latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they
were returned for the
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in
Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court
under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been clearly
illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public
respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have
complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while
he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment
to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation,
approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred
to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp.
40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds
to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management
Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing
and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and
provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to
thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to
P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal
level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however,
unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the
same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall
deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful
performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of Lease,
subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS
Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the
option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to
petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner,
delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez
not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks
dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the
four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on
the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank
Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September
15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of
P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who
advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the
reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was
convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg.
22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-
35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid.,
pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is
intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the
petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit"
equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of
Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing
scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service equipment, which was arranged at the
instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made
by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have
been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the
lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which
should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but
remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor
(Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business
failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his
own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the
least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation
officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were turned
over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This
fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically
requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty
deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful
legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the
name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same
time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus
operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection
from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey
to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim
off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the
law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law
in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism
and opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease
agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-
arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said
amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that after the
termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by
petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the
nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the
system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective
of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with
some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of
society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of
punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in
the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng
amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in
order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised
Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral
disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is
inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the
moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral
disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing
People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and
Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the
objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as
this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in
question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation
could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the open
admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of
doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to complainant had been
extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement — by the terms of which the warranty deposit
advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee — and that as the lessor L.S. Finance
neither made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed that
the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even if true, do not change the
fact, admitted by appellant and established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally issued on
account or for value. And as We have already observed, in order that there may be a conviction under the
from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to the element of said offense that the check
should have been made and issued on account or for value — it is sufficient, all the other elements of the
offense being present, that the check must have been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks, of the
obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at bar
beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that there
was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced
any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the warranty deposit
must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even
expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged.
But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already been taken back by
Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides being personally
interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value of the
accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the
checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty deposit
is evident from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a
special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases of
mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not
being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy
and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said
offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e.,
whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required under Section 1 of B.P.
Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for
which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have been
committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as they
are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p.
1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose: —
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods
are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some contract,
to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that
extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to intrust
to the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be withdrawn at
the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the
credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and generally
understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable on demand and for which
certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a
fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner
never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter
of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner
was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to
all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S.
Finance Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime charged.

G.R. No. 193169, April 06, 2015
ROGELIO ROQUE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an Information
that reads as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2001, in the municipality of Pandi, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and shoot with a gun
complain[an]t Reynaldo Marquez, hitting the latter on his right ear and nape, and kick[ing] him on the
face and back, causing serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said
Reynaldo Marquez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will, that is[,] by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Reynaldo Marquez which
prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded “not guilty.” During the pre-trial conference, the
defense admitted the identity of petitioner; that he is a Kagawad of Barangay Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan;
and that the day of the incident, November 22, 2001 was the Thanksgiving Day of the said
barangay. Trial thereafter ensued where the parties presented their respective versions of the incident.
The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and
Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi,
Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz (dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join them. At that instant,
petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that Rodolfo’s shout was directed at
him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo apologized for the misunderstanding
but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would
happen to them if they continue to perturb him.
Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to ask for assistance in
settling the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was fetched by
dela Cruz and brought to the house of Tayao. But since Tayao was then no longer around, Reynaldo just
proceeded to petitioner’s house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon arriving
at petitioner’s residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but the latter did not reply. Instead,
petitioner entered the house and when he came out, he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired
at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being
hit in the nape. Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the face and back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao
for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those around not to get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo’s
parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency medical treatment. He was later transferred
to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila where he was operated on and confined for three weeks. Dr.
Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a medical certificate stating that a bullet entered the base of
Reynaldo’s skull and exited at the back of his right ear.
Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that on November 22, 2001, petitioner went to
the house of Bella on board a tricycle to fetch his child. While driving, he was cursed by brothers
Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner ignored the two and just went
home. Later, however, the brothers appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives against
him. Petitioner’s brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed to leave but not without
threatening that they would return to kill him. Petitioner thus asked someone to call Tayao. Not long
after, the brothers came back, entered petitioner’s yard, and challenged him to a gun duel. Petitioner
requested Tayao to stop and pacify them but Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his
gun. Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice.
On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84, rendered its
Decision2 finding petitioner guilty as charged, viz:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years [of] prision
correccional, as minimum[;] to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium [period], as maximum.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order 4 dated August 16, 2007.
Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision 5 dated February 27, 2009,
the CA affirmed in full the RTC’s Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration7 thereto was likewise denied in a Resolution8 dated July 30, 2010.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari9 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner
imputes upon the CA the following errors:
I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY PROVEN SINCE THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY SHOWN THAT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WAS INDEED ARMED WITH A GUN.
II
III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT GRANTING FOR THE BENEFIT OF
ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, PETITIONER
WAS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED IN FIRING AT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
FOR THE SECOND TIME.
IV
V THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSULY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT INTENT TO KILL ON THE PART OF
PETITIONER WAS PRESENT CONSIDERING: (A) THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO GUNSHOT WOUNDS, AND (B) THE PETITIONER
PREVENTED BARANGAY OFFICIALS FROM INTERVENING AND HELPING OUT
THE WOUNDED PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.10
Our Ruling
The Petition must be denied.
The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to “appreciation of evidence” or factual errors which
are not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court had already
explained in Batistis v. People11 that:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a
decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly
so provides, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals,
the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court
averified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must
be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in
the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Petitioner’s assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and re-examination of the evidence, are
evidentiary and factual in nature.12 The Petition must therefore be denied on this basis because “one, the
petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court,
not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken,
absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached
by the court of origin,”13 which was not shown to be the case here.
reason thereof, Reynaldo is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Aside from this,
he is also entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00. These awards of damages are in accordance with
settled jurisprudence.20 An interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum must also be imposed on the
awarded damages to commence from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 21
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 31084 affirming in its entirety the March 12, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84 in Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002 convicting petitioner Rogelio
Roque of the crime of frustrated homicide, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner
is ordered to pay the victim Reynaldo Marquez moral damages and temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000,00 each, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Resolution until fully paid.

Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are accorded high
respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA, 14 as in this case. After all, the RTC “had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth.”15 “To [thus]
accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court’s findings of fact, [the
Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of fact of the RTC, particularly after their affirmance by the CA”16
as petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance which merits a departure
from the said doctrine.17

In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s ruling that petitioner is guilty of
frustrated homicide and not merely of less serious physical injuries as the latter insists. As aptly stated by
the CA:

In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the victim. If there is no
intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for physical injuries only. Vice-versa, regardless of
whether the victim only suffered injuries that would have healed in nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is
sufficiently borne out, the crime committed is frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-266).

Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the parts of the
victim’s body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly
weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter’s abdomen, the intent to kill can be presumed
(Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 13TH ED., P. 431).

It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head. Indeed the location of
the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready indications that the accused-appellant’s objective
is not merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor. Verily, had the accused-appellant been
slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets surely would have killed him outright. Also, the intent
to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the accused-appellant even prevented barangay officials from
intervening and helping x x x the bleeding victim. Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was
miraculously able to live through the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that the
crime ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries. After all, as was
mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not the gravity of the resulting injury but
the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the trigger. 18

The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant is also proper, there is a need to
modify the assailed CA Decision in that awards of damages must be made in favor of the victim
Reynaldo.

