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Communications Bill in 2002 – and in

the European Union, with some refer-


Media Ownership ences to Council of Europe initiatives)
written by Gillian Doyle and analysis of the goals of media own-
ership regulation – pluralism and di-
versity (though not of national owner-
ship) – and of the economics of the
media. Doyle argues (echoing themes
reviewed by Richard Collins
in the author’s “Understanding Media
Economics” 2002) that the economic
characteristics of the media engender
concentrated ownership. And, because
Gillian Doyle’s timely book on media However, Doyle seeks to persuade us concentrated ownership is likely to be
ownership regulation addresses a con- that ownership still requires regula- hostile to achievement of public policy
temporary policy issue of high sa- tion. Although, curiously, she gives goals, ownership regulation is re-
lience. Ownership regulation is under little attention to one important and quired. Doyle usefully teases out many
review in several jurisdictions: for ex- widely generalised form of ownership of the key economic relationships that
ample in Australia, Canada, the UK regulation – national ownership regu- must be understood to assess whether
and, as Doyle reminds us, the European lation. For her it’s concentration of regulation is required and, if so, what
Union dossier remains open. Why be ownership that’s important: the intrin- sort of regulation promises to be effec-
concerned about ownership and why sic economic characteristics of the me- tive.
the contemporary salience of the issue? dia mean that “Curbs on ownership ....
Doyle provides clear answers to these Are indispensable safeguards for plu- The author considers three types of
questions. First, media ownership mat- ralism and democracy” (p. 179). The media concentration – horizontal
ters because of the importance of the core of her argument is that the inher- (common ownership of several firms/
media in political and public life – ent high returns to economies of scale, products in the same market), vertical
ownership of media enterprises con- (high first copy, low second and subse- (along the supply chain for a single
fers power denied to owners of other quent copy costs in print and the very product) and diagonal (cross media
types of enterprise. Citing a character- low marginal costs of additional units ownership). All may arise out of own-
istically pithy comment from the “Fi- of consumption – an extra viewer/lis- ers’ desire to maximise market power
nancial Times” Doyle goes to the heart tener or extra minute of viewing/listen- (whether for economic or political rea-
of the issue “without his newspaper ing – in broadcasting), means that sons or both) and each has, for Doyle,
he’s just another millionaire, With it, there is an inherent tendency towards differing levels of potential economic
he can knock on the door of 10 Down- concentration in media markets. This efficiency. Horizontal concentration
ing Street” [the UK Prime Minister’s tendency is reinforced by other charac- clearly fits Doyle’s argument from
residence] (p. 7). And the more concen- teristics of the media and communica- economies of scale and poses particu-
trated the media the greater the power. tions sectors. Notably by potential lar regulatory problems, because regu-
Second, media ownership is under re- economies of scope (particularly in text lating against concentrated ownership
view because new media and new me- based media); the importance of cross may be regulating against economic ef-
dia technologies have seemed to re- platform promotion (eg plugs for list- ficiency. Vertical concentration is an
shape markets and, perhaps, have ings journals on broadcast television); internalisation of functions within the
dispersed and diffused the power me- and the power to lever power in one firm that could, potentially, be
dia ownership confers. In many mar- market into neighbouring markets (eg, outsourced. This, for Doyle, poses a dif-
kets, more television channels are control of gateway facilities into con- ferent type of problem though I think
available than ever before, entry barri- tent distribution) which f lows from she does not consider sufficiently the
ers have fallen (not just because of tech- vertical integration. potential for this different type of prob-
www.mediajournal.org

nological change but also because of lem (potential for anti-competitive


liberalisation) and the Internet both “Media Ownership” is organised behaviour, levering power in one mar-
disintermediates, enabling consumers around two themes. Narratives of the ket area of the supply chain into an-
to access primary sources across the evolution of media ownership regula- other) to be addressed by a different
world, and also integrates markets that tion in two jurisdictions (the UK dur- kind of regulation – behavioural com-
hitherto were clearly separated – eg ra- ing the 1990s – ie ending before publi- petition regulation rather than ex ante
dio on the web. cation of the Government’s Draft structural regulation. Generally, the

© 2002 – JMM – The International Journal on Media Management – Vol. 4 – No. 4 289
author prefers strong ex ante controls and follows the definition of the field Rating
to ex post competition regulation but, of earlier legislators and commenta-
particularly in the case of vertical own- tors. Her discussion, glancing refer- Rating Criteria Rating
ership concentration, it’s not clear ences aside, focuses on ex ante regula-
Theoretical Approach / Methodology +++
why. Diagonal concentration poten- tion of private firms. This leaves out
tially realises economies of scope but the possible problems posed by public Structure ++++
Doyle is sceptical of whether such sector firms (the BBC, to name one case
Depth of the Analysis +++
economies are real. She offers alterna- in point, has 53% of the UK radio and
tive explanations, notably management 38% of the UK TV market) and of copy- Contribution of new Knowledge +++
hubris and risk spreading, of diagonal right (monopoly rights in content – an
Applicability ++ +
concentration and her reasoning con- area of growing importance in the
vinces in the main case, UK newspaper/ media value chain). Likewise, Doyle Clarity and Style of Writing ++++
broadcasting cross ownership, she con- does not fully develop, in her discus-
Rating Points: excellent: +++++ poor: +
siders. But she does not explain why sion of solutions, the role of competi-
risk spreading should be confined to tion law, (which not all will agree is
the media sector nor the extent to “less likely to achieve consistency and
which diagonal concentration (eg in equality than clearly drawn media and Sage, London, 2002
the UK) has been attractive because of cross media ownership limits” p. 113)
market structures created by regula- of subsidies and professional/editorial ISBN 0-07619-6680-3/0-07619-6681-1 (pbk)
tion. codes.

In considering remedies, Doyle rec- However, as Doyle rightly observes,


ognises that market size matters a lot. ownership regulation is a research lite Review Author
There is an obvious difficulty to devis- zone. There are too few empirical stud-
ing effective and appropriate EU regu- ies and the author tellingly observes Richard Collins
lation when the disparity in size of that UK policy is “characterised from Open University, U.K.
Member States’ national markets is so beginning to end by lack of proper in- r.e.collins@open.ac.uk
large (p. 161). But she’s almost silent on formation gathering or analysis” (p.
the intractable problems of defining 107). Doyle’s “Media Ownership” cer-
markets and deciding which media tainly cannot be so accused and the
should be included (and whether they author provides some illuminating
all count equally) when ownership quotes from her, unidentified, UK
regulation is to be considered. How- sources. This contribution to research
ever, the author makes clear that mar- and the clarity of Gillian Doyle’s writ-
ket structure, as well as market size, ing make “Media Ownership” a good
counts and acknowledges that large, introduction to some central aspects of
concentrated, firms may make for media regulation which will suit well
product diversity (maximising returns MBA and good undergraduate stu-
by supplying several markets through dents.
differentiated products) whereas a
market supplied by firms of diverse
ownership may display less product
diversity (the Hotelling effect). Though,
because the author is clear that her
preferences lie with diversified owner-
ship, this trade off is not as fully con-
www.mediajournal.org

sidered as some readers would like. It


is, of course, a notorious failing of re-
viewers to point to aspects of a subject
they would have considered but which
the author has not. But it’s perhaps
worth observing that Doyle constructs
her discussion rather conventionally

290 © 2002 – JMM – The International Journal on Media Management – Vol. 4 – No. 4

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