To every thing there is a season Bo A.

Olson
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

Burma

To every thing
there is a season...
Analysis of a brutal regime
versus an ailing democratization process.

Paper presented to the Research Conference on Burma.

University of Stockholm, 25-26 September 1999.

Bo A. Olson
Burma Center, P.O.Box 4034, 181 04 Sweden, www.burma.nu
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

Initial notes This paper was initially presented at the Research Conference in September
1999 and was scheduled to be included in a documentation published by the Uni-
versity of Stockholm. As it has still not materialized, this specific paper is now
presented separately by Burma Center, July 2001.

Although things happen in Burma continously, such as the death of general Tin
Oo in February 2001 and the talks starting between the Military and Aung San
Suu Kyi in October 2000, this paper is printed as presented nearly two years ago.

Subjects discussed in the paper were suggested by the University prior to the
conference.

Cover photo:
Burmese soldier, Mingun area North of Mandalay. Bo A. Olson.

Layout:
Design Plus, Lidingo, Sweden

Copyright Burma Center 2001

ISBN 91-974357-0-8
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

Contents Page
5 Preface
6 Land of Gold and Tragedy
7 Bizarre human rights record
9 The military rulers
12 Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD
16 The Dancing Peacock - NCGUB
18 The Fighting Peacock - ABSDF
19 The ethnic nations
21 Un-armed strategies or armed resistance
23 Sanctions, good or bad ?
25 Democracy - a compromize
27 The season is now
30 Final note and bibliography

Preface
1 Although the official name is now Myanmar,
Burma is used throughout this paper to avoid
confusion.
2 Burmese is in this paper used to indicate all
peoples living in what is today generally known
as Burma. Burman is the ethnic majority.
3 Ecclesiastes 3:1.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
There is no excuse whatsoever for a government to deprive its citizens of their
fundamental human rights as has been the case in Burma1 for over half a century. This
is especially true in areas populated by the country´s Ethnic Minorities. Significant
change is long overdue and the purpose of this paper is to give an objective analysis
of not only the possibilities but also of the responsibilities of those involved.
My own major concern has always been with the ordinary Burmese2 on the streets
and in the fields all over the country, who every single day are denied their basic
human dignity. I sympathise even more with the Ethnic Minorities in their rugged
border regions, constantly terrorized, robbed and murdered by government troops.
Most of all, I fear for Burma itself.
For many years as a dedicated Burma activist I demanded international action be
taken against the dictatorship, but, as it says in the Bible; ”To every thing there is
a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven”3 . For, regardless of what
the opposition claims; things have changed for the better in Burma over the last ten
years. Granted, the metamorphosis is much too slow and the humanitarian situa-
tion in frontier areas still totally unacceptable, but maybe it is about time to give it
a chance.
As Burma is primarily a Buddhist country perhaps all of us should abide by the
ancient Buddhist teaching; ”things change constantly, and if you make one positive
change, it can affect other changes”.
Although I base the analysis on reports, correspondence and interviews on nume-
rous fact-finding journeys in Burma, the conclusions are my own and nobody else can
be held responsible. My intention has not been to accuse authorities, organizations
or individuals for what they have or have not done, but to encourage new, plausible
approaches to a stagnant democratization process.
Stockholm 31 August 1999,
Bo A. Olson

Land of Gold
and Tragedy
1 Source: United Nations´ Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC), 1987.
2 NDF - National Democratic Front – consisting
of the major ethnic minority groups.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
Burma is in fact one of Asia´s richest countries, both as far as natural resources
and cultural heritage are concerned and it could no doubt become a leading nation in
Southeast Asia. However, gross mismanagement, widespread corruption and tota-
litarian doctrines executed by cruel and incompetent leaders has turned the country
into one of the world´s poorest.1
Centuries old antagonism between the Burmans and the Ethnic Minorities have
been exploited by unscrupoulus leaders as a means of dividing and conquering and
thus also providing an excuse for more than half the country´s annual budget going
to ”defence” expenditures; an unreasonably high proportion for a small neutral state
with no outside enemies.
The struggle for democracy did not begin in 1988 as most foreigners, and many
Burmese as well, seem to believe. Nor even in 1962 when General Ne Win grabbed
power in a military coup. The fact is that it began in 1948 after the British had left
and made Burma a sovereign state. Some of the Ethnic Minorities felt cheated by the
Burman leaders and when they were requested to surrender all their weapons after
repeated atrocities committed by government soldiers, they chose to fight for what
they considered their basic human rights, including the right to their own culture and
self-determination in the lands they had settled hundreds of years previously.
Civil war has raged in Burma between the central government and one or more
of the Ethnic Minorities ever since and sometimes between different Ethnic Mino-
rities as well. In the mid-seventies however they realized the value of unity against
a common enemy and formed the NDF 2 . At the same time the first serious pro-
tests against the Ne Win regime were staged by students belonging to the Burman
majority. During the so-called ”democratic years” between 1948 and 1962, most
Burmans had been quite happy to support Ne Win in ”crushing the bandits”, i.e. the
Ethnic Minorities, and it was not until fairly recently, when Ne Win´s disasterous
policies started to hit the general populace, that the Burmans themselves began to
turn against their master.
And it was not until the massive demonstrations culminating in the massacre of
August 1988, that the problems in Burma reached the eyes and ears of the outside
world.

