Moscow-Tokyo and The Northern Territories Dispute PDF

Moscow-Tokyo and the Northern Territories Dispute
Author(s): Andrew Mack and Martin O'Hare

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Apr., 1990), pp. 380-394
Published by: University of California Press
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MOSCOW-TOKYOAND THE
NORTHERNTERRITORIESDISPUTE
Andrew Mack and Martin O'Hare
The most serious barrier today to a major improve-

ment in relations between Tokyo and Moscow is the long-standing and
bitter dispute over a number of small islands lying between the northern
Japanese island of Hokkaido and the USSR's Kamchatka Peninsula. The
territories in question-Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai Is-
lands-are claimed by both the Japanese and the Soviets, but have been
occupied by the latter since the end of World War II. The first two are the
most southerly of the Kuriles, a chain of islands that stretches for around a
thousand kilometres between Hokkaido and the Kamchatka Peninsula,
and are sometimes known as the southern Kuriles. Shikotan and a cluster
of small islands known as the Habomais lie off the northeastern coast of
Hokkaido (see Map 1). Japan refers to these islands as the Northern Ter-
ritories and asserts that their return is the sine qua non for the negotiation
of a peace treaty with the USSR to end the formal state of war between the
two countries and for the development of good relations with Moscow.
The Northern Territories comprise about 5,000 square kilometers, with
the southern Kuriles making up 90% of the total land area. No Japanese
citizens currently reside in the Kuriles, some 16,000 having been repatri-
ated after the Soviet occupation at the end of World War II. The former
Japanese inhabitants had worked on the islands as fishermen, hunters, and
agricultural workers, and the abundance of fish in the area also attracted
many seasonal workers from Hokkaido during the summer fishing season.
With the exception of access to fisheries, the Northern Territories are not,
however, of great economic importance to either Japan or the Soviet
Union. Their real significance lies in the realms of politics and strategy.
Andrew Mack is head of the Peace Research Centre at the

Australian National University and Martin O'Hare is Research Officerat the Australia-Japan
Research Centre, ANU. The authors are grateful to Stuart Harris, Peter Polomka, and
Mary-Lou Hickey for comments on an early draft of this article.
( 1990 by The Regents of the University of California
380

ANDREW MACK AND MARTIN O'HARE 381
History of the Dispute
Japanese writers usually commence a discussion of the Northern Territo-
ries dispute with reference to two nineteenth century treaties. In 1855, the
Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and
Russia (the Shimoda Treaty) set the Russo-Japanese border between
Etorofu and Urup islands in the Kurile chain, while the large island of
Sakhalin to the north became a condominium. In 1875 Russia and Japan
signed the Treaty of St. Petersburg, under which Japan relinquished its
rights to the joint possession of Sakhalin and in return received territorial
rights to the Kurile Islands. In these treaties, the term Kurile Islands re-
ferred to the 18 islands from Urup northward. This is important to the
Japanese as their claim rests in part on the premise that Etorofu and
Kunashiri (the southern Kuriles) were not historically considered part of
the Kuriles and, along with Shikotan and the Habomais, have never be-
longed to any country other than Japan. The status of the disputed territo-
ries was not changed by the Treaty of Portsmouth that followed the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, but as a consequence of this war, the
southern half of Sakhalin also came under Japanese control. Thus, prior
to World War II, the entire Kurile chain, Shikotan, the Habomais, and
southern Sakhalin south of 50 N. latitude were under Japanese sover-
eignty.
In April 1941 the Soviet Union concluded a Neutrality Pact with Japan
that was intended to run for five years. The two powers agreed to main-
tain peaceful and friendly relations and to respect each other's territorial
integrity. Following Tokyo's entry into World War II, however, pressure
mounted on the Soviets to join the allies in the struggle against Japan. At
the Teheran Conference in December 1943, Stalin reiterated an earlier
pledge to join the war against Japan once Germany was defeated, and at
Yalta in February 1945, he outlined the political conditions under which
the Soviet Union would enter the war. It was agreed, inter alia, that "the
southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be
returned to the Soviet Union," and that "the Kurile Islands shall be
handed over to the Soviet Union."' In November 1943, the Cairo Decla-
ration enunciated the principle of territorial nonexpansion and stipulated
that Japan would "be expelled from all territories which she has taken by
violence and greed."2
1. Edward R. Settinius, Roosevelt And The Russians At The Yalta Conference (Jonathan
Cape, London), pp. 89-92, 313-14.
2. Rajendra Kumar Jain, The USSR and Japan 1945-1980 (Brighton, England: Harvester
Press, 1981) p. 212.

