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The collapse of the Sella Zerbino gravity dam

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DOI: 10.1016/j.enggeo.2016.06.024

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The collapse of the Sella Zerbino gravity dam

G. Petaccia, C.G. Lai, C. Milazzo, L. Natale

PII: S0013-7952(16)30200-9
DOI: doi: 10.1016/j.enggeo.2016.06.024
Reference: ENGEO 4334

To appear in: Engineering Geology

Received date: 24 February 2016

Revised date: 27 June 2016
Accepted date: 28 June 2016

Please cite this article as: Petaccia, G., Lai, C.G., Milazzo, C., Natale, L.,
The collapse of the Sella Zerbino gravity dam, Engineering Geology (2016), doi:
10.1016/j.enggeo.2016.06.024

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THE COLLAPSE OF THE SELLA ZERBINO GRAVITY DAM

G. Petaccia1, C.G. Lai1, C. Milazzo1, L. Natale1

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DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE, UNIVERSITY OF PAVIA, VIA A. FERRATA 3, 27100,

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PAVIA, ITALY

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Corresponding author: Gabriella Petaccia email: petaccia@unipv.it

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ABSTRACT

When a severe flood wave completely filled the Ortiglieto reservoir on August 13, 1935, the 14 m high “Sella Zerbino”

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secondary dam failed catastrophically causing more than 100 casualties. Both of the dams, Sella Zerbino -Zerbino
Saddle- and Bric Zerbino -Zerbino Peak- (Figure 1) were overtopped but only the Sella Zerbino failed whereas the main
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barrage did not suffer any damage. The lawsuit that followed this tragic event ended with a full acquittal of the dam’s
designers since the plaintiff experts succeeded in demonstrating that the collapse was due to an extreme rainfall storm
of unpredictable intensity. The case was then officially closed and still today the failure of the Sella Zerbino dam is
attributed to the unpredictable hydrological event. Recently, Natale and Petaccia (2013) re-examined the case assessing
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the capacity of the flood spillways which equipped the Bric Zerbino dam. This paper thoroughly reviews the mechanics
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of the collapse of the Sella Zerbino dam focusing on the stability of the structure. The water pressure underneath the
dam and the poor quality of the foundation rock is believed to have played a major role in the sequence of events that
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ended in the collapse of the barrage.

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Keywords: dam failure, stability, seepage, rainfall, reservoir, flood spillways

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INTRODUCTION

In Italy, the construction of large dams started at the end of XIX Century when the second industrial revolution was just
beginning (ANIDEL 1961). The Gleno disaster, occurred in 1923, is considered as the first dam collapse happened in
Italy. It is believed to have been caused by foundation instability combined with changes in the construction
methodology. It provoked more than 400 causalities (Pilotti et al. 2011).

According to ICOLD (1974), the main causes of failure of gravity dams are foundations deficiencies and inadequacy to
release flood through spillways and outlet works. Poorly-designed spillways are often causing dams failures (ICOLD
1991).

The Spanish Puentes dam was a 286m long and 50m high concrete dam, laying on wooden pillars inserted in a sandy
ground. In 1802 the dam suddenly fell at the first filling of the reservoir and killed 608 people.

The Bouzey dam (France) was a dam 525m long and 22.7m high that created a reservoir of 7 million cubic meters
(Smith 1994). A 5m deep cutoff wall was built to improve the rather leaking bedrock. In 1895, at the initial filling of the
reservoir, water started to spout out from the bedrock and the dam slipped forward with a maximum displacement of
35cm. The dam failure killed 85 people.

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The St Francis dam (Begnudelli and Sanders 2007) was a curved concrete gravity dam (California, USA). The dam was
57m high, 213m long, and the reservoir stored 47 million cubic meters. In 1928 when the reservoir was first filled to its
crest the dam failed because of the poor quality of the bedrock: the westward abutment was built on a fault while the
eastward one was built on mica schist interspersed with talc.

The Sella Zerbino dam in Northern Italy is considered a classical example of poorly designed spillways because the
1935 peak flood discharge was 3 times bigger than the design discharge.

