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PLAIR Notes - Revision Checklist 7-9
PLAIR Notes - Revision Checklist 7-9
What is the significance of R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
and Keyu and others v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
and another?
Can Minister’s power to establish/not to establish inquiry be challenged through judicial
review?
R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 51:
o Family successfully challenged through judicial review decision of Home Secretary not to
hold inquiry on death of their relative who was murdered while in legal custody; Court
relied on ECHR Art.2 right to life to find that there was obligation to investigate death of
petitioner’s relative as it was “in public interest” to do so
o Established that decision of Minister not to establish inquiry can be challenged through
judicial review – but only in some circumstances; this was exceptional, fact-specific case;
not all governmental refusals to hold an inquiry can be successfully challenged through
judicial review
Keyu and others v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another [2015]
UKSC 69: Demonstrated that decision not to establish inquiry under Inquiries Act 2005 s1 wasn’t
open to challenge on common law grounds [i.e. judicial review principles]
o Involved deaths at hands of UK state in 1978; lapse of time meant that ECHR Art. 2
couldn’t apply; thus, they brought challenge on grounds that decision was irrational and
disproportionate; majority said it wasn’t unreasonable – but Lady Hale strongly dissented
Lord Neuberger: “The respondents clearly considered the request for an inquiry
seriously and rejected it for reasons which are individually defensible and relevant,
and which cumulatively render it impossible to characterise their conclusion as
unreasonable, let alone irrational”.
Lady Hale dissenting: Decision was unreasonable; respondents didn’t consider
public interest in properly inquiring into event of this magnitude, private interests of
relatives and survivors in knowing truth and importance of setting record straight
When was the ECHR drafted? When did it come into force? When was it ratified
by the UK? Who can petition the ECHR? What are some of the admissibility criteria
for the Strasbourg Court?
ECHR was drafted/signed by UK in 1950, ratified in 1951 and came into force in 1953
Court accepts petitions from individuals, NGOs, groups and other States
Admissibility criteria
o Petitioner must have victim status – must qualify as being victim, i.e. SP has enacted law
violating Convention rights that directly affects them
o Petitioner must have exhausted all domestic remedies
What is the role of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe? How are
judges elected? How do they serve?
Court can’t strike down primary or secondary legislation of a contracting party; can only declare
that there has been violation of rights; ECHR Art.46 provides that decisions of European Court
of Human Rights are binding on state which must then take action to remedy situation
Committee of Ministers: body of Council of Europe which supervises execution of European
Court of Human Rights’ judgments – ensures that member states comply with European Court
of Human Rights’ judgments
o Made up of ministers of foreign affairs of different member states of council of Europe
There are 5 sections of Court [of 7 judges] and Grand Chamber [of 17 judges]; as general rule,
initially case goes to one of chambers but if case is seen as raising issue of notable importance
chamber can relinquish jurisdiction and send it directly to Grand Chamber
ECHR Art.30: Where case raises serious question affecting interpretation of Convention or
where resolution of question might have result inconsistent with judgment previously delivered
by Court, Chamber may relinquish jurisdiction in favour of Grand Chamber
ECHR Art.43: After chamber has reached decision, there is period of 3 months during which one
of parties [either state/individual] can request for this decision to be referred to Grand Chamber
but these requests are very rarely successful and only succeed when there is big split on
judgment
Judges
o Serve non-renewable 9-year term; there is one judge for every state party to ECHR [47
judges in total]
o When position is vacated state nominates 3 individuals and Parliamentary Assembly of
CoE elects judge; rules now state that at least one of them must be woman
o Current UK judge is Tim Iecke
o National judge is always part of Chamber examining application against her home state
because it is considered useful to have someone who has good knowledge of law of that
state
o Judges, however, don’t serve as state representatives/defender of state interests, but
instead serve in their individual capacity – they must be completely impartial; if judge can’t
sit because of some connections to case ad hoc judges [certain judges from UKSC] could
be called in just to sit in Chamber for specific case
What was the role of Convention rights in Scotland before the Human Rights Act
1998?
UK is dualist state in relation to international law – if UK signs up to international treaty, it is
bound by that treaty in international law but provisions of that treaty don’t become part of
domestic law until act from UK Parliament provides that they do; thus, before HRA 1998 was
enacted individuals couldn’t bring human rights claims to UK courts under convention; they had
to use judicial review and grounds for judicial review; if that failed, they could go to European
Court of Human Rights and bring their case against UK and bring out full set of human rights
arguments
There was however some slow development in relation to use/consideration by UK courts
leading up to HRA 1998
o Kaur v. Lord Advocate (1980): ECHR couldn’t be referred to even as aid to interpretation
of statute
o R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind (1991): Where there is
statutory ambiguity, interpretation compatible with Convention should be preferred
because this is presumably what Parliament wanted
Developments came a bit slower in Scotland
o In Anderson v HM Advocate (1996), HoL observed that ECHR reflected principles that
have long been part of Scots law; HoL was prepared to use ECHR as aid to interpretation
in Scottish cases; however, since Anderson didn’t involve question of statutory ambiguity,
it wasn’t clear if decision had brought Scots law in line with English law as established in
Brind
o T, Petitioner (1997): Equivalent case to Brind for Scotland