382 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL.XXX, NO. 4, APRIL 1990
MAP 1
SOVIET UNION 4 mg 7
en /-\: /
a,,;) z Z g SUrup PAC/F/C OCEAN
CHINA~~~~Tky N
eS NTH
KOREA'\
SEA OF JAPAN International boundary
%MHonshu Averagewinter limit
)KOREA ok) of pack-ice
- / 22Shikru JAPAN PACIFI O5EAkm

Kyushuu
In August 1945 the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, attacked
Manchuria, and occupied the Kuriles. In February 1947 the Territories
were incorporated into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
and by 1949 there were no Japanese left on the islands.3 The Soviets thus
3. Wolf Mendl, "Stuck in a Mould? The Relationship Between Japan and the Soviet
Union," paper presented to the International Studies Association, London, March 1989, pp.
9-10.

became the de facto masters of what the Japanese have never ceased to call
"the Northern Territories"-a title the Soviets, not surprisingly, reject. In
the Treaty of Peace signed in San Francisco in 1951, Japan renounced "all
right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin
and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a
consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905."'4
The Japanese view. The Japanese argue that the Soviet declaration of war
against Japan in World War II was a violation of the five-year Neutrality
Pact of 1941. They also argue that the Northern Territories have always
been under Japanese sovereignty and therefore cannot be included as terri-
tories "taken by violence and greed" as set out in the 1943 Cairo Declara-
tion. They further argue that the principle of territorial nonexpansion
articulated in Cairo precludes Japan's own territory being usurped. The
secret Yalta Agreement, say the Japanese, was a statement of objectives,
not an international agreement; anyway Japan was not a party to it. Fur-
thermore, neither the Yalta Agreement nor the San Francisco Peace
Treaty define the geographical limits of the Kurile Islands, which Japan
was being required to surrender. The Japanese maintain that the 1855 and
1875 treaties with Russia define the Kurile Islands as excluding both
Kunashiri and Etorofu. Finally, the 1951 Peace Treaty does not concede
sovereignty to the Soviets over the territories in question. Indeed, Soviet
failure to obtain agreement from all of its wartime allies that Moscow
should have sovereignty over these territories was one of the main reasons
for Soviet refusal to sign the Peace Treaty. In Tokyo's view, Moscow's
failure to sign and ratify the treaty precludes the Soviets from any right or
benefit that may flow from it.
The Soviet view. The Soviet Union's claim is based on the agreements
reached at Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam, as well as the 1951 Peace Treaty.
The Potsdam Declaration, accepted by Japan in the Instrument of Surren-
der, states that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be implemented
and limits Japanese territory to the four main islands of Japan and such
minor islands as the signatories should determine. Although the Potsdam
Proclamation does not mention the Yalta Agreement, the Soviets maintain
that the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Proclamation are indivisible.
More salient, however, is the fact that Japan renounced all claim to the
Kurile Islands in the 1951 Peace Treaty. The Soviets consider Etorofu and
Kunashiri as part of the Kuriles and argue that no distinction was made at
Yalta or San Francisco between the northern and southern Kuriles.
4. John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 245.