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The design of the Bric and Sella Zerbino dams was completed in 1926 under the “Dam Construction Rule No. 1309”

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emitted by the Ministry of Public Works April 2, 1921, already in force. This Rule required that the water uplift to be

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considered in the dam stability analysis.

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After the Gleno dam failure in 1923, the Italian Government appointed a Technical Commission (December 6, 1923) to
carry out a detailed investigation on the safety of existing dams to determine the need for possible retrofitting measures.
On December 31, 1925 the Technical Commission submitted to the Government the new Dam Design and Construction

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Standards which were promptly approved. Only in November, 1st 1959, these technical regulations were superseded by
the Decree n. 1363; new Construction Standards were issued in March 24, 1982 to update the previous ones. In Italy,
the design of new dams and the assessment of existing ones is ruled by the Ministry Decree published on August, 7
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2014. The major innovation with respect to the previous technical regulations is the shift from a prescriptive design
philosophy to a performance-based design approach. The lessons learned from the catastrophic events occurred over the
past 150 years were somehow poured into the new regulations. An important aspect that is now fully recognized is the
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need to properly recognize from the beginning of the design procedure that hydrological, hydraulic, geological,
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geotechnical and seismic processes are strictly connected.

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Fig.1: Location of Ortiglieto reservoir in Northern Italy

DESIGN HISTORY OF SELLA AND BRIC ZERBINO DAMS

The Ortiglieto reservoir stored the waters of Orba basin which covers an area of 142 km2 on the leeward side of the
Liguria Apennine in Northern Italy (Figure 2). The design of the Molare hydropower plant changed several times in the

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28 years period from the initial design to the start up of the plant. The first project to exploit a discharge of 0.35 m3/s
from two Orba River tributaries, dates back to 1899 (Zunini 1899). In the following sections, the design of the main and
secondary dams is discussed separately.

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Fig.2: Ortiglieto reservoir, Location of Sella and Bric Zerbino dams

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Table 1: Historical evolution of Bric Zerbino and Sella Zerbino design projects

measure January May

1898 1912 1921 1925 1926
units 1924 1924
Maximum w. el. m a.s.l. - - 322 323 323 323 323
Normal w. el. m a.s.l. 313 316 320 322 322 322 322
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Flood spillways capacity m /s 400 n. a. 553 1000 n. a. 815 865

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Live Storage hm 9.5 12.25 16.15 16.15 18 18

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Bric Zerbino height m 33 40 45.5 45.5 45.5 47 47
Sella Zerbino height m 1 10 14 14 14 14.5 14.5

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Bric Zerbino main Dam

The first project of Bric Zerbino dam, dating 1899, aimed to create a reservoir with storage capacity of 8.1 hm3. The

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normal water elevation was 311.00m above the sea level (a.s.l.); the maximum water elevation was 313.00m a.s.l.
Floods were discharged by a gated lateral spillway. In July 1912 after the permission to exploit the reservoir for
hydroelectric purposes was granted, a call to accrue the reservoir volume up to 12.25 hm3 was put forward. The new
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project increased the maximum reservoir elevation to 316.00m a.s.l..

The dam was 40m high and 50m long and its flood spilling capacity was 328 m3/s. This project was approved in 1915.

On April 13, 1921 the construction manager filed for increasing the reservoir capacity to 16.15 hm3 with 320.00m a.s.l.
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maximum water elevation. The 45.5m high dam was equipped with Heyn siphons and a bottom outlet for an overall
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discharge of about 660 m3/s.

In 1923 the Heyn siphons were replaced by 2 groups of 9 broad crested weirs, operating at 322.00m a.s.l. The discharge
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released was about 800 m3/s for a reservoir level of 315.00m a.s.l.
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The May 1924 upgrade increased the reservoir volume to 18 hm3 and the maximum water elevation to 323.00m a.s.l. A
battery of 12 Heyn siphons released 500 m3/s (Petaccia and Fenocchi 2015).
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In 1925 the projects of the bottom outlet and the side spillway were presented. The bottom outlet was regulated by a
bell valve and could release up to 150 m3/s. The design discharge of the side spillway, located rightward of the dam,
was 110 m3/s. A high pressure bottom outlet of 55 m3/s was also present.