The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be awarded to Reynaldo due to the
absence of receipts to prove the medical expenses he incurred from the incident. “Nonetheless, absent
competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate
damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary
loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary
loss.”19 Since it was undisputed that Reynaldo was hospitalized due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by
petitioner, albeit as observed by the RTC there was no evidence offered as to the expenses he incurred by
G.R. No. 178512 November 26, 2014
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such intent, the
felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the overt and
external acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and
number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006, 1
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide committed against
Alexander Flojo under the judgment rendered on September 10, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-MD.2
Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:
x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at aboutten o’clock in the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter
"Alexander") was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St.,
Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of his land lady,
Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo
did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and told the latter to
just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around
12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a
container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his body and
begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded
Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.
Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander
stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the
second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was
transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further medical
examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the zygoma, left side, and
aboutone (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at
the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the
thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus
necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube toremove the blood. According to Dr. Francisco
Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second
wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical intervention. (Tsn, July
8, 1998, p.8).
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25,1997 at
around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he
accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted,
thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek
causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.3
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:
PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., "JUNIOR," guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in
Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION
CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as
MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered topay the private complainant compensatory damages in the amount of
P14,170.35 representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; that intent
to kill, the critical element of the crime charged, was not established; that the injuries sustained by
Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heatof anger during the fist fight between them; that he
did not inflict the stabwounds, insisting that another person could have inflicted such wounds; and that he
had caused only slight physical injuries on Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found guilty.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmedthe petitioner’s conviction, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The September 10, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007.6
Issue
Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his
use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) noneof the qualifying circumstances for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. 7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts
found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately
proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other elements.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between him and
Alexander.1âwphi1 He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both
of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he
appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries because the
intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established.
He avers that such intentto kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from
the crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that
the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as
differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.8
Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e.,
the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v.
People,9 we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the
means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We have also
considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of
inflicting the injuries on the victim.10
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them.
Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks
inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result ofa fistfight between them. The petitioner
wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander
sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his
face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby
belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to beno doubt about
the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical
intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found
guilty of frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial and appellate courts on
the credibility of Alexander’s testimony. It is not disputed that the testimony of a single but credible and are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission." 18 Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the
trustworthy witness sufficed to support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in physical injuries. 19 Towards
compelling application when the lone witness is the victim himself whose direct and positive identification that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of
of his assailant is almost always regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the moral damages.20 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of P30,000.00.21 Both of these
victim to seek justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the awards did not require allegation and proof.
manner in which the latter committed the crime.11 Moreover, it is significant that the petitioner’s mere In addition, the amounts awarded ascivil liability of the petitioner shall earn interest of 6% per
denial of the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible physical evidence corroborating annumreckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment by the accused. WHEREFORE, the
Alexander’s statements. Under the circumstances, we can only affirm the petitioner’s conviction for Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman,
frustrated homicide. The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the indeterminate penalty Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer
of "Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day
and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM"12 fixed by the RTC erroneous despite the CA of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of
concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an P30,000.00; moral damages of P30,000.00; and compensatory damages of Pl4,170.35, plus interest of 6%
indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.13 per annum on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS the
The maximum term is the penaltyproperly imposed under the Revised Penal petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the minimum term is within the SO ORDERED.
range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense committed.
Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code,14 frustrated homicide is punished by prision
mayor, which is next lower to reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present, however, prision
mayorin its medium period – from eight years and one day to 10 years – is proper. As can be seen, the
maximum of six years and one day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not
within the medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence is four years
of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum.
The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of P14,170.35 as compensatory
damages "representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven."15 We
need to revise such civil liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we emphatically declared to be "imperative that the courts prescribe
the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the
accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery." We explained why in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final
reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and
justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are
properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of
the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial
office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition
of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be
invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the
accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been
reserved or waived.17
Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the offender committed
violence that nearly took away the victim’s life. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL G.R. No. 166326
RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA,
Petitioners, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 27215 affirming, with modification, the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite,
Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 6962-99, entitled People of the Philippines. v. Esmeraldo Rivera, et al.
On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece
of hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal injury on his head and on the
different parts of his body, the accused thus commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts, but failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of
some causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to ran
(sic) away and the timely response of the policemen, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in April
1998 after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was even given a citation as a Bayaning Pilipino by the
television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His wife eked out a living as a manicurist.
They and their three children resided in Barangay San Isidro Labrador II, Dasmarias, Cavite, near the
house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.
At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him
for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled invectives
at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.
At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to look
for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two brothers,
Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled
Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times
with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben. People who
saw the incident shouted: Awatin sila! Awatin sila! Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael
threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo,
Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto Cagingin, Jr.,
signed a medical certificate in which he declared that Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on the parietal
area, cerebral concussion or contusion, hematoma on the left upper buttocks, multiple abrasions on the left
shoulder and hematoma periorbital left.[4] The doctor declared that the lacerated wound in the parietal area
was slight and superficial and would heal from one to seven days. [5] The doctor prescribed medicine for
Rubens back pain, which he had to take for one month.[6]
Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his house
and banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight. When he went out of
the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled with each other. He fell to the
ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife arrived, and he was pulled away and brought
to their house.
For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother Esmeraldo, but
Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free himself from Ruben and the latter fled. He went home
afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.
Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing garbage in front
of their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged the
gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to shoot him. His brother Esmeraldo
went out of their house and asked Ruben what the problem was. 
A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out
of the house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to the ground. When he stood up, he pulled at Edgardos
shirt and hair, and, in the process, Rubens head hit the lamp post.[7]
On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and are
sentenced to an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the accused. Likewise, the accused are
to pay, jointly and severally, civil indemnity to the private complainant in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the accused and their witnesses. The
accused appealed to the CA, which rendered judgment on June 8, 2004 affirming, with modification, the
appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is MODIFIED in
that the appellants are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. In all
other respects, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the CA erred
in affirming the RTC decision. They insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intention
to kill Ruben when they mauled and hit him with a hollow block. Petitioners aver that, based on the
testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a superficial wound in the parietal area; hence, they
should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only. Even if petitioners had the intent to kill Ruben,
the prosecution failed to prove treachery; hence, they should be held guilty only of attempted homicide.
On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners intent to kill Ruben:

On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound inflicted and the
kind of weapon used. Intent to kill was established by victim Ruben Rodil in his testimony as follows:
Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what happened next?
A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with a piece of hollow block xxx and
hit me thrice on the head, Sir.
Q: And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were hit with a hollow block by Dagol?
A: I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while Dagol was hitting, Sir.
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block directly hit
his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When a wound
is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown
by the fact that the (3) brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had
already fallen to the ground; that one of them even picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit
the victim on the head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the
appellants desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.[10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the decision of the CA is correct, thus:
The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the presumption of innocence raised by
petitioners. The crime has been clearly established with petitioners as the perpetrators. Their intent to kill
is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly and categorically declared that the
victim Ruben Rodil was walking along St. Peter Avenue when he was suddenly boxed by Esmeraldo Baby
Rivera. They further narrated that, soon thereafter, his two brothers Ismael and Edgardo Dagul Rivera,
coming from St. Peter
II, ganged up on the victim. Both Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo recounted that they saw Edgardo
Dagul Rivera pick up a hollow block and hit Ruben Rodil with it three (3) times. A careful review of their
testimonies revealed the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of petitioners. In this case, the
victim did not even have the slightest warning of the danger that lay ahead as he was carrying his three-
year old daughter. He was caught off-guard by the assault of Esmeraldo Baby Rivera and the simultaneous
attack of the two other petitioners. It was also established that the victim was hit by Edgardo Dagul
Rivera, while he was lying on the ground and being mauled by the other petitioners. Petitioners could have
killed the victim had he not managed to escape and had the police not promptly intervened.
Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the victim was superficial and, thus,
not life threatening. The nature of the injury does not negate the intent to kill. The Court of Appeals held:
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block directly hit
his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When a wound
is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown
by the fact that the three (3) brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had
already fallen to the ground; that one of them picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the
victim on the head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the
appellants desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil. [11]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted
stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial
evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.
In People v. Delim,[12] the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes
against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the 
victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and
the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill
is presumed.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent of
petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell
to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit
him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to
hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his
death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the
victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony, thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.[13]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed. [14]
The Court in People v. Lizada[15] elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The
raison detre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily
so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the
act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt
act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long
as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is
necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It
is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
offense after the preparations are made. The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for
completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In
the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. [16]
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling the
victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion of
his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.

We reject petitioners contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the commission of the
felony. Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was walking with his
three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He had no chance to defend himself
and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of the three siblings. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim. [17] Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden
and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself, there would be
treachery.[18] Obviously, petitioners assaulted the victim because of the altercation between him and
petitioner Edgardo Rivera a day before. There being conspiracy by and among petitioners, treachery is
considered against all of them.[19]