384 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXX, NO. 4, APRIL 1990
The Soviets point to the fact that the Japanese knew at the Peace Treaty
negotiations that they were renouncing the entire Kurile chain, and indeed
records of Diet committee sessions attest to this fact.5 The fact that the
Soviet Union was not a signatory to the 1951 Treaty does not absolve Ja-
pan of the responsibility for acceding to its provisions. Igor Rogachev,
deputy minister for foreign affairs,argues that, "renunciationof the Kurile
Islands by Japan is of an absolute character, and its legal consequences go
beyond the range of the Parties to the San Francisco Treaty."6 The Sovi-
ets argue, on the other hand, that the nineteenth century treaties on which
Japan places such great emphasis ceased to be binding on Russia when
they were violated by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.7 In
sum, Moscow's view is that Soviet sovereignty over the disputed islands
was "rooted in history, decided at Yalta, confirmed at Potsdam, and final-
ized at San Francisco."8
Postwar Developments
During the early 1950s, public opinion in Japan supported the normaliza-
tion of relations with the Soviet Union. There was a desire to terminate
the formal state of war between the two states and to resolve the Northern
Territories dispute. There were also unresolved problems concerning both
the repatriation of Japanese citizens detained in the Soviet Union at the
end of the war and fishing rights in the northern seas. Negotiations aimed
at concluding a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union com-
menced in 1955 and resulted in a Joint Declaration in 1956. On the terri-
torial question, the initial Japanese negotiating position was that the
Habomais and Shikotan were claimed unconditionally and that the histori-
cal claim to the southern Kuriles did not have to be met for settlement to
be reached. The demand for the return of the northern Kuriles and south-
ern Sakhalin was little more than an ambit claim. Japan's stance was, in
other words, much less unyielding than it is today.
In the Joint Declaration, the Soviets agreed to transfer the Habomai
Islands and Shikotan to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty. In
response, the Japanese government, which was deeply divided on the issue,
revised its original minimum claim to include the southern Kuriles as well
5. Ibid., pp. 199-200.

6. Igor Rogachev, "Unwarranted Claims," Isvestia, April 24, 1989, official translation.
Rogachev's article is an authoritative source for recent official Soviet thinking on the issue-
at least as of April 1989.
7. Young C. Kim, Japanese-SovietRelations: Interaction of Politics, Economics, and Na-
tional Security (Washington D.C.; CSIS, Georgetown University, 1974), pp. 31-32.
8. The fact was that from the Soviet point of view, Japan, one of the aggressors of World
War II, was also one of the losers and had no choice but to accept its consequences.

ANDREWMACKAND MARTINO'HARE 385
as Shikotan and the Habomais. Japan also brought up the issue of south-
ern Sakhalin and the northern Kuriles, arguing that a determination of the
future status of these territories should be made at an international confer-
ence. Tokyo's volte-face was a result of U.S. pressure,9conservative party
faction disputes, and public opinion. Japan's new territorialdemands were
unacceptable to the Soviets. Diplomatic relations were "normalized", but
the Northern Territories dispute remained unresolved and the peace treaty
remained unsigned. Reacting to the revision of the U.S.-Japan security
treaty, the Soviet Union in 1960 demanded the removal of all foreign (i.e.,
U.S.) troops from Japan as a condition for the return of Shikotan and the
Habomais. Japan was unwilling to abrogate its security alliance with the
United States for the sake of the islands in question and the Soviet Union
declared the issue closed.
Following President Nixon's Beijing visit in 1971, the Soviets became
increasingly concerned at the possibility of an anti-Soviet Washington-Bei-
jing-Tokyo axis developing, and Moscow began signaling that the territo-
rial issue was still unresolved-the clear implication being that a solution
needed to be found. Thus, prospects for resolving the dispute have been
complicated by Japan's security relationship with the United States; by the
Antagonistic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; by the Chi-
nese support since 1964 for Japan's claim to the islands; and by the settle-
ment of outstanding East/West territorial issues in Europe at Helsinki in
1975. Throughout this period, however, Japan has remained uncompro-
mising in its view that no peace treaty can be concluded without a solution
to the territorial problem.
Impediments to Progress
It is clear that the Soviet Union would like to establish closer relations
with Japan. For obvious strategic reasons, the Soviets would not wish Ja-
pan to develop a clqse security relationship with China at Moscow's ex-
pense, and they would welcome a weakening of the U.S.-Japan security
alliance. Moscow is also anxious to gain access to Japanese investment,
trade, and technology and would like to establish long-term economic and
industrial cooperation agreements. It now clearly recognizes that if the
Soviet Union is to become a Pacific power and benefit from East Asia's
economic dynamism, some form of rapprochementwith Japan will be nec-
essary. In the long term, it is also in Japan's interest to improve relations
with Moscow. The Soviet Union is regarded by Japan as the only country
9. U.S. pressure included threats from Secretary of State Dulles that a compromise deal
with the Soviets on the territories issue could lead to a permanent U.S. occupation of Oki-
nawa.

