CEO Succession, Strategic Change, and Post-Succession Performance - A Meta-Analysis

The Leadership Quarterly 28 (2017) 701–720
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The Leadership Quarterly

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/leaqua
CEO succession, strategic change, and post-succession

performance: A meta-analysis☆
Donald J. Schepker a,⁎, Youngsang Kim b, Pankaj C. Patel c,
Sherry M.B. Thatcher a, Michael C. Campion a
a
Darla Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, 1014 Greene Street, Columbia, SC 29208, United States
b
CUHK Business School, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Cheng Yu Tung Building, 12 Chak Cheung Street, Shatin, Hong Kong
c
Villanova University, School of Business, 800 Lancaster Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19085, United States
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: The relationship between CEO succession and firm outcomes is often examined through the
Received 2 October 2015 disruption or adaptation perspectives. These two perspectives, however, have evolved sepa-
Received in revised form 1 March 2017 rately. We propose that findings from these separate streams of research can be integrated,
Accepted 3 March 2017
and thus a more holistic understanding of CEO succession can be afforded, through focusing
Available online 14 March 2017
on the central factor responsible for their differences—distinct temporal foci of these streams.
The disruption perspective suggests CEO succession imposes costs on organizations, which in-
Keywords: fluences short-term performance. The adaptation perspective suggests CEO succession requires
CEO succession
time for effects to manifest, which implies a lagged effect on performance. Based on a meta-
CEO turnover
analysis of 60 samples from 1972 to 2013 representing 13,578 successions, we find CEO succes-
Strategic change
Firm performance sion negatively influences performance in the short-term and has no significant direct influ-
Board independence ence on long-term performance. Long-term performance effects, instead, are mediated by
strategic change and new CEO origin (inside vs. outside the firm). Inside CEOs improve long-
term performance and engage in less strategic change, while hiring an outside CEO leads to
more strategic change that results in lower long-term performance. Forced or unforced turn-
over is not related to short- or long-term performance. Board independence influences rela-
tionships between forced turnover and firm performance, as well as CEO origin and strategic
change.
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have a significant influence on firm outcomes, an influence that has grown both in substance
(Quigley & Hambrick, 2014) and perception (Quigley, Crossland, & Campbell, 2016) in recent years. CEO succession is considered
one of the most critical events in a firm's life-cycle and annual CEO turnover grew to 29% in 2012 (Favaro, Karlsson, & Neilson,
2014). Given their quintessential and strategic role, understanding, planning, and managing CEO succession and its outcomes is
increasingly important (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).
☆ Note: Supplemental material for this article is available online.

⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Donald.Schepker@moore.sc.edu (D.J. Schepker), YoungsangKim@baf.cuhk.edu.hk (Y. Kim), Pankaj.Patel@villanova.edu (P.C. Patel),
Sherry.Thatcher@moore.sc.edu (S.M.B. Thatcher), Michael.Campion@moore.sc.edu (M.C. Campion).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2017.03.001
1048-9843/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
702 D.J. Schepker et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 28 (2017) 701–720
The theoretical discourse on CEO succession has primarily focused on disruption costs or adaptation benefits resulting from
CEO succession. Disruption theorists (e.g. Ballinger & Marcel, 2010; Grusky, 1963) posit that succession is associated with signif-
icant disturbances within the organization (Boeker, 1992), and that the associated performance gains from CEO succession may
not offset the disruption costs associated with succession. Conversely, to adaptation theorists (e.g. Wiersema & Bantel, 1993),
CEO succession is an opportunity to realign strategy and resources with the external environment (Shen & Cho, 2005). Positive
benefits from adaptation accrue over time as new CEOs learn and adapt on the job (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). These streams
have developed separately and have resulted in mixed support for effects of CEO succession on performance (Hutzschenreuter,
Kleindienst, & Greger, 2012).
We propose that the adaptation and disruption frameworks complement one another, and thus can be integrated to develop a
more holistic understanding of CEO succession as a leadership phenomenon. This complementarity arises because they each focus
on different (performance-based) temporal horizons; disruption effects may be most significant in the short-term following suc-
cession, while adaptation benefits may not be realized until later on following succession. Highlighting the need for integrating
these two frameworks, adaptation theorists consider short-term costs of succession often in passing, whereas disruption theorists
focus on managing disruption costs, but less so on their potential long-term advantages.1 An integrated perspective would be
valuable. By providing a more inclusive consideration of constructs in terms of their measurement and potential linkages, it
may explain mixed results found by scholars adopting one perspective or the other, and guide measurement of constructs in vary-
ing spans of CEO tenure in extant studies.2 This approach allows us to more fully consider possible interdependencies and eval-
uate alternative theories in such relationships.
To test our integrated framework, which consolidates and attempts to reconcile mixed findings in prior research, we rely on
meta-analysis for the following reasons. First, recently, Wegman, Hoffman, Carter, Twenge, and Guenole (2016) highlighted that
“cross-temporal meta-analysis affords robust and generalizable inferences relative to single sample comparisons” (pg. 2). Studies
on CEO succession often examine the disruption and adaptation perspectives in isolation and/or methodologically consider vary-
ing performance windows and contextual measures applicable to these varying time windows (for an exception, see Hughes,
Hughes, Mellahi, & Guermat, 2010), resulting in theoretical arguments and study designs using different time frames and mea-
sures. Meta-analyzing studies that have accumulated over a longer period of time and from different countries should provide ad-
ditional temporal and conceptual elucidation.
Second, while we construe disruption and adaptation perspectives as complementary, we test these two perspectives by draw-
ing inferences from meta-analytic SEM (MASEM), an approach that “conduct[s] “horse races” between … frameworks” and in-
cludes tests for “intermediate mechanisms in a chain of relationships” (Bergh et al., 2016: page 478). By drawing on 49 US and
11 non-US studies from 1972 to 2013, and proposing mediation mechanisms between CEO succession and performance, we
are able to unpack and provide a finer grained understanding of this important phenomenon in strategic leadership. According
to Bilgili, Calderon, Allen, and Kedia (2016): pg. 3), “MASEM [allows investigators] to address questions difficult to cover in any
single study,” and enables both CEO and board dynamics to be coupled with strategic actions and modeled in order to assess
their joint effects on firm performance.
Third, meta-analysis allows us to respond to numerous calls made by CEO succession researchers for a more predictive and
parsimonious explanation regarding the effects of CEO succession (e.g. Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005; Kesner & Sebora,
1994). Research on board member succession has recently begun to move in this direction. For example, using MASEM, Post
and Byron (2015) “develop and test a contingency model of female board representation on boards and firm financial perfor-
mance” that “considers the role of national context” (pg. 1547). In the present meta-analysis, we develop a contingency model
that identifies and consolidates additional mediators and moderators associated with the relationship between CEO succession
and performance by incorporating studies from different national contexts and time periods.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss past work on CEO succession from the disruption and adaptation perspec-
tives and propose baseline relationships identified in the literature. Second, we develop hypotheses related to succession's influ-
ence on performance through strategic change and under the contextual influence of insider vs. outsider succession, forced vs.
unforced succession, and governance characteristics (Fig. 1 presents an overview of the model). Third, we outline our methodo-
logical process and meta-analytic tests. Finally, we discuss findings, theoretical implications, and paths for future research.
Theoretical development and hypotheses
CEO succession represents a crossroads for organizations, as new leadership is expected to better align organizational resources
with the environment and initiate strategic change with expectations to positively affect firm performance (Giambatista et al.,
2005). Successor selection is critical, as CEOs have a significant impact on firm strategy and performance outcomes, and the influ-
ence of CEOs on firm performance has increased in recent decades (Hambrick & Quigley, 2014; Quigley & Hambrick, 2014).
CEO succession has been studied through the lens of the disruption and adaptation perspectives. Related to the disruption per-
spective, CEO succession disrupts routines and relationships, increases internal instability, and deteriorates external relationships
(Ballinger & Marcel, 2010; Boeker, 1992). Managerial turnover results in the loss of firm-specific human capital and knowledge, a
source of firm value (Greiner, Cummings, & Bhambri, 2003). Also the new CEO must learn roles and responsibilities in the
1
Further suggesting the need for exploration of these two frameworks, we could identify only 12 studies that examined firm performance after succession using at
least a three year window. Performance timeframes less than three years may not be enough to observe performance gains from adaptation.
2
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
D.J. Schepker et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 28 (2017) 701–720 703
Fig. 1. A theoretical framework for the consequences of CEO succession.
position, understand organizational resources and routines, and foster relationships with stakeholders (Karaevli, 2007). Further,
stakeholders must also get familiar with new routines and processes, as the organization's resource base is orchestrated to
meet new objectives. The disruption perspective asks whether the “circle of perpetual change and underperformance” will con-
tinue due to the limited ability of new CEOs to learn and adapt (Hughes et al., 2010; 571), particularly if they fail to solve under-
lying organizational problems (Sakano & Lewin, 1999). However, one means by which firms can potentially reduce problems
related to disruption is by grooming and selecting inside CEO candidates through planned and orderly transitions (Vancil, 1987).
From the adaptation perspective, new CEOs bring novel strategic perspectives and reconfigure resources (Shen & Cho, 2005;
Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001). New CEOs improve adaptation by aligning internal resources with the external environment.
The strategic change initiated by the CEO may not directly influence short-term performance, but may influence long-term per-
formance. However, others have questioned whether adaptation benefits from the new CEO are contingent on the industry
(Miller & Shamsie, 2001) or whether the associated gains in performance decline with increasing tenure of the new CEO
(Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006). The adaptation perspective therefore poses the question: due to the risk associated
with adaptation, are the prospects of long-term performance gains sufficient to initiate CEO succession? (cf. Hughes et al.,
2010). Next, we review the findings in the literature.
State of the literature
In a review of CEO succession research, Giambatista et al. (2005): pg. 981) note that while “we are no closer to finding a gen-
eral theory for… the impact of leader succession performance and/or strategic change,” it is “important to identify the conditions
under which different theoretical approaches are applicable.” Empirical results related to the effects of CEO succession on firm
performance are mixed. Empirical studies supporting succession as a disruptive event have been found among both CEOs
(Ballinger & Marcel, 2010) and sports team managers (Giambatista, 2004). However, studies also show a positive (Alexander &
Lee, 1996; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996) or negative (Boeker, 1997a; Chen & Hambrick, 2012) influence of CEO succession on or-
ganizational performance (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991). Thus, CEO succession's ultimate effects on perfor-
mance are unclear.
The succession event is also associated with organizational change (Miller, 1993; Tushman, Virany, & Romanelli, 1985; Virany,
Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992), as CEO succession is generally preceded by poor past performance or a desire to improve growth
prospects. New CEOs therefore undertake strategic change, or “a difference in form, quality, or state in an organizational entity
over time that alters the company's alignment with its environment” (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012: 730). Strategic change in-
cludes changes in resource allocation patterns or in the mix of products and markets in which the firm competes (Barker &
Mueller, 2002). Drivers of strategic change include CEO human capital (Barron, Chulkov, & Waddell, 2011), understanding of
the environment (Barker & Duhaime, 1997), or internal and external discretion (Barron et al., 2011; Shen & Cannella, 2002b).
For both the adaptation and disruption perspectives, there is an expectation that a change in leadership will result in strategic
change that in turn influences short- and long-term performance.
Corporate governance is a vital component of the CEO succession process and strategic change. In actuating CEO succession
and facilitating post-succession strategic change, the board of directors plays a pivotal role in providing new leadership and
reinvigorating an organization (Wiersema, 1995). Boards of directors are tasked with ensuring that CEO succession occurs in a
timely and healthy fashion to ensure performance aspirations are met (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Forced CEO departures are signals
of an active board that initiates change in the organization (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Incoming CEOs are likely to have a mandate
for change but may also experience disruption due to a disorderly executive transition (Ballinger & Marcel, 2010). Governance
scholars also suggest that the board's relationship with an incoming CEO is an important consideration of the governance context
that impacts the success of the new CEO through advice and monitoring from the board (Zhang, 2008).
In jointly considering both the disruption and adaptation frameworks discussed earlier and the state of the literature discussed
above, there are a number of findings that we expect to confirm. First, following the disruption perspective's focus on the costs
organizations face following leadership transitions, we expect that CEO succession is negatively related to short-term perfor-
mance. We also expect that strategic change partially mediates the relationship between CEO succession and short-term perfor-
mance, such that strategic change after CEO succession is negatively related to short-term performance. Following the adaptation
perspective's focus on the long-term benefits of strategic reorientation on firm performance, and given support in prior research,
we expect that CEO succession is positively associated with long-term performance. We also expect that strategic change partially
mediates the relationship between CEO succession and long-term performance, such that strategic change after CEO succession is
positively related to long-term performance.
Hypotheses development
To provide a theoretical extension, we synthesize the disruption and adaptation frameworks to propose hypotheses that could
be tested through a meta-analytic framework. Further, a key piece of discourse in CEO succession research is a focus on the con-
tingent factors which have an influence on performance following CEO succession. The disruption and adaptation perspectives
highlight the tension between short- and long-term performance, and our proposed framework integrates these perspectives
by examining the inter-temporal tradeoffs in performance over time based on the type of CEO (insider vs. outsider), type of suc-
cession (forced vs. unforced) and the influence of board of directors. We consider the influence of each of these factors on per-
formance following succession individually in the sections that follow.
CEO successor origin
CEO succession research, rooted in strategic leadership literature, considers successor characteristics as an important consider-
ation in influencing post-succession success (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Successor actions (Lauterbach, Vu, & Weisberg, 1999) are
contingent on whether the successor is a firm insider or outsider (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012). We hypothesize that inside
CEO succession will lead to less strategic change and be more positively related to both short- and long-term performance,
while outside succession will lead to greater strategic change and poorer short- and long-term performance.
First, insiders, given their strong information base to identify superior knowledge and resource combinations (Alchian &
Demsetz, 1972) and knowledge of the competitive environment (Castanias & Helfat, 1991), prefer to maintain the status quo
(Lauterbach et al., 1999). Insiders' firm-specific cognitive orientation and involvement with prior strategy formulation allows in-
side CEOs to preserve firm-specific knowledge and leverage resources without undertaking strategic change, suggesting inside
CEOs engage in little strategic change.
Second, inside succession, particularly through relay succession (e.g. Vancil, 1987; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004), allows inside
CEOs socialized into the firm's culture and processes the opportunity to learn about the job before assuming the CEO position.
This training reduces the time it takes to learn the requirements of the position. The firm-specific knowledge and flat learning
curve of insiders also lessens disruptions (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Datta & Guthrie, 1994). Further, by engaging in minimal
strategic change, the organization is thrown into negligible upheaval as its resource bases continue to be aligned with prior strat-
egies. Media publications echo these arguments in suggesting that hiring an outside CEO is indicative of a failed succession pro-
cess (e.g. Favaro et al., 2014), suggesting that short-term performance will be less disrupted by an inside CEO than an outside CEO.
Third, in the long-run, inside CEOs improve performance by enabling adaptation to changes in the environment and by
leveraging relationships with internal stakeholders to adopt change when appropriate. Firm-specific knowledge enables the
new inside CEO to appropriately devise and manage strategic changes (Giambatista et al., 2005) and determine how to leverage
the firm's resource base. The inside CEO also has an understanding of the extent to which previous strategies have been success-
ful, allowing him or her to use the organization's strategic memory to guide future strategy. Finally, by relying upon existing re-
lationships, inside CEOs can use cohesiveness and communication to increase innovation (King & Anderson, 1990).
Alternatively, outside CEOs with a mandate for change and endowed with variegated information processing routines, are like-
ly to increase strategic change for several reasons. First, with outside CEO succession increasing from 14% in 2007 to 29% in 2012
(Favaro et al., 2014), outside CEO succession is increasingly aimed towards initiating change. Outside CEOs bring fresh strategic
perspectives and new ties to the environment (Virany et al., 1992; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). Second, outside CEOs have greater
discretion (Quigley & Hambrick, 2012) that allows them more latitude in initiating, directing, and implementing strategic change.
Third, outside CEOs often prefer to bring their own executive teams with whom they have past relationships. These ‘change
teams’ in the upper echelons further strengthen the relationship between outside succession and strategic change.
Outside CEO succession may be negatively associated with short- and long-term performance. “External succession creates
more disruption than internal succession” (Helfat & Bailey, 2005: 48), and is marred with high transition costs and uncertainty,
creating high short-term costs. Organizational changes initiated by outsiders may create the “illusion that the fundamental prob-
lems of the organization have been resolved … but the lull is illusionary because performance in the long term afterwards
deteriorates at the same rate” (Hughes et al., 2010: 572). Further, while outsiders have greater latitude in making changes, and at
times have a mandate to do so, problems associated with inertia and employees who resist change may scuttle change effective-
ness. Employees and managers may also resist outside CEOs who think differently than prior executives (Barker, Patterson, &
Mueller, 2001).
Given firm specific knowledge and a flat learning curve (Lauterbach et al., 1999), on the job training, and commitment to
existing dominant logics, the disruption perspective suggests that inside hires are less likely to reconfigure resources and relation-
ships, resulting in higher firm performance (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993), while the adaptation perspective would suggest that in-
siders are best positioned to understand the organization's competitive environment and resource base to institute the most
appropriate and effective changes when necessary. At the same time, disruption from the succession event and ensuing strategic
change suggests that outside CEOs may result in low performance in both the short- and long-term.
Hypothesis 1a. Inside CEO succession is negatively related to strategic change, whereas outside CEO succession is positively relat-
ed to strategic change.
Hypothesis 1b. Inside CEO succession is positively related to short-term and long-term firm performance, whereas outside suc-
cession is negatively related to short-term and long-term firm performance.
Continuing from H1b and the associated theoretical background on direct effects of succession origin and firm performance,
inside CEOs may channel their influence on performance through reduced strategic change, suggesting partial mediation. Inside
CEOs are well positioned to utilize firm specific knowledge and continue existing strategies, which reduces the need for strategic
change, yields low disruption costs, and should therefore enhance firm performance. As such, inside CEOs who engage in signif-
icant strategic change may lower both short- and long-term performance. While the adaptation perspective argues that succession
allows a firm to realign and reallocate resources (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) to improve long-term performance (e.g., Salancik &
Pfeffer, 1980), inside CEOs undertaking significant strategic change may not revitalize resource combinations or re-engage em-
ployees and stakeholders (Barker & Duhaime, 1997), and could increase disruption costs. Inside CEOs can effectively align internal
resources with the environment to undertake transactional (instead of transformative) strategic change necessary to establishing
new activities and patterns. As inside CEOs tend to have a long tenure, their experience within the firm may be more amenable
towards improving strategic fit than moving from ‘tried and tested’ strategies to reshape and reorient the organization (Hambrick
& Fukutomi, 1991).
Furthermore, inside CEOs undertaking strategic change may not be able to garner support as they are generally expected to
maintain continuity, and their strategic schema may not be consistent with novel strategic actions. Realignment efforts can
take two to four years (Miller & Shamsie, 2001) and with a three to five-year performance lag (Henderson et al., 2006), inside
CEOs may miss opportunities to build on existing resources with limited strategic change. Inside CEOs, despite low levels of stra-
tegic change could influence performance by managerial control systems such as “formalizing beliefs, set boundaries on accept-
able strategic behavior, define and measure critical performance variables, and motivate debate and discussion about strategic
uncertainties” (Simons, 1994; p. 169).
Alternatively, strategic change from outside CEOs reduces inertia, enables the firm to adapt to its environment (Shen &
Cannella, 2002b) and realigns strategy to improve performance (Chen & Hambrick, 2012; Finkelstein et al., 2009). Armed with