The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as maximum. This is erroneous. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
petitioners are guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced by two degrees,
conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2 of Article 61, in relation to
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance in the commission of the felony (other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery), the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor which has
a range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision
correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor
in its medium period, as maximum.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as
minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151258 February 1, 2012
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM,
Jr., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON,
ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA
FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL
BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR.,
ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO
CRUZ SARUCA, Jr., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa – the victim in this case – on 10 February
1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.1 Due in large part to the brave efforts of his
mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This
widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that
would criminalize hazing.2 The intent of the law was to discourage members from making hazing a
requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.3 Moreover, the law was
meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent" and "initial innocent act" in the conduct of
initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita. 4
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country. 5 Within a year of his
death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged – those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of
Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in
Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the
Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in
Baguio City.6
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation of
a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice
system – "[N]o act constitutes a crime… unless it is made so by law."7 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be
considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are
called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly
based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and
178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)8 and the trial court,9 are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera,
Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans.
As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda
compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to
traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the
neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes;
the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and
their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which
the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty
of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on
their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in
which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this
time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of
initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic plays
and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s
principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and
psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first
day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain
and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He
had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended,
and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started
helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.11 On the other
hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due
to certain matters that had to be resolved first.12
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the
26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.13 A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or
on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.14
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)15 set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman,
Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and
Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and
Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and
sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the
sum of P 30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P 50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P 1,000,000
by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. 16 Meanwhile, on different dates between
the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.17 On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 9015318
reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.19
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before
this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareal’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition
raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-
G.R. No. 15520 – first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt.20
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death
of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel
thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death
of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 – Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA’s Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.21 Petitioner sets forth two
main issues – first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial court’s forfeiture of his
right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to
him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused."22
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon’s right to present evidence
during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused,
Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should
not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that
he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like the other
accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil
motives.23 He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity.
He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites "decided
that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling…."24
Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual blows inflicted by
Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lenny’s death."25 The Solicitor General purportedly averred
that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal
if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim."26
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lenny’s
father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon’s father, since the latter did not have a car, and
their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the
alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space were
only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte – witness
Marquez – who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it up…."27
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern for
Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that
the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the
latter’s chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a
sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted
by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victim’s well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 – People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA’s Decision dated 10 January 2002
and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.)
and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. 28
According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy to
commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as
it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the
victim’s death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of
homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.29 The said article provides: "Criminal liability
shall be incurred… [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended."
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General,
the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside
the trial court’s finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the accused must be
based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 – Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA’s
Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and
90153.30 The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca,
Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-
38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused
recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did not commence
until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely,
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy
trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the
delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the
appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
Issues
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon’s right to present evidence constitutes denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the
accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when
it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused
according to individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
Discussion
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note
of counsel for petitioner’s Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is
extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the service
of personal or imprisonment penalties,31 while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to
fines and costs,32 including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil
liability ex delicto).33 However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives
the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action. 34
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and
pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of.
Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and
terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for accused-
petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993. 35 The
Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet
presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their evidence on all
said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to
present evidence."36
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client –
Antonio General – would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the
testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.37 Because of this development and
pursuant to the trial court’s Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line," the trial
court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date – 25 August 1993 – instead of his
originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September
1993.38 Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address
the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously
scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his
clients.39 The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion
for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.40 Consequently, the
trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.41
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial court
forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing
should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start
until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to
present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any
of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by
the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of
evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself. 42 Article
III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused … shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel…" This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in
one’s defense,43 as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the
proceedings.44
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defense’s presentation of
evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to "lack of quorum in
the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties.
The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The
Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his
right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at "yesterday’s and today’s scheduled hearings." In
ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomo’s non-
appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such
date only and not for the succeeding trial dates…
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, Crisostomo’s absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver of
his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and
must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in
person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver
due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called
upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to
present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of
another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in
clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The
Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even
allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not
assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court
could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x. 46 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as
a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel
justified, especially since counsel for another accused – General – had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify
until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of
evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out
of the five days set for Dizon’s testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial
dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present
evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce
an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.47 In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have
adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced
either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may
nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. 48
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither
can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially prejudice either the
prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused
Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really
contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner
Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that "all actions
of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites was
not outside the official activity of the fraternity."49 He even argues that "Dizon did not request for the
extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned."50
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to another –
at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the
evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going
on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case
have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been
dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She
points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them,
and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused
Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed
by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that "the prosecution could not be faulted for
the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not
at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals."51
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.52 This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive
delays.53 The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of
trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or
justifiable motive.54 In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.55 The
conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. 56 Also to be considered are factors such
as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.57
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the
accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.58 As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of
the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy. 59 As we have previously
discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies. 60 The rule on double
jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the
correctness thereof.61 Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of
jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.62
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors contributed
to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxx xxx xxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the prosecution’s failure
to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the
trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly
violated in this case x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as
early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through
the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The
prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a
quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It
is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the
said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the
said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost
seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both
the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner
Saruca’s motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case
remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the
kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.63 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera. 64 On 29 November
1993, they were all arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.66
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the
Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable
delay in the disposition of cases – a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases.67 Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases in
Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay
of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in
Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and
thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant
case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already. 68 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused
Escalona et al.’s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show
that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects
of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a
person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated – either by acquittal or conviction or in any
other manner without the consent of the accused – the accused cannot again be charged with the same or
an identical offense.69 This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. 70 It is
embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in
every system of jurisprudence.71 It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United
States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, 72 viz:
Article III – Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, provides
as follows:73
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the
acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. 74 The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b)
it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
defendant’s express consent.75
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately
final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused
in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes.
Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear
out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of
precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of
securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant
again in the hope of securing a greater penalty."76 We further stressed that "an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal." 77
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the
accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1)
where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a
deprivation of due process;78 (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;79 or (3) where there has been a grave
abuse of discretion.80
The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.81 Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by
law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility;82 or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the
court of its very power to dispense justice.83 In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at
risk of double jeopardy.84
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of
Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both
on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, "the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were denied
due process of law when the public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioner’s Comment x x x."85 Allegedly, the CA
ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 86 The Solicitor
General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well
as the appreciation of Lenny Villa’s consent to hazing.87
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties.88 In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot
be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. 89 Mere
errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari. 90 Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double
jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted fraternity
members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug – the four
fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state
seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. 91 We have also recognized, however, that
certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 92 The
present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned
thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the
accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment
heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no
precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required. To do so, at
this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense
and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this
period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act
charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is
absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los Santos,
CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that
the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not
serious, in nature.93 (Emphasis supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa94 in finding that the four accused should be
held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the victim, there
can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required."95 The
reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was
guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victim’s injuries neither caused incapacity for labor
nor required medical attendance.96 Furthermore, he did not die.97 His injuries were not even serious.98
Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the
ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely
for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four
accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation
rites on the person of Villa."99 It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officer’s findings that the antecedent
cause of Lenny Villa’s death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites.100
Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in
nature,"101 it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries,
which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of
an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an
initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the
victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life.
This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CA’s application of the legal framework governing physical injuries – punished under Articles 262 to
266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies – is therefore tantamount to a whimsical,
capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised
Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the
framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for
intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions.
We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in
that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.102
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of themselves,
caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof that the death of the
victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,103 the only logical conclusion is that
criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in
the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer
cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical
injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the
Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional
infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article
4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted. 104
The CA modified the trial court’s finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no
conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing
during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused – Victorino et al. – were acquitted; 4
of them – Tecson et al. – were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 – Dizon and
Villareal – were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a
felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the
victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man – driven by his own desire to join a
society of men – pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so
he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation
absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts
shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely
known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.105 The classical theory posits that a
human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and evil. 106
It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will
appears unimpaired.107 The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and
calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.108 They
refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or
advantage in committing the crime.109 Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral
blame of the actor.110 The identity of mens rea – defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent – is the predominant consideration.111 Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.112
In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or
"malice."113
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent.114 The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose
between two things.115 The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of
human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.116 The last element,
intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.117
The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind accompanying
an act, especially a forbidden act.118 It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a
person proceeds.119 It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the
result of the act.120 While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result,
intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. 121 On the other hand, the term
"felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. 122
With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious
intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise,
intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus – that the act or omission be done "willfully,"
"maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought."123 The maxim is actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.124 As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious
intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.125
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code – which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" – is to be interpreted to refer
only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an agreement" connotes
the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element present only in intentional
felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the
wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. 126 Here, a
person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack
of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. 127 Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a
requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa. 128
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the
commission of the intentional felony of homicide.129 Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the
existence of malice or dolo130 immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. 131 Intent
to kill – or animus interficendi – cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent.132 Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide.133 If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal
intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or
simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.134
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.135 It is said that, throughout history,
hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups to
indigenous tribes.136 Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during
which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for upperclassmen. 137 It is
believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece, 138 where young men recruited into the
military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the
recruits for battle.139 Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient
Greek civilization.140 According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or
"ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization
in which they seek to attain membership through hazing. 141
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an
organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter. 142 The neophyte
period is usually one to two semesters long.143 During the "program," neophytes are required to interview
and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the principles
of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to participate in the organization’s
activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and
alumni members.144 Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts
during the entire neophyte stage.145
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for
admission to an organization.146 In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant" – or
any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person – is generally placed in embarrassing
or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or
activities.147 It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically
endanger those who desire membership in the organization.148 These acts usually involve physical or
psychological suffering or injury.149
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our national
hero – Andres Bonifacio – organized a secret society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan
ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the
Nation).150 The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European
Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church. 151 The
Katipunan’s ideology was brought home to each member through the society’s initiation ritual. 152 It is said
that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series
of questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. 153 They were made to go
through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon."154 It would seem
that they were also made to withstand the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a
"matalas na punyal."155 As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign
membership papers with the his own blood.156
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the
late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was
jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting
physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable
foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.157 In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved
in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point. 158
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the
shriner’s hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership. 159 The ritual
involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick."160 It required each candidate to slide
down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the
candidate was required to climb.161 Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and
barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.162
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen
performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte
paratroopers’ chests.163 The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the
spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.164
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi
invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.165 The fraternity members subjected the pledges
to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back;
caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a
cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and
"body slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and
dropped them to the ground.166 The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle
of physical abuse.167
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of the
Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama. 168 The hazing included the following: (1)
having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and
vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits
and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot sauce,
mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as
cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7)
"running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway
and descended down a flight of stairs.169
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim – Sylvester Lloyd – was accepted to
pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity. 170 He participated in initiation
activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and
embarrassment.171
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing
activities during the fraternity’s initiation rites.172 Kenner and the other initiates went through
psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times. 173
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones – a university student in Florida – sought initiation into the campus
chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.174 The pledge’s efforts to
join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with
other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks. 175 In these rituals
described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his
buttocks.176 During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.177 The pledges sustained roughly
210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.178 Jones and several other candidates passed out.179
The purported raison d’être behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through which the
pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth. 180 Some organizations even
believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to
establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the organization. 181
Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-
esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit d’corp associated with close, almost filial,
friendship and common cause.182
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military. 183 The hazing of
recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military
hazing, harmful or not.184 It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom."185
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt
Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation
prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.186 As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil
statutes proscribing hazing.187 Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry
relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations. 188 Only a few states with anti-hazing
laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs. 189
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or great
bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.190 In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a
term of not less than one year and not more than three years. 191 Indiana criminal law provides that a person
who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a
person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.192
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.193 As an element of a
Class C felony – criminal recklessness – resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category
of "serious bodily injury."194 A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of
between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years. 195 Pursuant to
Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the
student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C felony.196 A Class C felony provides
for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.197
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony. 198 An individual adjudged guilty of a
state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not
less than 180 days.199 Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a
third-degree felony.200 A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to
imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.201 West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing
would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties
provided therefor.202 In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of
another.203 A Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years,
or both.204
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing
statute.205 This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry
Ballou’s family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in
South Carolina until 1994.206
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation – in this case, fraternity initiation rites – does not automatically
amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind – whether or not there is a contextual background or factual
premise – they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that – with the exception of Villareal
and Dizon – accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to
kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two
accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on
him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by
ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father’s parking space had been stolen by the
victim’s father.207 As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido
Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareal’s brother. 208 The CA then
ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with evil
and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants
Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the
crime of homicide.209 (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the existence of
animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances were made, the
Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquez’s testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngi’s] room and we were briefed as to what to expect
during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and their batch and we were also
told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngi’s] house and we were made to ride a van and we were
brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then the driver
of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion Patay ka" and
the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks uttered
upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what were the
voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking of the van
which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was there any
utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging others who
were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed looking
us being pounded, sir. briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what to expect during the
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard? initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa Witness Yes, sir.
niyan." Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote? Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could not really pin Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the
point who uttered those words, sir. initiation?
xxx xxx xxx Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be mocked at, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express? Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances. Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you remember? Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say that and I Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko," so that would in turn sort of justifying him in xxx xxx xxx
inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then after Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the bruises
on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that "this guy, his father stole the parking space of my would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long sleeves, it
father," sir. So, that’s why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on, sir. would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused? Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body but that
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir. will be covered?
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family have his Witness Yes, sir.
brother killed, what was your response? JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create bruises
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he said that I to your body?
knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering those Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir. xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is psychological
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villa’s father stole the in nature?
parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance when that utterance Witness Combination, sir.211 (Emphasis supplied)
was made? xxx xxx xxx
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir. Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation, meaning body
xxx xxx xxx contact, is that correct?
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who heard from Witness Yes, sir.
time to time, sir. Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
xxx xxx xxx Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny Villa’s father Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you, scare you,
was made? correct?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny Villa’s Witness Yes, sir.
turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir. Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I repeat, terrify you,
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villa’s father? frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa. Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted? Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was supposed to
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villa’s thighs and sometime he stand up and he kicked have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was an
his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir. NPA, do you remember saying that?
xxx xxx xxx Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that accusations Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you did not
made by Dizon "you or your family had his brother killed," can you inform this Honorable Court what believe him because that is not true, correct?
exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you in particular? Witness Yes, sir.
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his family who had Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have mentioned
his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story that he before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is correct?
made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And another Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those things was
incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court and I was sort of because he wanted to inflict injury.
looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez, Marquez, ano ang Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin," sir. Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Tadiar What else? Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of initiation by all
Witness That’s all, sir. the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came around as Witness Yes, sir.
promised to you earlier? Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said something
Witness No, sir.210 (Emphasis supplied) similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus: Witness No, sir.
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there was a Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run on your
thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not only on you
but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was administered by one
master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also administered by another master on
the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.212 (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal
were "baseless,"213 since the statements of the accused were "just part of the psychological initiation
calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as testified
by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of
‘tradition’ concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites." 214
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the
part of the CA – it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be
tolerated, especially because it was the CA’s primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill
Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to
Bienvenido Marquez’s testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both "accusations"
against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by
the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez’s] thigh"; and who told witness Marquez, "[I]to,
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villa’s thighs while
saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With the testimony clarified, we find
that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and
contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At
the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to
scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity
members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka," "Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang
ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some other words to that effect. 215 While
beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the former’s purported NPA brother, and
then blamed Lenny Villa’s father for stealing the parking space of Dizon’s father. According to the
Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the
psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.216
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon’s way of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling
make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could "justify"
giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of
the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the Senate
deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on why
we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."
xxx xxx xxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or neophyte is
made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette
extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be a
member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the
neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building
facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is
that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building – these are the mental or
psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who
appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that they
can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent.217 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of
the fraternity’s psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the
fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the
veracity of Dizon’s threats. The testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view.
According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up…." 218 Even the
trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative
acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of
the fraternity initiation rites x x x."219 The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should
not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. 220 Instead, we adopt and
reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the
specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.221
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa.
Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused
fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them
should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code,222 the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in
se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code,
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity
or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical
injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are. 223
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent
malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v.
People,225 the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and
thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment. In
reversing the trial court’s finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus:
"Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility … [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what
she had done with criminal intent … the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not
motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that
"as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil." In
People v. Carmen,226 the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady
of Fatima – under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" – plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of
water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a
kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad
spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious
intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court’s finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused’s initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the
neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised
Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious
intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused. 227 What persons do is the
best index of their intention.228 We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used,
and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the
perpetrator.229 The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of
Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites,
they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the whole
event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected
to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the "Auxies’
Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes’ arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play rough
basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Late in the
afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the rituals were
officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another
"traditional" ritual – paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the
neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict
physical and psychological pain on the initiates.230 It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive
physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would circulate; to
facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to
coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lenny’s consent. 231 A few days before the "rites," he asked both his
parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.232 His father knew that Lenny would go through an
initiation process and would be gone for three days.233 The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo physical
initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the
initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given
briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods such as
mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation
would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to
quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him
that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted
that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that a wooden paddle would be used to
hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs…. Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation
without consenting neophytes.234 (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquila’s grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his
participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious intent,
we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the
specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done
voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in
the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
Although the additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and
Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the
accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed
pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The
targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role
of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the
neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished
to join the fraternity went through the same process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny
Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized
that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.235 The totality of the circumstances must therefore
be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be
determined by Lenny’s continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even after
the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
Senator Guingona. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder or
homicide.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or
acts of lasciviousness.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the crime of
hazing?
Senator Lina. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any
association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or
results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or association can
require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without being held criminally
liable.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Guingona. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an
initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et
cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be
a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are
already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a
wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let
us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a
wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act
of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that
they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do
not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed
initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to institute
this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga
silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito
na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung
maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon.
Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan
at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Guingona. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death,
that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind.
We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing.
This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent,
which is one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And
even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new
society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the
result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am
afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context of
what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their
intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr.
President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters
intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who
inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the intention to kill.
This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary crime
of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they
are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The charge
is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy or not anymore?
Senator Lina. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
Senator Guingona. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
Senator Lina. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to prove
intent to kill.
Senator Guingona. But the charge is murder.
Senator Lina. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. 236
(Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include sodomy
as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
Senator Biazon. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of
the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be
committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into another
individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase "without
consent" for purposes of this section.
Senator Lina. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going to
aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the
results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity,
sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without the consent of the intended victim.
The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation which
may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless
of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and
therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that there is
an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a fraternity,
so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the
perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Lina. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite
and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when they do
their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if
they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is
not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be entered
into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the
neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte
accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the
victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill,
because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted
it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent
will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a
punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act
with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed without
consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
Senator Biazon. Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Thank you very much.
The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the
same is approved.237
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the state’s burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal author
of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether there it is
mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.238(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se
adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by
Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing – unique as against typical crimes – cast a cloud of
doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is
safe to presume that Lenny’s parents would not have consented 239 to his participation in Aquila
Fraternity’s initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaña v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nation’s very recent history, the people have spoken, through
Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of … hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom,
as criminal."240 Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows
recognition that hazing – or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering
– has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a
lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial court’s
finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as
required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of
hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that
are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution
or advertence on the part of the person committing it.241 In this case, the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated by the actor.242 In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without
grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or
skill.243 Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. 244
The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer
the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.246
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. 247 If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses
to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage
or injury.248 In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.249 It is thus possible that there
are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory
glance of care to the most vigilant effort."250 The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care
will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. 251
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple traumatic
injuries.252 The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump
and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood. 253 In the present case, the victim’s heart
could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen. 254
The deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system –
including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries – to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny,
thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots. 255 The multiple hematomas were wide,
thick, and deep,256 indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim
from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.257 Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to
gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to
produce death. 258 The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other
organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of
blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.259 It was concluded that there was nothing in the
heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease. 260
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa’s arms and thighs, resulting from repeated blows
to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death. These
hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity.
According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed,
stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs. 261 They were also "paddled" at
the back of their thighs or legs;262 and slapped on their faces.263 They were made to play rough
basketball.264 Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine." 265 The NBI
medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple
injuries suffered by the latter.266 The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of defense
counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa previously
marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by themselves would not cause the death of the victim.
The question I am going to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked
from Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to
isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a car
would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human approach is to interpret all those
injuries in whole and not in part.267
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during the
initiation rites.268
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made
the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their
initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.269 With the foregoing facts, we rule that the
accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found
that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds
to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least mitigated,
had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity – accused Dizon and Villareal – restrained themselves from insisting
on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would show that
the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites – having in mind the concept of
"seniority" in fraternities – the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in
future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lenny’s
initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of
the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly – or unwittingly –impose the misery of hazing and employ
appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish "kinship." A
neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it
offered, such as tips during bar examinations.270 Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being
looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice. 271 Thus, for Lenny Villa and
the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the
circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to
which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover
only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then,
these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by
reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).272 Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when
Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found
that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.’s individual participation in
the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa. 273 As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was
totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-
Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight physical
injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused Almeda,
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of P 50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and P 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon
and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of P 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.1âwphi1
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim. 274 In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,275 we sustain the CA’s award of indemnity in the amount of P
50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred in
connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible documents. 276
Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the
records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial.
Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual damages. 277
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the victim’s
death.278 This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the "spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."279 Thus, we hereby we affirm the CA’s award
of moral damages in the amount of P 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 –
finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under
Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED
jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P 50,000,
and moral damages in the amount of P 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of
12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.280 Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The appealed
Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal
deemed closed and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of
intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant. 
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the
incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the
prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to
the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any
doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially
correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in
August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened
upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the
other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height.
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing
this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but
one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there
were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was
suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out
twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along
the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or
a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was
struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness
and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the
door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the
chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell
down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept
in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described,
one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant
alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable
terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock
at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening
and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at
officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10
o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon
one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid
of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite
defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be
that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened
him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah
Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he
died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of
simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor,
the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but
insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful
right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced
open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to
be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning
to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any
available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the
thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant
nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the
fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant
believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to
defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed
the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances
there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative
a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny,
animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by
him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87
and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of
homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the
definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not
specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with
malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the
acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears
that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code,
which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in
the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain
provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent
in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express
provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently
or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where
the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even
these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a
will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal,
and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol.
1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a
disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since,
therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by
committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the
crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less
according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has
been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this
article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without
intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word
"voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition
of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists,
their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco,
Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from
criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and
in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the
provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1,
p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is
no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there
is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the
Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence
of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from
the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the
civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the
parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention,
which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact
submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a
grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision
correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence
shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or
less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one
thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and
the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the
absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on
the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the
word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been
said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is
more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal
malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as
employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American
statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is
not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a
particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime
that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the
various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general
principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime
evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from
the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important,
not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or
mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind
was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an
offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does
not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done
by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the
result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame
ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In
times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in
act from his neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an
evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the
want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that
the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines,
because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal
unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance
of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and
compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature
to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal
without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is
sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make
the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the
rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not
be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake
in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the
contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the
act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs.
Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y.,
509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209;
Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and
without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared
to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might
reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he
acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they
appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in
truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case
where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a
spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under
the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life
and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were
such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly
exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his
friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal
intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases
of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the
code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design
against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no
such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to
the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and
a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near
enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant
the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and
that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he
would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a
doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that
the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are
here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of
his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was
attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or
two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took
from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown
lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of
cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained
pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief
over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-
defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in
accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment,
with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court,
under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that
the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed
their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in
such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and
possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have
defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the
limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of
producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such
strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants,
nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower
court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and
that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of
Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the
city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8
paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he
fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before
simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the
body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing
that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse,
he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this
homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8,
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of
the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed
to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc.
The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was
acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and
that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the
shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone
thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and
is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which,
and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot.
Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all
of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to
exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed,
and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon
appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors,
who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just
self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced
open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his
life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances,
as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of
self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him
to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and
the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of
both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the
merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the
Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the
act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts
committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief
on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore
incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room,
without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be
sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory
penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the
costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
Republic of the Philippines Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva).
Supreme Court Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and
Manila Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated National Police (INP)[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario
THIRD DIVISION Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres
Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y G.R. Nos. 120744-46 Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home
ENRIQUEZ, Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and
Petitioner, Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in
three Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:
- versus -
Criminal Case No. 16612:
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x---------------------------x
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. G.R. No. 122677
REYES and VIRGILIO A.
MANGUERRA, That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Petitioners, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy.
- versus - Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense
Respondents. in relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
x--------------------------x premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and G.R. No. 122776 intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with
ERNESTO PUNO, automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney
Petitioners, Present: ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds
which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,* causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.
- versus - BERSAMIN, **
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR., *** and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 25, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION CONTRARY TO LAW.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]