that threatens Japanese security, while at the same time Tokyo has long-
term economic interest in gaining access to the huge natural gas, oil, and
pulpwood resources in eastern Siberia and Sakhalin, and in regaining ac-
cess to its rich traditional fishing resources in the northern seas. So given
that a resolution to the dispute would appear to be in the long-term inter-
est of both parties, why has progress towards a solution been so minimal?
Whatever the legal merits of the competing claims to the disputed is-
lands, it is clear today that the issue is essentially a political one-it cannot
be resolved by appeal to international law, historical precedent, or inter-
pretations of past agreements. The Soviets now seem to recognize this.
Under Brezhnev, Moscow simply refused to discuss the issue; under
Gorbachev, the Soviets seem prepared to talk but not yet to make the sort
of concessions Japan might accept. The particular political and strategic
constraints that hamper progress toward resolving the dispute are ex-
amined below.
Political Constraints
Moscow is concerned that the return of all or some of the Northern Terri-
tories might set a precedent for the return of other territories occupied by
the Soviet Union. Although Gorbachev made significant territorial con-
cessions to North Korea in the border treaty between Moscow and Pyong-
yang in 1984 and to China on the Amur River dispute in 1986, these were
made before the current upsurge of irredentist unrest in the Baltic states
and other parts of the USSR. There is now considerable concern in Mos-
cow about the domestic impact that territorial concessions on the disputed
islands could create. In December 1988, a Soviet diplomat stated that
"Moscow almost certainly could not move on the islands issue while inter-
nal minority problems are unresolved."10 Georgi Arbartov, the influential
director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, stated in
September 1989 in Tokyo that Moscow could not make any territorialcon-
cessions since even the return of "one half of a small island" would "open
up the whole Pandora's box of territorial questions."'1 The Soviets are
also concerned that any concessions to Japan could impact on the USSR's
still-unresolved territorial disputes with China, just as the precedent of So-
viet concessions along the eastern Sino-Soviet border have raised Japanese
expectations that similar progress might also be achievable on the North-
ern Territories issue.
10. Charles Smith, "Time to Compromise," Far Eastern Economic Review, (hereinafter
FEER), 22 December 1988, p. 28.
11. "Arbartov Blasts Stance on Northern Islands," Daily Yomiuri, September 19, 1989.

The sweeping political changes in the Soviet Union may also act as a
constraint on change in this area. The Soviet leadership now has to pay far
more attention than was formerly the case to public opinion in general and
regional opinion in particular. Opinion polls indicate that the Soviet pub-
lic is strongly opposed to any territorialconcessions, with the peoples actu-
ally living in the disputed islands being particularly adamant in their
opposition.12 Moreover, as Andrei Piontkovsky of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences' Research Institute for Systems Analysis has argued:
The border issues are the competence of the Congress of People's Deputies, so a
final decision will be taken by that body. And this circumstance must now be
taken into account by all the sides involved in the talks [on the disputed islands],
including the Japanese side. The creation of a new, full-time Soviet parliament,
the Supreme Soviet, will bring profound changes in the internal political situa-
tion in the USSR and also the process of decision-making in Soviet foreign pol-
icy, though the last fact has not been fully realised.13
The Soviet Union may even fear that the return of the Northern Territo-
ries could encourage the Japanese to make further demands-for negotia-
tions on the status of the northern Kuriles and even Sakhalin. Japan's
escalation of its claims against the USSR in the 1956 negotiations provides
a precedent that confers some credibility on such concerns. It is worth
noting in this context that all Japanese political parties, with the exception
of the ruling but now somewhat weakened conservative LDP, have laid
claim to the entire Kurile chain. If the USSR conceded to Japan's de-
mands on Kunashiri and Etorofu, the Soviet claim to the northern Kuriles
and southern Sakhalin could be weakened. However, there is little doubt
that Moscow would require Tokyo to waive all its claims to other islands
in the Kurile group and to Sakhalin as a precondition for a settlement of
the current dispute.
There are also important political interests at stake in the Japanese gov-
ernment's unyielding stance on the territories issue. The continued Soviet
refusal to give up territories perceived as belonging to Japan has certain
political advantages for a conservative and pro-American Japanese govern-
ment. The continued Soviet presence on the islands, the military buildup
of the past decade, and Moscow's "rejectionist" attitude towards a solu-
tion have all served to maintain the salience of the Soviet threat in the
public domain. This in turn has helped to reduce public opposition to
incremental increases in the defense budget. Increasing defense expendi-
ture has helped soften U.S. criticisms that Japan is a security "free-rider"
12. See Sophie Quinn-Judge, "Bleak Prospects," FEER, July 20, 1989, p. 31.
13. Andrei Piontkovsky, "Soviet-JapaneseRelations and the Territorial Issue- Is a Solu-
tion Possible?" Voennyi Vestnik,June 1989, p. 5.

