Q: When is a dismissed employee entitled to separation pay?

A: The Labor Code requires a valid cause to terminate an employee. If there is no valid cause,
there is no valid termination and the employer will be held liable for illegal dismissal. If the
cause of dismissal falls under any of the five circumstances of Article 282, no separation pay shall
be given to the dismissed employee. In dismissal cases falling under Article 283, separation pay
shall only be required if the dismissal is due to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy. In these two cases, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher.

If the dismissal is due to retrenchment to prevent losses or closures or cessation of operations of

establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. In all cases, a fraction of at least six (6) months shall
be considered one (1) whole year.

On the other hand if the dismissal is due to retrenchment to prevent losses or closures or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking due to serious business losses or financial
reverses no separation pay shall be given to the dismissed employee.

Q: What are the steps to follow to ensure that the dismissed employee is given due process?

A: a. Notice of Dismissal – The employer shall furnish the workers a written notice stating the
particular acts or omissions constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of
work, the notice shall be served at the worker’s last known address.

b. Answer – The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal
within a reasonable period.

c. Hearing – The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

d. Notice of decision – The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to
dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.

e. Report on dismissal – The employer shall submit a monthly report to the regional Office having
jurisdiction over the place of work, all dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying
therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of
commencement and termination of employment, the positions last held by them and such other
information as may ber required by the Department of labor for policy guidance and statistical
purposes.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175689 August 13, 2014

GEORGE A. ARRIOLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PILIPINO STAR .NGAYON, INC. and/or MIGUEL G. BELMONTE, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complaint is four years from the time the cause
of action accrued. This four-year prescriptive period, not the three-year period for filing money claims
under Article 291 of the Labor Code, applies to claims for backwages and damages due to illegal
dismissal.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' Decision1 and resolution2 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 91256, affirming the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The Commission
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s findings that there was no illegal dismissal in this case and that petitioner
George A. Arriola abandoned his employment with respondent Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.

In July 1986, Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. employed George A. Arriola as correspondent assigned in
Olongapo Cityand Zambales. Arriola had held various positions in Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. before
becoming a section editor and writer of its newspaper. He wrote "Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs" until his
column was removed from publication on November 15, 1999. Since then, Arriola never returned for
work.3

On November 15, 2002, Arriola filed a complaint4 for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
salaries/wages, moral and exemplary damages, actual damages, attorney's fees, and full
backwages with the National Labor Relations Commission. In his position paper,5 Arriola alleged that
Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. "arbitrarily dismissed"6 him on November 15, 1999. Arguing that he was a
regular employee,Arriola contended that his rights to security of tenure and due process
wereviolated when Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. illegally dismissed him.7 Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. and
Miguel G. Belmonte denied Arriola’s allegations. In their position paper,8 they alleged that around the
third week of November 1999, Arriola suddenly absented himself from work and never returned
despite Belmonte’s phone callsand beeper messages. After a few months, they learned that Arriola
transferred to a rival newspaper publisher, Imbestigador, to write "Boses ng Pamilyang OFWs."9

In his reply,10 Arriola denied that he abandoned his employment. He maintained that Pilipino Star
Ngayon, Inc. ordered him to stop reporting for work and to claim his separation pay.To prove his
allegation, Arriola presented a statement of account11 allegedly faxed to him by Pilipino Star Ngayon,
Inc.’s accounting head. Thisstatement of account showed a computation of his separation pay as of
November 30, 1999.

Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco decided the case. At the outset, she ruled that laches had set
in, emphasizing that Arriola took three years and one day to file his complaint. According to the
Labor Arbiter, this was "contrary to the immediate and natural reaction of an aggrieved person."12 If
Arriola were indeed aggrieved, he would not have waited three years and one day to sue Pilipino
Star Ngayon, Inc.13

The Labor Arbiter found that Arriola abandoned his employment with Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. to
write for a rival newspaper publisher.14 She also noted Arriola’s admission that hedid not contemplate
the filing of an illegal dismissal complaint but nevertheless filed one upon his lawyer’s advice.15
On Arriola’s money claims, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they have already prescribed.16 She cited
Article 291 ofthe Labor Code, which requires that all money claims arising from employer-employee
relations be filed three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Since Arriola filed his
complaint on November 15, 2002, which was three years and one day from his alleged illegal
dismissal on November 15, 1999,17 the Labor Arbiter ruled that his money claims were already
barred.

Thus, in the decision18 dated July 16, 2003, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Arriola's complaint for lack of
merit.

On Arriola’s appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission sustained the Labor Arbiter’s findings
and affirmed in toto the decision dated July 16, 2003.19 The Commission likewise denied Arriola’s
motion for reconsideration20 for lack of merit.21

Arriola filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.22

The Court of Appeals noted that the petition for certiorari questioned whether Arriola was illegally
dismissed. According to the appellate court, Arriola raised a factual issue "beyond the province of
certiorari to resolve."23 It added that the Labor Arbiter’s factual findings, if affirmed by the National
Labor Relations Commission,bound the appellate court.24

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals resolved the factual issue "in the interest of substantial justice."25

The Court of Appeals ruled that Arriola was not illegally dismissed. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. had the
management prerogative to determine which columns to maintain in its newspaper. Its removal of
"Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs" from publication did not mean that it illegally dismissed Arriola. His
employment, according to the appellate court,did not depend on the existence of the column.26

The appellate court enumerated the following factual findings belying Arriola’s claim of illegal
dismissal:

a) In his complaint, Arriola alleged that he did not receive his salary for the period covering
November 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999. This implied that he had worked for the whole
month of November 1999. However, this was contrary to his claim that Pilipino Star Ngayon,
Inc.dismissed him on November 15, 1999.

b) Sometime in 1999, an Aurea Reyes charged Arriola with libel. Pilipino Star Ngayon Inc.’s
counsel represented Arriola in that case and filed a counter-affidavit on November 24, 1999,
nine days after Arriola’s alleged illegal dismissal.

c) Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. never sent Arriola any notice of dismissal or termination.27

Similar to the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of
Appeals ruled that it was Arriola who abandoned his employment.28 The Court of Appeals likewise
ruled that his money claims have all prescribed based on Article 291 of the Labor Code.29

Thus, in the decision30 dated August 9, 2006, the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and dismissed Arriola's petition
for certiorari.
Arriola moved for reconsideration,31 but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its
resolution32 dated November 24, 2006.

