03 SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE V.

RAYMOND MANALO • Respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order" to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of
their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007, prior to the promulgation of the
PETITIONER/S: The Secretary of National Defense, The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders,
Philippines
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
RESPONDENT/S: Raymond Manalo, Reynaldo Manalo
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of
DOCTRINE: The Writ of Amparo is a remedy for those whose right to life, liberty and security
the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved
is violated or threatened to be violated, including extralegal killings and enforced
to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable
disappearances.
to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their
motion. On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a
SUMMARY: petition under the Amparo Rule.

RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO were forcibly taken from their • On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein
respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by respondents thus, this appeal.
unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident,
relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects:
ISSUE/S:
Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
In the evening of August 13, 2007, at about 1:00 a.m., Raymond and Reynaldo escaped from 1. W/N the court of appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full
captivity. faith and credit to the incredible, uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously
scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent
Raymond Manalo.
Respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
2. W/N the court of appeals seriously and grievously erred in requiring respondents
Order" to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of
(herein petitioners) to: (a) furnish to the manalo brother(s) and to the court of
their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,prior to the promulgation of
appeals all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
theAmparoRule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders,
connection with their case, except those already in file with the court; (b) confirm in
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
writing the present places of official assignment of m/sgt. Hilario aka rollie castillo
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of
and donald caigas; and (c) cause to be produced to the court of appeals all medical
the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved
reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and
to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable
medicines prescribed, if any, to the manalo brothers, to include a list of medical
to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their
personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until
motion. On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a
august 12, 2007.
petition under the Amparo Rule.

HELD:
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein
respondents thus, this appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that the case at bar falls within the
coverage of the Writ of Amparo, and affirmed the 2007 decision. 1. No. The case falls within the coverage of the Writ of Amparo.
2. No, the Supreme Court did not err.
FACTS
RATIO:
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO were forcibly taken from their
respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action:
unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident,
relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person
Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
In the evening of August 13, 2007, at about 1:00 a.m., Raymond and Reynaldo escaped from
captivity.
  The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
 Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required: Sec.
17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.
 After careful perusal of the evidence presented, the Supreme Court affirmed the
findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses
in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14,
2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The
abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is
dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and
tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his
memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel." "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang
tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni
Manuel." "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay.
Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas." "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung
saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena." "Tinanong ko sa isang
kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text
ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."
 The court was also convinced that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion
that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering
that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the
brother of petitioners.
 There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and
surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are
physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word" as
their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people
they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are
still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly
connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position tothreaten
respondents' rights to life, liberty and security." Respondents claim that they are under threat of
being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of
their right to security of person.
• The right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as
the highest aspiration of the common people." Some scholars postulate that "freedom from
fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human
right. It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from
fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides:
• Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
• In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of
person:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and
in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
• The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
• In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range
from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary
from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength
of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more
correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this
light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule
is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
• 1 Petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the
characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1)
the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause
with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving
and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and
affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by
name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to
be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of
petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
 Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo
Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a
protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
 Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of
documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides in relevant part:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an
action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
 documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control...
 The disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as
perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety
of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure
would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and
court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the
respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing
information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate
medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
 In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these
rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns
and prisoners behind secret walls.
CARPIO-MORALES V. COURT OF APPEALS AND BINAY
PETITIONER/S: Carpio-Morales
RESPONDENT/S: Court of Appeals (6th Division) and Jejomar Erwin S. Binary, Jr.
DOCTRINE: The Doctrine of Condonation no longer exists in this jurisdiction. Public office
is a public trust. Due to the principle of accountability, an elective local official’s
administrative liability for misconduct cannot be wiped off by being elected into public office a
second term. He cannot be absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense
done during a prior term.
SUMMARY:
July 2014 - Bondal and Enciso filed a complaint/affidavit before the OMB against Mayor
Binay Jr. and other public officers of Makati City government, accusing them of Plunder and
violation of RA 3019 (AGCPA) for the Makati Parking Building. September 2014 – the OMB
created the 1st Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding investigation and file a
complaint if warranted. In March 2015, it filed a complaint against Binay Jr., et al., charging
them with 6 administrative cases and 6 criminal cases for violation of Sec.3(e) of RA 3019. It
found the Binay released funds in several increments from 2010 – 2013. The OMB created a
2nd Special Panel of investigators to conduct a P.I. and administrative adjudication on the
OMB cases. It issued orders requiring Binay, et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.