and insufficiently sensitive to common Western security interests, as well

as helping to assuage U.S. demands for alliance "burden sharing." And
increased defense expenditures, involving the purchase of large amounts of
U.S. military hardware, have helped reduce the huge U.S. trade deficit
with Japan. An unresolved Northern Territories issue thus has a positive
function for the Japanese government in terms of both security and eco-
nomic relations with the United States.
Resolving the territories issue could pose real problems for a conserva-
tive Japanese government. A solution would require significant Soviet
concessions to Japan that would reduce the negative public image of the
USSR that exists in Japan. Moscow would then appear less threatening
(accelerating a trend already evident in the opinion polls as a consequence
of Gorbachev's policies) and public support for a continued military
buildup would almost certainly decline as it has in other OECD countries.
If defense expenditures were to slow down, friction with the U.S. over
"burdensharing" could grow and the already tense economic relationships
could worsen. Thus, from the perspective of a conservative Japanese gov-
ernment, an agreement on the Northern Territories dispute, while resolv-
ing some problems, could generate others.
Strategic Constraints
The Northern Territories are strategically located in that they guard the
southern gateways to the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific and provide the
most secure passage for Soviet surface combatants and submarines in and
out of the Pacific Ocean. The Sea of Okhotsk is a major deployment area
for Soviet missile firing submarines (SSBNs) operating out of Pe-
tropavlovsk on the eastern coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula. A new gen-
eration of long-range missiles has enabled the Soviets to deploy their
SSBNs in highly defended bastions like the Sea of Okhotsk and still be in
striking range of targets in the western United States. In other words, in
the 1990s the Northern Territories have a far greater strategic significance
than they had in 1956 when the Soviets had been preparedto make conces-
sions to Japan that would have resulted in at least some of the islands
being returned.
The SSBN "bastion" in the Sea of Okhotsk is of growing strategic im-
portance to Moscow. The full deployment by the United States of the 10-
warhead MX missile and the B1-B bomber, the imminent deployment of
the new, highly accurate Trident D-5 submarine-launched missile, and
possible deployments of a new single-warhead, land-based missile
(Midgetman) and the B-2 Stealth bomber have serious implications for So-
viet security. Soviet land-based missiles will become increasingly vulnera-
ble and the importance of safeguarding the sea-based deterrent forces