Bizarre human
rights record
1 States in Eastern Burma predominantly popu-
lated by Shan, Mon, Karenni and Karen Ethnic
Minorities.
2 Source: Reports to the Swedish Foreign Office
1980-85, Sweden-Democratic Burma Associa-
tion.
3 Source: Oh, Carl Gustaf, Lovely Carl Gus-
taf…, Burma Center report 1984.
7 Source: Various reports and correspondence
1970-1984, Burma Centers archive.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
Almost daily we see reports about how the humanitarian situation in today´s Burma
is deteriorating. This provides of course additional fuel for the opposition to keep
the Burma issue alive. There is no doubt that crimes against every thinkable human
right are committed en masse, but is it really true that they are getting worse?
When I visited Burma for the first time in the late seventies my journey went
through the Shan, Mon, Karenni and Karen States.1 I could hardly believe the
atrocities I saw committed by government troops, but in those days communications
were rather elementary and the surrounding world just not interested. Nonetheless,
numerous minority villages were constantly destroyed by roaming military units,
who tortured and killed scores of old men, women and even helpless infants, and
robbed the surviving villagers of all their belongings. In the Karen State the govern-
ment soldiers already routinely forced civilians to carry heavy ammunition loads,
often ahead of the troops in case there were landmines or other booby-traps. The
soldiers also captured young village girls and carried them along in cages for their
own on-going amusement.2
The severe persecution of villagers in ethnic states continued unabated throughout
the eighties but the strong guerilla forces, especially the KNLA, kept control over
the immediate border regions where the civilian population could live in reasonable
safety.
When the Swedish Government in 1982 and 1983 broke its own rules regarding
arms export and allowed the sale of a large number of 84mm Carl Gustaf recoilless
guns to the Burma Army, they referred to Amnesty International´s lack of reports on
persecution of civilians as well as US State Department and British Foreign Office
claims that no fighting was going on in Burma apart from the government efforts to
control ”bands of opium producing bandits”3 . The Foreign Office took its decision
despite the ongoing major military offensive ”King Conqueror II” in the Shan State
and despite the fact that well documented reports from other frontier areas, including
first hand records of endless atrocities against civilians, had been submitted to the
UN, humanitarian organizations and various governments the world over during the
previous five years at least.4 But there was still little interest in Sweden or anywhere
else, to find out what was really going on.

5 Tatmadaw – Burmas Armed Forces.
6 Source: NGO reports 1989-99.
7 Source: Interviews with local village headmen
and local authorities 1989-98, Burma Centers
archive.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
Along with the rapidly expanding Burmese Tatmadaw5 , the areas under ethnic
control diminished in the late eighties and early nineties. Ordinary people were
not safe any longer in their villages and fled in their thousands. This was nothing
new really as they had always fled into the jungle when threatened by soldiers, but
the big difference now was that they were close enough to cross the borders into
neighbouring countries where the refugees soon became a problem and thus news.
It also became a lot easier for foreign observers to document the situation inside
Burma as they no longer had to venture for days or even weeks through the jungle,
they could now find burnt-out villages and mutilated bodies at a comfortable distance
from the Thai border.
Although the Burmese Government´s crimes against the Ethnic Minorities in
particular are totally unacceptable with the accumulated number of refugees running
into hundreds of thousands6 , it doesn´t necessarily mean that their crimes as such are
getting worse. A rapidly growing interest ”to find out the truth”, greater accessibility
for documenting facts and, maybe most of all; immensely improved communica-
tion techniques, are more likely the reason. There have also been indications that
some of the atrocities have been committed by regional or local authorities acting
without consent from Rangoon.7 But then; this does not excuse the junta because a
government which cannot control its subordinates is not fit to rule.
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

The military When Ne Win took charge in 1962 he called his administration the Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP). After his official retirement in July 1988, it was renamed

rulers
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and in November 1997 it
got its present name; the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Actual
changes have been mostly cosmetic as basically the same generals are in charge and
with the same totalitarian ideology. Most Burma watchers even suspect that Ne Win
himself is still the de facto boss.

There is no indication that the present junta does not have the full support of the
military, especially the army, and it would hardly be worth taking the risk for, unless
a realistic alternative presented itself. The military is very strong but they still seem
afraid of the people. They have cemented themselves and their ideas into fortifi-
cations and now they don´t know how to get out. Over the years, virtually without
communication even with their own people, the cement has set. Everything the
ruling junta tries seems unsophisticated to the West and without Western influence,
it is hard to believe how they´ll ever be able to change.

From time to time, there have been rumours of splits among the generals but there
has been no evidence and there will hardly be, until Ne Win leaves this world1 . On
the other hand, several things indicate that there are factions within the ruling council;
the ”hardliners”, the ”liberals” and the ”in-betweens”.

1 Ne Win is now 90.
2 The bomb was mailed from Japan, coinciding
with a NCGUB visit to that country. Source:
Burmese exiles.
The majority of the ruling council are hardliners. Secretary 2, General Tin Oo, in
particular detests the opposition, as a mailbomb aimed for him killed his daughter
19972 . General Maung Aye was previously commander in the Karen, Karenni and
Mon States without being able to crush the ethnic resistance, and for this he hates
the Ethnic Minorities. To this group, the Army is everything and everyone who is
not a soldier is an inferior citizen, definitely not to be trusted to take part in running
the country. ”They think like thugs, and they think that all foreign leaders think like
thugs as well” a close observer told me once. You cannot bully them into compliance,
and you definitely cannot gain their respect through a lot of democratic mumbo-
jumbo which they can´t understand, and, which they will completely ignore. They
also demand unconditional surrender by the Ethnic Minorities who still engage in
armed resistance.