Before they filed counter-affidavits, the OMB (upon recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel)
issued a preventive suspension order, placing Binay under preventive suspension for not more
than 6 months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB cases. The OMB directed the
DILG Sec. Roxas to immediately implement this order. Binay filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA for a TRO and to nullify the preventive suspension order. Peña assumed office
as Acting Mayor. CA granted Binay’s TRO against the preventive suspension order, applying
the condonation doctrine from Aguinaldo v. Santos. His re-election in 2013 condoned any
administrative liability from anomalous activities. The OMB pleaded that the Court abandon
the condonation doctrine. Issue in this case is whether or not the CA can apply the condonation
doctrine in this case. The Court held that the Doctrine of Condonation no longer exists in this
jurisdiction.
A public official can no longer be absolved of any administrative liability arisen from an
offence done during a prior term even if there is re-election.
FACTS:
• A complaint was filed by Atty. Renato Bondal and Nicolas “Ching" Enciso VI before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the
City Government of Makati accusing them of plunder and violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” in connection with the five
(5) phase of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
 The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-
finding investigation. The 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB complaint)
against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six administrative cases for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, and six criminal cases for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB cases).
 Binay’s first term: Binary issued the Notice of Award for Phase III, IV, and V of
the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc’s Construction Corporation
(Hilmarc’s), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract without the
required publication and the lack of architectural design, and approved the release
of funds therefor.
 Binay’s second term: Binay, Jr. approved of the release of funds for the remaining
balance of contract with Hilmarc’s for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building
project. Binay also approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
contract with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design
and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building.
 Before Binay, Jr., et al’s filing of counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman issued the
subject preventive suspension order placing Binay, Jr., et al under preventive
suspension for not more than six months without pay, during the pendency of the
OMB Cases.
The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public
officer are present, finding that:
A. The evidence of Binay, Jr., et al’s guilt was strong given that:
(1.) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati
City has attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project;
 (2.) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and
(3.) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of
funds; and
B.
(1) Binay, Jr., et al were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
(2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and
(3) Binay, Jr., et al’s respective positions give them access to public records and
allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office
may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB cases filed against them.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals:
Binay contends: that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity
attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a)Phases I
and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second
term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic. In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented
against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported
irregularities. In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear
and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and
2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to
sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
• At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay,
Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier
that day.
1. The OMB manifested that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since
the preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer
any act to restrain
Proceedings before the Supreme Court:
• In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6,
2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition before this Court, arguing that
the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained
that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been
raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there
is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his
re-election in 2013.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the CA can apply the condonation doctrine in granting a TRO against the preventive
suspension order?
HELD:
NO
Condonation - A victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating
the offender as if there had been no offense.
RATIO:
1. The condonation is a jurisprudential creation originating from Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a 1959 case, based on the weight of authority in
the U.S. The Court uncovered that there really no authority favoring the doctrine of
condonation. At least 17 US states have abandoned the condonation doctrine.
1. (a) Numerous states recognize the “own-successor theory” as an
exception to the condonation doctrine, that each term of a re- elected
incumbent is NOT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT, but rather one
continuous term of office.
2. (b) Some State courts ruled that the malversation of public funds is an
offense continuous in nature, in that the large sums of money illegally
collected during the previous years are still retained by the public
officer, and there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant
to make restitution to the country, which extends into the present term.
Neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct.
2. Since U.S. cases are only persuasive, the Court must analyze based on the
prevailing legal norms.
3. The Court agrees with the OMB that since 1959, the legal landscape has radically
shifted (1935 constitution, dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the
Filipinos under the 1987 Constitution). This, plus the impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, made the Court re-examine Pascual.
4. The Court went through Constitutional provisions.
1. (a) In the 1935 Constitution, the law was silent about public
accountability;
2. (b) however, it was codified in the 1973 constitution: "[p]ublic office is
a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people.”
3. (c) In the 1987 constitution, the experience of corruption and
dictatorship in Martial Law brought about the provision that “[t]he State
shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.”
4. More importantly, it provides that “public officers must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.”
 5. The same mandate is found in the Revised Admin Code and the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
6. The court cited other laws (like the LGC and RRACCS), but none of
them state that the administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of
re-election. The concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the
idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and
there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to
support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term.
7. On Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to
have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his
faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any: no such presumption exists in any statute or
procedural rule. Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full
knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. Misconduct committed by an elective official is
easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.
Condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned.
Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.
8. This court abandons the condonation doctrine, but prospectively.
DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
PETITIONER/S: Arturo M. De Castro
RESPONDENT/S: Judicial and Bar Council and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
DOCTRINE: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
SUMMARY:
CJ Puno’s 70th birthday (and compulsory retirement) is on May 17, 2010. Incidentally, it
occurs just days after the presidential elections on May 10, 2010. This gives rise to many legal
dilemmas because of Section 15, Article 7 of the Constitution, which prohibits the president
from appointing somebody two months immediately preceding the election and up to the end
of his/her term. Hence, many people sought for guidance from the Court to resolve this issue.