(which carry an increasing proportion of Soviet warheads) will therefore
be more critical. Thus, in strictly military terms, maintaining control over
the strategically located Northern Territories will become more, rather
than less, important for the Soviets in the 1990s.
In the early 1980s, Washington announced that targeting Soviet SSBNs
in their protected bastions would be a critical task of U.S. hunter-killer
submarines at the outset of a conventional war. This new stress on Soviet
SSBN targeting simply reinforced the Soviet need to defend the bastions,
and control over the Northern Territories means that the Soviets can deny
access to U.S. hunter-killer submarines via the strategic passages straddled
by the territories. The growing importance of, and threat to Soviet SSBNs
may be one reason for the sharp reduction in the Soviet navy's out-of-area
operations over the past three years. Instead of deploying further afield,
Soviet forces are now concentrating increasingly on defending their home
waters-including, of course, the Sea of Okhotsk. In this context it is also
important to note that a new strategic arms agreement between the super-
powers may reduce the number of missile-firing submarines without com-
pensatory reductions in anti-submarine warfare capabilities.14 If this
happens, the threat to the Soviet missile submarines based in the Sea of
Okhotsk will increase still further and, in turn, increase the importance of
such defensive assets as the Northern Territories. Thus, possible shifts in
the nuclear balance and the prospect of a strategic arms agreement would
appear to increase the strategic importance of the disputed islands and
decrease the incentive for the Soviets to relinquish control over them.
Japan's Self-Defense Agency estimated in January 1988 that the USSR
had about 40 MiG-23 fighters and some 10,000 troops stationed on the
disputed islands. Glasnost notwithstanding, it appears that the Soviet mili-
tary buildup on the islands has not ceased. In December 1988 a Japanese
defense official claimed that the Soviets had added 3,000 more troops, ten
patrol boats, Mi-24 helicopters, and many additional aircraft to the island
garrisons.15 U.S. forces in the region have also been built up and modern-
ized in the past decade. The Soviet foreign minister recently stated that
there would be no withdrawal from the islands because the Soviet Union
had to strengthen its military forces in the Far East in response to the
build up in American naval forces. Using such an argument to justify a
refusal to withdraw from the islands might signal a Soviet willingness to be
flexible on the issue if the U.S. were preparedto discuss naval arms control
issues with Moscow. However, Washington has shown no interest in any
14. Soviet SSBN numbers will decline anyway as block obsolescence begins to hit the sub-
marine fleet.
15. Edward Neilan, "Soviets Refuse to Cut Forces on 4 Islands," Washington Times, 22
December 1988, p. 7.

of the USSR's recent proposals for naval arms control-indeed, the U.S.
navy's public position is that, with the exception of strategic naval weapon,
naval arms control is not in the U.S. interest.
Soviet strategic concerns about the territoriesmay be reduced if political
relations with the U.S. continue to improve, making the military factors
appear less salient. Soviet proposals for asymmetric force reductions in
Europe may provide a possible model here. Gorbachev has been willing to
make significant strategic sacrifices in Europe, in part because improved
political relations have reduced the salience of perceived threats and in
part to create a further improvement in political relations with the West.
Moscow's announced unilateral cuts in its ground forces (including
200,000 men from Soviet Asia) and the dramatic proposals in May 1989
for further force level reductions in Europe suggest that serious Soviet ini-
tiatives on the territories issue cannot be ruled out. The domestic political
risks involved in embarkingon such a course may, however, dissuade Mos-
cow from attempting it. If the United States chose to deemphasize some of
those aspects of its maritime strategy that enhance the strategic impor-
tance of the disputed islands for Moscow, such as the intent to attack So-
viet SSBNs at the outset of a conventional war between the superpowers,
the prospects for Soviet concessions would be improved.
In the not too distant future, it is also possible that Moscow may change
the basing mode of its missile submarines. The U.S. chooses to protect its
submarines, which are so quiet as to be virtually undetectable, by hiding
them in the open ocean. Soviet SSBNs are still much noisier and thus
easier to detect than their U.S. counterparts, so the Soviets seek to defend
them instead, deploying them in such enclosed and heavily defended bas-
tions as the Sea of Okhotsk. Acoustic surveillance systems on the seabed
of the bastions are deployed to help detect U.S. submarines, while antisub-
marine warfare (ASW) operations rely on hunter-killer submarines, sur-
face ships, mines, and ASW aircraft.16 But Soviet submarine quieting
technology (helped by clandestine imports from Toshiba) is improving
rapidly; in future the Soviets might choose to follow the U.S. example and
deploy their SSBNs in the open ocean.17 Should this occur, the strategic
importance of the Sea of Okhotsk bastion-and hence the Northern Terri-
16. Both Soviet and U.S. submarine operations are complicated by the fact that the Sea of
Okhotsk is covered by ice from October to June.
17. It should be noted, however, that the Sea of Okhotsk is a very large body of water and
already offers the Soviets considerable opportunity for SSBN concealment. The fact that this
area is covered by ice in winter does not necessarily impose an impediment on the operations
of Soviet Delta-class SSBNs which can fire their missiles through the ice providing it is not
too thick. Such conditions do, however, make the anti-SSBN task of the U.S. Navy more
complicated.