In his petition for review on certiorari,33 Arriola maintains that he did not abandon his employment. He
insists that Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. illegally dismissed him when it removed his column, "Tinig ng
Pamilyang OFWs," from publication.34

On the finding that he abandoned his work in Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. to write "Boses ng
Pamilyang OFWs" in Imbestigador, Arriola presents a certification35 from Imbestigador’s Managing
Editor, Almar B. Danguilan, stating that Arriola started writing for Imbestigador only on February 17,
2003. This was after he had filed his complaint for illegal dismissal on November 15, 2002.

As to the finding that his money claims have prescribed, Arriola argues that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code should be counted from December 1, 1999,
not November 15, 1999. According to Arriola, Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. computed his separation
pay up to November 30, 1999, as evidenced by the faxed statement of account. Consequently, he
was deprived of his salary as a regular employee beginning December 1, 1999. His causeof action
for payment of backwages and damages accrued only on December 1, 1999.36

Arriola argues that assuming thathis cause of action accrued on November 15, 1999, he pleads that
his one-day-late filing of the complaint be excused.

This court ordered Pilipino StarNgayon, Inc. and Belmonte to comment on Arriola’s petition for
review on certiorari.37

In their comment,38 respondents argue that this court should not entertain Arriola’s petition for review
on certiorari. Arriola raised questions of fact not allowed in a Rule 45 petition. They highlight that the
Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals all found that
Arriola was not illegallydismissed and that he abandoned his employment. These factual findings,
respondents argue, bind this court.39

Respondents maintain that Arriola was not illegally dismissed. On the contrary, it was Arriola who
abandoned his employment in Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. According to respondents,they "must not be
faulted if they presumed that [Arriola] was no longer interested in [writing for Pilipino Star Ngayon,
Inc.]"40 considering that he did not report for work for more than three years.

On Arriola’s money claims, respondents argue that these have all prescribed. According to
respondents, Arriola’s one-day late filing of the complaint cannot be excused because prescription is
a matter of substantive law, not technicality.41

Arriola replied to respondents’ comment, reiterating his arguments in his petition for review on
certiorari.42

The issues for our resolution are the following:

I. Whether Arriola’s money claims have prescribed

II. Whether Pilipino Star Ngayon,Inc. illegally dismissed Arriola

The petition lacks merit.

 I

Arriola’s claims for backwages and

damages have not yet prescribed when he filed his complaint
with the National Labor Relations Commission

The Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that
Arriola’s claims for unpaid salaries, backwages, damages, and attorney’s fees have prescribed.
They cited Article 291 of the Labor Code, which requires that money claims arising from employer-
employee relations be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued:

Art. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

Article 291 covers claims for overtime pay,43 holiday pay,44 service incentive leave
pay,45 bonuses,46 salary differentials,47 and illegal deductions by an employer.48 It also covers money
claims arising from seafarer contracts.49

The provision, however, does not cover "money claims" consequent to an illegal dismissal such as
backwages.It also does not cover claims for damages due to illegal dismissal. These claims are
governed by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff[.]

In Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.,50 Virgilio Callanta worked as a salesperson for Carnation
Philippines, Inc. beginning in January 1974. On June 1, 1979, Carnation filed with the Regional
Office No. X of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment an application for issuance of clearance
to terminate Callanta. The application was granted, and Callanta’s employment was declared
terminated effective June 1, 1979.51

On July 5, 1982, Callanta filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for backwages and
damages. Inits defense, Carnation argued that Callanta’s complaint was barred by prescription.52

Carnation stressed that Callanta filed his complaint three years, one month, and five days after his
termination. Since illegal dismissal is a violation of the Labor Code, Carnation argued that Callanta’s
complaint was barred by Article 290 of the Labor Code.53 Under Article 290, offenses penalized
under the Code shall prescribe in three years.54

As to Callanta’s claims for backwages and damages, Carnation contended that these claims arose
from employer-employee relations. Since Callanta filed his complaint beyond the three-year period
under Article 291 of the Labor Code, his claims for backwages and damages were forever barred.55

This court ruled that Callanta’s complaint for illegal dismissal had not yet prescribed. Although illegal
dismissal is a violation of the Labor Code, it is not the "offense" contemplated in Article 290.56 Article
290 refers to illegal acts penalized under the Labor Code, including committing any of the prohibited
activities during strikes or lockouts, unfair labor practices, and illegal recruitment activities.57 The
three-year prescriptive period under Article 290, therefore, does not apply to complaints for illegal
dismissal.
Instead, "by way of supplement,"58 Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines governs
complaints for illegal dismissal. Under Article 1146, an action based upon an injury to the rights of a
plaintiff must be filed within four years. This court explained:

. . . when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action
instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an
action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the
New Civil Code, which must be brought within four [4] years.59

This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages, not the three-year prescriptive
period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. A claim for backwages, according to this court, may be a
money claim "by reason of its practical effect."60 Legally, however, an award of backwages "is merely
one of the reliefs which anillegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to
render inhis favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer."61 Though it
results "in the enrichment of the individual [illegally dismissed], the award of backwages is not in
redress of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make
public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code."62

Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions "upon an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff." Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, therefore, governs these actions.63

Callanta filed his complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for backwages and damages three years,
one month, and five days from his termination. Thus, this court ruled that Callanta filed his claims for
backwages and damages well within the four-year prescriptive period.64

This court applied the Callanta ruling in Texon Manufacturing v. Millena.65 In Texon, Marilyn and
Grace Millena commenced work for Texon Manufacturing in 1990 until Texon terminated their
employment. Texon first dismissed Grace on May 31, 1994 then dismissed Marilyn on September 8,
1995.66

On August 21, 1995, Grace filed a complaint for money claims representing underpayment and non-
payment of wages, overtime pay, and holiday pay with the National Labor Relations Commission.
Marilyn filed her own complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of full backwages and
benefits on September 11, 1995.67

Texon filed a motion to dismiss both complaints on the ground of prescription.68 It argued that Grace
and Marilyn’s causes of action accrued from the time they began working in Texon. Their
complaints, therefore, were filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the
Labor Code.69

This court ruled that both complaints had not yet prescribed. With respect to Grace’s complaint for
overtime pay and holiday pay, this court ruled that the three-year prescriptiveperiod under Article
291 of the Labor Code applied. Since Grace filed her claim one year, one month, and 21 days from
her dismissal, her claims were filed within the three-year prescriptive period.70 With respect to
Marilyn’s complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for backwages, this court while citing Callanta as
legal basis ruled that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines applied. Since Marilyn filed her complaint three days from her dismissal, she filed her
complaint well within the four-year prescriptive period.71 Applying these principles in this case, we
agree that Arriola’s claims for unpaid salaries have prescribed. Arriola filed his complaint three
1âwphi 1

years and one day from the time he was allegedly dismissed and deprived of his salaries. Since a
claim for unpaid salaries arises from employer-employee relations, Article 291 of the Labor Code
applies.72 Arriola’s claim for unpaid salaries was filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period.
However, we find that Arriola’s claims for backwages, damages, and attorney’s fees arising from his
claim of illegal dismissal have not yet prescribed when he filed his complaint with the Regional
Arbitration Branch for the National Capital Region ofthe National Labor Relations Commission. As
discussed, the prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complaint is four years from the time
the cause of action accrued. Since an award of backwages is merely consequent to a declaration of
illegal dismissal, a claim for backwages likewise prescribes in four years.

