DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs HON. EMMANUEL M. MUÑOZ G.R. No.

L-24796

23 SCRA 1183 – Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds – Systems of Registration Prior to PD 1529 – Spanish Titles

Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco) is a company engaged in logging. It was given a Certificate of
Private Woodland Registration so that it can operate in a 72,000 hectare land. It also has a Titulo de Propriedad which it acquired in
1894 under the Spanish regime.

In 1964, the NAWASA (National Water and Sewerage Authority) director ordered the cancellation of Piadeco’s certificate because it
encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed area which was
prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its
certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should
have never been used to apply for a Certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.

HELD: No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. There should be no question now that
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised
Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations “deemed
expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply
of valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to
the same end.” Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of
the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations
to implement a given legislation, “[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.”
Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant
alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge,
said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact
that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.

ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?

HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be
acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Tan v Director of Forestry
FACTS:

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated
in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland,
which was turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their
application in due form.

The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general
memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions stated
therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)

Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon) promulgated on December 19, 1963 a
memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in
the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Director of Forestry .

Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The
Secretary of ANR declared Tan’s OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a
reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioner’s timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No)

RULING:

Petitioner’s timber license was signed and released without authority and is therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in
the general memorandum dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only
where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420
hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to
grant any license. (The license was released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 while on the other hand, the authority of the Director
of Forestry to issue license was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority
to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is the date of the
release or issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license.
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police
power.

II

Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders
or acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative
remedies.
SUNVILLE vs. JUDGE ABAD

The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent for the
eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.

FACTS:

Sunville was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA) authorizing it to exploit timber in Lison Valley, Zamboanga del Sur.
Respondents filed a petition with the DENR to annul the said TLA due to some serious violations of its conditions and provisions of
forestry laws, carried out by petitioner. They likewise filed a complaint for injunction in the RTC, based on the same causes of action.
Sunville filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the court and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The motion was
denied by Judge Abad of the RTC. The CA affirmed and held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found
that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention given the petitioner’s operations have
caused heavy siltation in various rivers.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents should first exhaust administrative remedies?

HELD:

YES. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the
resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. One of
the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-
interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. As correctly
suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial
action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the
administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and
10) in quo warranto proceedings. In this case, the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first
instance on this controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene. The respondents have failed
to satisfactorily establish that the extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative
remedies and immediate resort to the courts. In fact, Sunville has stopped its operations in compliance with the order of the DENR.
The Director of Forestry vs. Villareal

GR No. L-32266

February 27, 1989

Facts: The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several persons who opposed the application for registration of a parcel land
classified as mangrove swamps in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz with an area of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps, to
the applicant Ruperto Villareal. He alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interests had been in possession of the said parcel of land
for more than forty years (40). Both parties agreed in one point that the disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The respondent
argued that mangrove swamp are agricultural land but the petitioner contended that it is a forestall land therefore not disposable.The
Court of the First Instance of Capiz however grants the application of the respondent. The decision of the lower court was later
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the Director of Forestry elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not, mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.

Held: The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Furthermore the legislative definition embodied in section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines
hence they are not alienable. The evidence presented by the respondent in its claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and
ownership of the land, he only presented tax declaration. Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the
application for registration of title by the respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR
OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION,
respondents.

FACTS:

On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except
prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of
Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.

However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a
memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of
petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.

Subsequently, petitioner’s timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos
which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging
that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken
on his letter;

Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by petitioner’s TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be
logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by
relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President,
and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the
reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation
of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry
laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession
area. However, petitioner's request was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the
timber license agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion. Petitioner
subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. The Office of the President, acting through then
Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for
certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling his timber license agreement
and the granting of TLA to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

HELD:

NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to
the adverse legal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that unreasonable
delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the
right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for
at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in
1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief
from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to
laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor which
bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the
present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue
of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of
utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause.
G.R. No. 125797 February 15, 2002

DENR, 
VS. GREGORIO DARAMAN

Facts:

This is a case filed by the DENR represented by RED Israel Gaddi against Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio who were caught
by one Pablo opinion to transport illegal pieces of lumber using the vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio, the Holy Cross Funeral Services.
Here, the respondents alleged without proper documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had no permit to transport lumber although
they that one Asan, owner of furniture shop ask the two to bring also some pieces of wood to his house located near the funeral’s
location.

DENR employee, saw the vehicle and inspected it, there he saw some lumber and issued an order of forfeiture. The court granted bond
and released the funeral car and lumber because it was found out that Daraman and Lucenecio were not owners of the vehicle and
lumber. Hence, this complaint was filed.

Issue: WON the respondents violated P.D. 705 section 68-A

Held:

Yes. The court cannot deny the fact that Section 68-A P.D. 705 is also applicable to those who transport lumber without proper
documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had no permit to transport lumber although they were only asked to bring the lumber to the
house of one Asan.