3 Verbal agreement between SPDC and the
International Red Cross, Spring 1999.
4 The conference was held in February 1999
despite a boycott by US, Britain, and several
other nations.
5 Source: The New Light of Myanmar (the of-
ficial newspaper)
6 Source: New Light of Myanmar (the official
newspaper) 1998-99.
7 Source: Various news releases 1999.
8 Kachins - Ethnic Minority populating the
northernmost part of Burma.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
Lt General Khin Nyunt, the brain behind the feared Military Intelligence, and some
other young and likewise smart colleagues, realize the importance of appropriate
relations with the rest of the world. They have shown an interest in commencing
some kind of talks with the opposition under certain conditions.
The third category, the ”in-betweens” which may even include the present chair-
man, Senior General Than Shwe, seems to be the logical target. If the world keeps
on punishing them for doing something they do not see anything wrong with, they
are likely to be pushed into the wrong corner.
There have been some promising signs from the junta lately. One is that U Win
Aung was appointed new Foreign Minister in November 1998, an intelligent and
competent man who has spent enough time as Ambassador in both Germany and
Britain to understand the world outside Burma. You can already see some result
i.e. the agreement to allow the International Red Cross to inspect the jails3 and the
invitation for Interpol to hold its Conference on Narcotics in Burma4 . Other pro-
mising signs are that U Win Aung recently toured the country to collect first hand
information on the situation5 and he also follows the Burma debate on the Internet.
If he does not try to be too progressive too quickly for his own good, he might be-
come an excellent asset to the more liberal faction within the junta. Reactions from
opposition representatives have been negative, though.
Opium and its derivatives may well be Burma´s major export at present, but the
government as such may not benefit all that much. Local military commanders and
administrators in particularly the Shan State, definitely do benefit but chances are that
the people in Rangoon really mean what they say when they want to curb the produc-
tion6 . Thus it seems plain ignorant when the world due to ”principles”, boycotts the
Interpol conference on narcotics held in Rangoon7 . Where would be a better place to
hold it than right there in the back yard of the world´s biggest opium producer?
The Kachins8 have begged for funding for help in educating their people in the
negative effects of opium and ways of introducing alternative crops, but the world
does not lend an ear.

9 Source: Unofficial government statistics,
Burma Centers archive.
10 Source: Burma Government 1990.
11 Source: Interviews with villagers and local
authorities 1989-98, Burma Centers archive.
12 Source: Interviews with Rangoon busines-
smen and Burmese exiles 1988-99, Burma
Centers archive.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
Apart from the drug trade, it is estimated that Burma earns between 200 and
300 Million $US worth annually from produce and related trade9 . Since Ne Win´s
take-over 1962 the main part of this income has gone to the military and general
bureaucracy.. A very small proportion has gone to actual improvement of the civilian
infrastructure such as schools and hospitals for the ordinary Burmese.
In August 1990, Burma and China signed an agreement for 1.2 billion $US worth
of arms to be supplied to Rangoon. In return the Chinese got timber and other raw
materials as well as free access to a new trade route to the Indian Ocean.10 Since then
the Tatmadaw has grown into one of Asias, if not even the worlds, most efficient and
definitely most battle-seasoned military powers. It is no longer only a danger to the
ethnic minority forces but considered a potential threat to the whole region.
The Army takes its cut directly from farmers as well, even if they are already
heavily taxed. The regional commanders are granted rights to take what they need
from the regions´ produce, resulting in the ethnic minority farmers being robbed of
entire crops.11
Often you hear that the economy is run to the ground and the country bankrupt,
but this is absolutely nothing new either, as it already went bust years ago but still
manages to keep going somehow.
It is a sad fact that, at present, the only section with any kind of possibility of
making changes for the better is the military and there is little doubt that one day the
more progressive faction of the junta will consider the time ripe for these changes.
Meanwhile, according to most people; the worst thing that can happen in Burma is
if the military loses control.12
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

Aung San Suu Ne Win regarded Aung San as his leader and this is why Aung San Suu Kyi, his
leader´s charismatic daughter, is also treated with respect and certainly has a place in

Kyi and the

the highest ranks of the establishment. Presumably, she could if she wished, accept
responsibility as head of almost any important government function at any time,
although not being military would keep her from joining the ruling council.

NLD1 During the massacre in August 1988, she could possibly have stepped in and
stopped the demonstrations or even got Ne Win to end the killings, but instead she
herself took to the streets to confront the regime and thus crossed the line from be-
ing a concerned citizen to becoming a political figure. She must have known at the
time that she, herself, was protected and no soldier would dare to harm her without
receiving orders directly from Ne Win.

When Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in July 1995 feelings
ran high among her followers, who at the time were a considerable proportion of the
population, and she could easily have got them to do almost anything. She wouldn´t
even have had to encourage them as they were all set to start demonstrations by
themselves.

But during her internment she had consolidated a Gandhi-like image of non-
violence and she felt obliged to warn the people not to break any laws whatsoever,
”not even traffic rules”. She and her closest associates expected the international
community, headed by the US, to apply enough pressure on the generals to force
them to hand over power without having to risk more civilian blood, but the world´s
only collaboration was verbal. After that, people in general became more reluctant to
risk everything in demonstrations doomed to fail and, as things seemed to be picking
up in Burma, they acquired other priorities. The ruling council was smart enough
to realize that if people were fed and kept busy earning their living, they would be
less inclined to be a nuisance.

