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Philosophical zombie
The philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind and philosophy
of perception that imagines a being that, if it could conceivably exist, logically disproves the idea that physical stuff is
all that is required to explain consciousness. Such a zombie would be indistinguishable from a normal human being
but lack conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp
object it would not inwardly feel any pain, yet it would outwardly behave exactly as if it did feel pain. The argument
sometimes takes the form of hypothesizing a zombie world, indistinguishable from our world, but lacking first person
experiences in any of the beings of that world.

Philosophical zombie arguments are used in support of mind-body dualism against forms of physicalism such as
materialism, behaviorism and functionalism. It is an argument against the idea that the "hard problem of
consciousness" (accounting for subjective, intrinsic, first person, what-it's-like-ness) could be answered by purely
physical means. Proponents of the argument, such as philosopher David Chalmers, argue that since a zombie is
defined as physiologically indistinguishable from human beings, even its logical possibility would be a sound
refutation of physicalism, because it would establish the existence of conscious experience as a further fact.[2]
However, physicalists like Daniel Dennett counter that philosophical zombies are logically incoherent and thus
impossible.[3][4]

Contents
History
Types of zombies
Zombie arguments
Responses
Related thought-experiments
See also
References
Notes
Bibliography
External links

History
Philosophical zombies are associated with David Chalmers, but it was philosopher Robert Kirk who first used the term
"zombie" in this context in 1974. Prior to that, Karlyn Campbell made a similar argument in his 1970's book "Body and
Mind," using the term "Imitation Man."[5] Chalmers further developed and popularized the idea in his work.

There has been a lively debate about what the zombie argument shows[6]. Critics who primarily argue that zombies are
not conceivable include Daniel Dennett, Nigil J. T. Thomas[7], David Braddon-Mitchell[8], and Robert Kirk[9]. Critics
who assert mostly that conceivability does not entail possibility include Katalin Balog [10], Keith Frankish[11],
Christopher Hill[12], and Stephen Yablo[13], and critics who prominently question the logical validity of the argument
include George Bealer.[14]

Kirk, in 2003, summed up the current state of the debate:

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In spite of the fact that the arguments on both sides have become increasingly sophisticated — or
perhaps because of it — they have not become more persuasive. The pull in each direction remains
strong.[15]

However, two years later in 2005, Kirk would argue that zombies are inconceivable.[9]

In a 2013 survey of philosophers conducted by Bourget and Chalmers, 23.3% of the respondents felt P Zombies were
metaphysically possible. The other responses broke down this way:

35.6% said P Zombies were conceivable but not metaphysically possible; 23.3% said they were
metaphysically possible; 16.0% said they were inconceivable; and 25.1% responded "other."[16]

Types of zombies
Though philosophical zombies are widely used in thought experiments, the detailed articulation of the concept is not
always the same. P-zombies were introduced primarily to argue against specific types of physicalism such as
behaviorism, according to which mental states exist solely as behavior. Belief, desire, thought, consciousness, and so
on, are only behavior (whether external behavior or internal behavior) or tendencies towards behaviors. A p-zombie
that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a normal human being but lacks conscious experiences is therefore not
logically possible according to the behaviorist, so an appeal to the logical possibility of a p-zombie furnishes an
argument that behaviorism is false. Proponents of zombie arguments generally accept that p-zombies are not
physically possible, while opponents necessarily deny that they are metaphysically or even logically possible.

The unifying idea of the zombie is of a human that has no conscious experience, but one might distinguish various
types of zombie used in different thought experiments as follows:

A behavioral zombie that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human.

A neurological zombie that has a human brain and is generally physiologically indistinguishable from a
human.[17]
A soulless zombie that lacks a soul.
A zombie universe that is identical to our world in all physical ways, except no being in that world has qualia.

Zombie arguments
Zombie arguments often support lines of reasoning that aim to show that zombies are metaphysically possible in order
to support some form of dualism – in this case the view that the world includes two kinds of substance (or perhaps two
kinds of property); the mental and the physical.[18] According to physicalism, physical facts determine all other facts.
Since any fact other than that of consciousness may be held to be the same for a p-zombie and a normal conscious
human, it follows that physicalism must hold that p-zombies are either not possible or are the same as normal
humans.