distinct strategic diagnostic capabilities, transformational strategies initiated by outside CEOs result in strategic actions that are
supposed to help fundamentally address organizational challenges and improve performance (Haveman, et al., 2001). The outside
CEOs' willingness to deviate from past strategic patterns (Lauterbach et al., 1999) brings fresh perspectives to the organization, as
well as new ties to the environment (Virany et al., 1992; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). Outside CEOs' strategic change increases
knowledge and resource heterogeneity (Keck, 1997) and reconstitutes existing relationships within the environment (Westphal
et al. 2006).
While outside CEOs may face a steep learning curve and stakeholders may resist change (Barker et al., 2001; Karaevli, 2007),
hiring an outside CEO comes with a mandate to initiate disruption to ensure long-term adaptation through strategic change. Out-
side CEOs, generally brought in when performance is declining, are under pressure to improve performance (Barker & Mone,
1998; Krieger & Ang 2013). Strategic change, such as entering new markets, refreshing the product portfolio, and changing re-
source allocation among departments is essential to realigning the firm with the environment and increasing performance (Ma,
Seidl, & Guérard, 2015). Based on the direct effects of successor origin on performance (H1e) and expectations for strategic
change, we propose a partial mediation hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1c. Strategic change partially mediates the relationship between CEO successor origin and firm performance, such
that strategic change after inside CEO succession is negatively related to short-term and long-term performance whereas strategic
change after outside CEO succession is positively related to short-term and long-term performance.
Forced and unforced CEO succession
A second important consideration is the catalyst for succession. An incoming CEO's predecessor could either depart voluntarily
(unforced turnover), allowing for an orderly and smooth transition, or involuntarily (forced turnover), causing a chaotic and un-
certain transition. Unforced turnover is a sign that the board is content with the firm's direction and desires continuity in strategy
(Shen & Cannella, 2002b). Unforced turnover also allows for the firm to provide for a transition period to identify and train the
new CEO (Vancil, 1987). Forced CEO turnover is a sign the board is dissatisfied with existing management and desires strategic
change (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012). Unforced CEO succession is generally followed by continuance of strategies, while forced
turnover tends to lead to strategic changes (Wiersema, 1995).
Relying on disruption and adaptation arguments, there are several reasons to believe that unforced CEO turnovers increase
firm performance with less strategic change, while forced turnovers increase strategic change and decrease performance. First, un-
forced CEO turnover creates an orderly transition, minimizing short-term disruptions. Second, unforced turnovers are more likely
to be associated with relay succession, which allows for knowledge sharing between the outgoing and incoming CEO and reduces
learning challenges (Vancil, 1987). Shen and Cannella (2002b) echo these arguments in finding that inside successors performed
better following unforced turnover when the TMT continued with the firm. Forced turnover allows for little on-the-job training,
and often requires using an interim CEO while a permanent successor is found (Mooney, Semadeni, & Kesner, 2013). Third, while
some suggest that forced turnover influences long-term performance through reorienting the firm's strategy, unforced turnover
allows for quicker and more effective strategic changes due to the flatter learning curve. Further, forced turnover may create fac-
tions within the firm that are loyal to the dismissed CEO, limiting the new CEO's ability to effectively reorient the organization's
strategy due to problems associated with inertia (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012). Thus, we suggest that unforced turnover mini-
mizes short-term disruptions and enables more effective long-term adaptation through preparedness of the incoming CEO as
compared to forced succession. Despite this, we expect that forced turnover will result in greater strategic change; however,
we expect such changes, on the whole, to be less effective at enhancing overall performance.
Hypothesis 2a. Forced CEO succession is positively related to strategic change, whereas unforced CEO succession is negatively re-
lated to strategic change.
Hypothesis 2b. Forced CEO succession is negatively related to short-term and long-term firm performance, whereas unforced CEO
succession is positively related to short-term and long-term firm performance.
Board independence
One important consideration in the relationship between CEO succession and organizational performance is the degree of the
board's independence from management (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Directors' independence refers to the percentage of board mem-
bers who are not employed by or do not have business relationships with the firm. An independent board improves firm perfor-
mance through better monitoring of CEO behavior (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) and by serving as conduits of advice and ties to
external organizations (Westphal, 1999). Zhang (2008) illustrates that independence improves retention rates, as firms with in-
dependent nominating committees (committees typically responsible for identifying potential successors) have a lower likelihood
of CEO dismissal in the first three years of a CEO's tenure.
Directors' independence can also be a liability (Rediker & Seth, 1995) – having too many independent directors limits credible
information regarding the firm's strategy and performance because the board lacks multiple inside perspectives (Joseph, Ocasio, &
McDonnell, 2014). Few insider perspectives makes it difficult for board members to identify and evaluate CEOs successfully and
without biased information.
We posit that the effects of the incoming CEO's origin and context of the predecessor's departure on strategic change and
performance are influenced by board independence. When independence is low, inside CEOs have prior relationships with
other senior executives on the board (Lauterbach et al., 1999), which may make it feasible to co-opt such directors to side
with the CEO (Walsh & Seward, 1990) rather than shareholders. Thus, greater independence allows the board to better
monitor inside CEO behavior. Independent directors should provide access to novel resources and knowledge, which can
be a significant asset to inside CEOs whose knowledge base is engrained within the company. A strong independent board
can influence the effectiveness of inside CEOs by limiting disruptions during the succession process, providing fresh
perspectives from outside the organization, and through effective monitoring. Better monitoring through independent
boards should manifest through encouraging behaviors which limit strategic change leading to better firm performance for
inside CEOs.
For outside CEOs, however, internal knowledge of the firm is less important, as they are hired to bring a fresh perspective,
and they should be able to work with an independent board (Farrell & Whidbee, 2000). An independent board is less
involved in the firm's operations and has less information about firm capabilities than a board which includes more inside
directors (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Shen & Cannella, 2002a). Independent boards have limited access to valuable insights
on past firm strategies that have worked or have failed to be successful. Reducing the independence of board members can
result in executives who feel more inclined to share their perspectives with both the CEO and the board (Finkelstein et al.,
2009). Thus, from the adaptation perspective, less board independence can support outside CEOs in both greater strategic change
and firm performance by engaging board members who serve as conduits in the firm and allow for the CEO's changes to be
implemented.
Hypothesis 3a. Board independence moderates the relationship between outside (inside) CEO succession and strategic change,
such that board independence strengthens the positive (negative) relationship between outside (inside) CEO succession and stra-
tegic change.
Hypothesis 3b. Board independence moderates the relationship between outside (inside) CEO succession and performance, such
that board independence strengthens the negative (positive) relationship between outside (inside) CEO succession and
performance.
Following unforced turnover, new CEOs are expected to continue existing strategies (Wiersema, 1995). Independent boards, as
strong monitors, reduce managerial discretion to engage in strategic change (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Thus, independence may be
important following unforced succession to reduce managerial discretion to engage in strategic change, while reduction in discre-
tion is a liability following forced turnover. From a disruption perspective, more independent boards would allow for a more ef-
fective and orderly transition through strong board monitoring following unforced turnover.
Following forced turnover, board independence requires sharing information relating to the firm's operations, which often
comes through less independent directors (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Such information enhances the board's ability to eval-
uate and monitor the new CEO, while also providing critical information and advice (Westphal, 1999). As such, greater board in-
dependence may limit the board's access to information. Further, elevating executives to the board can increase their power to
assist the new CEO in implementing change following forced succession. Thus, we posit that board independence can moderate
the relationship between forced/unforced succession and both strategic change and performance.
Hypothesis 3c. Board independence moderates the relationship between forced (unforced) CEO succession and strategic change,
such that board independence weakens the positive (negative) relationship between forced (unforced) CEO succession and stra-
tegic change.
Hypothesis 3d. Board independence moderates the relationship between forced (unforced) CEO succession and performance,
such that board independence strengthens the negative (positive) relationship between forced (unforced) CEO succession and
performance.
Methods
To test the proposed hypotheses, a meta-analysis is desirable for theoretical and empirical reasons. First, meta-analysis is an
ideal tool to synthesize theories (Yang, 2002); it can enable aggregation of findings and exploration of population-based relation-
ships when theories in a field are fragmented. Numerous factors, including the environment, industry, resources, and governance,
influence the relationships between CEO succession and strategic change or performance. The influence of these factors may not
be empirically captured in individual studies as such factors may be unobservable (due to causal ambiguity among resources),
suppressed (e.g. positive CEO effects on performance are stronger (weaker) with environmental munificence (dynamism)) or
confounded (e.g. resource bundles strengthen or weaken the influence of CEO succession on performance). In individual studies,
the omitted variable bias cannot be fully addressed as all desired variables are not available and controlled. To reduce these
‘noises’ in effects between CEO succession and performance, meta-analysis aggregates effects across samples and identifies less
noisy effects in a population.
Second, given the influence of unobservables and potential confounds and suppressors, a meta-analysis is important for im-
proving precision and power. Related to precision, the ability to understand the ‘intervention’ effect of CEO succession improves
as samples from different periods and contexts are aggregated. Related to power, by combining studies for a meta-analysis, the
ability to detect small effect sizes of different relationships increases.
Third, the lead time for the influence of a CEO succession on performance varies based on the context of the succession event
and the degree to which change is necessary. Similarly, the relationship between a CEO succession and strategic change is not
modeled in all studies or available in databases. A meta-analysis allows for aggregation of multiple studies to triangulate multiple
sources to better understand the effects of CEO succession on performance and strategic change. Giambatista (2004) states that
for the “succession–performance relationship … longitudinal and life cycle studies are still not prominent” (page 608). As ex-
plained in Crook, Ketchen, Combs, and Todd (2008), pg. 444) “cross-sectional studies that do not capture the lagged effects …
or changes in performance overtime … are less likely to find effects.” A meta-analysis can help identify the influence of CEO suc-
cession on long-term performance and through strategic change. Meta-analysis is also conducive for testing the proposed relation-
ships as the proposed variables have limited measurement error and have similar operationalizations across studies.
Literature search
We started by identifying published studies through March 2016 from a variety of sources. First, using the search terms, “CEO
succession,” “Chief Executive Officer succession,” “newcomer” and “CEO,” “newcomer” and “Chief Executive Officer succession,”
“CEO dismissal,” and “CEO turnover,” we searched Academy of Management conference proceedings, JSTOR, ProQuest, Social Sci-
ence Citation Index (SSCI), and Southern Management Association (SMA) Proceedings. Second, we conducted a forward citation
search using several of the most highly cited papers (e.g., Zajac, 1990). Third, we examined citation lists in studies reviewing
CEO succession research (e.g., Giambatista et al., 2005; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher, Chreim, &
Kisfalvi, 2000). Fourth, we searched for studies in leading management journals between 1970 and March 2016 (i.e., Academy
of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Human Relations, Journal of Business
Venturing, Journal of Management, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Journal of Management Studies, Leadership Quarterly, Long
Range Planning, Management Science, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Organization Science, Organization Stud-
ies, Strategic Management Journal, and Strategic Organization). We also sent requests for unpublished studies through Listservs of
all divisions of the Academy of Management, but we did not receive any studies. In total, we identified 339 published studies.
Inclusion criteria
In examining the 339 studies, we only included studies in the meta-analysis if they: (a) examined the relationship between CEO suc-
cession and either performance or strategic change and (b) reported effect sizes (e.g., correlations,3 F or t-statistics) of the relationships.
We also included studies if they examined the relationship between pre-succession performance for supplemental analyses. We exclud-
ed studies if they: (a) were not quantitative (e.g., conceptual, review, or case studies) (50 studies), (b) did not include the relationship
between CEO succession and performance or strategic change (98 studies),4 (c) examined non-CEO succession (e.g., executive succes-
sion) (4 studies), (d) did not provide enough information to calculate a zero-order effect size (93 studies), and (e) used duplicated
data sets in different publications (9 studies). Specific reasons as to why each study was excluded are listed in Appendix 2.
Following these criteria, we dropped 278 studies for our analyses. Thus, our analyses used a total of 60 samples from 57 published
studies reporting 216 total effect sizes (94 for the relationship between succession and performance, 104 for the succession and strategic
change relationship, and 18 for the strategic change and performance relationship).5 Among the 60 samples for the main hypothesis
tests, 41 samples were from 40 studies testing the relationship between CEO succession and performance, and 28 samples were from
26 studies testing the relationship between CEO succession and strategic change. Of these, only six samples from six studies simulta-
neously examined variables related to succession, performance, and strategic change which are used to test the relationship between
strategic change and performance.6 A summary of the studies included in the meta-analysis is provided in Appendices 4 (CEO succes-
sion-performance relationship) and 5 (CEO succession-strategic change relationship).
Coding process
The coding process included two phases. In the first phase, two coauthors coded 20 randomly selected articles to evaluate
whether effect sizes, sample sizes, inclusion or exclusion of the study, types of CEO succession (insider vs. outsider, forced vs. un-
forced), and measures of board independence were coded consistently. To check interrater agreement, we calculated the ICC(2)
(intra-class correlation), which reflects the interrater reliability across raters (Bliese, 2000). Meta-analytic studies often use
ICC(2) to gauge interrater reliability (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2013). The ICC(2) calculated for coding of effect sizes was 0.92, and
the ICC(2) for coding of sample sizes was 0.99. In addition, the ICC(2) for coding for including or excluding studies was 0.91;
we did not find any discrepancies in the coding of the following variables: CEO successor origin, reason for succession, and
board independence scores. Second, after discrepancies (e.g., sample sizes) associated with the initial coding for 20 articles
were resolved, one of the coauthors completed the coding of the remaining articles (319 articles). When complex decisions
arose, the primary coder consulted with the second coder to obtain agreement on coding decisions.
Coding of key constructs
CEO succession
We categorized the effect sizes between CEO succession and performance or strategic change using three succession classifi-
cations. We classified CEO succession into overall, inside/outside succession, and forced/unforced departure of the predecessor.
Most studies used a dichotomous variable to measure CEO succession. Some articles analyzed data that included both firms
that had experienced CEO succession (or turnover) events and firms that had not. These studies reported effect sizes of CEO suc-
cession events (including overall, inside/outside, and forced/unforced CEO succession) and compared them to firms not experienc-
ing succession events. Other studies analyzed data that only included firms having CEO succession events. Here, the articles
compared the effect sizes between inside and outside CEO succession or between forced and unforced CEO succession.
CEO succession was coded as “inside” if the incoming CEO was promoted internally (e.g., Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011), or “out-
side” if the new CEO was hired from outside the firm (e.g., Friedman & Singh, 1989; Graffin et al., 2011) or had a short tenure (e.g., less
than two years) in the firm (e.g., Chen & Hambrick, 2012; Shen & Cannella, 2002a). CEO succession was coded as “forced” if the prede-
cessor CEO was fired or dismissed (e.g., Farrell & Whidbee, 2000), whereas succession was coded as “unforced” if the CEO voluntarily left
the position (e.g., Fong, Misangyi, & Tosi, 2010). These correlations are reported from studies which included firms that both experienced
and did not experience succession events, as well as studies only reporting firms experiencing successions.7 In the former case,
3
Some longitudinal studies reported the correlation table based on multiple firm years instead of number of firms or succession events. In this case, we focused on
number of succession events as the sample size.
4
We found 24 studies that only examined the relationship between pre-succession performance and CEO succession which we used to test the performance-succes-
sion relationship (please see Appendix 1 for specific references).
5
Appendix 3 provides all references included in the meta-analysis.
6
Two studies including CEO succession, performance, and strategic change were also excluded because performance was measured prior to the year in which stra-
tegic change was measured.
7
It must be noted that a vast majority of studies included in the meta-analysis are conducted using samples only from firms experiencing succession events. While
some studies include non-succession firms along with those experiencing succession events, the available data best allows us to directly compare insiders vs. outsiders
or forced vs. unforced succession, but not ‘insider vs. outsider vs. non-succession’ or ‘forced vs. unforced vs. non-succession.’
correlations represent comparison between firm outcomes for those experiencing succession and the successor's origin or reason for suc-
cession contrasted to cases where no succession occurred. In the latter case, successor origin and reasons for succession illustrate inverse
correlations as the variables represent two sides of the same, typically dichotomous, construct. The final sample includes 9471 US and
4107 non-US successions, however, these successions may not be unique and may be from overlapping samples.
Strategic change
Based on prior research and definitions of strategic change, we included variables such as degree of diversification, TMT mem-
ber turnover, divestitures, strategic change and reorientation, and resource allocation in our strategic change measure. For exam-
ple, several studies used change in diversification (e.g., Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Boeker, 1997), divestitures (e.g., Goodstein &
Boeker, 1991), and TMT turnover (e.g., Kesner & Dalton, 1994). Other studies have utilized composite measures of strategic
change such as strategic instability (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004) or strategic reorientation
(Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). In most studies, strategic change measures were continuous variables, demonstrating that higher
values indicate greater strategic change.
Short- and long-term performance