The four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 also applies to actions for damages due to
illegal dismissal since such actions are based on an injury to the rights of the person dismissed. In
this case, Arriola filed his complaint three years and one day from his alleged illegal dismissal.He,
therefore, filed his claims for backwages, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees
well within the four-year prescriptive period.

All told, the Court of Appeals erred infinding that Arriola’s claims for damages have already
prescribed when he filed his illegal dismissal complaint.

II

Arriola abandoned his employment with

Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.

In general, we do not entertain questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari.73 We do not try
facts.74 Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear that in a petition for review on certiorari with
this court, only questions of law may be raised:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.

A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise
only questions of lawwhich must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)

A question of fact exists "when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts."75 On the
other hand, there is a question of law "when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts."76 As this court explained in Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas:77

. . . For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.78

This court has made exceptions to this rule. We may review questions of fact in a petition for review
on certiorari if:

(1) the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there isa grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) in making its
findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.79

In his petition for review on certiorari, Arriola raises questions of fact. He invites us to examine the
probative value of a faxed letter80 containing a computation of his separation pay, and a
certification81 from Imbestigador’s Managing Editor, stating that Arriola started writing for
Imbestigador only on February 17, 2003. These pieces of documentary evidence allegedly prove
that Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. illegally dismissed Arriola and that he did not abandon his
employment.

This court has ruled that the issues of illegal dismissal82 and abandonment of employment83 are
factual issues which cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Arriola also failed to
persuade us why we should make an exception in this case.

We agree that Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. did not illegally dismiss Arriola. As the Court of Appeals
ruled, "the removal of [Arriola’s] column from private respondent [Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.’s
newspaper] is not tantamount to a termination of his employment as his job is not dependent on the
existence of the column ‘Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs.’"84 When Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. removed
"Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs" from publication, Arriola remained as section editor. Moreover, a
newspaper publisher has the management prerogative to determine what columns to print in its
newspaper.85 As the Court of Appeals held:

. . . it is a management prerogative of private respondent [Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.] to decide on

what sections should and would appear in the newspaper publication taking into consideration the
business viability and profitability of each section. Respondent [Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.] decided to
replace the "Pamilyang OFWs"section with another which it ought would better sell to the reading
public. Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may adopt or
devise means designed towards that goal. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the
employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. . . . The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its
purposes cannot be denied.86

Arriola abandoned his employment with Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. Abandonment is the "clear,
deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to continue his employment, without any intention
of returning."87 It has two elements: first, the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason and, second, a clear intention to sever employer-employee relations exists.88 The
second element is "the more determinative factor and is manifested by overt acts from which it may
be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work."89Assuming that Arriola started writing
for Imbestigador only on February 17, 2003, he nonetheless failed to report for work at Pilipino Star
Ngayon, Inc. after November 15, 1999 and only filed his illegal dismissal complaint on November 15,
2002. Hetook three years and one day to remedy his dismissal. This shows his clear intention to
sever his employment with Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.

Contrary to Arriola’s claim, Villar v. NLRC,90 Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores,91 and Anflo
Management & Investment Corp. v. Bolanio92 do not apply to this case. In these cases, the dismissed
workers immediately took steps to remedy their dismissal, unlike Arriola who "slept on his rights."93 In
Villar, the workers filed their complaint within the month they were dismissed.94 In Globe,the
employee filed her complaint two months after she had been constructively dismissed.95 In Anflo,the
employee filed his complaint one day after he had been dismissed.96
With respect to the computation ofArriola’s separation pay allegedly faxed by Pilipino Star Ngayon,
Inc.’s accounting head, we agree with the Court of Appeals that this does notprove that Arriola was
illegally dismissed:

[The faxed computation] does not conclusively show that the salaries were withheld from petitioner
Arriola starting 01 December 1999. It could not likewise be given probative value as the said
document does not bear the signature ofan unauthorized representative of private respondent
PSN[.] [N]either does it bears (sic) the official seal of the company. Besides, the abovementioned
computation for separation pay is not a conclusive proof of the existence of dismissal or termination
from work. It is just a mere computations (sic) which the authenticity thereof is being
assailed.97 (Citations omitted)

Considering the foregoing, we will not disturb the Labor Arbiter’s findings that Arriola was not illegally
dismissed and that he abandoned his employment. This is true especially since the National Labor
Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals affirmed these factual findings.98

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' decision dated August 9, 2006 and
resolution dated November 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 91256 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Villarama, Jr., J., designated as Acting Member per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22,
2014 in view of the vacancy in the Third Division.

1
Rollo, pp. 50-57. This decision is dated August 9, 2006. Associate Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes (now a Justice of this court) penned the decision, with Associate Justices Jose C.
Reyes, Jr. and Enrico A. Lanzanas concurring.

2
Id. at 58-59.

3
Id. at 7–8.

4
Id. at 60–61.

5
Id. at 62–72.

6
Id. at 64.

7
Id. at 65–67.

8
Id. at 85–91.

9
Id. at 87 and 63.

10
Id. at 141–155.

11
Id. at 136.

12
Id. at 97.

13
Id.

14
Id. at 98.

15
Id.

16
Id. at 98–99.

17
The year 2000 was a leap year.

18
Rollo, pp. 95–99.

19
Id. at 100–104.
20
Id. at 105–118.

21
Id. at 119–120.

22
Id. at 50.

23
Id. at 53.

24
Id.

25
Id.

26
Id. at 54.

27
Id. at 54–55.

28
Id. at 55.

29
Id. at 55–56.

30
Id. at 50–57.

31
Id. at 58.

32
Id. at 58–59.

33
Id. at 3–49.

34
Id. at 15–22.

35
Id. at 140.

36
Id. at 25–29.

37
Id. at 58, resolution dated January 29, 2007.

38
Id. at 59–70.

39
Id. at 59–60.

40
Id. at 63.

41
Id. at 64–66.

42
Id. at 75–105.

Texon Manufacturing v. Millena, 471 Phil. 318 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third
43

Division].
44
Id.

Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista, 497 Phil. 863 (2005) [PerJ. Chico-Nazario,
45

Second Division].

46
Republic Planters Bank v. NLRC, 334 Phil. 124 (1997) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].

University of Pangasinan v. Hon. Confesor, 344 Phil. 134 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second
47

Division].

Anabe v. Asian Construction (Asiakonstrukt),G.R. No. 183233, December 23, 2009, 609
48

SCRA 213 [Per J. Carpio Morales, First Division].

49
Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr., G.R. No. 167678, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 361
[Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc., 229 Phil. 279 (1986) [Per J. Fernan, Second
50

Division].

51
Id. at 283.

52
Id.

53
Id. at 283 and 285.

54
LABOR CODE, art. 290 provides:

Art. 290. OFFENSES. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations
issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.

55
Rollo, p. 285.

56
Id.

57
Id. at 286.

58
Id. at 288.

59
Id. at 289.

60
Id. at 287.

61
Id.

62
Id.

63
Id. at 287–288.

64
Id. at 289.
65
471 Phil. 318 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].

66
Id. at 321.

67
Id.

68
Id. at 322.

69
Id. at 323.

70
Id. at 324.

71
Id. at 325.

University of Pangasinan v. Hon. Confesor, 344 Phil. 134 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second
72

Division]; Chavez v. Hon. Bonto-Perez, 312 Phil. 88 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

73
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.

74
New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, Third Division].

75
Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas,G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 157, 166
[Per J. Brion, Second Division].

76
Id.

77
G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 157 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

78
Id. at 166–167.

Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, 597 Phil. 494, 498 (2009) [Per J.
79

Carpio Morales, Second Division], citing Uy v. Villanueva, 553 Phil. 69, 79 (2009) [Per J.
Nachura, Third Division].

80
Rollo, p. 136.

81
Id. at 140.

Cañedo v. Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 179326, July 31, 2013,
82

702 SCRA 647, 658 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

Pure Blue Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, 337 Phil. 710, 716 (1997) [Per J. Kapunan, First
83

Division].

84
Rollo, p. 54.

85
See Orozco v. The Fifth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals, 584 Phil. 35 (2008)
[Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

86
Rollo, p. 54.
 87
Camua, Jr. v. NLRC, 541 Phil. 650, 657 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division],
citing Cruz v. NLRC, 381 Phil. 775, 784 (2000) [Per J. Purisima, Third Division].

88
Id. at 657.

89
Id.

90
387 Phil. 706 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

91
438 Phil. 756 (2002) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

92
439 Phil. 309 (2002) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].

93
Rollo, p. 97.

94
387 Phil. 706, 709–710 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

95
438 Phil. 756, 760–761 (2002) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

96
439 Phil. 309, 313 (2002) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].

97
Rollo, p. 56.

Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 486 Phil. 276, 283-284 (2004) [Per J. Austria-Martinez,
98

Second Division].

SECOND DIVISION

PHILIPPINE LONG G.R. No. 182622

DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY [PLDT], Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
- versus - MENDOZA, JJ.

ROBERTO R. PINGOL, Promulgated:

 Respondent. September 8, 2010
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court filed by petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) which seeks to reverse and set aside: (1) the December 21, 2007
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98670, affirming the
November 15, 2006[2] and January 31, 2007[3] Resolutions of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC); and (2) its April 18, 2008 Resolution[4] denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.

THE FACTS

In 1979, respondent Roberto R. Pingol (Pingol) was hired by petitioner PLDT as a

maintenance technician.

On April 13, 1999, while still under the employ of PLDT, Pingol was
admitted at The Medical City, Mandaluyong City, for paranoid personality
disorder due to financial and marital problems. On May 14, 1999, he was
discharged from the hospital. Thereafter, he reported for work but frequently
absented himself due to his poor mental condition.

From September 16, 1999 to December 31, 1999, Pingol was absent from work
without official leave. According to PLDT, notices were sent to him with a stern
warning that he would be dismissed from employment if he continued to be absent
without official leave pursuant to PLDT Systems Practice A-007 which provides
that Absence without authorized leaves for seven (7) consecutive days is subject to
termination from the service.[5] Despite the warning, he failed to show up for
work. On January 1, 2000, PLDT terminated his services on the grounds of
unauthorized absences and abandonment of office.

On March 29, 2004, four years later, Pingol filed a Complaint for Constructive
Dismissal and Monetary Claims[6] against PLDT. In his complaint, he alleged that
he was hastily dismissed from his employment on January 1, 2000. In
response, PLDT filed a motion to dismiss claiming, among others, that respondents
cause of action had already prescribed as the complaint was filed four (4) years and
three (3) months after his dismissal.

Pingol, however, countered that in computing the prescriptive period, the years
2001 to 2003 must not be taken into account. He explained that from 2001 to 2003,
he was inquiring from PLDT about the financial benefits due him as an employee
who was no longer allowed to do his work, but he merely got empty promises. It
could not, therefore, result in abandonment of his claim.

On July 30, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) issued an order granting petitioners
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription, pertinent portions of which read:

As correctly cited by (PLDT), as ruled by the Supreme Court in the

case of Callanta vs. Carnation Phils., 145 SCRA 268, the complaint for
illegal dismissal must be filed within four (4) years from and after the date
of dismissal.
Needless to state, the money claims have likewise prescribed.
Article 291 of the Labor Code provides:

All money claims arising from employer-employee relations

accruing from the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within
three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued,
otherwise they shall be forever barred.

WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED on the ground

of prescription.
 SO ORDERED.[7]

Pingol appealed to the NLRC arguing that the 4-year prescriptive period has not
yet lapsed because PLDT failed to categorically deny his claims. The NLRC in
its November 15, 2006 Resolution reversed the LAs resolution and favored
Pingol. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant

appeal is GRANTED and the Order appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

Accordingly, let the entire records of the case be REMANDED to the Labor
Arbiter a quo for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[8]

PLDT moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in
its Resolution dated January 31, 2007.

Unsatisfied, PLDT elevated the case to the CA by way of a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in issuing the assailed resolutions.

