
The people’s respect and confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman are measured not only by its
impartiality, fairness, and correctness of its acts, but also by its capacity to resolve cases speedily.

UY KIAO ENG, petitioner, vs. NIXON LEE, respondent.

Remedial Law; Mandamus; Definition of Mandamus; Definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no interest.—Mandamus is a command issuing from a
court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the
writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy,
and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of
duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce
a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

Same; Same; Grounds for the issuance of the writ of mandamus; It is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that the relator should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.—The writ of mandamus, however, will not
issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or
to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce
a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising
a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule,
mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board,
or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,
board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Same; Same; Mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights and will not lie against an
individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.—Recognized
further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual
obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie
against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.
The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to
enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues
only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To
preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in
matters relating to the public.

Same; Same; Mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of
remedy are powerless to afford relief.—An important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is
that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the
remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the
usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a
legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable
principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE
BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners, vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING
AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
respondents.

Parties; Locus Standi; A party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Court’s discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised.—There is
no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do not
question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to
clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which may, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue
raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to
the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly. Undeniably, the right to
clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe,
but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably
affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners
deserves recognition.

Mandamus; It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual
obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion.—In
University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 761 (1994), we said, … “It is settled that
mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its
main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course
of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never
issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must
however, be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do
or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The
writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.” (Emphasis supplied.) In this petition the legal right
which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already
articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.
Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned, the
responsibility of implementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC.

Same; Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.
Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to order owners of
motor vehicles to use CNG.—Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein
sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of man-damus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use
CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law
as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of
motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4
“to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators
of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys.” Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one
branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by
orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with
and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal
branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.

Same; The Supreme Court admits in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that
imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus
compelling the use of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) for public utility vehicles.—It is the firm belief of
this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the
environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the
present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health
of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by
motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes
an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the
use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide
first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners
before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC.,

petitioner-appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent-appellee.

Statutory Construction; Case where judiciary’s power of interpretation not applicable; In the absence of
doubt as to scope of operation of the law, the law must be obeyed.—The applicable provision of
Republic Act No. 2023, quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so
applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view it
otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that
property appertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Ap-peals: “It has
been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is
nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation,
must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently been to that effect.”

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Special Civil Actions; Man-damus; Nature Of; Mandamus does not lie in
the absence of showing of a clear legal right.—Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-
appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would base his action fails to
supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a
suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v. Montesa, this Court held: “Mandamus is the
proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance
of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a du-ty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use
and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled.” The opinion continued in this wise: “According to
former Chief Justice Moran, ‘Only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear
and certain. If the legal rights of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must
be dismissed. In support of the above view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was
there categorically stated: ‘This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by
mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that
petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing demanded and that it must be the legal duty of the
defendant to perform the required act.’ As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion:
‘It is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought
to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the wit not issue in cases where the right is doubtful.’
To the same effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: ‘Stated otherwise, the
writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command
to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ and MANUEL V.
FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN and CITY COUNCIL
OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Local Government Units; The Supreme Court ruled that
a claimant may resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel a Local Government Unit (LGU) to enact
the necessary ordinance and approve the corresponding disbursement in order to satisfy the judgment
award.—The Court cannot blame petitioners for resorting to the remedy of mandamus because they
have done everything in the books to satisfy their just and demandable claim. They went to the courts,
the COA, the Ombudsman, and the DILG. They resorted to the remedy of mandamus because in at least
three (3) cases, the Court sanctioned the remedy in cases of final judgments rendered against a local
government unit (LGU). The Court ruled that a claimant may resort to the remedy of mandamus to
compel an LGU to enact the necessary ordinance and approve the corresponding disbursement in order
to satisfy the judgment award.

Same; Same; Same; A resort to the remedy of mandamus is improper if the standard modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are still available and capable of affording relief.—It has been held that
a resort to the remedy of mandamus is improper if the standard modes of procedure and forms of
remedy are still available and capable of affording relief. The equitable nature of a writ of mandamus
was discussed in the case of Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee, 610 SCRA 211 (2010), thus: Mandamus is a
command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the
public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose
of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse
for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision
instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The writ
of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or
which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor
will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt
exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and
the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds:
[a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station;
or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit; It is clear that the Commission on Audit (COA) has the
authority and power to settle “all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.”—It is clear that the COA has the authority and
power to settle “all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.” This authority and power can still be exercised by the COA
even if a court’s decision in a case has already become final and executory. In other words, the COA still
retains its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after the issuance of a writ of execution.

JOSEPH OMAR O. ANDAYA, petitioner, vs. RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC., DEMOSTHENES P. ORAIZ
and RICARDO D. GONZALEZ, respondents.

Corporation Law; The registration of a transfer of shares of stock is a ministerial duty on the part of the
corporation.—It is already settled jurisprudence that the registration of a transfer of shares of stock is a
ministerial duty on the part of the corporation. Aggrieved parties may then resort to the remedy of
mandamus to compel corporations that wrongfully or unjustifiably refuse to record the transfer or to
issue new certificates of stock.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Ministerial Acts; A writ of mandamus to enforce a
ministerial act may issue only when petitioner is able to establish the presence of the following: (1) right
clearly founded in law and is not doubtful; (2) a legal duty to perform the act; (3) unlawful neglect in
performing the duty enjoined by law; (4) the ministerial nature of the act to be performed; and (5) the
absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.—A writ of
mandamus to enforce a ministerial act may issue only when petitioner is able to establish the presence
of the following: (1) right clearly founded in law and is not doubtful; (2) a legal duty to perform the act;
(3) unlawful neglect in performing the duty enjoined by law; (4) the ministerial nature of the act to be
performed; and (5) the absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

MR prereq, xpns
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES LAZO, respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Although the direct filing of petitions for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals (CA) is discouraged when litigants may still resort to remedies with the trial court,
the acceptance of and the grant of due course to a petition for certiorari is generally addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.—A petition for certiorari may be given due course notwithstanding that
no motion for reconsideration was filed in the trial court. Although the direct filing of petitions for
certiorari with the CA is discouraged when litigants may still resort to remedies with the trial court, the
acceptance of and the grant of due course to a petition for certiorari is generally addressed to the sound
discretion of the court because the technical provisions of the Rules may be relaxed or suspended if it
will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.

Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is
a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an
opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case; Exceptions.—The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity
for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the
following exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to
file a motion for reconsideration: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where
the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.