Several measures have been used to operationalize performance, including accounting performance (e.g., ROA, ROE) and mar-
ket performance (e.g., CARs). In the present study, we distinguished between short- and long-term performance. CEO succession
research suggests that a three-year time frame between CEO succession and performance is needed to fully capture the effects of
succession events (e.g., Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Karaevli, 2007). Accordingly, we coded performance as short-term performance
if the time frame measured was less than three years and long-term performance if the time gap between CEO succession and per-
formance was three years or longer.
Board independence
Board independence was coded as the average proportion of outside directors to total directors on the board. Research on CEO
succession uses this measure to capture board power and independence in corporate governance research (e.g., Dalton, Daily,
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Shimizu & Hitt, 2005) or to control for board influences (e.g., Fong et al., 2010; Graffin et al., 2011).
In addition, two meta-analyses (Dalton et al., 1998; Rhoades et al., 2000) used a similar coding approach. Thus, a higher average
value indicates a greater proportional representation of outside directors on the board (and thus, more independence) in each
study.
Controls
To employ rigorous mediation hypothesis tests, we controlled for theoretically relevant variables. First, using correlation infor-
mation, we controlled for pre-succession performance on CEO succession, strategic change, and performance because pre-succes-
sion performance can influence leadership change and subsequent performance (Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers, & Owers, 1989).
Second, we controlled for organizational size given problems associated with inertia (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996).
Meta-analytic procedures
To test our hypothesized model, we followed the approach of Hunter and Schmidt (2004). Prior to testing the significance of
effect sizes, we calculated the composite of performance if studies reported multiple performance measures using the formula
provided by Hunter and Schmidt (2004), as opposed to averaging multiple correlations. Using the Schmidt-Le software package
(version 1.1; Schmidt & Le, 2004), we calculated the mean of the sample size weighted correlations (r)8 based on 95% confidence
intervals (CIs) to test all hypotheses. Specifically, we examined whether the 95% confidence interval for r includes zero (it is sig-
nificant when the 95% confidence interval does not include zero).
To test the effect of CEO successor origin and reasons for succession on the succession-strategic change relationship
(Hypothesis 1a; Hypothesis 2a) and the succession-performance relationship (Hypothesis 1b; Hypothesis 2b), we conducted sub-
group analyses because the succession types are categorical moderators (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Significance tests for categor-
ical moderators were based on whether 95% CIs among moderator categories overlapped or not. Non-overlapping Cis were
interpreted to mean that the moderator categories are significantly different.
For mediation tests (Hypothesis 1c), we used meta-analytic structural equation modeling (MA-SEM). First, we calculated
meta-analytic correlations among pre-succession performance, inside/outsider CEO succession,9 strategic change, short- and
long-term firm performance, and organizational size by operationalizing the sample-size weighted correlations for each relation-
ship based on Hunter and Schmidt's (2004) random-effects model. We computed the Q homogeneity statistic to gauge the exis-
tence of heterogeneity in a given relationship. 28 of 34 relationships among different types (i.e., overall, inside/outside, and
forced/unforced) of CEO succession, strategic change, pre- and post-succession performance, and organizational size had signifi-
cant Q statistics, suggesting that the relationships are heterogeneous. Accordingly, we used the random-effects model as it
8
We only focused on mean-corrected effect sizes because most CEO succession studies do not report reliability coefficients for every measure as the measures are
considered objective variables.
9
For a robustness check, we conducted additional MA-SEMs to examine how different types of CEO succession (overall/forced vs. unforced) differentially influence
post-succession (short-term and long-term) performance through strategic change (see supplemental analyses and the results in Appendix 6).
generates more accurate estimates than a fixed-effects model in heterogeneous relationships. Last, we used MPlus to test the
models (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). In particular, we used the harmonic mean of the sample sizes for each correlation to input
the sample size for MA-SEM. We considered chi-square, the comparative fit index (CFI), the root-mean-square error of approxi-
mation (RMSEA), and the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) following Hu and Bentler's (1999) suggestion. The cut-
off for CFI is 0.90 or more, while the cutoff for RMSEA and SRMR is 0.08 or less.
To test the moderating effect of board independence (Hypothesis 3a–3d), we used Wilson's (2005) weighted least squares
(WLS) regression. Here, we used Fisher-z transformed corrected correlations, which were calculated by adjusting each effect
size based on the inverse of its variance (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Before conducting the analysis, we com-
puted the 95% credibility interval and the Q homogeneity statistic. If we found the 95% credibility interval contained zero and a
significant Q statistic, we further investigated the moderating effect of board independence. For supplemental analyses for
Hypotheses 1b and 2b, we also used WLS regression. Using continuous values representing performance timeframes measured
(e.g., 1 or 2 years), we tested how the performance timeframe moderates the succession-performance relationship. If the moder-
ating effect is positive (negative), CEO succession has a stronger (weaker) effect on long-term performance.
Based on the metafor package in R, we also checked for outliers. However, none were found (Viechtbaur, 2010). We examined funnel
plots to detect systematic heterogeneity. Plots for the effect sizes between overall succession and strategic change or performance
showed roughly funnel-shaped distributions, reducing concerns relating to systematic heterogeneity in collated correlations (see Appen-
dix 7); however, plots for effect sizes between succession and strategic change showed slightly biased results. Accordingly, we tested
whether the means of the sample size weighted correlations (r) between succession and strategic change are significantly different
when excluding two studies with large sample sizes. The sample weighted correlation without the two studies (r = 0.09; 95% CI:
0.05, 0.14) was not significantly different from the correlation including all studies (r = 0.08; 95% CI: 0.04, 0.11). Thus, we assumed
that systematic heterogeneity does not significantly influence our results, and we included all studies in our hypothesis tests.
Results10
Table 1 presents effect sizes for relationships between different types of CEO succession and strategic change. We also discuss
the baseline findings proposed earlier. Results support the notion that overall CEO succession is positively related to strategic
change (r = 0.08; 95% CI: [0.04, 0.11]). Hypothesis 1a predicts that inside CEO succession is negatively related to strategic change,
while outside succession is positively related to strategic change. We found non-overlapping 95% CIs for inside succession (r =
−0.09; 95% CI: [−0.16, −0.01]) and outsider succession (r = 0.09; 95% CI: [0.02, 0.16]) Given the non-overlap in confidence in-
tervals, we infer support for Hypothesis 1a, suggesting that insiders are negatively related to strategic change, while outside CEOs
are positively related to strategic change.
Table 2 shows the direct effects of CEO succession on performance.11 CEO succession is negatively related to short-term performance
(r = −0.07; 95% CI: [−0.09, −0.05]). Hypothesis 1b predicts that inside CEO succession is positively related to short- and long-term firm
performance, while outside succession is negatively related to performance in both the short- and long-term. For insider successors, re-
sults show a non-significant relationship for short-term performance (r = 0.002; 95% CI: [−0.04, 0.04]), and a significant, positive rela-
tionship for long-term performance (r = 0.08; 95% CI: [0.001, 0.16]). For outside successors, we failed to find significant correlations
between outside CEOs and short-term (r = −0.02; 95% CI: [−0.06, 0.02]) and long-term (r = −0.07; 95% CI: [−0.14, 0.01]) perfor-
mance. These results provide limited support for Hypothesis 1b that successor origin has a significant direct effect on performance.
Although Hypothesis 1b has limited support, we further tested whether the performance timeframe moderates the relation-
ship between CEO origin and firm performance. A positive and significant moderating effect suggests that successor origin has
a stronger effect on long-term performance. As shown in Table 3, the timeframe significantly and positively (negatively) moder-
ates the relationship between inside (outside) CEO succession and performance, suggesting that inside CEO succession positively
influences long-term performance, while hiring outside CEOs has a deleterious effect on long-term performance. These tests pro-
vide at least partial support for Hypothesis 1b.
Hypothesis 1c predicts that strategic change partially mediates the relationship between successor origin and short- and long-
term performance. Before testing the hypotheses, we compared partial and full mediation models. As shown in Fig. 2, fit indices of
partial mediation models are fully saturated with zero degrees of freedom; thus, the models are not estimated. However, full me-
diation models generally have more constraints that make model fit worse. Hence, when comparing between partial and full me-
diation models, we can expect that partial mediation models have similar or better model fit because the models estimate more
parameters. The full mediation models in Fig. 3 show excellent fit (e.g., model fit [inside succession → strategic change → short-
term performance]: N = 1311; χ2 = 0.02, df = 1, p = 0.89; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = 0.00; SRMR = 0.001), and the direction and
significance of path coefficients are almost identical. Accordingly, we tested hypotheses using full mediation models (Fig. 3). As
shown in Fig. 3 (Table 4 contains correlation information for MA-SEM), inside CEO succession is significantly and negatively re-
lated to strategic change12 (r = − 0.08, p b 0.05); however, strategic change is only negatively and significantly related to
10
As shown in Tables 1–2 and 4–6, in some cases we used two to five samples (k) to test our hypotheses. Although it is acceptable in meta-analysis to use so few
samples, the results should be interpreted with caution.
11
Given the potential that prior performance strongly influences performance following succession, we conducted a series of tests to control for endogeneity which
are reported in the supplementary analyses and in Appendix 8.
12
We additionally tested whether overall and different types of CEO succession are significantly related to different types of strategic change. The results showed that
CEO succession had positive effects on diversification, divestiture, strategic reorientation, and TMT turnover. Results also indicate that inside CEO succession was neg-
atively related to TMT turnover, while outside succession was positively related to TMT turnover (for more details, see Appendix 9).
Table 1
Meta-analysis results of relationships between CEO succession and strategic change.
Predictor k N r SDr 95% CI 95% CV Q Inference
CEO succession types on strategic change

