Sparta claimed that it sought to free the Greek World.

To what extent did this claim reflect the Spartan policy

during the Peloponnesian War 431-404
After the crisis of the Persian Wars, Athens and Sparta had spawned great abhorrence against each other, cumulating in the
Peloponnesian War in 431. Traditionally, Sparta always saw its self as the mortal compass and the liberator of Greece
throughout the Archaic era by acting as remedy against tyrannical powers and progressive political endeavours. With the
Athenian empire embodying the concept of arete “always to be best,” saw its opportunist expansion across the Aegean
causing peril to the Delian League allies. Sparta took this as a sign to “free the Greeks” and sought to fulfil the Spartan
standard. However, the hypocrisy of the Spartans came about due the mainstream myth of the “Spartan mirage” [Ollie] that
the ‘liberator’ of Greece was busy practicing helotry and ultimately, the moral corruption embodied by Lysander’s narcissism.
Hence the Spartan claim that it sought to free the Greek world was in reality nugatory.
The tyrannical nature of Athenian hegemony over the Delian league validated the Spartan claim that they sought to liberate
the Greek world. After the expulsion of the Persians [480-479], the Hellenic League quickly became an empire as the victories
at Salamis and Platea saw an “undeniable boost to Athenian self-confidence” [Martin]. Although this Delian League was
created as a method for the Greeks to protect themselves from the Persians, it soon became a vessel for the Athenians to
advance their political agenda and this would expose the “dark underside of democratic achievement” [Cartledge]. At the
crux of Pericles’ “trireme diplomacy” [Hughes] the foreign policies expressed by their thirst for wealth, land and ultimate
hegemony purposefully engendered fear within Greece and especially Sparta - breaking Greece’s autonomia. Sparta’s right
to feel concerned for their allies was seen predominantly by the 9-month revolt of Samos [439 BC]. It saw Pericles’ sending
of a large fleet to Samos whereby he shifty placed a garrison on the island, took hostages and replaced the Samian oligarchy
with “a puppet democratic government” [Xenophon]. And following this, orders declared the crucifixion of ship captains
and marines. The combination of these actions was a clear inflammatory to Sparta, which was also conducted by its
innervating aggression towards Corcyra to switch sides. This proxy war would continue against Athens’ rival Corinth, ending
in the Megarian Decree [432]. However, the Spartans seemingly did not want immediate conflict and wanted the Athenians
to revoke their oppressive decree over their fellow Greeks, as Thucydides states “the Spartans wanted peace, and there will
be peace if you give the Greeks their autonomy”. Thus, the Spartans presented an ultimatum to the Athenians that amounted
to the dissolution of their tyrannical empire, otherwise there would be inevitable conflict. This “flimsy pretext” [Hughes]
saw Sparta’s assertion that it sought to free the Greek world from tyranny can be jusfied due to Athenian philosophy that
“the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must”, legitimizing its brutal tactics.
The Spartan paradigm that it could free the Greeks from Athens, was fundamentally flawed due it its own constitution. In
order to abolish vertical stasis, ironically, Sparta had “internally colonized Messenia” [McInerney] and had become a
“garrison state [Esman], enslaving an entire population, who ultimately have the ability to “eat the Spartans raw” [Xenophon]
if they revolted. However, in enslaving a population that outnumbered their elite almost twenty to one, the Spartiates would
be “forever on their guard” [Ryan]. It was this fear of revolt that the semidivine reformer Lycurgus was driven to creating a
rigid “Spartan policy [that] is mainly governed by the necessity of taking precautions against the helot” [Thucydides]. The
main function of these people was to work the kleros [land] and perform other domestic tasks deemed below the common
citizen meaning they “made the militarised way of life both possible and necessary” [Ryan]. Due to the unique system of
training in the agoge to become a citizen, Spartan numbers were often small meaning that “Sparta existed upon a volcano”
[H. Michel]. As a result, Sparta, under the guidance of the ephors, would declare war against the helots every year undertaking
mass culls in which helots would be killed indiscriminately. As part of a Spartiate’s training, the secret religious police known
as the krypteia was installed to kill any helot that came into sight at night in order to instil fear into them to never revolt. In
continuation, this paranoia would inspire a sense of conservatism in the Spartans that would characterise Sparta throughout
the Peloponnesian Wars as they would be too reluctant to travel far from Sparta for fear that they’d leave their homeland
defenceless to revolt, Due to this, they were often on the sidelines during the wars before 431. These fears would be realised
in 464 through the Thasian War which would see the near collapse of the Spartan state after a devasting earthquake.
Therefore, the hypocrisy of the Spartans in the practice of helotry at the expense of their fellow Greeks would ultimately
contradict their claim that they ‘sought to free the Greeks’.
The scandalous actions of the Lacedaemon navarch Lysander throughout the Peloponnesian War shows the deterioration
of Spartan identity claiming to ‘free the Greeks’ to one of immorality and selfishness. Lysander’s rise to power among the
Spartan ranks would question the standards and values of Sparta’s conservative system, as he had ‘begun to build his own
private empire’ [Kennell]. Inherently a ‘mothax’ (a poor childhood) the fact that the Spartans would allow for such a character
to command their troops is a sign in its self of their loss of tradition and ultimately, their weakening power. Lysander would
barter the Ionian Greek’s freedom to give the upper hand against Athens, but to the Spartans he “disguised most of his
actions in war with deceit” [Thucydides]. These tactics would prove effective at the final battle of Aegospotami [405] in
which serve as his defining achievement and would paint him as a hero, by having his “hand... around Athens’ throat”
[Kennell]. And yet, it was his deceptiveness behind his matristic fame of heroism is indictive by entreating the help of Hellas’
sworn enemy – Persia. Due to this, Lysander would be indicative of the loss of Laconain morals and ideals present in Sparta
up to its defeat against Thebes. This dishonesty plagued Lysander’s political and military career, as Plutarch would state he
would "cheat boys with dice, but men with oaths. His hubristic and narcissistic corruption is shown by the discovery of his
speech which speaks of proposing elected kingship on Sparta to change their Archaic traditional laws of Lycurgus. Lysander’s
blasphemous deeds in ignoring Spartan laws and viewing himself as above others is emphasised by his position on the island
of Samos in which “he was worshipped as a god” [Cartwright]. Thus, the arrogance and deceitfulness of elected leader
Lysander is representative of Sparta’s prioritisation of self-preservation over any desire to ‘free the Greeks’
As a consequence of the wars, “the Athenians were stripped of their Aegean Empire- which the Spartans were quick to try
and takeover themselves’ (Cartledge) in order to finally reclaim their rightful position as the hegemon of Hellas. Thinking
they had freed the Greek world, they themselves became as benevolent as the Athenians, due to their hypocritical and selfish
intentions by the greed of its leaders.