| Does ORIGINAL PTA. 25! cS America — Need a HENRY ‘prelg é ? KISSINGER oy SP PPPS OS OO OS©OSSSopoooesoooe Toward a ] AULA) Diplomacy for the 21st Century | | | | a \SEVEN eoeocooooe Peace and Justice Pewee of the proposition that certain are deemed enforceable, either by the Uni treme situations, by @ group of states Kosovo). Moreover, such international c demning genocide, torture, or war crimes, are said to be enforce- able by national judges who increasingly claim the right to demand extradition of alleged violators into their own jurisdictions. Inaddi- tion, an International Crimi being created that, when ratified by sixty nations, ceoutor with the power to start investigations of alleged violations of international law at the request of any signatory state and, when backed by three of the eighteen judges, to bring indictments against any suspected transgressor anywhere in the world (including inst citizens of nations which have refused to accept the ICC in). These innovations reflect the new conventional wis- according to which traditional principles of sovereignty atid mninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries are the principal obstacles to the universal rule of peace and justice. i ie 235. These views, treated as commonplace in American and much of contemporary West European public discourse—though far less so developing world—amount to revolution in the way the in- ternational system has operated for more than three hundred years. ‘They also represent the widespread acceptance of ideas which, tun dhe Ise decade of the Cali War, ind been held almost foreseeable consequences ‘America encountered when it en- be dated fairly precisely: it was cre- ated by the Treaty of West signed in 1648 to mark the end of the Thirty Years? War. That war had ies roots in the Reforma which split what had heretofore Church and challenged the auton palities used the opportunity to st a asserting control over the religious allegiance of their Catholic set about restricting the power of the Church to defi reach of political authority. Whether the various rulers opted for Catholic orthodoxy or Protestant reform, a century of war followed—a mixture of civ ‘war, international conflict, and religious crusade. The Holy Roman Emperor, « Habsburg situated in Vienna, fought to reimpose the Catholic Church throughout Central Europ of France, though Catholic, allied themselves princes of northern Burope to resist che emergence of a potenti hegemonic Austria. Whatever the motives, the war was conducted in the name-of religion, disregarding frontiers. Entire populations were obliged to change their faiths on the basis of whatever army triumphed on the battlefield (with the additional modern Realpol- ik wist that Catholic France sided with Protestant allies to weaken g the sphere of Catholic rule in Germany) power polities endowed the conduct of the war236 Hemy Kissinger with unprecedented ferocity. As noted earlier, by some estimates, reflected a general determination to pucan end to carnage once and forall, Its basic purpose (in modern terms) was to stop the merging of domestic and foreign policy or Gin 9f faith and diplomacy. All signatories confirmed the principle cujus regio, gus religio—whoever rules de- tormines the religion of his subjects, No other country hed 2 right to intervene in this process. Thus was born the concept of nonin- terference in the domestic affairs of other states, and it was devel- oped for precisely the opposite reason itis being discarded today. Ie ‘was the human rights slogan of the period; restoring peace and tranquillity was its purpose, not legitimizing domestic op Since the divide between Cathol prevent rulers of one faith from inciting uprisings of t gionists ruled by a prince of a different faith. W benign government. On the whol agglomeration of n the domestic affairs of other countries became one of the key- stones, together with the notions of sovereignty and international law regulating the conduct of states in their relations with each other. This did not prevent wars, but Indeed, in the twentieth century, one of the d isms oF i of Communism—was that they of international order by under- isting governments through radical movernents and par- led from abroad—in other words, through a return to the ethos of the religious wars. cernational system based on the Treaty of Westphalia had an answer for the problem of violence between states—that is, re~ Dues America Need a Foreign Pulig? 237 course to war—but it offered no solution to violence arising from civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and the entire ‘what are today called human problem of peace and left justice to the domestic institutions. The contemporary human rights activists are arguing the opposit their view, peace flows automatically from justice, and the nation- state, or pethaps any state, cannot be relied on to deliver justi ‘must be put under some kind of supranational authority entitled to ase force to make its writ ron: On the whole, the human rights ac- tivists trust jurists more than they do stat ‘Westphalian principles trust statesm n. The advocates of wore than jurists. ICAN TRADITION id States was one of the most vociferous crities of the subversive never ful the Europe and France, gener cendant but without ever con the injunction of Alexander F interest” required Americans to modi , tying themselves to nobody:! In a st that could as easily have originated in the theory: ‘tthe powers of Europe may beso poised and counterpoised among themselves that ccutity may require the presence ofall their forcesathome leaving the other parts of the world in undisturbed trang Bateven in this Ha icy resembled that of the European powers in many respe justification for itwas quite different: Americans then as now viewed their nation as motivated by principles higher than those of the Old ‘World, which they imagined reflected the basically selfish aspira-