The same rule was applied in People vs. Julito Franco, G.R. No.

118607, March 4, 1997. The Supreme Court acquitted a man accused

of robbery with homicide because they found that the evidence
against him was only hearsay:
From the records, it appears that not a single person witnessed the
incident. In fact, aside from the testimony of police investigator Pat.
Nestor Napao-it, none of the other three prosecution witnesses, to wit:
(1) Angelo Tongko — a Dunkin’ Donut employee who testified to have
found the body of Aurelio Cuya inside the supervisor’s room of the
establishment in the early morning of August 9, 1991, (2) Dr. Marcial
Cenido — the physician who autopsied the body of Aurelio Cuya, and
who testified on the cause of the latter’s death; and (3) Teresita Cuya
— the wife of Aurelio Cuya who testified on the civil aspect of the
case, ever imputed, directly or indirectly, to the appellant the
commission of the crime. With respect to the testimony of Pat. Nestor
Napao-it, there is no dispute that his testimony on the conduct of the
investigationis admissible in evidence because he has personal
knowledge of the same. However, his testimony on appellant’s alleged
separate confession/admission to Hilda Dolera and Maribel Diong,
which the trial court invariably considered in its decision as
establishing the truth of the facts asserted therein, is hearsay. In the
terse language of Woodroffes, said testimony is “the evidence not of
what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others”
And whether objected to or not, as in this case, said testimony has no
probative value. To repeat, the failure of the defense to object to the
presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay, does not give
such evidence any probative value.
One of the reasons that hearsay is inadmissible and not given weight
is that it denies the other side, as well as the Court, the opportunity to
examine and vet the real source of knowledge.