The side spillway was then modified in 1926, since a flood event evidenced its insufficiency. The capacity of the
modified spillway increased to 160 m3/s.

Finally, on August 13, 1935, the Bric Zerbino dam was 47m high, that is 40% higher than the original project, and
191m long (Figure 3). The distance between the main and the secondary dam was 500 m.

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Fig.3. Downstream view of the Bric Zerbino dam, 13/8/1935

Sella Zerbino secondary dam

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The 1899 project of the Ortiglieto plant envisaged a straight low sill 78m long located at Sella Zerbino to evacuate
floods. The releasing capacity of this weir, equipped by 24 couples of gates 1.5 m high, was 400 m3/s.

The 1921 the construction manager proposed to change the weir into an Ambursen non-overflow gravity dam: due to
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poor quality of the foundation rock spillways were excluded. As the Dam Office of the Ministry rejected this ill-advised
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proposals, a revised project of a gravity dam was presented on May 21, 1924. No additional geotechnical investigations
were accomplished despite the highly deteriorated characteristics of the bedrock. As later discussed, this played a major
role in the disaster. The four blocks of the dam were separated by three contraction joints.
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On August 13, 1935 the final shape of Sella Zerbino Dam was as follows: height 14.5m, length 109m,, shoulders made
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as solid walls 3.5m broad. The slope of the faces of three central blocks of the dam were:10% upstream and varying
from 75% to 55% downstream (Figure 4). The secondary dam had no spillways.
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Fig.4. Downstream view of Sella Zerbino-Dam 13/8/1935

A soon as the reservoir was filled, water leakages of about 0.06 m3/s were detected, so that grout injections in the
bedrock were called for. The grout curtain did not stop the leakage; in fact the final inspection noticed a considerable
water spillage for a reservoir level of 321.80m a.s.l.: a leakage of 0.017 and 0.005 m3/s from the right and left abutment
of the dam was reported. Table 1 shows the historical evolution of the Ortiglieto project involving the two barrages.

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THE FAILURE OF THE SELLA ZERBINO DAM

After a long dry period, at 6:15 a.m. of 13th August 1935 an exceptionally severe rainfall storm hit the Orba basin
(Natale and Petaccia 2013). At 7:00 a.m. the rain intensity increased and kept on without interruptions until 3:00 p.m.
The rain reached his highest intensity between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. and between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. At 9:30 a.m. the
siphon outlets operated to their full capacity (Petaccia and Fenocchi 2015). At 10:45 a.m. the water began to enter the
side spillway and soon afterwards the flood inflow exceeded the maximum capacity of the spillways. After 15 minutes

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the bell valve was clogged up with sediments and debris and there was no way to re-open it. At 12:30 a.m. both of the

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dams were overtopped. At 1:15 p.m. the Sella Zerbino dam abruptly collapsed (Alfieri 1936). Historical witnesses
confirm that the collapse started from the left side of the dam. The remaining parts of the dam failed sequentially. On

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August 15, 1935 a new flood wave swept down the wreckage of the left abutment. The dam failure flooded an area of

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almost 70 km2 and caused 111 casualties, 97 of which in Ovada town (Natale et al. 2008, Petaccia et al. 2016).

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GEOLOGIC AND GEOTECHNICAL SITE CHARACTERIZATION

The geological reports prepared for the design of the two Zerbino dams were mainly referred to the location of the Bric
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Zerbino Dam (Lelli 1937; Peretti 1937). Recent surveys on Sella Zerbino site (Capponi 2014; Bonaria and Tosatti 2013)
highlighted the extremely poor quality of the bedrock. Figure 4 shows the transversal cross section at the dam site.