1 Source: Former NLD officials, close associa-
tes and articles and interviews with ASSK in
Asiaweek 1999.
The generals also learned very quickly how to deal with Aung San Suu Kyi. They
knew that she would go to a lot of trouble to avoid doing anything they wanted her
to do so, instead of telling her to do what they wanted, they asked her to do the op-
posite. One good example is from shortly after her release from house arrest, hundreds
of people began to gather in the street outside her house to listen to her addressing
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

them from inside the gate. Suggesting that the audience was blocking the traffic, the
authorities asked her to invite them into her garden, which was quite large enough to
easily accomodate five hundred people. She replied that her weekly speeches were
spontaneous and that the people gathered spontaneously as well and that everyone
wanted it that way. If she was required to invite them in she would rather quit the
speeches altogether. And that is just what she did do.

Burma gradually faded from the news in the international media and so a year ago,
when Aung San Suu Kyi wanted renewed attention, she set off in a car in a forbidden
direction outside the capital, only to be stopped by the police. She knew very well she
would be stopped but endured this demonstration for several days and according to a
NLD source in Rangoon, she had expected a score of supporters to gather and maybe
even a massive student uprising to take place in the capital. Nothing happened at
all and she eventually had to return home. Even the press showed little interest as at
the same time, a handful of foreigners had been arrested in Rangoon for distributing
anti-government leaflets in connection with the tenth anniversary of 8.8.88.

From then on, as world media became less and less interested in Burma, arrests of
NLD members have kept it in the news. It would have been so much better had Aung
San Suu Kyi not insisted on the NLD withdrawing from the National Convention.
Had they not done so, the proceedings could have continued and thus been exposed
from the inside for what they were – another government spectacle. Instead, she
arranged meetings in her home so that NLD members were arrested in droves.

According to close associates, Aung San Suu Kyi is known as being arrogant
and because of this, she has several times angered leading generals. This may not
always have been her intention as she conveys the same feeling to many others, both
Burmese and foreigners. Even if she is from a highly- regarded Burman family and
wants to give the impression that she is culturally attuned, it must be remembered
that she has lived most of her life abroad. This is particularly noticeable when she
neglects cultural significances when dealing with other Burmese statesmen, such
as Ne Win for example, and where a good sense of diplomacy would definitely be
advantageous. Most likely she is just afraid of being accused, by her followers, of
submitting to the generals.
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

Aung San Suu Kyi has obviously a unifying role to play in a future Burma, but
not necessarily political. The problem is of course, and she is well aware of this, that
she has been elevated almost to sainthood (especially by the Burmese exile com-
munity) and she must think that she alone (with appropriate international support)
can lead Burma out from under military rule and into a democratic utopia. Others
are not at all so sure…

One of Aung San Suu Kyi´s major problems is; who can she trust? One reason why
she was released at all was that the military had enough assurance that everything
which happened in her home and within the NLD, would be conveyed back to them.
We can be absolutely sure that among her servants and the hundreds of NLD-members
frequently attending meetings in her house, you will find very few who do not report
back to MI one way or another. Not that they want to harm their leader or NLD,
but a little information in exchange for a few kyats or maybe some other favour, is
perhaps considered harmless and definitely quite acceptable in Burma. The trouble is
of course that the MI is smart enough to put all the single bits of information together
and nobody dares to invoke Aung San Suu Kyi´s fury by telling her that one of her
intimate colleagues may be a mole. Thus the military know everything planned by
NLD in advance and can take appropriate measures.

Support for Aung San Suu Kyi from her party members is not guaranteed anymore.
When she gave the military an ultimatum to convene Parliament on 21 August she
did not back this up with any threats as to what was going to happen if they didn´t.
She presumably expected people to demonstrate but, again, nothing happened. After
more NLD MPs elect were arrested, there were not many left at large and she formed
the ”Committee of Ten” to look after their interests as well as of those already in jail.
Although she, herself, is not an MP, she is one of the ten which keeps on publicizing
decisions which not many people, at least not in Burma, seem to pay much attention
to. They must mean something though, as SPDC insists on her disbanding the com-
mittee before negotiations can be held on any level.

Aung San Suu Kyi has so far been determined not to let NLD enter negotiations
with the junta without taking part herself. The generals are obviously just as deter-
mined, and insist on talks without her. Khin Nyunt indicated in the summer of 1997
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

that he was willing to talk with NLD Chairman U Aung Shwe, but Aung San Suu
Kyi refused to let Aung Shwe talk with the ruling council on behalf of the party.
Naturally, a party should be able to chose its own delegates but then Rangoon isn´t
Washington, London or even Stockholm, and a little submissiveness could actually
save a lot of country-wide sufferance.

Most serious of all may be that all of Aung San Suu Kyi´s most trusted colleagues
have gradually dropped out of the picture one by one, and she doesn´t seem to have
a single advisor who inspires confidence any more.