The RTC has overstepped its jurisdiction of the case since DENR was given the power to confiscate the property in favor of the
state/government. The release of this property defeated the purpose of section 68-A of P.D. 705. Therefore, SC granted the petition of
DENR, RTC’s decision was reversed and set aside.
CALUB V. CA
G.R. No. 115634
April 27, 2000

FACTS: the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles wherein Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present
proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. Petitioner,
Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed a criminal complaint against Abuganda, for violation of
Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, (Revised Forestry Code). Lower court ruled in favor of accused, and even
granted recovery of possession to them via replevin.
Upon petitioner’s appeal, the Court of Appeals denied said petition, stating that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant
to the authority granted by Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in
custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized
representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose
is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court.

The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. Additionally,
respondent CA noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990.
They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to
render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’ failure to comply with the procedure laid
down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation
order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such
procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis

ISSUE: W/N said motor vehicles are in custodial legis pursuant to Section 68 of PD 705. – YES.

RATIO: Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to
or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89
of the Revised Forestry Code. Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No.
59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice
to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly
took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and
impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written
notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The
seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be
absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Hence, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject
vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise
PAAT V. CA

G.R. No. 111107

January 10, 1997

FACTS: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from Cagayan, was seized
by DENR personnel in Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck
should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. Later, the Regional Executive Director
of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Respondents then appealed.

Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and
Executive Director, which thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and
Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause
of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, which the CA affirmed upon
petitioner’s appeal.

ISSUES:
1. W/N an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture
proceeding in the DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705. – NO.
2. W/N the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting
illegal forest products in favor of the government. – YES.

RATIO: Firstly, the Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to
one’s cause of action. In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it
was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order
of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an
administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case.
Secondly, as to the power of the DENR to confiscate, “SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly
Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.”
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the
authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.

Lastly, as to the contention that since they are not liable for qualified theft, then they should not have necessarily have
committed a crime under Sec. 68. This is unmeritorious. With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D.
705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense
independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that
provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it
eliminated the phrase “ shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
” and inserted the words “ shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ”.
Paat v CA (Natural Resources)

G.R. No. 111107

FACTS:

On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao,
Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck.

LOWER COURTS:

* CENRO: Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued
on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation.

* RED- DENR: On June 22, 1989,i[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive
Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive
Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.ii[2]

* DENR-SECRETARY (Pending resolution)

* RTC (action for replevin): denied motion to dismiss by Paat (DENR-RED)

* CA (review): denied, has legal questions involved.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

(1) Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable
property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?

NO, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action.

(2) Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal
forest products in favor of the government?

YES.

“SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases
of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations
and policies on the matter.” (Underline ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to
confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase “to dispose
of the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it
should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”

“SECTION 68. xxx

xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.” (Underline ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted
provision apparently does not mention nor include “conveyances” that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large
extent, due to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law
and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A.

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only ‘conveyances,' but forest
products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the ‘court' in a criminal action has long been provided for in
Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section
68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all.

it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended.

Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or
his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued
possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

OBITER DICTA:

(1) the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a
relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Hence, it is disregarded

(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

(2) the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within
the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

(3) “The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.”
LAGUA V. CUSI
G.R. No. L-44649
April 15, 1988
Ponente: Guiterrez, Jr.

FACTS: This is a mandamus case filed against respondents for closing a logging road without authority. The private respondents
extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development
Enterprises’ rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is
properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The lower court
affirmed the respondent’s defense, stating that the petitioners must first seek recourse with the Bureau of Forest Development to
determine the legality of the closure of the logging roads, before seeking redress with the regular courts for damages.

ISSUE: W/N the regular courts can take cognizance of the damages case without first seeking the determination of the Bureau
regarding the legality of the closure. – YES.

RATIO: P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest Development
to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an
action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the
petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding.
It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much
less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Forest Development.
[G.R. No. L-36847. July 20, 1983.]

SERAFIN B. YNGSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA
V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, Defendants-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN; HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL
RELEASED AS DISPOSABLE OR ALIENABLE. — It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain
that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has
authority to lease, grant, cell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for granting or other purposes,
fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for
fishery or other purposes.

2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAVING JURISDICTION OVER LEASES OF PUBLIC LANDS FOR DEVELOPMENT INTO
FISHPONDS; PREFERENTIAL RIGHT AMONG APPLICANTS, NOT FEASIBLE WHERE FILING OF APPLICATIONS
PREMATURE. — All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another.
The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the
swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential
treatment. Petitioner’s application was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private
respondents, who filed their applications within the one-year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in
spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary’s
order states that all three applications must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to
the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this
order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.

3. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY; CHARGED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF A PROVISION OF A
STATUTE; CONSTRUCTION GIVEN CONTROLLING WEIGHT. — The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose
of the provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was released
and not to grant a premature application a better right over another of the same category. The Supreme Court finds such an
interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed. In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) the
Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a
statute should be given controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) it was held that in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected. The records show that the above rulings
should also apply to the present case.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; CONTEMPT OF COURT; ABSENCE IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The petitioner has failed to show that the acts
committed by the respondents were a direct disturbance in the proper administration of justice and processes of the law which
constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of petitioner right, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the resolution
between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a criminal complaint or other before the courts. The Court held that
contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the court. The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court
which the Court can take cognizance of and punish. If any of his property or other rights over his one-third’s share of the disputed
property are violated, he can pursue the correct action before the proper lower court.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which upheld the orders of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into
fishponds. Originally taken to the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure question of law
was involved in the appeal.

There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement of facts in the Solicitor-General’s brief. We do the
same:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in
sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of
said area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said
purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio
Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as
communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes.

"On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries
followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the
same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area
was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting
claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10,
1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec.
on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal).

"In an order dated April 5,1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order of
the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of
one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed a petition for review
dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same was dismissed by
the Office of the President of the Philippines on December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for reconsideration filed by the
appellant on February 15, 1956 was likewise denied on August 3, 1956. A second and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the
appellant was also denied on August 5, 1958 and October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec. on Appeal)."cralaw virtua1aw library

Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance against the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M.
Lopez.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the order of the Director of
Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.

The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff had not established such "capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a special civil action.

The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH ‘CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL
EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT’ ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
JUSTIFYING REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE COURT.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT
ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE ‘PRIORITY RULE’ ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION OF THE BUREAU OF
FORESTRY THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE APPLICATIONS OF THE
APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING ONLY AND IN ORDERING THE DIVISION OF
THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS AWARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE
APPLICANTS.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.

Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into fishponds gravely abuse their
discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the only issue in this case.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application. —In determining the priority of application or right to a permit or lease the following rules shall
be observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the
right of preference thereto.

x x x

"‘(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the Director of Fisheries by reason of the fact that the
area covered thereby has been certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL NOT LOSE his right
as a PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry as available for fishpond
purposes, provided that not more than one (1) year has expired since the rejection or cancellation of his application, in which case, his
fishpond application which was rejected or cancelled before, shall be reinstated and given due course, and all other fishpond
applications filed for the same area shall be rejected.’"

The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946

2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947

3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952

4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953

5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953.

The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that
all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all
five applicants filed their applications.

After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngson’s application and rejected
those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngson’s priority of application.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authorities committed no grave abuse of discretion.

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as
disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise
dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of
utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara v.
Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1184).

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.

All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The priority given in
paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition
and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the
administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is
not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years
before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one year period,
do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the
fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary’s order states that all three applications must be considered as having
been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares
among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed
in toto.

The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature
application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was released and not to grant a premature application a better right over
another of the same category. We find such an interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed. In the
case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and
enforcing the provision of a statute should be given controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in
the absence of a clear showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected. The records show that
the above rulings should also apply to the present case.

During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have Patricio Bayoborda, Rene Amamio, and nine other
respondents, declared in contempt of court. Petitioner charged that Bayoborda and Amamio entered the property in controversy and
without petitioner’s consent, laid stakes on the ground alleging that the same were boundaries of the areas they were claiming; that
the other respondents likewise entered the property on different dates and destroyed petitioner’s hut and the uppermost part of his
fishpond and started to build houses and to occupy the same. In their comment, the respondents in the contempt motion denied
petitioner’s charges. Bayoborda and Amamio stated that they were bona-fide applicants for fishpond purposes of areas outside the 22
hectares allotted for the petitioner and that they were authorized to place placards in the areas they applied for. As evidence the
respondents attached a copy of the resolution of the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) showing that their
applications have been duly received and acknowledged by the latter and in compliance with government regulations, they placed
markers and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution likewise stated that these markers and signs were subsequently
destroyed and later on Mr. Yngson started development by building dikes in the area applied for, which he has no authority to do so
due to the present conflict. The resolution further prohibited Yngson from constructing any improvements in any area outside his 22
hectares and also prohibited Bayoborda and Amamio from entering and making constructions in the applied for areas pending the
issuance of their permits.

The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct disturbance in the proper administration of
justice and processes of the law which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of petitioner’s rights, he should resort
to PACLAP which issued the resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a criminal complaint or other action
before the courts. The motion also raises factual considerations including boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial
court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the court. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA
23; Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140, 142).

The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take cognizance of and punish. If any of his property or other
rights over his one-third’s share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the correct action before the proper lower court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against Petitioner-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.