tories-will decline considerably and the Soviet strategic interest in keep-
ing them will also decline.
Possible Solutions
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo in December 1988
led to no obvious progress on the territories issue, though little had been
expected. At the end of the foreign ministerial meeting, the two sides
agreed to establish a vice-ministerial task force to discuss the conclusion of
a peace treaty between the two countries. With no change in the Soviet
position on the disputed islands during the talks, Japanese Foreign Minis-
try officials expressed doubts that the working level discussions would lead
to much progress.18 The Soviets complained about Tokyo's hard-line
stance on the issue, and the Japanese in turn sharply criticized the Soviet
refusal to allow the phrase "the territorial issue has been discussed" to be
inserted into the joint communique following the December talks.19 Nev-
ertheless, Gorbachev's earlier admission to former Japanese Prime Minis-
ter Nakasone that "something, somehow" had to be done about the
problem provides a strong indication of a potential Soviet willingness to
compromise in future.20
There are a number of possible solutions to the territories dispute. The
least likely in the short- or medium-term is either Japan or the USSR con-
ceding in toto to the claims of the other. If the Soviets gave in completely
this would lead not only to the removal of Soviet forces on the islands, but
to their possible replacement by Japanese forces. Such a change would
make the Soviet task of keeping U.S. hunter-killer submarines and surface
combatants out of the Sea of Okhotsk far more difficult.21 But if a total
Soviet cave-in on the issue is unlikely and a Japanese renunciation of Ja-
pan's claims unthinkable, it is also difficult to see the status quo remaining
in place indefinitely. The USSR's desire to play a greater role in the Pacific
and its need for Japanese investment and technological assistance in open-
ing up the Soviet Far East are strong inducements for making the conces-
18. "Terms of Reference of Permanent Vice-Ministerial Task Force Unclear. Northern

Territories Not Spelled Out as Central Topic," Asahi Shimbun, 21 December 1988. The
Japanese Foreign Ministry has held to a consistently hard line on the territoriesissue. Insofar
as there have been any signs of a willingness to be flexible, this has come from key politicians
(including Mr Nakasone) and their advisors and not the foreign affairs bureaucrats.
19. "Paper Reviews Debate on Northern Territories," FBIS, Daily Report, East Asia, 89-
002 (January 4, 1989), annex p. 6.
20. Charles Smith, "Time to Compromise," FEER, 22 December 1988, p. 28.
21. Hiroshi Kimura presents an argument that the Soviets will eventually decide to return
all four islands to Japan in "The Soviet-Japanese Territorial Dispute," Harriman Institute
Forum, June 1989, pp. 7-8.

sions that Moscow recognizes are necessary for achieving a rapprochement
with Japan. Moreover, although public opinion in Japan remains more
anti-Soviet than in other OECD countries, it is becoming less so. One
possibility, suggested by an influential Japanese analyst and also mooted
by senior Soviet officials,22is for the islands to be demilitarized and the
question of sovereignty put on ice-as has been the case with Japan's sov-
ereignty disputes with Korea and China. However, Japanese Foreign Min-
istry officials reject both the idea and the validity of the comparison.
A second possibility, hinted at by a senior official of Moscow's prestigi-
ous Institute of World Economy and International Relations in December
1988, is that it might be theoretically possible to turn the islands into an
"internationalbuffer zone."23 What this would mean in practice is not at
all clear. A third possibility, and the one most frequently mooted, would
be to return to Japan the Habomais and Shikotan (to which the Soviet
claims are weakest) and to demilitarize the other two islands while making
the question of their eventual status subject to ongoing or future negotia-
tions. Gorbachev apparently raised the possibility of returning the
Habomais and Shikotan with Nakasone during the former Japanese prime
minister's visit to the USSR in July 1988. Although such a compromise is
officially still unacceptable to the Japanese government, opinion-poll data
"suggest that most Japanese would find such an accord acceptable."24
There is also disagreement within Japan on whether the resolution of
the Northern Territories dispute should precede an improvement of rela-
tions (which is the official position of the Japanese government) or be the
culmination of improved relations. Those who argue the latter case sug-
gest that a number of Soviet concessions that fell far short of Japan's re-
quirements for a settlement might nevertheless be stepping stones towards
one. There have been some recent indications from Moscow of greater
openness on at least some of the issues relating to the disputed islands and
the issue is receiving increasing attention in the Soviet media. Soviet offi-
cials have hinted at the possibility of "joint ventures" on the islands or
cooperation in exploiting fish in the disputed area-the 200-mile EEZ
around the Northern Territories allows the Soviets access to unusually
rich fishing grounds. In 1986 the Soviets agreed for the first time in nearly
20 years to allow visits by Japanese to family grave sites on the islands
22. Private communication with author and Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1989 p. 33.
23. Alan Goodall, "Bird Diplomacy Thaws Japan's Icy Soviet Links," Australian, 19 De-
cember 1988, p. 8.
24. Gerald Segal, "Quiet Progress on Ending the Japanese-Soviet Chill," International
Herald Tribune, 18 March 1989; also Hiroshi Kimura, "Japan's Relations with the Soviet
Union," International Review, April/May 1988 p. 33.