The Dancing
Peacock
-NCGUB
1 Source: BBC, December 1990.
2 Source: Report on the establishment of the
DVB, Sweden-Democratic Burma Ass´n 1993.
3 Source: NCGUB statement, Bommersvik,
Sweden 1995.
4 Source: Interviews with ethnic leaders
1995-96, Burma Centers archive.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
After the May 1990 election and the government´s refusal to hand over to the new
parliament, a group of MPs claiming authorization from a majority of all the MPs
elect and led by Aung San Suu Kyi´s cousin, Dr Sein Win, formed an alternative
government in Manerplaw, Karen State.
”We shall work for demo-crazy in Burma” said Sein Win when the National Coa-
lition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) was introduced in December
19901 . It was his first proclamation in English so his slip of the tongue was, at the
time, only a quaint faux-pas. Now, almost nine years later; if the opposition doesn´t
adopt more realistic strategies, ”demo-crazy” is just what they might get.
According to the Manerplaw Declaration, NCGUB had agreed to act in accordance
with decisions taken by the entire united opposition with headquarters in liberated
areas. Thus the NCGUB got their financial support to journey out into the world and
lobby for all the groups together. Soon it was clear that NCGUB officials ”spoke with
forked tongues” and said different things abroad to what they had agreed on with
their colleagues back home. A good example was the deceit behind the Democratic
Voice of Burma (DVB) radio station, when lobbied funds for united purposes was
channelled to NCGUB thus effectively killing any aspiring hopes for a genuinely
united opposition movement over all ethnic boundaries2 .
At the start the NCGUB, symbolized by a dancing peacock, was all Burman but
eventually, after the deaths of a couple of ”ministers” and defection of one or two
others, some elected representatives of ethnic minority origin were chosen to join
in in order to give an impression of being more representative for the country as a
whole.3 The problem was that these new members were selected by Sein Win and
were not the minority organizations´ own choice. Accordingly, they are widely looked
upon as Sein Wins puppets.4
Almost all international funding for democratic purposes in Burma has to be
approved by NCGUB one way or another. As one aid distributor in the early days
once told me; ”They are the only alternative as they at least are publicly elected”.
But they are not the only MPs elect to choose from, as there are several others who
have managed to escape, some of whom are considered much more capable.

5 Source: NLD MPs elect.
6 Source: The Gecko, Burma Center 1999.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
At the moment it is estimated that a couple of hundred NLD-members are in
Thailand and of these around twenty are elected MPs, living on small hand-outs from
NCGUB5 . As they have no other means of supporting themselves they will not bite
the hand that does feed them, at least not until other funding can be guaranteed.
By the look of it, NCGUB goes to great expanse to discourage criticizm. The
movement is handsomely supported by, among others, the Soros Foundation in order
to be able to distribute information via Internet and other media. Both government
and opposition propaganda was published freely for years through the Burmanet,
until recently when suddenly questions as to how the NCGUB and associates spent
their funds appeared from within the movement itself. Immediately the free com-
munication was interrupted and replaced by a censorship on Burmanet, screening
all messages that might put ”the good guys in a bad light”.6
It is Interesting to see how people who demand democracy the most have a ten-
dency to be the first to condemn free speech when directed against themselves. Is this
perhaps the way they intend to run parliamentary proceedings in the future Burma?
Undoubtedly Mr George Soros himself must have choked on his breakfast.
The NCGUB must realize that once an agreement is reached between Aung San
Suu Kyi/NLD and the military junta, their own importance would have played out
its role. Thus it may just be in their interest to counteract any compromise or at least
delay proceedings until they have prepared for a return home to continue political
work in situ.

The Fighting
Peacock
- ABSDF
1 Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) formed
1988 by both Etnic Minorities and Burman
groups.
2 Source: Interviews with current and former
ABSDF members 1998-99, Burma Centers
archive.
3 Source: Eyewitness reports.
4 Source: Special Report on solidarity work
abroad, Sweden-Democratic Burma Associa-
tion 1992.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
There was a time when the fighting peacock of the All Burma Students´ Democratic
Front (ABSDF) was synonymous with the struggle for democracy in Burma. Back
in 1988/89, after having fled the lost revolution in the streets, ten thousand members
were active along the Burma borders, both in the political field and in the trenches
alongside the ethnic guerilla.
The organization carried a lot of respect both within the Democratic Alliance1
and abroad, but today most members have either gone back home or, in the case of
the more competent ones, found safe havens all over the world where they either
seem to pursue their own ideas or have found other interests to keep them busy. The
organization itself has in fact shrivelled into a group of a couple of hundred members,
mostly stranded in Thailand. They too would perhaps have left ABSDF if they were
not dependent on the pittance they get from the Central Executive Committee which
keeps them barely alive. Their leader is Dr Naing Aung, and according to sources
close to the organization; ”the group gets an unproportionally large economic sup-
port considering its present activities”.2
As to concrete activities, nothing much has materialized. There were student
protests in Burma in December 1996, but they were limited to campus matters only,
and had nothing to do with Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD or ABSDF.3 There do not seem
to be any close connections with major student groups inside Burma any more.
Foreigners who have tried to help members of the ABSDF have been severely
disillusioned. There seems to have been a common attitude among its members
that the world owed them everything as self-proclaimed ”heroes bleeding for de-
mocracy”.4

