B R O A D E R L E SS O N S D E R I V E D F R O M T H E C U B A N M I SS I L E

CRISIS

In commemorating the fifty year anniversary of the Cuban Missile

Crisis last year, Harvard scholar Graham Allison wrote in Foreign
Affairs:

“Fifty years ago, the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the
brink of nuclear disaster. During the standoff, U.S. President John F.
Kennedy thought the chance of escalation to war was “between 1 in
3 and even,” and what we have learned in later decades has done
nothing to lengthen those odds. We now know, for example, that in
addition to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union had
deployed 100 tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba, and the local Soviet
commander there could have launched these weapons without
additional codes or commands from Moscow…The resulting war
might have led to the deaths of 100 million Americans and over 100
million Russians.”

The peaceful outcome achieved despite the dire consequences

involved has led scholars to intensely study the presidential decision
making process. President John F. Kennedy’s leadership and his
administration’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an example
of high quality presidential decision-making. It provides several
lessons that are still applicable to contemporary challenges. First, a
president should act in the strategic interests of the country while
considering the long-term implications of potential actions. Second,
be creative in developing solutions, but recognize that the right
inputs can lead to the right outputs and continually reassess
circumstances and options as new information becomes available.
Third, manage intra-executive branch politics to ensure that the
intended outcome is achieved. Current and future presidents would
be well served to apply these lessons as they address both
emergent and long-standing foreign policy challenges. By so doing
they, like Kennedy, will be more likely to avert crisis, restore calm,
and further U.S. interests.

G O O D S T R AT E G Y
Of first import, President Kennedy considered the long-term
implications of decisions and acted in the strategic interests of the
country. This meant that he acted consistent with vital national
security interests in the realm of power, peace, prosperity, and
principles (the “four p’s”). The most significant national security
interest was avoiding nuclear war. Kennedy, however, also sought to
push back Soviet military presence and offensive weapon
capabilities from the Western Hemisphere, while assuring regional
and global partners of U.S. resolve.
One of the first images of missile bases under construction shown to
President Kennedy on the morning of October 16. (John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library and Museum/Wikimedia)

Kennedy’s leadership to think strategically and evaluate likely

political implications in a broad context was one feature that
distinguished his bungling of the Bay of Pigs with his strong
leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the former
incident Kennedy allowed public opinion and domestic political
factors to play too large a factor in his decision calculus. During the
Cuban Missile Crisis, however, Kennedy led his national security
team to consider the long term rationale for proposed actions and
their implications. He considered political dimensions, but did so
within an international context instead of limiting himself to a
myopic view dominated by domestic political concerns. Kennedy’s
consideration of an invasion’s impact on Soviet action pushed his
team to contemplate the big picture and demonstration his concern
with the “four p’s.” As a result of his probing questions, it became
apparent that escalation from Cuba to Berlin to nuclear salvos could
happen all too easily. Finding viable alternatives was crucial.

G O O D A SS U M P T I O N S ; G O O D P R O B L E M S O LV I N G

A second reason that the Cuban Missile Crisis provides insight into
presidential decision making is that President Kennedy required his
national security advisors to be creative in developing solutions.
Toward this end Kennedy forced his advisors to continually reassess
circumstances and options as new information became available. To
facilitate unrestrained thinking and because he recognized that the
right inputs can lead to the right outputs, Kennedy formed the
Executive Committee (ExCom). ExCom was a tailored committee of
the National Security Council with the mandate to develop a feasible
option fast. Kennedy placed his brother and Attorney General,
Robert Kennedy, in charge. The president had the utmost confidence
in Robert’s capabilities—and could trust him. Both were critical
during a time sensitive crisis situation. ExCom allowed for the
structural and analytical dimensions necessary to arrive at the best
possible option.

Structurally it brought the right people to bear on the situation in a

timely manner. It provided a mechanism through which the relevant
actors from across the administration, and occasionally a
Congressional leader and a former Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson, could provide insights. Analytically, ExCom allowed for the
right inputs (based on the assembled wisdom, experience, and roles
of the participants). It also facilitated the right outputs. Intense
deliberations could unfold, while the Kennedy brothers encouraged
continual reexamination, dissenting views, and multiple advocacy.
This format led to consideration of second and third order effects
and better options than those with which they began. The decisions
to implement the quarantine, to ignore Khrushchev’s second letter,
to use diplomatic back channels, to provide a non-invasion pledge,
and to privately assure the Soviets that the U.S. would withdraw its
missiles from Turkey in approximately six months, were all positive
outcomes of the structural and analytical dimensions of this
arrangement.