The mechanical characteristics of the bedrock were retrieved from the results of the experimental investigation
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campaign funded in 1980 by Piedmont Regional Administration to assess the budget costs of a multipurpose plant
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aimed to revitalize the exploitation of the Orba River. The investigation included a series of geophysical refraction
surveys (Calvino and Siccardi, 1980) from which a total of 15 subsoil profiles were constructed. The average low-strain
elastic moduli of the undisturbed rock formations were then estimated from the measured speed of propagation V P of
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compressional waves. The values of VP typical of a compact rock could only be found below 20 m from the free
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surface. Three boreholes with continuous sampling were drilled to reconstruct the lithostratigraphic profile along the
axis of the Sella Zerbino dam (Figure 5). The rock formations were distinguished based on the RQD (Rock Quality
Designation) geomechanical parameter.
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The hydraulic conductivity of the geologic formations was measured through standard in situ Lugeon tests. The subsoil
at the foundation site of the dam is locally fractured; therefore a distinction was made between primary and secondary
permeability. Furthermore, different mechanical properties of the various lithotypes produce systems of discontinuities
with different hydraulic parameters. Figure 5 shows qualitatively that the bedrock is highly fractured and inadequate to
bear the stresses induced by the weight of the Sella Zerbino dam. As mentioned above, this was noted during the
construction works when the grout curtain was injected.

The top soil layer is a sandy silt originated from weathering of the underlying bedrock and an highly fractured
Serpentinite with talcose silt; its thickness varies from 1 to 4 meter below the ground level. A large variability of
geomechanical characteristics characterizes the intermediate geologic formation at the right abatement (borehole S3 in
Figure 4). This is also caused by the presence of a mylonite interface in the interior of the riverbed. In the central part of
the dam cross-section the intermediate geologic formation has relatively homogeneous properties (borehole S2 in
Figure 4). However, the terminal part of the borehole intercepts the mylonite with some visible serpentinite pieces after
crossing some degraded Serpentinite breccia.

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Fig.5 Longitudinal vertical cross-section at the site of foundation of the Sella Zerbino dam (view from upstream).

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We tested 3 concrete samples of the remains of Sella Zerbino Dam recovered during one of our on-site surveys: the
results are reported in Table 2. In this table Rck denotes the average cubic strength, fck the average cylindrical strength,
fctm the average tensile strength and Ecm the average elastic Young modulus of the concrete.

Table 2: Mechanical characteristics of the cyclopean concrete of the Sella Zerbino dam calculated
according to the formulas of the current Italian Building Code (NTC08)

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Rck fck fctm fcm Ecm
Cubic

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samples
[N/mm2] [N/mm2] [N/mm2] [N/mm2] [N/mm2]

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1 37.20 30.88 2.95 38.88 33062.50
2 28.87 23.96 2.49 31.96 31174.51

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3 30.17 25.04 2.57 33.04 31486.59

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Average 32.08 26.63
MA 2.67 34.63 31907.87

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE OF SELLA ZERBINO DAM

Following the collapse of the Sella Zerbino dam, different causes were blamed for the disaster (Accusani 1936; De
Marchi 1937; Mangiagalli 1937) including:
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1. Failure of the internal body of the barrage due to inadequate concrete resistance
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2. Instability due to the uplift force. The design did not consider this force, even though it was required by the
technical Standard of that time (Ministry Rule No. 1309 of April 2, 1921)
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3. Instability due to the scour caused by the plunging of the water overtopping the dam.
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Since both the trial report and our preliminary analyses verified that the cause n 1 did not occur, the following sections
thoroughly investigate causes 2 and 3.
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SEEPAGE ANALYSIS

The seepage analysis was carried out to quantify the uplift force acting beneath the Sella Zerbino Dam and to assess the
overall stability of the barrage. The analysis was performed using SEEP/W (Geo-Slope International Ltd. 2007); this
finite element-based code computes the flow net in a two-dimensional porous medium. The spatial domain was
extended approximately 40 m upstream and downstream of the dam and was discretized by 1718 quadrangular elements
with side ranging from 0.6 to 1.0m. The hydraulic conductivity and other hydraulic parameters introduced in the
SEEP/W model were derived from geotechnical characterization and using empirical correlations (Tong et al. 2014). As
an example, Table 3 reports the values adopted for the various geological formations in cross section 5. Figure 6 shows
the finite element grid used in the SEEP/W model.