The ethnic
nations
1 Source: British Government documentation
1940-46 and the Panglong Agreement 1947.
2 Source: Speech by Foreign Minister Anna
Lindh, Stockholm March 1999.
3 Source: Special Report on more effective aid,
Sweden-Democratic Burma Association 1993.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
When dealing with issues concerning the States predominantly inhabited by
Ethnic Minorities, we must realize that self-determination in their own territories
is their historic or constitutional right.1 For them to settle for less autonomy within
the Union of Burma would have to be a matter of negotiation and, to guarantee a
peaceful transition, a credible itinery has to be approved by all concerned before the
country is transferred to civilian rule.
Some of the ethnic groups have been forced to accept the government´s cease-fire
offers, but this can only be considered a more or less fragile ”time-out” as displeasure
is brewing under the surface.
Passing through refugee camps in Thailand one is sometimes met by posters
stating; ”The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend”. These camps are predominantly
inhabited by Karen, Karenni and Shan, all of them Ethnic Minorities with a long
history of hatred for the ruling Burmans.
As the aid for democratization purposes is predominantly channelled through
Burmans, the Minorities have to keep up an impression of unity in order to at least
receive some means of preparing themselves for freedom in the future. Talking
separately with different leaders, they are not all that happy with the NCGUB and
other Burman opposition groups, but a little funding is better than nothing at all.
The question is: Is it fair that these Peoples, suffering so much due to Burman
chauvinism, should be relegated to being dependent on Burman discretion for their
survival?
According to the Swedish Foreign Minister, Swedish support to ”democratic for-
ces in and outside Burma” last year amounted to approximately 2.5 Million USD2 .
Even if this includes humanitarian aid to refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand it is
a considerable amount, and it is reasonable to expect that it should be distributed
fairly and accompanied by an appropriate interest from the NGOs set to distribute
the funds. It is not enough to deliver sacks of rice to starving people who spend year
after year in refugee camps. The NGOs must, even if it is a lot of extra work, engage
the recipients in training and other constructive activities. This would certainly keep
youngsters away from liquor and other bad influences and would make them more
prepared for life in a free Burma one day. If the established NGOs do not feel fit to
handle this, others should be employed.3
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

The KNU have still not surrendered to junta demands to give up all their arms
before cease-fire talks can start. The Thai Government has made an offer to General
Bo Mya4 to mediate between the KNU and the SPDC but the Karens are not prepared
to accept the offer yet as they do not trust the Burmans and they are likewise well
aware that a surrender on terms offered could endanger the entire Karen culture.
Obviously, the Karens cannot present a serious military threat to the SPDC in the
foreseeable future and winners never really want mediation.
There might have been a possibility, several years ago, for one or even some ethnic
armies to have succeded in defeating the Tatmadaw and thus secured autonomy. But
not today, not even with considerable support from outside, which they never have
4
President of the Karen National Union had and never will get, of course. Nevertheless, the ethnic issue is the ultimate one
(KNU). for progress in Burma.
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

Un-armed One of the main issues which may have delayed help for the Burmese democracy
movement all these years could be a divided stance on the arms issue. It is sensi-

strategies or
tive to help those who fight for their survival, but the international community can
readily support NLD-leaders who claim that they´ll use peaceful means, ”even if the
democratization process takes ten or even twenty years”.1
armed Easy to say if you are sitting safely abroad or not suffering too much inside Burma

resistance
itself, but it is a different matter for the people who constantly have their homes
ravaged and their family members raped and murdered by invading soldiers. There
is a limit to how far you can run and then turn the other cheek.

Over the years, ethnic leaders have made attempts to solve their disagreements
with the Central Government through peaceful means. They have been willing to
compromize, as well as surrendering land and restricting autonomy, but their efforts
have always been met by deceit and treachery, followed by renewed Government
offensives in their areas. Thus, you cannot really blame the Minorities for not uncon-
ditionally handing over their arms and refraining from defending themselves.

In Central Burma, with towns and villages under strict government control, the
situation is somewhat different. The soldiers may keep a low profile most of the
time, but they are never very far away. Added to which the fear of MI infiltrators in
every walk of life restrict open resistance. It would nowadays be virtually impos-
sible to attempt any kind of armed mobilization like the one in the Irrawaddy Delta
a few years ago.

1 Source: Statement by Aung San Suu Kyi
1998.
2 Jinglees - homemade hand-held catapults
firing sharpened bicycle spokes.
3 Source: Eyewitness reports and video docu-
mentation 1988, Burma Centers archive.
Movements in Central Burma are restricted but people are left alone as long as they
are not suspected of being a threat to the authorities. Life may not be easy but it is not
unbearable enough to risk what little they have got. Those who do want to protest are
forced into un-armed strategies or finding a way to joining the ethnic resistance. It is
a myth that the average Burman would avoid armed struggle if he had the means and
a chance to win his freedom that way. Experience from the 1988 uprising confirms
this as jinglees2 and all kinds of spontaneous weapons available were used against
the soldiers, and it is certainly doubtful that a government issue Kalashnikov would
have been left lying unused on the street had there been one.3
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

Naturally, the exiled opposition realizes the reluctance of the International Com-
munity to support any kind of armed struggle and stick to their policy of wearing the
generals down by peaceful means. On the other hand; new atrocities and refugees
resulting from ethnic groups putting up an armed struggle are gratefully used in the
propaganda war.