The CA denied the petition in its December 21, 2007 Decision, the fallo of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby

DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated 15 November
2006 and 31 January 2007 of the National Labor Relations
Commission are AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.[9]

PLDT moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated April 18, 2008.

THE ISSUES

Not in conformity with the ruling of the CA, PLDT seeks relief with this Court
raising the following issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION

OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT PROBABLY IN ACCORD WITH LAW
OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE

ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS
TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.[10]

The issues boil down to whether or not respondent Pingol filed his
complaint for constructive dismissal and money claims within the prescriptive
period of four (4) years as provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code [11] and three
(3) years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code,[12] respectively.

Petitioner PLDT argues that the declaration under oath made by respondent
Pingol in his complaint before the LA stating January 1, 2000 as the date of his
dismissal, should have been treated by the NLRC and the CA as a judicial
admission pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Court.[13] According to petitioner, respondent has never contradicted his admission
under oath. On the basis of said declaration, petitioner posits that the LA was
correct in finding that Pingols complaint for illegal dismissal was filed beyond the
prescriptive period of four (4) years from the date of dismissal pursuant to Article
1146 of the New Civil Code.

In his Comment,[14] respondent Pingol counters that petitioner PLDT could

not have sent those notices with warning as that claim has never been supported by
sufficient proof not only before the Labor Arbiter but likewise before the Court of
Appeals.[15] He further alleges that his dismissal is likewise unsupported by any
evidence. He insists that both the NLRC and the CA correctly stated that his cause
of action has not yet prescribed as he was not formally dismissed on January 1,
2000 or his monetary claims categorically denied by petitioner.

THE COURTS RULING

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Parties apparently do not dispute the applicable prescriptive period.

Article 1146 of the New Civil Code provides:

 Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted
within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

xxx xxx xxx

As this Court stated in Callanta v. Carnation,[16] when one is arbitrarily and

unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest
the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action
predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated under
Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four (4) years.

With regard to the prescriptive period for money claims, Article 291 of the
Labor Code states:

Article 291. Money Claims. All money claims arising from

employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this
Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause
of action accrued; otherwise they shall be barred forever.

The pivotal question in resolving the issues is the date when the cause of
action of respondent Pingol accrued.

It is a settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three (3) elements, to

wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.[17]

Respondent asserts that his complaint was filed within the prescriptive
period of four (4) years. He claims that his cause of action did not accrue
on January 1, 2000because he was not categorically and formally dismissed or his
monetary claims categorically denied by petitioner PLDT on said date. Further,
respondent Pingol posits that the continuous follow-up of his claim with petitioner
PLDT from 2001 to 2003 should be considered in the reckoning of the prescriptive
period.

Petitioner PLDT, on the other hand, contends that respondent Pingol was
dismissed from the service on January 1, 2000 and such fact was even alleged in
the complaint he filed before the LA. He never contradicted his previous
admission that he was dismissed on January 1, 2000. Such admitted fact does not
require proof.

The Court agrees with petitioner PLDT. Judicial admissions made by parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
conclusive and so does not require further evidence to prove them. These
admissions cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[18] In Pepsi Cola
Bottling Company v. Guanzon,[19] it was written:

xxx that the dismissal of the private respondent's complaint was

still proper since it is apparent from its face that the action has prescribed.
Private respondent himself alleged in the complaint that he was unlawfully
dismissed in 1979 while the complaint was filed only on November 14,
1984. xxx (Emphasis supplied. Citations omitted.)

In the case at bench, Pingol himself alleged the date January 1, 2000 as the
date of his dismissal in his complaint[20] filed on March 29, 2004, exactly four (4)
years and three (3) months later. Respondent never denied making such admission
or raised palpable mistake as the reason therefor. Thus, the petitioner correctly
relied on such allegation in the complaint to move for the dismissal of the case on
the ground of prescription.

The Labor Code has no specific provision on when a claim for illegal dismissal or
a monetary claim accrues. Thus, the general law on prescription applies. Article
1150 of the Civil Code states:
 Article 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there
is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the
day they may be brought. (Emphasis supplied)

The day the action may be brought is the day a claim starts as a legal
possibility.[21] In the present case, January 1, 2000 was the date that respondent
Pingol was not allowed to perform his usual and regular job as a maintenance
technician. Respondent Pingol cited the same date of dismissal in his complaint
before the LA. As, thus, correctly ruled by the LA, the complaint filed had already
prescribed.

Respondent claims that between 2001 and 2003, he made follow-ups with PLDT
management regarding his benefits. This, to his mind, tolled the running of the
prescriptive period.

The rule in this regard is covered by Article 1155 of the Civil Code. Its
applicability in labor cases was upheld in the case of International Broadcasting
Corporation v. Panganiban[22] where it was written:

Like other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is
subject to interruption, and in the absence of an equivalent Labor Code
provision for determining whether the said period may be
interrupted, Article 1155 of the Civil Code may be applied, to wit:

ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are

filed before the Court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by
the debtor.

Thus, the prescription of an action is interrupted by (a) the filing of

an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
 In this case, respondent Pingol never made any written extrajudicial
demand. Neither did petitioner make any written acknowledgment of its alleged
obligation. Thus, the claimed follow-ups could not have validly tolled the running
of the prescriptive period. It is worthy to note that respondent never presented any
proof to substantiate his allegation of follow-ups.

Unfortunately, respondent Pingol has no one but himself to blame for his
own predicament. By his own allegations in his complaint, he has barred his
remedy and extinguished his right of action. Although the Constitution is
committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it
does not necessary follow that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in
favor of labor. The management also has its own rights. Out of Its concern for the
less privileged in life, this Court, has more often than not inclined, to uphold the
cause of the worker in his conflict with the employer. Such leaning, however,
does not blind the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to
be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and
doctrine.[23]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 21,

2007 Decision and April 18, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 98670, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment
entered DISMISSING the complaint of Roberto R. Pingol.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
 WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo pp. 134-140. Penned by Associate Justice Japar D. Dimaampao with Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III
and Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring.
[2]
Id. at 126-129.
[3]
Id. at 131-132.
[4]
Id. at 141-142.
[5]
Id. at 18.
[6]
Id. at 124-125.
[7]
Id. at 136.
[8]
Id. at 129.
[9]
Id. at 139.
[10]
Id. at 31.
[11]
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. xxx
[12]
Article 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they
shall be forever barred.