without requiring the visitors to carry either passports or seek visas-an
issue of considerable emotional importance to the Japanese.
Conclusion
Moscow's intense desire to be a Pacific "player" and the Soviet need for
Japanese investment and technological assistance in opening up the Soviet
Far East are strong inducements for making the concessions necessary to
achieve a rapprochement with Japan. Whether or not real progress to-
ward a solution to the territorial dispute is made will depend on the rela-
tive importance of competing Soviet interests. On the one hand, there is
the strong interest in gaining access to Japanese technology, investment
capital, and bank credits for the development of the Soviet Far East. On
the other hand, Moscow still has a strong security interest in keeping the
Northern Territories out of the hands of its strategic rivals and in not set-
ting dangerous political precedents at a time when irredentist sentiment is
so strong within the USSR itself.
Much also depends on the degree to which the Northern Territories
continue to be important to Japan. Notwithstanding the Japanese stress
on the illegality of Soviet occupation of the islands, Tokyo's exploitation of
the territorial issue owes as much to domestic political considerations and
alliance relations with the United States as it does to a concern with sover-
eignty per se. But the political symbolism of the islands to the Japanese
should not be minimized. Tokyo wants the Soviet Union to acknowledge
Japan's status as an independent country with an important and legitimate
role to play in the region. Soviet proposals that acknowledge the legiti-
macy of such concerns may help to encourage a more positive response
from Japan.
The Soviets are concerned to ensure that any solution to the Northern
Territories issue is discussed in a broad political context. They want the
question of a Soviet-Japanesepeace treaty to be a central part of any dis-
cussion on the islands issue. Japan has made it quite clear that it is the
Soviets who must make the major concessions. In the short term, the Jap-
anese have little to lose from waiting; Moscow would seem to have a
greater immediate interest in improving relations than does Tokyo. From
this it would seem to follow that if Soviet strategic concerns about losing
military facilities in the Northern Territories can be lessened, and if polit-
ical concerns about the implications for other parts of the USSR of territo-
rial concessions on the disputed islands can be assuaged, then genuine
progress is a real possibility.
One final possibility needs to be canvassed, namely that relations be-
tween Japan and the USSR will slowly improve without any progress to-
ward resolution of the territories issue. If this does happen, and there

already are some signs that such a process may have started, the un-
resolved problems may simply become less and less politically salient. In
November 1989, a visit to Tokyo by senior Politburo member Aleksandr
Yakolev was widely seen as paving the way for the 1991 visit by President
Gorbachev. The meetings between the Soviet delegation and Japan's lead-
ers did not result in any progress being made on the territories issue, de-
spite vague talk from Yakolev about a "Third Way." The visit was
nevertheless notable for the friendly atmosphere in which most discussions
were conducted-a marked change from previous official visits.
If resolving the territorial dispute ceased to be the sine qua non of im-
proved relations, both sides could benefit. Each could reap the rewards of
improved relations, while avoiding the very considerable domestic political
difficulties that would inevitably confront efforts at a territorial solution.


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Moscow-Tokyo and the Northern Territories Dispute

Author(s): Andrew Mack and Martin O'Hare

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Andrew Mack and Martin O'Hare

The most serious barrier today to a major improve-

Andrew Mack is head of the Peace Research Centre at the

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a,,;) z Z g SUrup PAC/F/C OCEAN

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5. Ibid., pp. 199-200.

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and insufficiently sensitive to common Western security interests, as well

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18. "Terms of Reference of Permanent Vice-Ministerial Task Force Unclear. Northern

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