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Fig.6 Finite element model of cross-section S5 used for seepage analysis with SEEP/W
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Table 3: Hydraulic conductivity in the SEEP/W model for saturated bedrock

Geomaterials Conductivity
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[m/s]
Mylonite 5*10-4
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Talcose Silt 1*10-4

Fill from construction site 1*10-3
Sediments 1*10-3
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Fractured Serpentinite 1*10-4

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Weathered silt with Serpentinous breccia 3*10-4

Fractured Prasinite 1*10-6
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First of all a steady state seepage analysis was conducted with the water elevation of 323.00 and 326.67m a.s.l.
respectively, corresponding to the maximum storage level in the reservoir and the water level attained when the Sella
Zerbino Dam collapsed. Figure 7 shows the flow net beneath the dam obtained for cross section S5. Afterwards,
unsteady flow seepage analysis was performed to simulate the evolution of the phenomenon from 10:00 a.m. to 1:20
p.m..

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Fig.7 Steady state flow net calculated with SEEP/W for cross section S5 and reservoir water elevation of 326.67m a.s.l.
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Figure 8 shows the comparison for cross section S5 (Figure 5) of the components of the uplift force calculated under
steady state and transient conditions. The results of the two types of analyses are rather close to each other: the storage
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factor is irrelevant due to the almost large values of the hydraulic conductivity of the bedrock.
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Fig.8 Comparison of the components of buoyancy forces calculated under steady state and transient conditions for cross
section S5 (Figure 5)

STABILITY ANALYSIS OF SELLA ZERBINO DAM

The forces acting on the cross section of the gravity dam are shown in Figure 9: the destabilizing actions are in red color
and the stabilizing actions are in green color. The forces are: weight of the barrage W, weight of the soil above the
sliding plane Wt , hydrostatic force on the upstream face of the dam Si , the thrust of the saturated soil Ss, the uplift

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thrust Sp, and possibly the ice thrust and the seismic action. The contraction joints attenuate the internal forces directed
as the axis of the straight gravity dam. With reservoir full, the dam is subjected to tensile stresses at the upstream face
and to compression stresses at the downstream face. The stability of a single element should be assessed for sliding,
overturning and strength of the material to withstand strains. The geometry of nine cross sections taken from the
drawings of the construction project dated February 8, 1924 located as shown in Figure 5 was carried out.

The assessment of stability of the Sella Zerbino dam is performed according to the Standards: DM No. 1309 of April 2,

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1921; DM No. 44 of March 24, 1982.

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The first one was in force at the time of Bric Zerbino and Sella Zerbino project and construction. The second one refers

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to the technical regulations for the design of dams that were in force until very recently in Italy. The main difference
between the two technical norms is the shape of the underpressures, which is trapezoidal according to the DM 44/82

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while is triangular according to the DM 1309/21 (Figure 9).

The stability verifications are conducted with respect to two scenarios, which are considered the most relevant in our

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case: A: maximum water level 323.00 m a.s.l; B: water level at the dam collapse 326.67m. The destabilizing actions
increase considerably when the level of the reservoir increases of 3.67m. The sliding plane of the structure is assumed
horizontal, as shown by the dashed red line in Figure 8, and the portion of geomaterial Wf above the this line is assumed
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to move along with the bulk of the dam; this is considered reasonable in view of the predominantly horizontal direction
of the upstream hydrostatic pressure, and the highly fractured bedrock whose joints pattern is unknown. This hypothesis
was also confirmed by the on-site surveys, since the active river bed is now placed at the former elevation of the
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upstream face of the dam. The uplift thrust Sp,21 was calculated following the technical prescriptions above mentioned.
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Fig.9 Pressure and forces acting on Section S5 when the dam collapsed (reservoir upstream level: 326.67 m a.s.l)

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Tables 4 and 5 show the results of stability analyses at nine cross sections of the dam (Figure 5) and for the A and B
aforementioned water elevation scenarios. The tables also include the compression stresses in the concrete along the
cross-sections of the upstream (upstream) and downstream (downstream) parts of the dam for both A and B water elevation
scenarios.

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The numbers in red color denote a critical situation where the stability condition is not satisfied. It should be remarked

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that the results shown in Tables 4 and 5 were obtained by considering a block of the dam of unit width along the
longitudinal direction of the barrage at each of the nine aforementioned cross sections. The sliding coefficient SS is

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defined as the ratio between the forces acting along the direction of the x axis and those acting along the positive
direction of the y axis. To fulfill the verification, the sliding coefficient SS must be lower than 0.75.