The zombie argument is a version of general modal arguments against physicalism such as that of Saul Kripke[19] and
the kind of physicalism known as type-identity theory. Further such arguments were notably advanced in the 1970s by
Thomas Nagel (1970; 1974) and Robert Kirk (1974) but the general argument was most famously developed in detail
by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996). According to Chalmers one can coherently conceive of an entire
zombie world, a world physically indistinguishable from this world but entirely lacking conscious experience. The
counterpart of every conscious being in our world would be a p-zombie. Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers
claims, it is metaphysically possible, which is all the argument requires. Chalmers states: "Zombies are probably not
naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."[20] The outline structure of
Chalmers' version of the zombie argument is as follows;

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1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of
the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must
exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no
consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is metaphysically
possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.)
The above is a strong formulation of the zombie argument. There are other formulations of the zombies-type argument
which follow the same general form. The premises of the general zombies argument are implied by the premises of all
the specific zombie arguments. A general zombies argument is in part motivated by potential disagreements between
various anti-physicalist views. For example, an anti-physicalist view can consistently assert that p-zombies are
metaphysically impossible but that inverted qualia (such as inverted spectra) or absent qualia (partial zombiehood)
are metaphysically possible. Premises regarding inverted qualia or partial zombiehood can substitute premises
regarding p-zombies to produce variations of the zombie argument. The metaphysical possibility of a physically
indistinguishable world with either inverted qualia or partial zombiehood would imply that physical truths don't
metaphysically necessitate phenomenal truths. To formulate the general form of the zombies argument, take the
sentence 'P' to be true if and only if the conjunct of all microphysical truths of our world obtain, take the sentence 'Q'
to be true if some phenomenal truth, that obtains in the actual world, obtains. The general argument goes as follows.

1. It is conceivable that P is true and Q is not true.

2. If it is conceivable that P is true and Q is not true then it is metaphysically possible that P is true and Q not true.
3. If it is metaphysically possible that P is true and Q is not true then physicalism is false.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false.[21]
Q can be false in a possible world if any of the following obtains: (1) there exists at least one invert relative to the actual
world (2) there is at least one absent quale relative to the actual world (3) all actually conscious beings are p-zombies
(all actual qualia are absent qualia).

Responses
If one accepts two-dimensional semantics, Chalmers' argument is logically valid. Some philosophers accept its validity
but dispute its soundness, arguing that its premises are false. Zombies might not actually be conceivable or, if they are,
just because they are conceivable, that might not mean that they are possible. Chalmers has argued that zombies are
conceivable, saying "it certainly seems that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no contradiction in the
description."[22] This leads to the questions of the relevant notion of "possibility": if something is conceivable, does
that mean it is possible? Most physicalist responses deny that the premise of a zombie scenario is possible.

Many physicalist philosophers have argued that this scenario eliminates itself by its description; the basis of a
physicalist argument is that the world is defined entirely by physicality; thus, a world that was physically identical
would necessarily contain consciousness, as consciousness would necessarily be generated from any set of physical
circumstances identical to our own.

One can hold that zombies are a logical possibility but not a metaphysical possibility. If logical possibility does not
entail metaphysical possibility across the domain of relevant truths, then the mere logical possibility of zombies is not
sufficient to establish their metaphysical possibility. The zombie argument claims that one can tell by the power of
reason that such a "zombie scenario" is metaphysically possible. Chalmers states; "From the conceivability of zombies,
proponents of the argument infer their metaphysical possibility"[20] and argues that this inference, while not generally
legitimate, is legitimate for phenomenal concepts such as consciousness since we must adhere to "Kripke's insight that
for phenomenal concepts, there is no gap between reference-fixers and reference (or between primary and secondary
intentions)." That is, for phenomenal concepts, conceivability implies possibility. According to Chalmers, whatever is
logically possible is also, in the sense relevant here, metaphysically possible.[23]

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Another response is the denial of the idea that qualia and related phenomenal notions of the mind are in the first place
coherent concepts. Daniel Dennett and others argue that while consciousness and subjective experience exist in some
sense, they are not as the zombie argument proponent claims. The experience of pain, for example, is not something
that can be stripped off a person's mental life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences.
Dennett believes that consciousness is a complex series of functions and ideas. If we all can have these experiences the
idea of the p-zombie is meaningless.