PERALTA, J.:

Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton
violence is never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A shoot first, think later
disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a function
of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the June 30, 1995 Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613
and 16614 cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively. The
cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Criminal Case No. 16613:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public
officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense
Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to
information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus
committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores,
Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican with automatic weapons by firing directly
at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G.
Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of murder directly by overt acts of
execution which should produce the murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
Criminal Case No. 16614:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and
members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and
mutually helping one another, and while responding to information about the presence of
armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the
offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent of taking the life of
Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green
Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting multiple gunshot
wounds which are necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts which would have
produced the crime of murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the
defendants will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C.
Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
the accused except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990, [if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] and
Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] entered individual pleas of not guilty.[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his
arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres
Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case
No. 16612.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] Said motion was heard on the premise, as previously agreed upon by both
the prosecution and the defense, that these cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at
said hearing would automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the merits. [if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] On
May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Yapyuco
likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991. [if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] and accordingly, the
charges against him were dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial inquest.
[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the presentation of
evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera,
Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between
5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious
procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the
wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the
passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly
proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road,
they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding
profusely.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not
see any one on the road flag them down.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] In open court, Flores executed a sketch [if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif]
depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of
Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road right after the
curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron
where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how
many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva
were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the
yard of Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be
employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when
flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang
for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs house as instructed
and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were
being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital. [if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] This was corroborated
by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan,
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis
Hospital.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly succeeded each other,
and that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to what the defense would say. [if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif]
He professed that he, together with his co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao
jeepney on its way to the hospital and inside it he observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated
beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he and his companions had been dropped off at the
hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two armed companions. [if
!supportFootnotes][23][endif]
He further narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought Licup to the Makati
Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7, 1988.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] He claimed that all the
accused in the case had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he
identified to be his wifes uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused
for that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. [if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] He claimed the
bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were no other bullet holes
at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the presence
of his companions at his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated Villanuevas and Flores
narration of the events immediately preceding the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his guests
shortly after the procession had passed his house and reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-
studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire from a distance which
was shortly followed by Flores frantic call for help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle
and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just outside the gate of Narons house where, inside, he noticed a
congregation of more or less six people whom he could not recognize. [if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] At this point,
he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney occupied by three men who
appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and
decided to deliver it to his mothers house, but before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario
Reyes on the wheel of an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same
jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He
claimed he spent the night at his mothers house and in the morning, a policeman came looking for him
with whom, however, he was not able to talk.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post in
front of Narons house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the neighboring houses was
illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was Yapyucos group or the group of Pamintuan
that brought his injured companions to the hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao
jeepney previously identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured companions to the
hospital.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas,
affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected to have been used by petitioners in the
shooting and found them positive for gunpowder residue. She could not, however, determine exactly when
the firearms were discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms were discharged that night nor the
relative positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to administer paraffin test on petitioners
and on the other accused because the opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She
affirmed having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of
which had punctured the door at the passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions.
She explained, rather inconclusively, that the bullets that hit at an angle might have been fired while the
jeepney was either at a standstill or moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the
curve on the road.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer
of the INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of firearms and ammunitions to
members of the local police force and CHDF and CVO members, identified in court the memorandum
receipts for the firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco.[if
!supportFootnotes][31][endif]
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the
injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital
region of Villanuevas head as well as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in
these wounds in that the incapacity would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet
wound on the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that this wound would be caused by
a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming the assailant and the victim were both standing
upright on the ground and the firearm was fired from the level of the assailants waist; but if the victim was
seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot coming from his front, the
trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Villanueva,
the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a lower level.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the patient,
he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head one consistent with being hit by a hard
and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested that
Licup was upright when fired upon from the front: one is a through-and-through wound in the middle
lateral aspect of the middle portion of the right leg; another, through-and-through wound at the middle
portion of the right forearm; and third one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally involved
the stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger seat as claimed,
his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant must have been in front of him holding the gun
slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the wound in the abdomen had
entered from the left side and crossed over to and exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman
must have been positioned at Licups left side. He explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead of
that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup had changed his position as a reaction
to the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg must have been caused by a bullet fired at
the victims back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting any hard surface prior.[if
!supportFootnotes][33][endif]
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licups right forearm must have been caused by a
bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim. Hypothesizing, he held the
improbability of Licup being hit on the abdomen, considering that he might have changed position
following the infliction of the other wounds, unless there was more than one assailant who fired multiple
shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup
having changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which of
Licups three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead
of the others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down with his head lying low
and steady.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had been
administratively charged with and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting
incident and that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which
culminated in their dismissal from service.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] Dolly Porquerio, stenographer at the
NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the report on
the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his office. This, according
to her, together with the sketch showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and the
Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM Central Office for
consideration.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these documents together with
the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as
the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of
petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan
and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a
physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police assistance from David, who
supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in
Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the
time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed his men to put
on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif]

Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who
told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective
strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen
had also brought in a number of armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened at the
residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying
the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it
was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled
for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This
allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno, [if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] to fire
warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires
thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons house directly
at the subject jeepney.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif]
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at
Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men
then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom
they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men
returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney.
They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone. [if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time
was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had been
ambushed supposedly by rebel elements,[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] and that he frequently patrolled the
barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein. [if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] That
night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and
Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, [if !supportFootnotes][43][endif] the team composed of Pamintuan and his
men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself,
were armed.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all
the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed. [if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] He said that the shots
which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police
officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were
fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled. [if
!supportFootnotes][46][endif]
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the
accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that his co-accused
had already been investigated by the main police station in San Fernando, but the inquiries did not include
himself, Cunanan and Puno.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif] He admitted an administrative case against him,
Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the
decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to an investigation independently
conducted by their station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. [if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga
acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where members of the
police force had fallen victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has actually
conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had been trying to infiltrate the
employment force of San Miguel Corporation plant, and that he has accordingly conducted clearing
operations in sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He intimated that days prior to the incident, Yapyucos
team had already been alerted of the presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyucos
declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting incident and making a report on it in which,
curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuans statement referring to Flores as being married to a resident
of Barangay Quebiawan and found after surveillance to be frequently visited by NPA members. He
affirmed having found that guns were indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator was able to
gather bullet shells from the scene. [if !supportFootnotes][49][endif]
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco as
well as the latters documentary evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif] Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson,
Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and submitted their memorandum as told. [if
!supportFootnotes][51][endif]
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular
and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials
and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance
provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the
victims with the intent of killing them.[if !supportFootnotes][52][endif] With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco,
Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of
homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and
of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as charged in
Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted
murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The
dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
[if !supportLists]I. [endif]In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any
aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the
minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of
P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their
proportionate shares of the costs of said action.
[if !supportLists]II. [endif]In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the
accused charged in the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y
Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Baez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson,
Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y
Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder charged therein, with costs de
oficio.
[if !supportLists]III. [endif]In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249, in relation to
Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting them with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor
as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the amount of
P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to
pay their proportionate share of the costs of said action.