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The overturning coefficient SR is defined as the ratio between the stabilizing and the destabilizing forces; to fulfill the
verification the coefficient must be greater than 1.5.

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Overall, based on the results illustrated in Table 4, the Sella Zerbino dam can be considered stable for the maximum
reservoir level assumed in design. The safety margin however is tight and this should not be acceptable given the level
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of importance of the infrastructure and the catastrophic consequences of a failure.

Table 4: Stability analysis of the Sella Zerbino dam for the maximum storage level (323.00 m a.s.l.)
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Cross S3 S5 S7
Verification S1 S2 S4 S6 S8 S9
Section Joint Joint Joint
DM
Sliding 0.06 0.22 0.49 0.47 0.53 0.77 0.55 0.37 0.16
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2/04/1921
DM
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SS<0.75 0.06 0.25 0.59 0.49 0.54 0.73 0.54 0.36 0.16
24/03/1982
Strength of
materials σ1upstream 15.7 56.9 102.0 123.6 123.6 112.8 92.21 57.88 21.58
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(concrete)
σcomp<8500KPa
σ2upstream -7.85 -342.2 -59.2 11.81 11.81 10.78 -68.29 -28.9 -10.8
σtens>-300KPa
σ1downstream 23.54 553.3 434.9 454.3 454.3 414.7 411.0 86.82 32.37
σ2downstream 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DM
Overturning 13.36 5.91 3.14 1.46 1.66 2.07 2.04 1.77 4.27
02/04/1921
DM
SR>1.5 6.56 3.85 2.18 1.52 1.74 2.49 2.4 1.93 6.21
24/03/1982

Table 5: Stability analysis of the Sella Zerbino dam for the reservoir level corresponding to collapse (326.67 m a.s.l)

Verification Cross Section S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9

(Joint) (Joint) (Joint)
DM
Sliding 0.38 0.55 0.84 0.89 0.96 1.37 1.11 0.92 0.63
2/04/1921
DM
SS<0.75 0.47 0.68 1.11 0.94 0.97 1.28 1.07 0.9 0.61
24/03/1982
Strength of
σ1upstream 51.99 93.2 138.3 159.9 158.9 149.1 127.5 93.2 56.9
materials

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(concrete)

σcomp<8500KPa
σ2upstream -26 -560.4 -80.26 15.27 15.18 14.24 -94.45 -46.6 -28.5
σtens>-300KPa
σ1downstream 77.99 906.3 589.6 587.7 584.1 548.1 568.5 139.8 85.35
σ2downstream 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DM
Overturning 2.43 1.88 1.55 0.99 1.08 1.23 1.13 0.77 1.4
02/04/1921

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DM
SR>1.5 1.62 1.43 1.2 1.02 1.11 1.36 1.24 0.82 1.56
24/03/1982

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The compression stress in the concrete do not exceed the admissible ones in any of the cross sections of the dam for
both A and B scenarios. Hence, the structural design of the dam was correct since the geometry of the upstream and

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downstream faces of the dam in all its blocks allow a correct redistribution of the compression stresses even for an
extreme loading scenario which was not considered in design. On the contrary, the safety against sliding and

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overturning fails to be satisfied at several cross sections for B scenario. Furthermore, the most unstable blocks are those
placed on the left side of the dam, viewed from upstream, and this using both aforementioned technical Standards: the
fact was confirmed by the few witnesses of the event (Audoly, 1939). From Tables 4 and 5 it appears that the safety
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conditions of the dam rapidly deteriorate along the left side of the barrage. It is remarked once again that the stability
assessment discussed above was performed assuming that the stresses act in the cross section planes.