Dennett argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of
conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition".[3][4] He coined the
term "zimboes" – p-zombies that have second-order beliefs – to argue that the idea of a p-zombie is incoherent;[24]
"Zimboes thinkZ they are conscious, thinkZ they have qualia, thinkZ they suffer pains – they are just 'wrong' (according
to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!".[4] Under (reductive) physicalism,
one is inclined to believe either that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie –
following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being, or not being a zombie is (just) a product of the
physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's. P-zombies in an observed world would be
indistinguishable from the observer, even hypothetically (when the observer makes no assumptions regarding the
validity of their convictions). Furthermore, when concept of self is deemed to correspond to physical reality alone
(reductive physicalism), philosophical zombies are denied by definition. When a distinction is made in one's mind
between a hypothetical zombie and oneself (assumed not to be a zombie), the hypothetical zombie, being a subset of
the concept of oneself, must entail a deficit in observables (cognitive systems), a "seductive error"[4] contradicting the
original definition of a zombie.

Verificationism[1] states that, for words to have meaning, their use must be open to public verification. Since it is
assumed that we can talk about our qualia, the existence of zombies is impossible. A related argument is that of
"zombie-utterance". If someone were to say they love the smell of some food, a zombie producing the same reaction
would be perceived as a person having complex thoughts and ideas in their head indicated by the ability to vocalize it.
If zombies were without awareness of their perceptions the idea of uttering words could not occur to them. Therefore,
if a zombie has the ability to speak, it is not a zombie.

Artificial intelligence researcher Marvin Minsky saw the argument as circular. The proposition of the possibility of
something physically identical to a human but without subjective experience assumes that the physical characteristics
of humans are not what produces those experiences, which is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.[25]
Richard Brown agrees that the zombie argument is circular. To show this, he proposes "zoombies", which are creatures
nonphysically identical to people in every way and lack phenomenal consciousness. If zoombies existed, they would
refute dualism because they would show that consciousness is not nonphysical, i.e., is physical. Paralleling the
argument from Chalmers: It's conceivable that zoombies exist, so it's possible they exist, so dualism is false. Given the
symmetry between the zombie and zoombie arguments, we can't arbitrate the physicalism/dualism question a
priori.[26]

Stephen Yablo's (1998) response is to provide an error theory to account for the intuition that zombies are possible.
Notions of what counts as physical and as physically possible change over time so conceptual analysis is not reliable
here. Yablo says he is "braced for the information that is going to make zombies inconceivable, even though I have no
real idea what form the information is going to take."[27]

The zombie argument is difficult to assess because it brings to light fundamental disagreements about the method and
scope of philosophy itself and the nature and abilities of conceptual analysis. Proponents of the zombie argument may
think that conceptual analysis is a central part of (if not the only part of) philosophy and that it certainly can do a great
deal of philosophical work. However others, such as Dennett, Paul Churchland and W.V.O. Quine, have fundamentally
different views. For this reason, discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy.

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Some accept modal reasoning in general but deny it in the zombie case. Christopher S. Hill and Brian P. Mclaughlin
suggest that the zombie thought experiment combines imagination of a "sympathetic" nature (putting oneself in a
phenomenal state) and a "perceptual" nature (imagining becoming aware of something in the outside world). Each
type of imagination may work on its own, but they're not guaranteed to work when both used at the same time. Hence
Chalmers's argument needn't go through.[28]:448 Moreover, while Chalmers defuses criticisms of the view that
conceivability can tell us about possibility, he provides no positive defense of the principle. As an analogy, the
generalized continuum hypothesis has no known counterexamples, but this doesn't mean we must accept it. And
indeed, the fact that Chalmers concludes we have epiphenomenal mental states that don't cause our physical behavior
seems one reason to reject his principle.[28]:449–51