The first issue is whether or not Sec. 15, Art. 7 applies to the Judiciary. The SC says no. In
resolving the issue, the SC referred to another provision in the Constitution: Section 4 (1) of
Article 8 which says that any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence
thereof. The SC sought the intent of the framers of the Constitution and found out that the use
of the word “shall” in Section 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an
appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution.
FACTS:
• The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually
happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas:
o May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety?
o What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution,
which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor?
o May the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates
nominated or being considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees
to the incumbent President even during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article
VII?
o Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
• Preliminaries: Note that this is a consolidation of 7 cases, having the same set of legal issues.
This involves the appointment of the successor of Puno for the position of Chief Justice of the
SC.
o De Castro and Peralta (in their respective petitions) prays that JBC be compelled to submit to
President GMA the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next CJ.
o Soriano proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its search and nomination proceedings.
o PHILCONSA wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees because the prohibition in Article
VII of the Constitution only applies to appointments in the Executive Department.
o Former SolGen Estelito Mendoza seeks a ruling from the Court for the guidance of the JBC
on W/N Sec. 15, Art. VII applies to appointments in the Judiciary.
o Tolentino and Inting wants to enjoin JBC from submitting a list of nominees due to the
prohibition under Art. VII Sec. 15.
o Note: I will not include their respective arguments because it will be summed up by the Court
anyway in the end. Also, it might only confuse you.
• These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election.
o An interpretation of the following provisions is needed: Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, “Vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.”
• On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC,
addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the
Chief Justice be commenced immediately
• On January 18, 2010, the JBC issued the following resolution, which says:
o The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of
the incumbent Chief
Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno.
o As to the time to submit this shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in the light of the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and will consider all views on
the matter. (Di rin sila sure kung kelan nila susubmit yung list).
 As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement dated January
20, 2010. It was published in the Inquirer and the Philippine Star.
 Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Carpio, Corona, CarpioLMorales, Velasco, Nachura. Velasco and Nachura
declined their nomination.
o Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, applied, but later formally withdrew. Those whose nominations were accepted
without conditions were the following: Corona, Leonardo DeLCastro, Brion, Sandoval.
Candidates who accepted their nominations with conditions were Carpio and CarpioLMorales.
Declining their nominations were Atty. Henry Villarica and Atty. Gregorio M. Batiller, Jr.
o The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failure to
meet the standards set by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis VillaLIgnacio of the
Office of the Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the Office of the Ombudsman).
 JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or
opposition to the aforementioned candidates.
 In the meanwhile, time is marching in quick step towards May 17, 2010 when the
vacancy occurs upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno, and the JBC is not yet
sure as to when it shall submit the shortlist to the President.
ISSUE/S:
 W/N the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary – YES
 W/N a CJ really needs to be appointed despite a provision in the
Judiciary Act of 1948 which provides for Acting Chief Justice – YES
• W/N the JBC is mandated to submit the list of nominees to the President – YES
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No.
191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of
merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10L2L5LSC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar
Council:
A. To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created
by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
B. To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
C. To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
D. To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in
accordance with this decision.
RATIO:
ARTICLE 8, SECTION 4 of the CONSITUTION MAKES IT IMPERATIVE FOR THE
PRESIDENT TO APPOINT JUSTICES WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM THE OCCURRENCE OF
THE VACANCY
First Point: Intent of the Framers of the Constitution
• Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
o Sec. 15, Art VII L Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
o Sec. 4(1), Art VIII L The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
o Basically, the Supreme Court is trying to weigh these two provisions. Later on, we will find
out that Sec. 4(1) of Art. VIII is more important than the other.
• Some of the petitioners submit that the incumbent President can appoint successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against
presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the
Judiciary. The Court AGREES.
• The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers
devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to
reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
o The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that
underlies the political structure.
o As Adolfo Azcuna explained:
§ We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of powers in
government because we believe that the only way to protect freedom and liberty is to separate
and divide the awesome powers of government. Hence, we return to the separation of powers
doctrine and the legislative, executive and judicial departments.
 Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department. It lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in
Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
 Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others.
o Section 4(1) mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy.
o Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the
President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC.
• Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section
4 (1), Article VIII.
o That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
One precedent frequently cited by those who are against the immediate submission of the list to
the President is In Re: Valenzuela.
o The Court ruled that the appointments made by the President on two RTC judges during the
prohibition is VOID.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it
cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
o Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado, a
former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to
apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly
mentioned, should prevail.
While Valenzuela referred to the intent of the Constitutional Commission, its reference to the
records did not advance or support the final result. Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the
express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, upon the initiative of
Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, “a command [to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein
within 90 days from its occurrence,” which even Valenzuela conceded.