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the

[13]

course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.
[14]
Rollo pp. 62-76.
[15]
Id. at 70.
[16]
229 Phil. 279, 289 (1986).
[17]
J Marketing Corporation v. Taran, G.R. No. 163924, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 428, 440, citing Auto Bus
Transport Systems, Inc. v. Baustista, 497 Phil. 863 (2005).
[18]
Damasco v. NLRC, 400 Phil. 568, 586 (2000), citing Philippine American General Insurance Inc. v. Sweet Lines,
Inc., G.R. No. 87434, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 194.
[19]
254 Phil. 578, 586 (1989).
[20]
Rollo, p. 124.
[21]
Anabe v. Asian Construction, G.R. No. 183233, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 213, 221.
[22]
G.R. No. 151407, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 404, 411-412, citing Laureano v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil.
403, 412, (2000).
[23]
Maribago Bluewater Beach Resort, Inc. v. Dual, G.R. No. 180660, July 20, 2010.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

ABDULJUAHID R. PIGCAULAN,⃰ G.R. No. 173648

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,⃰ ⃰ and
SECURITY and CREDIT VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
INVESTIGATION, INC. and/or
RENE AMBY REYES , Promulgated:
Respondents. January 16, 2012
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is not for an employee to prove non-payment of benefits to which he is entitled by

law. Rather, it is on the employer that the burden of proving payment of these claims
rests.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the February 24, 2006
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85515, which granted the
petition for certiorarifiled therewith, set aside the March 23, 2004[3] and June 14,
2004[4] Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and dismissed
the complaint filed by Oliver R. Canoy (Canoy) and petitioner Abduljuahid R. Pigcaulan
(Pigcaulan) against respondent Security and Credit Investigation, Inc. (SCII) and its
General Manager, respondent Rene Amby Reyes.Likewise assailed is the June 28, 2006
Resolution[5] denying Canoys and Pigcaulans Motion for Reconsideration.[6]

Factual Antecedents

Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were assigned
to SCIIs different clients. Subsequently, however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed with the
Labor Arbiter separate complaints[7] for underpayment of salaries and non-payment of
overtime, holiday, rest day, service incentive leave and 13th month pays. These
complaints were later on consolidated as they involved the same causes of action.

Canoy and Pigcaulan, in support of their claim, submitted their respective daily time
records reflecting the number of hours served and their wages for the same. They
likewise presented itemized lists of their claims for the corresponding periods served.

Respondents, however, maintained that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid their just
salaries and other benefits under the law; that the salaries they received were above the
statutory minimum wage and the rates provided by the Philippine Association of
Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO) for security guards; that their
holiday pay were already included in the computation of their monthly salaries; that they
were paid additional premium of 30% in addition to their basic salary whenever they
were required to work on Sundays and 200% of their salary for work done on holidays;
and, that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid the corresponding 13th month pay for the years
1998 and 1999. In support thereof, copies of payroll listings[8] and lists of employees who
received their 13th month pay for the periods December 1997 to November 1998 and
December 1998 to November 1999[9] were presented. In addition, respondents contended
that Canoys and Pigcaulans monetary claims should only be limited to the past three
years of employment pursuant to the rule on prescription of claims.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Giving credence to the itemized computations and representative daily time records
submitted by Canoy and Pigcaulan, Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion awarded them
their monetary claims in his Decision[10] dated June 6, 2002. The Labor Arbiter held that
the payroll listings presented by the respondents did not prove that Canoy and Pigcaulan
were duly paid as same were not signed by the latter or by any SCII officer. The
13th month payroll was, however, acknowledged as sufficient proof of payment, for it
bears Canoys and Pigcaulans signatures. Thus, without indicating any detailed
computation of the judgment award, the Labor Arbiter ordered the payment of overtime
pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and proportionate 13thmonth pay for the
year 2000 in favor of Canoy and Pigcaulan, viz:

WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainants: 1)

their salary differentials in the amount of P166,849.60 for Oliver Canoy and P121,765.44
for Abduljuahid Pigcaulan; 2) the sum of P3,075.20 for Canoy and P2,449.71 for
Pigcaulan for service incentive leave pay and; [3]) the sum of P1,481.85 for Canoy
and P1,065.35 for Pigcaulan as proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000. The rest
of the claims are dismissed for lack of sufficient basis to make an award.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Respondents appealed to the NLRC. They alleged that there was no basis
for the awards made because aside from the self-serving itemized computations, no
representative daily time record was presented by Canoy and Pigcaulan. On the contrary,
respondents asserted that the payroll listings they submitted should have been given more
probative value. To strengthen their cause, they attached to their Memorandum on
Appeal payrolls[12] bearing the individual signatures of Canoy and Pigcaulan to show that
the latter have received their salaries, as well as copies of transmittal letters[13] to the bank
to show that the salaries reflected in the payrolls were directly deposited to the ATM
accounts of SCIIs employees.

The NLRC, however, in a Resolution[14] dated March 23, 2004, dismissed the
appeal and held that the evidence show underpayment of salaries as well as non-payment
of service incentive leave benefit. Accordingly, the Labor Arbiters Decision was
sustained. The motion for reconsideration thereto was likewise dismissed by the NLRC
in a Resolution[15] dated June 14, 2004.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In respondents petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction[16] before the CA, they attributed grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that Canoy and Pigcaulan are entitled to
salary differentials, service incentive leave pay and proportionate 13th month pay and in
arriving at amounts without providing sufficient bases therefor.

The CA, in its Decision[17] dated February 24, 2006, set aside the rulings of
both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC after noting that there were no factual and legal
bases mentioned in the questioned rulings to support the conclusions
made. Consequently, it dismissed all the monetary claims of Canoy and Pigcaulan on the
following rationale:

First. The Labor Arbiter disregarded the NLRC rule that, in cases involving money
awards and at all events, as far as practicable, the decision shall embody the detailed and
full amount awarded.

Second. The Labor Arbiter found that the payrolls submitted by SCII have no probative
value for being unsigned by Canoy, when, in fact, said payrolls, particularly the payrolls
from 1998 to 1999 indicate the individual signatures of Canoy.

Third. The Labor Arbiter did not state in his decision the substance of the evidence
adduced by Pigcaulan and Canoy as well as the laws or jurisprudence that would show
that the two are indeed entitled to the salary differential and incentive leave pays.