Overall CEO succession 18 2673 0.08 0.00 0.04, 0.11 0.08, 0.08 15.75 Sig
H1a. Inside CEO succession 13 2444 −0.09 0.12 −0.16, −0.01 −0.32, 0.15 50.34⁎ Sig
Outside CEO succession 14 2673 0.09 0.11 0.02, 0.16 −0.13, 0.31 49.01⁎ Sig
H2a. Forced CEO succession 3 578 0.07 0.09 −0.06, 0.20 −0.11, 0.25 8.06⁎ Non-sig
Unforced CEO succession 3 578 −0.07 0.09 −0.20, 0.06 −0.25, 0.11 8.06⁎ Non-sig
Note. k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; r = sample-weighted mean correlation; SDr = the standard deviation of r; CI = confidence interval;
CV = credibility interval; Sig = significant based on p b 0.05; Q = homogeneity statistic of r. Overall CEO succession includes studies that collect with succession
events and without those that did not.
⁎ p b 0.05.
long-term performance (r = −0.23, p b 0.05)13 but not short-term performance. The lack of a direct effect on long-term perfor-
mance suggests that strategic change fully mediates the relationship between inside CEO succession and long-term performance;
however, this relationship is opposite of the hypothesized direction. These findings suggest that inside CEO succession has a sig-
nificant positive influence, but only on long-term performance through lower strategic change.
Similarly, outside CEO succession is significantly and positively related to strategic change (Fig. 3: r = 0.08, p b 0.05); however,
strategic change under outside CEOs is negatively and significantly related to long-term performance (r = −0.23, p b 0.05) only,
suggesting that outside CEO succession negates long-term performance by enhancing strategic change, also opposite of the hy-
pothesized direction. We further confirmed a significant indirect effect (95% bootstrapping confidence interval [inside: 0.005,
0.031; outside: − 0.031, − 0.006]) between inside/outside CEO succession and long-term performance via strategic change
based on a parametric bootstrap procedure (Monte Carlo method) (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Selig & Preacher,
2008) with 20,000 repetitions. Thus, Hypotheses 1c is not supported.
Hypothesis 2a predicts that forced CEO is positively related to strategic change, while unforced succession is negatively related
to strategic change. In Table 1, the results show overlapping 95% CIs for forced succession (r = 0.07; 95% CI: [−0.06, 0.20]) and
unforced succession (r = −0.07; 95% CI: [−0.20, 0.06]). As the confidence intervals overlap between forced and unforced suc-
cession, Hypothesis 2a is not supported.
Hypothesis 2b predicts that forced CEO succession is negatively related to short- and long-term performance, while unforced
succession is positively related to short- and long-term performance. For forced successions, the results show a non-significant
relationship for short-term (r = − 0.06; 95% CI: [− 0.12, 0.01]) and long-term performance (r = − 0.18; 95% CI: [− 0.42,
0.06]). For unforced successions, the results also show a non-significant relationship for short-term performance (r = 0.03; 95%
CI: [− 0.03, 0.09]), not supporting Hypothesis 2b. For long-term performance, we could not test our hypothesis because only
one study was available for this case. However, we were able to test how the performance timeframe moderates the relationship
between forced or unforced turnover and the succession-performance relationship. Table 3 shows that the timeframe significantly
and positively moderates the relationship between unforced CEO succession and performance, suggesting that unforced CEO suc-
cession positively influences long-term performance, at least partially supporting Hypothesis 2b.
We checked whether other potential moderating effects exist using the 95% credibility interval and the Q homogeneity statis-
tic. As reflected in Tables 1 and 2, the 95% credibility interval from the relationships between different types of CEO succession
and performance (or strategic change) did contain zero and the Q values were significant. Thus, we proceeded with moderation
analyses. Hypothesis 3a predicts that board independence strengthens the positive relationship between outside successors and
strategic change, as well as the negative relationship between inside CEOs and strategic change. As seen in Table 5, board inde-
pendence positively moderates the relationship between outside CEO succession and strategic change (B = 1.85, p b 0.05),
while independence negatively and significantly moderates the relationship between inside CEO succession and strategic change
(B = −1.96, p b 0.05). Thus, Hypothesis 3a is supported. Hypothesis 3b predicts that board independence moderates the relation-
ship between successor origin and performance, such that board independence strengthens both the negative relationship be-
tween outside succession and performance and the positive relationship between inside succession and performance. As seen
in Table 6, Hypothesis 3b is not supported.
Hypothesis 3c predicts that board independence weakens the positive relationship between forced succession and strategic
change and the negative relationship between unforced CEO succession and strategic change. As seen in Table 5, board indepen-
dence does not significantly moderate the relationship between forced or unforced CEO succession and post-succession strategic
change. Thus, Hypothesis 3c is not supported. Hypothesis 3d predicts that board independence strengthens the negative relation-
ship between forced turnover and performance and the positive relationship between unforced turnover and performance. As
seen in Table 6, board independence negatively and significantly moderates the relationship between forced CEO succession
and performance (B = −0.36, p b 0.05), but not for unforced succession and performance (B = 0.17, p N 0.05), suggesting inde-
pendent boards can be a liability following forced turnover. Thus, Hypothesis 3d is partially supported.
13
Because of the small sample size for testing the relationship between strategic change and long-term performance, the result should be interpreted with caution.
Table 2
Meta-analysis results of relationships between CEO succession and performance.
Predictor k N r SDr 95% CI 95% CV Q Inference
Overall CEO succession on performance