The change of safety margin against sliding verification of the dam from scenario A and B measures the gradual
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reduction of dam stability with the rise of the water level in the reservoir. Table 6 shows the results of the stability
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assessment of the Sella Zerbino dam by calculating the uplift force according to one of the following methods:
Technical Standards No. 1309 of April 2, 1921; SEEP/W analysis under steady state conditions; SEEP/W analysis
under transient conditions.
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Table 6: Sliding safety conditions of the Sella Zerbino dam assessed with different criteria
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Rule No. 1309 Steady-state conditions Transient conditions

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SS

323.00m 326.67m 323.00m 326.67m 323.00m 326.67m

Cross
0.49 0.98 0.44 0.87 0.47 0.88
Section S3
Cross
0.47 0.91 0.52 1.04 0.49 1.08
Section S4
Cross
0.53 0.96 0.51 0.90 0.52 0.89
Section S5
Cross
0.77 1.33 0.60 1.09 0.59 1.04
Section S6
Cross
0.55 1.09 0.53 1.07 0.53 1.03
Section S7

The three criteria are comparable in results. The stability assessment under transient conditions allowed calculating the
time evolution of the sliding safety factor. Figure 10 shows the predicted evolution of failures along the longitudinal
axis of the dam. Cross sections S6 and S7, belonging to the second block of the dam, appear to be the most critical.

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Fig.10 Cross sections sequence of failures along the longitudinal axis of the Sella Zerbino dam

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Let us consider the stability of the blocks of the dam separated by the joints at cross sections S3, S5 and S7 as shown in
Figure 11. The actions taken into account for the equilibrium are the hydrostatic pressure, the uplift force and the weight

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of the concrete block.

The Cartesian reference system used for the stability calculations of the dam blocks is also indicated in Fig. 10. The
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total uplift force was calculated by integrating the pressures along the foundation.

For the water level at the collapse of the Sella Zerbino dam the block in the most critical stability conditions is
contained by the joints 5-7. This confirms that the first block to fail, is the one adjacent one to the left abutment ( see
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Table 7). Again, this is due to the highly fractured bedrock characterizing that part of the barrage.
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Once open, the breach enlarged toward the block of the right abutment of the dam. On the left bank, only the extreme
portion of the abutment was left standing, as evidenced by some old photographs.
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Fig.11 Axonometric view of the Sella Zerbino dam with highlighted the cross sections of known geometry along the
axis of the barrage (Gianfranceschi, 1926)

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Table 7: Stability analyses of the blocks of the dam with the sliding coefficients

ΣFo ΣFv SS SSblock

[kN] [kN]
From cross section S1 to section S2 3817.40 6403.78 0.60
Block 4 0.87
From cross section S2 to section S3 (joint) 13692.15 13663.66 1.00
From cross section S3 (joint) to section S4 16845.37 13875.63 1.21
Block 3 1.18

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From cross section S4 to section S5 (joint) 11842.08 10442.20 1.13

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From cross section S5 (joint) to section S6 17102.37 13934.99 1.23
Block 2 1.23
From cross section S6 to section (joint) S7 10359.39 8346.63 1.24

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From cross section S7(joint) to section S8 19118.15 17889.22 1.07
Block 1 1.01
From cross section S8 to section S9 5023.98 6014.68 0.84

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BEARING CAPACITY OF ROCK FOUNDATION

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A bearing capacity calculation was performed to assess possible exceedance of the allowable pressure at the contact
between the foundation of the Sella Zerbino dam and the underlying geological formation. The computation has been
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carried out using the procedure discussed in Annex G of Eurocode 7 Part 1 (EN 1997-1:2004/AC, 2009). This is based
on a presumed allowable bearing pressure estimated from a qualitative description of rock quality. Table 8 shows the
results of the analysis conducted for the water elevation of 323.00 and 326.67m a.s.l. respectively. The rock was
assumed characterized by medium spaced discontinuities with an allowable bearing pressure of 1750 kPa. According to
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the two technical norms (DM 44/82 and DM 1309/21).