Fourth. The Labor Arbiter held Reyes liable together with SCII for the payment of the
claimed salaries and benefits despite the absence of proof that Reyes deliberately or
maliciously designed to evade SCIIs alleged financial obligation; hence the Labor Arbiter
ignored that SCII has a corporate personality separate and distinct from Reyes. To justify
solidary liability, there must be an allegation and showing that the officers of the
corporation deliberately or maliciously designed to evade the financial obligation of the
corporation.[18]

Canoy and Pigcaulan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but same was denied by the CA
in a Resolution[19] dated June 28, 2006.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues
The petition ascribes upon the CA the following errors:

I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the complaint on

mere alleged failure of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to observe the prescribed form
of decision, instead of remanding the case for reformation of the decision to include the
desired detailed computation.

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it [made] complainants suffer the
consequences of the alleged non-observance by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC of the
prescribed forms of decisions considering that they have complied with all needful acts
required to support their claims.

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the complaint
allegedly due to absence of legal and factual [bases] despite attendance of substantial
evidence in the records.[20]

It is well to note that while the caption of the petition reflects both the names of
Canoy and Pigcaulan as petitioners, it appears from its body that it is being filed solely by
Pigcaulan. In fact, the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was
executed by Pigcaulan alone.

In his Petition, Pigcaulan submits that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are not
strictly bound by the rules. And even so, the rules do not mandate that a detailed
computation of how the amount awarded was arrived at should be embodied in the
decision. Instead, a statement of the nature or a description of the amount awarded and
the specific figure of the same will suffice. Besides, his and Canoys claims were
supported by substantial evidence in the form of the handwritten detailed computations
which the Labor Arbiter termed as representative daily time records, showing that they
were not properly compensated for work rendered. Thus, the CA should have remanded
the case instead of outrightly dismissing it.

In their Comment,[21] respondents point out that since it was only Pigcaulan who
filed the petition, the CA Decision has already become final and binding upon Canoy. As
to Pigcaulans arguments, respondents submit that they were able to present sufficient
evidence to prove payment of just salaries and benefits, which bits of evidence were
unfortunately ignored by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Fittingly, the CA
reconsidered these pieces of evidence and properly appreciated them. Hence, it was
correct in dismissing the claims for failure of Canoy and Pigcaulan to discharge their
burden to disprove payment.

Pigcaulan, this time joined by Canoy, asserts in his Reply[22] that his filing of the
present petition redounds likewise to Canoys benefit since their complaints were
consolidated below.As such, they maintain that any kind of disposition made in favor or
against either of them would inevitably apply to the other. Hence, the institution of the
petition solely by Pigcaulan does not render the assailed Decision final as to
Canoy. Nonetheless, in said reply they appended Canoys affidavit[23] where he verified
under oath the contents and allegations of the petition filed by Pigcaulan and also attested
to the authenticity of its annexes. Canoy, however, failed to certify that he had not filed
any action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. He likewise
explains in said affidavit that his absence during the preparation and filing of the petition
was caused by severe financial distress and his failure to inform anyone of his
whereabouts.

Our Ruling

The assailed CA Decision is considered final as

to Canoy.

We have examined the petition and find that same was filed by Pigcaulan solely on his
own behalf. This is very clear from the petitions prefatory which is phrased as follows:

COMES NOW Petitioner Abduljuahid R. Pigcaulan, by counsel, unto this

Honorable Court x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Also, under the heading Parties, only Pigcaulan is mentioned as petitioner and consistent
with this, the body of the petition refers only to a petitioner and never in its plural form
petitioners. Aside from the fact that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping attached to the petition was executed by Pigcaulan alone, it was plainly and
particularly indicated under the name of the lawyer who prepared the same, Atty. Josefel
P. Grageda, that he is the Counsel for Petitioner Adbuljuahid Pigcaulan only. In view of
these, there is therefore, no doubt, that the petition was brought only on behalf of
Pigcaulan. Since no appeal from the CA Decision was brought by Canoy, same has
already become final and executory as to him.

Canoy cannot now simply incorporate in his affidavit a verification of the contents and
allegations of the petition as he is not one of the petitioners therein. Suffice it to state that
it would have been different had the said petition been filed in behalf of both Canoy and
Pigcaulan. In such a case, subsequent submission of a verification may be allowed as
non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading, or
the petition as in this case, fatally defective.[24] The court may order its submission or
correction, or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby. Further, a verification is deemed substantially complied with when one
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct.[25] However, even if it were so, we note that Canoy still
failed to submit or at least incorporate in his affidavit a certificate of non-forum shopping.

The filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory so much so

that non-compliance could only be tolerated by special circumstances and compelling
reasons.[26] This Court has held that when there are several petitioners, all of them must
execute and sign the certification against forum shopping; otherwise, those who did not
sign will be dropped as parties to the case.[27] True, we held that in some cases, execution
by only one of the petitioners on behalf of the other petitioners constitutes substantial
compliance with the rule on the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping on the
ground of common interest or common cause of action or defense.[28] We, however, find
that common interest is not present in the instant petition. To recall, Canoys and
Pigcaulans complaints were consolidated because they both sought the same reliefs
against the same respondents. This does not, however, mean that they share a common
interest or defense. The evidence required to substantiate their claims may not be the
same. A particular evidence which could sustain Canoys action may not effectively serve
as sufficient to support Pigcaulans claim.

Besides, assuming that the petition is also filed on his behalf, Canoy failed to show
any reasonable cause for his failure to join Pigcaulan to personally sign the Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping. It is his duty, as a litigant, to be prudent in pursuing his claims
against SCII, especially so, if he was indeed suffering from financial distress. However,
Canoy failed to advance any justifiable reason why he did not inform anyone of his
whereabouts when he knows that he has a pending case against his former
employer. Sadly, his lack of prudence and diligence cannot merit the courts consideration
or sympathy. It must be emphasized at this point that procedural rules should not be
ignored simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys
substantial rights. The Rules of Court should be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons.[29]
Having declared the present petition as solely filed by Pigcaulan, this Court shall
consider the subsequent pleadings, although apparently filed under his and Canoys name,
as solely filed by the former.

There was no substantial evidence to support

the grant of overtime pay.

The Labor Arbiter ordered reimbursement of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay and 13th month pay for the year 2000 in favor of Canoy and Pigcaulan. The
Labor Arbiter relied heavily on the itemized computations they submitted which he
considered as representative daily time records to substantiate the award of salary
differentials. The NLRC then sustained the award on the ground that there was
substantial evidence of underpayment of salaries and benefits.