Moreover, the use of the word “shall” in Section 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative
duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to
the Constitution.
The 90 day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the
President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in
Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15,
Article VII prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.”
• Hence, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise
that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A
misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to
last after its false premises have been exposed. We reverse Valenzuela.
Second Point: The dangers surrounding the concept of “midnight appointment” are neutralized
by the JBC
 There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15
as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by
an outgoing Chief Executive.
 In Valenzuela, it was observed:
o Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for
buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations
o The second type (for partisan considerations) was dealt with in Aytona v. Castillo. In that
case, President Diosdado Macapagal defeated Pres. C.P. Garcia in the elections. The issuance
of 350 appointments in one
night before the inauguration of President Macapagal was considered to be an abuse of
Presidential prerogative.
o EXCEPTION TO THE ABOVE RULE: The Court recognized that there may well be
appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the
new President. Such appointments, so long as they are “few and so spaced as to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee’s qualifications,” can be made by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several
appointments made by President Garcia, which were shown to have been well considered, were
still upheld.
o Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably
be deemed to contemplate not only “midnight” appointments – those made obviously for
partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making – but also
appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential
election.
o On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII – allowing
appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein provided – is much narrower than
that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President
during the period of the ban
o Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and
the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Court’s view that, as a general
proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of
vote buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in
filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases.
• The following is very IMPT, so take note: this is where the role of JBC comes in.
• Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no
doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the
Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in
the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of
the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
 If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with
irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his
administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or
for partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of
the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC’s prior
processing of candidates.
 The intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the
Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential
election, or of satisfying partisan considerations.
o The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for
judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the President could not always
be assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had
to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there.
o The creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away
with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent
from the Aytona midnight appointment.
Third Point: Sec. 14 and 16 of Art VII does not apply to the Judiciary. So Sec. 15 should not
apply too
• Sec. 14-16, Art. VII concern the appointing powers of the President.
• Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by
an Acting President, and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It
has no application to appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments
can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will.
 Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the
restored requirement did not include appointments to the Judiciary.
 Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context.
 o It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments.
Fourth Point:
The wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent
President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial
independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing
authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the
same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will
end by June 30, 2010.
Fifth Point:
Some argues that there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the
prohibition period the successor of CJ Puno because anyway there will still be 45
days remaining out of the 90 days when the next President assumes office. The next
President may thus appoint the next Chief Justice without violating the mandatory
nature of the 90Lday period in Art. 8 Sec. 4(1). SC said that this is bullshit, because
it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Puno’s
retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every
situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
o Example: If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the total period of the
prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is
109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court, hence, the above argument fails to address these situations.
Seventh Point:
We can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President – any
President – to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting
justices of the Supreme Court.
o Sec. 9, Art. VIII of the Consti says that the Members of the Supreme Court shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least 3 nominees. It clearly refers to an appointee
coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to
become one.
o Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief
Justice (without JBC list)?
o The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper
analysis if and when circumstances permit (and also a good thesis topic).
AN ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE WAS NOT INTENDED BY THE FRAMERS
• It has been argued that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having
the next President appoint the successor.
o Section 12 of such act states: In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall
devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed,
or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every
Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice.
• The Court does not agree. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the
President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an acting capacity. The express
reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers contemplated an Acting Chief
Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply
written so in the
Constitution.
• In relation to the scheme of things under the present Constitution, Section 12 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not yet
appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers
of the office. It ought to be remembered, however, that it was enacted because the Chief Justice
appointed under the 1935 Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, and the confirmation process might take longer than expected.
• The Court goes on to say that in the history of the appointments of the CJs under the 1987
Constitution, there has been no wide gap between the retirement and resignation of the
incumbent and the assumption of office of the successor.
JBC MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO SUBMIT THE NAMES OF THE
NOMINEES TO THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE 90NDAY PERIOD
 Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within
90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90L day
period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the
process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before
the occurrence of the vacancy.
 The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy
occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the
President to make the appointment.
 The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President’s
mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates
whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the
discretion of the JBC.
o The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the
President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute
unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. So, there
must be first an unexplained delay on the part of the JBC in its submission before mandamus
can be sought.
MARBURY V. MADISON
PETITIONER/S: William Marbury
RESPONDENT/S: James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States DOCTRINE: The
Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void.
SUMMARY: Marbury was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. He
then applied directly to the Supreme Court of the US for a writ of mandamus to compel the
Secretary of State, Madison, to deliver the commission. The Supreme Court ruled that Marbury
had the remedy of mandamus and further ruled that the Supreme Court has the authority to
review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.