Overall CEO succession 19 7546 −0.06 0.00 −0.08, −0.05 −0.06, −0.06 7.36 Sig
Short-term (overall) 14 4324 −0.07 0.00 −0.09, −0.05 −0.07, −0.07 5.49 Sig
Long-term (overall) 4 442 −0.02 0.00 −0.06, 0.02 −0.02, −0.02 0.81 Non-sig
Inside/outside CEO succession on performance

Inside CEO succession 23 7610 0.02 0.08 −0.02, 0.07 −0.14, 0.19 77.74⁎ Non-sig
Outside CEO succession 26 8223 −0.03 0.08 −0.07, 0.003 −0.19, 0.12 77.85⁎ Non-sig
H1b. Short-term (inside) 15 5361 0.002 0.07 −0.04, 0.04 −0.13, 0.13 38.41⁎ Non-sig
Long-term (inside) 8 2249 0.08 0.10 0.001, 0.16 −0.11, 0.27 29.92⁎ Sig
H1b. Short-term (outside) 17 5751 −0.02 0.06 −0.06, 0.02 −0.14, 0.10 40.21⁎ Non-sig
Long-term (outside) 9 2472 −0.07 0.10 −0.14, 0.01 −0.26, 0.12 33.58⁎ Non-sig
Forced/unforced CEO succession on performance

Forced CEO succession 6 2545 −0.07 0.08 −0.15, 0.004 −0.24, 0.09 24.76⁎ Non-sig
Unforced CEO succession 6 3325 0.05 0.09 −0.03, 0.12 −0.13, 0.22 32.74⁎ Non-sig
H2b. Short-term (forced) 4 2209 −0.06 0.05 −0.12, 0.01 −0.15, 0.04 9.32⁎ Non-sig
Long-term (forced) 2 336 −0.18 0.16 −0.42, 0.06 −0.49, 0.12 10.49⁎ Non-sig
H2b. Short-term (unforced) 5 3121 0.03 0.06 −0.03, 0.09 −0.08, 0.14 15.44⁎ Non-sig
Long-term (unforced) 1 204 0.32 – – – – –
Note. k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; r = sample-weighted mean correlation; SDr = the standard deviation of r; CI = confidence interval;
CV = credibility interval; Sig = significant based on p b 0.05; Q = homogeneity statistic of r. Overall CEO succession includes studies that collect with succession
events and without those that did not.
⁎ p b 0.05.
Supplemental analyses
Consistency of effect sizes across US vs. non-US firms and public vs. private firms
We examined whether effect sizes differed across countries (Appendix 10: US vs. non-US) and types of organizations (Appen-
dix 11: public vs. private). First, for country differences, effect sizes for inside CEO succession and performance from US samples is
significantly higher than from non-US samples (US samples: r = 0.04; non-US samples: r = −0.04), suggesting country-specific
differences. We further found that inside CEO succession has a negative effect on performance (especially, short-term) in non-US
samples (Appendix 12: the relationship between different types of CEO succession and performance in non-US samples only). We
found no differences in effect sizes reported for public vs. private firms.
Endogeneity issues related to pre-succession firm performance

Endogeneity may exist among pre-succession performance, CEO succession, and subsequent performance. To reduce
endogeneity concerns, we conducted multiple analyses. First, we examined the relationships between pre-succession firm perfor-
mance and (i) the likelihood that a CEO succession occurs, (ii) whether a successor was an insider or outsider, (iii) whether a
turnover was forced or unforced, and (iv) post-succession performance. Appendix 13 provides the results of these analyses,
which illustrate that higher pre-succession performance reduces overall, outside, and forced CEO succession, while it increases in-
side and unforced CEO succession.
Second, we further tested the influence of prior performance on subsequent performance using WLS regression (Wilson,
2005). We allowed the effect size between pre- and post-succession performance to moderate the relationship between CEO suc-
cession and subsequent performance. If we find a non-significant moderating effect, endogeneity concerns are not critical issues,
demonstrating that confounds between pre- and post-succession performance do not significantly conflate our findings. As seen
in Appendix 8, the effect size between pre- and post-succession performance does not significantly conflate the relationship be-
tween overall CEO succession and performance, suggesting that endogeneity concerns do not exist. Additionally, the effect size
does not significantly conflate the relationships between inside/outside CEO succession and long-term performance, demonstrat-
ing that long-term performance is not constrained by endogeneity concerns. At the same time, prior performance does conflate
other relationships for which we failed to find significance in the main results. This finding reduces concerns of endogeneity re-
lated to our significant findings, but suggests that our non-significant findings may be due to endogeneity problems that we are
unable to control.
Discussion
Building upon prior research, we integrate the disruption and adaptation perspectives on CEO succession to provide a more
holistic account of short- and long-term effects of CEO succession that also considers how context (e.g. successor origin,
predecessor's reasons for departure) and intermediate adaptation through strategic actions influence these outcomes. Largely
supporting the disruption perspective, our results illustrate that CEO succession has a negative effect on overall and short-term
performance and no direct effects on long-term performance. Our results also largely fail to provide support for the adaptation
Table 3
WLS regression results of succession-performance timeframe measured on the relationship between CEO succession and performance.
Predictor k B SE B β Z p 95% CI R2 Inference
Moderating effect of succession-performance time gap

Constant 18 −0.07 0.02 0.00 −4.34 0.00 −0.11, −0.04 0.06 Non-sig
Succession-performance time gap (overall) 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.67 0.50 −0.02, 0.03
Moderating effect of time gap of succession-performance (inside/outside)

H1b. Constant 23 −0.02 0.02 0.00 −1.40 0.16 −0.06, 0.01 0.19 Sig
Succession-performance time gap (inside) 0.03 0.01 0.44 3.86 0.00 0.01, 0.04
H1b. Constant 26 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.50 0.62 −0.02, 0.04 0.16 Sig
Succession-performance time gap (outside) −0.02 0.01 −0.39 −3.48 0.00 −0.04, −0.01
Moderating effect of time gap of succession-performance (forced/unforced)