Sanctions,
good or bad?
1 Between 1974 and 1988; 80-90 Million $US
annually according to US Government sources.
2 Source: British Foreign Office correspon-
dence 1983-87, Burma Centers archive.
3 Source: The White House 1997.
4 Source: Burma, as we saw it…, Gecko Series
1997/98.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
As late as in the mid-eighties, the US Government saw the Ne Win regime as a
barrier against communist expansion in Southeast Asia and as a partner in the effort
to prevent Burmese opium from reaching the streets of New York. Support to the
military regime was adjusted accordingly.1
At the same time, the British had considerable interests in the Burmese oil indu-
stry and other ventures. ”Anarchistic rebels”, i.e. those who in those days bled for
democracy, did not even get the slightest moral support2 . There was no criticism
of the Burmese government and all demands for sanctions and other restrictions
were rejected by both the US and Britain; two countries which now all of a sud-
den strongly condemn the same regime and in addition spearhead both economic
sanctions and boycotts.
The value of sanctions has been lively debated. They do no doubt change things,
but for the better or for the worse as far as Burma´s democratization process is
concerned, is an open question.
They do have a positive psychological effect on the Burmese opposition though,
and it is obvious that its intensive lobbying has now grown to be a domestic political
issue both in the US, UK and elsewhere. In reality, the various sanctions and other
restrictions themselves may not be all that comprehensive; merely words and words
are cheap3 . And what seems to be the moral behind sanctions against Burma while,
for example, China is left scot-free?
Most remarkable of all is that the sanctions came at a time when progress in Burma
started to move in the right direction, if ever so slow and gropingly.4 If they had
been applied in the early eighties, before the military regime had the opportunity to
sell out the country´s natural resources thus beefing up their war machinery from the
profits, they could probably have forced Ne Win to the negotiating table and would
most certainly have saved thousands of lives. Sanctions at this late stage seem more
like a play for the gallery than an effective weapon. They will not stop money coming
in and the generals will take their cut first.

5 Source: Aung San Suu Kyi press statements
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
Whichever way you look at it; the Burmese people in general seem to be the losers
when they are laid-off from recently acquired employment following the foreign
business exodus and failing tourist boom. A Western boycott of all contacts with
Burma, will force the country even closer to Chinese influence, whether this is in the
right direction towards democracy is certainly a matter of opinion.
Many intelligent Burmese even claim that the tourist boycott is a serious obstacle
to the democratization process as such, as people get very little chance to exchange
democratic ideas. Aung San Suu Kyi and leading exile politicians warmly promote
this boycott. The former suggests that foreigners are both ”patronizing” and ”racist”
if they even speak about democracy with Burmese people on the streets.5

Democracy –
a compromize
1 Source: Interviews with Burmese in Rangoon
and expat´s 1998-99, Burma Centers archive
2 Source: Who´s afraid of the big, bad SLORC,
Gecko Series March 1997.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
The current situation in Burma is that the SPDC is sitting very tight and runs the
show. Several educated Burmese are of the opinion that the military has improved
and could be influenced to go even further, if only the West stopped bullying them,
which inhibits them from even considering changes.1
It must be clear to anybody by now, that changes in Burma must come from within
the country. And this does not mean students taking to the streets with signs and
slogans, only to be clobbered for no practical reason.
There is nothing to gain from pie-throwing, so the idea would be to convince the
military establishment that it is in their own interest to let the people lead their own
lives and conduct their own business without interference. Granted, this has been
tried before, but obviously not well enough.
To get the ruling council and a united opposition to talk to each other in a con-
structive way is long overdue and it is not only the generals who have to get out
of the rut. In a way you can even appreciate the military reluctance to consider the
opposition as an equal, as it seems to be flaying all over the place, split and divided,
each faction with its own aims and without clear policies on what is going to happen
the day Burma becomes free.
On those rare occations when appropriate initiatives to form a united front for
negotiations have been tried, they have also quickly and effectively been putdown,
not by the generals but by Burmese activists themselves who proclaim they want
democracy but in fact cannot refrain from deceiving their colleagues for their own
benefit.2 Each individual group, both within and outside Burma has to be made to
understand that sincere dialogue and compromize is what democracy is all about.
Aung San Suu Kyi may be the unchallenged symbol for the democracy move-
ment so far, but it is dangerous to build democracy on one person alone. May be her
vision for a future Burma is what most Westerners find desirable, but Burma is for
the Burmese. The country must not adopt democracy just as a system for voting but
as a system for thinking. This inevidably means compromizes and maybe Aung San
Suu Kyi herself must accept a symbolic role and leave the actual politics to others.

3 Source: St Suu and the Dragon, Gecko
Series 1999.
4 Source: Interviews with minority leaders
and exile Burmese 1998-99, Burma Centers
archive.
To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson
This might be her noblest sacrifice for the country and the people she claims that
she loves.3
Internationally, the NCGUB is expected to be syncronizing the democratic struggle,
but considering that it has been active for almost nine years with ample financial
support, it still has not proved itself to be the co-ordinating body for the exile com-
munity to rally around.4 To try to achieve credibility and thus unity, NCGUB and its
related officials, should be required to publicly account for their strategies, funding
and expenditures. Who are the facts hidden from anyway, if not from their own fel-
lows within the opposition movement? The military could not care less, as to them
it is the result that counts anyway. As it stands, suspicion of corruption, inefficiency
and mismanagement is seriously hurting the unity abroad, as well as relations with
the Ethnic Minorities.
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

The season
is now.
On the road towards democracy, we have to consider three major obstacles; the
nationwide stagnation and poverty; the atrocities; and constitutional matters, including
the status of the ethnic populations.

The first obstacle could likely be solved by cancelling sanctions and other restric-
tions immediately, followed by intensive dialogue and constructive support. Burma
is a great country populated by astute people and with our help instead of hindrance
the situation would quickly improve. It is all very simple really; the generals in the
ruling council may be millionairs in hard cash and foreign bank accounts, but they
are not prepared to part with any of it. So, they want foreign investments to get the
country back on its feet and the people satisfied. This would no doubt make them even
richer but it would benefit the rest of the people as well. Gradually a new generation
of leaders, more attuned to 21st Century demands, will develop.