Another way to construe the zombie hypothesis is epistemically – as a problem of causal explanation, rather than as a
problem of logical or metaphysical possibility. The "explanatory gap" – also called the "hard problem of
consciousness" – is the claim that (to date) no one has provided a convincing causal explanation of how and why we
are conscious. It is a manifestation of the very same gap that (to date) no one has provided a convincing causal
explanation of how and why we are not zombies.[29]

Related thought-experiments
Frank Jackson's Mary's room argument is based around a hypothetical scientist, Mary, who is forced to view the world
through a black-and-white television screen in a black and white room. Mary is a brilliant scientist who knows
everything about the neurobiology of vision. Even though Mary knows everything about color and its perception (e.g.
what combination of wavelengths makes the sky seem blue), she has never seen color. If Mary were released from this
room and were to experience color for the first time, would she learn anything new? Jackson initially believed this
supported epiphenomenalism (mental phenomena are the effects, but not the causes, of physical phenomena) but
later changed his views to physicalism, suggesting that Mary is simply discovering a new way for her brain to represent
qualities that exist in the world.

Swampman is an imaginary character introduced by Donald Davidson. If Davidson goes hiking in a swamp and is
struck and killed by a lightning bolt while nearby another lightning bolt spontaneously rearranges a bunch of
molecules so that, entirely by coincidence, they take on exactly the same form that Davidson's body had at the moment
of his untimely death then this being, 'Swampman', has a brain structurally identical to that which Davidson had and
will thus presumably behave exactly like Davidson. He will return to Davidson's office and write the same essays he
would have written, recognize all of his friends and family and so forth.

John Searle's Chinese room argument deals with the nature of artificial intelligence: it imagines a room in which a
conversation is held by means of written Chinese characters that the subject cannot actually read, but is able to
manipulate meaningfully using a set of algorithms. Searle holds that a program cannot give a computer a "mind" or
"understanding", regardless of how intelligently it may make it behave. Stevan Harnad argues that Searle's critique is
really meant to target functionalism and computationalism, and to establish neuroscience as the only correct way to
understand the mind.[30]

See also
Begging the question Map–territory relation
Blindsight Mind
Causality Mind-body problem
Consciousness Neutral monism
Dual-aspect theory No true Scotsman
Explanatory gap Philosophy of mind
Functionalism (philosophy of mind) Problem of other minds
Hard problem of consciousness Quantum Night
Inverted spectrum Reverse engineering
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Sentience Solipsism
Ship of Theseus Turing test

