China Airlines Flight 120

China Airlines Flight 120

Burnt-out wreckage of Flight 120 at Naha Airport.

Accident summary
Date August 20, 2007

Type Fire, caused by fuel leak

Site Naha Airport, Okinawa, Japan

Passengers 157

Crew 8

Injuries 3 (and 1 ground crew)[1]

Fatalities 0

Survivors 165 (all)

Aircraft type Boeing 737-809[2]

Operator China Airlines

Tail number B-18616[3]

Flight origin Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport

Destination Naha Airport

China Airlines Flight 120 was a regularly scheduled flight from Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport in
Taoyuan County, Taiwan to Naha Airport in Okinawa, Japan. On August 20, 2007, the Boeing 737-800
aircraft operating the flight caught fire and exploded after landing and taxiing to the gate area at Naha
Airport. Four people (three from the aircraft and one ground crew) sustained injuries in the
accident.Contents
1 Background

2 Accident sequence

3 Investigation

4 Aftermath

Background

The China Airlines aircraft, with registration number B-18616,had been delivered in July, 2002. Like
other Next Generation Boeing 737 aircraft, it was equipped with CFM56-7B26 engines.

There were 157 passengers aboard, including 2 infants. Of the number, 110 passengers were from
Taiwan, 23 were from Japan, and 24 were from other countries. The crew of eight were mostly
Taiwanese, with one Japanese flight attendant.

Accident sequence

The plane landed normally at 10:26 a.m. local time and taxied to the gate area by 10:34. Ground crew
noticed flames coming from engine number 2 as the captain shut it down in anticipation of gate
connection. Informed about the situation by air-traffic controllers, the captain ordered an emergency
evacuation. All passengers and flight attendants managed to leave the aircraft safely through the four
hatches using slides. The first officer and the captain left the aircraft through the cockpit windows when
the last flight attendant had fled from the right aft hatch. Immediately after the evacuation of the last
person (the Taiwanese captain), the number 1 engine and left wing fuel tanks exploded and burst
violently into flames, igniting a blaze that destroyed the aircraft. A statement from the airline confirmed
that all passengers and crew members were evacuated safely. A 57-year old Taiwanese man suffered
from hypertension and an 8-year-old Hong Kong girl felt unwell; both were sent to a hospital nearby. An
airport ground crew member was hurt during evacuation on the ground, and a flight attendant, who was
the last person to leave the cabin, fell over on the ground when the aircraft exploded.

Due to the accident, the taxiways of Naha Airport were closed until 11:03 a.m.
According to Naha Airport air traffic control, there was no report of any abnormal situation of the
aircraft during cruising and landing, and the status of the aircraft was normal.

Following the accident, the Taiwan Civil Aeronautics Administration grounded all 14 remaining Boeing
737-800s of China Airlines, Mandarin Airlines and the Republic of China Air Force for inspection of the
fuel systems. The Japan Civil Aviation Bureau asked Japanese operators of 737-700 and 737-800 aircraft
to similarly inspect their aircraft. No anomalies were found and the aircraft returned to service.

George Ishizaki recorded a raw video of the accident. The video is now copyrighted by the Associated
Press. Another raw video from a different angle captured by Katsutoshi Yuasa has been submitted to
Sankei Shimbun.

Investigation
Investigators discover hole in fuel tank of burnt-out China Airlines jet

Japan blames design, maintenance for explosion on China Airlines jet

The cause of the accident was investigated by the Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation
Commission of Japan.[3][4] The crew, as confirmed by the recording in the cockpit voice recorder, did
not observe any abnormalities before the incident.

The investigating team confirmed that the aircraft caught fire in the gate area and there was no sign of
fuel leakage during taxiing to the gate. The investigation focused on the possibility that a fuel leak led to
the fire. At a news conference on August 24, investigators revealed that a bolt, which had come loose
from the slat track, had punctured the right wing fuel tank, creating a hole 2–3 centimetres in diameter.

Aftermath
Emergency inspections ordered on all Boeing 737s in aftermath of China Airlines explosion

Boeing 737 inspection deadline shortened after four jets found with similar fault to China Airlines plane
China Airlines stated they would compensate passengers NT$1000 for every kilogram of luggage lost, for
a maximum of NT$20,000 for checked-in pieces of luggage and another NT$20,000 maximum for carry-
on luggage.

In the stock trading after the accident, China Airlines stock fell along with Taiwan Fire & Marine
Insurance Co.

Due to the accident, on August 25, the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ordered
emergency inspections of wing leading-edge slat tracks on all Next Generation Boeing 737 aircraft. The
Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) from the FAA requires operators to inspect the slat track
downstop to check for missing parts, ensure proper installation, and check the inside of the slat can for
foreign object debris and damage. The directive requires operators to inspect within 24 days and every
3000 flight cycles thereafter.[15] Following feedback from completed inspections revealing loose parts
in several other aircraft and one with a damaged slat can, the FAA issued a new emergency
airworthiness directive on August 28. Airlines were then required to perform the inspection on Next
Generation Boeing 737 aircraft within 10 days instead of 24 days. In addition, the AD required a one-
time torquing of the nut and bolt in the downstop assembly for the slat track within 24 days.[19]

On 28 August 2009. Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) published the results of the investigation. It is
considered highly probable that this accident occurred through the following causal chain: When the
Aircraft retracted the slats after landing at Naha Airport, the track can that housed the inboard main
track of the No. 5 slat on the right wing was punctured, creating a hole. Fuel leaked out through the
hole, reaching the outside of the wing. A fire started when the leaked fuel came into contact with high-
temperature areas on the right engine after the Aircraft stopped in its assigned spot, and the Aircraft
burned out after several explosions.

With regard to the cause of the puncture in the track can, it is certain that the downstop assembly
having detached from the aft end of the above-mentioned inboard main track fell off into the track can,
and when the slat was retracted, the assembly was pressed by the track against the track can and
punctured it.

With regard to the cause of the detachment of the downstop assembly, it is considered highly probable
that during the maintenance works for preventing the nut from loosening, which the Company carried
out on the downstop assembly about one and a half months prior to the accident based on the Service
Letter from the manufacturer of the Aircraft, the washer on the nut side of the assembly fell off,
following which the downstop on the nut side of the assembly fell off and then the downstop assembly
eventually fell off the track. It is considered highly probable that a factor contributing to the detachment
of the downstop assembly was the design of the downstop assembly, which was unable to prevent the
assembly from falling off if the washer is not installed.

With regard to the detachment of the washer, it is considered probable that the following factors
contributed to this: Despite the fact that the nut was in a location difficult to access during the
maintenance works, neither the manufacturer of the Aircraft nor the Company had paid sufficient
attention to this when preparing the Service Letter and Engineering Order job card, respectively. Also,
neither the maintenance operator nor the job supervisor reported the difficulty of the job to the one
who had ordered the job.

The Japan Transport Safety Board recommends the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States
of America to supervise the Boeing Company, the manufacturer of the Aircraft, to take the following
actions: When preparing maintenance job instructions for airlines such as Service Letters/Bulletins, the
scopes of jobs should be clearly defined and the working conditions and environments including
accessibilities to job areas should be appropriately evaluated in order to prevent maintenance errors.

The Japan Transport Safety Board recommends the Civil Aeronautics Administration of Taiwan to
supervise China Airlines to take the following actions: When planning and implementing maintenance
jobs, the scopes of jobs should be fully ascertained and the working conditions and environments should
be appropriately evaluated, and the countermeasures to prevent maintenance errors including the
actions taken in 2009 against the recurrence of this accident should be steadfastly implemented and
enhanced.