To put an end to the atrocities the central government have to give their approval,
but the major task will be to get access to local commanders and to change their ways
of thinking. When development gets going it would certainly have positive effects
even in the regions, and commanders could be assisted to find other suitable outlets
for their energy than the harassment of the population.

We must accept that an army consisting of half a million men is not just going to
disappear into thin air over night. Burma will have to keep its legendary Tatmadaw,
but its size will have to be drastically reduced, especially if domestic insurgence
ceased and the ruling council saw the general public as a resource rather than a threat.
To guarantee the safety of the Minorities, as well as their co-operation, the ethnic
states must be allowed to have their own leaders and be protected by their own troops
or, alternatively, by some kind of international security during the interim period
regardless of what degree of autonomy is eventually decided upon.

It is an absolutely vital requirement that the economy is moving so that the hundreds
of thousands of both officers and rank and file can find suitable civilian employment.
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

If not, the situation would once again revert to what it was not so long ago when
disbanned military units roamed the countryside in their thousands, systematically
robbing and killing people.

The third major obstacle could well be the heart of the democratization process
and can of course not be solved fully until both the ruling council and a united op-
position are well into negotiations. But there is no real reason for all concerned not
to be made to think along these lines already.

It is not enough any more to refer to the elections held almost ten years ago, the
whole situation has changed and the MPs elect are either dead, have resigned, are
scattered all over the world or otherwise incapacitated in one way or another. In ad-
dition, many of the elected representatives were not competent to start with, as ethnic
leaders and most capable Burman dissidents were not even allowed to take part.

SPDC will have to hold an election eventually. If, as soon as possible capable
people, with the appropriate outside assistance, were allowed to work on local and
regional levels along with local and regional commanders and administrators and
with ordinary people as well, they should eventually become a great asset. If they
were trusted by both the military and the general public, they would be excellent
candidates in that coming election.

It is definitely not up to us, the foreigners who have had the advantage of being able
to take democracy for granted, to decide upon the course of Burmas democratization.
At the same time however, it would be irresponsible of us to encourage changes
without giving proper and sincere guidance. We have to set our aims much higher
than simply getting rid of military rule as the greatest problem facing Burma, it is
not military rule itself but violence, greed, corruption, and the traditional suspicion
and hatred between peoples which oppressors thrive on. That will not go away by
just calling it a democracy.

If we really want to see positive changes in Burma, we all have to dig far deeper
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

than the subjective propaganda and empty slogans we are all drowning in and often
fooled by.

Most of all, we have to be realistic, and it is thus time for us to stop dodging the
really important issues and maybe this even means, for many of us, finding completely
new approaches.. Then, and only then, Burma will be on the right path to becoming
a peaceful and prosperous country where all citizens, regardless of etnicity, religion
or social standing are guaranteed their human rights and equality.

To end, I quote the late American Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, who in the
midst of racial upheaval in the deep American South said: ”Some men see things as
they are, and ask, Why? I dream of things that never were and ask, Why not?”.
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

Final note As Burma is still virtually virgin territory for in-depth research, a thorough, objective and
current analysis has to be based on interviews and other first hand documentation. The situation
being as it is, sources wish to be protected as far as possible, not only from retaliation by the
government but from the wrath of colleagues as well, a wish that must be respected.

Bibliography A conventional bibliography accompanying this paper would be longer than the paper
itself as it is based on a very great number of personal interviews, recordings and unpublished
reports in the extensive Burma Center Library and Database.
Thus, references have been added in footnotes, and listed below are publications specifi-
cally referred to in the paper and obtainable in print or digital media through Burma Center,
P.O. Box 4034, 181 04 Lidingo, Sweden. E-mail: webmaster@burma.nu

Sweden-Democratic Burma Association:

Reports on human rights abuses in the Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan States, 1980-85
Who needs enemies with friends like this? Report on the establishment of the DVB, 1993.
Humanitarian Aid, not just smiles and bags of rice. Report on more effective aid, 1993.

Burma Center:
Oh, Carl Gustaf, Lovely Carl Gustaf… Swedish arms sales to Burma, 1995 (1st ed.1984).
Who´s afraid of the Big Bad Slorc? A split opposition movement, 1997 (1st ed. 1993).
Burma, as we saw it… Summary report from fact finding missions 1997/1998.
The Gecko. Burma Center English Language Newsletter, 1999.
St Suu and the Dragon. Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD vs SLORC/SPDC, 1999 (1st ed.1990).
 To every thing there is a season Bo A. Olson

About the author

” Bo A. Olson has been working with information for the Swedish Rescue Services
Agency and the Civil Defence League for 25 years, as well as free-lancing as a writer and
illustrator. A graduate Civil Engineer he got involved with human rights and civil liberties
during the Vietnam War and continued academic studies in those fields.
After his first visit to Burma in the late 1970s, he has been doing research work on a vo-
luntary basis and has since then spent a total of two years in the country divided into several
shorter periods.
1983-84 he represented the Karen National Union in international lobbying; 1985-87 the
National Democratic Front, and 1988-90 the Democratic Alliance of Burma. In February 1991
he was appointed the Official Representative for the National Coalition Government of the
Union of Burma to Sweden, until 1993 when he became the Director of Burma Center, Sweden,
an independent voluntary foundation for objective research and information.
Mr Olson has been the editor of the ”Fria Burma” (Free Burma) Swedish language news-
letter for 17 years and is the author of ”Burma-the Elusive Peacock” as well as co-author of

”
several other books and reports.

Excerpt from book jacket