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The stability of the dam to bearing capacity is assured if the factor of safety (FS), defined as the ratio between the
maximum allowable pressure qlim and the contact pressure acting at the rock-foundation interface qes, is greater than 2.5.
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The calculation give a value of FS equal to 3.12 for a water elevation of 323 m a.s.l and equal to 3.03 for the reservoir
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elevation that caused the collapse of the dam. Therefore, based on the available information, the rock underneath the
foundation had a bearing capacity that it appears adequate to sustain the contact pressure transmitted by the Sella
Zerbino dam under both ordinary loading conditions and at the time of collapse.
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Table 8: Bearing capacity of the rock foundation along the various blocks of the Sella Zerbino dam

qes,323 qes,326
[kPa] [kPa]
From cross section S1 to section S2 148.51 152.44
Block 4
From cross section S2 to section S3 (joint) 117.30 122.34
From cross section S3 (joint) to section S4 72.94 77.07
Block 3
From cross section S4 to section S5 (joint) 42.80 43.80
From cross section S5 (joint) to section S6 54.21 55.57
Block 2
From cross section S6 to section (joint) S7 39.46 39.97
From cross section S7(joint) to section S8 56.64 57.53
Block 1
From cross section S8 to section S9 28.91 29.57

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SCOUR DEPTH ESTIMATION

The overtopping of the Sella Zerbino dam was not considered in the design. In the trail, the consultants of the designers
identified the scour as a possible cause of the collapse. For this reason, we calculated the maximum scour depth for a
water elevation of 326.67m a.s.l. applying different empirical formula (Liu 2005) which can be written in the form:

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(1)

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where q is the unit discharge overtopping the secondary dam, d is the characteristic dimension of the average rock, H is
the difference between upstream and downstream water surfaces, is a coefficient related to rock resistance to

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erosion. Table 9 shows the coefficients of the empirical formula (1) and the scour depth computed at cross section S5.

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Table 9: Parameters of the empirical formula and scour depth estimation for cross section S5

Parameters
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Formula ke x y z t(m)
Schoklitsch (1932) 4.75 0.57 0.20 0.32 1.33
Chen (1963) 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.00 1.48
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Yu(1963) 0.56 0.75 0.13 0.00 1.48

Yuditskii (1971) 0.51 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.26
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Mason e Arumugam (1985) 0.50 0.60 0.15 0.20 0.90

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Figure 12 shows the depth of the scour for cross section S5. This was almost 30% of the refill material in the
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downstream part, corresponding to 1.2 m.

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Fig.12 Scour depth on cross section S5 of the secondary dam

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CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Italian dam safety regulations effective on 1935, the year the Sella Zerbino dam collapsed, would avert the disaster
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if enforced. The several changes to the 1899 design of the Zerbino lead to a final very unsure configuration. The
leakages through the bedrock of the secondary dam, detected by the on-site inspections, were dealt with sporadic and
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ineffective grout injections.

This paper mainly focused on the overall stability of the Sella Zerbino dam first under the conditions assumed in design
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and then at the time when the barrage collapsed on August 13, 1935. According to the technical Standard, effective
when the dams were designed, and more recent regulations, the Sella Zerbino dam was stable to sliding, overturning
and exceedance of stresses in the concrete for the design water level only. However, from analyses’ results, it appears
that the discriminating factor jeopardizing the stability of the secondary barrage is the hydraulic pressure underneath the
dam which was ignored by the designer. Overtopping of the Sella Zerbino dam did not seem to affect the stability of the
barrage according to the present scour calculations. The sudden increase of the reservoir water level was due to the
inadequate capacity of the flood spillways which were not able to release the flood inflow.

A finite element model was applied to simulate seepage beneath the dam as well as to investigate the influence of the
fractured rock foundation on the magnitude of the uplift forces and thus on the stability of the barrage. The extremely
poor quality of the bedrock seems to have been the cause of the instability of the dam section located at the left side of
the barrage (cross section S7) that rapidly brought to the formation of a breach towards the center of the dam. A
conclusion that can be drawn from these analyses is that the collapse of the Sella Zerbino dam could perhaps have been
prevented whether technical regulations of that time were adopted.

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AKNOWLDGEMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge Geol. Vittorio Bonaria and Prof. Giovanni Capponi for their kind assistance and
for providing important technical data of the Molare’s project and the Italian National Dam Service for kindly providing
the original projects.

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HIGHLIGHTS:

o the mechanics of the collapse of the Sella Zerbino dam is analyzed focusing on the
stability of the structure
o The water pressure underneath the dam is evaluated according to a steady state and
an unsteady state analysis

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o The sequence of dam blocks collapse is determined

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