FACTS:
The President of the United States, by signing the commission, appointed Mr. Marbury, a
justice of the peace for the County of Washington, in the District of Columbia, and the seal of
the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the
verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment.
The appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years.
At the December term, 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and
William Harper, by their counsel, severally moved the court for a rule to James Madison,
Secretary of State of the United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue
commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as
justices of the peace in the District of Columbia.
ISSUE/S:
1. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
2. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and
determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void?
HELD:
1. Yes 2. Yes
RATIO:
1. It is therefore decidedly the opinion of the Court that, when a commission has been
signed by the President, the appointment is made, and that the commission is
complete when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the Secretary
of State. Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President and
sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed, and as the law creating the office
gave the officer a rich to hold for five years independent of the Executive, the
appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights which are
protected by the laws of his country. To withhold the commission, therefore, is an
act deemed by the Court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right,
for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
2. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.
• It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard
the Constitution and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
LORENZO TAÑ ADA V. MARIANO CUENCO
PETITIONER/S: Lorenzo M. Tañada and Diosdado Macapagal RESPONDENT/S: Mariano
Jesus Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio,
Placido Reyes, and Fernando Hipolito in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer,
DOCTRINE: Political question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. In other words, if an issue is deemed to be a political question the Supreme
Court is barred from deciding the case and must respect the doctrine of separation of powers
(Executive, Legislative, Judiciary branches). The Judiciary must refer such question back to the
appropriate branch and such branch must resolve it.
SUMMARY:
Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members
of the same Electoral Tribunal. Now the question in this case is whether or not this is a political
question, and it was held that it is not, as the question involves the validity of the election of
the officers (which is a judicial question), and not of the policy.
FACTS:
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied
by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to
the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost
the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision
the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of
9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the
majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority
senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the
NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he
deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) claimed that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the
SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise
the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the issue is a political question
HELD:
No, the issue at hand is not a political question.
RATIO:
1. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In other words, if an issue is
deemed to be a political question the Supreme Court is barred from deciding the case and must
respect the doctrine of separation of powers (Executive, Legislative, Judiciary branches). The
Judiciary must refer such question back to the appropriate branch and such branch must resolve
it.
2. In this case, the issue at bar is NOT a political question. The Supreme Court is not being
asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada
was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial
question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not
perform legislative acts.
3. But how should the gridlock/issue of who will become part of the SET be resolved? The
nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those
will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the
SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set
its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
MARCOS V. SAGUISAG (MARCOS BURIAL)
INTERVENORS: Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr., Rene A.Q. Saguisag, Jr., Rene A.C. Saguisag III
RESPONDENT/S: Saturnino C. Ocampo, Trinidad H. Repuno, Bienvenido Lumbera,
Bonifacio P. Ilagan, Neri Javier Colmenares, Maria Carolina P. Araullo, M.D., Samahan Ng
Exdetainees Laban Sa Detensyon At Aresto (Selda), Represented By Dionito Cabillas,
Carmencita M. Florentino, Rodolfo Del Rosario, Felix C. Dalisay, And Danilo M. Delafuente,*
Petitioners, V. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez (In His Capacity As The Deputy Chief of
Staff For Reservist And Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces of The Philippines), The Grave
Services Unit (Philippine Army), And General Ricardo R. Visaya (In His Capacity As The
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of The Philippines), Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, And
Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Represented By His Surviving Spouse Imelda Romualdez
Marcos
DOCTRINE: President Duterte’s decision involves a political question that is not a judiciable
controversy. He decided a question of policy based on his wisdom. There being no taint of
grave abuse, his decision is outside the ambit of judicial review. Petitioner must have standing
to question the validity
Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
Issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily,
out of malice, ill will or personal bias. None is present in this case.
SUMMARY
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) whose remains are currently in Ilocos Norte.
On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana
issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB. Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte on July 11, 2016. Dissatisfied
with the foregoing issuance, petitioners filed certiorari and prohibition, certiorari-in-
intervention, prohibition, and mandamus and prohibition. The procedural issues before the
court are 1)W/N President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB poses a judiciable controversy; 2)W/N petitioners have locus standi to file the
petitions, 3)W/N petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and hierarchy of courts. The substantive issues are 1)W/N respondents Secretary of National
Defense and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with
the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise, 2)W/N the
issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the
Constitution, domestic, and internal laws. Particularly 1987 Constitution, RA 289, RA 10368,
AFP Regulation G 161-375, ICCPR, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law of the UN General Assembly, “Updated
set of Principles for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat
Impunity of the UN Economic and Social Council. 3)W/N historical facts, laws enacted to
recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the
Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former president to
interment at the LNMB. 4)W/N Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the
remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the
Government as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to
and interred in the Philippines. The court ruled that it is a political question and not a judiciable
controversy. Political Question is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a political measure. The interment of President Marcos in the LNMB is a
discretionary act of President Duterte.