SO ORDERED.[if
!supportFootnotes][53][endif]
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and
which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the
guise of maintaining peace and order;[if !supportFootnotes][54][endif] that the acts performed by them preparatory to
the shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear
intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action deliberately
and consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates their
defense of lawful performance of official duty;[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif] that the theory of mistaken belief
could not likewise benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient
basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuans report that the victims were armed NPA members, and
they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence when
they acted as they did;[if !supportFootnotes][56][endif] that there was insufficient or total absence of factual basis to
assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that
the shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police
operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and
Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation. [if !supportFootnotes][57][endif]
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of prosecution
witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the circumstances prior to the subject
incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had
truly been flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since as it turned out after the search of the
vehicle they had no firearms with them, and hence, they had nothing to be scared of. [if !supportFootnotes][58][endif]
It observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it
would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay captain no less, not to have known them and the location of
their houses which were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence of the victims
and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsangs house that evening could not have possibly escaped his
notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuans Sworn Statement dated April 11, 1988 did not sufficiently
explain his suspicions as to the identities of the victims as well as his apparent certainty on the identity and
whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw jeepney. [if !supportFootnotes][59][endif] It surmised how the defense, especially
Yapyuco in his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group of armed men which allegedly
included Cafgu members from neighboring barangays were assembled at the house of Naron that night,
and how petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it
inferred that petitioners had already known that their suspect vehicle would be coming from the direction
of Salangsangs house such knowledge is supposedly evident first, in the manner by which they
advantageously positioned themselves at the scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and
second, in the fact that the house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by
prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that night.[if !supportFootnotes][60][endif]
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores sketch depicting the position of the
Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet holes on the
right side of the jeepney and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit
Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of Narons residence and the shots were fired at
the jeepney while it was slowly moving past them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the report of
Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners had been tested and found to be positive of
gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they had indeed been discharged. [if !supportFootnotes][61][endif]
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence
pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the
gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage and
injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the front passenger side of
the jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on the right side of the street and inside the front yard
of Narons house; the deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the
positive ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners. [if !supportFootnotes][62][endif]
This evidentiary resum, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners
admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a predicate to its conclusion that
petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a common purpose, design and objective to harm the
unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no conclusive proof of who among the several
accused had actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the
Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those who were shown to have discharged their
firearms that night petitioners herein.[if !supportFootnotes][63][endif] Interestingly, it was speculated that the manner
by which the accused collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously
with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of them, had a grudge
against the employees of San Miguel Corporation;[if !supportFootnotes][64][endif] and that on the basis of the self-
serving evidence adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-up of the
incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM. [if
!supportFootnotes][65][endif]
It likewise found very consequential the fact that the other accused had chosen not to
take the witness stand; this, supposedly because it was incumbent upon them to individually explain their
participation in the shooting in view of the weight of the prosecution evidence, their invocation of the
justifying circumstance of lawful performance of official duty and the declaration of some of them in their
affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front yard of Narons residence from
which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself. [if !supportFootnotes][66][endif]
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown how the
aggression commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began and
developed, and second, this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious
adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from circumstances
immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding holds true for evident premeditation because
between the time Yapyuco received the summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David and the
time he and his men responded at the scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for the
materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.[if !supportFootnotes][67][endif]
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from work for
60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits;[if !supportFootnotes][68][endif] that he was
earning P8,350.00 monthly;[if !supportFootnotes][69][endif] and that he had spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his
Tamaraw jeepney.[if !supportFootnotes][70][endif] Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had spent
P18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for the funeral plot and
P20,000.00 in attorneys fees for the prosecution of these cases. [if !supportFootnotes][71][endif] He also submitted a
certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son. [if !supportFootnotes][72][endif]
On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva
P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the
proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as
actual damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayans finding of conspiracy and
labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly established that he had
by positive acts intended to participate in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and that
his participation in a supposed common criminal object has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He
believes the finding is belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the shooting
incident when the wounded passengers were taken to the hospital on his jeepney. [if !supportFootnotes][73][endif] He
also points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayans declaration that the incident could not have been the
product of a well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted
against the victims by the barangay officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their part to earn
commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of
homicide or frustrated homicide but rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated
homicide. [if !supportFootnotes][74][endif] He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the
victims were caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the
scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence at the scene of the
incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof a
fact which has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for
gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno.[if !supportFootnotes][75][endif] He also invokes the concept of
mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these
cases, had entertained the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements. [if !supportFootnotes][76][endif]
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the
Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision was based on
acts the evidence for which has been adduced at a separate trial but erroneously attributed to them. They
explain that there were two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu
and themselves who had waived the presentation of evidence. They question their conviction of the
charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials
and had waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all
accused barangay officials and CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence by the
accused police officers and, hence, the finding that they too had fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly
based on an established fact.[if !supportFootnotes][77][endif] Also, they believe that the findings of fact by the
Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself
and those presented in a separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and
suspicious and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal prosecution. [if
!supportFootnotes][78][endif]
Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in evidence and that the
prosecution has not even shown that they were with the other accused at the scene of the incident or that
they were among those who fired at the victims, and neither were they identified as among the perpetrators
of the crime.[if !supportFootnotes][79][endif]
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy. They claim that
judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the
result of a legitimate police operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to obtain commendation,
conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has
not, as far as both of them are concerned, shown that they had ever been part of such malicious design to
commit an ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as police officers, they
merely followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the conversation among
the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to
have had community of criminal design with the rest of the accused.[if !supportFootnotes][80][endif] They affirm
Yapyucos statement that they fired warning shots at the subject jeepney,[if !supportFootnotes][81][endif] but only
after it had passed the place where they were posted and only after it failed to stop when flagged down as
it then became apparent that it was going to speed away as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the
chassis and not on the rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives
that would have otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since none of the victims
had been personally or even remotely known to either of them. That they were not intending to commit a
crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that they did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the
jeepney and that in fact, they immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees
of San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could have easily
fired at the victims directly.[if !supportFootnotes][82][endif]
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding
of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had assembled themselves
and awaited the suspect vehicle as though having previously known that it would be coming from
Salangsangs residence. It posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a
community of purpose and design to commit the crimes charged.[if !supportFootnotes][83][endif] It believes that
criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the road that would give
them a direct line of fire at the target as shown by the trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw
jeepney.[if !supportFootnotes][84][endif] This intent was supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both
Flores and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence. [if !supportFootnotes][85][endif] It
refutes the invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual basis to support
the belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have not shown that
they had previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that the
accused had merely responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is
convinced that they had exceeded the performance thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney
occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals instead.[if !supportFootnotes][86][endif]
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence
adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be binding on them, the
OSP explains that said petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously
withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as directed later on submitted the case for decision as to them
with the filing of their memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due process to said petitioners in
view of their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on the motion for bail at the trial proper as
well as by their manifestation to forego with the presentation of their own evidence. The right to present
witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the
other accused, especially where the latter has failed to register his objection thereto. [if !supportFootnotes][87][endif]
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to
rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that evidence
nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of the
incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony which was adopted
by Cunanan and Puno as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had
been offered in evidence by the prosecution,[if !supportFootnotes][88][endif] explained that their presence at the scene
was in response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on
board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay
Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11
(5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not
by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became apparent that the
suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to whether or not there was intention to
harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the
eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal. [if
!supportFootnotes][89][endif]
To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-
affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][90][endif] of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][91][endif]
of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][92][endif] of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-
affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][93][endif]of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][94][endif] of Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated
therein that [their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle when it accelerated after warning shots were
fired in air and when it ignored Yapyucos signal for it to stop;[if !supportFootnotes][95][endif] in their earlier affidavit
they, together with Yapyuco, declared that they were constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic) the said
fleeing vehicle.[if !supportFootnotes][96][endif] Yapyucos open court declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan and
Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the subject jeepney after it allegedly
failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires thereof when it came clear that it was trying to
escape.[if !supportFootnotes][97][endif] He suggested substantiating the implication in his affidavit that it was the
whole team [which fired] at the fleeing vehicle [if !supportFootnotes][98][endif] that the bullets which hit the
passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of
Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken post while awaiting the
arrival of the suspect vehicle.[if !supportFootnotes][99][endif]
 Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only
Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give warning shots,[if
!supportFootnotes][100][endif]
and that it was the policemen [who] directly fired upon the jeepney. [if
!supportFootnotes][101][endif]
Manguerra himself shared this statement.[if !supportFootnotes][102][endif] Yet these accounts do
not sit well with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney
which Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to have come from bullets sprayed from
perpendicular and oblique directions. This evidence in fact supports Yapyucos claim that he, Cunanan and
Puno did fire directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already moved past them such
that the line of fire to the passengers thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his
claim that, almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he,
Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Narons
house sitting on the right side of the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes were positioned, such that the line of fire would be direct and perpendicular to it. [if
!supportFootnotes][103][endif]
While Dabors ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who
among the accused actually discharged their firearms that night, her report pertaining to the examination
of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of
Narons house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes
seek to insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be applied to them as it is evidence
adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted, they may not evade the effect of their having withdrawn
their motion for separate trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them
of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.[if !supportFootnotes][104][endif]
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against
said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court
his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded
the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused because
then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.[if !supportFootnotes][105][endif] It is thus perplexing why, despite the
extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latters testimony implicating them
in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in fact, they could have
shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses charged. We, therefore,
reject their claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and be
cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the
inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a
right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in
the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the
offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.[if !supportFootnotes][106][endif] The justification is based on the complete absence of
intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was
committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.[if !supportFootnotes][107][endif] Where invoked, this
ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has
committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury
or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right
or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were indeed
lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law
enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them who were either
police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order were
bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs,
therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms
inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect a bloodless arrest should they
find cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a
crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing
in the evidence suggests that the accused were acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the
suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims
having launched such aggression as would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having
exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to
embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented
at the trial to show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims,
except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably prepared to conduct
hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether
or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as
accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to
be, the actuations of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable
expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of
engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must
always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if
the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not
vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful
apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains to other government officers or
agencies.[if !supportFootnotes][108][endif]
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if
he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm.[if !supportFootnotes][109][endif] United States v. Campo[if
!supportFootnotes][110][endif]
has laid down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is
not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance,
and finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the
offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such force, the same could be justified in
inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force. [if
!supportFootnotes][111][endif]
He is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender
with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. [if
!supportFootnotes][112][endif]
People v. Ulep[if !supportFootnotes][113][endif] teaches that
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used
only as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender
cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe
police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may
be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when
pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action
is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of
police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither
capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of
a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with
the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the
law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who
indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are
apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing
with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these
criminals are also human beings with human rights.[if !supportFootnotes][114][endif]
 The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States
v. Ah Chong,[if !supportFootnotes][127][endif] but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-
defense where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an
aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by
the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after
having demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but
at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that he was
under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged
with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no
evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:

x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
Thus, in People v. Tabag,[if !supportFootnotes][115][endif] where members of the Davao CHDF had
killed four members of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were NPA members, and the in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
accused sought exoneration by invoking among others the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding them liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a superior
for some lawful purpose. Other than suspicion, there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his
wife Wendelyn, and their children were members of the NPA. And even if they were members of the
NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night, they were peacefully resting in
their humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing justified
the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a
merciless vigilante-style execution.[if !supportFootnotes][116][endif]
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming that crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor
While it is possible that the jeepney had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark road with from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on
its headlights dimmed missed petitioners signal to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that the his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must
passengers thereof were drunk from the party they had just been to,[if !supportFootnotes][117][endif] still, we find depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." x x x
incomprehensible petitioners quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact there was at least one other
vehicle at the scene the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco which they could actually have used to pursue
their suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.

Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies the
use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We find, however, that
petitioners failed in that respect. Although the employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily
connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not seem to have been confronted with the rational
necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered why they,
in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at their suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or
impatience or simply their careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment
of police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has
wound, causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers of the jeepney to grave
reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing
danger to life and limb all of which could not have been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
their duties.
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not believe them he is
III. legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with
failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true,
reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. [if !supportFootnotes][118][endif] authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in
Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
component of the crime.[if !supportFootnotes][119][endif] It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the
proof of only general intent.[if !supportFootnotes][120][endif] The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the
facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
defendant,[if !supportFootnotes][121][endif] and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he
person.[if !supportFootnotes][122][endif] A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest
thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they
and reasonable;[if !supportFootnotes][123][endif] (b) that it be a matter of fact;[if !supportFootnotes][124][endif] and (c) that it
are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme
negate the culpability required to commit the crime[if !supportFootnotes][125][endif] or the existence of the mental measure. x x x [if !supportFootnotes][128][endif]
state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.[if !supportFootnotes][126][endif]

Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[if !supportFootnotes][129][endif] and Baxinela v. People,[if
!supportFootnotes][130][endif]
the justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact,
must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. [if !supportFootnotes][131][endif] Thus, Ah Chong
further explained that
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this
jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which
would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To
this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.[if
!supportFootnotes][132][endif]
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has
been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound
by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The
weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of proving
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[if !supportFootnotes][133][endif] By reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered
by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt.[if !supportFootnotes][134][endif] The overriding consideration is not whether the court
doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [if
!supportFootnotes][135][endif]
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by
direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][136][endif] Corpus delicti consists
of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. [if
!supportFootnotes][137][endif]
In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the
death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other
than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the
death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after
the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.[if !supportFootnotes][138][endif] In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is
homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences
thereof. [if !supportFootnotes][139][endif] Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and
attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with
the same degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses. [if !supportFootnotes][140][endif]
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is
interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the
jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is
certainly an ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as Yapyucos testimony are replete with suggestions
that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their
(petitioners) minds that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the
suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of
his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San Miguel Corporation plant
where the victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyucos
claim that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against members of law enforcement in
Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident.
But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of
these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.[if !supportFootnotes][141][endif]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and
materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime. It gains
significance when the commission of a crime is established by evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise
inconclusive.[if !supportFootnotes][142][endif] The question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as to
whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt that the
defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not so important to know the reason for
the deed.[if !supportFootnotes][143][endif]
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to
kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service firearms; and the manner by
which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that
the shots were intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound
where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to kill,
and that there are instances where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge
was not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a
specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the
attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][144][endif]
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30
caliber carbine.[if !supportFootnotes][145][endif] While the use of these weapons does not always amount to
unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and
hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even
killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that
moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to
which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the tires especially
considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in
encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms
employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the driver himself of being hit
and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with
the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to
them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical
impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence
put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners actuations leaned
towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was
seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the
consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than
that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v.
State[if !supportFootnotes][146][endif] tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his own
acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination
of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man
always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed
another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but
was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the
burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate
intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744
that he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and frustrated homicide. Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional
and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
the incident of another act performed without malice. [if !supportFootnotes][147][endif] People v. Guillen[if
!supportFootnotes][148][endif]
and People v. Nanquil [if !supportFootnotes][149][endif] declare that a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,[if
!supportFootnotes][150][endif]
we held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence
inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of
frustrated homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan,
likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if
it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each
other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished
and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy,
he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.[if !supportFootnotes][151][endif]
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense,
the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. [if !supportFootnotes][152][endif] The instant case
requires no proof of any previous agreement among petitioners that they were really bent on a violent
attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from the moment
petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had converged and strategically posted themselves at the
place appointed by Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the common
impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it suddenly occurred to them
that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it to stop and
submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were confronted with the convenient yet irrational
option to take no chances by preventing the jeepneys supposed escape even if it meant killing the driver
thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And by their concerted action of almost
simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the posts they had deliberately taken around the
immediate environment of the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they
did achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of the
jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive proof that tells which of all
the accused had discharged their weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by
Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayans conclusion that since only herein
petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their service firearms that night and had fired the
same, they should be held collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement
operation which had gone terribly wrong.[if !supportFootnotes][153][endif]
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the crimes
of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries
sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge
of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims.[if !supportFootnotes][154][endif] The allegation of evident
premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent with the
fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived
their suspects to be attempting flight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as
there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by
petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal
whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases are
entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating
circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed
in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have
denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed
attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted homicide is two
(2) degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence to be
meted out on petitioners is within the minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the
sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto
mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of Leodevince
Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to
Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P51,700.00 as
actual and compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages
should be deleted, there being no aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is
hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince
Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel
Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00 as moral
damages.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March
2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against petitioners John Eric
Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief
Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of
Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of
the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had
placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s
end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of
Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"), 5 Section 86 of Presidential Decree No.
984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"),7 Section 1088 of Republic Act No. 7942
or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"),9 and Article 36510 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC")
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.11
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were
"duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners
John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the
Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or
justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC 12 initially deferred ruling on petitioners’
motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled
petitioners’ arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners’ motion, the MTC issued a
Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint
Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the
Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine tailings" which were
precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian
drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and
siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be undertaken
under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the single fact of
pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of
evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements constituting
violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the
terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other
words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after taking into
consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3)
aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be
maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water
Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid violations
are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code; and
Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the
Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained and
heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic]
damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not the negligent act of polluting
the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the
prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. 13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners’ arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the
hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended to
appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of
record petitioners’ manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of "not
guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque,
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942.
Petitioners’ petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with
the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of
PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondent’s appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondent’s
motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent’s appeal consolidated with petitioners’ petition in Branch
94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondent’s appeal but denied petitioners’
petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation
of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order
in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no absorption
by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct
from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same with each other. Concededly, the
single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was
the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a
well-established rule in this jurisdiction that –
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from
one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not although they stemmed from a single act.15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted with
grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the
Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations
contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.16 Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained
of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts complained of"
in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners
should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC. 17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94’s ruling. The appellate
court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned Informations
for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides
the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners’ claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the doctrine laid
down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People’s argument with respect to the variances in the mens
rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the context of
the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since the
Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are
national in character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent’s understanding that the laws by which the petitioners
have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different.
Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, although
they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise to any
suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Court’s quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for
violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial court’s denial of the
petitioner’s motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 18
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution of 14
March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING THE
CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING
THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR
INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE
TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES
CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986
THAT "AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR
OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH
CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE,
RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT
PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING
ACT CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.]19
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges
and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as
Section 13 of Rule 11020 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases
in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one
offense.21
Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single
information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to
avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. 23 Here, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the
petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only — Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property — because (1) all the charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a
single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2)
the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element of "lack
of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend
against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the
accused for more than one offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."25 In People v. Doriquez,26 we
held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same" —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x
x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from
the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.27
(Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. 28 However, for the limited
purpose of controverting petitioners’ claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote
with approval Branch 94’s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the
RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element
not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of mine
tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the
authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump said
mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution
Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly
prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has
complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the
necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual
pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be
exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of precaution
on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation
and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt
materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the
accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run-
off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted
under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the
accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws.
Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the
Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast
with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se. 29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident,
is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those
violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes this Court’s
ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Court’s statement in Relova that the law seeks
to prevent harassment of the accused by "multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from
one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one Manuel
Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of
violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated
Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those
two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a
national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act under
the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of
electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the
first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from the express
terms of the constitutional provision involved – which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioner’s position is that it must be
examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather
under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general
rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is
for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the
first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV
(22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double
jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses
spring from the same act or set of acts. x x x30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single act not
only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals
held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by
an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21,
Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses
arising from the same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and the
Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court 2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch
54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646. 3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an
information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio
R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of
Section 27(b). The information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995 elections,
in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer
Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and
Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by
senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes,
as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the
Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420,
008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No.
436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence,
except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator
Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of
Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but
applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower
which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she
is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to commit
her person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders from
the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification,
increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the
following as errors of the appellate court:
I in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the use of
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT,
NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE
VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE
PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS
BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES
DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO
ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh.
"7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL
OR INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous, based on speculations, surmises
and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to reduce the
votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law,
which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or
mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special
law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts
are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With
these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where
the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in
Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after
proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and
canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could
not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally
increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is
done with malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes,
unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving
its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof
were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the Statement of
Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from the
precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the number in the
Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes
received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by accused Viray
electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were handed to
appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts listed in each
Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of
Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added all
the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was reflected was
handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the
column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct,
nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos.
008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the
grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423. 15The grand total
of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000
votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the
Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of
1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the
board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it
was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to
perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how the
SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921
votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was to assure accurate,
correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her
trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility
pursuant to the dictates of the law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Sen.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability
under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an
election is already punishable under the said provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The Court
has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and
the appellate court on the matter coincide.21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of
canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting
statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose
entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.22
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921 votes
and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be
validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record
unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to
another.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead
of six months is AFFIRMED.