We find that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in this regard. The handwritten
itemized computations are self-serving, unreliable and unsubstantial evidence to sustain
the grant of salary differentials, particularly overtime pay. Unsigned and unauthenticated
as they are, there is no way of verifying the truth of the handwritten entries stated
therein. Written only in pieces of paper and solely prepared by Canoy and Pigcaulan,
these representative daily time records, as termed by the Labor Arbiter, can hardly be
considered as competent evidence to be used as basis to prove that the two were
underpaid of their salaries. We find nothing in the records which could substantially
support Pigcaulans contention that he had rendered service beyond eight hours to entitle
him to overtime pay and during Sundays to entitle him to restday pay. Hence, in the
absence of any concrete proof that additional service beyond the normal working hours
and days had indeed been rendered, we cannot affirm the grant of overtime pay to
Pigcaulan.
Pigcaulan is entitled to holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay and proportionate
13th month pay for year 2000.

However, with respect to the award for holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay and 13th month pay, we affirm and rule that Pigcaulan is entitled to these benefits.
Article 94 of the Labor Code provides that:

ART. 94. RIGHT TO HOLIDAY PAY. (a) Every worker shall be paid his
regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments
regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;

xxxx

While Article 95 of the Labor Code provides:

ART. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE. (a) Every employee

who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive
of five days with pay.

xxxx

Under the Labor Code, Pigcaulan is entitled to his regular rate on holidays even if
he does not work.[30] Likewise, express provision of the law entitles him to service
incentive leave benefit for he rendered service for more than a year already. Furthermore,
under Presidential Decree No. 851,[31] he should be paid his 13th month pay. As employer,
SCII has the burden of proving that it has paid these benefits to its employees.[32]

SCII presented payroll listings and transmittal letters to the bank to show that
Canoy and Pigcaulan received their salaries as well as benefits which it claimed are
already integrated in the employees monthly salaries. However, the documents presented
do not prove SCIIs allegation. SCII failed to show any other concrete proof by means of
records, pertinent files or similar documents reflecting that the specific claims have been
paid. With respect to 13th month pay, SCII presented proof that this benefit was paid but
only for the years 1998 and 1999. To repeat, the burden of proving payment of these
monetary claims rests on SCII, being the employer. It is a rule that one who pleads
payment has the burden of proving it. Even when the plaintiff alleges non-payment, still
the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on
the plaintiff to prove non-payment.[33] Since SCII failed to provide convincing proof that
it has already settled the claims, Pigcaulan should be paid his holiday pay, service
incentive leave benefits and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000.

The CA erred in dismissing the claims instead

of remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for a
detailed computation of the judgment award.

Indeed, the Labor Arbiter failed to provide sufficient basis for the monetary
awards granted. Such failure, however, should not result in prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party. While we disallow the grant of overtime pay and restday pay in favor
of Pigcaulan, he is nevertheless entitled, as a matter of right, to his holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay for year 2000. Hence, the CA is not correct in
dismissing Pigcaulans claims in its entirety.

Consistent with the rule that all money claims arising from an employer-employee
relationship shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action
accrued,[34] Pigcaulan can only demand the amounts due him for the period within three
years preceding the filing of the complaint in 2000. Furthermore, since the records are
insufficient to use as bases to properly compute Pigcaulans claims, the case should be
remanded to the Labor Arbiter for a detailed computation of the monetary benefits due to
him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

February 24, 2006 and Resolution dated June 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 85515 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Abduljuahid R.
Pigcaulan is hereby declared ENTITLED to holiday pay and service incentive leave pay
for the years 1997-2000 and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000.

The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings to determine the
exact amount and to make a detailed computation of the monetary benefits due
Abduljuahid R. Pigcaulan which Security and Credit Investigation Inc. should pay
without delay.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
⃰
Originally captioned as Oliver Canoy and Abduljuahid Pigcaulan, petitioners vs. Security and Credit Investigation
Inc. and/or Rene Amby Reyes, respondents. The Court, however, drops Oliver Canoy from the caption
consistent with the Courts ruling herein.
⃰⃰
Per raffle dated January 10, 2012.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 10-26.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 219-225; penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada and concurred in by Associate
Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Mario L. Guaria III.
[3]
Id. at 18-25; penned by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C.
Javier and Commissioner Ernesto C. Verceles.
[4]
Id. at 27-28.
[5]
Id. at 250.
[6]
Id. at 229-234.
[7]
Canoys complaint was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-03-01409-2000 while Pigcaulans complaint was
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-03-01782-2000.
[8]
Annex 1 of SCIIs Position Paper, CA rollo, pp. 59-63 and 70-76.
[9]
Annex 2 of SCIIs Position Paper, id. at 64-65 and 77-78.
[10]
Id. at 83-87.
[11]
Id. at 87.
[12]
Annex 2-2-OO of SCIIs Memorandum on Appeal, id. at 101-142.
[13]
Annex 4-31 of SCIIs Memorandum on Appeal, id. at 150-205.
[14]
Id. at 18-25.
[15]
Id. at 27-28.
[16]
Id. at 2-16.
[17]
Id. at 219-225.
[18]
Id. at 223-224.
[19]
Id. at 250.
[20]
Rollo, p. 18.
[21]
Id. at 46-52.
[22]
Id. at 57-61.
[23]
Annex A of the petitioners Reply, id. at 62-63.
[24]
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Estanislao Mioza, G.R. No. 186045, February 2, 2011,
641 SCRA 520, 528 citing Altres v. Empleo, G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 583, 597.
[25]
Id.
[26]
Mandaue Galleon Trade, Inc. v. Isidto, G.R. No. 181051, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 414, 421.
[27]
Traveo v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 164205, September 3, 2009, 598
SCRA 27, 36 citing Altres v. Empleo, G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 583, 597.
[28]
Northeastern College Teachers and Employees Association v. Northeastern College, Inc., G.R. No. 152923,
January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 149, 179; Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Mingoa, Sr., G.R. No. 146548,
December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 394, 406-407.
[29]
Pyro Copper Mining Corporation v. Mines Adjudication Board-Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, G.R. No. 179674, July 28, 2009, 594 SCRA 195, 211-212.
[30]
Labadan v. Forest Hills Academy, G.R. No. 172295, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 262, 268.
[31]
Requiring All Employers To Pay Their Employees A 13 th-Month Pay.
[32]
Saberola v. Suarez, G.R. No. 151227, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 135, 146-147.
[33]
Id.
[34]
LABOR CODE, Article 291.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jun2005/151849.htm