H2b. Constant 6 −0.06 0.03 0.00 −1.65 0.10 −0.12, 0.01 0.02 Non-sig
Succession-performance time gap (forced) −0.01 0.02 −0.15 −0.73 0.47 −0.05, 0.02
H2b. Constant 6 −0.01 0.02 0.00 −0.30 0.76 −0.05, 0.04 0.32 Sig
Succession-performance time gap (unforced) 0.06 0.02 0.56 3.23 0.00 0.02, 0.09
Note. WLS = weighted least squares; k = the number of effect sizes; B = the mean estimate of the Fisher-z-transformed corrected population correlation for the
effect sizes cumulated; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; Sig = significant based on p b 0.05.
perspective; findings caution that succession does not appear to lead to long-term performance gains. Further, while strategic
change from an adaptation perspective is thought to be beneficial, we find that the mediating effects of strategic change on
the relationship between succession and performance are consistently negative for outside successors leading to poor long-
term performance. We find that inside successors can increase long-term performance through few strategic changes; thus, the
adaptation perspective associating strategic change with long-term performance gains is not borne out by the evidence. The find-
ings suggest that greater strategic change may yield more disruptive costs than adaptive benefits.
Through aggregating and analyzing the results of 60 studies, the findings inform debate on new CEO origin and performance
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Giambatista et al., 2005; Karaevli, 2007). Inside CEOs ‘disrupt’ to a lesser extent by undertaking fewer
Fig. 2. Standardized path relationships among study variables (partial mediation model).
Fig. 3. Standardized path relationships among study variables (full mediation model).
strategic changes and the ‘adaptation’ gains yielded by outside CEOs, through the strategic changes they make, do not improve
performance. The negative association between outsider succession and performance, mediated fully by strategic change, is in
line with findings in Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2016). For outside CEOs, in influencing performance through strategic change,
“tension within the top management team, [and hostility] toward the outside successor” (Shen & Cannella, 2002a; p. 722),
along with limited shared interests and communication challenges (Denis et al. 1997), could lead to disruption costs that exceed
adaptation benefits. Alternatively, results do not suggest that insiders fail to engage in strategic change. It may simply be that on
the job training and a more thorough understanding of the firm and its environment better position insiders to make fewer, yet
more appropriate, changes to re-adapt the firm to its environment, without placing significant strains on the firm. Supporting the
disruption perspective – we find some evidence that inside CEOs positively guide the firm by undertaking few strategic changes
(thereby, lowering disruption) over a long period and the strategic change from an outside CEO leads to low long-term perfor-
mance. Our results do not identify significant direct effects related to forced or unforced departure on subsequent firm perfor-
mance or strategic change.
Related to mitigating disruption or facilitating adaptation, board independence weakens the relationship between forced turn-
over and performance. Independent boards may improve oversight, but may also hinder adaptation or may not mitigate disrup-
tion costs. Related to adaptation, board independence weakens (strengthens) the relationships between inside (outside)
succession and strategic change.
Using MA-SEM, we conducted analyses to address endogeneity related to prior firm performance and CEO succession. Our
analyses suggest that succession is more likely when firms perform poorly and that poorly performing firms are more likely to
utilize forced turnover and hire an outside CEO. Despite this, we find no evidence that pre-succession performance inflates the
relationship with subsequent performance or the relationships we found. In addition, our MA-SEM results show that CEO succes-
sion negatively relates to (short-term) post-succession performance even when controlling for pre-succession performance, and
when exploring subsamples where data was gathered at different points in time.
Limitations
There are four limitations that must be considered in interpreting our findings. First, we find mixed support for moderating
effects, suggesting a need for research to explore relationships across a variety of time periods, competitive conditions, and
Table 4
MA-SEM random effects correlations (inside vs. outside CEO succession).
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Pre-succession performance (r) –

k (N) –
95% CI –
Q –
2. Inside CEO succession (r) 0.09* –
k (N) 33 (10,424) –
95% CI [0.05, 0.12] –
Q 95.65* –
3. Outside CEO succession (r) −0.09* – –
k (N) 36 (11,593) – –
95% CI [−0.12, −0.06] – –
Q 108.38⁎ – –
4. Strategic change (r) −0.07 −0.09⁎ 0.09⁎ –
k (N) 19 (2136) 13 (2444) 14 (2673) –
95% CI [−0.15, 0.01] [−0.16, −0.01] [0.02, 0.16] –
Q 77.55⁎ 50.34⁎ 49.01⁎ –
5. Short-term performance (r) −0.02 0.002 −0.02 0.03 –
k (N) 16 (4966) 15 (5361) 17 (5751) 5 (399) –
95% CI [−0.13, 0.09] [−0.04, 0.04] [−0.06, 0.02] [−0.06, 0.12] –
Q 267.95⁎ 38.41⁎ 40.21⁎ 3.99 –
6. Long-term performance (r) 0.45⁎ 0.08⁎ −0.07 −0.25⁎ – –
k (N) 7 (2260) 8 (2249) 9 (2472) 2 (432) – –
95% CI [0.30, 0.60] [0.001, 0.16] [−0.14, 0.01] [−0.34, −0.15] – –
Q 107.85⁎ 29.92⁎ 33.58⁎ 2.38 – –
7. Organizational size (r) 0.11⁎ 0.09⁎ −0.08⁎ −0.09⁎ 0.03 −0.04 –
k (N) 21 (9646) 32 (10,965) 37 (12,443) 6 (1098) 10 (4178) 4 (811) –
95% CI [0.03, 0.19] [0.05, 0.12] [−0.12, −0.05] [−0.18, −0.002] [−0.04, 0.09] [−0.15, 0.07] –
Q 345.69⁎ 119.19⁎ 134.84⁎ 13.86⁎ 45.07⁎ 9.93⁎ –
Note. k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; r = sample-weighted mean correlation; CI = confidence interval; Q = homogeneity statistic of r.
⁎ p b 0.05.
strategic contexts. We suggest some means by which this could be done in the following section. Second, our results show that
CEO succession has differential effects on performance across timeframes, suggesting that the relationship between CEO succes-
sion and change in performance may be curvilinear. We could not test a curvilinear relationship because not all studies in the
meta-analysis reported both short- and long-term performance outcomes.14 We call on future studies to explore the potential
for curvilinear effects of CEO succession on firm performance over time. Third, some hypothesis tests are based on small sample
sizes (e.g., two to five studies). Future research could test our hypotheses using data with larger sample sizes and in more recent
timeframes.
Theoretical considerations for future research
Strategic management scholars have used meta-analysis to synthesize divergent theoretical perspectives and/or mixed findings
on a variety of topics (e.g., Crook et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 1998; Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin,
2004; Vanneste, Puranam, & Kretschmer, 2014). We believe that the current meta-analysis adds to this literature and provides
additional venues for future research. Based on our results, and continuing from Yang (2002), we discuss seven areas of theoret-
ical import in moving CEO succession research forward.
First, our findings provide broad support for disruption theories of CEO succession that are consistent with Shen and Cannella's
(2002a) findings on the effects of inside successors following dismissal. Research examining two similar firms who take different
paths (one that experiences a CEO turnover and one that does not) and the subsequent effects of such decisions may yield addi-
tional insights into disruption theories of CEO succession.
Second, our results reflect a positive relationship between inside CEO succession and long-term performance and a negative
relationship between outside CEO succession and long-term performance. Research has begun to examine types of inside CEOs
and their relationship to performance (e.g. Shen & Cannella, 2002a; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). However, a better understanding
of the processes through which inside CEOs are selected and groomed is necessary. Getting “behind the veil” on such processes is
crucial. From the disruption perspective, an heir apparent may impose lower short-term costs and yield benefits through on the
job training; however, these benefits could also dissipate over time.
Our understanding of the influence of outsiders is also relatively limited. Karaevli (2007) suggests that outsiderness is a con-
tinuum based on an executive's tenure in both the firm and the industry. Successors who come from very different industries are
likely to be less committed to traditional strategic actions, and may be more committed to engaging in more variegated and
14
We thank the Associate Editor for this suggestion.
Table 5
WLS regression results of board independence on the relationship between CEO succession and strategic change.
Moderating effect of board independence

Constant 2 0.09 0.21 0.00 0.42 0.67 −0.32, 0.50 1.00 Non-sig
Board independence (overall) −0.03 0.38 −1.00 −0.07 0.94 −0.77, 0.72
Moderating effect of board independence (inside/outside)

H3a. Constant 4 1.32 0.57 0.00 2.32 0.02 0.21, 2.44 0.52 Sig
Board independence (inside) −1.96 0.79 −0.72 −2.48 0.01 −3.52, −0.41
H3a. Constant 6 −1.23 0.53 0.00 −2.34 0.02 −2.27, −0.20 0.51 Sig
Board independence (outside) 1.85 0.73 0.72 2.52 0.01 0.41, 3.29
Moderating effect of board independence (forced/unforced)

H3c. Constant 3 0.09 0.60 0.00 0.16 0.87 −1.07, 1.26 0.00 Non-sig
Board independence (forced) −0.04 0.84 −0.01 −0.04 0.97 −1.68, 1.61
H3c. Constant 3 −0.09 0.60 0.00 −0.16 0.87 −1.26, 1.07 0.00 Non-sig
Board independence (unforced) 0.04 0.84 0.01 0.04 0.97 −1.61, 1.68
grandiose strategic changes than successors who come from similar industries. However, such changes may not yield better per-
formance. These arguments suggest that outsiders may only be beneficial when firm survival is at risk or when drastic change is
necessary.
Third, our results suggest that forced turnover has little effect on performance. This might be due to several reasons. In practice
this distinction may not be clear cut as forced turnover events are difficult to identify (e.g. Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001; Shen &
Cannella, 2002a). Furthermore, the board controls the timing of voluntary turnover events and can work with the CEO to develop
succession plans. The timing of turnover may be an important consideration to manage stakeholder concerns, as boards can
choose how and when to make such decisions and release such information (Graffin et al., 2011).
Fourth, our results also suggest incorporating corporate governance conditions into an examination of how succession may be
beneficial in tandem with strategic actions. Corporate governance can enhance succession outcomes based on the board's ability
to provide sound advice and monitoring. Shen and Cannella's (2002a) power circulation theory provides evidence that strong gov-
ernance can significantly influence a new successor's impact on the firm. Alternative board compositional attributes may better
support outside CEOs than inside CEOs, such as inside directors with significant firm tenure or a lead director with strong industry
knowledge. Directors serve as an important conduit to important resources, which may be beneficial under certain conditions.
Consideration of configurations among corporate governance mechanisms and incoming CEO characteristics is likely to be an im-
portant research area.
Fifth, despite our findings, research to date has considered the effects we hypothesize as censored by time invariance. That is,
inside CEOs are presumed to always be more successful unless the firm is facing severe difficulties, CEOs will always perform bet-
ter following routine succession, and good governance should improve the effects of these relationships. Despite these arguments,
it is possible that these relationships change over time, such that inside CEOs may become more valuable over time. Organization-
al environments have become more dynamic as organizations have grown in size and complexity. CEO succession researchers
should consider the importance of time both within and across leaders as important contextual conditions relating to a leader's
success, as Quigley and Hambrick (2014) have illustrated that leaders have grown in importance in recent years. We encourage
researchers to continue to explore moderators of relationships which influence the effectiveness of outside and inside CEOs, such
as industry characteristics, firm resources and capabilities, and successor and board human capital.
Sixth, as noted earlier, research remains theoretically fragmented (Giambatista et al., 2005). We believe this fragmentation is
not problematic, but leaves opportunity to integrate existing theory and build new theoretical perspectives. There are significant
opportunities for researchers to understand how boards select CEOs and how the selection process influences subsequent out-
comes. For instance, researchers may work with board members to understand how they identify and evaluate success in a
CEO. Our own discussions with practitioners suggests that even what appear to be minor signals, such as a firm promoting an
executive to the title of “President”, sends strong indications to other firms of the company's evaluation of that executive, increas-
ing the likelihood the chosen executive is courted by another firm.
Seventh, the negative relationship between strategic change and performance not only supports disruption theory, but also has
implications for two areas of strategic management – temporary competitive advantage (D'Aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010;
McGrath, 2013)15 and relative variance in performance explained by a CEO (Quigley & Hambrick, 2014). The limited ability of
CEOs to influence long-term competitive performance through strategic change could vary across contexts. Future research
could further address the role of the environment, strategic tactics and changes and sustainable competitive advantage. Relatedly,
CEOs explain about 10% of the variance in firm performance (Quigley & Hambrick, 2014), however, these studies have seldom
considered time-varying performance implications after succession.
15
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
Table 6
WLS regression results of board independence on the relationship between CEO succession and performance.
Moderating effect of board independence