As demonstrated by these strategies, Kennedy did not confine

himself to military instruments of power when developing solutions.
He considered military, diplomatic, economic, as well as
combination solutions. It was Kennedy’s recognition of the
consequence of unfolding events, his refusal to be constrained by
the military chiefs’ invasion plans, and his prodding to develop
options that allowed for deescalation that were most responsible for
ExCom’s development of creative schemes, including the
quarantine. The quarantine had the advantage of demonstrating
that Kennedy would not allow the Soviets to stage offensive missiles
in Cuba uncontested, while also offering Khrushchev a “golden
bridge” to back down short of going to war. The other diplomatic
aspects of Kennedy’s solution package further enabled this aim. Air
attack and ground invasion scenarios recommended by the military
chiefs, the first and only options initially provided, did not offer the
same level of political flexibility. Likewise, they had implications for
further escalation in Berlin and potentially for nuclear exchanges.
Therefore, Kennedy’s unconventional methods ultimately proved
important ingredients for a peaceful outcome.

GOOD EXECUTION

Adept management of intra-executive branch politics was a third

significant component comprising Kennedy’s leadership. Kennedy
faced a difficult situation given the external circumstances posed by
the Soviet placement of nuclear armed ballistic missiles in Cuba. But
he also faced a challenging situation internally. The administration
had botched the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba just eighteen months
prior. The military chiefs seemed bent on making up for that failure,
allegedly had plans in place as early as spring 1962, and saw the
Cuban Missile Crisis as an opportunity to do just that. The initial
discussions reflected this influence, tilting heavily toward an air
strike followed by a ground invasion. As ExCom devised additional
options that Kennedy embraced, it became important for him to
ensure that his intended outcomes were met. Several events
threatened to thwart his intent and unravel the situation beyond
Kennedy’s control. A decision to elevate a military unit’s readiness
level signaled an escalation that ran contrary to the president’s
intent. A test nuclear explosion was particularly inflammatory,
painting the U.S. as aggressors. Cuba then shot down one of the U-2
spy planes conducting a reconnaissance flight. Any one of these
could have derailed the crisis; that they did not is miraculous and a
testimony to “cooler heads prevailing.”

“The Loneliest Job,” a photograph of President John F. Kennedy looking out of

the south window of the oval office taken on 10 Feb 1961. (George Tames)

Given these dynamics and the lack of trust Kennedy had in the
motivations of some significant players within his administration, he
implemented special measures. He sought to safeguard his intent
first through redundant communication. He charged his special
assistant, Kenny O’Donnell, with communicating directly with the
pilots flying reconnaissance missions over Cuba, imploring them not
to be shot down and not to advertise to their commanders if they
were shot at. Although the situation did not disintegrate when the U-
2 went down, the rationale was that such an incident could cause
the crisis to further spiral out of control. Kennedy also utilized the
adhoc nature of ExCom to exclude Vice President Johnson, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor, and Central Intelligence Agency
Director McCone from the final policy deliberations. Although not
normally a healthy way for an administration to function, it proved
useful in ensuring secrecy and that the president’s intent was met.

Each of the three lessons of high quality presidential decision

making highlighted in the Cuban Missile Crisis case study hold
relevance for other situations. It is always useful to think
strategically, question assumptions and plan innovatively, and to
have competent execution. These principles remain germane across
time, space, administrations, and geopolitical circumstances. They
are pertinent in time sensitive crises, and at times when an
administration is developing a long term policy to address a
challenging bilateral relationship or global phenomenon. They may
seem so basic that it should not be necessary to state them and
elucidate in depth. Yet it is all too easy for politics and other
dynamics—such as the enemy, sanctuary, or third party unreliability
—to drive the train in ways that render accomplishment of the
political objective infeasible or unlikely. Even among the factors that
a president can reasonably control, weighting the wrong criterion,
groupthink, and ulterior or parochial agendas make failure easier
than victory.

B A D S T R AT E G Y

The Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and Iraq are tangible examples. Each of
these conflicts may have turned out differently (or not happened at
all) had these lessons been applied rigorously from start to finish.
Counterfactuals are, of course, impossible to prove. A cursory
examination of the literature and circumstances surrounding these
case studies, however, demonstrates various combinations of
failures. First, presidents thought less than strategically by failing to
consider the implications of decisions to use and escalate force.
With the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy failed to realize that the stated plan
may not achieve an easy victory and that it would be impossible to
disguise American involvement.