FACTS:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) whose remains are currently in Ilocos Norte.
August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte on July 11, 2016. On August 9, 2016,
respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the following directives to the
Philippine Army (PA) Commanding General
[x] Vigil -Provide vigil- [x] Bugler/Drummer [x] Firing Party [x] Military Host/Pallbearers [x]
Escort and Transportation [x] Arrival/Departure Honors Dissatisfied with the foregoing
issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:
1. Certiorari and Prohibition
1. Ocampo, et. al in their capacity as human rights advocates or human rights
violations victims as defined in RA 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013)
2. Zaira Baniaga, et. al. as concerned citizens and taxpayers
c. Algamar Latiph (former Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights Comission, ARMM) on
behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the Martial Law
d. Leila De Lima as member of the Senate, public official, and concerned citizen
2. Certiorari-in-Intervention
a. Saguisag Sr and son, as members of the bar and human rights lawyers
3. Prohibition
1. Rep Lagman in personal capacity as member of the HoR, and as Honorary
Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND) –an
organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during
martial law; others as elected Congressmen of HoR
2. Loretta Pargas-Rosales (former Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights),
et. al as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law
4. Mandamus and Prohibition
a. Heherson Alvarez, former Senator, et. al as concerned Filipino
Citizen and taxpayers
ISSUE/S:
Procedural
1. W/N President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB poses a judiciable controversy
2. W/N petitioners have locus standi to file the petitions
3. W/N petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts
Substantive
1. W/N respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral committed
grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when they issued
the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of
President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise
2. W/N the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive
violate the Constitution, domestic, and internal laws. Particularly 1987 Constitution,
RA 289, RA 10368, AFP Regulation G 161-375, ICCPR, Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law of the UN General Assembly, “Updated set of
Principles for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to
Combat Impunity of the UN Economic and Social Council.
3. W/N historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses
and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have
nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former president
to interment at the LNMB.
4. W/N Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former
President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the
 Government as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws
brought back to and interred in the Philippines or jurisprudence.

HELD: • Petitioners Saguisag, et al. as members of the Bar, are required to allege any direct or
potential injury which the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as an institution, or its members
may suffer as a consequence of the act complained of. Suffice it to state that the averments in
I. Procedural
their petition-in-intervention failed to disclose such injury, and that their interest in this case is
1. No, it is a political question
too general and shared by other groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without
2. No, they do not have locus standi
more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.
3. Yes, they violated such doctrines
II. Substantive
1. NO, there is no grave abuse of discretion • As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
2. NO, there is no violation of the constitution, domestic law and transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
international law interest. In cases involving such issues, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental
3. NO, it has not nullified his entitlement as a soldier and president to be constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.
interned in LNMB
4. NO, the burial is not deemed waived when they entered into an
• At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a
agreement with the government
national military cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no profound effect on the
political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-
RATIO: seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed.
Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental
constitutional rights.
I. PROCEDURAL
a. NO, it is a political question
Senator De Lima, and Congressman Lagman, et al. come before the Court as legislators suing
to defend the Constitution and to protect appropriated public funds from being used
 The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the unlawfully. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a institution to which they belong, their standing as members of the Congress cannot be upheld.
justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the They do not specifically claim that the official actions complained of, i.e., the memorandum of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of the Secretary of National Defense and the directive of the APP Chief of Staff regarding the
1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public interment of Marcos at the LNMB, encroach on their prerogatives as legislators.
domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall
promote national healing and forgiveness. c. YES, they had violated such doctrines
• Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
 There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed
below, President Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the ambit of
judicial review. hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery
b. NO, they don’t have locus standi
can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
• Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar the court's judicial power can be sought.
and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that
they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB.  Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the
• In this case, what is essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense. The
President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners Secretary of National Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if
merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order.
Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of
 sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of his office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If
petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they could
elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and
supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).
 The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the
exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and
injunction when proven necessary. In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed
on procedural grounds alone. Even if We decide the case based on the merits, the
petitions should still be denied.
II. SUBSTANTIVE
a. NO, there is no grave abuse of discretion
 Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed
because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act
of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed
during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a "human rights
constitution." For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear
condemnation of Marcos' alleged "heroism."
b. NO, there is no violation of the constitution, domestic law and international law
 There basis on various sections of Article II are baseless for such provision are not
self-executing provisions because of absence of legislation.
 In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a selfexecuting
provision considering that a law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define
and effectuate the principle embodied therein.
 Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the
Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional
duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism
and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision
on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten
wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect
prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.
• The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President to "ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed, " which is identical to Sec. 1, Title I, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief
Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his or her department.
• Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and
proper steps" to carry into execution the law.62 The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its
being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions.
• It is best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision
simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is
not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
• Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 1 7, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the
international human rights laws cited by petitioners
• FOR RA no. 289
• It is asserted that Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal standard by which a person's
mortal remains may be interred at the LNMB, and that AFP Regulations
G 161-375 merely implements the law and should not violate its spirit and intent. • Petitioners
are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the oral arguments, they miserably failed to
provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the National
Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and
separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of
President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by President
Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by Marcos' Proclamation No.
208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise
not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on National
Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the
establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
• Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners' allegations
must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave"
or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the
burial of each and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of
separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of
authority to the President under existing laws and regulations.
 Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not
equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself does not
confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is actually a
misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives,
has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require
that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero."
 Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors,"
without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to
the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment have been
finalized by public respondents.
 FOR RA no. 10368
 Certainly, R.A. No. 10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of all
Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or
involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights violations
committed from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986. To restore
their honor and dignity, the State acknowledges its moral and legal
obligation to provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for
the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they
experienced.
 Additionally, R.A. No. 10368 requires the recognition of the violations
committed against the HRVV s, regardless of whether they opt to seek
reparation or not.
 This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial
provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the
prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend
the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented
perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a provision
specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a
"reparation" for the HRVV s, but they did not. As it is, the law is silent
and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is
simply not there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume
the legislative will by supplying material details into the law. That
would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
 Considering the foregoing, the enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under
R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal
connection and legal relation to the law. The subject memorandum and
directive of public respondents do not and cannot interfere with the
statutory powers and functions of the Board and the Commission. More
importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for by
R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are not curtailed
FOR International Human Rights Law
• Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVV s
to "full" and "effective" reparation, which is provided under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly on December 16, 2005, and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity
• We do not think so. The ICCPR, as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat
impunity, call for the enactment of legislative measures, establishment of national
programmes, and provision for administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance with the
country's constitutional processes, that are necessary to give effect to human rights embodied
in treaties, covenants and other international laws. The U.N. principles on reparation expressly
states:
• Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail new
international or domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and
methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights
law and international humanitarian law which are complementary though different as to their
norms
• Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a
single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at
the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already
engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of
Filipinos.
c. NO, it has not nullified his entitlement as a soldier and president to be interned in LNMB
• Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer
to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the
burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected
ground. Neither does it negate the presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men and
women buried or will be buried therein. The "nation :S esteem and reverence for her war dead,
" as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still
stands unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a
violation of the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national military
shrine.
• Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a)
Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c) Secretaries of
National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active
and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in
line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat
operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered
or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII
and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other
deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-
Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of
Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of
National Defense and Chief of Staff. Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are
not qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were
convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.
 In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP
Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are
entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they
were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not
revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The
validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been
 issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of
National Defense, who is the alter ego of the President.
 It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to
argue that the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a
symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military
memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a military
cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the
purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither
been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only
those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." In fact, the privilege of
internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years.
 Since 1986, the list of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military
service or military-related activities but also non-military personnel who were
recognized for their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as
government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons
whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress or Secretary of National Defense).
 In 1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and
Chief of Staff were added to the list.
W/N the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in
order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to
the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military
service and military-related activities
• Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander- in-Chief, a
legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of
Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard
Marcos as a President and Commander-in- Chief, but we cannot deny him the right to be
acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense, We
agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person.
While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like
us.
• Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by final
judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
• Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that Marcos was not
convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No less than the 1987
Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law and that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf "
• Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to
safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give
him or her the privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation
from the Commanderin-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of National Defense, no right can
be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is not legally demandable and
enforceable.
• There is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents
buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification between a
military personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208
and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military memorials, it is also an
active military cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons interred
therein.
• Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly
recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have
not shown that he was dishonorably discharged from military service under APP Circular 17,
Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for
violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War
 Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency
during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion
or discharge from the military service. The fact that the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987
 Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the
military. Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the court
martial, the President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by AFP
Regulations G 161-375.
 Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional
and direct
 sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a
mere administrative regulation.
 It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people
through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not
be automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious
consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the
Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from
multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the people.
d. NO, the burial is not deemed waived when they entered into an agreement with the
government
 The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO,
which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under
 the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under the Office of
the President.
 The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a
self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he
is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
• Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public
use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved
land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by
law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding
the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended by the past
Presidents
• The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a secretary, a military personnel , a veteran, and a Medal of
Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the
public use requirement.
• Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB
was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation
that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually
motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As
the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual
basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues
since We are not a trier of facts.