References

Notes
1. Kirk, Robert. "Zombies" (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/zombies/). The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
2. Chalmers, D. (1996): The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, New York.
3. Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston, Toronto, London: Little, Brown and Co. ISBN 0-
316-18065-3.
4. Dennett, Daniel C. (1995). Darwin's Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 322. ISBN 0-684-82471-X.
5. Chalmers, David (21 March 2019). "Zombies and the Conceivability Argument" (https://philpapers.org/browse/zo
mbies-and-the-conceivability-argument). Phil Papers.
6. Chalmers, David. "Zombies and the Conceivability Argument" (https://philpapers.org/browse/zombies-and-the-con
ceivability-argument). PhilPapers. PhilPapers. Retrieved 21 March 2019.
7. Thomas, Nigel. "Zombie killer" (https://philpapers.org/rec/THOZK). Retrieved 15 March 2019.
8. Braddon-Mitchell, David (2003). "Qualia and analytical conditionals". Journal of Philosophy. 100 (3): 111-135.
doi:10.5840/jphil2003100321 (https://doi.org/10.5840%2Fjphil2003100321).
9. Kirk, Robert (2005). Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199229802.
10. Balog, Katalin (1999). "Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem". Philosophical Review. 108 (4):
497-528. doi:10.2307/2998286 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2998286).
11. Frankish, Keith (2007). "The anti-zombie argument". Philosophical Quarterly. 57 (229): 650–666.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.510.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9213.2007.510.x).
12. Hill, Christopher (1997). "Imaginability, conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem". Philosophical
Studies. 87 (1): 61–85.
13. Yablo, Stephen (1999). "Concepts and Consciousness". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 59 (2):
455–463.
14. Bealer, G. (2002). Gendler, Tamar; Hawthorne, John (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility.
15. Kirk, Robert (21 March 2019). "Zombies" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/). Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
16. Bourget, David; Chalmers, David. "What Do Philosophers Believe?∗" (https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP).
PhilPapers. Retrieved 21 March 2019.
17. Harnad, Stevan (2000). "Minds, Machines, and Turing: The Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables" (http://cogpri
nts.org/2615/). 9 (4). Journal of Logic, Language, and Information: 425–445.
18. Robinson, Howard. "Dualism" (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/dualism/). The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
19. Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity (1972)
20. Chalmers, 2003, p. 5.
21. Chalmers, 2010, p. 106-109
22. Chalmers, 1996, p. 96.
23. Chalmers, 1996, pp. 67–68.
24. Dennett 1995; 1999
25. "Edge: CONSCIOUSNESS IS A BIG SUITCASE - A Talk with Marvin Minsky [page 2]" (http://www.edge.org/3rd_c
ulture/minsky/minsky_p2.html). edge.com.
26. Brown, Richard (2010). "Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism" (http://philpapers.org/archive/
BRODTA.pdf) (PDF). Journal of Consciousness Studies. 17 (3–4): 47–69.
27. Yablo, 2000, §XV.

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28. Christopher S. Hill; Brian P. Mclaughlin (Jun 1999). "There are Fewer Things in Reality Than are Dreamt of in
Chalmers's Philosophy". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 59 (2): 445–454. doi:10.2307/2653682 (htt
ps://doi.org/10.2307%2F2653682).
29. Harnad, Stevan (1995) "Why and How We Are Not Zombies (http://cogprints.org/1601/6/harnad95.zombies.html).
Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:164–167
30. Harnad, Stevan (2001) (http://cogprints.org/4023/), "What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room
Argument", in M.; Preston, J., Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument, Oxford University Press.

Bibliography
Chalmers, David. 1995. "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness", Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2,
no. 3, pp. 200–219. Online PDF (http://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf)
Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Hardcover: ISBN 0-19-511789-1, paperback: ISBN 0-19-510553-2
Chalmers, David. 2003. "Consciousness and its Place in Nature", in the Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of
Mind, S. Stich and F. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell. Also in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings, D. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford, 2002. ISBN 0-19-514581-X, Online PDF (http://consc.net/papers/nature.pd
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vol. 68, no. 1. Online text (http://consc.net/papers/perry.html) doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00334.x (https://doi.
org/10.1111%2Fj.1933-1592.2004.tb00334.x)
Chalmers, David. 2010. "the character of consciousness", OUP
Dennett, Daniel. 1995. "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies", Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol.
2, no. 4, pp. 322–326. Online abstract (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzombie.htm)
Dennett, Daniel. 1999. "The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?", Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial
Lecture. Online text (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/zombic.htm)
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able/2252795)
Kripke, Saul. 1972. "Naming and Necessity", in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. by D. Davidson and G.
Harman, Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, pp. 253–355. (Published as a book in 1980, Harvard University Press.)
Nagel, Thomas. 1970. "Armstrong on the Mind", Philosophical Review, vol. 79, pp. 394–403. JSTOR 2183935 (htt
ps://www.jstor.org/stable/2183935)
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(https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914)
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External links
Online papers on philosophical zombies (http://consc.net/online/1.3b), by various authors, compiled by David
Chalmers.
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind (http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/zombies.htm)
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Zombies" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/). Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Skepdic entry on p-zombies (http://skepdic.com/zombies.html)
A Chaospet comic on the subject of philosophical zombies (http://chaospet.com/28-philosophical-zombies/)
On The Conceivability of Zombies (http://philpapers.org/archive/SILOTC-3.1.pdf) Paper argues that Philosophical
Zombies are not conceivable

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