Constant 4 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.36 0.72 30.28, 0.40 0.75 Non-sig
Board independence (overall) −0.15 0.22 −0.87 −0.67 0.50 −0.59, 0.29
Moderating effect of board independence (inside/outside)

H3b. Constant 9 −0.06 0.07 0.00 −0.79 0.43 −0.20, 0.09 0.07 Non-sig
Board independence (inside) 0.18 0.11 0.26 1.61 0.11 −0.04, 0.41
H3b. Constant 11 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.75 0.45 −0.09, 0.20 0.06 Non-sig
Board independence (outside) −0.17 0.11 −0.25 −1.56 0.12 −0.39, 0.04
Moderating effect of board independence (forced/unforced)

H3d. Constant 4 0.10 0.08 0.00 1.29 0.20 −0.05, 0.26 0.45 Sig
Board independence (forced) −0.36 0.12 −0.67 −2.89 0.00 −0.60, −0.11
H3d. Constant 5 −0.05 0.08 0.00 −0.70 0.48 −0.21, 0.10 0.07 Non-sig
Board independence (unforced) 0.17 0.12 0.26 1.47 0.14 −0.06, 0.40
Additional areas for future research
Building on our theoretical implications, we propose several additional areas for future research. First, firm size could explain
whether a firm hires an inside or outside CEO. Smaller firms may select outside CEOs due to a dearth of internal candidates and
such firms could potentially better manage long-run performance by investing greater resources into developing existing talent or
onboarding new talent earlier to limit the ‘liability of newness’ associated with outside CEOs. Additionally, theory primarily focus-
es on outside CEOs as initiators of change when performance is poor. Our sample and analyses may not fully illustrate this rela-
tionship, as there are likely to be some positive associations between strategic change and firm performance. For instance, outside
CEOs may be beneficial in highly dynamic or high discretion industries where entrenched cognitive orientations of inside CEOs
may be liabilities. Consistent with the adaptation perspective, hiring an outsider can allow the firm to access new cognitive view-
points. In stable environments, outsiders may initiate strategic change which risks future performance. The sample of available
studies for meta-analysis precludes us from testing these relationships.
Second, many studies examining CEO succession outcomes suffer from endogeneity. While some studies control for
endogeneity, advances in statistical methods and our theoretical understanding make such methods more accessible today. Fol-
lowing Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004), future research should continue to employ rigorous methodological designs to iden-
tify the impact of different successor characteristics on firm outcomes across a variety of contexts.
As most firms are family firms (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999), studying CEO succession in family firms is an impor-
tant area for research. An emerging body of research focuses on founder and family firm CEOs (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, &
Cannella, 2007). CEO succession is influenced by two parallel executive labor markets – family relatives and executive labor mar-
kets. In a succession event, a family CEO may have economic and non-economic goals whereas non-family CEOs generally have
economic goals. Family owners also face the dilemma of continuing with a family CEO for maintaining control and continuity ver-
sus bringing in a non-family CEO for external human capital to improve performance. Relatedly, forced turnover of a family CEO
could have different implications for strategic change and performance, and non-family CEOs may be evaluated using a different
set of criteria than family CEOs. As empirical evidence builds, assessing roles of founder identity or filial identities among such
CEOs could further explain effects of succession. The extent of disruption may be greater and adaptation lower in stability-seeking
family firms relative to non-family firms.
Finally, opportunities exist to better capture the inter-temporal benefits related to CEO succession research. For instance, re-
searchers may extend the work of Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, and Gorman (2005) regarding an executive's life cycle in office to un-
derstand long-term outcomes associated with CEO learning curves. Such learning curves are likely to be different across industry
contexts (Henderson et al., 2006). Understanding these effects would give rise to addressing theoretical concerns regarding where
and under what conditions certain successor characteristics may be more valuable than others (Whetten, 1989).
Practical implications
Our results have practical implications for firms. Boards should evaluate the timing and frequency of CEO succession events
and understand that replacing the CEO may not only fail to improve performance but may be detrimental, particularly when hir-
ing an outside CEO. The findings show that inside CEOs should be preferred as they undertake fewer strategic changes and are
able to improve long-term performance. While outside CEOs increase strategic change they do not necessarily improve long-
term performance. The conditions under which CEOs depart (e.g. unforced [retirement or resignation due to personal reasons]
or forced [firing]) do not seem to influence strategic actions of the next CEO or performance of the successor, suggesting the
forced turnover alone should not lead to drastic performance declines or changes for firms.
Due to the relevance of inside CEOs in improving firm performance, firms could consider internal talent development process-
es such as talent acquisition and development to build the executive talent pipeline. Furthermore, independent board members
provide governance benefits, due to their limited inside knowledge. This is especially likely after forced succession, where firm
performance may decline, and independent directors may limit (enable) strategic changes after succession of an inside (outside)
CEO. If boards hire outside CEOs, directors could facilitate rapid integration and familiarization of outside CEOs to lower disruption
costs and provide informational and resource benefits to improve adaptation.
The findings also have implications for TMT composition. Executive search committees must consider TMT composition in
supporting a new CEO. According to Menz (2012), roles, characteristics, and turnover of functional TMT members is critical to
both intermediate strategic actions and performance. Executive search committees should consider complementary roles that
can assist inside CEOs in devising strategies, but also providing enough variegation in the strategic process to reduce the “stale
in the saddle” effects (Miller, 1991). Whether TMT members should be insiders or outsiders is also an important consideration.
Outside TMT members can bring fresh perspective to complement inside CEOs leveraging insider knowledge to increase value.
Similar to CEO succession, TMT succession is an equally important consideration for executive search committees where managing
continuity and change in the TMT could influence the efficacy of inside CEOs. We call on future research to theorize and test the
interface of CEO succession and complementary TMT roles, characteristics, and turnover.
Conclusion
Researchers have long attempted to understand how changes in CEO leadership affect organizations. We integrate the two
dominant theoretical viewpoints for studying CEO succession – disruption and adaptation – which report mixed results regarding
the effects of CEO succession on post-succession outcomes. The results of this meta-analysis primarily support the disruption per-
spective and indicate that CEO succession is negatively related to firm performance, particularly in the short-term. In the long-run,
an outside CEO performs poorly due to significant strategic change and inside CEOs (related to lower disruption) have strong per-
formance, suggesting that an inside CEO's firm-specific knowledge is a source of enhancing long-run performance. Finally, board
independence plays a limited role in influencing performance, and even, negatively affecting performance following forced turn-
over. The results, based on an aggregation of studies, strongly highlight the importance of CEO succession as a disruptive event
given its often negative consequences, and suggest that a stronger understanding of the conditions under which new CEOs can
be successful is needed.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2017.03.001.
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CEO Succession, Strategic Change, and Post-Succession Performance - A Meta-Analysis

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The Leadership Quarterly 28 (2017) 701–720

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

The Leadership Quarterly

CEO succession, strategic change, and post-succession

☆ Note: Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Theoretical development and hypotheses

Fig. 1. A theoretical framework for the consequences of CEO succession.

State of the literature

CEO successor origin

Forced and unforced CEO succession

Coding of key constructs

Short- and long-term performance

Predictor k N r SDr 95% CI 95% CV Q Inference

CEO succession types on strategic change

Predictor k N r SDr 95% CI 95% CV Q Inference

Overall CEO succession on performance

Inside/outside CEO succession on performance

Forced/unforced CEO succession on performance

Endogeneity issues related to pre-succession ﬁrm performance

Predictor k B SE B β Z p 95% CI R2 Inference

Moderating effect of succession-performance time gap

Moderating effect of time gap of succession-performance (inside/outside)

Moderating effect of time gap of succession-performance (forced/unforced)

1. Pre-succession performance (r) –

Theoretical considerations for future research

Predictor k B SE B β Z p 95% CI R2 Inference

Moderating effect of board independence

Moderating effect of board independence (inside/outside)

Moderating effect of board independence (forced/unforced)

Predictor k B SE B β Z p 95% CI R2 Inference

Moderating effect of board independence

Moderating effect of board independence (inside/outside)

Moderating effect of board independence (forced/unforced)

Additional areas for future research

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2017.03.001.

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