• dissenting opinion Sereno, CJ:
• As will be further discussed, this Court cannot refuse to review an issue simply because it is
alleged to be a political question. That train has departed a long time ago. Prevailing
jurisprudence is a generation apart from the former use: ulness of the political question
doctrine as a bar to judicial review. The reason for that departure - Philippine Martial Law
experience.
• Section 1, Article VIII, “Judicial power includes the duty of the comis of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” the so-
called expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
• The new provision vests in the judiciary, particularly in the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature, as well as to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction, should they be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Summary of the dissenting opinions of the 5 magistrates Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno
• President Rodrigo Duterte acted with grave abuse of discretion by allowing the burial because
it violates domestic and international law "to do justice for human rights victims" – both
monetarily and non-monetarily.
 Marcos' interment would be the "antithesis of symbolic reparation".
 Public funds may not be used to honor Marcos who was named a "dictator,
plunderer and a human rights violator" by the judiciary and the legislative.
 "Bringing about national unity and healing itself, is insufficient to justify the use of
public funds absent a public purpose." Senior Justice Antonio Carpio
 Even if Marcos was a medal of valor awardee, he "ceased to qualify" for
interment at the heroes' shrine because he was ousted through the 1986
EDSA People Power Revolution.
 "Marcos' ouster is beyond judicial review and must be accepted as an
incontrovertible fact, which has become part of history."
 He disagreed with the majority argument that Marcos was not
dishonorably discharged based on the Armed Forces of the Philippines'
Circular 17 Series 1987 because the late strongman was ousted before it
was passed and it cannot be applied retroactively.
 The senior magistrate pointed out that Marcos is the "very antithesis of
freedom and democracy because he was a dictator as declared by the
[SC]."
 Burying Marcos at the national shrine is also contrary to public policy,
based on Republic Act 10368 or the Human Rights Victims Reparations
Act.
Justice Marvic Leonen
 Based on the Constitution, only the Filipino people "can determine a
President's place in history"
 Marcos is not a hero or "an exemplary public officer" because of the
human rights atrocities committed under his regime
 The orders to bury him at the Libingan ng mga Bayani violate Republic
Act 289, which created the National Pantheon. Section 1 of the law says
that only those "who have led lives worthy of emulation" can be buried
at the heroes' shrine.
 Duterte's order to allow the burial contradicts his oath of office "because
they encourage impunity, which is the result of rewarding the person
 who presided over human rights violations and who personally
participated in the plunder of public treasury."
 The government failed to show factual basis to prove that Marcos' burial
would not violate RA 289 in relation to the findings of the National
Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP). The NHCP earlier
released a study disputing the claims that Marcos was a soldier and war
veteran.
Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa
• The justice says the argument that the late president's burial does not make him a hero
"disregards the status of LNMB as a national shrine, the public policy in treating national
shrines, [and] the standards set forth in these laws and executive issuances..."
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 allows the President to identify the purpose of
certain public lands through a proclamation or an executive order. But President Rodrigo
Duterte issued only "verbal orders" to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which falls short of
what is prescribed by law.
• Burying Marcos' remains is not of public purpose and does not justify disbursement of public
funds
GMA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PETITIONER/S: Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
RESPONDENT/S: People of the Philippines
DOC TRINE:
The failure to properly allege the identity of the accused is violative of the rights of each
accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.
The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal
prosecution.
Noscitur a sociis is when the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering
the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated.
SUMMARY:
This case is regarding a case filed in the Sandiganbayan against former Pres. GMA and PCSO
Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas for conspiracy to commit plunder, which is
penalized by RA. 7080. This is for conspiring to accumulate P365,997,915 by taking undue
advantage of their respective official positions and raiding the public treasury. However, the
Court ruled that the Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte. Also, that no proof of amassing, or accumulating, or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.
Further, the Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury.
FACTS:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and
Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas. On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the
Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and
Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose
charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence
were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes, who were at large) for conspiracy to commit
plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. The information reads:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx
Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the
offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective
official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail, which
were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was
strong. After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed
their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder
against them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient
evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for
reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas, which were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan,
they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among
GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of
plunder: (a) Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate act
of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?
HELD:
1. NO
2. (a) NO (b) NO
RATIO: malversation occurs when “any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA,
person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common
Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken.
prior to, during and after the implied agreement. The Prosecution did not allege that the Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that
conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires
chain conspiracy. such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending
that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public
treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient
raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the
basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable
doubt.
We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy,
however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A.
No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was
not only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it was
essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges
they were being made answerable for. In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the
main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the
rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million

was adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti
should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution. The Prosecution adduced no evidence
showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated
or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or
otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs
[Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or
Uriarte.

The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury (under Section 2
(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds as
defined in RA 7080. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction
noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering
the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own;
to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a
good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;” and