A group of captured U.S.-backed Cuban exiles, known as Brigade 2506,

being lined up by Fidel Castro’s soldiers at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of
Pigs), Cuba, following an unsuccessful invasion of the island, April 1961.
(Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

When the
invasion
failed, the
U.S. lost
more than a

noncommunist Cuba. The international community shunned the U.S.

as an aggressor state and the invasion pushed Castro to further
align with the Soviets. In Vietnam, Johnson ramped up U.S.
involvement, thinking that victory there was necessary to arrest the
spread of communism internationally and to accomplish his
domestic political agenda. His thinking was flawed as he did not
save South Vietnam, its fall did not lead to a domino of states falling
to communism, and he was still able to implement aspects of his
Great Society. With Iraq, Bush’s drive for preventive war led to a
lengthy engagement with disputed benefits but clear and significant
costs—human, financial, international political capital, and
opportunity cost in prosecuting the war on terrorism. In each case, a
narrow focus—easy win, domino theory, and preventive war—led to
strategic action without proper strategic thought. The result was
strategic loss.

B A D A SS U M P T I O N S ; B A D P R O B L E M S O LV I N G

The second mistake in these three case studies was group think—
inadequate questioning of critical assumptions—again directly
conflicting with the second principle of high quality presidential
decision making. In each case, decisions were based on incorrect
information and not revisited at appropriate points. With the Bay of
Pigs, faulty assumptions included underestimating the Cuban
military and overestimating the invasion’s ability to spark guerilla
warfare among an anti-Castro Cuban contingent. In Vietnam, bad
assumptions again included underestimating the enemy and the
force of nationalism, while overestimating South Vietnam’s capacity
for organizing and fighting the North. In Iraq, the Bush
Administration underestimated the fractural nature of Iraq’s
sectarian divisions and the U.S. forces necessary, while
overestimating the degree to which Iraqis would view Americans as
liberators. In each case, the president and the country would have
been better served by multiple advocacy.

BAD EXECUTION
The third mistake common
across these case studies
was costly mismanagement
during the endeavor. During
the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy’s
last minute decision to limit
the first and eliminate the
second wave of the air
attack left more of Cuba’s military intact to repel the ground
invasion, while the change in invasion sites made the Cuban
Brigade’s job more difficult. During the Vietnam War, the main
strategy of attrition proved incapable of delivering victory, or even
eliciting the necessary support from the South Vietnamese.
Meanwhile, the enemy often enjoyed relative sanctuary in the
surrounding countries and, at times, in North Vietnam. Furthermore,
Johnson regularly approved military targets from the White House,
making the generals prosecution of the war inefficient. During the
Iraq War, debaathification and disbanding the Iraqi Army were
shortsighted decisions that set the U.S. back several years, while
implementation of the counterinsurgency strategy and surge came
late. In each endeavor, better management of executive branch
politics could have facilitated better results.

The bombing of Baghdad during the

Second Gulf War in 2003. (AP)

C O N C LU S I O N

In the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and the 2003 Iraq invasion, strategic
calculation, systematic probing of assumptions combined with
multiple advocacy and creative thinking, and skilled implementation
may have led to decisions not to commit U.S. power and prestige in
the first place, or have led to better outcomes. There is no shortage
of need to apply these lessons with discernment as the U.S. faces
contemporary challenges including the Iranians’ suspected nuclear
weapons program, North Korea’s nuclear program and periodic
provocations, the Arab Spring, a rising China, terrorism and
transnational crime, climate change, and potential pandemics. It is
possible, by chance, to have a good outcome in these and other
challenging situations without a good decision-making process, but
those chances are not high. A good decision making process,
therefore, is effectively a necessary but not sufficient condition to
ensure good outcomes. Allies, enemies, non-state actors,
international institutions, non-governmental organizations, weather,
and other events can all play critical roles in making events unfold in
positive or negative ways for the U.S. Hence, it is incumbent upon
the president to lead his national security team wisely to stack the
odds as best as possible in the U.S.’ favor. Strategic thinking,
reassessment of assumptions and creative problem solving with the
right inputs, and discerning execution are mission critical to the
successful resolution of any international crisis.